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On the other hand, activists for Palestinian rights who call for the state of Israel
to be destroyed, for example, by referring to a free Palestine “from the river to
the sea,” engage in illegitimate criticism.
To suggest that Jews have no right to live in Israel is also to engage in illegitimate
criticism. All states are permitted to determine who will live within their borders.
And suggesting that Jews should not live in Israel means advocating the creation
of a huge refugee population based on religio-ethnic criteria.
Some critics call Israel a colonial power. They assume that it is illegitimate for
any Jewish “settler” to live in Israel proper. This assumption is based in part on
the belief that Jews are not indigenous to the Middle East. But Jews have lived in
the Middle East for thousands of years.
In later years, about 800,000 Jews left Arab countries. About two-thirds of them
settled in Israel, and the other third elsewhere. Many of these Jews had been
forcibly expelled.
This does not justify Israeli violations of the human rights of either Israeli Arabs
or of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. It merely provides some context as
to why so many Jews have settled in Israel.
Having said this, I agree with the opinion of the International Holocaust
Remembrance Alliance that it’s legitimate to criticize Israel as one might criticize
any other state. Thus the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement against
Israel is legitimate, as long as it does not simultaneously question the right of
Israel to exist as a state. Many Jewish people both within and outside Israel who
are concerned about Palestinian rights support this movement.
Similarly, although it is not strictly accurate to call Israel an apartheid state, it is
within the realm of acceptable political rhetoric. Legally speaking, apartheid can
only occur within a state. So calling Israel an apartheid state suggests that it has
legal sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza.
A better way to judge Israel’s actions in Gaza and the West Bank is through
universal standards. One such standard is international humanitarian law,
especially the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. This convention prohibits
transfers of population, either from or into conquered territories. That means
Jewish settlements in the West Bank are illegal.
These legal standards are universal. As long as they do not advocate eradication
of the state of Israel and/or expulsion of Israeli Jews, states and activists that
adhere to these standards are engaged in legitimate criticism.
Activists should respect Israel’s rights as a sovereign state. But Israel should
respect Palestinians’ rights under universal human rights and humanitarian law.
Israel is the most important of all the states in the Palestinian crisis.
In May 1967, not a single Israeli lived in the West Bank, a hilly region about the
size of Delaware. It was home to roughly a million Palestinians, who had been
living under contested Jordanian control for two decades.
Israel conquered the West Bank during the Six-Day War in June 1967. Soon
afterwards, Israeli civilians began moving to the region, initially to areas like Kfar
Etzion that had been home to Jewish communities before Israel’s founding in
1948.
The population of Israelis living in the West Bank has mushroomed over the
years. An estimated 430,000 Israeli Jews now live in 132 officially recognized
“settlements” and in 121 unofficial “outposts” that require, but haven’t yet
received, government approval. Constituting about 15% of the West Bank’s total
population, these “settlers” live in their own communities, separate from the
area’s approximately 3 million Palestinian residents.
Most legal experts and the United Nations agree that Israeli settlements in the
West Bank violate international law.
The Trump administration’s new position that Israeli settlements are not illegal
boosts Israel’s claims about the West Bank. But it’s unlikely to legitimize Israeli
settlements in the eyes of the international community.
The territory question is also wrapped up in other overlapping but distinct issues:
whether the Palestinian territories can become an independent state and how to
resolve years of violence that include the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the
partial Israeli blockade of Gaza and Palestinian violence against Israelis.
Most governments and world bodies have set achievement of the two-state
solution as official policy, including the United States, the United Nations, the
Palestinian Authority and Israel. This goal has been the basis of peace talks for
decades.
And most important, the current Israeli leadership, though it nominally supports
a two-state solution, appears to oppose it in practice.
Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister since 2009, endorsed the two-
state solution in a speech that year. But he continued to expand West Bank
settlements and, in 2015, said there would be “no withdrawals” and “no
concessions.”
Israeli public pressure for a peace deal has declined. The reasons are complex:
demographic changes, an increasingly powerful settler movement, outrage at
Palestinian attacks such as a recent spate of stabbings, and bitter memories of the
Second Intifada in the early 2000s, which saw frequent bus and cafe bombings.
And the status quo has, for most Israelis, become relatively peaceful and bearable.
Many see little incentive for adopting a risky and uncertain two-state solution,
leaving Mr. Netanyahu with scant reason to risk his political career on one.
There are multiple versions of the so-called one-state solution, which would join
all territories as one nation. One version would grant equal rights to all in a state
that would be neither Jewish nor Palestinian in character, because neither group
would have a clear majority. Skeptics fear this would risk internal instability or
even a return to war.
Another, advocated by some on the Israeli far right, would establish one state but
preserve Israel’s Jewish character by denying full rights to Palestinians. Under
this version, Israel would no longer be a democratic state.
With few viable or popular alternatives, the most likely choice may be to simply
maintain the status quo — though few believe that is possible in the long term.
This choice, rather than coming in one decisive moment, would probably play out
in many small choices over a process of years. For instance, a 2015 poll by the
Israel Democracy Institute found that 74 percent of Jewish Israelis agreed that
“decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a
Jewish majority.” That pollster also found that, from 2010 to 2014, Jewish Israelis
became much less likely to say that Israel should be “Jewish and democratic,” with
growing factions saying that it should be democratic first or, slightly more
popular, Jewish first.
Many analysts also worry that the West Bank government, whose scant remaining
legitimacy rests on delivering a peace deal, will collapse. This would force Israel to
either tolerate chaos in the West Bank and a possible Hamas takeover or enforce a
more direct form of occupation that would be costlier to both parties.
This risk of increased suffering, along with perhaps permanent setbacks in the
national ambitions of both Palestinians and Israelis, is why Nathan Thrall, a
Jerusalem-based analyst with the International Crisis Group, told me last year,
“Perpetuating the status quo is the most frightening of the possibilities.”