The Seduction of Hyper-Surveillance: Standards, Testing, and Accountability

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The Seduction of Hyper-Surveillance: Standards,

Testing, and Accountability
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and Accountability
Alejandra Falabella1
Abstract
The idea of a hyper-surveillance state that devolves school management to
the private sector and local governments, but, at the same time, evaluates,
inspects, and sanctions schools in the name of “educational quality and
equality,” has been advocated by diverse sectors, right and center-left,
conservative and liberal, pro-privatization, and pro-public education. It is
a seductive policy. This article is based on the case of Chile, which in recent
decades has consolidated a performative school market model. The study is
based on an examination of official speeches and policy documents (a total
of 84 documents), from the germination of the model in 1979 through to
2011 when the “Quality Assurance Education System” law was passed.
Following Foucault’s studies in governmentality, the analysis not only aims
to understand the policies that led to the creation of the hyper-surveillance
state in education, but also seeks to examine the policy rationale that made
these transformations desirable. The research analysis is also intended
to contribute to a broader understanding of the spread of testing and
accountability policies around the world.
Keywords
accountability, high-stakes tests, school markets, history of assessment, Chile
1
Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, Chile
Corresponding Author:
Alejandra Falabella, University Alberto Hurtado, Erasmo Escala 1825, Santiago 8340539, Chile.
Email: afalabel@uahurtado.cl
2 Educational Administration Quarterly 00(0)
Introduction
The hyper-surveillance state that standardizes, tests, and calls for school
accountability has proliferated around the world in the name of “educational
quality and equality assurance,” usually with transversal political support
from left and right, conservative and liberal, and in countries with a predomi-
nantly market-oriented education system and those with a strong public edu-
cation system (Maroy & Voisin, 2015; Verger & Parcerisa, 2017).
So, for instance, in the case of England, these policies began under
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party and then continued to expand
under Tony Blair’s New Labour Party; in the United States, they began
under the Republican Party with George W. Bush and then continued under
the Democrats with Barack Obama; in the case of Chile, they started during
the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet and deepened with the center-left
coalition, known as the “Concertación.” Similar policies, albeit with differ-
ent degrees of depth, have also been enacted in countries such as Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and
Scotland, among many others. And this policy approach has not only colo-
nized school education policies but also early childhood, special needs, and
higher education, in addition to teacher training and salary policies.
These measures have been promoted together with the application of inter-
national standardized tests (Program for International Student Assessment
[PISA], Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study [TIMMS],
among others), the growth in the business of transnational companies selling
testing technologies (such as Pearson), and the dissemination of these reforms
by various international agencies, such as the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Bank (Lingard
et al., 2013; Sahlberg, 2016).
All of this has occurred despite a lack of research showing the effective-
ness of standard-based reforms and accountability policies, while a meaning-
ful body of literature tends to show harmful effects in school communities,
such as curriculum reduction; intensification of traditional teaching methods;
pupil ability selection, grouping, and exclusion; students and teachers’ stress
and disenchantment with the practice of their profession; in addition, there
are inconclusive results about students’ learning progress (Au, 2007; Berliner,
2011; Falabella, 2014; Lipman, 2004; Verger & Parcerisa, 2017).
Within this scenario various questions arise, such as the following: Why
have these policies expanded so rapidly in recent decades? Why has the idea
of a hyper-surveillance state become so attractive to policy makers? When
did these ideas emerge and how have they changed over time?
Falabella 3
This article is about Chile, which is an exemplary case for examining per-
formance accountability policies within a market-driven model (Falabella,
2015). On a scale of market and accountability policies from low to high, the
country is near the top end. This approach started in the early 1980s under the
Pinochet dictatorship, inspired by neoliberal and conservative principles.
Later, center-left and right-wing governments have continued sophisticating
and expanding the model and, in 2011, it was consolidated through the cre-
ation of the “National Quality Assurance Education System”(SACE by the
Spanish language acronym).1
Following Foucault’s (2006, 2008) studies on governmentality, the article
offers a genealogical analysis of the hyper-surveillance state, in a market
school scenario, in the case of Chile, considering its origin, transformation,
and consolidation. The analysis focuses on testing and accountability poli-
cies, while other market policies (e.g., vouchers, choice, school fees, freedom
to profit) are part of the research background. It is also important to mention
that Chile’s testing policies precede the market-based school schema, never-
theless this study aims to understand the use of national tests since they were
engaged and interwoven into the market-oriented model.
The research results are organized into four sections. The first focuses on
the emergence of the subsidiary state and the use of testing policies within an
embryonic school market system under the military dictatorship (1979–
1990). The second section discusses the first center-left governments under
the Concertación coalition,2 in which a “proactive state” is shaped to “coun-
terbalance” the market-based schema, entailing initial accountability policies
(1990–2000). In the third section, with the continuity of the governing coali-
tion, a more marked discourse emerged on performance accountability,
together with the expansion of a managerial logic, drawing the beginning of
a “tough state” (2000–2006). The fourth and final section addresses the phase
of consolidation of the evaluative or hyper-surveillance state, through legal
reforms including the General Education Law and the Quality Assurance
Education System Law (2006–2011).
Finally, the article discusses the seductive discourse of the policy, as it
uses an ambiguous narrative and offers dual promises, such as market/state
regulations, public/private provision, quality standards/diversity, and free-
dom/equality benefits. This policy narrative has created an elastic discourse
that persuades factions of different political sensibilities (while other policies
are intensely disputed). The attraction to accountability policies has also been
nurtured by local and global ideational, technological, and pragmatic compo-
nents that have helped consolidate the role of the hyper-surveillance state.
The mixture of test-based accountability and pro-privatization policies in the
Chilean case particularly resonates with countries, such as, England, the
United States, New Zealand, and Australia. Furthermore, the case of Chile
illuminates transnational thinking to understand the extensive spread of these
policies in diverse territories around the globe.
Research Context: Global Trends and the Case of

Chile
The prevailing reformulations of educational systems in recent decades have
been diverse and complex, and cannot be reduced to “neoliberal reforms.”
Although each country’s educational models vary significantly according to
their specific features and history, in general terms, the nature of these reforms
entails the policy mix of national testing, performance accountability, and
pro-market measures. Performance responsibility is devolved to schools and
teachers, making them accountable to both the state and parents. Therefore, it
is a double accountability.
Within this policy framework, the state, on the one hand, defines learning
national standards and goals, assesses and inspects schools, informs parents
and the general public about school performance indicators, gives out school
awards and sanctions, and provides school guidance according to institutional
outcomes. On the other hand, to differing extents, these transformations are
commonly combined with parental school choice, school privatization, and
demand-driven funding, which fuels competition in the education system.
The coexisting movement of liberalization-standardization is essential to
understand the mixed nature of the model, which constitutes a performative
school market (Ball, 2008). Hence, in spite of the expected “free” parental choice
and private initiative, at the same time, the state oversees and defines the rules of
the game in a competition-based schema, maintaining and even increasing its
control over a dispersed network of public and private school providers. The state
governs “at a distance,” in the words of Rose and Miller (1992), also known as
the “evaluative state” (Maroy, 2009), or “governing by numbers” as stated by
Ozga (2011). The market transaction, in this case, is not a dual relationship
between supply and demand, but is rather triangulated and steered by the state. In
consequence, it is not a “free market,” but instead a “performative market.”
The state acts as a market-maker in this scenario, as it produces and orga-
nizes markets for public assets, such as education. It achieves this not only
through a competitive funding system, but also by creating policy tools that
assign value to education providers through differentiating market signs,
such as scores, rankings, and quality ratings, which are then linked to rewards
and sanctions. These market signs are crucial for producing school hierar-
chies, distinction, and comparison, granting schools symbolic reputation
and, therefore, a sense of competition.
Falabella 5
This approach, following the principles of new public management

(Newman, 2005; Verger & Normand, 2015), transforms the ethos of educa-
tion, applying a managerial logic to a public right (Ball & Youdell, 2008).
The available policy technologies include quantifiable goals and constant
monitoring, customer attention culture, incentives and sanctions, and the
individualization of risk and responsibility. Under these principles, it is
essential for school staff not to have an assured and stable budget, since it is
believed that incentives, risks, and latent penalties positively drive the system
and its actors toward continuous educational quality.
The Chilean school system has gradually followed these policy trends
(Bellei, 2015; Corvalán et al., 2016; Falabella, 2015). In brief, the school
system has a widespread market-oriented schema, with parents’ free choice3
and a competing funding formula per student, equivalent for both the public
and private sector. The primary reform that gave life to the current model was
developed in the 1980s under Pinochet’s dictatorship, guided by neoliberal
and conservative principles. Since then, the expansion of the private-subsi-
dized sector has been strongly fostered. These schools were allowed to select
pupils, make profits, and, starting in 1993, they were able to charge school
fees (“copayment funding”). Meanwhile, the governance of public schools
was transferred from the central state to municipalities.
The subsequent center-left and right-wing governments preserved the
overall market-oriented model. However, the dictatorship had abandoned
schools’ daily work and applied fiscal discipline measures, leaving them in
extremely precarious conditions. In contrast, the following governments
gradually raised public spending on education and adopted curricular leader-
ship, together with diverse measures for providing support to improve
schools, and the fortification of a performance accountability approach.
The system has an annual national test, called SIMCE (System for
Measuring the Quality of Education), which was created in 1988. The test is
applied eight to nine times per year, comprising four grades (students from 10
to 15 years old) and four subjects. The country, from 2011, has a “Quality
Assurance Quality System” (SACE). The model entails an institutional infra-
structure—the Agency for Quality Education and the Superintendence of
Education—responsible for auditing, assessing, and rating schools, as well as
disseminating school results and sanctioning schools with consistently poor
performances (e.g., removing the leadership team or, ultimately, closing the
school).
From a general perspective, the outcomes of these transformations have
been complex. School enrolment increased significantly during the past
decades of the 20th century. Nowadays, primary education has reached 96%
student coverage and secondary education is at 88.8% (Ministry of Education,
2018). Chile is also among the leaders in Latin America in results on the
“Program for International Student Assessment,” although below the average
of the OECD (2014) countries. From a long-standing perspective, however,
national test results have not shown a consistent improvement and, on the
contrary, there are still meaningful inequalities linked to social class.
Furthermore, Chile has one of the most segmented school systems in the
world (Valenzuela et al., 2014) and a shrinking public education that covers
only 38.2% of annual student enrolment (Ministry of Education, 2018), while
municipalities have serious technical and economic inequalities for governing
public schools. Besides, in accordance with international research outcomes,
various pieces of research that study the effects of performance accountability
measures show significant tensions within schools and harmful effects on the
quality of learning and teaching; especially affecting schools that serve disad-
vantaged communities (see e.g., Assaél et al., 2014; Falabella, 2016, 2019;
Flórez & Rozas, 2019; López et al., 2018; Rojas & Leyton, 2014).
In 2006 and 2011, massive protests by school and higher education stu-
dents broke out on the streets (Donoso, 2016; Villalobos & Ortiz, 2019). They
questioned the logic of the system, including the lack of state control over the
private sector, the existence of for-profit schools and universities, the cost for
families for education, the inequity of the system, and the dictatorial origins of
the model. Slogans on the protest banners read as follows: “Education is not
for sale,” “No more market education,” “Public, free, and quality education
for all.” Criticism has also risen because of student overtesting and the overall
school performance accountability approach. In fact, a group of academics
and teachers formed a campaign called “Stop Simce” (Alto al Simce), which
has demanded a halt to the logic of standardization in education and calls for
the creation of a new assessment system (Inzunza & Campos-Martínez, 2016).
In the past few years, ongoing reforms have been implemented as a
response to the student movements, which were mobilized during the second
center-left government of President Michelle Bachelet, between 2014 and
2017 (Bellei, 2015; Carrasco, 2018; Orellana, 2018). The “School Inclusion
Law,” enacted in 2015, introduced new regulations to the school market, pro-
hibiting—albeit with exceptions—selection of students, profit-making, and
parental fees in subsidized schools. Also, a new public school governance
law has been devised, transferring their management from municipalities to
new autonomous entities, called “Local Educational Services,” which work
over a larger extension of territory and which, unlike municipalities, are
exclusively dedicated to school administration and are accountable to the
Ministry of Education. In addition, a new Law of “Teacher’s Development”
defines the ways in which teachers are assessed, classified, and paid, as well
as other regulations for teacher training programs.
Falabella 7
The Chilean education system is moving in dynamic ways, while these

reforms are progressively implemented. However, it is important to acknowl-
edge that, in spite of these significant changes, the performance accountability
system has been strengthened and the market-based model has been regulated
further, but is still conserved. And, although it is a nonselective and gratuitous
“fair market,” it is still a market. In effect, the model continues functioning
with a subsidiary state, without public education having a preferential role
ahead of private education provision; performance accountability remains to
be a crucial policy technology for governing the system; and furthermore, it is
extremely difficult to control profit-making and nondiscriminatory practices
over a large subsidized private sector that has had license to do these things for
decades. The results of these latest transformations remain to be seen.
Theoretical References and Methodological Design

Foucault’s (2006, 2008) work on “govern-mentalities” and political rationali-
ties is the basis for the research analysis. Policy from this perspective is not
limited to a set of policy measures or a list of dogmas. It implies the exercise
of a “method of rationalization”, in Foucault’s (2006) words, which produces
desires, truths, and discourses, which circulate in different spheres to assure
the functioning of the political project. The discursive dimension of policies,
explains Rose (1996), produces the conceivable, the desirable, and the
unthinkable. They are a system of thought, entailing “meaning making,” as
Newman (2005) notes, they are a productive discourse of the world, includ-
ing ideas, such as “quality,” “leadership,” “inclusion.”
Bacchi (2000, 2012), following Foucault, suggests analyzing “policies as
a problem.” This approach involves examining how objects become real and
the historical conditions of emergence. Policy texts, that is, laws, regulations,
and official documents, imply government activity. These policy artifacts are
discursive assemblages that attempt to shape conducts by working through
peoples’ subjectivities. However, as Ball (2008) argues, policy discourses are
also messy, containing gaps, contradictions, and often combining different
rationalities.
Policy discourses have a particular narrative. They produce dramatic cri-
ses, dangerous scenarios, urgent needs, and indispensable solutions. In words
of Lindblad and Popkewitz (2004), policy discourses are “salvation narra-
tives of progress, rescue and redemption” (p. 70), making up stories, plots,
and people, “embodying systems of reason” (p. 90). They involve reiterative
ideas that are slowly built and accumulated over time, and contain persuasive
meanings, metaphors, and policy clichés that work as “topoi” that appear as
authorless universal consensus.
This problematization method suggests that what is produced as the policy

reality is contingent and therefore available for constant change. The analyti-
cal approach allows the reader to develop a deconstructive examination that
unsettles, displaces, and reassembles hegemonic meanings. It “makes it pos-
sible to think otherwise,” and is therefore open for change, intervention, and
movement (Bacchi, 2012, p. 7).
The aim of this piece of research is to trace performance accountability
policy rationale in the school market scenario in Chile, that is, to understand
how this thinking emerged and developed. The period selected for the study
is from the origin of the model in 1979 to 2011, when the policy was consoli-
dated through the SACE Law.
The research study is based on a review of official speeches and policy
documents from the period defined above. The initial starting point for the
documentary study was to obtain a comprehensive view of the policy dis-
courses in education throughout the examined period, based on the collec-
tion of the Presidents’ annual state-of-the-nation speeches and the Education
Ministers’ annual speeches at the beginning of every school year. These
documents allowed the research to capture the discursive continuities, fluc-
tuations, and turning points, year by year.
Second, all laws of the time that include testing and/or performance account-
ability measures were examined. The involved laws (presented by their names
and Spanish language acronym) are as follows: Organic Constitutional Law of
Education (LOCE); National System of Performance Evaluation Law (SNED);
Preferential School Subsidy Law (SEP); General Education Law (LGE); and
Education Quality Assurance System Law (SACE). Additionally, the document
analysis included the President and Education Ministers’ speeches to Congress
when the aforementioned laws were submitted or approved, as well as the
Congressional records of the debates on the LGE and SACE.
Third, official ministerial documents of the period related to SIMCE and
school management were reviewed. These set of documents were searched
for in the archives of the Ministry of Education and of the “Centre of Teacher
training, experimentation and Pedagogical Research” (an entity of the
Ministry), and on the official web sites of the Ministry of Education, of the
SIMCE test and of the Agency for Quality Education. As a result of this pro-
cess, a total of 84 documents were finally selected and analyzed, which
aligned to the three types of policy texts outlined above.
The research analysis is concerned with exposing the circulation of policy
discourses, the formation of particular rules and versions of the truth, and the
use of governance technologies. It looks at the construction of meaning in the
development of policies, the mechanisms of justification and persuasion, and
the ideational atmosphere, in the words of Verger (2016). All this plays a
Falabella 9
preponderant role in the gestation of public policies and allows us to under-

stand their nature and practical results.
All of the material was coded in broad analytical axes: (a) the role of the
state and of the market; (b) public education and privatization; (c) school
autonomy, de/centralization, and community participation; (d) curriculum
and teachers; (e) school assessment and accountability; (f) equality and inclu-
sion; and (g) parents’ choice, “voice,” and school involvement. Within each
axis the codification analysis was refined into subcategories and was orga-
nized within presidential periods, allowing a detailed examination of the
data. Based on the systematic consideration of the predominant policy dis-
courses and key turning points, four temporal phases where defined, identify-
ing the reiterative policy discourses, as well as the discursive discontinuities,
nuances, and disputes. Throughout the article, transcribed quotes are used to
illustrate these main policy rationales. Nonetheless, one of the limitations of
the research is its inability to account for internal policy-making controver-
sies and for other actors’ views and responses (e.g., civilian and student lead-
ers), since this is not the focus of the study.
The Birth of the Performative Market Under the

Dictatorship
The organization of the Chilean school system under the logic of a performa-
tive market began during Pinochet’s civil–military dictatorship (1973–1990).
This regime acquired power through a military coup, violently ending the
elected “Popular Unity” government, led by the socialist President Salvador
Allende. The crisis responded to the deep conflicts that provoked the attempt
to apply a socialist project in the country, generating strong rejection from the
right-wing and the business sector, added to the accentuated divisions within
the left. Furthermore, it took place in the middle of the Cold War, together
with the emergence of various other Latin American dictatorships, and it was
supported by the intervention of the United States as part of a hegemonic
agenda in the region (Hunneus, 2016).
The authoritarian regime made profound transformations in the political–
economic model of the country, with unusual conditions for carrying out
widespread measures, operating as a neoliberal laboratory for the rest of the
world (Harvey, 2006). These transformations were led by a group of Chilean
economists who studied at the University of Chicago4 (known as the “Chicago
boys”) and that advocated for Milton Friedman’s monetarist theory.5 Their
headquarters for engendering the key economic and social reforms was the
National Planning Office, which was responsible for overseeing the Ministry
of Education,6 among other ministries.
The neoliberal policy thinking of that time implied a global activity of

flowing policies, technologies, and ideas. Neoliberal transformations spread
out in different parts of the world during the “Reagan and Thatcher era,” and
led to the enforcement of “structural adjustment policies” in various Latin
America countries in crisis with huge foreign debts. This meant the applica-
tion of the so called “Washington consensus” formula, such as fiscal auster-
ity, privatization of social services, and economic liberalization, promoted by
international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.
During this period, an educational reform was announced in 1979, moving
away from the centralized state-run education model, and building the foun-
dations of a subsidiary state in charge of creating and protecting fertile condi-
tions for a competitive school market (Ruiz, 2010). The guiding principles
were the attempt to achieve the utopia of the free school market, the defense
of individual parental freedom, and the supremacy of free entrepreneurship.
This process of marketization was coupled with a nationalist conservative
curriculum ideology and the belief that school quality should be measured in
order to positively foster the desired educational market, as well as for the
state to oversee schools.
In 1982, a census evaluation was introduced called the “School Academic
Assessment Program” (PER in Spanish language),7 which was subsequently
transformed into the SIMCE in 1988. In 1990, at the end of the Pinochet regime,
the dissemination of school test results was enshrined in the LOCE.
These kinds of tests were not new. Prior to the dictatorship, under the gov-
ernment of President Frei Montalva (1964–1970), the leader of the Christian
Democratic Party, a national standardized assessment was introduced called
the “National Verbal and Mathematical Skills Test.” The exam was applied
between 1967 and 1971, for eighth graders (13–14 years old), added to the
“Academic Aptitude Test” university admission exam, applied for the first
time the same year (Falabella & Ramos, 2019; Gysling, 2015).
This assessment approach was part of the technocratic curriculum
approach that was popular among intellectuals in the education field between
the 1950s and 1970s. Its standpoint was influenced by North American
authors and curriculum theorists, such as Ralph Tyler and Benjamin Bloom,
and coincided with the beginning of school effectiveness studies, advances in
psychometrics and the use of standardized testing that developed rapidly
around the world from the early 20th century.
The use of standardized tests was promoted particularly by the U.S. gov-
ernment and the Educational Testing Service in Latin America during the
1960s. It was a “scientific colonization,” as Alarcón (2015) argues. Important
exchanges were organized between experts from that country, financed by
Falabella 11
the Kennedy government in the context of “The Alliance for Progress.”8 In

consequence, the north american “Scholarship Aptitude Test” became a key
reference in the preparation of these national tests in Chile.
From another position, UNESCO, together with the Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) of the United Nations, also
played a key role influencing and articulating Latin American governments’
agenda under the policy rationale of “education planning” and development
theories. One of the main strategies of UNESCO, which was tremendously
effective in propagating national assessments, was to create a policy network
called the “Principle Project of Education,” based on meetings every 2 years
between Ministers of Education of the region, which started in 1979 and
lasted until the year 2000 (UNESCO-OREALC, 2001).
In this national and international scenario, the continuation of mass exams
was of great relevance. In 1978, the design of the PER test was commissioned
by the Ministry of Education to a team from the Pontificia Universidad
Católica of Chile,9 an institution that maintained close ties with the Pinochet
regime. This team was headed by Erika Himmel, who conducted her post-
graduate studies at Columbia University and was one of the experts that
designed the Academic Aptitude Test.
The initial agreement between the team in charge of designing the PER
test and the Minister of Education, Gonzalo Vial (who was also an academic
at the Universidad Católica), was to carry out a study to identify the variables
that affect students’ academic performance. In line with school efficiency
studies at the time, the expectation was to control certain school variables and
influence learning outcomes. In addition, in the context of a decentralizing
school reform, the test would foster effective teaching and empower local
schools and teachers by providing objective assessment information for edu-
cational improvement (see interventions by Nicolás Majluf in Cox, 1985;
Himmel, 1992, 1996).
Under the military regime, however, the transfer of power from Minister
Gonzalo Vial to his successor Alfredo Prieto was a political turning point. At
the end of 1979, Prieto asked the academic team in charge of designing the
test to change the objective in order to measure “school quality,” with the
results of each school to be published to help guide parental choice (Himmel,
1992;10 Prieto, 1983). The novelty of Minister Prieto’s proposal was not the
application of a standardized test, but rather the extrapolation of students’
learning results as an indicator of school quality. This explains the following
change of the name of the test from “School Academic Assessment Program”
to “System for Meassuring the Quality of Education.”11
The new testing policy generated high expectations for the novel market-
oriented educational project. In an interview, Juan Enrique Fröemel, a former
military officer and undersecretary for education, said, “If there was some-
thing we did that was deliberate and well thought-out, it was the school per-
formance measurement system” (cited in Almonacid et al., 2008). Minister
Prieto (1983), also wrote that without the national assessment, “the reformed
educational system would lose one of its main tools for making the rest of the
modernization of education plan effective, real and operative” (p. 93). The
exam results, explained the Minister, are an input so that parents can exercise
their “free school choice,” “maximizing their goods,” and acting as the pri-
mary stakeholders in the education of their children.
In spite of the ode to individual freedom of the time, the new policy was
understood as a means of having the state oversee and drive the liberalized
school system. The policy thinking meant that quality education is objective,
standard, and measurable, defined as a supraindividual good, therefore,
beyond individual preference. Minister Prieto (1983), in effect, explained
that test outcomes serve to “demonstrate the truth or falsity of a series of
statements that are frequently heard about the quality of our education” (p.
97). Moreover, the test, as a “comparative indicator of quality (...) benefits
parents and allows the rules on freedom of education to operate properly” (p.
95, italics added).
In the minutes of the government meeting when the LOCE was drafted
(October 17 and 25, 1988), interestingly, it was made evident that the
SIMCE test was planned not only to guide supposedly informed parental
choice, but was also to be used by educators for pedagogical purposes and,
at the same time, by the state to ensure compliance with minimum curricu-
lar requirements.
During the beginning of the restructuring of the system (1978–1979),
Minister of Education Gonzalo Vial, who represented the most “centrist”
wing of the regime, said in a seminar:
[The national assessment] turns on the red light . . . at any given school that is
performing poorly. Then, the whole community becomes concerned and, if
they cannot fix it, a deadline will have to be set for the Ministry to take action.
(G. Vial in Cox, 1985, p. 52)
Similarly, in 1983 Minister of Education Mónica Madariaga sent a letter stat-

ing that schools could be closed because of poor results on the PER test.
Although this measure did not materialize in practice, it was circulating
within the ideational atmosphere.
The study, therefore, shows that the standardized tests in this period were
not only thought of as an instrument for school choice within an education
market, but also served pedagogical and mercantile purposes, while helping
Falabella 13
to strengthen state control. As Pinochet declared in one of his annual speeches

to the nation: “Parents have priority and preferably the right and duty to
ensure the education of their children! The state assumes its important sub-
sidiary role through the supervision and control of educational management”
(September 11, 1986, italics added).
In short, what seemed to be an ideology of a “savage market” with mini-
mal state interference, paradoxically contained a vision that freedom should
be regulated and steered by the state. These are the foundations of the hyper-
surveillance state, which guides the performative school market “from a dis-
tance.” Nonetheless, in practice it took three decades for the consolidation of
the model, since the existing competitive formula contained almost no regu-
lations and the state’s institutional capacity for design and analyzing mass
standardized tests was still immature.
The Initiation of State Accountability Policies

Under the Center-Left Coalition
With the return of democracy, the center-left “Concertación” coalition
assumed power for four consecutive presidential terms, lasting over 20 years
(1990–2010). Under these governments, the subsidiary state and the neolib-
eral policies inherited from the previous period were maintained and the con-
viction to maintain a “growing economy” prevailed. This phase, known as
“the transition”—implied limited democracy, since the authoritarian regime
conditioned the return of democracy on the preservation of the Political
Constitution of 1980, and a set of other constitutional laws, such as the
LOCE, which require the approval of a large congressional majority for any
legal changes. The political strategy of the Concertación was “the policy of
consensus,” described by accurately Moulián (1997). This implied the pres-
ervation of the structural transformations carried out under the dictatorship
and to reconcile the coming changes with the right-wing political parties,
avoiding any institutional rupture.
The governments in the first decade of the Concertación in the 1990s
maintained the pro-privatization and competitive education policies of the
previous period and even extended some of these policies, such as the use of
fees in subsidized schools. But, at the same time, policy makers working in
the Ministry of Education in this period, argued that the Concertación
replaced the previous “minimalist state” with an “active state” to “counter-
balance the market” and thus acquire a policy balance (Cox, 2003, p. 20; also
see García-Huidobro, 1999; Núñez, 1995). This idea of balance referred to
the preservation of free parental choice and public and private school provi-
sion, together with a “active state” that increases state spending, fortifies a
centralized national curriculum (with democratic and civic values), develops

diverse measures for school improvement, along with positive discrimination
programs, and the improvement of teachers’ working conditions.
Under the logic of the “pro-active state,” standardized assessment policies
were maintained and advanced.12 In 1995, the first major change, in terms of
accountability policies, was carried out, as since then, test results are made
public in the media, stipulated in the LOCE. And the same year, a perfor-
mance-based pay for teachers was created, called the “National Performance
Evaluation System.”13 The relevance of this measure is that, for the first time,
school performance was directly linked to state consequences.
The accountability measures, however, were still incipient, and policy dis-
courses emphasized the supportive and compensatory state, in a post-dictato-
rial scenario of school precariousness; under the narrative of “the educational
reform for improving quality and equality in schools” (Ministry of Education,
1998). However, at the same time, the policy thinking about the hyper-sur-
veillance state continued to develop.
Multilateral lenders during this decade (e.g. Inter-American Development
Bank, Organization of American States, and World Bank) promoted the use
of standards, understood as tangible evidence of the effective use of resources.
The World Bank, particularly played a chief role in monitoring policymaking
in this decade, as it financed a significant part of Chile’s policies in this period
(Cox & Avalos, 1999).
In the region, UNESCO continued to foster policy networks. An influen-
tial document of ECLAC-UNESCO (1992)14 promoted “responsible school
management” and the use of performance accountability measures. And in
1994, UNESCO created the “Latin-American Laboratory for Assessment of
the Quality of Education,” located in Santiago, which formed an assessment
network in the region and created the students’ exam: “Regional Comparative
and Explanatory Study.” Interestingly the international agency congregated
Chileans from different political positions around standardized testing
(Falabella & Ramos, 2019).15 Furthermore, it is important to note that
Chilean policy makers and experts were indeed active participants in these
global networks, promoting Chilean policies and the SIMCE test in the
region (Campos et al., 2015).
In the country, the “Report of the National Commission for the
Modernization of Education,” which was established by President Eduardo
Frei in 1994 and led by the Minister Secretary General of Government, José
Joaquin Brunner, was drafted according to a market-performance rationale.
This is probably the most important political text of the Concertación coali-
tion in the educational field, since it set out the guidelines in education for
the following 15 years. In order to generate “effective schools,” a strong
Falabella 15
system of assessment, accountability, and sanctions was recommended,

along with extensive dissemination of information to parents. It was
described as follows:
A system whereby each school is responsible for its results and these are
systematically evaluated and made known to the public. Where meritorious
work is celebrated and rewarded; mediocre work is corrected and improved,
and situations of failure are faced with a determined attitude. (Commission for
the Modernization of Education, 1995, p. 64)
On the Ministry’s website performance accountability was defined as a prin-

ciple of educational reform to move “from rules-based compliance to respon-
sibility for results; from exclusively bureaucratic-administrative regulations
of the system to an emphasis on regulations for incentives, information, and
assessment.”16
Despite the fact that disputes had arisen within the Concertación between
the “statist” and “liberal” factions of the coalition, the documentation shows
that the policy of standardized assessment and accountability was based on a
broad consensus.
The Move Toward the “Tough State”

From the 2000s, a hyper-surveillance state and new public management
logic began to be put into practice in a more determined manner, demand-
ing that schools demonstrate the “quality” of their performance. The new
emphasis of the educational discourse, in contrast to the previous decade,
was not on what the state gives to the school (pedagogical programs, teacher
training, resources, etc.), but rather on what the school gives to the state,
that is, performance outcomes. Rather than the previous “benevolent state”,
this is the “tough state” in charge of standardizing, assessing, and, when
necessary, sanctioning schools.
Under the market-based scheme, with strong participation of the private
sector, low-entry requirements, and almost no regulations, the study by
Parcerisa and Falabella (2017) shows that post-2000 there was a feeling of
powerlessness within the Concertación regarding the impunity of “bad pro-
viders” of education that received public funding with no strings attached.
Among the interviewees who worked at the Ministry of Education at the
time, one described it as “a toothless Ministry,” in reference to its lack of
punitive power over private and municipal education providers.
For this same reason, a OECD (2004) report (led by Martin Carnoy) reso-
nated among Ministry officials, since the international agency categorically
stated: “The [Chilean] educational market experiment has not produced the
progress in learning or the cost savings envisioned by its supporters” (p. 192).
This report gave legitimacy to strengthening assessment and standardization
policies, added to OECD’s growing global influence in the area (Ydesen &
Andreasen, 2019).17
At the end of the 1990s, after meaningful state investment in education,
national test results were stagnant, and Chile’s performance on international
tests was poor. The media (particularly newspaper El Mercurio) and the
opposition political parties produced a sense of educational crisis,18 strategi-
cally pushing the government to demonstrate an increase in national school
results. As noted by another Ministry official at the time:
[The stagnation of SIMCE results] began to generate a strong debate regarding

. . . the effectiveness and legitimacy of the reform. And, at the same time,
legislators, especially opposition lawmakers on the right, started to criticize the
policy initiatives of the reform with much greater force. Political parties in
general, even the parties in the governing coalition, began to distrust what was
being done because the desired results were not achieved. Shortly afterwards,
Chile commenced to participate in international tests, but the TIMMS results
were not very good. So, all of that added to the pressure and the view that many
things were not working. (cited in Parcerisa & Falabella, 2017)
The circulating discourse on “the stagnation of test results” had a profound

effect on policy makers, as the interviewee quoted above claimed, “we started
to distrust what was being done.” The Ministry of Education policy makers,
who had decided to publish the SIMCE scores and participate in the interna-
tional tests, implicitly accepted that educational policies are successful only
insofar as they improve standarized test results. The government fell into its
own trap, as it was obliged to demonstrate its effectiveness by improving
performance outcomes.
The pro-accountability rationale created the crisis, contrary to the idea
that the “crisis of results” acted as a neutral and independent cause that later
triggered accountability policies. The proposed solution to this crisis was to
improve national test results by making test performance the focus of school
management. In her first opening speech of the school year in March 2001,
the Education Minister Mariana Aylwin said, “We have to pay more attention
to school results, which means promoting a new culture of excellence.” In the
ministerial narrative, this meant “bringing the reform to the classroom,”
“achieving more and better learning,” and emphasizing that improving results
is “the responsibility of all.” Consequently, the responsibility for test results
was devolved from the central government to the schools.
Falabella 17
In this period, a result-oriented management approach emerged based on

the theory of effective schools. Measurable goals and standardized tests
began to form a roadmap for school governance, with an emphasis on basic
competencies in language and mathematics. Under these guidelines, school
management decisions “should not be random,” but rather “based on evi-
dence” derived from test results. This led to the emergence of a results-
based schizophrenia, since whatever cannot be measured or demonstrated
to an external observer does not seem to exist. Under this rationale, account-
ability measures were incorporated into compensatory programs (“Critical
Schools,” “Priority High-Schools”), as well as in policy instruments, such
as the “Framework for Good School Management” and the “System for
Quality Assurance in School Management,” while the frequency of national
tests was increased in line with recommendations made by a “SIMCE
Commission” in 2003.
These changes occurred under a hyper-iterative narrative, supported by a
broad political spectrum, that saw the historical evolution of the nation as
having first secured the “right of access to education” in terms of coverage,
and was now called on to move to a second higher phase, which meant ensur-
ing “the right to quality education,” thereby providing justification for the
new performance accountability system.
At the same time, the draft bill to create the SEP was being prepared,
based on the view that state resources had to be delivered in exchange for
performance test results. This law, subsequently approved in 2008, was the
first to incorporate a scheme of performance accountability, with the delivery
of an additional subsidy for every “vulnerable student,” but on the condition
that the school complies with test goals and indicators established by the
state. In this regard, President Michelle Bachelet said, “I want to be very
clear: we need more resources for children from families with lower incomes,
yes; but also, better performance by the schools attended by those children”
(May 21 presidential speech, 2006). Importantly, this policy introduced for
the first time school sanctions for continuous underperformance, such as a
letter to parents indicating school outcomes and information of alternative
nearby schools, the removal of the senior leadership team, and the definitive
closure of the school.
Finally, it must be noted that the political rationality of the hyper-surveil-
lance state was applied transversally across other educational initiatives in
Chile at the time, such as the National Teacher Evaluation System (2004), the
Higher Education Accreditation System (2006), the Quality Assurance
System (2007) for JUNJI19 kindergartens, and the “Inicia test” (2008), a stan-
dardized exam that sought to regulate the quality of training of recent gradu-
ates in pedagogy.
The State as the Guardian of School Consumers

This is the last stage examined in the article, which led to the SACE Law. In
2006, under the government of President Bachelet, the fourth term of the
Concertación, there was a turning point. Secondary school students took part
in massive protests (known as the “Penguin Revolution”20) and strongly criti-
cized educational inequalities, the lack of school quality, and the overall neo-
liberal scheme inherited from the military dictatorship.
In this climate, the government used the crisis strategically as shock
therapy, to use Klein’s (2007) term, in order to promote more radical
accountability measures. The official discourses presented a “quality assur-
ance agenda” in the name of the student movement. The government trans-
lated the student’s demands—which were sufficiently vague—into a policy
narrative in which the educational system urgently needed high-stakes poli-
cies as a solution to the crisis. For example, Education Minister Yasna
Provoste said, “Citizens are demanding greater participation of the state in
education, and they also want school administrators, both municipal and
private, who receive state support, to be held accountable for their results”
(Inaugural school year speech, March 2007). This policy tale is still an
ongoing narrative. For instance, members of the “Agency for Quality
Education” characteristically open their official presentations with a photo
of the 2006 student movement, in order to highlight to the audience that this
was the catalyst for the creation of the agency and for the current national
quality assurance model.
During the governments of the Concertación, the official discourse, unlike
ever before was strongly critical of the existing market model. President
Bachelet stated, “the market and competition alone are not enough to ensure
quality,” and that education “cannot be regulated as a business” (Promulgation
of the Law for the Superintendency of Education, May 23, 2007).
In contrast to most cases in which standardization and accountability poli-
cies are used as a mechanism to introduce market logic into education sys-
tems, in the Chilean case it was the other way around (Verger & Normand,
2015), that is, school accountability policies were strengthened as an attempt
to control the “savage free market.” In this scenario, the state emerged as the
savior of the necessary, yet failing market. The invisible hand of the market
did not, on its own, guarantee education quality and had to be supplemented—
not replaced—by the visible hand of the state. President Bachelet declared,
“We need a bigger and better state,” the market “is not enough to ensure
educational quality” (inaugural school year speech, March 2008). Similarly,
Minister Martín Zilic stated,
Falabella 19
Schools that provide a poor quality education are a fraud for parents and today
these institutions are unregulated. Primary, secondary, and higher education
has been commercialized. The freedom to provide education was prioritized
above the right to education, but they must be on the same level. Supporters of
the state model say that everything must be controlled by the state, while the
other side argues that the market should self-regulate. I am for greater freedom,
but with much stronger control by the state—not by the government—on
matters of quality in education. (interview in El Mercurio, June 11, 2006).
In this way, the mantra of equilibrium emerged, in tune with the emergence
of the “renewed social democracy” and the “Third Way” (Falabella, 2015).
The solution proposed was not to end the participation of the market in edu-
cation, but to regulate it strategically, like an alchemist who seeks the perfect
combination between the state and the market, rights and freedoms, and the
public and private sectors. It was understood that the market has benefits
(freedom, diversity, incentives), but left on its own it is vulnerable to flaws
(abuses, exclusions, frauds), and therefore it is necessary to balance it with
regulatory mechanisms. This was a tactical discourse that emerged repeat-
edly in the examined documents, and it was key for the center-left coalition
to promote and justify its policy of quality assurance.
This rationale was also aligned with the “post-Washington consensus”
view (Herrera-Jeldres, Reyes-Jedlicki, Ruiz-Schneider, 2018). In contrast to
its first version, it extolled the importance of the state in economic and social
development. Devolution of public governance and prochoice policies in edu-
cation are claimed as necessary, but alone are not enough, as they require state
investment, standards, and surveillance. This vision was strongly influenced
by the World Bank, which financed an important part of Chile’s policies in the
1990s. The document “Beyond the Washington Consensus” (Burki & Perry,
1998), edited by the World Bank, reflects the agreements of the seminar held
in Santiago (called the “Santiago Consensus”).
Specifically regarding the SACE law, the World Bank was the most impor-
tant institution in guiding this policy, through a report widely disseminated in
2007 and headed by Emiliana Vegas. The report states that it is “unlikely”
that ending the voucher system will produce the intended improvements, and
that instead what is required is to strengthen a quality assurance system
(World Bank, 2007, p. 16). Afterward, in a similar vein, three reports were
delivered in 2009, exclusively for the Ministry of Education, to advice on the
design of the model and the preparation of the draft law.
In the meantime, an ambitious discourse was used to promote this educa-
tion model, probably as no other policy has managed, through a long list of
benefits: “quality,” “equity,” “transparency,” “high quality for vulnerable
students,” “honoring families,” and “development of human capital,” among

others. In fact, many have praised this formula, including intellectuals from
the right (e.g., Beyer, 2001; Fontaine & Eyzaguirre, 2001) and members of
the center-left governments (e.g., Montt et al., 2006; Vanni & Bravo, 2010),
as well as in works cowritten by authors from the center-left and right
(Brunner & Peña, 2007; Larroulet & Montt, 2010; Santander, 2002).
As a result, on November 13, 2007, the “Agreement for the Quality of
Education,”21 the bases of the LGE and SACE law, was achieved, being signed
by the heads of the center-left and right-wing political parties in parliament.
While there were heated debates between and within both coalitions—such as
on student selection, for-profit private-subsidized schools, and the system of
school copayments—the policy of evaluation and accountability was legiti-
mized by the equilibrium formula. Although in the parliamentary debate of the
law there was certain apprehension expressed by lawmakers from both coali-
tions, because of the possible side effects of the quality assurance model, there
was a general consensus.
Despite the fact that social protests started because of students’ disap-
proval toward the market-driven approach, the Concertación’s narrative of a
“stronger state” was not, in practice, a reduction of the school model (Santa
Cruz, 2016; Villalobos, 2016). And even that a large faction of the coalition
advocated for regulating the educational market (e.g., banding pupil selection
and profit-making), the performative-market rational was maintained. The
SACE reform has implied deeper and more sophisticated control devices,
competition mechanisms, and performance differentiation between schools.
The state protects the rights of parents as consumers, as their guardian in
the marketplace, and monitors suppliers, without distinction between the pub-
lic and private sectors. In the words of President Bachelet, “the state acts as a
guarantor of the quality of education that is at the service of the people . . . to
honor the trust of families” (promulgation of the Law for the Superintendency
of Education, May 23, 2007, italics added). Finally, it was President Sebastián
Piñera, leader of the right-wing coalition, who promulgated the SACE law on
August 11, 2011, noting:
I want to say this clearly: we firmly believe in the freedom of education, which
requires that different proposals and different models of education coexist. We
firmly believe in the right of parents to choose the education of their children.
And, upholding this right effectively requires diversity. We believe in a society-
run education, in which both the public and private sectors coexist and collaborate
to offer different options and alternatives. ( . . . ) Parents will be duly informed of
[test results] on a timely basis, because we believe that the main responsibility in
the education of children rests with their parents. And, therefore, for them to be
able to exercise that responsibility, they need to have accurate, timely and
complete information that allows them to make informed and free decisions.
Falabella 21
Both political coalitions backed up the reform, although, interestingly, with

ethical and esthetic differences in their discourses.22 While President Bachelet
highlighted “more state” in a school market context, President Piñera under-
lined the importance of freedom in “society-run education” (i.e., not state-run
education) and more information to facilitate parental choice. This is the
seductive and elastic narrative use to promote the hyper-surveillance policy
of the time.
Final Discussion: Seduction in Educational Policies

The idea of a hyper-surveillance state that devolves school management to
the private sector and local governments, but, at the same time, evaluates,
inspects, and sanctions them, in the name of “assuring educational quality”
has been promoted by sectors of both Chile’s right-wing and center-left coali-
tions. It is a seductive policy.
The attraction of this formula—of a “tough state” with free choice and
diverse public–private education suppliers—lies in its policy elasticity, which
displays a wide range of benefits and ethical principles, touching on the core
identity of different sectors. As Verger and Parcerisa (2017) claim,
“Accountability is a slippery and elusive concept that can be used in different
ways to mean different things to different people” (p. 3). Thus, the expansion
of the “Global Educational Reform Movement,” does not precisely appear as
something repulsive as a “GERM,” so-called by Sahlberg (2016), or an “epi-
demic policy” (Levin, 1998), but as a seductive policy.
Testing is a powerful governance technology. Test-based accountability
rationale offers to evaluate, judge, and reduce the educational reality to num-
bers, categories, and rankings, and then apply effective disciplinary tools
(rewards, sanctions, counseling, training), with the expectation of governing
schools’ conduct. This form of policy thinking promises order, accuracy, and
certainty in pedagogical processes that are, in contrast, inherently complex,
uncertain, and incommensurable. This paradox is part of the policy account-
ability epistemic, in which using Power’s (2004) term, holds a “quantifica-
tional spirit.” It is a simple, yet useful economic equation for “governing at a
distance.”
The governing seductive fantasy of this policy, in a market context,
claims to guarantee—no less—the “quality of education” of the entire
national school system. And, while responsibility and risk is mainly
devolved to schools and local institutions, governments appear as con-
cerned and hardworking.
The studied accountability policy thinking is interwoven with interna-

tional threads. These global–local interactions refer to soft power flows, as
explained by Verger (2016), which is the use of persuasive ideas that play a
key role in the generation of meanings for the adoption of policies. These
ideas circulate across multiple spheres, such as state institutions, Universities,
think tanks, and international organizations, forming global and local epis-
temic communities and an ideational atmosphere from which policies emerge
(Verger, 2016). In fact, the accountability schema outlined in Chile is similar
to policy solutions that have been used in different countries, such as
Australia, New Zealand, and England, among others.
The policy influences examined are exposed on the understanding that
they imply mutual influential networks, strategically used in interactive
ways, responding to different interests. As Steiner-Khamsi (2016) claims,
“globalization is not an external force, but rather a domestically induced rhet-
oric” (p. 384). Policy borrowing is selective and is translated, at the local
level, in tactical manners, as a way to legitimize “domestic policy talk” and
apply pressure for intended reforms.
Notwithstanding the above, seduction has been combined with political
pragmatism. A study by Parcerisa and Falabella (2017) shows, through inter-
views with Chilean policy makers, that the reform was seen as feasible and
less expensive compared with other policies (such as ending school copay-
ment). For this reason, the law received the support of the Ministry of Finance,
which was crucial for its viability. In addition to this, the bill generated a low
level of conflict with the right-wing coalition; hence, it allowed a “political
peace” to be maintained with the government’s opposition.
Parallel to these seductive and pragmatic narratives, however, it is impor-
tant to point out that critical visions of the model emerged from different
social actors, such as student movements, parents’ organizations, teachers’
colleges, academic associations, and “opt-out-movements,” demanding an
end to the SIMCE test. Particularly in the past few years, the national debate
on the assessment model has increased, and some lawmakers have also raised
critical arguments against it and there have been various legislative attempts—
albeit unsuccessful—to ban the dissemination of school test results.23 In
response to these public criticisms, a “SIMCE Commission” (Equipo de
Tarea, 2015) was created, mandated by the Ministry of Education, with the
mission of assessing the SIMCE test and its usefulness to improve the quality
of schools. Nonetheless, the changes made, such as reducing the number of
national tests and ending the use of raw school rankings, did not entail a
structural transformation of the model.
Overall, this study based on the case of Chile, exposes the imbricated gov-
ernance rationalities, policy technologies, and global influences which led to
the hyper-surveillance state and performing school market. This article has
Falabella 23
attempted to shed light on the policy’s seductive dimension in order to under-

stand its successful expansion and maintenance in the country—and in vari-
ous other parts of the world, despite ongoing resistance and scant evidence
showing the usefulness of such testing and accountability measures.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the
National Commission of Scientific Research and Technology (Conicyt), National
Fund of Scientific Development and Technology (Fondecyt) [Grant number
1170477].
ORCID iD
Alejandra Falabella https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2755-4911
Notes
1. Sistema Nacional de Aseguramiento de la Calidad de la Educación.
2. Named “Concertation of Parties for Democracy,” founded in 1988, by parties
opposed to the military regime.
3. A long-standing right in the country.
4. Various others who worked in education also studied at the same University,
such as Eduardo Cabezón, Teresa Infante, and Juan Enrique Fröemel.
5. Friedman also visited Chile in 1975, met Augusto Pinochet, and subsequently
sent him a personal letter with recommendations for his government program.
6. Although during the first few years of the dictatorship, the ministries were dis-
tributed among the armed forces, with the navy being responsible for education.
7. In Spanish: Prueba de Evaluación del Rendimiento Escolar.
8. Under this policy, the United States provided economic support to Latin America
between 1961 and 1970, and the education reform of Frei Montalva was financed
partly with these donations.
9. Consequently, the “Center of Teacher Training, Experimentation and Pedagogical
Research” (CPEIP; dependent on the Ministry of Education), formerly in charge
of preparing the “National Test,” was displaced from this task.
10. The university team accepted this change, but insisted on the results being sig-
nificantly weighted according to students’ socioeconomic status. Therefore, they
did not translate directly into an indicator of school quality (Himmel, 1992).
11. In 1984, the task of designing and applying the test was transferred to the
Ministry of Education for budgetary reasons and as a strategy to maintain more
direct control over the national test. In 1985, an attempt was made to create a
new test called the “Education Quality Assessment System” (SECE) under the
responsibility of the CPEIP. However, this test did not come to fruition and the
team focused on analyzing the results of the PER test. Later on, from 1988 to
1991, the same team from the Universidad Católica took over the test again, but
this time in conjunction with the Ministry of Education, with the aim of installing
the technical capacities within the state.
12. At first, the compensatory policy, “900 School Program,” entailed the use of
SIMCE scores, to identify underperforming schools located in disadvantaged
areas, and provide extra school support and materials; nonetheless it did not
include accountability measures.
13. In Spanish: Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Desempeño de Excelencia.
14. Authored by well-known intellectuals such as J. J. Brunner, J. C. Tedesco, E.
Ottone, and F. Fajnzylber.
15. For instance, people close to the center-left worked for the international agency,
such as Mario Leyton, Ernesto Schiefelbein, and Juan Cassasus and, at the same
time, actors close to the right and the former dictatorship regime, such as Violeta
Arancibia, Eduardo Cabezón, and Juan Enrique Frömel. See, for example, cow-
ritten publications, such as Cassasus et al. (1996).
16. See www.mineduc.cl/reforma90s/.
17. Another key policy diffuser in this decade was the “Promotion of the Educational
Reform of Latin America and the Caribbean” (PREAL in Spanish language),
financed by Inter-American Dialogue, which assembled diverse North and Latin
American intellectuals around testing policies (see, e.g., the compilation of writ-
ings in Arregui [2006]).
18. Although it had only been possible to compare results on an annual basis since
1998, given that the marking methodology was changed, replacing the use of
classical theory with the item response theory).
19. National Nurseries and Preschools Board.
20. An allusion to the school uniform, as students wore white shirts and dark jackets.
21. In response to the student protests, the “Presidential Advisory Council for the
Quality of Education” was created to raise policy demands and propositions
from civilian representatives and experts in education (81 members in total),
representing diverse political positions (Presidential Advisory Council, 2006).
However, later on, as the first bill failed in Congress, an elite political round-
table was established to assure the successful proclamation of the bill (for further
detail, see, Santa Cruz, 2016).
22. See Falabella (2018) for a further analysis on the policy discourses and differ-
ences between the right and center-left wing coalitions.
23. Lead by the parliamentary Carlos Montes, among other legislatives initiatives
(see Falabella & Ramos, 2019).
Falabella 25
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http://dx.doi.org/10.14516/fde.710
Author Biography
Alejandra Falabella is an associate professor at Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile.
Her main areas of interest are in sociology of education and the relationship between
education policy, school practices, and social class. Her research draws on market and
accountability policies, school privatization, and inclusion and exclusion dynamics in
the education system. Recently, she has studied history of school markets and national
assessment policies in Chile. She is associated editor of the Journal Education Policy
Analysis Archives.
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Article in Educational Administration Quarterly · May 2020

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Research Context: Global Trends and the Case of

This approach, following the principles of new public management

The Chilean education system is moving in dynamic ways, while these

Theoretical References and Methodological Design

This problematization method suggests that what is produced as the policy

preponderant role in the gestation of public policies and allows us to under-

The Birth of the Performative Market Under the

The neoliberal policy thinking of that time implied a global activity of

the Kennedy government in the context of “The Alliance for Progress.”8 In

Similarly, in 1983 Minister of Education Mónica Madariaga sent a letter stat-

to strengthen state control. As Pinochet declared in one of his annual speeches

The Initiation of State Accountability Policies

centralized national curriculum (with democratic and civic values), develops

system of assessment, accountability, and sanctions was recommended,

On the Ministry’s website performance accountability was defined as a prin-

The Move Toward the “Tough State”

[The stagnation of SIMCE results] began to generate a strong debate regarding

The circulating discourse on “the stagnation of test results” had a profound

In this period, a result-oriented management approach emerged based on

The State as the Guardian of School Consumers

students,” “honoring families,” and “development of human capital,” among

Both political coalitions backed up the reform, although, interestingly, with

Final Discussion: Seduction in Educational Policies

The studied accountability policy thinking is interwoven with interna-

attempted to shed light on the policy’s seductive dimension in order to under-

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Falabella, A. (2015). El mercado escolar en Chile y el surgimiento de la Nueva

Hunneus, C. (2016). El régimen de Pinochet. [The regimen of Pinochet]. Taurus.

Orellana, V. (2018). Entre el Mercado Gratuito y la Educación Pública. Dilemas

Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2016). New directions in policy borrowing. Asia Pacific Journal

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