Us v.

Sweet
GR no: 448 September 20 1901

Facts:
By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of
First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a penalty of
more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be
imposed."

The appellant was at the time of its alleged commission an employee of the United
States military authorities in the Philippine Islands.

The person upon whom it is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of war in
the custody of such authorities.

Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at the time
the alleged offense was committed, the court was without jurisdiction.

Issues:
Whether or not that an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a
prisoner of war is not an offense under the Penal Code.

Whether or not that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military
character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its
commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.

Ruling:
As pointed out by counsel, that an assault of the character charged in the complaint
committed in time of war by a military person upon a prisoner of war is punishable as
an offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice (art. 232), and it is also true
that under the provisions of the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military tribunals have,
with certain exceptions which it is not material to state, exclusive cognizance of all
offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise, committed by military
persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as
an offense under the Spanish military legislation does not render them any less an
offense under the article of the Penal Code above cited. We are unable to see how
these provisions of the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here and which
indeed never had any application to the Army of the United States, can in any
possible view have the effect claimed for them by counsel for the appellant.

We have been cited to no provision in the legislation of Congress, and to none in the
local legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as respects employees of the United
States military establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of
First Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission above
cited, and we are not aware of the existence of any such provision. The case is
therefore open to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the
civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the person
brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of England and
America and which must, we think, prevail under any system of jurisprudence unless
controlled by express legislation to the contrary.

Principles:
Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military Justice above cited a military person
could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault upon a prisoner of
war, but by the commission of that offense he incurred a criminal responsibility for
which he was amenable only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility,
however, arose from an infraction of the general penal laws, although the same acts,
viewed in another aspect, might also, if committed in time of war, constitute an
infraction of the military code.