Routledge Revivals

The Falkland Islands as an

International Problem

Although the Falklands War of 1982 had a decisive outcome in respect

to the restoration of British control, it failed to resolve the basic cause
of the war: the Anglo-Argentine dispute over sovereignty. Relations
between the two countries remain unstable, whilst a series of events
throughout the past three decades have emphasised the sensitive and
important nature of the international problem.

First published in 1988, this book stresses the dispute’s significance as

both a domestic and an international problem, with important con-
sequences for other governments and such international organisations
as the United Nations, as well as the two key players. Beck emphasises
an equal concern for the obvious and immediate problem of sover-
eignty, and for the long term future of the South Atlantic and Ant-
arctic region. Discussing issues that remain of major political relevance,
this reissue will be of particular value to students of politics, interna-
tional relations and diplomatic history with an interest in the key
developments within and background to the Anglo-Argentine dispute.
This page intentionally left blank
The Falkland Islands as an
International Problem

Peter J. Beck

Routledge
RE S Taylor & Francis Group
VI VA L
First published in 1988
by Routledge
This edition first published in 2014 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 1988 Peter J. Beck

The right of Peter J. Beck to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
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Publisher’s Note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but
points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent.

Disclaimer
The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes
correspondence from those they have been unable to contact.

A Library of Congress record exists under LC control number: 89183459

ISBN 13: 978-1-138-01797-9 (hbk)

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Additional materials are available on the companion website at

http://www.routledge.com/books/series/Routledge_Revivals
 THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS
AS AN INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEM
PeterBeck

ROUTLEDGE
London and New York
First publishedin 1988 by
Routledge
a division of Routledge,Chapmanand Hall
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Publishedin the USA by

Routledge
a division of Routledge,Chapmanand Hall, Inc.
29 West 35th Street,New York NY 10001

© 1988 Peter1. Beck

Phototypesetin English Times by Pat and Anne Murphy,
Highcliffe-on-Sea,Dorset
Printedand boundin GreatBritain by
Biddies Ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn

All rights reserved.No part of this book may be

reprintedor reproducedor utilised in any form or
by any electronic,mechanical,or other means,now
known or hereafterinvented,including photocopying
and recording, or in any information storageor
retrieval system,without permissionin writing from
the publishers.

British Library Cataloguingin PublicationData

Beck, Peter
The Falkland Islandsas an internationalproblem.
1. Falkland Islands. Political events,1833...,.1987.
Internationalpolitical aspects
I. Title
997'.11
ISBN 0-415-00909-X

Library of CongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
ISBN 0-415-00909-X
 Contents

Lists of FiguresandTables vii

AbbreviationsandAcronymsUsedin the Text viii
Preface xi

Part One: Introduction 1

1. The Falklands/MalvinasProblem 3

Part Two: The Anglo-ArgentineDisputeover Title to

theFalklands/Malvinas 27
2. British Versionof the FalklandsPast 29
3. ArgentineVersion ofthe Malvinas Past 61

Part Three: Developmentof the SovereigntyDispute,

1833-1982 85
4. Early Developmentofthe Problem,1833-1968 87
5. Dynamicsof Djadlock, 1968-82 111

Part Four: TheFalklands War andAfter 137

6. Searchfor a Way Forward 139
7. Two Monologuesbut Little Dialogue: The Dispute
Since1982 169

Bibliography 197
Index 206
This page intentionally left blank
 Figures and Tables

FIGURES

1.1 The FalklandsWar of 1982 8

1.2 World Map Centredon the FalklandIslands 12
2.1 Falklandsor Malvinas? 32
2.2 The FalklandIslands 37
3.1 Rival Anglo-ArgentinePerceptionsof the South
Atlantic 74

TABLES

1.1 Mediationin the 1982War 16

3.1 ArgentineOpinion Polls on the Malvinas Issue 76
4.1 Argentina, Britain and the Falkland IslandsUntil
1945 89
4.2 UN Resolutionson the Falklands/Malvinas,1965-76 98
5.1 FormalAnglo-ArgentineNegotiations,1970-6 111
5.2 FormalAnglo-ArgentineNegotiations,1977-82 118
6.1 What Sovereigntydo the FalklandIslandersWant? 140
7.1 Post-1982UN Resolutionson Anglo-Argentine
Negotiations 176
7.2 British DefenceCostsfor the Falklands1982-6 177
7.3 British DefenceSpendingon the Falklands1983-90 177

vii
Abbreviations and Acronyms Used
in the Text
AA Australian Archives, Canberra
AARI Associaci6nArgentinade RelacionesInternacionales
BBC British BroadcastingCorporation
CARl ConsejoArgentino para las Relaciones
Internacionales
CEAS Centro de Estudiosdel Atlantico Sur
CO British Colonial Office Records
COl Central Office of Information
CRS CommonwealthRecordSeries,Australian Archives
EEC EuropeanEconomicCommunity
EEZ ExclusiveEconomicZone
FAO UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCO Foreign and CommonwealthOffice
FIC Falkland IslandsCompany
FICZ Falkland Islands Interim Conservationand
ManagementZone
FID Falkland Islands Dependencies(after 1985:
Dependenciesof South Georgiaand the South
SandwichIslands)
FIDC Falkland Islands DevelopmentCorporation
FIEC Falkland IslandsEmergencyCommittee(later
UKFIC)
FIG Falkland Islands Government
FO British Foreign Office Records
HCDC Houseof CommonsDefenceCommittee
HCFAC Houseof CommonsForeign Affairs Committee
HMSO Her Majesty'sStationeryOffice
IPU InterparliamentaryUnion
LADE Lineas Aereasdel Estados
MOD Ministry of Defence
MP British Member of Parliament
NA USA National Archives, Washington
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NZ New ZealandArchives, Wellington
OAS Organizationof American States
OAU Organizationof African Unity

viii
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT

OPEC Organisationof PetroleumExporting Countries

RAF Royal Air Force
RIIA Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs
SATO South Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SAZOP South Atlantic Zone of Peace
TEZ Total Exclusion Zone
UKFIC United Kingdom Falkland IslandsCommittee
(formerly FIEC)
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations GeneralAssemblyRecords
UPU Universal PostalUnion
YPF YacimientosPetroliferosFiscales

ix
This page intentionally left blank
 Preface

Soon after the 1982 war one reviewer, overcomeby the pro-
liferation of official, academicand journalistic studies on the
Falklands/Malvinas dispute, complained that never in the
sphereof humanconflict had so much beenwritten by so many
so quickly. He might well have added a reference to the
relatively low quality and narrow focus of most productsof the
Falklandspublicationindustry, sincethe majority were charac-
terisedby either a vague,incompleteand instant knowledgeof
the topic and/or an attempt to prove a particular point rather
than to searchfor an objectiveand balancedaccount.Neverthe-
less, a number of studies, mostly in the form of articles,
pamphlets and radio broadcasts, have made important
contributions,even if, pending the appearanceof the memoirs
of the key actors and the eventual availability of archival
material, it seems difficult to anticipate further major
revelations.
Against such a background,this book is presentedas a work
of synthesisdesignedto pay dueregardto varying viewpoints,to
correct existing misconceptions,to identify difficulties and
opportunities,and to encouragereadersto look againat a long-
standingproblem. Although an attempthas beenmadeto offer
balancedcoverageof divergentattitudes,it doestend neverthe-
lessto representa British interpretation.The chief emphasishas
been placed upon the nature and developmentof the dispute
until the presentday, while focusing also upon options for a
settlement.The 1982war, albeit the major eventin the history of
the disputeand discussedin severalchapters,is not coveredin
detail, sincethis enablesmore attentionto be devotedto aspects
often ignored by previouswriters, including post-wardevelop-
ments.In any case,the war hasbeenfully coveredalready,while
the Antarctic dimension was analysedin my book The Inter-
national Politics of Antarctica (1986).
Historicru and contemporaryresearchwas conductednot only
in Britain but also overseas,including Argentina, Australia,
Canada,France,New Zealandand the USA, with the help of
grants from the Nuffield Foundation,the Leverhulme Trust,
Fundacion Perez Companc of Argentina and the Kingston

xi
PREFACE

PolytechnicResearchFund. I am indebtedto many diplomats,

academicsand others for informed advice and material, and
especiallyto Michael Akehurst,Emilio Cardenas,JuanEduardo
Fleming, Marcelo Kohen, Willy Makin, Geoffrey Till and
Nicholas Tozer. A special word of thanks is due to staff at
Kingston PolytechnicLibrary, particularly to Sue Arthur from
inter-loans,as well as to thoseat the United Nations Library in
London. My family haveprovidedtheir usualsupport,while my
wife designedsomeof the book's diagrams.
Footnotescover textual quotesand referencesin a sequential
manner, while archival sourcescited can be consultedat the
Public Record Office, London [British FO AND CO records],
the National Archives, Washington DC [USA materials], the
Australian Archives, Canberra[Australian records], the New
ZealandArchives, Wellington [New Zealandrecords], and the
Quai D'Orsay, Paris [French files]. An invaluablesourcewas
the eight-partBBC radio seriesThe Little Platoon [April-June
1987], in which Michael Charlton interviewed many of the
leading actorsin the Falklandsdispute.

Kingston upon Thames

December1987

xii
 Part One
Introduction

Situated in the South Atlantic, the Falkland Islands/Islas

Malvinas, located about 480 miles north-eastof Cape Horn,
consist of some 200 islands, the largest being East and West
Falkland. Their total land area is 4,700 squaremiles and the
populationis 1,919. The archipelagois about 300 miles distant
from the nearestpoint on the South American mainland, and
over 7,000 miles from Britain. The islands have been disputed
betweenArgentina andBritain since the 1820s.
This page intentionally left blank
 1
The Falklands/Malvinas Problem

On 4 February 1976 the RRSShackleton,an unarmedBritish

researchship engagedin scientific work in the South Atlantic,
was interceptedsome78 miles southof the Falkland Islandsby
an Argentinedestroyer,AlmiranteStorni, andthencommanded
to stop becauseof its alleged presencein Argentine territorial
waters. The Shackletonresponded:

We are not in Argentine waters; we are more than 200 miles

from theArgentinemainlandandthe British governmentdoes
not recognisetheseasArgentinewaters. Ihaveno intentionof
stopping.l

Theseexchangesreflectedthe Anglo-Argentinedisputeconcern-
ing sovereignty over the Falkland Ishinds/lslas Malvinas,
controlledby Britain since 1833 but claimed,togetherwith their
territorial waters, by Argentina. The Shackleton's captain
turned a Nelsonianblind eye towardsthe demandsto make for
the Argentineport of Ushuaia,in spiteof further pressurewhen
an Argentine Neptuneaircraft flew over at mast height and the
Storni fired severalshotsacrosshis ship'sbows. The Shackleton
remained on coursefor Port Stanley, the capital of the Falk-
lands, still shadowedand harassedby the Storni, which turned
away only six miles from the islands.
At the time, the Shackletonaffair, which prompted strong
British protests,provedthe mostseriousconfrontationyet in the
long-standing Falklands dispute, particularly as it occurred
during a period characterisedby both Argentinedomesticinsta-
bility and difficult Anglo-Argentine relations in general. The

3
THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

sovereigntytalks of the early 1970s had reachedan impasse,

ambassadorshad been withdrawn, the Argentine press advo-
cated 'firm' and 'concrete' measuresfor the Malvinas, the
islandersspeculatedabout invasion, and the British Chiefs of
Staff evaluatedthe military options. Although the Argentine
governmentwarnedBritain that it 'was rapidly moving towards
a head-on collision' on the dispute, the Shackletonincident
failed to escalate, since Britain's anxiety for a diplomatic
solution was paralleledby the way in which Argentina pulled
back from the brink. Nevertheless,the dramaticfeaturesof this
episodetypified the Argentinetendencyto brinkmanship.It was
stage-managing the disputefor both domesticand international
audiencesthrough a series of measuredactions designedto
record its claim to the islands and to persuadeBritain to
negotiate about their future. In the short term the incident
promptednot only the precautionarydeploymentof a British
frigate to the areaand a reprieve for HMS Endurance(whose
presencein the region was threatenedby the 1974 Defence
Review) but also the resumption of more meaningful
negotiationson sovereignty.

THE FALKLANDS WAR OF 1982

SubsequentlyAnglo-Argentine relations were characterisedby

both cooperative and confrontational tendencies, for
Argentina's 'continuedpinpricks' were interspersedby periods
of dialogue. During March 1982, the relationshipdeteriorated
towardsanothercrisis. The contextwas the continuing impasse
on sovereigntyas well as of friction over South Georgiain the
Falkland Islands Dependencies(FlO), which Buenos Aires
viewed as part of the sameclaim as its rights to the Malvinas. In
London, the question was posed as to whether the Argentine
military regime, perhaps seeking internal political benefits,
would raise the temperatureof the dispute - although it was
expectedto stop short of armed invasion. However, by 31
March the British government,which had madeno preparations
for suchan eventualityand had only a small marinedetachment
in the colony, was forced to considerits responseto imminent
Argentine landings on the islands.2 On 1 April Rex Hunt, the
Falklands Governor, informed the islanders that 'there is
mountingevidencethat the Argentinearmedforcesarepreparing

4
 THE FALKLANDSIMALVINAS PROBLEM

to invade the Falklands',but the islands were not surrendered

without a fight, and on the following day, againsta background
of gunfire, Hunt broadcastthat 'we're not surrendering.I am
resisting'.3 The Governor and the marines were soon pinned
down by the Argentinetroops: 'We can't move from herewith-
out being shot at ... So I'm afraid it is just a matter of time.'
Indeed, time was running out for British control over the
islands,sincethe arrival of the main Argentinelanding force of
about 1,400 men meant that Hunt, consciousof the military
realities, ordereda surrender.
Later the sameday Hunt, resplendentand defiant in his full
gubernatorialregalia was taken in his official car, a London
taxi, to the airport for his flight to Britain. South Georgia fell
the next day, and theseevents,in conjunctionwith its post-1976
occupation of the South Sandwich Islands, meant that
Argentina had given substanceto its long-standingterritorial
aspirations towards the Falklands and the FID. Hitherto,
Argentina had been forced to confine its ambitions to paper
demands,as evidencedby the representationof theseislandson
maps and stampsas its territory, but on 2 April 1982 the wish-
fulfilment was translated into actuality. General Mario
Menendezwas installed as Governor, the Argentine flag was
hoisted, and the islands were re-namedthe Islas Malvinas. At
the sametime Port Stanleyand South Georgia becamePuerto
Argentino and Isla San Pedro respectively; letters from the
islands carried Argentine stampsand were postmarked'Islas
Malvinas, Republica Argentina', and television programmes
recordedthe fact of the occupationfor the Argentine people,
who 'without thinking aboutit ... got to know the Malvinas'.4
The ecstaticreactionof the populaceof BuenosAires to news
of the recoveryof their islands- the eventswere presentedas
the re-possessionof territory conquered byBritain in 1833 -
encouragedPresidentGaltieri to notify a jubilant crowd outside
the Casa Rosadothat the governmenthad implemented'the
sentimentsof the Argentinepeople'. At the time, few Argentines
considered the'utility of the islands, since they were 'less
important in themselvesthan as a nationalist myth'.s Also, it
seemedeasyto forget their country'spressingeconomic,human
rights, and other problems,and'particularly to allow emotion
and pride to push asidethe memory of eventsin the Plazade
Mayo a mere three days earlier, when police had broken up
violent anti-governmentdemonstrations.

5
THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

By contrast,the mood in London was one of shock,wounded

pride and uncertainty, a situation aggravatedby the sudden
developmentof the invasionand the initial absenceof informa-
tion on events in a forgotten colony. In response,the British
government despatcheda naval task force, Operation Cor-
porate,'to causethe withdrawal of the Argentineforces and the
restorationof the British administrationof the islands'.6
This move answeredthe parliamentaryand mediademandfor
'action not words' in the face of 'an act of naked, unqualified
aggression' by a military dictatorship, and it allowed Mrs
Thatcher, the self-confessed'iron lady', to rise to Enoch
Powell's challengeto show 'the nation of what metal she is
made'.7It imparteda cutting edgeto British diplomacy, suchas
to confirm a resolve to protect British territory and to uphold
international law against aggression.In the event, the United
Nations (UN) and its resolutions[502 and 505], exertedonly a
marginal impact upon events,since power and will, not diplo-
macy, determined the outcome of the Falklands War; thus
OperationCorporate,enabling the San Carlos landings on 21
May, resulted in the re-occupationof the islands after the
Argentine surrenderon 14 June, and early the following year
Britain celebrated150 years of rule (see Figure 1.1).8 South
Georgia was re-capturedon 25 April through OperationPara-
quat; Operation Keyhole secured the return of the South
SandwichIslandson 20 June.
Mrs Thatcher, whose political fortunes becameintertwined
with the war's outcome, rejoiced in and exploited the victory,
which came relatively quickly partly becausethe impact of
Britain's military qualities was accentuatedby Argentine sur-
prise at the despatchof the task force and inability to secureits
occupation. The Argentine government,influenced by recent
evidenceof British lack of interest in the region, saw its own
OperationRosarioas a 'touch and run' invasionof the islands.
Most of the Argentineinvading forceswereinstructedto employ
minimal force and returned to the mainland by 3 April. The
Argentine sortie was designedto establisha symbolic assertion
of Argentine sovereigntyand to pressuriseBritain to negotiate
the transferof the territory.9 Argentineconscriptsadmittedthat
'no one really believedwe were going to fight', since 'we'd get
there and they'd come to an arrangement'.10There were
numerousreferencesin BuenosAires to 'anotherSuez',that is,
to the likelihood of the eventualrecall of the British task force,

6
 THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

and evenduring April 1982AlexanderHaig, the US Secretaryof

State, among others, failed to disabuseGaltieri and his col-
leaguesof their assumptionthat Britain would never actually
fight.H Argentina's initial successwas followed some 73 days
later by a decisivedefeatas well as by the loss of 255 British and
over 740 Argentine lives. In the ensuing days, one islander,
waggingher finger at the departingArgentinesoldiers,reminded
them: 'don't you comeplanting your little flag hereagain'.'2

THE FALKLANDS PROBLEM

The explosive potential of the Falklandsdispute, suggestedby

the 1976 Shackletonincident, was confirmed by the eventsof
1982, but for much of the pre-1982war period the islandshad
provedlittle morethan a diplomaticbackwater,at leastas far as
the world outside Argentina was concerned.Yet the Malvinas
issue had been a constant factor in the foreign policy of
Argentina,whereit was treatedas a major and sensitiveissueby
both government and public opinion. It attracted a steady
streamof publicationsand constituteda significant determinant
of its relationshipwith Britain and, albeit to a lesserextent,with
other countries, like the USA. In September1979 Brigadier
Pastor, the Argentine foreign minister, reminded Lord
Carrington, his British counterpart,that the islandsmight be a
low British priority but they were at the top of the list for his
government.J3
Michael Stewart,British foreign minister (1965-6, 1968- 70)
at a crucial period of the dispute'sdevelopment,admittedthat it
was 'not one of my major problems', and prior to 1982 the
matter attractedrelatively little interest in either Britain or the
wider internationalcommunity.14It seemedeasyto dismiss the
problemas a trivial imperial postscript.When the Conservatives
carne to power in 1979, Lord Carrington, indicating only a
'superficial' appreciation of the topic, is reputed to have
admittedin 1981 that the subjectwas 'trivial beyondbelief' and
ranked no higher than number 242 on the Foreign and
CommonwealthOffice (FCO)'s scaleof priorities.I ' The public
imageof British policy during theseyearsreinforcedthis impres-
sion, as evidencedby the official reluctanceto allocatemoney
for the defence anddevelopmentof the islands,the preparedness
to negotiatetheir sovereignty,and the·proposedwithdrawal of

7
Figure 1.1: Falklands War of 1982
58* W

D K
SOUTH Pebble ATLANTIC OCEAN
Island B
C
Port
San Douglas^
Douglas
Green„
- S I* 30'S kTeal>? 51* 30' S
E F !k.lnleC 'Patchi >
Berkeley Souno
Port H o w a r d . . San M
Carlos \San v ^ M r . Stanley^- A
Water Carlos UJ<ent Airport-cl
WEST /.Falkland EAS T Bluff Cove.
.. Sound, _Stanley
Fltzroy^C L
Darwin), Q
• FALKLAND / Goose J .FALKLAND "
Green J
Fox Bay ATL ATL
West • LAFONIA NTAICNTIC
i F o x Bay 52* S-
52* S ' East

SOUTH, •f ATLANTIC OCEAN

0 km 40
Note: Although the map shows the main moves of the land forces, M
it is impossible to illustrate air and sea movements 59' W SB* W
I I
 Air bases and . - Naval bases on mainland Argentina JA1 2 April: Argentil)9 invasion of the Falklands
~ and capture of Stanley
Argentine-C~ilean
Argentine-C~ilean
Argentine-C~ilean frontier
line
ArQe1lltine 12 mile Total Exclusion Zone 00 15 May: SAS Commando raid, Pebble Island
British 200 mile Total Exclusk>n Zone erEl), April 1982
British 150 mile Protection Zone (FIPZ) introduced in July 21 May: British landings of over 5,000 troops at
1982' 10 replace the 200 mile zone
@] San Carlos to establish beach head
In February 1987 a Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and
Management Zone (FICZ) for fishing came into force within 150 @ 25 May: destroyer HMS Coventry sunk
miles of the islands (basicafty identical with the FIPZ except in
south-west) @ 21 May: frigate HMS Ardent sunk

Comodoro (f] 24 May: frigate HMS Antelope sunk

destroyer
~ivadavia SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
28-29 May: Battle of Goose Green - surrender of
Approximate position of ~ Argentine garrison to battalion of the 2nd
L!!J
the British Task Force Parachute Regiment

destroyer
ARGENTINA when the Beigrano was sun«
29 May: British f·orces reach Teal Inlet (3rd Parachute
(f] Regiment and 45th Commando Regiment)
n ., .,
British on o nn B4'itiSh
Ch Ch
Cruz 4-8 June: landing of B4'ltlsh reinforcements at Bluff Cove
destroyer Q] and Fitzroy, with severe ,damage to the landing ships,
destroyer Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram
Chonn.,
destroyer destroyer (f] 25 May: British container ship Atlantic Conveyor sunk
destroyer
,
n.
,
on
B4'itiSh destroyer HMS 11-14 June: final assault on Stanley - land forces
;"'\: ;_ .. - --, Sheffield sun!< (4 May) reinforced beforehand from the air and by sea;
n. Ch
Chonn.,
11 June: severe damage to destroyer HMS Glamorgan;
on
Ch [Q
Chonn., 14 June: surrender of Argentine garrison and taking
of over 7,000 Argentine prisoners
Chonn.,
Island • Argentine crt.llser General
I Jl', B.ogi. Chonn., Betgrano sun!< (2 May) ~ 4 May: destroyer HMS Sheffield sunk
0 , 'C"pe Horn
(f]
? km 29
THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

HMS Endurance. Significantly, John Nott, the Secretaryof

Statefor Defenceat the time of the Endurancedecisionand the
war, has statedthat 'the Falkland Islands did not interest me
... [and were] not of any great importancein my life' .16 This
official benign neglect, which could not be disguised by the
continued emphasisupon the paramountcyof the islanders'
wishes, was paralleledby academiclack of interest, since few
seriousBritish studiesof the disputehad beenpublished;one of
the most recentaccountswas a relatively brief and unbalanced
study made in 1968, while in 1981 the author's article on the
dispute was not deemed topical enough for publication in
Britain (although it was published in the USA in February
1982).17
The Falkland Islands also attractedminimal interest in the
wider international community. At the UN the question, a
regular agendatopic since the mid-1960s,was far from being a
mainstreamissue, and Sir Anthony Parsons,the British repre-
sentative(1979-82),hasconfirmedthat prior to 1982the islands
were perceivedfrom New York as 'very peripheral'in both the
geographicaland political senses,especiallyas comparedto the
UN's preoccupationwith the Middle East, South Africa and
Central America. Inevitably, in April 1982 'the crisis hit the
SecurityCouncil like a bolt from the blue':

When I called the Security Council in emergencysessionon

the daybeforethe invasionin order to takepre-emptiveaction
. . . a numberof colleagues.. . thoughtI was perpetratingan
April Fool joke becausethey had not heardof the ... busi-
ness, it had not been reportedin New York . . . Except for
conversationsbetweenmyself and my Argentinian colleague
in the previous three years I genuinelydo not rememberthe
Falklandsbeing mentionedto me once by anybody before1
April 1982.18

In Britain, an immediate surge of interest followed the

developmentof the dispute, even if much political, media and
even academicinterest was superficial. The superficiality was
partly becauseof the relative absenceof backgroundstudies-
the war caughtacademiaby surprise- andpartly becauseof an
anxiety to support Britain's wartime efforts rather than to
provide a rational and balancedassessmentof the issues.Few
aspiredto the nauseatingjingoism of the Sun, but the passions

10
 THE FALKLANDSIMALVINAS PROBLEM

and emotionsarousedby the conflict meantthat objectivity was

treated in London, as in Buenos Aires, as an unwelcome
intrusion; the resulting blinkered form of patriotismof the 'my
country right or wrong' variety served to limit the range,
accuracyand quality of debateaboutaspectsraisedby the war,
Severalpublicationshave highlighted the basic dilemma posed
for the media in 1982, when the urge to publish clashedwith
pressure to suppress or distort information - hence The
Economist'srecentcommentthat 'theseare bad times for those
who believe that freedom for the press meansfreedom to do
things that conventionalpatriotsmight decry',19
In these circumstances,politicians, media, academicsand
othersin Britain struggledto find the answersto questionsraised
by this unexpectedwar, Where were the Falklands(see Figure
1.2)? Why were the islands, oft-forgotten and difficult to find
on world maps,the subjectof a controversygoing back over 149
years?Why had the problemneverbeenresolvedthrough nego-
tiation or arbitration?Why did Argentina feel strongly enough
to move from its traditional methodsof diplomacy and propa-
gandatowardsthe employmentof force? And why was Britain,
having disengageditself relatively peacefully from empire in
recent decades,engagedin a war over 'a rock with a village
population'?20In brief, why did two countries,linked by rela-
tively strong historical, commercial,cultural and other ties -
indeed, during the 1930s Argentina was often described as
anotherBritish dominion - find themselvesinvolved in a short,
sharp South Atlantic war? Few asked, or were encouragedto
ask, whether the islands were worth a war liable to threaten
Britain's future relationswith Latin Americain generaland with
Argentina in particular, Of course,the Argentine people, edu-
cated at school and by the media to believe that the Malvinas
belongedto their country, did not needto be convincedof the
justice of their cause;in fact, the questionwas rarely askedby
the man in the BuenosAires street.
In Britain, where little thought had been devoted to the
islands,the government'sattitude was promptedmore by prag-
matic considerations,most notably the political and jingoist
forces releasedin the wakeof the suddenand humiliating loss of
a British possession,even if this failed to prevent attemptsto
rationalise the action in other ways, such as to uphold inter-
national law against 'unprovoked aggression',However, the
dominantapproachstressedthat 'British sovereignterritory has

11
THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

Figure 1.2: World map centred on the Falkland Islands

BRAZI L

e •ARGENTINA /
e ak Buenosi; » U R U G U A Y
akDr
Dr Aires

CHILE J i^.S^Rivadavi
SOUTH ATLANTIC
60° W OCEAN
SOUTH PACIFIC
OCEAN » Comodoro 60
OCEAN i^.S^Rivadavia W
/ Falklan d Island s
e a ke , Rio Stanley
ak Dr
Dr ^Gallegos (Isla s Malvinas )
Scotia Sea __
South^G^ytviKen
Drake Passage Georgia Oslas Georgias del Sur)
•.South Sandwich /
/ i s l a n d s (Islas Sandwich
Antarctica ^ - S d e l Sur)
ke
era Peninsula/;::
akD
Dr

NySOUthy

<PoleS <

12
 THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

beeninvadedby a foreign power'; while the Falklandsmight be

a 'faraway'country, the islandswere not treatedin April 1982as
a marginal issue.21 Consequentlya Falklands'Munich', or - to
use a phrasecoined before 1982 - 'selling the islandersdown
the River Plate', proved politically inexpedientfor the British
government in the context of the emotions and pressures
generatedwithin and outside Parliament after the invasion.
Although the despatchof the task force entailedvariouspolitical
and military risks, it was difficult for the Thatchergovernment,
beleagueredby economicand other difficulties and performing
badly in opinion polls, to avoid strong action againstwhat was
dismissedas 'a tin pot military dictatorship' guilty of human
rights violations. The state of Britain that April was uncon-
ducive to serious,informed appraisalof the long term implica-
tions of a military response.

THE WIDER CONTEXT

The 1982 war transformedthe position of the Falkland Islands,

which werecatapultedto the attentionof the British government
and people, often for the first time. For a few months the dis-
pute occupiedthe front of the internationalstage:

The crisis, when it struck, attracted more public attention

than the most long-serving member of the UN Secretariat
could rememberbeinggeneratedby any eventin the history of
the organisation.Even now, it is not easyto understandwhy
. . . television, radio and press . . . from allover the world,
swarmedto New York. 22

Both AlexanderHaig and CasparWeinberger,the US Secretary

for Defence,viewed the FalklandsWar as 'more than simply a
local dispute in the South Atlantic' becauseit touchedupon a
range of other questions,including the strengthand credibility
of the westernalliance. It also offered a 'casestudy in miscalcu-
lation, national rivalry, war fever, and the way in which the
leaders of n,ations can be driven by the most basic emotions
towards fateful decisions'.23 Thus, it raised 'larger questionsof
sovereignty... which could be equally applied to a large inter-
nationalwar of the greatpowers', as arguedby David Gompert,
who assistedHaig during the war:

13
THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

The FalklandsWar holds great fascination for military and

political analysts. Militarily, it had a bit of everything: air,
naval, and ground operationsin every conceivablecombina-
tion; staggeringlogistical difficulties . . . We know why some
weapons systems worked well and others not, why some
soldiersfought well and othersnot ... we can seeclearly the
logic of the result. The war is just as compelling a subjectfor
studentsand practitionersof diplomacy and law, providing
them, too, with a little bit of everything:a major peacemaking
effort was undertakenby the United States;both the United
Nations and a regional organisationbecameinvolved; and
certainkey principles of internationalconductwere tested.24
Until then, the US governmenthad never devotedmuch atten-
tion to the Falklands dispute, but the war raised 'several
hauntingquestionsaboutUS policy'; for example,Washington,
torn between two special relationships,was forced to choose
betweensupportfor eithera traditional NATO ally or a member
of the inter-Americansystem.25 In 1985, when looking back at
her wartime role as the USA's UN representative, Jeane
Kirkpatrick observedthat 'Britain and Argentinahad a stakein
the Falklands, but in many ways the United States had the
largest stakeof all'.26 Initial ambiguitiesand attemptsto stress
neutrality as a basis for Haig's mediationbetweenLondon and
Buenos Aires were followed by US support for Britain, and,
againstthis background,it has been arguedthat 'by a strange
paradox, the United Stateshas been the chief loser from the
whole Falklandimbroglio'.27
The 1982war may havebeenonly a relatively brief andlimited
conflict but it offered multi-disciplinary study opportunities:
The FalklandsWar of 1982 provided diplomats, strategists,
and internationallawyers with the opportunityto apply their
skills to attemptto resolvethe conflict and, after the fact, to
assessthe implications of the war for the international
system.28
In this mannera study of the war, in conjunctionwith research
on the natureand developmentof the Anglo-Argentinedispute,
provides an informed insight into the operationsof the inter-
national political system. Certainly, the British responsewas
interpretedin certain quartersas 'a war on behalf of abstract
principles', including the needto uphold the internationallegal

14
 THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

order and the right of self-determination.

29 It was perceivedalso

as a welcome sign of strength in contrast to recent western

passivity; for instance,Haig, noting recent Soviet advancesin
Afghanistan and Poland, believed that Britain reaffirmed the
rule of law and restoredthe credibility of the westernalliance
througha much-neededprojectionof power.30
Against this background,othergovernmentsspeculatedabout
the consequences of the invasion for them, a tendencywhich
servedto qualify Argentina'sability as a memberof the Non-
Aligned Movement(NAM) to presenttheinvasionasending'one
of the last vestigesof colonialism on Latin American territory'
and to summon the otherwise automatic Third World UN
majority, especiallyon the part of governmentssuchas Guyana,
Kenya and Zaire involved in similar sovereigntydisputes.3! For
example, Moore, noting the domino-like nature of develop-
ments, feared the war's implications for '15 other islands
disputesandhundredsofland andseaboundarydisputes'.32As a
result, the matterdid not conformto the typical UN patterncon-
cerningtheeventualrecognitionof a forceful changeof thestatus
quO. 33 In practice, the UN's wartime role proved relatively
peripheral, and the episode raised questions related to the
constantstruggle for international law to assertitself against
power politics, with special referenceto the UN's methodsof
conflict managementand how to effect peacefulchange. For
instance,wasArgentina'sresortto force symptomaticof a belief
that, while UN debatesand resolutions provided a meansto
publicise grievancesand recruit wider support, the UN system
wasincapableof securingthe requisitetransferof sovereignty?In
the event,the 1982war highlightedthe UN's inability to enforce
its resolutionsin the face of Argentine intransigence,and Inis
Claudeclaimed that the UN proved less of a peaceconference
and more of a battlefield in which both sides sought collective
legitimacy for their respectivecases(seeTable 1.1).34 Attention
was also focusedupon the future of inter-Americancooperation
and security: could the Organizationof AmericanStates(OAS)
manageborder disputes,particularly those involving an extra-
continental power?35 But the OAS merely offered Argentina
rhetorical and ritual support rather than material aid; indeed,
certain governments, including Colombia and Mexico, had
strong reservations about the use of force to settle Latin
Americandisputes.
NicanorCostaMendez,theArgentineforeignministerclaimed:

15
THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

Table 1.1: Mediation in the 1982 war

1 April - UN Security Council calls for restraint and the non-use of force
2 April - Argentine landings; British despatch of the task force; the passage of
UN resolution 502 [for the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces,
pacific solution!.

Mediation efforts
1} Haig Mission, 7-2fJ April - for an accommodation based on resolution 502.
Britain promised 'serious consideration', but Argentina rejected the
proposals. After 30 April, the USA supported Britain in the war.
2} Peruvian Peace Proposals, 1-6 May - a re-packaging of (1) by the Peruvian
President ['Haig in a poncho'], but rejected by Argentina [6 May).
3} UN Secretary-General, 2-21 May - attempt to find common ground, but on
21 May reported his failure [date of British landings).
4} UN Resolution 505, 26 May - this reaffirmed resolution 502 for renewed
efforts by the Secretary-General, but hostilities continued.

Common elements
All proposals were characterised by a ceasefire, linked to the mutual withdrawal
of forces and third party verification; interim administration [e.g. by the UN);
and a framework for negotiations to settle the dispute.

Reasons for failure

1} Inability to find a formula acceptable to both disputants.
2} Argentina's rejection of every proposal - Argentina was unable either to
withdraw, to arrive at a clear decision or to accept less than immediate
sovereignty .
3} Communication problems, since Argentina'a belief that it was in a crisis
management mode contrasted with British perceptions of being at war.
4} Diplomacy was gradually overwhelmed by military considerations and the
search for victory, especially once the British task force neared the islands
and even more so after the San Carlos landings.

The 2nd of April changedthe future of the Malvinas. Before

that . . . the world did not know the Argentineright over the
islands.The Malvinasissuedid not interestanyone... Today
it is known by the world.36

The war transformedthe global statusnot only of the Falklands

and the South Atlantic region but also of South America, since
the international community's traditional preoccupationwith
other regionscreated'the imageof an areaisolatedfrom today's
international context: South America'Y Therefore, western
securitydoctrinesassumeda low level of externalthreatto South
America, which rated 'nil on most world appraisalsfor defence,

16
 THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

foreign or strategicstudies'in spiteof occasionalexpressionsof

anxiety about Soviet interestsin the region.38 The outbreakof
war revealedEurope'sblind spot about Latin America, includ-
ing what Virginia Gambahas describedas 'the lack of direct
communication'arising from the absenceof a commonstrategic
languageabout the operationsof the internationalsystem;thus
the FalklandsWar was 'nothinglessthan the inevitableresult of
a collision of misperceptions'and misunderstandingsbetween
Latin America and Europe.39 In turn, once the war started,it
proved difficult to achieve a negotiatedsolution becausethe
Argentine regime's perception that it remained in a crisis
managementmodeconflicted with the British stresson being at
war.
Arthur Marwick, presenting war as 'the supremetest of a
country's military, social, political and economicinstitutions',
has analysedits role in their collapse,transformationand con-
solidation.40 The British victory reinforced Mrs Thatcher's
political image and reputation, especially as people were
encouragedto glossover her government'sdomesticfailings and
responsibilityfor the initial loss of the islands.In this vein, one
MP observedthat 'the fleet is really that of HMS Government
whosepurposeis not only to right the wrongsover the Falkland
Islandsbut also to retrieve the reputationof the government'.41
Subsequently,Mrs Thatcher'sdecisiveelection successin 1983
was ascribedto the so-called'Falklandsfactor', evenif a recent
revisionist study concluded surprisingly that the war exerted
only a 'negligible' impact on the government'spopularity.42By
contrast,Argentina's'Malvinas factor' performeda crucial role
in the openingof the political system,since the military regime
failed the test of war and enabledthe restorationof democracy.

The military in Argentinahavealways soughtpopularity and

to be at onewith the people. . . Pressureandstudentcriticism
calling for democratisationcontinued unabatedthroughout
April, May and June 1982 ... The invasion and the failures
operatedas a catalyst on the pending issues in Argentine
politics.43

In October 1983 elections resulted in the victory of Raul

Alfonsin's Radical Party and were followed by the graqual
reassertionof civilian control, underlined by the trials of the
military, and of Galtieri. However, subsequentdevelopments,

17
THE FALKLANDSIMALVINAS PROBLEM

including continuing economic problems (such as the general

strike in November 1987), the external debt question, military
mutinies(as in April 1987)and the Peronistsuccessesin the pro-
vincial and legislative elections of September 1987, raised
questionmarks about thestability and durability of Argentine
democracyin the light of the country'spost-1930historical cycle
of military and ineffective democratic regimes. However, in
April 1987:

Argentina'sEasterrising showsthat the country hasnot over-

comethe abiding threatof militarism. But the reactionof the
ordinary people shows just as strongly that the general
appetitefor democraticgovernmentis extremelyhealthyfour
yearsafter the generalswithdrew in ignominy.44

Similarly, Alfonsin's poll setbackin Septemberwas interpreted

as providing comfort for the military, even if the Peronists
respondedto adverseinternationalreactionsby stressing- to
quote Guido di Tella, an Oxford academicand Peronistdeputy
- that 'the new Peronismmakesits commitmentto democracy
explicit' .45 The orderly natureof the elections,the adventof an
effectiveoppositionparty, andthe responsibletransferof power
at the provincial level should not be overlookedas evidenceof
the qualitative changein the country'spolitical culture, even if
Argentina's future policy towards the Falklands will prove
unpredictableuntil its internal political complexionis stabilised.
At presentfew look to the military for a solution to Argentina's
problems,and future changesshould occur within the political
system.46

ROLE IN THE WORLD

In spite of traditional pretensionsto a world role, Argentina

remaineda regional power caught up in its rivalry with Brazil
and Chile for influence in the southerncone(as highlighted by
its long-standingand recentlyresolvedBeagledisputewith Chile
in 1984).47 In fact, the 1982 war confirmed the difficulties
inherent in the southwardsextensionof its control in an area
governedby Britain but regardedasArgentine.Democratisation
has fostered revised foreign policy perceptions,.including
improved links with Latin America, especially Brazil, and

18
 THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

NAM, but neither defeat nor the advent of democracyhave

moderatedArgentina'sdemandfor the Malvinas. The unchang-
ing, inflexible nature of the Argentine side of the Falklands
equation contrasts with a transformation in Britain, whose
apparentresumptionof a South Atlantic role has encouraged
referencesto a revival of British greatnessafter the pre-1982
processof decline and of withdrawal into Europeand NATO.
To someextent,the task force washauntedby the ghostsof Suez
and Anthony Eden, a situation recalling a 1956Punch cartoon:

The grand old Anthony Eden

He had ten thousandmen
He marchedthem up to the top of the hill
And marchedthem down again.

Significantly, Argentine policy-makers interpreted the Suez

affair in a mannerwhich ruled out any possibility of either a
British military responseor US supportfor Britain.48 However,
Britain avoided 'anotherSuez',and in July 1982 Mrs Thatcher
developedNigel Lawson's recent referencesto the 'rebirth of
Britain' after 'the long yearsof retreatand self doubt':

When we startedout . . . peoplethought we could no longer

do the great things we once did. Well they were wrong. The
lessonof the Falklandsis that Britain has not changedand
that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine
through our history.49

In December1962 Dean Achesonremarkedthat Britain had

'lost an Empire but not yet found a role' to replaceher 'played
out ... separatepower role'. The post-1945period has been
characterisedby debateand uncertaintyaboutBritain's role in a
changingworld influenced by economicand fiscal constraints,
decolonisation,withdrawal from East of Suez,and the process
of Europeanintegration.so Britain's pre-1982 approachto the
Falklands,which arosefrom willingnessto transfersovereignty
but failure to basedefencepolicy upon South Atlantic require-
ments,could be interpretedas a realistic readjustmentof power,
and a retreatfrom a global and imperial role towardsa concen-
tration uponEuropeanandNATO responsibilitiesby 'oneof the
weakestand least successfulof the secondrate powers'.SI The
victory and the post-1982enhancementof British commitments

19
THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS PROBLEM

and visibility in the South Atlantic region served not only to

challengethis role perceptionbut also to foster debateaboutthe
realities of this trend, such as in the light of the military and
fiscal demands,the impact uponNATO responsibilities,andthe
natureof British interestsin Latin AmericaandAntarctica.As a
result, British policy towards the Falklands should be inter-
preted in part as a code for somethingelse - its role in the
contemporaryworld.

MILITARY LESSONS

Since 1982 a range of books and reports has appearedon the

military lessonsof the Falklandscampaign,suggestingreforms
in intelligence, ship design, fire damagecontrol on ships, the
Rapier system,and army boots.s2In December1982 the British
governmentindicatedthe war's 'unique' featuresand the result-
ing need to 'be cautious in deciding which lessons of the
campaignare relevant' in the light of the increasingly Euro-
centric/NATO nature of defencepolicy: 'our analysis of the
campaignis continuing; some new lessonshave been learned;
many more lessons have been reinforced'.S3 This suggested
various areasfor debate.For example,were the NATO/Euro-
peanassumptionsof the 1981 DefenceReview'mistaken'?S4Was
an 'exceptional', out-of-area precedenteither relevant for a
NATO power or welcomeat a time of fiscal pressuresto 'think
small'?SSWas JohnNott correctin criticising the fact that 'since
the Falklandstriumph, we fancy ourselvesas a world policeman
readyto fight brushfirewars aroundthe world'?S6Or shouldone
fOllOW the House of CommonsDefenceCommittee(HCDC)'s
conclusions:

It has beenarguedthat the Falklandscampaignwas unique,

and so almost irrelevant to future defencepolicy. We reject
this view ... We believe that a true out-of-areacapability
shouldbe retained.. . the political and economicsignificance
of British interestsworldwide is suchthat the United Kingdom
must in prudenceretain an ability to defendthem in extreme
circumstances... All the lessons of the Falklands are
relevantif the governmentwishesto retain sucha capabilityY

The HCDC argued also for lessonsof 'general applicability'

20
 THE FALKLANDSIMAL VINAS PROBLEM

relating to 'readiness,the reliability and maintainability of

equipment,flexibility, the ability to deal with the unexpected,
the potential for improvisation and . . . the enormousimport-
anceof . . . high standardsof training'.
The debatecontinues.The defencebudgetfacesnegativereal
growth in the next few years, which again raises the need for
awkward political decisions on priorities. The British debate
finds a parallel in the Argentineexperience,as evidencedby the
impact of severe fiscal constraintsand the 1983 Rattenbach
Reporton the war'slessons,includingthe absenceof an effective
defenceafter the invasion.58

mE FIRST MALVINAS WAR?

In 1984 RaymondBriggs satirisedthe eventsin the Falklands.

Onceupon a time, down at the bottomof the world, therewas

a sadlittle island. No one lived on the sadisland exceptfor a
few poor shepherds... Next door ... was a great big king-
dom, ruled over by a Wicked Foreign General ... he was
madeof Tin PotS.59

His captureof the. islands was opposednot only by the shep-

herds but also by 'an old woman madeof iron', who lived far
away and 'wantedto bagsythe little island back again'. Other
writers proved equally dismissive of this 'strange'war, which
allegedlycombined'an Italian operawith a very British Ealing
comedy'.60Perhapsit was possibleto regardthe episodeas 'an
amusinganachronism',that is, an 'uniqueeventpossessinglittle
relevance to other problems', erupting suddenly and unex-
pectedly in an unknown place, and then disappearingfrom
prominencejust as quickly. However, the 1982 War's influence
extendedfar beyond its impact upon domestic and external
developmentsin Argentina, Britain, and the Falklands,sinceit
proved difficult for other governmentsand organisationsto
ignore the dispute's implications for the wider international
political and legal order. In April 1976JamesCallaghanwarned
Edward Rowlands,his Minister of Stateat the FCO, to watch
over 'the dots on the map' like the Falkland Islands,sincethey
were capableof causingseriousproblems.61 Certainly the war,
having demonstratedthe fragility of internationalorder and the

21
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