TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C.

Santiago, petitioner-appellant, 
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA
CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR MARCELO, respondents-
appellees
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970

FACTS:

Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil studying in Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2
days before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They
alleges:
 that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who became her English
teacher in the sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro against her rivals.
 that the teachers who composed the committee on honor students are all grade six teachers while the
Service Manual For Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the teachers from the
fifth and sixth grades.
 that there are direct and circumstantial evidence showing the change of ratings of Socorro Medina and
Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank.
 that the giving of district examinations upon which ratings were partly based were not advisable.
 that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural.
 that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner the word "First Place" was erased and changed to
"Second Place".
 that petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities but they only 'passed the buck to each
other.'They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on
rating honors.

Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question
has become academic because the graduation already proceeded. Further, they argue that the "committee on the
ratings of students for honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

ISSUE: 

1. Whether or not the said committee of teachers does fall within the category of the tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65.
2. Whether or not administrative remedies are neglected.

RULING:

1. No. A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is
the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist, test to
determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1. there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination.
2. that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3. the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least not
the legislative nor the executive)

The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It
may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

Judicial power is defined:

 as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
 authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or
property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
 The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
 The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which
performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not
essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used
when applied to the courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act
judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character. ...'

It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor
whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance
of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal
board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some
specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed
out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit
down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves
the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial
functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of the
Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee
they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's duties.

2. Yes. All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities who
only 'passed the buck to each other.' This allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and
exhausted the administrative remedies of the Department of Education. The petition implies that this is the first
formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers. The administrative agencies of the Department of Education
could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with dispatch and give effective remedies, but petitioner
negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Carino vs CHR

FACTS:

Respondents are teachers who took part in the “concerted mass actions” to "dramatize and highlight"
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon their grievances.

Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order
of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply
and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the
week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, they were administratively charged and were also
preventively suspended and temporarily replaced. The teachers then went to the CHR to complain.
Thereafter, the Commission issued an order to the Secretary for him to provide the real facts of the case
for guidance in its investigation and resolution of the matter. The latter however filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case. The CHR
denied the Secretary’s motion and instead held that the "striking teachers" were denied due process of
law and that there had been a violation of their civil and political rights.

ISSUE:

WON the CHR has the adjudicatory powers to try and decide certain type of cases like alleged human
rights violations.

HELD:

No, the Commission on Human Rights has no such power. It was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining there from the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its
investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have
no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil
Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that
Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal
for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Ruperto vs torres

Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. NHA, August 31, 1987 – Baring

FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa

Heights Subdivision from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando
transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson.

However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only the
arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all
monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. On October 14 1976, the president of Antipolo
Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the
subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly
installments on Lot No. 15.

Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the
post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract toSell, and
claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr. Yuson brought his
dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision
on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asserting that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in
the regular courts, not in the NHA.

ISSUE: Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy.

HELD: NHA was upheld by the SC. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies
exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited
delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies is well recognized in our
jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as
essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion
recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In general the
quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in
the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts.

Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium

Buyers' Decree", states that National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of
this decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344, clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the
grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following manner:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices:

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in
the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute. There is no questionthat under Presidential
Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting
parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that
their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.

Boiser vs. CA, June 24, 1983 – Cabradilla

FACTS:

The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and other municipalities in
the province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the name and style of Premiere
Automatic Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and private respondent
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated as
"Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and
overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The
arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and
overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of the world. Petitioner on
the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent
PLDT, provide relay switching services and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the
required standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement.

On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit
authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to
terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system
in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited "
Interconnecting Agreement." To avert serious consequences to the public and private hours resulting
from any disruption of the petitioner's telephone network and, of course, to the long distance and
overseas aspects of its business, the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It instituted Civil
Case No. 17867 with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu now a Regional Trial Court, for injunction
and damages.
On March 2, 1979, the CFI of Cebu issued a temporary restraining order against respondent PLDT
and directed the preservation of the status quo between the parties.

On August 2, 1979, or five (5) months after the issuance of the temporary restraining order, the
private respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the restraining order. Thereafter, the petitioner
and the private respondents submitted the merits of the main case to a hearing and agreed to
consider jointly in said trial on the merits the motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order
including the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

The hearing on the merits progressed and petitioner was already in the process of winding up its
evidence in Civil Case No. 17867 before the Court of First Instance, Cebu when on July 20, 1982, or
nearly three (3) years after the filing of their motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order, the
private respondents elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by filing the petitioner for
certiorari.

The petition filed with the Court of Appeals had for its object the setting aside of the CFI restraining
order which enjoined PLDT and the other respondents from disconnecting the Mandaue-Tagbilaran
telephone connections. The ground alleged in the petition was:

RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE RESTRAINING ORDER, DATED MARCH 2, 1979,
CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUE OR SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR WHICH THE SAID ORDER
WAS ISSUED PROPERLY DEVOLVES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND NOT WITH THE REGULAR COURTS.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Telecommunications Commission is the body with jurisdiction to hear and
decide controversies arising from the operation of telephone systems or the interconnection of
communications facilities, not the Court of First Instance.

RULING:

YES.

The case before the trial court is for injunction arising from breach of contract. Premiere asks for
compliance with the terms of the contract and for the payment of P100,000.00 exemplary and moral
damages in addition to attorney's fees.

PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board of
Communications, now National Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the Commission's
powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and
exemplary damages.

Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve "a purely
internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would necessary affect rights
guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated
Davao New Town Development Corporation vs. COSLAP, June 8, 2005 – Bisnar

American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents, October 14, 1975 – Casino

Facts: This case involves the validity of the amendment made by the Director of Patents to Rule 168 of
the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademarks. The Trademark Law (RA
166) vested the Director of Patents with jurisdiction over “inter partes” proceedings

The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the Director of Patents and
approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Subsequently, the Director of Patents,
with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended Rule 168. (see below for the
law) In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners'
cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustice Casia and Hector
Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.

Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that
the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear
and decide inter partes case. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the
present petition for mandamus

Issue: Whether or not director of Patents is authorized to designate any ranking official of said office to
hear "inter partes" proceedings?

Held: It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of Patents under the
general law 2 and Republic Acts Nos. 165 3 and 166 3* to sustain the contention of petitioners. Under
section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical,
scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the
Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office
relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers
"the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The
aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement of the
Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166).

It has been held that power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a
statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order
to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There is no
provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the
designation of hearing examiners by concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred
from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act. The nature of the power and
authority entrusted to the Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in
relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the
administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said laws.

This subdelegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that
"those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions
of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller
and far less important matters of detail." Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides
solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to
hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made.

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is
sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of
testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not
deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is
supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and
fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer
concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that
to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence
the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies
them."

*Inter partes proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name,
interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption
and use of a trademark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trademark or
trade name pending at the Patent Office.

Previous Amended

"168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes
proceedings . — The Director of Patents shall have
original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings.
In the event that the Patent Office should be
provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this
Examiner shall have the original jurisdiction over
these cases, instead of the Director. In the case
that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the
original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings,
"168. Original jurisdictional inter partes
proceedings . — The Director of Patents shall have
original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings.
[In the event that the Patent Office is provided
with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner
shall then have the original jurisdiction over these
cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the
Examiner of Interferences taxes over the original
jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final
his final decision shall be subject to appeal to the
Director of Patents within three months of the
receipt of notice of decisions. Such appeals shall
be governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
insofar as said sections are applicable and
appropriate and the appeal fee shall be P25.00."
decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director
of Patents within three months of the receipt of
notice of decision. Such appeals shall be governed
by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as
said sections are applicable and appropriate, and
the appeal fee shall be P25.00.] Such inter partes
proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under
this Title shall be heard before the Director of
Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official
of the office designated by the Director but all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall
be personally and directly prepared by the Director
and signed by him.

(Emphasis supplied.).

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, January 18, 2000 – Crodua

Facts:

Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment,
the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along
with the request. Charges include: conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US, attempt to evade
or defeat tax, fraud by wire, radio, or television, false statement or entries and election contribution in
name of another.

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation
and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a
letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government
and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the
United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that
point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition
Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the
documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled
in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as
well as conducting further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Whether or not private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing.

2. Whether or not this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation
of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?
3. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s basic due process rights & provisions of
RP-US Extradition treaty
Held:

1. Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines
with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under
the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power
exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any
judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in
the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two
stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the
temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court.

Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative
agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since
such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of
liberty of a prospective extradite.

In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.
There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the
Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in
forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, &
such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation,
the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information
against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the
extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 S14(1) & (2), as well
as A3 S7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to
access to official records & documents

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation,
having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable
action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus
exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the
respondent.

The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings.
Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of
any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein &
present their side.

Rights to notice and hearing are dispensable in 3 cases:

a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative
charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action & the respondent isn’t prevented from
enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property
of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)
c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

1. No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment
of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their
respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due
process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.

2. No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts.
Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial.
Request should impose veil at any stage.

Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava, February 16, 1959 – DURAN

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The
petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court
to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in
excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the
prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to
include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent
office. He also mentioned hat the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-
judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle
cases before the Patent Office which. And that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with
Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United
States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar
examination as that prescribed by respondent. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is
holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the
practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also
embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the
legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board
of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold
that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice
before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification.

In conclusion, Supreme Court said that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized
by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent
Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are
judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken
to the Supreme Court.

DARAB vs. Lubrica, April 29, 2005 – DY

Suntay, filed a petition for the fixing of just compensation against the DAR, the DAR regional director of
Region IV and the Land Bank of the Philippines. The case was filed before RARAD. The subject of the case
was the land of Suntay covering an area roughly around 948 hectares which is situated in Sablayan,
Mindoro Occidental. The DAR and LBP determined the value of the land to only be around 4.2m pesos,
which according to Suntay was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking without due process. The
RARAD decided in favor of Suntay and ordered LBP and DAR to pay Suntay the amount of 157m as just
compensation for the taking of the property. LBP asked for reconsideration but was denied. He filed
another case in the RTC to change the amount of just compensation to 4.2m pesos. Suntay moved to
dismiss on the grounds for the lack of capacity to sue, lack of cause of action, and res judicata. The RTC
dismissed the case. LBP then appealed the case by submitting a notice of appeal to the special agrarian
court. While pending Suntay requested that the decision of RARAD be made final. RARAD denied LBP’s
motion for reconsideration of the order of finality. On July 18, 2001, the RARAD issued a Writ of
Execution. LBP then filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of TRO or Preliminary
injunction before the DARAB. Josefina the successor of Suntay filed with the CA a motion for prohibition.
This notwithstanding, DARAB issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA rendered its decision ruling
that DARAB had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

Issue: WoN DARAB may take cognizance of the case

Ruling:

No, In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency
is not implied. There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in
all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special
jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DAR’s competence
and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could
not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast
powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited
jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in
R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR, February 27, 1940 – Edradan, B.

Danan vs. Aspillera, November 28, 1962 – Edradan, D.

Montoya vs. Varilla, December 18, 2008 – Elumba

Fabella vs. CA, November 28, 1997- Jugan

Due process of law requires notice and hearing.  Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes a
competent and impartial tribunal.  The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law
lose meaning in the absence of an independent, competent and impartial tribunal.

FACTS:

Then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had
participated in talk-outs and strikes, (for payment of their 13th month differentials, clothing allowances
and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things), on various dates during the period
September 26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. 

Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers
of the Mandaluyong High School, and they were required to explain in writing why they should not be
punished for taking part in the mass action which is a violation of civil service law and regulations, to wit:

1.       grave misconduct;

2.       gross neglect of duty;

3.       gross violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office regulations;

4.       refusal to perform official duty;

5.       conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service;

6.       absence without leave (AWOL)

 Secretary Cariño ordered and placed the petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive
suspension.

Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990

Petitioner-appellees’ counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and

demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation
and imposition of penalties.

Teachers filed a an injunctive suit (Civil Case No. 60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit and praying that it be
stopped from further investigating them and from rendering any decision in the administrative case.  

The trial court denied them a restraining order.

The teachers alleged that the investigating committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion
because its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove
their innocence instead of requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff to adduce evidence to prove the
charges against the teachers. Another petitioner-appelle was allowed to intervene having the same
allegations as to the guidelines of the investigation.

The Solicitor General answered the petitioner for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of
respondent DECS Secretary.  In the main he contended that, in accordance with the doctrine of
primary resort, the trial court should not interfere in the administrative proceedings.

The DECS investigating committee rendered a decision on August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-
appellees guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal.

The trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit.  Petitioner-
appellees moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied on September 11, 1991.

The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Cariño failed to appear in court on the date set for pre-trial conference, and instead he was
represented by Atty. Capinpin. The court rendered the former in default. SolGen moved for recon but
denied by the trial court, for lack of merit.

On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in which it stated:

“The Court is in full accord with petitioners’ contention that Rep. Act No. 4670 otherwise known
as the “Magna Carta for Public School Teachers” is the primary law that governs the conduct of
investigation in administrative cases filed against public school teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its
supplemental law. Respondents erred in believing and contending that Rep. Act. No. 4670 has already
been superseded by the applicable provisions of Pres. Decree No. 807 and Exec. Order No. 292.  Under
the Rules of Statutory Construction, a special law, Rep. Act. No. 4670 in the case at bar, is not regarded
as having been replaced by a general law, Pres. Decree No. 807, unless the intent to repeal or alter the
same is manifest.  

The manner of dismissal of the teachers is tainted with illegality.  It is a dismissal without due
process.  While there was a semblance of investigation conducted by the respondents their intention to
dismiss petitioners was already manifest when it adopted a procedure provided for by law, by shifting
the burden of proof to the petitioners, knowing fully well that the teachers would boycott the
proceedings thereby giving them cause to render judgment ex-parte.

Former DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

Whether or not due process of law was observed in the administrative proceedings against
herein private respondents.

RULING:

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1)  the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights;  

(2)  a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; 

(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;  and  

(4)  a finding by said  tribunal  which is  supported by substantial evidence submitted for

consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

Furthermore, the legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers.  Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division
as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization
and a supervisor of the division.  

Sec. 9.          Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by
a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the  last two  to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools.  The committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public
Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the
school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall
be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges
against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. 

Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all

proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.  

Sec. 38,. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. -

a)           Administrative Proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or the employee
by the head of department or officer of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of
agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges
against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all
proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for
the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a
teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It
was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso
facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section
9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its
choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right
to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or
their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by
the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a
teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee.

5. Pefianco vs. Moral, January 19, 2000 – Muchaniel

On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent
Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the
vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library which were under her
control and supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her possession, without legal authority
and justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical documents which were missing from the
FAD vaults of the National Library.

On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty of the
administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of historical documents of the national
library, to the prejudice of the national library in particular, and the country in general." She was
ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of
all her retirement benefits and other remunerations.

On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, or on 1

October 1996, she received another resolution correcting the typographical errors found on the
first resolution. Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most appropriate to
take under the circumstances."2 Her petition was, however, denied.

Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution dated
September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order of 23 October 1996.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted" in view of the
warning in the 23 October 1996 Order that the denial of the request for the production of the
Investigation Committee Report was final. 3 As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the
Resolution dated 30 September 1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an
action formandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying
that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS
Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said
report.4

Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action,
but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13 January 1998,
Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review.

Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter
substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.

Issue:

1. whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of
petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss,

2. won the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.

1.We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily
requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons
therefor —

After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion or order the
amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied
upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor (Emphasis
supplied).

The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements
prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the
trial court's jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the
basis why petitioner's motion to dismiss was being denied.

Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior
motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would be to
expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain
degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was justified.

Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for reconsideration, has
been given an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act or order. However, this rule is
not absolute and is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the act or order of the
lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory provision of the Rules; as in
this case, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may
assail the act or order of the lower court directly on certiorari.5

2.On the second issue. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone
to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be
necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not
issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to
do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and
to perform a duty already imposed.6

In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear
legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of
petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled
to the writ prayed for.

Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution
dismissing her from the service.7 By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution
from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful purpose now to compel
petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation report.

Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent
with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz
v. Drilon8 that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the
findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges
filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial
evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence
presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt
had been accorded these rights.

It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal communication between
the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally intended for the
perusal of respondent or any other person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary.
More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon
which respondent's removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation
report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we
cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation report.

In fine, the trial court's Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss is not a
mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity for failure to
comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should
clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ
of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there
is no law or rule which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy
of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such instance,
while the trial court's order is merely interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper
remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

6. Garcia vs. Molina, August 10, 2010 - Vargas

1. Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA, March 11, 1991 – Seballos

Lumiqued vs. Exevea, November 18, 1997 - Suan

Prangan vs. NLRC, April 15, 1998 – Sususco

Fortrich vs. Corona, April 24, 1998 - Toral

 What is assailed here is the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President (OP)
approving the conversion of a 144-hectare land form agricultural to agro-industrial institutional
area

 Respondent Corona who was then Deputy Executive Secretary, issued the so-called “win-win”
resolution modifying the said OP decision after it became final & executor

 The said resolution had the effect of converting only 44Ha. and ordered the remaining 100 to be
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries

 Petitioners seek to annul said resolution and to prevent DAR Secretary, Garilao from
implementing the same
I: W/N the act of respondent Corona in issuing the “win-win” resolution is valid

H: NO. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the OP, particularly sec.7 of AO No. 18 provides
that decisions of the OP shall, except as otherwise provided by special laws, become final after the lapse
of 15d from the receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless an MR is seasonably filed. Only one MR
by any one party shall be allowed and entertained.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23 1997 declaring the Decision of March
29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the
said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from
the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration w as permitted to be
filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still
the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration
was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus,
the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,
1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and
basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

Dulay vs. Minister of Natural Resources, February 9, 2003 – Yam-Oc

Encinas vs. PO1 Agustin, Jr., April 11, 2013 – Yballe

- Respondents, who were both Fire Officers, claim that petitioner (Provincial Fire Marshall)
informed them that unless they gave him 5000php, they would be relieved from their station at
Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas

- Respondents abided with the condition but they only managed to give 2000php. Petitioner
demanded for the balance but they failed to do so.

- Subsequently, on March 27, 2000, both respondents were effectively reassigned.

- Respondents filed a letter-complaint with the BFP for illegal transfer of personnel under the
DILG Act of 1990.

o Petitioner answered that the charges should be dropped for insufficiency of evidence
o He recommended that respondents be charged with conducting unauthorized fire safety
inspection and engaging in the sale of fire extinguishers.

o BFP recommended that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence

- On April 2000, on the basis of similar facts, respondents likewise filed with CSC Regional Office
another complaint on the basis of petitioner’s violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.

o Petitioner cited, among others, that the investigating body (BFP) already dropped the charges
against him.

o The CSCRO issued a decision finding petitioner administratively liable

- On appeal, Petitioner argued that the BFP Complaint had already been dismissed by virtue of
the Confidential Report, and that the dismissal had already served as a bar to the further prosecution of
any administrative charge against him.

- Also, petitioner claims that respondents are guilty of forum-shopping for filing two allegedly
identical complaints.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents are guilty of forum shopping

Held:

NO, because the BFP Complaint does not constitute RES JUDICATA in relation to the CSCRO
Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents.

In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur:

a. the former judgment must be final;

b. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties;

c. it must be a judgment on the merits; and

d. there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of
subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections;" or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point."

In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal
of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding investigation
for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed.
Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality.