Pedro Syquia et. al. vs. Natividad Almeda Lopez, Et. al. G.R. No.

L-1648 August 17, 1949

FACTS:
Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint owners of properties in Manila, namely,
the North Qyauia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In 1945, they
executed contracts for lease of the apartments to USA, with the term being until the war has ended
and six months after, or unless terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings were used for billeting
and quartering officers of te US armed forces stationed in the Manila Area. George Moore, a
Commanding General of the US Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief of the Real Estate Division to the US
Army in Manila who was under the command of Moore, was said to be in control of the apartment
buildings and had authority in the name of USA to assign officers of the army to the buildings or
order them to vacuate the same. When Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, the lease would
be terminated six months after. The petitioners approached the predecessors of Moore and Tillman
and requested the buildings to be returned to them, as per contract agreement. However, they were
advised that the US Army wanted to continue their occupancy of the buildings, and refused to
execute new leases but advised that they will vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, not the
original terms of the contract agreement. Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of
Manila with the demand to get the properties as their agreement supposedly expired, and
furthermore asked for increased rentals until the premises were vacated. Respondent-defendants
were part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the court. The MC of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit, sustained by the CFI of
Manila, hence the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity, that USA has not given their consent to be a respondent. (NO)
HELD:
The real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America. Any
judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore
and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U. S. Government. On the basis of the ruling
in the case of Land vs. Dollar, the present action must be considered as one against the U. S.
Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila
have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction
was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action.

The U. S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against
her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of the law behind this rule are so elementary
and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.
 USA vs Ruiz
G.R. No. L-35645 | May 22, 1985

DOCTRINE:
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are
not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

FACTS:
United States invited the submission of bids for projects for the repair of wharves and shoreline.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Thereafter, a letter was
sent saying that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its
previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat
landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America and
Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering
Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the plaintiff to allow the company to perform
the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to
order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for
work on the projects. The Trial court issued the writ.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the company may sue US. (NO)

RULING:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they
are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has
been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii.

The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in western Europe. That the correct test for the application of State
immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in
Syquia vs. Lopez.

Further, the latter case ruled that the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but
the contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be
sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis.
 THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was
contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to
the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose
as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana.

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila
for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages
against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana.

Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party.
An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.

The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding
that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in
question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the
privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative,
the Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to
a private entity

RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the
Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner
has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed
that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was
made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official
place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or
personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission,
is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with
a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to
dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner
to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still
occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by
private respondent in its complaint

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both
Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a
foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its
claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with
the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination
of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by
Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to
espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183
against petitioner is DISMISSED.
 REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON
G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance
agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets,
electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4
years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and
not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the
agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign
immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived their
immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

HELD:
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the
ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of
the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii.
The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and
equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity
when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into
by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to
have waived its immunity from suit.
USA vs HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND
PABLO C. DEL PILAR
G.R. NO. 76607
FEBRUARY 26, 1990

FACTS:
In the first case, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services
in the base.

In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against private petitioners
for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.

In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was
arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners, officers of the U.S.
Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He then filed a
complaint for damages against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts
that he was removed.

In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the private
petitioners, for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on
them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on
the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting
the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.

ISSUE:
WON the Doctrine of State Immunity is applicable thereby making the State liable

HELD:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they
are constantly developing and evolving. In addition, because the activities of states have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them – between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is
now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.

1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be
remanded to the lower court.

2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The restaurants are
commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly
divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable, not
liable.)
3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions. For
discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable
to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be made by
the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time
of the incident.
 U.S.A. and Bradford v. Judge Luis Reyes,
G.R. No. 79253, 01 March 1993

FACTS:
Private respondent, hereinafter referred to as Montoya, is an American citizen who, at the time
material to this case, was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange
(NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City.
She is married to one Edgardo H. Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the U.S.
Navy and stationed in San Francisco, California. Petitioner Maxine Bradford, hereinafter referred to
as Bradford, is likewise an American citizen who was the activity exchange manager at the said
JUSMAG Headquarters. As a consequence of an incident whereby her body and belongings were
searched after she had bought some items from the retail store of the NEX JUSMAG, where she had
purchasing privileges, and while she was already at the parking area, Montoya filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court of her place of residence — Cavite — against Bradford for damages
due to the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as
store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. Bradford countered that a suit against her is a suit against her
foreign state, thus the doctrine of immunity from suit is applicable.

ISSUE:
Is the RTC correct in not applying the doctrine of immunity from suit considering the search
conducted by Bradford was done in the parking area outside the NEX-JUSMAG? (YES)

HELD:
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official
is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or
in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may
be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

Since it is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity
for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions, said
complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on the grounds relied upon by the
petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical admission of the truth of the allegations
therein, the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
 DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales vs.
HON. TITO V. TIZON, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and
EDGARDO GENER

FACTS:
Edgardo Gener was engaged in the business of logging in an area situated in Barrio Mabayo, Bataan.
His logging operations was, however, stopped by American Naval Base authorities - who were
headed by Donald Baer, the Commander of the US Naval Base in Olongapo.

Gener filed a complaint in the CFI [RTC] of Bataan praying for a writ of preliminary injunction with
restraining order against Baer for interfering with his logging operations.

Baer, on the otherhand, contested the jurisdiction of the CFI [RTC] of Bataan and invoked the
doctrine of state immunity from suit. He claimed that cessation of the logging operations within the
Naval Base is within the scope of his authority and official duty. Thus, a suit filed against him is one
against a foreign sovereign.

ISSUE:
Whether Baer may invoke the doctrine of state immunity, thus, he is outside the jurisdiction of the
CFI [RTC] of Bataan?

HELD:
Yes. Baer may validly invoke the doctrine of state immunity, thus, the suit against him will not
prosper.

What was sought by Gener and what was granted by the respondent Judge amounted to an
interference with the performance of the duties of Baer in the base area in accordance with the
powers possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement.

His point has been made clear, "Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the Philippine
Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue a Timber License to
cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases Agreement subjects the exercise of rights under a timber
license issued by the Philippine Government to the exercise by the United States of its rights, power
and authority of control within the bases; and the findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency
of both the Philippine and United States Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr.
Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be consistent with the security and
operation of the Base," is conclusive upon the respondent Judge.
 R v. Bow Street Magistrates Ex Pinochet, House of Lords 2000

SUMMARY:
R (Pinochet Ugarte) v Bow St Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate is a set of three UK constitutional
law judgments by the House of Lords that examined whether former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet was entitled to claim state immunity from torture allegations made by a Spanish court and
therefore avoid extradition to Spain. They have proven to be of landmark significance in
international criminal law and human rights law.

In the first judgment, a panel of 5 judges ruled that Pinochet, as a former head of state, was not
entitled to immunity from prosecution for the crimes of torture and could therefore be extradited
to Spain to face charges. However, in a subsequent judgment that was to prove controversial, the
ruling was set aside (R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte
(No 2) (Pinochet II) following revelations that one of the Law Lords had links to one of the
intervenors in the case, Amnesty International, thereby creating an appearance of bias. A new panel
of judges (R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3)
(Pinochet III) subsequently affirmed that Pinochet was not entitled to state immunity but that acts
committed outside of British territories could only be prosecuted under national law if committed
after the passage of section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (which gave UK courts universal
jurisdiction over crimes of torture).

FACTS:
Pinochet had been accused by Spanish judge Baltazar Garzon of torture, a crime under international
law that can be prosecuted in any country under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. While on a
visit to London for a medical treatment, Pinochet was arrested by British authorities following the
issuance of an arrest warrant via Interpol by the Spanish judge. Pinochet's lawyers argued before a
High Court panel presided by Lord Bingham that since Pinochet was head of state at the time of the
alleged crimes, he was immune from the jurisdiction of British courts. The panel disagreed, ruling
that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity from prosecution.

HELD:
Pinochet (No 1)
By a 3–2 majority, Lord Nicholls, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Steyn ruled that Pinochet did not enjoy
state immunity.

Notable passages of the judgment include the following:

... the development of international law since the Second World War justifies the conclusion that by
the time of the 1973 coup d'état, and certainly ever since, international law condemned genocide,
torture, hostage taking and crimes against humanity (during an armed conflict or in peacetime) as
international crimes deserving of punishment. Given this state of international law, it seems to me
difficult to maintain that the commission of such high crimes may amount to acts performed in the
exercise of the functions of a Head of State.

... International law has made plain that certain types of conduct, including torture and hostage-
taking, are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or
even more so, as it does to everyone else. The contrary conclusion would make a mockery of
international law.
Pinochet (No 2)
In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2), a new
panel of judges, composed of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Goff, Lord Hope, Lord Hutton, Lord
Saville, Lord Millett and Lord Phillips, set aside the first judgment on the grounds that an
appearance of bias had been created, following revelations that one of the judges, Lord Hoffmann,
had failed to disclose personal ties to Amnesty International, an intervenor in the case against
Pinochet.

Pinochet (No 3)
In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), the House
ruled that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity from prosecution for torture, but only as it applied after
8 December 1988, when section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, giving UK courts universal
jurisdiction over crimes of torture, came into effect, Pinochet could not be tried as it would
constitute a retroactive law
 Underhill v. Hernandez
No. 36
November 29, 1897 168 U.S. 250

SYLLABUS:
Hernandez was in command of a revolutionary army in Venezuela when an engagement took place
with the government forces which resulted in the defeat of the latter, and the occupation of Bolivar
by the former. Underhill was living in Bolivar, where he had constructed a waterworks system for
the city under a contract with the government, and carried on a machinery repair business. He
applied for a passport to leave the city, which was refused by Hernandez with a view to coerce him
to operate his waterworks and his repair works for the benefit of the community and the
revolutionary forces. Subsequently a passport was given him. The revolutionary government under
which Hernandez was acting was recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of
Venezuela. Subsequently Underhill sued Hernandez in .the Circuit Court for the Second Circuit to
recover damages caused by the refusal to grant the passport, for alleged confinement of him to his
own house, and for alleged assaults and affronts by Hernandez' soldiers. Judgment being rendered
for defendant, the case was taken to the circuit court of appeals, where the judgment was affirmed,
the court holding "that the acts of the defendant were the acts of Venezuela, and as such are not
properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government." Held that the circuit
court of appeals was justified in that conclusion.

Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within
its own territory.

In the early part of 1892, a revolution was initiated in Venezuela against the administration thereof,
which the revolutionists claimed had ceased to be the legitimate government. The principal parties
to this conflict were those who recognized Palacio as their head, and those who followed the
leadership of Crespo. General Hernandez belonged to the anti-administration party and
commanded its forces in the vicinity of Ciudad Bolivar. On the 8th of August, 1892, an engagement
took place between the armies of the two parties at Buena Vista, some seven miles from Bolivar, in
which the troops under Hernandez prevailed, and on the 13th of August, Hernandez entered
Bolivar and assumed command of the city. All of the local officials had in the meantime left, and the
vacant positions were filled by General Hernandez, who from that date, and during the period of the
transactions complained of, was the civil and military chief of the city and district. In October, the
party in revolt had achieved success generally, taking possession of the capital of Venezuela
October 6, and on October 23, 1892, the "Crespo government," so called, was formally recognized as
the legitimate government of Venezuela by the United States.

George F. Underhill was a citizen of the United States, who had constructed a waterworks system
for the City of Bolivar under a contract with the government, and was engaged in supplying the
place with water, and he also carried on a machinery repair business. Some time after the entry of
General Hernandez, Underhill applied to him, as the officer in command, for a passport to leave the
city. Hernandez refused this request, and requests made by others in Underhill's behalf, until
October 18, when a passport was given, and Underhill left the country.
This action was brought to recover damages for the detention caused by reason of the refusal to
grant the passport, for the alleged confinement of Underhill to his own house, and for certain
alleged assaults and affronts by the soldiers of Hernandez' army.

The cause was tried in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York,
and on the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the circuit court ruled that, upon the facts, plaintiff was not
entitled to recover, and directed a verdict for defendant on the ground that "because the acts of
defendant were those of a military commander, representing a de facto government in the
prosecution of a war, he was not civilly responsible therefor."

Judgment having been rendered for defendant, the case was taken to the circuit court of appeals,
and by that court affirmed upon the ground "that the acts of the defendant were the acts of the
government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of
another government."

Thereupon the cause was brought to this Court on certiorari.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion
of the Court.

Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.

Nor can the principle be confined to lawful or recognized governments, or to cases where redress
can manifestly be had through public channels. The immunity of individuals from suits brought in
foreign tribunals for acts done within their own states in the exercise of governmental authority,
whether as civil officers or as military commanders, must necessarily extend to the agents of
governments ruling by paramount force as matter of fact. Where a civil war prevails (that is, where
the people of a country are divided into two hostile parties, who take up arms and oppose one
another by military force), generally speaking, foreign nations do not assume to judge of the merits
of the quarrel. If the party seeking to dislodge the existing government succeeds, and the
independence of the government it has set up is recognized, then the acts of such government, from
the commencement of its existence, are regarded as those of an independent nation. If the political
revolt fails of success, still, if actual war has been waged, acts of legitimate warfare cannot be made
the basis of individual liability. United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246; Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603;
Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594; Dow v.
Johnson, 100 U. S. 158, and other cases.

Revolutions or insurrections may inconvenience other nations, but by accommodation to the facts,
the application of settled rules is readily reached. And where the fact of the existence of war is in
issue in the instance of complaint of acts committed within foreign territory, it is not an absolute
prerequisite that that fact should be made out by an acknowledgment of belligerency, as other
official recognition of its existence may be sufficient proof thereof. The Three Friends, 166 U. S. 1.

In this case, the archives of the State Department show that civil war was flagrant in Venezuela
from the spring of 1892, that the revolution was successful, and that the revolutionary government
was recognized by the United States as the government of the country, it being, to use the language
of the Secretary of State in a communication to our minister to Venezuela, "accepted by the people,
in the possession of the power of the nation, and fully established."

That these were facts of which the court is bound to take judicial notice, and for information as to
which it may consult the Department of State, there can be no doubt. Jones v. United States, 137 U.
S. 202; Mighell v. Sultan of Jahore, (1894) 1 Q.B. 149.
It is idle to argue that the proceedings of those who thus triumphed should be treated as the acts of
banditti or mere mobs.

We entertain no doubt upon the evidence that Hernandez was carrying on military operations in
support of the revolutionary party. It may be that adherents of that side of the controversy in the
particular locality where Hernandez was the leader of the movement entertained a preference for
him as the future executive head of the nation, but that is beside the question. The acts complained
of were the acts of a military commander representing the authority of the revolutionary party as a
government, which afterwards succeeded and was recognized by the United States. We think the
circuit court of appeals was justified in concluding "that the acts of the defendant were the acts of
the government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts
of another government."

The decisions cited on plaintiff's behalf are not in point. Cases respecting arrests by military
authority in the absence of the prevalence of war, or the validity of contracts between individuals
entered into in aid of insurrection, or the right or revolutionary bodies to vex the commerce of the
world on its common highway without incurring the penalties denounced on piracy, and the like, do
not involve the questions presented here.

We agree with the circuit court of appeals that "the evidence upon the trial indicated that the
purpose of the defendant in his treatment of the plaintiff was to coerce the plaintiff to operate his
waterworks and his repair works for the benefit of the community and the revolutionary forces,"
and that "it was not sufficient to have warranted a finding by the jury that the defendant was
actuated by malice or any personal or private motive," and we concur in its disposition of the
rulings below. The decree of the circuit court is

Affirmed.
 US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran Case (US v. Tehran)
ICJ Reports 1980

FACTS:
United States of America v. Islamic Republic of Iran [1980] ICJ 1 (also called the Case Concerning
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran) is a public international law case (issued in
two decisions) brought to the International Court of Justice by the United States of America against
Iran in response to the Iran hostage crisis, where United States diplomatic offices and personnel
were seized by militant revolutionaries.

On 4 November 1979 there was an armed attack by Iranian students on the United States Embassy
in Tehran and they overtook it. The students, belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the
Imam's Line, did this as an act of support to the Iranian Revolution. More than sixty American
diplomats and citizens were held hostage for 444 days (until January 20, 1981). Some of the
hostages were released earlier, but 52 hostages were held hostage until the end. Although Iran had
promised protection to the U.S. Embassy, the guards disappeared during the takeover and the
government of Iran did not attempt to stop it or rescue the hostages. The U.S. arranged to meet with
Iranian authorities to discuss the release of the hostages, but Ayatollah Khomeini (the leader of the
Iranian Revolution) forbade officials to meet them. The U.S. ceased relations with Iran, stopped U.S.
exports, oil imports, and Iranian assets were blocked

HELD:
The first decision was an Order of Provisional Measures, issued December 15, 1979. This was the
court issuing an opinion not on the merits underlying the case specifically, but rather ordering
preservation of the respective rights and obligations the two countries owed one another pending
the final decision of the court. More specifically, the Court unanimously declared Iran should ensure
the restoration of the U.S. embassy in Tehran to U.S. possession, release the hostages, and afford
diplomatic officials full protections as afforded by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The second decision addressed the actual merits of Iran's actions. Iran took no part in the
proceedings.

The case was the first real instance of the Court and the Security Council acting together to bring a
crisis to an end.

The ICJ considered the case in hand in two phases. The first phase referred to the armed attack on
the US Embassy in Tehran by militants and students of Iran. The question asked was whether the
militants and the students were 'agents' of the Iranian Government and therefore, acting on their
behalf. The second phase comprises the whole series of facts which occurred following the
completion of the occupation of the US Embassy by militants and the seizure of the Consulates.

The Court reached a judgement on 24 May 1980.

For the first question, the ICJ found the militants and students to be 'agents' of the Iranian
Government, because the latter had approved and perpetuated their actions, translating occupation
of the embassy and detention of the hostages into official acts of the state, of which the
perpetrators, while initially acting in private capacities, were rendered agents of the Iranian state.

The Arrest Warrant Case (Democractic Republic of Congo v. Belgium)

ICJ Reports 2002

FACTS:
In 1993, the Belgian Parliament voted a "law of universal jurisdiction" to allow it to judge people
accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. In 2001, four people from Rwanda
were convicted and given sentences from 12 to 20 years' imprisonment for their involvement in
1994 Rwandan genocide. There was quickly an explosion of suits deposed.

An arrest warrant issued in 2000 under this law against Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was challenged before the International
Court of Justice in the case entitled Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium).

HELD:
On 14 February 2002, the judgment was handed down, and the ICJ issued a press release:

The Court found that the issue and international circulation by Belgium of the arrest warrant of 11
April 2000 against Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi failed to respect the immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo
enjoyed under international law; and that Belgium must cancel the arrest warrant.

In its Judgment, which is final, without appeal and binding for the Parties, the Court found, by 13 votes
to 3, "that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000,
and its international circulation, constituted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of
Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that they failed to respect the immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed under international law"; and, by 10 votes to 6, "that the
Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000
and so inform the authorities to whom that warrant was circulated".

The Court reached these findings after having found, by 15 votes to 1, that it had jurisdiction, that the
Application of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("the Congo") was not without object (and the
case accordingly not moot) and that the Application was admissible, thus rejecting the objections
which the Kingdom of Belgium ("Belgium") had raised on those questions.

The court limited the scope of its judgment to the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the
inviolability of an incumbent minister for foreign affairs and that as none of the treaties brought to
the attention of the court covered this issue that the court must decide the issue based on
customary international law.[1] But it rejected Belgium's argument that because the parties had not
raised the issue of "the disputed arrest warrant, issued by the Belgian investigating judge in
exercise of his purported universal jurisdiction, complied in that regard with the rules and
principles of international law governing the jurisdiction of national courts, because that question
was not contained in the final submissions of the Parties." and concluded that this did not stop the
court dealing with certain aspects of that question in the reasoning of its Judgment.

Referring to the few existing decisions of national high courts, such as the House of Lords and the
French Court of Cassation they concluded that immunity was not granted to state officials for their
own benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective
state; and when abroad that they enjoy full immunity from arrest in another state on criminal
charges including charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The court noted that this immunity from jurisdiction of a foreign national court, existed even when
foreign national courts exercise an extended criminal jurisdiction on the basis of various
international conventions that covered the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes.
However the court emphasized that "While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature,
criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it
applies from all criminal responsibility.
 WHO v. Aquino, GR L-35131, 11/29/1972

FACTS:
Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free
entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates
“contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon
application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure
of the personal effects of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to
immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic
missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The
Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent
judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity.

HELD:
Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised
respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as
principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by
the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting
under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of
property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.
 INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION vs CALLEJA
G.R. No. 85750 | September 28, 1990

FACTS:
ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing
center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a
non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work.

IRRI on the other hand was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-profit, non-
stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of conducting “basic research on
the rice plant, on all phases of rice production, management, distribution and utilization with a view
to attaining nutritive and economic advantage or benefit for the people of Asia and other major
rice-growing areas through improvement in quality and quantity of rice.”

The labor organizations in each of the above mentioned agencies filed a petition for certification
election, which was opposed by both, invoking diplomatic immunity.

ISSUE:
Are the claim of immunity by the ICMC and the IRRI from the application of Philippine labor laws
valid? (YES)

HELD:
There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to
international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus:

1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or
interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of
which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the
nations concerned are represented;

2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common
international funds; and

3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the

facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual
member States.

The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. “It is not
concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional
independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them
to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. The raison d’etre for
these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned.
ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights,
which are guaranteed by our Constitution.

For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section
31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations provides that “each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which
the specialized agency is a party.” Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of
Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege
by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact,
there had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by
the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein “both
management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and
beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its employees.”

NOTES:

The term “international organization” is generally used to describe an organization set up by

agreement between two or more states. Under contemporary international law, such organizations
are endowed with some degree of international legal personality such that they are capable of
exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly as a means for conducting
general international business in which the member states have an interest. The United Nations, for
instance, is an international organization dedicated to the propagation of world peace.

“Specialized agencies” are international organizations having functions in particular fields

 JOSE G. EBRO III v. NLRC, INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION, JON
DARRAH, ALEX DY-REYES, CARRIE WILSON, and MARIVIC SOLIVEN
G.R. No. 110187. September 4, 1996

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order dated October 13, 1992 and the resolution
dated March 3, 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 1

The antecedent facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Private respondent International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) is a non-profit agency

engaged in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. It was
one of the agencies accredited by the Philippine government to operate the refugee processing
center at Sabang, Morong, Bataan.

On June 24, 1985, private respondent ICMC employed petitioner Jose G. Ebro III to teach "English as
a Second Language and Cultural Orientation Training Program" at the refugee processing center.
The employment contract provided in pertinent part:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Salary: Your monthly salary for the first 6 months probationary period is P3,155.00 inclusive of cost
of living allowance. Upon being made regular after successful completion of the six (6) months
probationary period your monthly salary will be adjusted to P3,445.00 inclusive of cost of living
allowance.

x x x

Termination of Employment: Employment may be terminated by ICMC in any of the following

situations:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. A cessation or reduction in program operation, by Department of State order,

b. Unsuccessful completion of probationary period, at any time during that period,

c. For due cause, in cases of violation of provisions detailed in ICMC Personnel Policies and
administrative regulations,

d. For just and authorized causes expressly provided for or authorized by law,

e. For reasons of inadequate or deficient professional performance based on relevant guidelines

and procedures relating to the position,

f. In cases where, as a member of the PRPC community, ICMC is directed to take action.

If either party wishes to terminate employment, a notice of two (2) weeks should be given in
writing to the other party.
After six months, ICMC notified petitioner that effective December 21, 1985, the latter’s services
were terminated for his failure to meet the requirements of "1. classroom performance . . . up to the
standards set in the Guide for Instruction; 2. regular attendance in the mandated teacher training,
and in the scheduled team meetings, one-on-one conferences with the supervisor, etc; 3.
compliance with ICMC and PRPC policies and procedures."cralaw virtua1aw library

On February 4, 1986, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice,
underpayment of wages, accrued leave pay, 14th month pay, damages, attorney’s fees, and
expenses of litigation. The complaint was filed against private respondents ICMC and its Project
Director Jon Darrah, Personnel Officer Alex Dy-Reyes, Program Officer of the Cultural Orientation
Program Carrie Wilson, and Supervisor of the Cultural Orientation Program Marivic Soliven.
Petitioner alleged that there was no objective evaluation of his performance to warrant his
dismissal and that he should have been considered a regular employee from the start because ICMC
failed to acquaint him with the standards under which he must qualify as such. He prayed for
reinstatement with backwages; P3,155.00 for probationary and P3,445.00 for regular salary
adjustments; value of lodging or dormitory privileges; cost of insurance coverage for group life,
medical, death, dismemberment and disability benefits; moral, and exemplary, and nominal
damages plus interest on the above claims with attorney’s fees.

Answering the complaint, ICMC claimed that petitioner failed to qualify for regular employment
because he showed no interest in improving his professional performance both in and out of the
classroom after he had been periodically evaluated (observation summary from August 20 to
October 2, 1985 and evaluation summary of December 14, 1985); that petitioner was paid his
salary up to December 31, 1985, two weeks pay in lieu of notice, and 14th month pay pro-rata; and
that his accrued leave balance had already been converted to cash.

After the parties had formally offered their evidence, private respondents submitted their
memorandum on July 31, 1989 in which, among other things, they invoked ICMC’s diplomatic
immunity on the basis of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on July 15, 1988 between the
Philippine government and ICMC.

The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner’s legal immunity under the Memorandum could not be given
retroactive effect since" [that would] deprive complainant’s property right without due process and
impair the obligation of contract of employment." In addition, he expressed doubt about
petitioner’s legal immunity on the ground that it was provided for by agreement and not through an
act of Congress. Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered ICMC to reinstate petitioner as regular
teacher without loss of seniority rights and to pay him one year backwages, other benefits, and ten
percent attorney’s fees for a total sum of P70,944.85.

Both parties appealed to the NLRC. On August 13, 1990, petitioner moved to dismiss private
respondent’s appeal because of the latter’s failure to post a cash/surety bond. In its order of
October 13, 1992, however, the NLRC ordered the case dismissed on the ground that, under the
Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine government and ICMC, the latter was immune
from suit.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing among other things, that the Memorandum of
Agreement could not be given retroactive effect and that in any case ICMC had waived its immunity
by consenting to be sued.
However, petitioner’s motion was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated March 4, 1993. 2
Hence this petition presenting the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) Whether private respondents have perfected their appeal and whether public respondent may,
on appeal, entertain or review private respondents’ claim of immunity;

b) Whether a mere Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
with respondent International Catholic Migration Commission, which is not a law, can divest the
Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission of their jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the persons of respondents in the pending case;

c) Whether the Memorandum of Agreement may be given retroactive effect;

d) Whether the dismissal of the case based on the claim of immunity will deprive petitioner of his
property without due process of law;

e) Whether the dismissal of the case based on the claim of immunity will result in the impairment of
the obligations assumed by respondent International Catholic Migration Commission under its
contract of employment with petitioner;

f) Assuming for the sake of argument that the Memorandum of Agreement has validly conferred
immunity on private respondents, whether they may be considered as having waived such
immunity;

g) Upon the same consideration, whether private respondents may be considered estopped from
claiming immunity.

The basic issue in this case is whether the Memorandum of Agreement executed on July 15, 1988
gave ICMC immunity from suit. The Court holds it did. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.

First. Petitioner’s contention that the Memorandum of Agreement is not an act of Congress which is
needed to "repeal or supersede" the provision of the Labor Code on the jurisdiction of the NLRC and
of the Labor Arbiter is untenable. The grant of immunity to ICMC is in virtue of the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, adopted by the UN
General Assembly on November 21, 1947, and concurred in by the Philippine Senate on May 17,
1949. This Convention has the force and effect of law, considering that under the Constitution, the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. 3 The Memorandum of Agreement in question merely carries out the Philippine government’s
obligation under the Convention. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 4 this
Court explained the grant of immunity to ICMC in this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC . . . is clearly necessitated by their
international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality
and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to
shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from
political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
Second. Petitioner argues that in any case ICMC’s immunity can not apply because this case was
filed below before the signing of the Memorandum on July 15, 1988. Petitioner cites in support the
statement of this Court in the aforesaid case of International Catholic Migration Commission v.
Calleja, 5 distinguishing that case from an earlier case 6 also involving ICMC, wherein the NLRC, as
well as the Court, took cognizance of a complaint against ICMC for payment of salary for the
unexpired portion of a six-month probationary employment. The Court held: 7

[N]ot only did the facts of said controversy [ICMC v. NLRC, 169 SCRA 606 [1989] occur between
1983-1985, or before the grant to ICMC on 15 July 1988 of the status of a specialized agency with
corresponding immunities, but also because ICMC in that case did not invoke its immunity and,
therefore, may be deemed to have waived it, assuming that during that period (1983-1985) it was
tacitly recognized as enjoying such immunity.

Here, according to petitioner, his employment and subsequent dismissal by ICMC took place in
1985, prior to the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement on July 15, 1988 and, therefore, like
in the 1989 ICMC case, the Memorandum should not be made to apply to him.

This Court did not really reject ICMC’s invocation of immunity for causes of action accruing prior to
the execution of the Memorandum. It left open the possibility that ICMC may have been tacitly
enjoying diplomatic immunity beforehand. It is important to note that in the 1989 case ICMC did
not invoke its immunity notwithstanding the fact that the Memorandum took effect while the case
was pending before the Court. 8

Moreover, in the 1990 ICMC case, ICMC’s immunity was in fact unheld despite the fact that at the
time the case arose, the Memorandum recognizing ICMC’s status as a specialized agency had not yet
been signed. In that case, the petition for certification election among its rank and file employees
was filed on July 14, 1986 and the order directing a certification election was made when ICMC’s
request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending in the Department of Foreign
Affairs. Yet this Court held that the subsequent execution of the Memorandum was a bar to the
granting of the petition for certification election.

The scope of immunity of the ICMC contained in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations is instructive. Art. III, §4 of the Convention provides
for immunity from "every form of legal process." Thus, even if private respondents had been served
summons and subpoenas prior to the execution of the Memorandum, they, as officers of ICMC, can
claim immunity under the same in order to prevent enforcement of an adverse judgment, since a
writ of execution is "a legal process" within the meaning of Article III, §4. 9

Third. Another question is whether ICMC can invoke its immunity because it only did so in its
memorandum before the Labor Arbiter. It is contended that ICMC waived its immunity in any event.
Art. III, §4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations requires, however, that the waiver of the privilege must be express. There was no
such waiver of immunity in this case. Nor can ICMC be estopped from claiming diplomatic immunity
since estoppel does not operate to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of
action. 10

Fourth. Finally, neither can it be said that recognition of ICMC’s immunity from suit deprives
petitioner of due process. As pointed out in International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja,
11 petitioner is not exactly without remedy for whatever violation of rights it may have suffered for
the following reason:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes
of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which
the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of
Agreement between ICMC and the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege
by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.
Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities. — 1. The Commission shall cooperate at all
times with the appropriate authorities of the Government to ensure the observance of Philippine
laws, rules and regulations, facilitate the proper administration of justice and prevent the
occurrences of any abuse of the privileges and immunities granted its officials and alien employees
in Article III of this Agreement to the Commission.

2. In the event that the Government determines that there has been an abuse of the privileges and
immunities granted under this Agreement, consultations shall be held between the Government
and the Commission to determine whether any such abuse has occurred and, if so, the Government
shall withdraw the privileges and immunities granted the Commission and its officials.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER represented by its Chief, DR. FLOR J.
LACANILAO vs.
DANILO ACOSTA in his capacity as Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Arbitration, Branch VI, CORAZON CANTO, DAN BALIAO, ELIZABETH
SUPETRAN, CARMELITA FERRER, CATHRYN CONTRADOR, and DORIC VELOSO

FACTS:
Two labor cases for illegal dismissal was filed against SEAFDEC before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) of Iloilo. SEAFDEC, however, invoked the doctrine of state immunity from suit
and claims that the NLRC cannot acquire jurisdiction over it as it is a recognized international
organization.

ISSUE:
Whether SEAFDEC may invoke the doctrine of state immunity from suit

HELD:
Yes. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic
immunity.

In the case Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. NLRC
(1992), the Supreme Court has held that SEAFDEC is an international agency beyond the
jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. And that it was established by the Governments of Burma,
Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the
Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam. xxx

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys

functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located.

Further, the said case also discussed the doctrine of state immunity,
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e.,
that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it
is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority
of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to
discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
 DFA vs NLRC

FACTS:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against Asian
Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other
through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that
the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process
except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55
of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5
and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines
Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did not
appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its
referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a
favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has
descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its
immunity from suit

HELD:
1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of
every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the
purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in
respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters
Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments
voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.

Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is
independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by
the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of
such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru
which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its
policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would
impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states."
2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which
should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with
different private companies. “There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each
widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to
the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.

“Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the
foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for
profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.
 JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an
"office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the
country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion
for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which
set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier
issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court
via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.1â wphi1.nêt

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by
immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's
advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the
accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was
acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet
to be presented at the proper time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.2

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity
except when the Bank waives the immunity.
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done
in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit
of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA
protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so
desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.3 The
imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle
of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.4 It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does
not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the
case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.5 As already mentioned above, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say
that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the
one at bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.8 Besides the absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of
the information or otherwise render it defective.9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.1â wphi1.nêt