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Stress Testing
Chapter 17
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 2e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2009 1
Stress Testing
l Key Questions
l How do we generate the scenarios?
l How do we evaluate the scenarios?
l What do we do with the results?
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 2e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2009 2
Generating the scenarios
l Stress individual variables
l Choose particularly days when there were
big market movements and stress all
variables by the amount they moved on
those days
l Form a stress testing committee of senior
management and ask it to generate the
scenarios
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 2e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2009 3
Core vs Peripheral Variables
l If scenario generated involves only a few
“core” variables, regress other “peripheral”
variables on the core variables to
determine their movements. (Kupiec,
1999)
l Ideally the relationship between peripheral
and core variables should be estimated for
stressed market conditions (Kim and
Finger, 2000)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 2e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2009 4
Making Scenarios Complete
l Often an adverse scenario has an
immediate effect on the value of a portfolio
and a “knock on” effect
l Examples
l Credit crisis of 2007
l LTCM
l Greek Bond
l 2020 Corona Virus
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 2e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2009 5
Reverse Stress Testing
l Use an algorithm to search for scenarios
where large losses occur
l Can be a useful input to the stress testing
committee.
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 2e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2009 6
What are the Incentives of a
Financial Institution?
l If the stress testing committee comes
up with extreme scenarios more
regulatory capital is likely to be required
l The stress testing committee may
therefore has an incentive to “water
down” the scenarios they consider
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 2e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2009 7
Scenarios Proposed by
Regulators?
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 2e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2009 10
Subjective vs Objective
Probabilities
l Objective probabilities are calculated from data
l Subjective probabilities is base don a
individual’s judgment.
l Objective probabilities are inevitably backward
looking
l The procedure just described is a way of
combining subjective and objective probabilities.
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 2e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2009 11
Credit Risk: Estimating
Default Probabilities
Chapter 16
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 12
Altman’s Z-score (Manufacturing
companies) page 348
l X1=Working Capital/Total Assets
l X2=Retained Earnings/Total Assets
l X3=EBIT/Total Assets
l X4=Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Liabilities
l X5=Sales/Total Assets
Z = 1.2X1+1.4X2+3.3X3+0.6X4+0.99X5
If the Z > 3.0 default is unlikely; if 2.7 < Z < 3.0 we should
be on alert. If 1.8 < Z < 2.7 there is a moderate chance of
default; if Z < 1.8 there is a high chance of default
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 13
Estimating Default Probabilities
l Alternatives:
l Use historical data
l Use bond prices or asset swaps
l Use CDS spreads (only introduction)
l Use Merton’s model X not do it
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 14
Historical Data
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 15
Cumulative Average Default Rates %
(1970-2010, Moody’s) Table 16.1, page 350
Time (years)
1 2 3 4 5 7 10
Aaa 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.037 0.104 0.244 0.494
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 16
Interpretation
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 17
Do Default Probabilities Increase
with Time?
l For a company that starts with a good
credit rating default probabilities tend to
increase with time
l AA rating bond .021, .038, .044, .081% for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 yrs
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 18
Hazard Rate vs. Unconditional
Default Probability
l The hazard rate or default intensity is the
probability of default over a short period of
time conditional on no earlier default
l The unconditional default probability is the
probability of default as seen at time zero
l dV(t)/dt = - l(t) V(t)
l V(T) = e – [integration 0 to t l(t) d(t)]
l Defining Q(t) as PD, Q(t) = 1 – e [- l(t)*t]
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 19
Properties of Hazard rates
l Suppose that l(t) is the hazard rate at time t
l The probability of default between times t and
t+Dt conditional on no earlier default is l(t)Dt
l The probability of default by time t is
1 - e - l (t )t
where l (t ) is the average hazard rate between
time zero and time t
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 20
Recovery Rate
The recovery rate for a bond is usually
defined as the price of the bond 30 days
after default as a percent of its face value
From Chapter 11 Loss Given Default (LGD)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 21
Recovery Rates; Moody’s: 1982 to 2010
(Table 16.2, page 352)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 22
Recovery Rates Depend on
Default Rates
l Moody’s best fit estimate for the 1982 to
2007 period is
Ave Recovery Rate =
59.33 − 3.06 × Spec Grade Default Rate
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 23
Credit Default Swaps (page 352)
Default Default
Protection Protection
Buyer, A Seller, B
Payoff if there is a default by
reference entity=100(1-R)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 25
Other Details
l Payments are usually made quarterly in arrears
l In the event of default there is a final accrual
payment by the buyer
l Increasingly settlement is in cash and an auction
process determines cash amount
l Suppose payments are made quarterly in the
example just considered. What are the cash
flows if there is a default after 3 years and 1
month and recovery rate is 40%?
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 26
Attractions of the CDS Market
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 27
Credit Indices (page 356-357)
l CDX IG: equally weighted portfolio of 125
investment grade North American companies
l iTraxx: equally weighted portfolio of 125
investment grade European companies
l If the five-year CDS index is bid 165 offer 166 it
means that a portfolio of 125 CDSs on the CDX
companies can be bought for 166bps per
company, e.g., $800,000 of 5-year protection on
each name could be purchased for $1,660,000
per year. When a company defaults the annual
payment is reduced by 1/125.
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 28
Use of Fixed Coupons
l Increasingly CDSs and CDS indices trade
like bonds
l A coupon and a recovery rate is specified
l There is an initial payments from the buyer
to the seller or vice versa reflecting the
difference between the currently quoted
spread and the coupon
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 29
Credit Default Swaps and Bond
Yields (page 357-358)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 30
Risk-free Rate
l The risk-free rate used by bond traders when
quoting credit spreads is the Treasury rate
l The risk-free rate traditionally assumed in
derivatives markets is the LIBOR/swap rate
l By comparing CDS spreads and bond yields it
appears that in normal market conditions traders
are assuming a risk-free rate 10 bp less than the
LIBOR/swap rates
l In stressed market conditions the gap between
the LIBOR/swap rate and the “true” risk-free rate
is liable to be much higher
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 31
Asset Swaps
l Asset swaps are used by the market as an
estimate of the bond yield relative to
LIBOR
l The present value of the asset swap
spread is an estimate of the present value
of the cost of default
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 32
Asset Swaps (page 358)
l Suppose asset swap spread for a particular corporate
bond is 150 basis points
l One side pays coupons on the bond; the other pays
LIBOR+150 basis points. The coupons on the bond are
paid regardless of whether there is a default
l In addition there is an initial exchange of cash reflecting
the difference between the bond price and $100
l The PV of the asset swap spread is the amount by which
the price of the corporate bond is exceeded by the price
of a similar risk-free bond when the LIBOR/swap curve is
used for discounting
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 33
CDS-Bond Basis
l This is the CDS spread minus the Bond
Yield Spread
l Bond yield spread is usually calculated as
the asset swap spread
l Tended to be positive pre-crisis
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 34
Using CDS Prices to Predict
Default Probabilities
Average hazard rate between time zero and
time t is to a good approximation
s (t )
l=
1- R
where s(t) is the credit spread calculated for
a maturity of t and R is the recovery rate
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 35
More Exact Calculation for Bonds
(page 361)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 36
Calculations
Time Def Recovery Risk-free Loss Discount PV of Exp
(yrs) Prob Amount Value Factor Loss
0.5 Q 40 106.73 66.73 0.9753 65.08Q
Total 288.48Q
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 37
Calculations continued
l We set 288.48Q = 8.75 to get Q = 3.03%
l This analysis can be extended to allow
defaults to take place more frequently
l With several bonds we can use more
parameters to describe the default
probability distribution
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 38
Real World vs Risk-Neutral
Default Probabilities
l The default probabilities backed out of
bond prices or credit default swap spreads
are risk-neutral default probabilities
l The default probabilities backed out of
historical data are real-world default
probabilities
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 39
A Comparison
Rating Historical Hazard Rate Hazard Rate from bonds Ratio Difference
(% per annum) (% per annum)
Aaa 0.03 0.60 17.2 0.57
Aa 0.06 0.73 11.5 0.67
A 0.18 1.15 6.5 0.97
Baa 0.44 2.13 4.8 1.69
Ba 2.23 4.67 2.1 2.44
B 6.09 8.02 1.3 1.93
Caa 13.52 18.39 1.4 4.87
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 41
Risk Premiums Earned By Bond
Traders (Table 16.5, page 364)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 42
Possible Reasons for These Results
(The third reason is the most important)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 44
Merton’s Model (Section 16.8, pages 367-370)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 45
Equity vs. Assets
E 0 = V0 N ( d 1 ) - De - rT N ( d 2 )
where
ln (V0 D) + ( r + sV2 2) T
d1 = ; d 2 = d1 - sV T
sV T
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 46
Volatilities
¶E
s E E0 = s V V0 = N ( d 1 ) s V V0
¶V
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 47
Example
l A company’s equity is $3 million and the
volatility of the equity is 80%
l The risk-free rate is 5%, the debt is $10
million and time to debt maturity is 1 year
l Solving the two equations yields V0=12.40
and sv=21.23%
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 48
Example continued
l The probability of default is N(-d2) or
12.7%
l The market value of the debt is 9.40
l The present value of the promised
payment is 9.51
l The expected loss is about 1.2%
l The recovery rate is 91%
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 49
The Implementation of Merton’s
Model to estimate real-world default
probability (e.g. Moody’s KMV)
l Choose time horizon
l Calculate cumulative obligations to time horizon. We denote it
by D
l Use Merton’s model to calculate a theoretical probability of
default
l Use historical data to develop a one-to-one mapping of
theoretical probability into real-world probability of default.
l Assumption is that the rank ordering of probability of default
given by the model is the same as that for real world
probability of default
l Distance to default is ln(V0 ) - ln( D) + (r - sV2 / 2)T
sV T
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 50
The Implementation of Merton’s
Model to estimate real-world default
probability (e.g. CreditGrades)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 16, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 51
The Credit Crisis of 2007
Chapter 6
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 52
U.S. Real Estate Prices, 1987 to 2011:
S&P/Case-Shiller Composite-10 Index
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 53
Case Shiller
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 54
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPISA)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 55
What happened…
l Starting in 2000, mortgage originators in the US relaxed
their lending standards and created large numbers of
subprime first mortgages.
l This, combined with very low interest rates, increased
the demand for real estate and prices rose.
l To continue to attract first time buyers and keep prices
increasing they relaxed lending standards further
l Features of the market: 100% mortgages, ARMs, teaser
rates, NINJAs, liar loans, non-recourse borrowing
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 56
What happened...
l Mortgages were packaged in financial products and sold to investors
l Banks found it profitable to invest in the AAA rated tranches
because the promised return was significantly higher than the cost of
funds and capital requirements were low
l In 2007 the bubble burst. Some borrowers could not afford their
payments when the teaser rates ended. Others had negative equity
and recognized that it was optimal for them to exercise their put
options.
l U.S. real estate prices fell and products, created from the mortgages,
that were previously thought to be safe began to be viewed as risky
l There was a “flight to quality” and credit spreads increased to very
high levels
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 57
Asset Backed Security (Simplified)
ABS
Senior Tranche
Asset 1 Principal: $75 million
Asset 2 Return = 6%
Asset 3
Mezzanine Tranche
6 SPV Principal:$20 million
Return = 10%
Asset n
A “waterfall” defines
Principal: Equity Tranche the precise rules for
$100 million Principal: $5 million allocating cash flows
Return =30% to tranches
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 58
The Waterfall
Asset
Cash
Flows
Senior
Tranche
Mezzanine Tranche
Equity Tranche
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 59
ABS CDOs or Mezz CDOs (Simplified)
ABSs
Subprime Mortgages Senior Tranches (75%)
AAA ABS CDO
Senior Tranche (75%)
Mezzanine Tranches (20%) AAA
BBB
Mezzanine Tranche
(20%) BBB
Equity Tranches (5%)
Not Rated
Equity Tranche (5%)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 60
Losses to AAA Tranche of ABS CDO
(Table 6.1)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 61
A More Realistic Structure
(Figure 6.5)
High Grade ABS
CDO
Senior
AAA 88%
Junior AAA 5%
AA 3%
A 2%
BBB 1%
ABS
AAA 81%
NR 1%
AA 11%
Subprime
Mortgages
A 4% Mezz ABS CDO CDO of CDO
BBB 3% Senior AAA 62% Senior AAA 60%
BB, NR 1% Junior AAA 14% Junior AAA 27%
AA 8% AA 4%
A 6% A 3%
BBB 6% BBB 3%
NR 4% NR 2%
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 62
BBB Tranches
l BBB tranches of ABSs were often quite thin (1%
wide)
l This means that they have a quite different loss
distribution from BBB bonds and should not be
treated as equivalent to BBB bonds
l They tend to be either safe or completely wiped
out (cliff risk)
l What does this mean for the tranches of the
Mezz ABS CDO?
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 63
Regulatory Arbitrage
l Capital required for securities created from
a portfolio of mortgages was considerably
less than capital that would be required if
mortgages had been kept on the balance
sheet
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 64
Role of Incentives
l Arguably the incentives of valuers, the
creators of ABSs and ABS CDOs, and
rating agencies helped to create the crisis
l Compensation plans of traders created
short-term horizons for decision making
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 65
Importance of Transparency
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 66
Lessons from the Crisis (page 133-
134)
l Beware Irrational Exuberance (Book by Shiller 2013 Nobel)
l Do not underestimate default correlations in stressed
markets
l Recovery rate depends on default rate
l Compensation structures did not create the right
incentives
l If a deal seems too good to be true (eg, a AAA earning
LIBOR plus 100 bp) it probably is
l Do not rely on ratings
l Transparency is important in financial markets
l Resecuritization was a badly flawed idea
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 6, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 67
Credit Value at Risk
Chapter 18
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 68
Rating Transitions
l One year rating transition probabilities are
published by rating agencies.
l If we assume that the rating transition in one
period is independent of that in other periods we
can calculate the rating transition for any period
(see Appendix J and software)
l The “ratings momentum” phenomenon means
that the independence assumption is not
perfectly correct
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 69
One-Year Rating Transition
Matrix (% probability, Moody’s 1970-2010)
Table 18.1 page 401
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 70
Five-Year Rating Transition
Matrix (calculated from one-year transitions)
Table 18.2 page 401
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 71
One-Month Rating Transition
Matrix (calculated from one-year transitions)
Table 18.3 page 401
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 72
Credit VaR (page 321)
l Can be defined analogously to Market
Risk VaR
l A one year credit VaR with a 99.9%
confidence is the loss level that we are
99.9% confident will not be exceeded over
one year
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 73
Vasicek’s Model (Equation 18.1, page 402)
l For a large portfolio of loans, each of which has
a probability of Q(T) of defaulting by time T the
default rate that will not be exceeded at the X%
confidence level is
ìï N -1 [Q(T )] + r N -1 ( X ) üï
Ní ý
ïî 1- r ïþ
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 74
VaR Model (Equation 18.2, page 402)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 75
Credit Risk Plus (Section 18.3, page 403)
This calculates a loss probability distribution using a
Monte Carlo simulation where the steps are:
l Sample overall default rate
l Sample probability of default for each counterparty
category
l Sample number of losses for each counterparty category
l Sample size of loss for each default
l Calculate total loss from defaults
This is repeated many times to calculate a probability
distribution for the total loss
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 76
CreditMetrics (Section 18.4, page 405)
l Calculates credit VaR by considering
possible rating transitions
l A Gaussian copula model is used to define
the correlation between the ratings
transitions of different companies
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 77
The Copula Model : xA and xB are sampled from
correlated standard normals
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 78
Credit Risk in the Trading Book: The
Specific Risk Charge
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 79
Credit Risk in the Trading Book:
Incremental Risk Charge
l Banks must calculate a one year 99.9%
VaR
l This is to ensure that capital is similar to
the capital that would be charged if the
instrument were in the banking book
l They are allowed to make a constant level
of risk assumption (minimum liquidity
horizon is three months)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 80
Constant Level of Risk
Assumption
l Suppose a bank has a BBB bond and
uses a liquidity horizon of 3 months
l At the end of each month period the bond,
if it has deteriorated is assumed to be sold
and replaced with a new BBB bond
l The one-year loss is then replaced by four
three-month losses
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 18, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 81
Counterparty Credit
Risk in Derivatives
Chapter 17
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 82
Clearing Arrangements for OTC
Derivatives (Figure 17.2, page 381)
l Bilateral clearing: usually governed by an ISDA
Master agreement
l Central clearing: a central clearing party (CCP)
stands between the two sides
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 83
Regulations
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 84
Central Clearing: Role of CCP
(Figure 17.1, page 380)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 85
Key Questions
l How many CCPs
l Will there be interoperability?
l Will benefits of netting increase or
decrease?
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 86
Simple Example: 3 market
participants; 2 product types (Figure
17.3, page 382)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 87
Bilateral Clearing:The ISDA
Master Agreement
l One important feature is netting
l This states that all transactions with the
counterparty are considered to be a single
transaction in the case of early termination
and for the purposes of posting collateral
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 88
Events of Default and Early
Termination
l Declaration of bankruptcy
l Failure to make payments on derivatives
as they are due
l Failure to provide collateral when it is due
l The non-defaulting party has the right to
declare an early termination event a few
days after an event of default if there has
been no resolution of outstanding issues
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 89
Collateral Arrangements
The credit support annex (CSA) of the
ISDA Master Agreement specifies
l Threshold
l Independent Amount
l Minimum Transfer Amount Eligible
Securities and Currencies
l Haircuts
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 90
Possible ISDA Clause: Downgrade
Triggers
l Specify that in the event of a downgrade
the counterparty has certain rights.
l It might specify that the counterparty can
terminate outstanding transactions or that
the counterparty can require collateral
l In AIG’s case counterparties could require
collateral in the event of a downgrade
below AA. This necessitated a huge
government bailout.
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 91
CVA
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 92
The CVA Calculation
n
CVA = (1 - R)å qi vi where R is the recovery rate
i =1
Copyright 2011 © John Hull, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 93
CVA continued
Copyright 2011 © John Hull, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 95
Incremental CVA
l Results from Monte Carlo are stored so
that the incremental impact of a new trade
can be calculated without simulating all the
other trades.
Copyright 2011 © John Hull, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 96
CVA Risk
Copyright 2011 © John Hull, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 98
Wrong Way/Right Way Risk
l Simplest assumption is that probability of
default qi is independent of net exposure
vi.
l Wrong-way risk occurs when qi is
positively dependent on vi
l Right-way risk occurs when qi is
negatively dependent on vi
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 99
Examples
l Wrong-way risk typically occurs when
l Counterparty is selling credit protection
l Counterparty is a hedge fund taking a big
speculative positions
l Right-way risk typically occurs when
l Counterparty is buying credit protection
l Counterparty is partially hedging a major
exposure
Copyright 2011 © John Hull, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 100
Problems in Estimating Wrong
Way/Right Way Risk
l Knowing trades counterparty is doing with other dealers
l Knowing how different market variables influence the
fortunes of the counterparty
l Do counterparties become more likely to default when
interest rates are high or low? The evidence is mixed and
so we do not know whether receiving or paying fixed
generates wrong way risk
l Even when there appears to be right-way risk liquidity
problems can lead to a company being unable to post
collateral (e.g Ashanti)
Copyright 2011 © John Hull, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 101
Allowing for Wrong-Way risk
l One common approach is to use the
“alpha” multiplier to increase the v’s
l Estimates of 1.07 to 1.1 for alpha obtained
from banks
l Basel II sets alpha equal to 1.4 or allows
banks to use their own models, with a floor
of 1.2
Copyright 2011 © John Hull, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 102
DVA (more recent and more
controversial)
l Debit (or debt) value adjustment (DVA) is an
estimate of the cost to the counterparty of a
default by the dealer
l Same formulas apply except that v is
counterparty’s exposure to dealer and q is
dealer’s probability of default
l Accounting value of transactions with
counterparty = No default value – CVA +
DVA
Copyright 2011 © John Hull, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 103
DVA continued
l What happens to the reported value of
transactions as dealer’s credit spread
increases?
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 104
Expected Exposure on Pair of Offsetting
Interest Rate Swaps and a Pair of
Offsetting Currency Swaps (No collateral)
(Figure 17.2, page 317-318)
Exposure
Currency
swaps
Interest Rate
Swaps
Maturity
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 105
Interest Rate vs Currency Swaps
l The qi’s are the same for both
l The vi’s for an interest rate swap are on
average much less than the vi’s for a
currency swap
l The expected cost of defaults on a
currency swap is therefore greater.
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 106
Simple Example: Single transaction
always has positive value to dealer
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 107
Example 17.1 (page 391)
l A 2-year option sold by a counterparty to
the dealer has a Black-Scholes value of $3
l Assume a 2 year zero coupon bond issued
by the counterparty has a yield of 1.5%
greater than the risk free rate
l If there is no collateral and there are no
other transactions between the parties,
value of option is 3e-0.015×2=2.91
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 108
Dealer Has Single Long Forward
with Counterparty (page 392)
For a long forward contract that matures at time T the
present value of the exposure at time ti is
vi = e - rT [F0 N (d1 ) - KN (d 2 )]
where
ln( F0 / K ) + s 2ti / 2
d1,i = d 2,i = d1,i - s ti
s ti
F0 is the forward price today, K is the delivery price, s is
the volatility of the forward price, T is the time to maturity
of the forward contract, and r is the risk-free rate
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 17, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 109
Correlations and
Copulas
Chapter 11
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 110
Correlation and Covariance
l The coefficient of correlation between two
variables V1 and V2 is defined as
l The covariance is
E(V1V2)−E(V1 )E(V2)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 111
Independence
l V1 and V2 are independent if the
knowledge of one does not affect the
probability distribution for the other
f (V2 V1 = x ) = f (V2 )
where f(.) denotes the probability density
function
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 112
Independence is Not the Same as
Zero Correlation
l Suppose V1 = –1, 0, or +1 (equally
likely)
l If V1 = -1 or V1 = +1 then V2 = 1
l If V1 = 0 then V2 = 0
V2 is clearly dependent on V1 (and vice
versa) but the coefficient of correlation
is zero
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 113
Types of Dependence (Figure 11.1, page 235)
E(Y) E(Y)
X X
(a) (b)
E(Y)
(c)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 114
Monitoring Correlation Between
Two Variables X and Y
Define xi=(Xi−Xi-1)/Xi-1 and yi=(Yi−Yi-1)/Yi-1
Also
varx,n: daily variance of X calculated on day n-1
vary,n: daily variance of Y calculated on day n-1
covn: covariance calculated on day n-1
The correlation is
cov n
varx ,n vary ,n
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 115
Covariance
l The covariance on day n is
E(xnyn)−E(xn)E(yn)
l It is usually approximated as E(xnyn)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 116
Monitoring Correlation continued
EWMA:
cov n = l cov n -1 + (1 - l) xn -1 yn -1
GARCH(1,1)
cov n = w + axn -1 yn -1 + b cov n -1
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 117
Positive Finite Definite Condition
A variance-covariance matrix, W, is
internally consistent if the positive semi-
definite condition
wTWw ≥ 0
holds for all vectors w
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 118
Example
The variance covariance matrix
æ 1 0 0.9ö
ç ÷
ç 0 1 0.9÷
ç ÷
è 0.9 0.9 1ø
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 119
V1 and V2 Bivariate Normal
l Conditional on the value of V1, V2 is normal with
mean
V1 - µ1
µ 2 + rs 2
s1
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 121
Generating Random Samples for
Monte Carlo Simulation (pages 239-240)
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 122
Factor Models (page 240)
l When there are N variables, Vi (i = 1,
2,..N), in a multivariate normal distribution
there are N(N−1)/2 correlations
l We can reduce the number of correlation
parameters that have to be estimated with
a factor model
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 123
One-Factor Model continued
l If Ui have standard normal distributions
we can set
U i = ai F + 1 - ai2 Z i
where the common factor F and the
idiosyncratic component Zi have
independent standard normal
distributions
l Correlation between Ui and Uj is ai aj
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 124
Gaussian Copula Models:
Creating a correlation structure for variables that are not
normally distributed
-0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
V1 V2
One-to-one
mappings
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
U2
U1
Correlation
Assumption
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 126
Example (page 241)
V1 V2
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 127
V1 Mapping to U1
V1 Percentile U1
0.2 20 -0.84
0.4 55 0.13
0.6 80 0.84
0.8 95 1.64
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 128
V2 Mapping to U2
V2 Percentile U2
0.2 8 −1.41
0.4 32 −0.47
0.6 68 0.47
0.8 92 1.41
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 129
Example of Calculation of Joint
Cumulative Distribution
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 130
Other Copulas
l Instead of a bivariate normal distribution
for U1 and U2 we can assume any other
joint distribution
l One possibility is the bivariate Student t
distribution
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 131
5000 Random Samples from the
Bivariate Normal
0
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 132
5000 Random Samples from the
Bivariate Student t
10
0
-10 -5 0 5 10
-5
-10
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 133
Multivariate Gaussian Copula
l We can similarly define a correlation
structure between V1, V2,…Vn
l We transform each variable Vi to a new
variable Ui that has a standard normal
distribution on a “percentile-to-percentile”
basis.
l The U’s are assumed to have a
multivariate normal distribution
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 134
Factor Copula Model
In a factor copula model the correlation
structure between the U’s is generated by
assuming one or more factors.
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 135
Credit Default Correlation
l The credit default correlation between two
companies is a measure of their tendency
to default at about the same time
l Default correlation is important in risk
management when analyzing the benefits
of credit risk diversification
l It is also important in the valuation of some
credit derivatives
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 136
Model for Loan Portfolio
l We map the time to default for company i, Ti, to a
new variable Ui and assume
U i = aF + 1- a Z i 2
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 137
Vasicek’s Model for Loan Portfolio
l Suppose the Bank has a large no. of Loans where PD is 1% but will
change in each year. Suppose Ti is the time firm defaults. All firms has
the same Cum. Prob. Dist, for the time to default Qi.
l The Gaussian copula method can be used to define correlation structure
between Ti’s.
l We map the time to default for company i, Ti, to a new variable Ui N(0,1)
and assume
U i = aF + 1- a Z i 2
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 138
Vasicek’s Model for Loan Portfolio
l
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 139
Analysis
l To analyze the model we
l Calculate the probability that, conditional on the value
of F, Ui is less than some value U
l This is the same as the probability that Ti is less that T
where T and U are the same percentiles of their
distributions
This leads to
é N -1 [PD] - r F ù
Prob(Ti < T F ) = N ê ú
êë 1- r úû
where PD is the probability of default in time T
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 140
The Model continued
l The X% worst case value of F is N-1(X)
l The worst case default rate during time T with a
confidence level of X is therefore
æ N -1[Q(T )] + r N -1 ( X ) ö
WCDR(T,X) = N ç ÷
ç 1- r ÷
è ø
l The VaR for this time horizon and confidence limit
is
VaR (T , X ) = L ´ LGD ´ WCDR (T , X )
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 141
Gordy’s Result
l In a large portfolio of M loans where each
loan is small in relation to the size of the
portfolio it is approximately true that
M
VaR (T , X ) = å Li ´ LGDi ´ WCDR i (T , X )
i =1
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 142
Estimating PD and r
l We can use data on default rates in
conjunction with maximum likelihood
methods
l The probability density function for the
default rate is
ì é ü
1 - r N (DR ) - N (PD) ù ï
2
1- r ï 1 ê -1 æ -1 -1
ö
g (DR ) = expí ( N (DR )) - çç
2
÷ úý
÷ ú
r ïî 2 êë è r ø û ïþ
Risk Management and Financial Institutions 3e, Chapter 11, Copyright © John C. Hull 2012 143
Non-Normal Distributions
Elements of
Financial Risk Management
Chapter 6
Peter Christoffersen
144
Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Overview
l Third part of the Stepwise Distribution Modeling
(SDM) approach: accounting for conditional
nonnormality in portfolio returns.
l Returns are conditionally normal if the
dynamically standardized returns are normally
distributed.
l Fig.6.1 illustrates how histograms from
standardized returns typically do not conform to
normal density
l The top panel shows the histogram of the raw
returns superimposed on the normal distribution
145Elements of Financial
and
Risk the bottom panel shows the histogram of the
Management
Figure 6.1: Histogram of Daily S&P 500
Returns and Histogram of GARCH Shocks
30%
Frequency (%)
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-0,08 -0,06 -0,05 -0,03 -0,02 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,05 0,06 0,08
Return
30%
25%
Frequency (%)
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-6,00 -4,00 -2,00 0,00 2,00 4,00 6,00
Standardized Return
146Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Learning Objectives
l We introduce the quantile-quantile (QQ) plot,
which is a graphical tool better at describing
tails of distributions than the histogram.
l We define the Filtered Historical Simulation
approach which combines GARCH with
historical simulation.
l We introduce the simple Cornish-Fisher
approximation to VaR in non-normal
distributions.
147Elements of Financial
148Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Visualising Non-normality Using
QQ Plots
l Consider a portfolio of n assets with Ni,t
units or shares of asset i then the value of
the portfolio today is
149Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Visualising Non-normality Using
QQ Plots
150Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Visualising Non-normality Using
QQ Plots
l QQ (Quantile-Quantile) plot: Plot the
quantiles of the calculated returns against
the quantiles of the normal distribution.
l Systematic deviations from the 45 degree
angle signals that the returns are not well
described by normal distribution.
l QQ Plots are particularly relevant for risk
managers who care about VaR, which itself
is essentially a quantile.
151Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Visualising Non-normality Using
QQ Plots
l 1) Sort all standardized returns in ascending order
and call them zi
l 2) Calculate the empirical probability of getting a
value below the value i as (i-.5)/T
l 3) Calculate the standard normal quantiles as
l 4) Finally draw scatter plot
4
Return Quantile
0
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-2
-4
-6
-8
Normal Quantile
153Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Figure 6.2: QQ Plot of Daily S&P 500 GARCH
Shocks
8
6
GARCH Shock Quantile
0
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-2
-4
-6
-8
Normal Quantile
154Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Filtered Historical Simulation Approach
l We have seen the pros and cons of both
data-based and model-based approaches.
l The Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS)
attempts to combine the best of the model-
based with the best of the model-free
approaches in a very intuitive fashion.
l FHS combines model-based methods of
variance with model-free method of
distribution in the following fashion.
155Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Filtered Historical Simulation Approach
l Assume we have estimated a GARCH-type
model of our portfolio variance.
l Although we are comfortable with our
variance model, we are not comfortable
making a specific distributional
~ ( ) assumption
t d
about the standardized returns, such as a
Normal or a distribution.
l Instead we would like the past returns data
to tell us about the distribution directly
without making further assumptions.
156Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Filtered Historical Simulation Approach
l To fix ideas, consider again the simple
example of a GARCH(1,1) model
• where
157Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Filtered Historical Simulation Approach
l We will refer to the set of standardized returns as
158Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Filtered Historical Simulation Approach
l where the indicator function 1(*) returns a 1
if the argument is true and zero if not
161Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Cornish-Fisher Approximation
to VaR
• Where
162Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Cornish-Fisher Approximation
to VaR
• Consider now for example the one percent VaR,
where
163Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Cornish-Fisher Approximation to
VaR
164Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Cornish-Fisher Approximation
to VaR
• The expected shortfall can be derived as
• Where
165Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Cornish-Fisher Approximation
to VaR
166Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Standardized t distribution
l The Student’s t distribution is defined by
167Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Standardized t distribution
l Define Z by standardizing x so that,
• where
168Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Standardized t distribution
l In standardized t distribution random variable z
has mean equal to zero and a variance equal to 1
l Note also that the parameter d must be larger than
two for standardized distribution to be well
defined
l In distribution, the random variable, z, is
taken to a power, rather than an exponential,
which is the case in the standard normal
• distribution
The power function
where driven by d will allow for
distribution to have fatter tails than the normal
169Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Standardized t distribution
l The distribution is symmetric around zero,
and the mean µ, variance s2, skewness z1, and
excess kurtosis z2 of the distribution are
170Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Standardized t distribution
l Note that d must be higher than 4 for the kurtosis
to be well defined.
distribution.
Risk Management
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
l We can combine dynamic volatility model such
as GARCH with the standardized t distribution to
specify our model portfolio returns as
172Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
l The d parameter can then be chosen to
maximize the log likelihood function
173Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
l If we want to jointly maximize over the
parameter d and we should adjust the
distribution to take into account the
variance
174Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
l As a simple univariate example of the difference
between QMLE and MLE consider the
GARCH(1,1)- model with leverage:
• as
177Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Extreme Value Theory (EVT)
l Typically, the biggest risks to a portfolio is the
sudden occurrence of a single large negative
return.
l Having an as precise as possible knowledge of the
probabilities of such extremes is therefore at the
essence of financial risk management.
l Consequently, risk managers should focus
attention explicitly on modeling the tails of the
returns distribution.
l Fortunately, a branch of statistics is devoted
178exactly to the modeling of these extreme values.
Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Extreme Value Theory (EVT)
l The central result in EVTstates that the extreme
tail of a wide range of distributions can
approximately be described by a relatively simple
distribution, the so-called Generalized Pareto
distribution.
l Virtually all results in Extreme Value Theory
assumes that returns are i.i.d. and are therefore not
very useful unless modified to the asset return
environment.
l Asset returns appear to approach normality at long
horizons, thus EVT is more important at short
horizons,
179Elements of Financialsuch as daily.
Risk Management
Extreme Value Theory (EVT)
l Unfortunately, the i.i.d assumption is the
least appropriate at short horizons due to the
time-varying variance patterns.
l We therefore need to get rid of the variance
dynamics before applying EVT.
l Consider therefore again the standardized
portfolio returns
180Elements of Financial
Risk Management
The Distribution of Extremes
l Define a threshold value u on the horizontal axis
of the histogram in Figure 6.1
l As you let the threshold u go to infinity, the
distribution of observations beyond the threshold
(y) converge to the Generalized Pareto
Distribution, where
182Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Estimating Tail Index Parameter, x
• We can get the density function of y from F(y):
183Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Estimating Tail Index Parameter, x
l The log-likelihood function is therefore
184Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Estimating Tail Index Parameter, x
l We can estimate the c parameter by ensuring that
the fraction of observations beyond the threshold
is accurately captured by the density as in
185Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Estimating Tail Index Parameter, x
l Notice that our estimates are available in closed
form
189Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Constructing the QQ Plot from EVT
l We now set the estimated cumulative probability
function equal to 1-p so that there is only a p
probability of getting a standardized loss worse
than the quantile, F-11-p
190Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Constructing the QQ Plot from EVT
191Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Figure 6.7: QQ Plot of Daily S&P 500 Tail Shocks
against the EVT Distribution
8
4
Empirical Quantiles
0
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-2
-4
-6
-8
EVT Quantile
192Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Calculating VaR and ES from EVT
l We are ultimately interested not in QQ plots but
rather in portfolio risk measures such as VaR.
l Using the loss quantile F-11-p defined above by
193Elements of Financial
Risk Management
Calculating VaR and ES from
EVT
l We usually calculate the VaR taking F p to be the
-1
0,025
Tail Distribution Shape
0,010
0,005
0,000
-5,00 -4,75 -4,50 -4,25 -4,00 -3,75 -3,50 -3,25 -3,00 -2,75 -2,50
Return
197Elements of Financial
Risk Management