2.

Control of Executive Departments

Section 17, Article 7

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Power of Control vs. Power of Supervision

Power of Control – the power to substitute one’s own judgement in that of the subordinate.
It’s the power of an officer to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgement of the former to that of
the latter. Exercised over executive departments.

Power of (General) Supervision – overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see

that the subordinate officers perform their duties under the law. Exercised over Local

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Government Officers. But this does not include the power to overrule their acts, if these acts
are within their discretion.

BERNARDO HEBRON, vs. EULALIO D. REYES G.R. No. L-9124. July 28, 1958

ISSUE: W/N a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines,
regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative
Code.

HELD: NO. The President has no "inherent power to remove or suspend" local elective
officers. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the
particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitation.

RATIONALE: Article VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President "shall…
exercise general supervision over all local governments", but supervision does not
contemplate control. The constitutional intention was that the provisions were not to be
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self-executing but requires legislative implementation. Removals must be accomplished only
for any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure. The procedure
prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and
removal of the municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory.

Sir’s note: President has power to investigate but no inherent power to discipline Local
Government officials only executive officials. It should be granted by law. Admin. Code grants
the power of suspension the Executive. The Revised Administrative Code grants the power of
preventive suspension of a municipal officer for not more than 30 days.

Drilon vs. Lim G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994

Issue: WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional because it empowers the Secretary of
Justice to review the Tax ordinance of the LGU.

Held: Constitutional. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance. What he found only was that it was illegal. That
3 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes
act is not control but supervision. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code,
but he did not replace it with his own version of what the ordinance should be.. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with
law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act
not of control but of mere supervision.

Lacson-Magallanes vs. Jose Paño, G.R. No. L-27811. November 17, 1967

ISSUE: Whether the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, can reverse a
decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources

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HELD: Yes. Executive Secretary’s act cannot be assailed and therefore has full force and
effect. "Under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in
behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm,
modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue (Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency).

“Doctrine Of Qualified Political Agency”.

The alter ego principle. Also known as the “doctrine of qualified political agency”. Under this
doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and

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administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Buklod Ng Kawaning EIIB, Vs. Hon. Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora G.R. No.
142801-802. July 10, 2001

Issue: Buklod questioned the President’s authority to abolish their office rendering them
unemployed and violating their right to security of tenure.
Does the president have the authority to reorganize the executive department?
How shall the reorganization be carried out?

Held: Yes. The President has the authority to reorganize the executive
department. Bureaus, agencies, or offices in the executive department are under
the President’s power of control. Hence he is justified in deactivating the functions of a
particular office, or in carrying out reorganizations when a certain law grants him such power.
Sec. 31, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code provides the President with the continuing
6 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President in order to
achieve economy and efficiency.

The reorganization should be carried out in good faith. The EOs issued by Estrada was
motivated by the fact that the functions of EIIB are also being performed by other agencies.
The Court also pointed out that the deactivation of EIIB was intended to lessen the expenses of
the government.

Sir’s Note: Power to abolish office created by Congress is lodged in Congress. EIIB was
created by Pres. Aquino, the power of control allows Pres. Estrada to abolish and reorganize
the said office so long as it’s done in good faith and for a legitimate reason.

Fixed Standard: Economy an efficiency of Government office.

Security of Tenure: There is no absolute right to hold office. No one can be said to have a vested
right over their office except for constitutional office. Security of tenure is not violated because
there was no removal from office. Removal presupposes that an office is still in existence.

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When there is no office at all then there can be no removal. Security of tenure is not violated
because there was a valid abolition of office.

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 3. General Supervision Of Local Governments And Autonomous Regions

Sections 4 and 16, Article 10

Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

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JOSE MONDANO Vs. FERNANDO SILVOSA, G.R. No. L-7708. May 30, 1955

Issue: Whether or not the declaration that the order of suspension issued by the provincial
governor is illegal and without legal effect.

Held: Yes it has no legal effect. The Executive has no power of control over local
governments which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may
be provided by law. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to
"receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."

Rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do
they constitute or involve "neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of
maladministration of office." The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of
Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of law.
Pimentel vs. Hon. Alexander Aguirre G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000
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Issues: 1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all
LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy

2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over
local governments

Held: 1. NO. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. It is merely
directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over
local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain
economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does
not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore,
Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

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2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. Here the President is exercising his power of
control over the Local Government. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than
the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall
not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that
must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.

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Rodolfo T. Ganzon, vs. Court Of Appeals G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President)
has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.

Held: Service of suspension renders issue on validity of preventive suspension moot and
academic. Elective officials cannot be preventively suspended for more than 90 days. — We
take judicial notice of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides (as to imposition of
preventive suspensions) as follows: "SEC. 63. Preventive Suspension . . . b) . . . that, any
single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond sixty
(60) days: Provided, further that in the event that several administrative cases are filed
against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days
within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension."

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior

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from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is
exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of
discretion.

4. Power of Appointment

It is the most imminently executive power, because it is through his appointees that the
President can execute the laws.

4 Categories of Officials that the President can Appoint

1. Those vested by the Constitution on the President alone. [Art VII, Sec 3(2)]
2. Those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
3. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
4. Those other officers lower in rank whose appointments are vested by law in
the President(alone).

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SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.

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(a) With consent of Commission on Appointment

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as

COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

Issue: Whether or not the President can appoint Mison without submitting his nomination to
the Commission on Appointments

HELD: Petition dismissed. President of the Philippines acted within her

constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for

presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII,
including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in

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the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide
for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the
officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law.

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BAUTISTA, vs. SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA [G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989]

Issue: Whether or Not CA has constitutional authority to review President’s appointment to

Bautista as CHR Chairwoman.

Held: NO. The President (with Congress agreeing) may not, from time to time move the power
boundaries, from where they are placed by the Constitution. Even if the president voluntarily
submit to COA an appointment that under the Constitution solely belongs to her, still there was
no vacancy to which appointment could be made. By virtue of Bautista’s appointment by
President and Bautista’s acceptance thereof made her a duly appointed chairwoman and she
may only be removed for a cause.

CHR Chair’s appointment is not otherwise provided by law. Since the position of Chairman of
CHR, an independent office created by the Constitution, is not among the positions mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII, appointments to which are to be made with the
confirmation of the CA, it follows that the President’s appointment of CHR Chair is to be made
without the review or participation of the CA.

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TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.), vs. THE COMMISSION
ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS,[G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989]

Issue: WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the HoR
to be confirmed by the CoA.

Held: Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5,
Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section
7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII
whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

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JESULITO A. MANALO, vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA. [G.R. No. 107369. August 11, 1999]

The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the
military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation

Held: Only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent
officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other
government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.

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PETER JOHN D. CALDERON, vs. BARTOLOME CARALE, in his capacity as Chairman
of the National Labor Relations Commission, [G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992]

Issue:Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by CA of appointments

extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in
the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA.

Held: To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by CA of the appointments of

respondents Chairman & Members of NLRC, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because:
1) It amends by legislation, the 1st sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by adding thereto appointments
requiring confirmation by CA
2) It amends by legislation the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by imposing the confirmation of
the CA on appointments w/c are otherwise entrusted only w/ the Pres. Legislation cannot
expand a constitutional provision after the SC has interpreted it.

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b) Limitations on Appointing Power of the President - Sections 13 and 15, Article 7

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants SHALL NOT, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree
of the President SHALL NOT, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

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Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President SHALL NOT MAKE
APPOINTMENTS, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

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DOMINADOR R. AYTONA vs. ANDRES V. CASTILLO G.R. No. L-19313. January 19,
1962.

Issue: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of
the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had
already qualified.

Held: Case involves political question. Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court
resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential
Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such midnight or last-minute appointments.

Others:The "midnight appointments" made by President Garcia were extended by him

under Section 10, Paragraph 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides: "The President
shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." It is clear that these
appointments can only be made during the recess of Congress because they are ad
interim appointments.
24 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes
The term "recess" has a definite legal meaning. It means the interval between a session of
Congress that has adjourned and another of the same Congress. It does not refer to the interval
between the session of one Congress and that of another. In that case the interval is not
referred to as a "recess" but an adjournment sine die. Since the appointments in question
were made after the Fourth Congress has adjourned sine die and ceased to function on
December 30, 1961, they cannot partake of the nature of  ad interim appointments within the
meaning of the Constitution.

An ad interim appointment, to be complete, needs to be submitted to the

Commission on Appointments one the same is constituted. It must be submitted to
the Commission on Appointments of the Congress that has created it. It cannot be
submitted to the Commission on Appointments of a different Congress. Since the
appointments in question were submitted to the Commission on Appointments which ceased
to function on December 30, 1961, they lapsed upon the cessation of said Commission.
Consequently, they can be recalled by the new Chief Executive.

25 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes

 An ad interim appointment is not complete until the appointee takes the oath of
office and actually takes possession of the position or enters upon the discharge of its
duties. The appointment becomes irrevocable. The mere taking of the oath of office
without actual assumption of office is not sufficient to constitute the appointee the actual
occupant thereof who may not be removed therefrom except for cause.

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GODOFREDO QUIMSING, vs. EDUARDO TAJANGLANGIT,[G.R. No. L-19981.
February 29, 1964]

Issue: : Whether the ad-interim appointment extended to petitioner Quimsing on December

20, 1961 and the confirmation thereof and subsequent action taken by the Commission on
Appointment are both valid and in effect?

Held: YES. In the present case, petitioner Quimsing admittedly had been occupying the
position, in an acting capacity since May 20, 1960, and discharging the functions thereof.
Clearly, it cannot be said that the ad-interim appointment extended to him on
December 20, 1961, by virtue of which he took his oath of office on December 28, 1961 was one
of those hurried designations that brought about the "scramble" on the 29th and 30th of
December, 1961, where the outgoing Chief Executive perhaps did not have the
opportunity to consider the merits and qualifications of the hundreds of nominees
to the positions to which they were respectively being appointed. The ad-interim appointment
of petitioner, whose qualification is not in dispute and the regularity of which is not
questioned except for the fact that it was made only on December 20, 1961, cannot
be considered as among those "midnight" appointments the validity of which this
27 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes
Court declared to be, at least, doubtful to entitle the appointees to the equitable relief of quo
warranto”.

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ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) [G.R. No.
191002. March 17, 2010]

Issue: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.

Held: Yes. The Constitution provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled
within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII
does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary. The prohibition only applies to officials in the Executive
department that may influence the election. The presence of the JBC (recommending
appointees to the Judiciary) prevents the abuse of discretion by the President.

Reasons that Would Justify Appointment During Election Ban

1) Paramount national interest

2) When continued vacancies will prejudice public service
3) When continued vacancies will prejudice public safety
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(c) Interim or Recess Appointments - Section 19, Article 6; Section 16, Article 7

Section 19, Article 6: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, AFTER CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT. He shall
also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress.

Section 16, Article 7: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the

30 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes

appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress.

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NICANOR G. JORGE, vs. JOVENCIO Q. MAYOR, [G.R. No. L-21776. February 28, 1964]

ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as a

valid revocation of Jorge's ad interim appointment.

RULING: No. Jorge was duly appointed, confirmed, and qualified Director of Lands.
Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal covers only all appointments made and
released by former President Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on December
13, 1961. Jorge’s ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence
on record that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the
same day. It is a matter of contemporary history, of which SC may take judicial cognizance,
that the session ended late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office
hours. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the
appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being the
regular course of business. The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended
to be covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently,
it was validly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and thereafter, the
office never became vacant.
32 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes
EXCEPTION TO AYTONA RULING. — Ad interim appointments "so spaced as to
afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee’s qualifications" could be validly made even by an outgoing
President under the Aytona ruling.

Regular Appointments – require confirmation before the appointee can take his post. The
President nominates, Congress receives nomination and forwards to the CoA for confirmation
then the Office of the President issues a Commission, at which point the appointee can assume
his office.

Recess Appointments (ad interim) – need no confirmation to be effective albeit

temporarily (or permanently as the case may be). The appointment is effective until
disapproved by the CoA or until the next adjournment of Congress (due to inaction of
congress). It applies only to officers belonging in the 1st category.

Term of Office – provided by law

Tenure – dependent on the will of the officer; can be shortened
33 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes
d. Temporary Designations - Section 17, Book 2, Administrative Code of 1987

Section 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. –

(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch,
appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
(a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of
illness, absence or any other cause; or
(b) there exists a vacancy;

(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is
already in the government service in which case he shall receive only such additional
compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the
position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds
appropriated for the office or agency concerned.

(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.

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e. Limitations on the Power of the Acting President – Sec. 14-16 Art. VII

SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless
revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of
office.

SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

SECTION 16. … The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress.

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 5. Executive Clemencies - Section 19, Article 7; Section 5, Article 9-C

Section 19, Article 7: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Section 5, Article 9-C: No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation
of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.

Reprieve – a temporary relief from or postponement of execution of criminal penalty or

sentence or stay of execution. It does not more than stay the execution of a sentence extended
to a prisoner to afford hi, an opportunity to procure some amelioration of the sentence
imposed.
36 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes
Commutation – reduction of sentence. It is a remission of a part of the punishment; a
substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed.

Pardon- a permanent cancellation of a sentence. It is an act of grace proceeding from the

power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. It is a
remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the offense.

Kinds of Pardon

Absolute pardon -> It is the total extinction of the criminal liability of the individual to
whom it is granted without any condition whatsoever resulting to the full restoration of his civil
rights.

Conditional pardon -> It is the conditional exemption of a guilty offender for the
punishment imposed by a court. It requires the convict to comply with certain conditions.
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Plenary pardon -> extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including
accessory disabilities.

Partial Pardon -> does not extinguishe all the penalties imposed upon the offender.

Amnesty -> a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by government generally to a
class of persons who have been guilty usually of political offenses (treason, sedition, rebellion)
and who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted, and often conditioned upon their
return to obedience and duty within a prescribed time. (no need for acceptance of the grantee)

Probation -> a disposition under which the defendant after conviction and sentence is
released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation
officer.

Parole -> It is the conditional release of a prisoner from correctional institution after serving
the minimum period of prison sentence.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO,"

Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?

Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations.
Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.

This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.

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d) Effect of pardon

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FRANCISCO SALLE, G.R. No. 103567 December
4, 1995

Issue: Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from
a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.

Held: No. No pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes

final. A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably
perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal
is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court,
and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where
the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained
finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the
appellant.

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The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during
the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.

Sir’s Note: Finality of judgment is required to prevent the President from encroaching upon
the jurisdiction of the judiciary and preserve the separation of powers. The President can only
grant pardon after final judgement because there is nothing left for the judiciary to do; the
executive can then proceed to the execution or non-execution of the sentence as the case may
be.

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e) Sanctions for violations of conditional pardons

WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, vs. HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE

CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, [G.R. No. 76872. July 23, 1987]

Issue: Is conviction by final judgment necessary before a person may be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his condition pardon? (President cancelled the
pardon)

Held: No. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the
proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a
judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. (2 ways to revoke a pardon; executive act or judicial act)

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less

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conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
f) Pardon in administrative cases

Rodolfo D. Llamas, Vs. Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos G.R. No. 99031 October 15,
1991

Issue: May the president grant administrative cases?

Held: Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the
constitution. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If
the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. If executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.

43 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive
branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.

g) Who may avail of amnesty?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO,"
CARLOS NARRA, [G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000]

Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who
have offended, by some breach, the law of nations.

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6. Powers as Commander-in-Chief -
Section 18, Article 7; Section 13, Article 3; Section 1 paragraph 2, Article 8

Section 18, Article 7: The President shall be the Commander-in- Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

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The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of
the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

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Section 13, Article 3: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required

Section 1, Article 8: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

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Graduated Powers of the President
1) Calling Out Power
2) Suspension of Writ of Habeas Corpus
3) Declaration of Martial Law

Integrated Bar Of The Philippines Vs. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, [G.R. No. 141284.
August 15, 2000]

Issues: (1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review.
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP.

Held: No. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom.
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The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant
the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call
out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both
of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
2) The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets
for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the
visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.

Sir’s note: President cannot use calling out power indiscriminately. He cannot replace the
duties of the PNP with the AFP using the calling out power. It can only be used when there is
49 |Solis, A. - Tita’s PoliRev Notes
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion or when there is an external threat to the sovereignty of
the Philippines.

The President has discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out power; it is a
political question. When it comes to political question the extent of the power of the court are;
1) to determine WON the President acted with grave abuse of discretion or arbitrarily, and 2) to
determine the factual basis of the calling out power.

PANFILO LACSON, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, [G.R. No. 147780 May 10,
2001]

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional

RULING: As to petitioner’s claim that the proclamation of a “state of rebellion” is being used
by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has
issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the “rebellion.” Xxx With
this declaration, petitioners’ apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.

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In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests
of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based
on the declaration of a “state of rebellion.”

Sir’s note: Is it necessary to declare a state of emergency or rebellion before the President can
exercise his calling out power? NO, as long as the 3 conditions are present (lawless violence,
rebellion or invasion).

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