ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Teehankee: It would violate the fundamental
I. HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
A. Development of Administrative Law as a distinct
field of public law
1. Factors Responsible for the emergence of
administrative agencies.
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
1. Lack of time: branches are so busy
2. Lack of expertise: about pollution or energy, etc.
3. Lack of organizational aptitude for effective and
continuing regulation of new developments in society.
When society was not as complex, the trichotomy could
still handle it, but when it became too complex agencies
were needed.
2. The doctrine of separation of powers and
the constitutional position of administrative
agencies.
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF ADMIN AGENCIES
If not, the likelihood of abuse is so great. Its not a strict
separation. More of a division of functions. Where do you
put the administrative agencies? NLRC, they perform
legislative executive and judicial functions. They perform
hybrid functions.
Admin agencies do to belong strictly in either of the 3
branches
B. Definition of Terms – Administrative Law and
Administrative Agency; Types of Agencies.
“Administrative law is the law concerning the powers and
procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the law
on judicial review of administrative action.
An administrative agency is any governmental authority, other
than the court, and other than a legislative body, performing rule-
making and adjudicative functions which affect the rights of private
parties.” (Davis)
Pangasinan Transportation Co v. Public Service Commission:
The factors responsible for the emergence of adminstrative
agencies are: (1) Growing complexities of modern life; (2)
Multiplication of number of subjects needing government
regulation; and (3) Increased difficulty of administering laws.
Subordinate legislation – delegation to commission an
administrative function which involves the use of discretion to carry
out the will of the assembly.
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Comission: A
board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the
term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act
contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.
Noblejas v.
doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the
Chief Executive over such officials
Garcia v. Macaraig: It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary
under our present constitutional scheme of government that no
judge or even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself
in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for
action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval
and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any
authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court,
as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly
that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.
CJ Fernando Concurring: While the doctrine of separation of
powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor,
the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire
application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being
required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in
character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a
plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was
emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is
not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however
eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the
rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the
task of adjudication.
In Re: Rodolfo Manzano: Administrative functions are those
which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of
rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency
by the organic law of its existence
Puyat v. De Guzman: A ruling upholding the "intervention" would
make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman
need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to
acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and
then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution
directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general
legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited.
Notes: If it is for pecuniary gain, prohibited, if not, it is NOT
prohibited.
II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
A. Administrative Agencies and the Executive Power
of the President
Article VII. Sec. 1 The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines
Article VII. Sec. 17 The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed
Agencies created by law controlled ONLY IF charter provides for it,
otherwise, supervisory
Supervision – Laws are faithfully executed. Control -- power to
change, alter and rehect decision of the subordinate.
B. Congressional Oversight Power
Acts done by Congress in the exercise of Oversight Functions may
be divided into Three Categories (Macalintal v. COMELEC J. Puno
Dissent):
1. Scrutiny: Based primarily on the (a) power of appropriation of
Congress. The holding of a budget hearing has been the usual
means of reviewing policy.
(b) Congress can also ask the heads of departments to appear
before and be heard by either House of Congress on any matter
pertaining to their departments.
(c) Power of confirmation through the CoA.
2. Investigation: This is the in aid of legislation investigations. 3
limitations (1) In aid of legislation (2) conducted in accordance
with procedure (3) persons afforded their rights.
3. Supervision: Congressional supervision allows Congress to
scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and
permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies
through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when
granting the President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions
require the President or an agency to present the proposed
regulations to Congress, which retains a “right” to approve or
disapprove any regulation before it takes effect
C. Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative
Decision-Making
1.Non-delegation doctrine: exception is when the law is a complete
fit, and comes with standards. It has been observed that SC is
generally unwilling to strike down the validity of the delegation
despite broadness or vagueness. Thus many begun to suggest that
the courts should try an innovative approach wherein the focus of
judicial inquiries should shift from statutory standards to
administrative safeguards and standards. (i.e. the administrators
must structure their discretionary powers thru appropriate
safeguards and the standards emanate from the agency itself. This
practice is being done in the US, but not yet in the Phil.)
2. Legislative control
1. Creation and abolition. - Congress can create, divide, merge,
modify, or even abolish agencies. Power to abolish is not effective
because administrative agencies are needed. Reality is more on the
creation
2. Appropriation. - Congress has budgetary power. In actual life,
no appreciable effect because annual appropriation usually gets
Congressional approval, otherwise, public suffers.
3. Investigatory - Effective only as an aid in legislation and cannot
serve the need for constant regulation.
Prescription of legislative standards. Ineffective because the
standards should be flexible and those who make the standards
lack the expertise. The standards must be effective and sufficient.
Prescription of minimum procedural requirements. There must be
a shift towards having administrative standards instead to allow
the agencies enough flexibility.
On the other hand, Congress may prescribe rules on administrative
procedure and consider the ff:
1. Agencies are not courts – the AAs are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure and evidence followed in regular courts
(although they are not exempted from procedural due process)
2. Agencies are specific – the AAs are created to deal with specific
problems hence, a uniform rule of procedure is not possible but
only minimum procedural guidelines and general principle where
the agencies can make supplementary rules. (Rules of Procedure
cannot be uniform for it tends to stifle the AAs flexibility)
3. Judicial Control: Power of judicial review over decisions of
administrative agencies.
Radical view: Courts should review not only agency’s conclusions of
law but even its determinations of fact and policy.
Traditional/Accepted view: Judicial review is allowed on questions
of law and jurisdiction, but not on questions of fact and policy.
Courts defer to the expertise and experience of agencies in their
areas of specialization. Courts are confined to seeing to it that
agencies stay within the limits of their power or to checking
arbitrariness in the administrative process
D. The Ombudsman: Its effectivity and visibility
amidst bureaucratic abuse and irregularity.
Characteristics of an Ombudsman
1. Political independence: The office of the Ombudsman is created
independent, in addition to strict qualification requirements, there
are also certain prohibitions and disqualifications specified in
RA6770
2. Accessibility and expedition: If courts are not easily available to
the poor man’s reach, it becomes more imperative for the
Ombudsman to be more accessible to them. He has deputies all
over the country and even in the military, and may also establish
offices outside MM whenever necessary. Complaints from any
source is to be acted on immediately.
3. Grant of investigatory power: power to prosecute on his own
initiative or upon complaint from any person. He can direct any
officer or employee of the government and its subordinate agencies
or instrumentalities or GOCCs with original charters either upon
complaint or on his own motion to perform or expedite any act or
duty required by law to stop, prevent and correct any abuses or
impropriety in the performance of duties. Can cite for contempt,
seek assistance of any government agency, can inspect, examine
records and conduct private hearings.
4. Absence of revisory jurisdiction: cannot modify or overturn
decisions of administrative agencies performing rule-making or
adjudicative functions. He cannot function as an appellate or review
court.
Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez: The reason for the
creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the
grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office
from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate
judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution
of erring public officials.
While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act
or omission which ". . . appears illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede,
however, that the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act have
intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon
whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested.
We have said that neither this Court nor Congress, and now
perhaps the Ombudsman, could be expected to have the time and
technical expertise to look into matters of this nature. While we
cannot go so far as to say that MWSS would have the monopoly of
technical know-how in the waterworks system, by the very nature
of its functions, however, it obviously must enjoy an advantage
over other agencies on the subject at hand
Lastimosa v. Vasquez: The Ombudsman is authorized to call on
prosecutors for assistance. §31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.:”
The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be
under his supervision and control.”
Moreover the ombudsman has the power to punish for contempt by
virtue of §15(g) of the Ombudsman Act disproving the petitioners
contention that she cannot be held liable for contempt because
their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial,
proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to
discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave
misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the
Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under
preventive suspension as given in §21(power over all elective and
appointive officials except over officials who may be removed only
by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary).
and §22 (preventive suspension in proper cases even without
giving the accused the opportunity to defend themselves since
preventive suspension is not a penalty) of the Ombudsman Act.
BIR v. Office of the Ombudsman: There is no requirement of a
pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative
power. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative
prerogative on its own or upon a complaint filed in any form or
manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or
unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the
investigation.
Also, the power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to
the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The Ombudsman Act
makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee…during his tenure. The law does not qualify the nature
of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that
the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act
or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the
performance of official duty.
Office of the Ombudsman v. ENOC: The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
"any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough
to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such
primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases
The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints
against officers and employees of the government and to enforce
their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where
the evidence warrants.
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman: The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet,
local government, government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or
administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge,
pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.
Ledesma v. CA: this case involves the interpretation of the
phrase: “Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.” Sec. 15(3), RA 6770 (Powers,
Functions and Duties): refusal by any officer to comply with an
order by the ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee
is a ground of disciplinary action  strong indication that the
Ombudsman’s “recommendation” isn’t merely advisory but is
actually mandatory within the bounds of law
Estarija v. Ranada: Under RA 6770 and the 1987 Constitution,
the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove
from government service an erring public official other than a
member of the Congress and the Judiciary
Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing: Respondent also argues
that according to the ruling in Fabella vs CA she may only be
administratively dealt with according to Sec 9 of The Magna Carta
of Public School Teachers. However, in Fabella, the case involved
violation of the Civil Service Law, contrasted with this case, the
charges were filed for violation of RA 6713 or the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
III. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. Legislative Function
1. Non delegation Doctrine
Valid Delegation: If the law is complete when it leaves the
legislature, in all its terms and provisions, in form and substance.It
provides for a general rule of action under which a delegate shall
proceed. Nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate
except ascertainment of existence of facts and events that render
the act operational as provided by the act itself. It’s the
Delegation of Power to make the law.
Invalid Delegation: If act wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain so that it could be
put in use as a uniform policy. If it has no statutory landmark,
guidepost which shall control its exercise. If it is not indicative of
the intendment of the legislative
Conferring authority to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of law (Compania General de Tabacco v. Board of Public
Utility Commission)
Requisites for valid delegation: (1) Law must be complete in
itself and must set forth the policy to be executed (2) Law must fix
a standard, the limits which sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform.
Sufficient standard: (1) Defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. (2) indicates the circumstances which the legislative
command is to be effected.
Form of Standard: May be (1) express (2) implied (3) embodies
in other statytes on the same matter.
Exceptions from the rule of non-delegation of legislative
power: (a) delegation of tariff powers to the President (b)
delegation of emergency powers to the President (c) Delegation to
the people at large (d) Delegation to Local Governments (e)
Delegation to administrative bodies.
US v. Ang Tang Ho: The legislature does not undertake to specify
or define under what conditions or for what reasons the gov-gen
shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any
cause and leaves the question as to any cause to the gov-gen.
People v. Vera: By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not
seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation
Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the
provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial
boards
Pelaez v. Auditor General: Since Jan. 1, 1960, when RA 2370
took effect, barrios can only be created or their boundaries be
altered or their names changed by Act of Congress or of provincial
board (Par. 2 & 3 respectively). the statutory denial of presidential
authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger
power to create new municipalities. The creation of municipalities is
NOT an administrative function but one which is essentially
legislative in character.
Edu v. Ericta: There must be a standard: at the very least the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down
fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected. The standard may
be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety.
The regulations to implement policies should be:
1. Germane to the objects and purposes of the law.
2. Regulation should not be in contradiction but in conformity with
the standards that the law prescribes.
Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor: The
delegation to the Minister of Labor of the power to assume
jurisdiction in a labor dispute likely to affect the national interest or
to certify the same to the NLRC for arbitration does not constitute
an undue delegation of legislative powers. BP130 cannot be any
clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely
affecting the national interest.”
PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz: Under EO 546, the NTC should be
guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and
reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of
private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities.
Hence, the NTC in exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by
the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable
feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy
the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power
Chiongbian v. Orbos: Power of President to reorganize stems
from his duty to supervise local governments since division of
regions are not for territorial or political purposes but
administrative in nature
Santiago v. COMELEC: To constitute valid delegation, the law
must be (a) complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate (b) fix a
standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable, to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Panama Refining v. Ryan: The “declaration of policy” in Section
1 of the Act, stating that there was a national emergency, was a
sufficient definition of a standard to make the statute valid. The
NRA does contain clear standards for exercising executive authority
to prohibit petroleum transportation when read in full context.
(Dissent of Cardozo)
ALA v. Schetcer Poultry Corp v. US: This code was found to be
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because:
1) private groups were given lawmaking function and discretion to
make the policies. Authority wasn’t really delegated to the
President.
2) It covered every sector of the economy (not like the FCC, which
just deals with communications). It was an overbroad delegation of
authority. There was no limitation on things that could be subject
to the “codes of fair competition.”
Cardozo wrote a strong concurrence saying that this was a
situation of “delegation run riot”, that although Congress
delegating power to executive can sometimes be ok, congress
delegating power to industrial or trade associations was out of the
question.
ABAKADA v. Ermita: It is not a delegation of legislative power. It
only delegates the ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement
and administration of increased rate under the law is contingent.
The legislature made the operation of the 12% rate effective Jan.
1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. This leaves
the operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside the
control of the Executive
Review Center v. Ermita: The CHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is
limited to public and private institutions of higher education and
degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a
framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to
amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
Federal Energy Administration v. Al Gonquin SNG: Section
232 (b) does not constitute an improper delegation of power, since
it establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action, including a
finding by the Secretary of Treasury that an article is being
imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security. Moreover, even if these
preconditions are met, the President can act only to the extent he
deems necessary to adjust the imports so that they will not
threaten to impair the national security, and Section 32 (c) sets
forth specific factors for him to consider in exercising his authority.
2. Permissible Delegation
a. Ascertainment of Fact
Lovina v. Moreno: The mere fact that an officer is
required by law (1) to inquire the existence of certain
facts, and (2) to apply the law thereto, in order to
determine what his official conduct shall be, and the fact
that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute
an exercise of Judicial Power
Statutes may give non-judicial officers the power (i) to
declare the existence of facts which call into operation the
statute’s provisions, and (ii) to ascertain appropriate facts
as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular
laws. Such functions are merely incidental to the exercise
of power granted by law to clear navigable streams of
unauthorized obstructions.
b. Filling in of Details
Alegre v. Collector of Customs: For necessity and as a
means of enforcement and execution.
c. Administrative Rulemaking
In rule making, administrative agencies are not directly
answerable to the people since administrative officers
were not elected by the masses.
There is a need for publication and public participation.
Rule – an agency statement which implements or
interprets the law
Book VII, Administrative Procedure Sections 1-9,
Administrative Code of 1987
Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all
agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except
the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, military establishments in all matters
relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board
of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and colleges.
Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book:
(1)"Agency" includes any department, bureau, office,
commission, authority or officer of the National
Government authorized by law or executive order to make
rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and
adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to
licensing functions; government corporations with respect
to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation
or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary
power as provided by law.
(2)"Rule" means any agency statement of general
applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and
describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of,
an agency, including its regulations. The term includes
memoranda or statements concerning the internal
administration or management of an agency not affecting
the rights of, or procedure available to, the public.
(3)"Rate" means any charge to the public for a service
open to all and upon the same terms, including individual
or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof,
as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other
special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation
to be observed and followed by any person.
(4)"Rule making" means an agency process for the
formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
(5)"Contested case" means any proceeding, including
licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges
asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution
or by law are to be determined after hearing.
(6)"Person" includes an individual, partnership,
corporation, association, public or private organization of
any character other than an agency.
(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or
admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of
right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding;
but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an
agency from admitting any person or agency as a party
for limited purposes.
(8)"Decision" means the whole or any part of the final
disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether
affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency
in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting
of rights and privileges.
(9)"Adjudication" means an agency process for the
formulation of a final order.
(10)"License" includes the whole or any part of any
agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval,
registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or
other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a
right or privilege.
(11)"Licensing" includes agency process involving the
grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension,
annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment,
modification or conditioning of a license.
(12)"Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition,
limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any
person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty
or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of
property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement,
restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the
revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other
compulsory or restrictive action.
(13)"Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of
money, assistance, license, authority, privilege,
exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any
claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception;
or taking of any action upon the application or petition of
any person.
(14)"Agency proceeding" means any agency process with
respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing.
1."Agency action" includes the whole or part of
every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief
or its equivalent or denial thereof.
Sec 3. Filing –Every agency shall file file with UP Law
Center 3 certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules
in force on the date of the effectivity of this code which
are not filed within 3 months from that date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party
or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent
functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section
under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the
issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
Sec 4. Effectivity In addition to other rule-making
requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this
Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days
from the date of filing as above provided unless a different
date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of
imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the
existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons
who may be affected by them
Sec 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the
Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules
filed with it during the preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus
published and remaining in effect, together with a
complete index and appropriate tables.
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. -
(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit
from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its
publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or
otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be
made available on application to the agency which
adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating
the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new
copies thereof may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act
which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject
to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.
Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The
University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one
(1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified
rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the
codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public
officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other
persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or
distribution costs.
Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of
the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the
bulletin or the codified rules.
1. Limits to Rule-Making Power
1. It must be within the scope of authority
2. Must not be inconsistent with law
3. Must be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law
Olsen v. Aldanese: The Legislature has not defined what
shall be the standard or the type of leaf or manufactured
tobacco which may be exported to the United States, or
even specified how or upon what basis the Collector of
Internal Revenue should fix or determine the standard. All
of that power is delegated to the Collector of Internal
Revenue
Syman v. Jacinto: Memo order is void because it is
inconsistent with law, since the RAC specifically provides
for an appeal to the commissioner before he can review
the case.
People v. Maceren: The lawmaking body cannot
delegate to an executive official the power to declare what
acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself.
Toledo v. CSC: Commission later promulgated the
Revised Civil Rules which was published on the OG. Sec 5,
Rule 6 provided – a prohibition on the appointment of 57
year olds and above in the service RA 2260 however
contained no provision prohibiting appointment in the
Gov’t service of any person who’s already 57 years old.
This prohibition was entirely a creation of the CSC.
CIR v. CA: All administrative issuances must be in
harmony with the law and must NOT modify it. In this
case, it was an act of administrative legislation.
Landbank v. CA: Sec 16 of RA 6657 provides that
deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. DAR
exceeded the limits of its power to enact rules that
allowed the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
land owner. Function of promulgating rules and
regulations may be exercised only for the purpose of
carryinf the provisions of the law into effect. Admin
regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative
enactment.

GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications: EO 146 organized
NTC as a 3-man commission. Thus all memo circulars
negating the collegial nature of NTC are illegal.
Administrative regulations derive their validity from the
statute that they intend to implement.
APDC v. Philippine Coco Authority: The PCA is charged
with the duty of carrying out the State’s policy to promote
the rapid integrated development of the coco industry. By
limiting the scope of registration to merely monitoring
volumes of production in effect abdicates its role provided
by law.
PBC v. CIR: NIRC provides that a taxpayer may file a
claim only within 2 years. Circular extended the
prescriptive period. This cannot be done.
2. Publication and Effectivity
Ppl v Que Po Lay: Said circular, particularly its penalty
provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one
until its publication in the Official Gazette or after Nov.
1951, or 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. Appellant could not be liable because the circular
was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to
sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof
Tanada v. Tuvera: Effect of Having No Date of
Effectivity: Where the legislation itself does not provide for
its effectivity date, the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth
day following its publication
Effect of Having its Own Date of Effectivity: Date only
refers to effectivity, but which does not preclude
requirement of publication [MEANING, while the law would
be effective according to the date provided, it must still be
published prior]
Purpose of Publication: Due Process To give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. It would be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no
notice whatsoever.
NOT INCLUDED: Other presidential issuances which apply
only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published
PASEI v. Torres: Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall
file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three
(3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. In addition
to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become
effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided.
Republic v. EXPRESS Telecommunications: The fact
that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law
Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is
nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies
that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the
operative act that gives the rules force and effect.
The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of
codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the
President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National
Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress
may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to
cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Still,
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation is a condition sine qua non before
statutes, rules or regulations can take effect
Nasecore v. ERC: Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
GMA v. MTRCB: With regards to Memo Circular 98-17 –
the Administrative code of 1987, particularly Section 3,
requires each agency to file with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR) of the UP Law Center
three certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Administrative issuances not published or registered with
the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
The memo here which provides for penalties for offenses
of exhibiting programs without a valid permit has not been
registered with the ONAR as of 1/27/2000
It is the unenforceable since it hasn’t been registered –
petitioner not bound by said circular and should not have
been meted with the sanction provided
RP v. Shell: Strict compliance with the requirements of
publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that
parties were notified of the existence of the implementing
rules concerned.
3. Penal Regulations
The law itself must declare the act as punishable and must
also define or fix the penalty for the violation.
Admin bodies cannot make penal rules as they are
exclusive to the legislature and cannot be delegated.
For an administrative regulation to have the force of penal
law, (1) the violation of the admin regulation must be
made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the
penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute
itself (Perez v. LPG)
Ppl v. Que Po Lay supra
4. Interpretative Rules
Legislative Rules Interpretative Rules
Promulgated pursuant to Passed pursuant to its
its quasi-legislative/ rule- quasi-judicial capacity
making functions
Creates a new law, a new Merely clarifies the
policy, with the force and meaning of a pre-existing
effect of law law by inferring its
implications
Needs publication Need not be published
Hilado v. CIR: An administrative officer cannot change a
law enacted by congress. A regulation that is merely
interpretative of the statute when once determined to
have been erroneous becomes a nullity.
Victorias v. SSC: When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it MAKES a new law
with the force and effect of a valid law and partakes the
nature of a statute. When it renders an opinion, it merely
interprets a statement of policy. These are merely
advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the
law means.
Peralta v. CSC: Administrative construction is NOT
necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an admin
agency may be set aside by the judicial department if
there is an error of law or abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with the letter and spirit of a legislative
enactment.
5. Examples of Rule-Making in Various
Agencies
American Tobacco v. Director of Patents: Power and
authority granted to the Director suggests that the
Director has the administrative flexibility necessary for the
prompt expeditious discharge of its duties. Hence he can
allow any hearing officer to hear the parties
Dagan v. PHILRACOM: Validity of an administrative
issuance hinges on the ff requisites: (1) Promulgation
must be authorized by the legislature (2) Promulgated in
accordance with prescribed procedure (3) Within the
scope of authority given by the legislature (4) Must be
reasonable.
Petitioners argue that Philracom’s guidelines have no
force and effect for lack of publication and failure to file
copies with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law
Center as required by law.
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the
exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-
legislative power does not require notice and hearing. In
Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court had the
occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in
the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no
determination of past events or facts that have to be
established or ascertained (?)
d. Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices
Admin Code Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not
otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules
and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit
their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be
valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published
in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2)
weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases
shall be observed.
Generally: The power to fix rates is a quasi-legislative
function. However it becomes judicial when the rate is
applicable only to an individual.
Is Notice and Hearing required? Only when it is a
contested case. Otherwise it can be dispensed with.
Legislative Rate-Fixing: Applies to all, notice and hearing
may be dispensed with unless law requires otherwise
Quasi judicial Rate- Fixing: Applies to particular persons,
requires notice and hearing
Panay Autobus v. Phil Railway: The legislature has
delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services, but it has not
authorized the Public Service Commission to delegate that
power to common carrier or other public service. The
rates of public services like the Philippine Railway Co.
have been approved or fixed by the Public Service
Commission and any change in such rates must be
authorized or approved by the Public Service Commission
after they have been shown to be just and reasonable.
KMU Labor Center v. Garcia: The power to fix rates
can’t be delegated to a common carrier or other public
service. The latter may propose new rates, but these will
not be effective w/o the approval of the administrative
agency.
Ynchausti v. PUC: But in fixing the rate, it would not be
fair to the public to base it upon a peak cost, and, for the
same reason, it would not be fair to the owner of the
property to place it upon a minimum cost. Neither would it
be fair to either party to base the rate upon any abnormal
condition. A just rate must be founded upon conditions
which are fair and reasonable both to the owner and the
public.
What are considered in gixing rates? (1) Present valuation
of all the property of a public utility (2) The fixed assets.
The property then is deemed taken and condemned by the
public at the time of filing of the petition.
Vigan Electric v. PSC: . Such rate-fixing was based on
an audit report – that petitioner is making a profit of more
than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by Vigan
Electric. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine
the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to
disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion
drawn therefrom by PSC. In other words, in making said
finding of fact, PSC performed a function partaking of a
quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which
demands previous notice and hearing.
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz: In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
 required to prescribe for guidance of the administrative
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an
express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard
may be implied. Under EO 546, the NTC should be guided
by the requirements of public safety, public interest and
reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition
of private entities in communications and broadcasting
facilities. Hence, the NTC in exercise of its rate-fixing
power, is limited by the requirements of public safety,
public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates
Manila International Airport Authority v. Airspain: As
an attached agency of the DOTC, the MIAA is governed by
the Administrative Code of 1987.23 The Administrative
Code specifically requires notice and public hearing in the
fixing of rates:
BOOK VII. – Administrative Procedure:
SEC. 9. Public Participation. - … (2) In the fixing of rates,
no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed
rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing
thereon.
e. Licensing Function
Admin Code Section 17. Licensing Procedure. - (1)
When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a
license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing,
the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply
insofar as practicable.
(2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws,
rules and regulations or when public security, health, or
safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn,
suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and
hearing.
Admin Code Section 18. Non-expiration of License. -
Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient
application for the renewal of a license with reference to
any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license
shall not expire until the application shall have been finally
determined by the agency.
Gonzalo Sy v. Central Bank of the Philippines: A
license is a special privilege, a permission or authority to
do what is within the terms. It is not in any way
permanent, vested or absolute. A license granted by the
state is revocable. As a consequence of the power to grant
licesnes, the State and its instrumentalities have the
power to recoke it. The absence of an expiry date does
not make it perpetual, and it cannot last beyond the life of
the basic authority under which it was issued.
B. Judicial Function
Definition: The power of the administrative agency to determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
Admin Code Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To
expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or
claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the
public interest, encourage amicable settlement, comprise and
arbitration.
Admin Code Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases.
(1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and
hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5)days before the
date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the
hearing.
(2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and
argument on all issues. If not precluded by law, informal
disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation,
agreed settlement or default.
(3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.
Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case:
(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence
commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs.
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies
or excerpts, if the original is not readily available.
Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare
the copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of
a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted.
(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses
presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence.
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of
generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its
specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an
opportunity to contest the facts so noticed.
Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall
have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the
production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data,
upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon
showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the
Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case
being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as
contempt.
Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a
contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency
shall decide each case within thirty (30) days following its
submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally
or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any,
or to them.
Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall
become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a
copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that
period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has
been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which
shall suspend the running of the said period.
a. Power to issue subpoena, declare contempt
Note: Subpoena – All agencies with quasi-judicial
functions have the power to issue a subpoena even if the
charter is silent on the power. It is implied in investigatory
functions. It is the lifeblood of investigatory power.
Contempt – The enabling statute must expressly provide
power of contempt. If there is no power then the agency
must go to the RTC because the power to cite contempt is
inherently judicial.
Evangelista v. Jarencio: An administrative agency may
be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information
upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature
may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature.
An administrative subpoena differs in essence from a
judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a
judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a
competent court, and not an administrative subpoena.
Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in
the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is
involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and
even before the issuance of a complaint. The purpose of
the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a
pending charge, but upon which to make one if the
discovered evidence so justifies.
The administrative agency has the power of inquisition
which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in
order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.
Requisites of a valid subpoena: (1) within the
authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too
indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
Guevara v. COMELEC: Although the negotiation has
resulted in controversy, it merely refers to a ministerial
duty which COMELEC has performed in its administrative
capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by
our Constitution. It only discharged a ministerial duty; it
did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case,
it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as
postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial
in nature.
Catura v. CIR: To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power
to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very
least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and
conditions. The documents required to be produced
constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to
whether or not there was a failure to comply with the
mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle
down the authority conferred on administrative agencies
to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this
case intended to protect the rights of union members
against its officers. The matter was properly within its
cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and
effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power
sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon
private rights of petitioners entitled to priority
Tolentino v. Inciong: The competence “to hold any
person in contempt for refusal to comply” certainly does
not extend to a judge of the CFI
b. Warrants of Arrest, Administrative Searches
1987 CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
1973 CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE IV – Bill of Rights
Section 3. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and whatever
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as maybe authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Notes: The provision (repeated in all 3 constitutions) is an
expressed guarantee against unwarranted violations of
the privacy and security of persons and their properties.
1987 version is a verbatim adaptation of the ’35 one, with
additional phrases, and some were removed from the ’73
version.
1.The phrase “determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law” was
removed in the 1987 Constitution from the ’73 to
eliminate what had happened during the Marcos regime
wherein the military could arrest any one only on mere
suspicion.
2. The phrase “of whatever nature and for any purpose”
was retained (addition if compared to ’35).
3. The phrase “shall be inviolable” replaced the phrase
“shall not be violated” as appearing in the ’73 putting the
phrase in positive.
4. The phrase “to be determined personally by the judge”
This is to give more responsibility to the judge who will
issue the warrant of arrest and be accountable for it.
Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board: “The Constitution
does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case
and administrative warrants in administrative
proceedings.”
Vivo v. Montesa: The warrants of arrest issued by the
Commissioner are void because: (a) the arrests were not
administrative arrest that are valid but instead were for
the sole purpose of investigation and before a final order
of deportation had been issued, where the brothers had
 been ordered exactly for the purpose of showing cause
why they should not be deported. The consequence of
such orders of arrest is the operation of the Constitutional
limitation that (b) the power to determine probable cause
for warrants of arrest is limited to judges exclusively.
Santos v. Commissioner: The contention of the Solicitor
General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry
into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as
already stated, there is already an order of deportation.
To carry out the order of deportation, the President
obviously has the power to order the arrest of the
deportee But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not
indispensable that the alien be arrested
Salazar v. Acachoso: Art. 38 of the Labor Code is void
because only a judge may issue warrants of search and
arrest. The POEA administrator or the Secretary of Labor
not being judges may not issue search or arrest warrants.
Camara v. Municipal Court: Camara has been charged
with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to
enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no
emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the
inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt
to obtain Camara’s consent to search. Camara had a
constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a
warrant to search and that appellant may not
constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the
inspection
See v. Seattle: The businessman, like the occupant of a
residence, has a constitutional right to go about his
business free from unreasonable official entries upon his
private commercial property.
c. Imposition of Fines and Penalties
Oceanic v. Stranahan: (1) Subject matter must be
within the control of Congress (2) Penalty is
administrative or civil NOT criminal (3) Must be expressly
conferred to an administrative official.
CAB v. PAL: though it is true that the power to impose
fines is a judicial function, administrative agencies
empowered by legislation to regulate certain sectors are
empowered to impose administrative fines.
Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller: Sec. 25 of RA
875, entitled Penalties, provides that any person who
violates Sec. 3 of this act shall be punished by a fine of
P100-P1000, or by imprisonment of 1 month to 1 year, or
both. Any other violation which is declared unlawful shall
be punished by a fine ranging from P50-P500 for each
offense, at the court’s discretion.
SC: The above provision is general in nature since it
doesn’t specify the “court” that may act when the violation
charged calls for the imposition of the penalties. That
word (court) cannot refer to the CIR, for to give that
meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed
to every accused by the Constitution.
C. Judicial Determination of Sufficiency of Standards:
1. Interest of Law and Order
2. Public Interest
3. Justice, Equity, and substantial merits of the case
4. What is moral, and educational
5. What is sacrilegious
6. Adequate and efficient instruction
7. Reasonableness as an implied standard
8. To promote simplicity, economy or efficiency
9. Maintain monetary stability
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Section 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions. -
(1) Every agency shall publish and make available for public
inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication of
contested cases.
Section 19. Appeal. - Unless otherwise provided by law or
executive order, an appeal from a final decision of the agency may
be taken to the Department head.
Section 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals. -
(1) Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision
complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with the
agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving
copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate agency,
and paying the required fees.
(2) If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have
the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period
for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the
decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall
have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal
within which to perfect his appeal.
(3) The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the
records of the case to the appellate agency.
Section 21. Effect of Appeal. - The appeal shall stay the decision
appealed from unless otherwise provided by law, or the appellate
agency directs execution pending appeal, as it may deem just,
considering the nature and circumstances of the case.
Section 22. Action on Appeal. - The appellate agency shall review
the records of the proceedings and may, on its own initiative or
upon motion, receive additional evidence.
Section 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency. - In any
contested case, the decision of the appellate agency shall become
final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt by the
parties of a copy thereof.
Section 24. Hearing Officers. -
(1) Each agency shall have such number of qualified and
competent members of the base as hearing officers as may be
necessary for the hearing and adjudication of contested cases.
(2) No hearing officer shall engaged in the performance of
prosecuting functions in any contested case or any factually related
case.
Section 25. Judicial Review. -
(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in
accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.
(2) Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency
decision may seek judicial review.
(3) The action for judicial review may be brought against the
agency, or its officers, and all indispensable and necessary parties
as defined in the Rules of Court.
(4) Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with
the agency within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof a
notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a petition for review
of the order. Copies of the petition
shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. The
petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved
and the grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be
accompanied with a true copy of the order appealed from, together
with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred
to therein and other supporting papers. The petition shall be under
oath and shall show, by stating the specific material dates, that it
was filed within the period fixed in this chapter.
(5) The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the final administrative decision. One (1)
motion for reconsideration may be allowed. If the motion is denied,
the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remaining period for
appeal reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the
decision is reversed on reconsideration, the appellant shall have
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution to perfect his
appeal.
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by
statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules
of Court.
(7) Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole.
The findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial
evidence shall be final except when specifically provided otherwise
by law.
Section 26. Transmittal of Record. - Within fifteen (15) days from
the service of the petition for review, the agency shall transmit to
the court the original or a certified copy of the entire records of the
proceeding under review. Th record to be transmitted may be
abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceedings. The court
may require or permit subsequent correction or additions to the
record.
A. In Rule-Making, price, wage or rate-fixing
B. In Adjudication of Cases
1. Due Process
a. Cardinal Primary rights
Cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
administrative proceedings:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered. (Ang Tibay v. CIR)
Asprec v. Itchon: For due process to be satisfied, the law only
requires that parties be given notice of the trial and an opportunity
to be heard. Presence of a party at trial is not its essence.
As found, Asprec was given notice of such trial and actually agreed
upon the date. However he forfeited his right to be heard due to
his absence during the hearing
Vinta v. NLRC: In labor cases, this Court has consistently held
that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing,
but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements
of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when parties are
given the opportunity to submit position papers. The holding of an
adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties
cannot demand it as a matter of right
Bachrach v. CIR: The right of the party to confront and cross-
examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or
civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals
with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right, which is part of
due process. If without his fault, this is violated, he can have the
direct examination stricken off the record.
UP Board of Regents v. CA: Due process does not always entail
notice and hearing prior to deprivation of a right. Hearing may
occur after deprivation as in emergency cases.
Rivera v. CSC: The law, in prescribing a process of appeal to a
higher level, contemplates that the reviewing officer is a person
different from the one who issued the appealed decision. Otherwise
the review becomes a farce and meaningless.
Pefianco v. Moran: Moreover, there is no law or rule which
imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a
copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally
held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative case
is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations
of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision
based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented
against her during the hearings of the investigation committee.
Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.
NAPOLCOM v. Bernabe: Due process as a constitutional precept
does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of
the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of
Montemayor v. Bundalian: Administrative due process cannot be Uy v. COA: Notice to enable the other party to be heard
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a
enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an
case against him is decided indispensable ingredient of due process.

American Inter-Fashion: There is no retroactive effect of curing It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor
the evidential flaw. Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners
amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an
Samalio v. CA: But administrative bodies are not bound by the opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his
technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in defense
courts of law. They're not strictly applied, and administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict 2. When Not Required
judicial sense. Administrative tribunals exercising QJ powers are
unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, Not required when: (1) Urgent reasons (2) Discretion is
subject to the observance of fundamental and essential exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed
requirements of due process fact. (3) It involves the exercise of discretion and there is
no grave abuse (4) When rules to govern future conduct
Goss v. Lopez: The total exclusion from the educational process of persons or enterprise, unless law provides otherwise
for more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension is for (5) In the valid exercise of police power
10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended child. At the
very minimum, therefore, students facing suspension and the Suntay v. People: When discretion is exercised by an
consequent interference with a protected property interest must be officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact such as the
given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing filing of a serious criminal charge against a passport
holder, hearing may be dispensed with for the cancellation
Matthews v. Eldridge: 3 factors vis a vis Goldberg v. Kelly (1) of the passport
Potential Deprivation (2) Fairness and reliability of the existing pre-
termination procedures (3) Public interest. Bisschop v. Galang: Extension of stay of aliens is purely
discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities.
b. Notice and Hearing Hence formal hearing may be dispensed with. Moreover, a
letter advising Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere
1. When Required formality and far from final. It is only advisory for him to
depart.
It is required: (1) When the law specifically requires it
(2) When it affects a persons status and liberty (UP Bar)
Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA: Ex parte cease and
desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in
NADECOR v. Collector: Rocha was not given an
situations like that here presented precisely because
opportunity to prove that the television set complained of
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters
Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Decisions
of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted
must be supported by evidence gathered from a hearing
litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of
especially when they impose a fine.
such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
Bautista v. WCC: We rule that the respondent
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken,
Commission gravely abused its discretion in ignoring and
which of course may take several years. It is a
in not passing upon the issue of denial of due process
constitutional common place that the ordinary
squarely presented by claimant's counsel. The very rules
requirements of procedural due process yield to the
of the Commission require the giving of reasonable
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those
notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon
here involved, through the exercise of police power
him personally or by registered mail of a copy thereof at
his last known post office address or if he is represented
by a counsel, through the latter (Sec. 2, Rule 15, Revised
rules of the WCC, 1973
c. Form and Promulgation of Judgment
Equitable Banking v. NLRC: While it is true that the
Indias v. Phil. Iron Mines: The order, it is true, does not make
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
its own discussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact, but
heard or, as applied in administrative proceedings, an
such is not necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of its
opportunity to explain one's side, meetings in the nature
examiner or referee which already contains a full discussion of the
of consultation and conferences such as the case here,
evidence and the findings of fact based thereon. The situation
however, may not be valid substitutes for the proper
differs if the court disagrees with the report in which case it should
observance of notice and hearing.
state the reasons for its disagreement. If it is in full accord with the
For having violated private respondent Sadac's right to
report, it is purposeless to repeat what the referee or examiner has
due process, and considering that his repeated request for
already found in it. Such is the present situation. The court
a hearing was left unheeded, Petitioner Bank is liable in
approved the report of the hearing examiner "after a perusal of the
the amount of P5,000.00
record of the case." This presupposes that it has examined the
evidence and found no justification for modifying his findings and
conclusions. This is a substantial compliance with the law.
Serrano v. PSC: Art. VIII, Sec. 12 does not apply to the Public
Service Commission. The obligation to state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which the decision is based is incumbent
on a court of record. The Public Service Commission is not a court
of record within the meaning of the constitutional provision. The
Seven Cardinal Primary Rights pronounced therein must be
respected, the last of which is that “quasi-judicial tribunals,” and
the Public Service Commission is one of them, “should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Solidhomes v. Laserna: The constitutional mandate (Sec 14 Art
8), which provides that, “no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
law on which it is based.” does not preclude the validity of
memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals.
The memorandum decision to be valid can’t incorporate the
findings of fact and conclusion of law of the lower court only by
remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is
not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation to be allowed, it must
provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to said. The
memorandum decision should embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and
made an indispensable part of the decision.
Additional condition: this kind of decision may be resorted to only
in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties
and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal
complications involved that will require an extended discussion of
the laws involved.
DOH v. Camposano: However, the actual exercise of the
disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to
comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision. The
disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigator’s recommendation, but must personally weigh and
assess the evidence gathered. The President’s endorsement of the
records of the case for the “appropriate action” of the health
secretary did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal
of respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of
Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a
legal assessment of the controversy.
American Tobacco v. Director of Patents: The power to decide
resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law. But this
does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on
the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be
made.
Albert v. Gangan: The COA decision merely stated conclusions of
law. Facts and circumstances, as well as the why’s, the what’s and
the how’s of the disallowance, were patently missing, inaccurate or
incomplete. The COA cannot just perform its constitutional
function of disallowing expenditures of government funds at sheer
discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure is
alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a misrepresentation.
Arocha v. Vivo: Retyping dates on the face of documents, w/o
further evidence of record, is not enough to convict the member of
the BoC of maliciously antedating their decision.
There’s a presumption of regularity in official actuations.
Falsification of documents carries serious implications and must be
proved clearly beyond reasonable doubt. The operative date of the
Commissioners’ action is that when the resolution of exclusion was
voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date
when the decision was prepared, written, and signed.
Arocha Rule: Voting must be within the 1 year period. The writing
of the decision extensor related back to the date of voting
Neria v. Commission of Immigration: In this case, August 2,
1961 was the date when the BSI concluded its hearing of case,
deliberated on it, and voted for his admission as a citizen of the
Philippines. August 2, 1961 was also the date when the decision in
extenso was rendered. That date and not September 4, 1961,
therefore, is the date of promulgation of the decision of the BSI,
which decision should "prevail and shall be final ... unless reversed
by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu
proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the
promulgation of said decision." Computing the one-year period
from August 2, 1961, the Board of Immigration Commissioners had
until August 2, 1962 within which to review the proceedings motu
proprio.
Go Yu Tak Wai v. Vivo: This Court held that "the operative date
of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of
exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless
of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and
signed" because "the decision in extenso must relate back to the
day when the resolution to exclude was adopted. It suffices that
the Commissioners should review the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry and deliberate upon it within one year from the
promulgation of the Board of Special Inquiry's decision and that the
minutes of their deliberation should reflect the action which they
took within the said statutory period.
Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners: Under Sec 27 of
Commonwealth Act No 613, the act of the Board of Special Inquiry
can be reversed within one year from promulgation of decision. In
this case, the original decision was rendered on Sept 11, 1961
while the reversal was made on Sept 4, 1962 thus within the one
year period.
The fact that it was sent to the minors on Oct 26, 1962 does not
vitiate it since all All that the Immigration Law requires is that the
decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners be promulgated
within one year from the rendition of the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry
Also, Sichangco failed to provide any evidence that the Board of
Comissioners acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
Teehankee dissent: decision on a review motu proprio by
respondent board (whether for inclusion or exclusion) must be duly
put in writing and promulgated as required by substantive due
process within the statutory one-year period. It should be duly
promulgated.
3. Jurisdiction
Administrative agencies may only exercise such powers as are
explicitly or by necessary implication conferred upon them by law.
Absent such jurisdiction, their decisions would be void.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The enabling statute should be
carefully examined because the agency can validly act only if it is
authorized by law.
Factors: (1) If what is involved is a question of constitutionality,
judicial review is available (2) Intention of Congress prevails. (3)
Nature of problem involved (4) Finality of administrative decision.
Feliciano v. Director of Patents: Under the provisions of the
Patent Law (Republic Act No. 165), the Director of Patent has no
power and authority to compel the inventors to do what the
appellant is asking them to perform. What the appellant asked the
Director Patents to do for him is essentially a judicial function
which would require the determination or finding by a court of
competent jurisdiction as to whether there was a meeting of the
minds of the contracting parties before it could compel the
applicant-inventors to perform what the appellant prays the court
to order them to do.
Go Tek v. Deportation Board: . Under existing law, the
deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of
the President, after due investigation, pursuant to RAC Sec. 69 and
(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of
the Board of Commissioners under Immigration Law Sec. 37. It is
fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not
dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case" Thus, it
was held that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in a criminal
proceeding of the particular charge does not prevent the
deportation of such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal
does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings.
Conviction of a crime is not necessary to warrant deportation.
Go v. Ramos: Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by the mere
claim of citizenship. After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the
appellate court was not convinced that the same was sufficient to
oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation
proceedings.
Dela Fuente v. De Veyra: Exlusive jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture cases is vested in the Collector of Customs. It precludes
a CFI from taking cognizance of such cases.
Carino v. CHR: CHR’s powers are limited to investigation. It was
not intended by the constitution to be a quasi-judicial agency.
Simon v. Commission on Human Rights: On the issue of
contempt powers, while the CHR is constitutionally authorized to
adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof, that power should be understood
to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatory powers
such as when someone refuses to cooperate with the CHR or obey
summons issued in pursuit of its investigatory work.
The order to cease and desist is not investigatorial in character but
rescinds from an adjudicative power which the CHR does not
possess.
The best CHR can do is indorse for appropriate action its findings
and recommendations to any appropriate government agency and
not order the cease and desist order.
Laguna Lake Development v. CA: GRule: Issues regarding
pollution fall within the jurisdiction of the Pollution Adjudication
Board. Exception: Whenever a specific law grants jurisdiction to
another body.
Union Bank v. HLURB: The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate
the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over
complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of
the mortgage, of a condominium unit, with damages.
Osea v. Ambrosio: This Court has consistently held that
complaints for breach of contract or specific performance w/
damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unity buyer
against the owner/developer fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HLURB
Mateo v. CA: The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution,
is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil service. RTCs
have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of
officers and EEs covered by the Civil Service Law.
Cagayan v. Constancio Collera: ERB has the power to regulate
and fix rates. But this does not carry with it the power to
determine whether an electric company is guilty of overcharging
customers for consumption of electric power.
Arranza v. BF Homes: HLURB has jurisdiction over cases
involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against the
developer.
4. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Arising
from the Same Facts
Galang v. CA: The difference in the proceeding (one admin and
one criminal) is merely physical incompatibility. They involve
different causes of action and therefore can proceed
simultaneously. An order of release in the criminal action, upon the
filing therein of the corresponding bail bond, would not affect the
legality of the detention under a warrant of arrest or deportation
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration under said section 37.
Similarly, the acquittal of the accused in said criminal action would
not bar his deportation under the same provision, by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Co San v. Director of Patents: In the cancellation proceedings
the question refers to the validity of the design patents issued to
respondent Jose Ong Lian Bio, while in the criminal case the inquiry
is whether Co San unfairly competed against the luggage of said
respondent protected by design patent No. 7.
The first is within the cognizance of the Patent Office while the
second is under the CFI jurisdiction. The acquittal of San Co was
not based on the cancellation of a patent, but on the opinion that
San Co had not deceived or defrauded the complainant.
Villanos v. Subido: A condemnatory decision in a criminal case,
even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for a decision in
an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple
reason that matters that are material in the administrative case are
not necessarily relevant in the criminal case. So, notwithstanding
that findings in criminal cases must be beyond reasonable doubt,
they cannot be conclusive for administrative purposes. There are
defenses, excuses and attenuating circumstances of value in
administrative proceedings which are not admissible in the trial of
the criminal cases
PNR v. Domingo: The reason for the rule is that generally
acquittal in the criminal case does not carry with it relief from
administrative liability. The administrative case may generally
proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for
the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of
evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the criminal charge, as in the analogous cases
provided by Art. 33 of the Civil Code.
Tan v. COMELEC: The administrative case against petitioner,
taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in
relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser
and not as a city prosecutor. Hence absolution from criminal
charge in Ombudsman is not a bar to an admin prosecution.
Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan: Ferrer argues that the criminal case
against him requires a higher quantum of proof for conviction --
that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt -- than the administrative
case, which needs only substantial evidence. He claims that from
this circumstance, it follows that the dismissal of the administrative
case should carry with it the dismissal of the criminal case. While
that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of
administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of
administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service,
based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public
trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is
the punishment of crime. The independent nature of a criminal
prosecution dictates that the Sandiganbayan must determine
petitioner's criminal liability without its hands being tied by what
transpired in the administrative case. The court is duty-bound to
exercise its independent judgment.
5. Rules of Evidence
Rules of Evidence: GRule: Apply the specific rules of the
administrative agency. In the absence thereof, apply the general
rules on procedure.
Pervasive Principle: Admin agencies are not bound by the
technical rules of evidence of ordinary courts so long as due
process is observed.  Applies in (1) Admissibility (2) Judicial
Notice (3) Quantum of Evidence.
Philippine Movie Pictures Association v. Premier Production:
An ocular inspection of the establishment or premises involved is
proper if the court finds necessary, but such is authorized only to
help the court in clearing a doubt reaching a conclusion or finding
the truth. In this case, the court merely acted on the strength of
the ocular inspection it conducted on the premises of Premiere. The
petition for lay-ff was the lack of work and financial losses. These
allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the place
of labor especially when such inspection was conducted at the
request of the interested party.
Estate of Florencio Buan v. Pambusco: Distinguishable from
Premiere because the survey and ocular inspection was done only
to find out the truth about the adequacy of service and was not
meant to supplant actual trial. The Commission’s decision was not
based solely on the survey, but considered all the evidence
presented by the parties.
Rizal Light v. Municipality of Morong: settled is the rule that in
reviewing the decision of the Public Service Commission this Court
is not required to examine the proof de novo and determine for
itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence really justifies
the decision. As stated earlier, the Commission based its decision
on the inspection reports submitted by its engineers who
conducted the inspection of petitioner's electric service upon orders
of the Commission. 11 Said inspection reports specify in detail the
deficiencies incurred, and violations committed, by the petitioner
resulting in the inadequacy of its service. We consider that said
reports are sufficient to serve reasonably as bases of the decision
in question
Bantolino v. Coca Cola Bottlers: Administrative bodies like the
NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure
and the rules obtaining in courts of law
The submission by respondent, citing that an affidavit not testified
to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary
value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a
criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from
that of an administrative proceeding.
Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the
discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing.
Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may
be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting
documents and their affidavits
CSC v. Colanggo: Administrative rules of procedure are construed
liberally to promote their objective and to assist parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses. Section 39 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides: xxx The
investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the
truth without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in
judicial proceedings. It shall be conducted by the disciplining
authority concerned or his authorized representatives.
The provision above clearly states that the CSC, in investigating
complaints against civil servants, is not bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence applicable in judicial proceedings.
The CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of PBET application
form, picture seat plan and PDS (though not duly authenticated) in
determining whether there was sufficient evidence to substantiate
the charges against the respondent. Worth noting was that
respondent never objected to the veracity of their contents. He
merely disputed their admissibility on the ground that they were
not authenticated.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS
Judicial review keeps the admin agency within its jurisdiction and
protects substantial rights of the parties affected by its decisions.
Judicial review is proper in cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of
law, grave abuse of discretion, fraud or collusion, or in case the
admin decision is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious
A. Factors Affecting Finality of Administrative
Decisions
Switchmen’s Union of North America v National Mediation
Board: Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial
review, the following become highly relevant in determining
whether judicial review may nonetheless be supplied (1) the type
of problem involved (2) history of the statute in question.
Fortich v. Corona: Thus, the act of the Office of the President in
re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in
gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord
finality to administrative determinations.
Antique v. Zayco: Even administrative decisions must and
sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written
on judicial controversies. Public policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for
which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversy
Sotto v. Ruiz: If it is a question of law, then it is within the ambit
of judicial review.
before the end of the fiscal year to avoid the reversion of the
funds. The SC here held it as another EXCEPTION to the rule since
appeal to the administrative hierarchy would be unavailing
considering the urgency of the situation and the damage
impending.
Cipriano v. Marcelino: It is altogether too obvious that to require
the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way to the President of the
Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of the small
total P949, would not only be oppressive but would be patently
unreasonable. By the time her appeal shall have been decided by
the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the
total sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been spent.
Corpuz v. Cuaderno: The Court held that appeals to the CSC and
President are merely permissive and not mandatory as there are
no laws requiring appeals exclusively to the President. Hence
exception

Uy v. Palomar: The Postmaster General here asserts that his
decision is beyond judicial review of the courts the same not
having been given in the Postal Law. The SC here ruled that
although the allegation of the Postmaster General is correct
(GENERAL RULE), the absence of statutory provisions for judicial
review does not necessarily mean that access to the courts is
barred the exception being decisions of such agencies that exceed
its authority or are palpably wrong.
Manuel v. Villena: When there is grave abuse of discretion,
judicial review is available.
De Lara v. Clorivel: rule regarding exhaustion of administrative
remedies may be relaxed when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage which cannot otherwise be prevented except
by taking the opportune appropriate action
Paredes v. CA: The SC held that the exhaustion of remedies rule
is applicable as the enabling law tasked the Cabinet to review and
approve any proposed revisions of rates of fees and charges.
Petitioners should have availed of this easy and accessible remedy
instead of immediately resorting to the judicial process as the
courts.

San Miguel v. Secretary of Labor: The issue was w/n an
administrative decision may be reviewed by the court. The SC here
again held the GENERAL RULE is NO, since the administrative
agencies possess the necessary technical expertise to make the
determinations on their own. However the EXCEPTION lies when
there is: (1)Lack/excess of jurisdiction (2) Grave abuse of
discretion (3) Error of law (4) Collusion (5) A Decision Illegal for
violating or failing to comply with a mandatory provision of law (6)
A decision that is corrupt, arbitrary, or capricious.
Quasha v. SEC: The SC held that with just 6 days before the
deadline there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies
and that they properly filed the petition with the SC without going
through the prescribed procedure of filing before the SEC en banc
Republic v. Sandiganbayan: this case falls under 2 exceptions
on the application of the doctrine: 1) estoppel on the part of the
agency by laches; 2) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction as it was beyond
the power of the PCGG to issue the search and seizure orders.

PAAT v. CA: Exceptions to exhaustion:

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Requisites: (1) Administrative agency is performing a quasi judicial
function (2) Judicial review is available (3) The court acts in its
appellate jurisdiction
Reasons/Purposes: Legal: the law prescribes procedures
exhaustion.
Practical: to give an agency the chance to correct itself and for
purposes of expediency
Remedy: Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Cause of Action.
The same must be seasonably raised or deemed waived
Pascual v. Provincial Board: The SC here held that the
circumstances of the case were an exception to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies as what the case pertained
to was a legal question (w/n an official’s acts during his first term
may be subject of disciplinary charges during his 2nd term.)
Alzate v. Aldana: A mandamus was filed by the principal of the
school violating the rule on Exhaustion of Administrative remedies
there being the need to have dispensation of the teacher’s salaries
1. There is violation of due process;
2. Issue involved is a purely legal question;
3. The admin action is patently illegal amounting to lack/excess of
jurisdiction;
4. Estoppel on the agency's part;
5. There is irreparable injury;
for
6. Respondent is a dept. secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the Pres bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. To require exhaustion of admin remedies would be
unreasonable;
8. It would amount to nullification of the claim;
9. Subject matter is private land in land case proceeding;
10. Rule does not provide a plain, speedy & adequate remedy;
11. Circumstances indicate the urgency of judicial intervention
12. Where the claim involved is small
13. Quo Warranto (Lopez v. City of Manila)
DAR v. Apex Investment: Exception in this case: circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and the
administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
Smart v. NTC: In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a
rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need
no exhaust administrative remedies before going to court as this
principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function
and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or
quasi-legislative power. The scope of judicial power includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political departments.
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges: The CHED does not have the
power to award damages. She could not have commenced her case
before the CHED. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained of.
CSC v. Dept of Budget and Management: The rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where there is
an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a
condition precedent to taking action in court. CSC is not mandated
by law to seek clarification from the DBM Secretary prior to filing
this action. A direct invocation of the SC's original jurisdiction may
be allowed where there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition
C. Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary Resort
There is a concurrence of jurisdiction between the court and the
administrative agency such that there is a choice as to which body
the relief shall be sought. This doctrine does not apply where the
law grants exclusive jurisdiction to a body.
Requisites: (1)Admin body and regular court have concurrent and
original jurisdiction (2) Question to be resolved requires expertise
of administrative agency (3) Legislative intent on the matter is to
have uniformity in rulings (4) Administrative agency is performing
a quasi-judicial function not rule making or quasi-legislative
function.
Doctrine is inapplicable: (1) Agency has exclusive jurisdiction (2)
Issue is not within the competence of the admin body to act on (3)
Issue involved is clearly a factual question.
Effect: Case is not suspended but merely suspended.
Grule: Courts will not intervene if the question to be resolved is
one which requires the expertise of administrative agencies and
the legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in the
rulings. It can only occur where there is a concurrence of
jurisdiction between the court and the admin agency.
Texas v. Abilene: Courts will not intervene if the question to be
resolved is one which requires the expertise of administrative
agencies and the legislative intent on the matter is to have
uniformity in the rulings. It can only occur where there is a
concurrence of jurisdiction between the court and the
administrative agency. It is a question of the court yielding to the
agency because of the latter’s expertise, and does not amount to
ouster of the court.
Phil Global Communications v. Relova: Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction does not apply since NTC had no competence to act on
questions which were purely legal. The doctrine calls for application
when there is such competence to act on the part of an
administrative body.
Industrial Enterprises v. CA: However, if the case is such that
its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical
matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the
proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view.
D. Standing to Challenge
Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged
The technical rules on standing comes from the general doctrine of
separation of powers as there is a need for an actual case or
controversy before judicial review becomes available
Standing as opposed to real party-in-interest: the former is a
constitutional law concept which only concerns the petitioner, while
the latter is a concept in procedural law which concerns both the
petitioner/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant.
Note: Standing issue should be resolved in its own. No standing.
No case. It is irrelevant whether or not the case is meritorious. The
merits of the case should not be a factor in the consideration of
locus standi. (Association of Data Processing)
Ursal v. CTA: The rulings of the Board of Assessment Appeals did
not "adversely affect" the city assessor. At most it was the City of
Cebu that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could
not thereafter collect higher realty taxes from the abovementioned
property owners.
Acting Collector v. CTA: Only persons, associations or
corporations whose pecuniary and proprietary interests are
adversely affected by a decision of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, or provincial or city Board of
Assessments Appeals may appeal to the CTA.
Lozada v. v. COMELEC: Taxpayer's suit is proper only when the
act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or
statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public funds. Taxpayer's
suits cannot lie upon the mere generalized interest of all the
citizens because such kind of interest is so abstract in nature.
Concreteness of an injury, may it be actual or threatened, makes a
dispute capable of judicial resolution.
As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the petition, for nowhere
therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. The act
complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special
election, as is allegedly its ministerial duty under the constitutional
provision cited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public
funds.
Oposa v. Factoran: As to the propriety of generations yet unborn,
it is valid under the concept of intergenerational responsibility with
respect to the right to a balanced and healthy ecology.
Joya v. PCGG: The term "interest" is material interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and related party.
Kilosbayan v. Guingona: As a general rule, a person impugning
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of its enforcement.
An EXCEPTION to this is transcendental importance to the public in
which case the Court wants to settle the issue definitively as soon
as possible.
Kilosbayan v. Morato: Questions of constitutionality: legal
standing. Otherwise: real party in interest (because this is a civil
case)
Domingo v. Carague: Petitioners have not shown any direct and
personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan.
There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
implementation.
Association of Data Processing v. Camp: Petitioner satisfied
the test for standing. This case rejected the "legal interest" test
and established that a plaintiff may sue provided he is "injured in
fact.”
1.Legal interest test
Old test used in prior cases; CA used this test and found
petitioner without standing; Court, however, held here that
this test was not fit to determine standing since it already
involved the merits of the case which should not be. (See
above, separate issue ang standing)
2.Public interest test
Another test used by the CA to find petitioner without
standing; Court ruled, however, that this was inapplicable
since the test only applied to plaintiffs who were significantly
involved to have standing to represent the public
3.Case or controversy test
Introduced in Flast v. Cohen; capacity of dispute to be
presented in an adversary context and in a form capable of
judicial resolution. However, Court qualified that Flast was a
taxpayer's suit whereas case at bar was a competitior's suit.
(see Simon v Eastern Kentucky below)
4.Injury in fact test
Whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. Petitioner
alleged probably profit loss from the new competitor.
5.Zone of interest test
Whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question; a measure of self-restraint for the
Court.
Sierra v. Morton: No injury-in-fact showed because the Petitioner
asserted no individualized harm to itself or its members. Supreme
Court held that the Sierra Club, in its corporate capacity, lacked
standing.
Lujan v. National Wildlife: Respondent failed to show 2
requisites to claim right to judicial review: 1) person must specify a
final agency action that affects him; 2) person must prove that he
is adversely affected by the final agency action within the meaning
of regular statute.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing requires a concrete,
discernible injury—actual or imminent and not a "conjectural or
hypothetical one"—injury in fact this is the first of 3 elements of
constitutional minimum for standing: 2) causal connection between
injury and act complained of; 3.) it is likely as opposed to
speculative that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision
E. Ripeness
Fitness of issues for judicial determination.
Abbot v Gardner: The basic rationale of ripeness is (1) to prevent
the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also (2) to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties.
TWO-FOLD ASPECT/TEST:
1. FITNESS for judicial decision: Purely legal questions agreed
upon by both parties (only questions of law; should NOT involve
policy making function)
2. HARDSHIP OF PARTIES of withholding Court consideration: (1)
Must be a final agency action  There is no hint that this
regulation is informal or only the ruling of a subordinate official, or
tentative. (2) Consider: added cost to parties, possibility of
instituting a criminal action against disobedient party, etc.
National Automatic Laundry v. Schultz: Ripeness involves an
inquiry to; 1) the finality; but also to 2) the presumption of
reviewability of issues. General Ripeness Considerations are; 1)
WON there is a congressional intent to negative judicial review, 2)
the possibility of courts entangling themselves in abstract
disagreement over administrative policies due to premature
adjudication; and 3) the fitness of issues for judicial determination
and hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.
VI. MODES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1987 CONSTITUTION: Article IX Sec. 7. Each Commission shall
decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of is submission
for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
BP 129 Sec 9. (See Rule 43 also) The Court of Appeals shall
exercise:
Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decision,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission
and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
B. Certiorari
Requisites: (1) Lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (2) No plain, adequate
or speedy remedy. (3) Administrative agency performing a quasi-
judicial function. It cannot be invoked if it is a ministerial function.
Purpose: To set aside and nullify proceedings.
St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC: In the case of NLRC
decisions, the intent of the legislature was to make a special civil
action for certiorari as the proper vehicle for review. Thus, all
references in the law to “appeals” from the NLRC to the SC must
be interpreted to mean petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All
such petitions must initially be filed in the CA following the
hierarchy of courts.
Police Commission v. Bello: While findings of facts of
administrative bodies are entitled to great weight and should not
generally be disturbed, there is grave abuse of discretion justifying
the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Purefoods v. NLRC: It must emphatically be reiterated, since so
often is it overlooked, that the special civil action for certiorari is a
remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment.
Villaruel v. NLRC: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court does not include a correction of its evaluation of the
evidence but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the
judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner.
Hadji Sirad v. CSC: Doctrine of case is that a special civil action
for certiorari can only be taken when there is no other plain and
speedy remedy. Here there was one as instead of going directly to
the SC, an appeal from the CSC decision finding her guilty of grave
misconduct could have been taken to the CA by appeal.
C. Prohibition
It is preventive and not for acts already performed. Issues on the
same grounds as certiorari. Not only quasi-judicial but also
ministerial. (1) Grave Abuse and (2) No other speedy remedy.
Purpose: To prohibit or stop proceedings.
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board: . If the alienage of the Chua
Hiong is not denied, the Board's jurisdiction and its proceedings are
unassailable; if the respondent is admittedly a citizen, or
conclusively shown to be such, the Board lacks jurisdiction and its
proceedings are null and void ab initio and may be summarily
enjoined in the courts. When the evidence submitted by a
respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings.
However, it is neither expedient nor wise that the right to a judicial
determination should be allowed in all cases; it should be granted
only in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is
substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the
claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only
in the sound discretion of a competent court in a proper
proceeding.\
Co v. Deportation Board: While doctrine of primary jurisdiction
wherein the administrative agency, such as the Deportation Board
in this case, must be given the opportunity to decide the matter
before it before the courts could intervene, the doctrine is not
applied in proper cases where right to immediate judicial review
should be recognized such as in this case as recognized in Calacday
v Vivo where it stated that the Chua Hiong decision is an exception
to the rule.
Paredes v. CA: SC said that prohibition is granted only where no
other remedy which is sufficient to afford redress is available.
Here, the law itself provided that increases of rates would still have
to be approved by the cabinet, since the approval was not yet
given, prohibition is premature.
D. Mandamus
Mandamus is an order compelling a party to perform an act arising
out of a positive duty imposed by law. It will only lie against a
ministerial duty when the official/agency refuses to exercise it. It
will not lie to enforce a contractual obligation. Specific performance
is the remedy.
Requisites: (1) Duty is ministerial (2) Petitioner has a clear and
controlling right (3) No other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Blanco v. Board of Examiners: SC said that mandamus does not
lie, duty of the Secretary was discretionary to confirm or not
confirm the results, he had to determine w/n the results were
credible. Act of confirming is NOT a ministerial duty.
Ng Gioc Lu v. DFA: act of issuing a visa is discretionary,
particularly because the consular office in China is in the best
position to determine w/n the return of Ng Gioc Lu to the
Philippines is a threat to public safety.
Policarpio v. Phil. Veterans Board: Mandamus does not lie when
the action calls for the review of an action or decision of a Board
granted with discretion, and when such action or decision involves
the construction of the law and the application of the facts thereto.
Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission: Mandamus lies because
after proving that Tan was a member of a guerilla organization
recognized by the US army, it becomes ministerial to approve the
release of backpay.
Pangasinan v. Reparation Commission: Reparations goods
were not transferred to Pangasinan because respondent did not yet
sign the contract to convey the goods to the province. SC said
mandamus will not lie to enforce contractual obligations.
Mandamus is based on the ministerial duty imposed by law, while
specific performance is based on contract.
Cruz v. CA: Mandamus will not issue to (1) compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do (2) give the applicxnt anything
to which he is not entitled to law.
It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and
to perform a duty already imposed.
PRC v. De Guzman: Filed petition for mandamus to compel the
PRC to register them as licensed physicians, but SC said that
mandamus will not lie as such registration is discretionary because
licenses shall be issued only to those who have “satisfactorily
complied with the requirements of the Board”, the operative word
is satisfactorily, the determination of satisfactory compliance is
discretionary.
E. Declaratory Relief
May be brought by a person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument or by a person whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation or ordinance
before breach or violation of his right.
The power to grant declaratory relief is discretionary with the
courts and they may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights
and to construe instruments in cases where;
1. A decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy
which gave rise to the action; and
2. In any case where the declaration of construction not necessary
and proper at the time and under all circumstances.
Requisites: (1) Subject matter must be a deed, will contract or
written instrument in which the petitioner is legally interested, or
governmental regulation which affects his rights. (2) Terms of the
written instrument are doubtful and requires construction (3) Filed
before breach. (4) Actual justiciable controversy (5) ripe for
adjudication (6) administrative remedies have been exhausted,
adequate means are still available through other forms of action or
proceeding
Azajar v. Ardalles: Azajar brought an action for declaratory relief
to declare his citizenship. SC said declaratory relief is the improper
remedy, there is a proper administrative procedure for the
declaration of citizenship, it must be what must be resorted to.
De Borja v. Villadolid: SC said declaratory relief would not lie
since it should be filed before the breach of law, here there has
already been a breach, he proceeded to catch fish without a
license, he should have sought declaratory relief first before
proceeding without a license.
NDSC v. Meer: SC said that the removal of the proviso was to
make the application discretionary, the law would allow the
taxpayer the remedy of declaratory relief when the tax is not yet
due, but not when it is due.
DR is no proper when a taxpayer questions his tax liability.
Remedy is to pay first then sue afterwards for recovery so that
there is no delay in collection of taxes./
Mirando v. Wellington: Requisites for the applicability of DR: 1)
Justiciable controversy; 2) Adverse interests between parties 3)
petitioner has Legal Interest in the controversy; 4) Ripeness. Not
all are present thus it must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action.
F. Habeas Corpus
The great writ of liberty is intended as a speedy remedy to secure
the release of a person deprived of his liberty.
Requisites: (1) There is illegal confinement or detention (2) Illegal
restrain of liberty (3) Rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.
Mejoff v. Director of Prison: . 2 Habeas Corpus cases – 1st,
denied because his detention was necessary for the process of his
deportation, 2nd was granted because it was for an unreasonable
length of time (2 years), the government could have adequately
found ways to repatriate him to Russia. Here, it was shown that
the writ does not apply to Philippine citizens alone.
Co v. Deportation Board: Habeas corpus may issue in
deportation cases "in cases when the courts themselves believe
that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of
citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for
the belief that the claim is correct, In other words, the remedy
should be allowed only in sound discretion of a competent court in
a proper proceeding.
Lucien Tran v. Liwag: Habeas corpus petition mooted by the fact
that he posted bail and hence is already granted liberty. Also, other
events have supervened, deportation proceedings have actually
taken place and hence his arrest, although initially illegal, is now
legal as it is for the purpose of the proceedings.
G. Injunction as a Provisional Remedy
It is an ancillary remedy provided to preserve the petitioner’s
rights while the main action is pending.
It may be used (1) to prevent the commission of certain acts
complained of (2) Order the continued performance of some act
for the purpose of preventing injury.
Grounds: (1) Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded (2)
Commission or continuance of act would probably work injustice to
him (3) Defendant is doing, threatens or about to do an act in
violation of petitioners right which may rended the judgment
ineffective.  If plaintiff wins, injunction is permanent. If he loses,
dissolved.
Types:
i. Preliminary Mandatory Injunction – Plaintiff wants to compel
defendant to do something
ii. Preliminary Injunction – To prevent or to stop defendant from
doing something
iii. Restraining Order – Life span is 20 days then hearing is held to
decide propriety of injunction
iv. Permanent injunction – If plaintiff wins the case, injunction
becomes permanent.
Collector v Reyes: Injunction cannot be had when a taxpayer
questions his tax liability. However, SC saw an exception (Sec. 11
of RA 1125): “When in the CTA’s opinion, the collection by BIR may
jeopardize the Government’s and/or the taxpayer’s interest, the
court may at any stage suspend the old collection
Pineda v. Lantin: CFI has no jurisdiction to grant the prohibition.
Orders of the SEC commissioner may be reviewed only by the SC.
Lemi v. Valencia: When the law requires a hearing before the
denial of an application to operate a radio station, the seizure of
the station’s radio equipment is illegal. The preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering the return of the confiscated transmitter is
proper. Courts should exercise great care in issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction bec it requires one of the parties
to perform a positive act, as opposed to merely maintaining the
status quo.
*Preliminary Mandatory Injunction will be granted in the following
cases: (1) Cases of extreme urgency (2) Where petitioner’s right is
clear (3) Relative inconvenience are strongly in his favor (4) There
is a willful invasion of petitioner’s right, injury being a continuous
one (5) Restore the status quo.
Honda v. San Diego: Writ of injunction/prohibition may be issued
against a court only by a superior court.
Nocnoc v. Vera: Maranang filed in the CFI a complaint for
injunction to enjoin execution. CFI granted, saying that it could
take cognizance of the complaint as it was a court of general
jurisdiction, despite the fact that it had no appellate jurisdiction.
CFI may not enjoin the WCU. The proper forum to question the
validity of WCU’s award is the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, then to the SC if appealed further. “Court of general
jurisdiction” is merely descriptive and does not confer jurisdiction.
VII. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Law and Fact Distinction
The distinction between law and fact is important to make because
reviewing courts can look into determinations of fact by the lower
courts (bodies) only if the same are unsupported by substantial
evidence. If they are so supported, then the appellate courts are
bound to such findings of fact. Questions of law, however, are
always reviewable by the higher courts.
The distinction, for practical purposes seem empty. Lawyers can
validly argue that a question of fact is in fact a question of law
because when the interpretation of the law is necessarily related to
the determination of the facts, then they form part of the review
and are too questions of law which the appellate court may look
into.
Dauan v. Secretary: The records of the Bureau of Lands had been
destroyed so circumstantial evidence had to be introduced, and the
rule now is that the conclusion drawn from these facts is a
conclusion of law which the courts may review.
Reyes v. Reyes: The law presumes that the worker had died in
the ordinary course of his employment. The employer must present
substantial evidence to overcome this presumption, which the
employer failed to do. (Sufficiency of evidence to overcome a
presumption of law is a question of law)
Aboitiz v. Pepito: The claim only stated that the crew member
was missing; thus when the petitioner failed to controvert the
claim, it only admitted that the crew member was missing, not that
he was dead. Non-controversion in compensation cases (and
ordinary civil cases) simply means admissions of facts, not
conclusions of law. (The question of law herein is the question of
whether the crew member is dead or not.)
B. Question of Law
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns
the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood
of facts being admitted.
What may be questioned?
(1)Constitutionality of the Statute creating the agency and
granting its powers;
(2) Validity of the agency action if this transcends the limit
established by law;
(3) Correctness of the agency’s interpretation and
application of the law.
Ortua v Singson Encarnacion: However, any action of the
Director of Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of the law
can be corrected by the courts. The question of law herein is
Ortua’s citizenship
Mejia v. Mapa: SC is not unmindful of the doctrine that “a
decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the
Secretary upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to
be reviewed by the courts.” But this does not apply herein,
because here the decision of the Director was NOT approved, but
was revoked by the Secretary
Ysmael v. Santos: The argument against “majority” is contrary to
the findings of fact of the lower court, which was based on a list of
the salesmen or agents affiliated to the Union. Hence, said findings
may not be disturbed in this proceeding for review by certiorari.
O’Leary v. Brown Pacific Maxon: The determination of W/N the
accident arose out of, or in the course of Valek’s employment is a
question of law that is cognizable by the courts. The question of
W/N an employer-employee relationship existed between Valak
and BPMI is also a question of law
All that is required is that the "obligations or conditions" of
employment create the "zone of special danger" out of which the
injury arose.
O’Keefe v. Smith: Inferences drawn by the DC are to be accorded
great weight, unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence.
SC held that the DC was correct in finding that the conditions of
employment created the “zone of special danger” out of which the
injury arose.
C. Question of Fact
A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts, or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility
of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
Reviewing courts can look into determinations of fact by lower
courts ONLY if the same are unsupported by substantial evidence.
Questions of law, however, are always reviewable by higher courts.
 General Rule: Finality is attached o findings of fact of
some agencies when these findings are supported by
substantial evidence and as long as there is no grave
abuse of discretion.
A question of fact is raised when the issue involved is:
1. W/N a certain thing exists; or
2. W/N an event has taken place; or
3. Which version of events, among 2 or more, are correct.
Gonzales v. Victory Labor Union: Employees were dismissed for
pilferage. Substantial evidence rule is that findings of fact will not
be disturbed on appeal as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.
Acting Commissioner v. Meralco: The SC is bound by the
finding of facts of the CTA, which enjoys wide discretion in
construing tax statutes. The CTA is dedicated exclusively to the
study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily
developed an expertise on the subject. The CTA’s determination of
insulating oil as within the meaning of insulators is thus accorded
respect
Meralco v. NLRC: SC has ruled that the ground for an employer's
dismissal of an employee needs to be established only by
substantial evidence.
Lameyra v. Pangilinan: Held: No substantial Evidence. SC was
not convinced that the certification of the personnel officer that
petitioner did not report for work from July 6, 1995 to August 6,
1995 constitutes such substantial evidence in light of the
petitioner’s submission that said personnel officer precisely
prevented him from signing the log book. Under these
circumstances, petitioner should be given a last full opportunity to
prove his contention that the termination of his services was illegal.
German Marine Agencies v. NLRC: Award of sickness wages
case. Whether or not petitioners actually paid the balance of the
sickness wages to private respondent is a factual question. In the
absence of proof that the labor arbiter or the NLRC had gravely
abused their discretion, the Court shall deem conclusive and
cannot be compelled to overturn this particular factual finding
Velasquez v. Hernandez: Held: There was substantial evidence.
SC says that 20 sworn statements of teachers are sufficient. Only 3
desisted but it is of no moment because administrative actions
cannot be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who
may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act.
CSC v. Cayobit: Person who said that 84% siya sa CSC exam but
in truth 40% lang! Quantum of evidence required is only
substantial in administrative proceedings. Hence the masterlist,
being the primary record of the passers, is sufficient evidence to
dismiss the employee.
Office of the Ombudsman v.Santos: Case of the principal who
stole Yero’s (galvanized iron sheets) Since the decision of the
Ombudsman was supported by substantial evidence, the SC
sustained saying: “We affirm all the other findings of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The testimonial and documentary evidence
contained in the records constitutes substantial evidence to prove
the administrative liability of respondent,”
Universal Camera v. NLRB: Dean says that this is the leading
case in substantial evidence. Doctrine: The evidence supporting the
agency's conclusion must be substantial in consideration of the
record as a whole, even including the evidence that is not
consistent with the agency's conclusion.
Notes: Sir says you must look at the evidence at a whole, the CA
(penned by Learned Hand ) ignored the examiners report.
D. Questions of Discretion
DISCRETIONARY MINISTERIAL
Power or right conferred upon A response to a duty which has
agencies to act officially under been positively imposed by law
certain circumstances, according and its performance required
to the dictates of their own at a time and in a manner or
judgment and conscience and upon conditions specifically
not controlled by the judgment of designated. Not dependent
others upon the officer’s judgment or
discretion
Power to make a choice among Nothing is left to discretion. It
permissive action or policies. is a simple definite duty arising
Person or persons exercising it under conditions admitted or
may choose which of several proved to exist
courses of action should be
followed
GRule: Courts have no power to substitute their own judgments
with that of the administrative official. Because it is a recognition of
the expertise of the agency.
Except: When there is grave abuse of discretion.
Laguna Tayabas Bus v. PSC: Provisional permit for buses case.
Super Memory Jolter: This is the case where Sir made the historic
speech about being PRECISE and CUTTING EDGE! Doctrine: Just
because there was a difference or erroneous appreciation of the
competing facts presented before the officer, the court will not
substitute its judgment with that of the PSC. No grave abuse of
discretion is present.
The only time when it could be reversed (1) such order is without
reasonable support in evidence (2) such was rendered in violation
of the law
Manila Trading v. Zulueta: CIR ordered the ER to just suspend
an EE who was found guilty to breach his duty. SC says: “An
employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the
employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance
or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in
the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interests.” Hence,
there was grave abuse of discretion in this case.
Kapisanan v. Noriel and Federation of Free Workers v.
Noriel: Sir says these labor cases should be studied in tandem.
Basic doctrine: When the 30% requirement in the certification
election has been met, then BLR is divested of the discretion to
decide WON a certification election must be held. It is duty bound
to grant it. If 30% is NOT met, then BLR has the discretion WON a
certification election must be held when the circumstances dictate.
PLDT v. NTC: NTC, as the governmental agency charged with
passing upon applications for Certificates of Public Convenience
and Necessity in the field of telecommunications, is authorized to
determine what the specific operating and technical requirements
of "public convenience and necessity" are in the field
telecommunications.
VIII. ENFORCEMENT OF AGENCY ACTION
The General Rule is that the manner in which administrative
decisions are enforced are to be found in the enabling statute.
Legislature does this by providing mechanisms (i.e. contempt,
cease and desist) in the statute governing the agency in order to
put teeth into admin actions.
A. Res Judicata; Finality of Judgment
Requisites:1. Former final judgment; 2. Rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; 3. Judgment on the merits; 4. there being,
between the first and second action:[a) identity of parties,
b)subject matter and c) cause of action.
It only applies to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to
the exercise of purely administrative functions. Administrative
proceedings are non-litigous and summary in nature.
Ipekdjian v. CTA: Board of Tax Appeal’s decisions have judicial
character if they were not subsequently brought before the CFI or
Court of Tax Appeals. They were in a sense judicially confirmed
hence it attained the character of finality.
Nasipit v. NLRC: The principle of res judicata may not be invoked
in labor relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII,
Book V of the IRR of the Labor Code provides that such
proceedings are "non-litigious and summary in nature without
regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law
Dulay v. Minister of Natural Resources: The rule of res judicata
which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined
by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction.
The decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality,
the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview
of the doctrine of res judicata
Note: Res Judicata is a judicial doctrine hence it only applies to
quasi-judicial agencies.
Phil American General Insurance Company v. CA: The cause
of action in the marine protest was to enforce the administrative
liability of the shipmaster/captain of M/V "Crazy Horse", its officers
and crew for the wreckage and sinking of the subject vessel. The
cause of action in the 2nd is to enforce the civil liability the
common carrier, for its failure to unload the subject cargo within a
period of time considered unreasonably long by the petitioner. No
identity of CoA hence Res judicata not present.
Manila Electric Co. V. Phil Consumers: Requisites for res
judicata to apply (1) There must be a final judgment or order (2)
Court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the parties and
subject matter (3) Must be a judgment on the merits (4) Identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
of B. Writ of Execution; Mandamus
GRule: Administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions
have the implied power to issue writs of execution. When the law is
silent, presume that the agency has the power to enforce its
decisions emanating from its QJ powers.
Exception: When the enabling law expressly provides otherwise.
Apolega v. Hizon: As the law now stands, the power to enforce
awards under the Workmen's Compensation Act is expressly vested
in the Commission or the duly deputized officials in the Regional
Offices of the Department of Labor (previously it was the regular
courts of justice which could enforce awards)
Vda de Corpuz v. Commanding General Phil Army: Petition for
mandamus by petitioner was granted because a final and
executory award entities petitioner to its enforcement according to
its letter. It is not susceptible of any change or alteration by the
officer charged with its implementation as the latter's duty on the
matter constitutes only a ministerial act that does not call for the
exercise of discretion
Note: Sir says, what if the writ of execution is ignored? Look at
Vda. De Corpuz,you must file a petition for mandamus
Ambrosio v. Salvador: The Court of First Instance cannot issue a
writ of injunction or prohibition against the Court of Industrial
Relations because the CIR is equal in rank with the Court of First
Instance. Thus, the Injunction was an Unwarranted Interference of
the Writ of Execution of the NLRC.
Merano v. Tutaan: Labor Arbiter refused to enforce NLRC
decision. His remedy against the refusal or inaction the LA to
enforce NLRC awards/decision, is to call the NLRC’s attention to the
alleged nonfeasance and NOT to file a mandamus action in CFI
which has no jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of a final
judgment of the NLRC. (Again because NLRC is equal with CFI)
GSIS v. CSC: The grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory
power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally
and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce
or execute the judgments. (As sir says: if it doesn’t have the power
to execute, “inutile agency”)
Clavano v. HLURB: Case where the HLURB modified its FINAL
decision by ordering the petitioners to also pay the registration
fees. Since, The decision has long become final and, has also been
completely satisfied. HLURB is thus left with no other authority but
to enforce the dispositive part of its Decision which it can no longer
amend, modify or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the
judgment.