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2022 BAR

NOTES
EVIDENCE
MA. SOLEDAD
DERIQUITO-MAWIS
DEAN
LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES
UNIVERSITY
WHAT IS EVIDENCE?

Evidence is the means, sanctioned by the Rules of Court,


of ascertaining in a judicial proceedings the truth
respecting a matter of fact. (Sec. 1, Rule 128)
IS PROOF THE SAME AS EVIDENCE?

No. It is merely the probative effect of


evidence and is the conviction or persuasion
of the mind resulting from consideration of
the evidence.
WHO BEARS THE BURDEN TO PROVE?

• The burden of proof rests upon the party who, as


determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense.
(Saguid vs. CA)
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FACTUM PROBANS AND
FACTUM PROBANDUM

• Factum Probandum refers to the ultimate fact to be proven, or


the proposition to be established. That, which a party wants to prove
to the court. E.g.: guilt or innocence; existence of a breach of
contract; existence of an obligation; the fact of payment; the injury or
damage incurred.
• Factum Probans refers to the evidentiary facts by which the
factum probandum will be proved. Examples: the written contract; the
promissory note to prove the existence of an unpaid debt. (Dela
Llanbo vs. Biong)
WHEN IS EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE?

• Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not


excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be
admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded
it by the court. (People of the Philippines vs. Moner. G.R. No.
202206 - March 5, 2018)
WHEN IS EVIDENCE RELEVANT?

•Rule 128, Sections 3&4


•Evidence is relevant if it has a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief of its existence or
non-existence. The relevancy of evidence is determined
by the rules of logic and human experience.
WHEN IS EVIDENCE COMPETENT?

•Evidence is competent when not excluded by the law


or by the Rules of Court. It is determined by the
prevailing exclusionary rules on evidence.
•The weight, however, of admissible evidence depends
on judicial evaluation within the Rule 133 and rules of
the Supreme Court.
WHEN IS ADMISSIBILITY DETERMINED?

• Admissibility is determined at the time it is offered to the court.


• Real evidence is offered when the same is presented for its view or
evaluation and when the party rests his case, and the real evidence consists
of objects exhibited in court.
• Testimonial evidence is offered by calling the witness to the stand.
• Documentary evidence is offered by the proponent immediately before he
rests his case.
WHEN SHOULD ADMISSIBILITY BE OBJECTED?

• Admissibility should be objected to at the time evidence is offered to the court or as soon
thereafter as the objection to its admissibility shall have become apparent.
• Objection to the qualification of the witness shall be made at the time such person is called to the
stand. On the other hand, objection to the testimony shall be made at the time the question is
asked or after the answer is given when the objectionable features become apparent by reason of
the answer.
• If the objection is not done within such time, the right to object is deemed waived.
DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF ADMISSIBILITY

• ConditionalAdmissibility-Whentheevidenceatthetimeitisofferedappearsto be immaterial or
irrelevant, such evidence may be received on condition that the other facts will be proved
thereafter. If not proved subsequently, the evidence given will be stricken out.
• b. Multiple Admissibility - When the evidence is relevant and competent for two or more
purposes, such evidence should be admitted for any or all the purposes for which it is offered;
provided it must satisfy all the requirements for its admissibility.
• c. CurativeAdmissibility-Therightofthepartytointroduceincompetentevidence in his behalf
where the court has admitted the same kind of evidence adduced by the adverse party.
WHAT IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

• Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence


as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is
contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the
appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for
that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of
evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.
WHAT IS PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?

• Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate


evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." 
• Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it
is worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. (Tan vs
Hosana)
WHAT IS CLEAR & CONVINCING EVIDENCE?

•This is a quantum of proof that requires more


than preponderant evidence but less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. (Andal Tan)
WHAT IS PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

• Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the degree of proof


that, after investigation of the whole record, produces
moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the
accused’s culpability. Such moral certainty is, however,
lacking in this case due to the insufficiency of the
circumstantial evidence presented. (Atienza vs. People)
CAN THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE BE PASSED
UPON DURING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

• No. "A preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial[;]


[i]t is not a trial on the merits." Since "it cannot be expected that
upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would
have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a
conviction of the accused," the admissibility or inadmissibility of
evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation. (Maza
vs. Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017)
WHAT IS HEARSAY EVIDENCE?

• Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness


knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it
is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but
likewise applies to written statements. (Mancol vs. DBP)
WHAT IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE?

•Competent Evidence is evidence that is not


excluded by the Constitution, the law or these
rules.
EXCLUSIONARY RULES UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION

• (a) Sections 2 and 3, Art. III


• Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
EXCLUSIONARY RULES UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
• Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
• (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
EXCLUSIONARY RULES UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
• Art. III, SECTION 12.
• (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
• (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
• (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
• (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.

(c) Section 17, Art. III


Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
MARTINEZ VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 198694 - FEBRUARY 13, 2013

• A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is


carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court which requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. The term
probable cause, specifically with respect to arrests has been understood to
mean such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.
Based on the records in the case at bar, PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844 (breaches
of peace) of the Manila City Ordinance. Evidently, the gravamen of these offenses is the disruption of communal
tranquility. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be established that the apprehension
was effected after a reasonable assessment by the police officer that a public disturbance is being committed.
However, PO2 Soque’s testimony surrounding circumstances leading to Ramon’s warrantless arrest clearly
negates the presence of probable cause when the police officers conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon.

It cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly populated place, with many people conversing with each
other on the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844 of the said ordinance. The
words he allegedly shouted "Putangina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" are not slanderous, threatening or abusive,
and thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of the incident,
Balingkit Street was still teeming with people and alive with activity. Further, no one present at the place of arrest
ever complained that Ramon’s shouting disturbed the public. On the contrary, a disinterested member of the
community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely standing in front of the store of
a certain Mang Romy when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon,
immediately
handcuffed and took him away.
PEOPLE VS. COGAED
G.R. NO. 200334 - JULY 30, 2014
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge. However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The
known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
(1)  Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2)  Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3)  Search of a moving vehicle;
(4)  Consented warrantless search;
(5)  Customs search;
(6)  Stop and frisk; and
(7)  Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the
legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
“suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of
the police officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be
mere suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to serve the purposes of the
“stop and frisk” exception.

The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for
the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for
the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying
a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. He was not even the person mentioned by the informant.
The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even
if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya,
this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search
Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was
made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was
about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee
prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified
by the police officers otherwise. It is the police officer who should observe facts
that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police
officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person.

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we


assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags.
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.
AMBRE VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 191532 - AUGUST 15, 2012

• In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is


committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of
the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Futhermore, Ambre is deemed to have waived her objections to her arrest for not raising
them before entering her plea
VERIDIANO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 200370 - JUNE 7, 2017
• Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
• (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
• (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
• (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur:

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In
Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not
exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs
at the time he was apprehended.
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires
that an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time." That a crime
was in fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule.94 An arrest under
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime
is committed up to the
point of arrest.
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule
113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint.
Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of
the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police
officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support
a warrantless arrest.

The warrantless arrest cannot be justified as the police officers had no personal knowledge of
the fact or circumstances indicating that the petitioner was committing a crime.
STATUTORY EXCLUSION
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1405
AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY
BANKING INSTITUTION AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR.

• Section 2.  All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and
its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
• Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any
person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
RA 1405
AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO,
DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION AND
PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR.

• All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and
its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not
be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,
except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of
a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases
where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6426
AN ACT INSTITUTING A FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT SYSTEM IN THE
PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

• Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized
under this Act, as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized
under PD No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature
and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or
private; Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and
further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977.)
RA 4200
ANTI WIRE TAPPING LAW
• Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6426
AN ACT INSTITUTING A FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT
SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
• Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized
under this Act, as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized
under PD No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature
and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or
private; Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and
further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977.)
GANAAN V. IAC
145 SCRA 112 (1986)

• An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,


dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be
there for ordinary office use.
WHAT IS JUDICIAL NOTICE?

• Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on
without proof because they already know them (31 C.J.S. 509). Under the amended Rule,
there are facts of which courts must now take judicial notice and of which they may take
judicial notice.
• Judicial notice is based on considerations of expediency and convenience. It displaces
evidence since, being equivalent to proof; it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended
achieve and, therefore, makes such evidence unnecessary (Alzua, et al. vs. Johnson, 21 Phil.
308).
• The power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt
on the subject must be resolved in the negative (Republic vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 54886, Sept.
10, 1981).
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES

• While the courts of justice are required to take judicial notice of the laws, the rule with respect to ordinances is
different. Municipal trial courts are required to take judicial notice of the ordinances of the municipality or city wherein
they sit. However, in the case of Regional Trial Courts, they must take such judicial notice only:
a) when required to do so by statute, e.g., in Manila as required by the city charter (City of Manila vs. Garcia, et al., L-26053,
Feb. 21, 1967); and
b) in a case on appeal before them and wherein the inferior court took judicial notice of an ordinance involved in said case
(U.S. vs. Blanco, 37 Phil. 126; U.S. vs. Hernandez, 31 Phil. 342)
The appellate courts may also take judicial notice of municipal or city ordinances not only where the lower courts took
judicial notice thereof but because these are facts capable of unquestionable demonstration (Gallego vs. People, et al.,
L-18247, Aug. 31, 1963). For the same reason, courts may take judicial notice of administrative regulations (Chattamal, etal.
vs. Collector of Customs, 42 Phil. 916).
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF COURT DECISIONS?

• Courts are required to take judicial notice of the decisions of the appellate
courts but not of the decisions of coordinate trial courts, nor even of a
decision or the facts involved in another case tried by the same court itself,
unless the parties introduce the same in evidence or where the court, as a
matter of convenience, may decide to do so (Figueras vs. Serrano, 52 Phil. 28;
Baguio vs.Vda. De Jalagat, et al., L-28100, Nov. 29, 1971; T’boli Agro- Industrial
Dev., Inc. vs. Solilapsi, Adm. Case No. 4766, Dec. 27, 2002).
JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE & PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF THE JUDGE
• The judicial notice which the court is required to take should
not be confused with the personal knowledge of the judge. A
fact may be of judicial notice and not be of the judge’s personal
knowledge, and vice-versa, as this rule refers to facts which
“ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.”
JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE & FOREIGN LAWS

• The question as to what are the laws of a foreign state is one of fact, not
of law. Foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proved like any other fact (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Fluemer
vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610), except where said laws are within the actual
knowledge of the court such as when they are well and generally known
or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of
the parties claim otherwise (Phil. Commercial & Industrial Bank, etc. vs.
Escolin, etc., et al., L-67896, Mar. 29, 1974).
To prove a written foreign law, the requirements of Secs. 24 and 25, Rule 132
must be complied with, that is, by an official publication or by a duly attested and
authenticated copy thereof.

The provisions of the foreign law may also be the subject of judicial admission
under Sec. 4 of this Rule.

Absent any of the foregoing evidence or admission, the foreign law is presumed
to be the same as that in the Philippines, under the so-called doctrine of
processual presumption (In Re Testate Estate of Suntay, 50 O.G. 5321; Collector
of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher, et al., L-11622, Jan. 28, 1961). To prove an
unwritten foreign law, the provisions of Sec. 46, Rule 130 supply the evidential
sources or remedies (see Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No.
119602, Oct. 6, 2000).
WHAT ARE JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

• Judicial admissions may be made in


• (a) the pleadings filed by the parties,
• (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations
or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding, as in the
pre-trial of the case. Admissions obtained through depositions, written
interrogatories or requests for admission are also considered judicial
admissions.
To be considered as a judicial admission, the same must be made
in the same case in which it is offered. If made in another case
or in another court, the fact of such admission must be proved
as in the case of any other fact, although if it was made in a
judicial proceeding, it is entitled to greater weight (see Bagsa vs.
Nagramada, 11 Phil. 174; In Re Estate of Mijares de Farinas, 13
Phil. 63).
RULE ON JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE IN
ANOTHER CASE

• Judicial admissions made in one case are admissible at the trial of another
case provided they are proved and are pertinent to the issue involved in
the latter, unless (a) the said admissions were made only for purposes of
the first case, as in the rule on implied admissions and their effects under
Rule 26; (b) the same were withdrawn with the permission of the court
therein; or (c) the court deems it proper to relieve the party therefrom
(20 Am. Jur. 470).
EXCEPTIONS TO JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

• By palpable mistake, or no such admission was made or, in the


case of a pre-trial admission in civil cases, to prevent manifest
injustice (Sec. 7, Rule 18). The same rule applies to criminal
cases if the pre- trial admission was reduced to writing and
signed by the accused and his counsel (Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 118).
(CITY OF MANILA VS. GERARDO GARCIA ET. AL. , G.R. NO.
L-26053 – FEBRUARY 21, 1967)

• Courts in the City of Manila should take judicial knowledge of


all municipal ordinances passed by the City for the Charter of
Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice
of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila
GABRIEL PRIETO VS. MEDEN ARROYO ET. AL., G.R.
NO. L-17885 – JUNE 30, 1965

• As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are
actually pending before the same judge.
• Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine
whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a
previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration”.
TABUENA VS. CA AND TABERNILLA JR.
G.R. NO. 85423 – MAY 6, 1991
• GEN RULE: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases
pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.
• EXCEPTIO:
• . . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into
the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part
of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with
the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
ON FOREIGN LAWS

•Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign


laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact.
(Koike vs. Koike ,G.R. No. 215723 | July 27, 2016 )
ON FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments


and laws. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our Rules of Evidence, under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF JAN AUREL MAGHANOY
BULAYO WITH APPLICATION FOR CHANGE OF NAME, G.R. NO.
205752. (2019)

• The courts of the Philippines are bound to take judicial notice of the existence of the diplomatic relations
between our country and Japan. Diplomatic relations form part of the official acts of the Executive
Department of our Government. They are also matters of public knowledge.
There is no dispute, indeed, that the Philippines and Japan have had a long history of diplomatic relations.  In
1888, Japan already established a diplomatic office in Manila, and expanded it as a Consulate General in 1919.
Eventually, Japan declared its office in Manila an embassy in 1943 during the Japanese occupation of the
country. Both countries were also signatories to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, an
indication that they wished to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in each other by sending of
diplomatic missions. This further shows that both countries, being signatories to the Vienna Convention,
aimed to have the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with
the receiving state. The countless efforts to maintain their diplomatic relations no longer required the
presentation of proof of the existence of diplomatic relations.
MATTERS OF JUDICIAL NOTICE HAVE THREE MATERIAL
REQUISITES:

• 1. the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;


2. it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain;
3. it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court
(Genesis transport Service, Inc. and Jalbun vs Unyon ng Malayang
Manggagawa ng Genesis Transport, and Taroy, G.R. No. 182114 |
April 5, 2010)
ATIENZA VS. BOARD OF MEDICINE AND SIOSON ,
G.R. NO. 177407, FEBRUARY 9, 2011
• The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s
exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as
it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. In this case, we may
take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys before, and at the time
of her operation, as with most human beings, were in their
proper anatomical locations.
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS & PLEADINGS

• Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case are conclusive. Hence, they do not require
further evidence to prove them. (PLDT vs. Pingol, G.R. No. 182622 | September 8,
2010)
• The original complaint must be offered in evidence and accepted when there is an
amended complaint filed which lacks statements from the original in order for the
statements contained in the original to be considered as judicial admissions and
thus binding. (Torres vs. CA, Santillan, et al , G.R. No. L-37420 | July 31, 1984)
REAL AND DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
RULE 130, SECTIONS 1-2

• Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. - Documents as evidence consist of writings,


RECORDINGS, PHOTOGRAPHS or any material containing letters, WORDS,
SOUNDS, NUMBERS, figures, symbols, OR THEIR EQUIVALENT, or other modes
of written expression offered as proof of their contents. PHOTOGRAPHS INCLUDE
STILL PICTURES, DRAWINGS, STORED IMAGES, X-RAY FILMS, MOTION
PICTURES OR VIDEOS.
NOTES:

• The expanded definition of “documentary evidence” is taken from Rule 1001 of the Federal rules of
Evidence (FRE) and Rule 1001 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (URE) to embrace in the broadest
possible terms essentially every memorial that preserves written and spoken language, including
recorded sounds; hence, the inclusion of “recordings” and “sounds” in the definition of documentary
evidence. The provision that “photographs include still pictures, stored images, x-ray films, videotapes
and motion pictures” should be construed or taken as merely exemplary rather than exclusive in
order to embrace similar technology and processes that may be developed in the future (Mueller &
Kirkpatrick, Modern Evidence, section 10.2 (1995])
• In the case of Sison v. People (G.R. Nos. 108280 to 83, November 16, 1995), and in more
recent case of College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development (G.R. No. 155604,
November 22, 2007) and People vs. Zeta (G.R. No. 178541, May 27, 2008), the court
allowed the use photographs as documentary evidence if they ae relevant to the issue
and are verified. The verification need not be made by the photographer himself; it can
be made by any other competent witness who can testify as to its exactness and
accuracy.

• The Committee opted to use the term “ videos” rather than “videotapes” as the former
is the more modern term, and included “drawings” pursuant to Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.,
where the US court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “drawings” were
“writings” within the meaning of the best evidence rule, specifically, Rule 1001, FRE
WHAT IS AN OBJECT EVIDENCE?

• Are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an


object is relevant to the fact in issue it may be exhibited to,
examined or viewed by the court.
REQUIREMENTS OF AN OCULAR INSPECTION

• An ocular inspection conducted by the judge w/o


notice to or the presence of the parties is invalid, as
an ocular inspection is part of the trial.
•  Whether ocular inspection is to be conducted lies in
the discretion of the court.
GROUNDS FOR COURT’S REFUSAL TO THE
INTRODUCTION OF OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE

1. When the exhibition of such object is contrary to public policy, morals or decency;
2. When to require its being viewed in court or in an ocular inspection would result in delay,
inconvenience, unnecessary expense out of proportion to the evidentiary value of such object;
3. When such object (real) evidence would be confusing or misleading, as when the purpose is to
prove the former condition of the object and there is no preliminary showing that there has been
no substantial change in said condition;
4. The testimonial or documentary evidence already presented clearly portrays the object in
question as to render a view thereof unnecessary.
PEOPLE V. SABDULA
G.R. NO. 184758, APRIL 21, 2014

• The Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the
seized drugs casts reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized
contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will
use the markings as reference. It is not enough that the seized drug be marked; the
marking must likewise be made in the presence of the apprehended violator.
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE
RULES 130 AND 132
• Section. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions2.—When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, WRITING, RECORDING, PHOTOGRAPH OR
THEIR RECORD, no evidence IS admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
• (a)  When the original IS lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
• (b)  When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; OR THE
ORIGINAL CANNOT BE OBTAINED BY JUDICIAL PROCESS OR PROCEDURE;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d)  When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office;

(e)  WHEN THE ORIGINAL IS NOT CLOSELY RELATED TO A


CONTROLLING ISSUE. (2a)
SEC. 4. Original of document —

(A) AN “ORIGINAL” OF A DOCUMENT IS THE DOCUMENT ITSELF OR ANY COUNTERPART


INTENDED TO HAVE THE SAME EFFECT BY A PERSON EXECUTING OR ISSUING IT. AN
“ORIGINAL” OF A PHOTOGRAPH INCLUDES THE NEGATIVE OR ANY PRINT THEREFROM. IF
DATA IS STORED IN A COMPUTER OR SIMILAR DEVICE, ANY PRINTOUT OR OTHER
OUTPUT READABLE BY SIGHT OR OTHER MEANS, SHOWN TO REFLECT THE DATA
ACCURETELY IS AN “ORIGINAL.”

(B) A “DUPLICATE” IS A COUNTERPART PRODUCED BY THE SAME IMPRESSION AS THE


ORIGINAL, OR FROM THE SAME MATRIX, OR BY MEANS OF PHOTOGRAPHY, INCLUDING
ENLARGEMENTS AND MINATURES, OR BY MECHANICAL OR ELECTRONIC RE RECORDING,
OR BY CHEMICAL REPRODUCTION, OR BY ANY OTHER EQUIVALENT TECHNIQUES
WHICH ACCURATELY REPRODUCE THE ORIGINAL.
(C) A DUPLICATE IS ADMISSIBLE TO SAME EXTENT AS AN
ORIGINAL UNLESS (1) A GENUINE QUESTION IS RAISED AS TO
THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE ORIGINAL, OR (2) IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS UNJUST OR INEQUITABLE TO ADMIT
THE DUPLICATE IN LIEU OF THE ORIGINAL. (4a)
NOTES:

• The term “original” does not necessarily mean the first writing, recording or photograph that was made, but rather refers
to the writing, recording or photograph that is at issue in litigation.” The determination of whether a writing or recording
is an “original” depends upon what it is being offered to prove.
• With respect to photographs not only the negative but any print therefrom qualifies as an “original.”
• As to any output from a computer, the amendment adopts Section 1, rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
provides that any printout readable by sight and shown to reflect accurately the data stored in the computer is an
“original.” But is an “original” only of the data stored in the computer or diskette.
• The definition of “duplicate” in the proposed amendment follows Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
which was actually adopted from Rule 1004(4) of the FRE. The definition makes duplicates generally admissible in lieu of
the originals without showing the unavailability of the original. The amendment defines “duplicate” to mean a counterpart
produced by any reliable modern mechanical process. The rationale behind the new rule is to eliminate the best evidence
objections to copies made in clearly reliable ways, except where the objecting party can offer a good reason to support
the production of the original as indicated by the new Section 4(c).
WHAT IS THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE?

• It provides that when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
• Note: The voluminous records must be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the portion produced or
summary of the document may be tested on cross-examination.
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office (Sec. 3)
• Note: Where the issue is only as to whether such a document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant
to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
WHEN IS THIS APPLICABLE?

•The rule will come into play only “when the


subject of inquiry is the contents of a document.”
WHAT IS A DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE?

•Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. — Documents as


evidence consist of writings or any material containing
letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expressions offered as proof of their
contents, (n)
5. WHAT IS AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT?

• There are three concepts of “original” document:


1. The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry;
• 2. When a document is in 2 or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, including signed carbon copies, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals; or
• 6. 3.When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, including entries in journals and ledgers,
all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals (Sec. 4)
ARE AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS
CONSIDERED AS BEST EVIDENCE?

•No, hence, not admissible if the affiants and witnesses


are available as witnesses. (Regalado,Vol. II, p. 721, 2008
ed.)
WHAT IS THE COLLATERAL FACTS RULE?

• It states that a document or writing which is merely “collateral”


to the issue involved in the case on trial need not be proved.
Where the purpose of presenting a document is not to prove
its contents, but merely to give coherence to, or to make
intelligible the testimony of a witness regarding a fact
contemporaneous to the writing, the original of the document
need not be presented.
WHAT IS THE RULE ON DUPLICATE ORIGINAL?

• It states that when a document is in two or more copies


executed at or about the same time with identical contents, all
such copies are equally regarded as originals (Sec. 4b, Rule 130).
It may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the
non-production of the other copies.
PEOPLE V. GIMENEZ, G.R. NO. 174673, JANUARY 11,
2016.
• Even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule
applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
is admissible.
SALUN-AT MARQUEZ V. ESPEJO, G.R. NO. 168387,
AUGUST 25, 2010
• When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the
best evidence is the original document itself and no other
evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence)
is admissible as a general rule.
GUAW V. CHUA ET AL, G.R. NO. 160855, APRIL 16,
2008
• Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed,
or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution,
the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to
account for the original. Moreover, production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent does
not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production..
AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO, G.R. NO. L221438
SEPTEMBER 28, 1966
•When the subject is not the actual entry in a document
but the fact that the entry was made, it does not come.
PLAY
COMPANIA MARITIMA V. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION,
77 SCRA 25 MAY 24, 1977

• In order that the exception to the best evidence rule may be


invoked it is important to prove the following: (1) The
voluminous character of the records; and (2) that the records
and the accounts should be made accessible to the adverse
party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on
cross examination.
SECONDARY EVIDENCE

• Section. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.(4a)
• SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control.—If the document is in
the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he OR SHE must have reasonable notice
to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he OR SHE fails
to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.(5a)
Section 7. SUMMARIES. — THE CONTENTS OF VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTS, PHOTOGRAPHS, OR
NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS WHICH CANNOT BE CONVENIENTLY EXAMINED IN COURT AND THE
FACT SOUGHT TO BE ESTABLISHED IS ONLY THE GENERAL RESULT OF THE WHOLE, MAYBE
PRESENTED IN A FORM OF A CHART, SUMMARY OR CALCULATION.THE ORIGINALS SHALL BE
AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION OR COPYING, OR BOTH, BY THE ADVERSE PARTY AT A
REASONABLE TIME AND PLACE.THE COURT MAY ORDER THAT THEY BE PRODUCED IN COURT. (n)

Section. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.—When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.(2a)

Section. 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it.—A party who calls for the production of a document and
inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence.(6a)
NOTES:

• The new Section 7 is taken substantially from Rule 1006 of the FRE, but it retains the
requirements in the existing section 3 (c) of Rule 130 that the records must be
voluminous, that they cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the
fact sought to be established is only the general result of the whole. Since our Supreme
Court has already held that in such a case the original records must be made accessible
to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross
examination (Compana Maritima v. Allied Free Workers’ Union, 167 Phil. 381, 1997), there
is really nothing new about the proposed amendment.
WHAT IS SECONDARY EVIDENCE

• Secondary evidence is that which shows that better or primary evidence exists as to the
proof of the fact in question. It is the class of evidence that is relevant to the fact in issue,
it being first shown that the primary evidence of the fact is not obtainable. It performs
the same functions as that of primary evidence. (Francisco, p. 68, 1992 ed.)
• All originals must be first accounted for before one can resort to secondary evidence. It
must appear that all of them have been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court. The non- production of the original document, unless it falls under any of the
exceptions in Sec. 3, Rule 130, gives rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence.
WHEN MAY SECONDARY EVIDENCE BE ADMITTED

• It may be admitted only by laying the basis for its production and such requires compliance with the following:
1. The offeror must prove the due execution and existence of the original document;
2. The offeror must show the cause of its unavailability; and
3. The offeror must show that the unavailability was not due to his bad faith.
• Accordingly, the correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. This order may
be changed if necessary at the sound discretion of the court. (Citibank N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, G.R. No.
150905, Sept. 23, 2003)
• Note: Intentional destruction of the originals by a party who acted in good faith does not preclude the introduction
of secondary evidence of the contents thereof.
WHAT IS THE ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF
SECONDARY EVIDENCE?

• 1. Copy of the original;


• 2. A recital of the contents of the document in some authentic document; or
• 3. By the testimony of witnesses (Sec. 5, Rule 130).
WHAT IS DEFINITE EVIDENTIARY RULE?

• Where the law specifically provides for the class and quantum of
secondary evidence to establish the contents of a document, or bars
secondary evidence of a lost document, such requirement is controlling.
E.g. Evidence of a lost notarial will should consist of a testimony of at least
two credible witnesses who can clearly and distinctly establish its contents
(Sec. 6, Rule 76).
HOW MAY THE DUE EXECUTION OF THE
DOCUMENT BE PROVED?

It may be proved through the testimony of:


1. The person who executed it;
2. The person before whom its execution was acknowledged;
3. Any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered;
4. Any person who thereafter saw and recognized the signature;
5. One to whom the parties thereto had previously confessed the execution thereof; or
6. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. (Sec. 20, Rule
• 132)
HOW MAY THE LOSS OR DESTRUCTION BE
PROVED?

• It may be proved by:


1. Any person who knew of such fact;
• 2. Anyone who, in the judgment of the court, had made sufficient examination in the
places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person
in whose custody the document was and has been unable to find it; or
• 3. Any person who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the document is indeed lost.
HOW MAY THE CONTENTS BE PROVED?

• They may be proved by the testimony of:


• 1. Any person who signed the document;
2. Any person who read it;
3. Any person who heard when the document was being read;
4. Any person who was present when the contents of the document were talked over by
the parties to such an extent as to give him reasonably full information of the contents;
or
5. Any person to whom the parties have stated or confessed the contents thereof.
HEIRS OF TEODORO DE LA CRUZ V. CA, G.R. NO. 117384,
OCT. 21, 1998)

• If the party against whom the secondary evidence is offered does


not object thereto when the same is offered in evidence, the
secondary evidence becomes primary evidence. But even admitted
as primary evidence, its probative value must still meet the various
tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its admissibility
should not be confused with its probative value.
WHAT FACTS MUST BE SHOWN BY THE PARTY
OFFERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE IF THE
ORIGINAL IS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE ADVERSE
PARTY?
• 1. Original is in the possession or under the control of the opponent;
2. Demand or notice is made to him by the proponent signifying that the
document is needed;
• 3. Failure or refusal of opponent to produce document in court; and
4. Satisfactory proof of existence of document (Sec. 6).
• Note: The party who called for a document is not obliged to offer it into
evidence (Sec. 8).
WHAT IS THE FORM OF NOTICE REQUIRED TO BE
GIVEN TO THE ADVERSE PARTY?

• No particular form of notice is required as long as it fairly appraises the


other party as to what papers are desired. Even an oral demand in open
court for such production at a reasonable time thereafter will suffice. Such
notice must, however, be given to the adverse party, or his attorney, even if
the document is in the actual possession of a third person. (Regalado,Vol.
II, p. 726, 2008 ed.)
EFFECT OF REFUSAL OR FAILURE OF THE ADVERSE
PARTY TO PRODUCE THE ORIGINAL IF JUSTIFIED?

• It does not give rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence, or


create an unfavorable inference against him. It only authorizes the
presentation of secondary evidence. (Regalado,Vol. II, p. 727, 2008 ed.)
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE ADMISSION
OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE WHEN THE ORIGINAL
CONSISTS OF NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS?

• 1. The original must consist of numerous accounts or other documents;


2. They cannot be examined in court without great loss of time; and
3. The fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole. (Sec.
3c, Rule 130)
• Note: Secondary evidence may consist of a summary of the voluminous documents or
records. (Herrera,Vol.V, p. 203, 1999 ed.) Such records must be made accessible to the
adverse party so that the correctness of the summary of the voluminous records may be
tested on cross- examination. (Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, et.al., G.R.
No. L-28999, May 24, 1977)
HOW MAY THE CONTENTS OF THE DOCUMENT BE
PROVED WHEN THE ORIGINAL IS IN THE CUSTODY
OF A PUBLIC OFFICER?

• The contents may be proved by:


1. A certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Sec. 7, Rule 130); and
• 2. Official publication. (Herrera,Vol.V, p. 203, 1999 ed.)
VILLA REY TRANSIT V. FERRER, 25 SCRA 845, OCTOBER 29,
1968

• The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the
adverse party:
• 1) opponent’s possession of the original,
• 2) reasonable notice to the opponent to produce the original,
• (3) satisfactory proof of existence,
• (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court.
As to the first element, it is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the original is in
the actual possession of the adversary.
LEE V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 159288, OCTOBER 19, 2004

• The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the
loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror
which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise
a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be
shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the
document in the proper place or places. It has been held that where the missing
document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than
where the document is only collaterally involved.
SPS TAPAYAN V. MARTINEZ
G.R. NO. 207786, [2017]

• The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its contents are the
subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule 130. However, to set this
rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is necessary. The Court's ruling in Lorenzana v. Lelina is
instructive:
• “The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the contents of a document, no
evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section
3, Ru1e 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible
pursuant to the best evidence rule. Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a
mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered.
In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at
the proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made at the
time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the
witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which
the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to
the documentary evidence may be made. And when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived.

This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been
rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. Moreover, grounds for objection
must be specified in any case. Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall
be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus,
even on appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other ground of objection,
except those that were raised at the proper time.”
DEP ED V. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 146586 [2005]

• Vidal De Jesus' testimony does not help to establish the deed of donation's existence,
execution and contents. He testified that he never saw the deed of donation. On
cross-examination,Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information that Isaias donated the
lot to the Municipality was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad himself. If at all, DECS
offered Vidal De Jesus' testimony to establish the loss of the deed of donation.Vidal de
Jesus testified that the barangay council tried to get a copy of the deed but the
Municipality informed the barangay council that the deed was lost when the municipal
office was transferred to a new building. DECS also made a search in the DECS office in
Malolos but this proved futile too.
MMC INDUSTRIAL SALES V. SSANYONG
536 SCRA 418 [2007]

• Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under


the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other
means, showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an
electronic data message or to be
• The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic
Data Message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
[T]he terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a
facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the


functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing
must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document.

We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
MALIKSI V. COMELEC , G.R. NO. 203302, [2013]

• The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original
official ballots themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149,
January 22, 2013the Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS,
are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots
filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
• That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered "original documents" simply
means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one
is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and
the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of
the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without
notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the
revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the
official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters will. In that
regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first
shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.
PEOPLE V. ENOJAS ,G.R. NO. 204894 [2014]

• As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.
[A.M. No. 01-7-01- SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
September 24, 2002.] Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. [Id., Rule 11, Section 2] Here,
PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused
in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to
the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages
and was competent to testify on them.
CADAJAS VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR NO.
247348, NOV. 16, 2021

Q: Are Facebook photos from the Facebook account of the Accused


admissible in evidence? Will using them be a violation of this right to
privacy?
S: Right to privacy is defined as the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into o ne’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiuliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities .
The constitutional right to privacy is meant to protect private
individuals from government intrusions . It is not appllicable
between and amongst private individuals.

Here, they were properly authenticated. Accused did not even


say that his account was hacked. He even gave his password to
AAA. Having given the authority to access his Facebook
Messenger account, his reasonable of privacy, insofar as AAA is
concerned, had been limited. Thus, there is no right to privacy to
speak iof.
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
RULE 130 SECTION 9 (NOW
SEC 10)
• Sec. 10 – Evidence of written agreements – When the terms of an agreement have been reduced in
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, as between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he OR SHE puts in issue in a VERIFIED pleading:
a. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
b. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
c. The validity of a written agreement, or;
d. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution
of the written agreement.

The term “agreement” includes wills.


WHAT IS PAROL EVIDENCE RULE?

• Parol evidence rule provides that when the terms of an agreement


have been reduced in writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE?
The exceptions to the parol evidence rule is that a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add
to the terms of written agreement if he or she puts in issue in verified pleading:

1. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;


2. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
3. The validity of a written agreement, or;
4. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE RULE?

• The rationale for the rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement in writing, it
is presumed that they made such writing as the repository of all the terms of the agreement.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PAROL EVIDENCE RULE?

• Parol evidence rule is intended to prevent varying terms of the agreement.


WHAT IS THE REQUIREMENT IN ORDER TO
MODIFY, EXPLAIN OR ADD TO THE TERMS OF THE
WRITTEN AGREEMENT THE TRUE INTENTION OF
THE PARTIES TO THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT?
•The rule provides that a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of a written
agreement if he puts in issue in his verified pleadings the
exception/s to the parol evidence rule.
WHEN IS THE TERM OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT
AMBIGUOUS?

•When the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in


terms that the parties’ contractual intention cannot be
understood from a mere reading of the agreement.
HOW TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT
THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT CONTAINS ALL THE
TERMS OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT?
• To overcome the presumption that the written agreement contains
all the terms of the agreement, the parol evidence must be clear
and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the
written agreement.
WILL THE NOTARIZATION OF A SIMULATED
WRITTEN DOCUMENT RESULTS TO ITS
INCONTROVERTIBILITY?

•No, the fact that the questioned document was reduced to


writing and notarized does not accord it the quality of
incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parol
evidence rule.
HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF
ORAL AGREEMENT IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT
FROM THE SUBJECT OF THE WRITTEN
AGREEMENT?
• In determining whether or not the subject of an oral agreement is separate and distinct from the
subject of the writing, it is necessary that:
a. To ascertain first, what is the whole subject by the intended by the parties to be covered by such
writing by examining the subject matter it deals and the circumstances attending its execution; and
b. To ascertain the oral agreement offered to be proved;
c. Comparison should be made between the writing and the oral agreement;
d. If the subject of the oral agreement is not so closely connected with the subject of the writing as to
form part and parcel of it, then parol evidence is admissible. (Wigmore on evidence; Meland vs
Youngberg)
WHAT IS AN AMBIGUITY?

• The fact that a word or a phrase or the general sense of a document or part of it, could
equally apply to more than one things or event.
WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF AMBIGUITIES?
• The kinds of ambiguities according to Lord Bacon:
• a. Latent ambiguity – when the writing on its face is clear and unambiguous, but there are collateral
matters or circumstances which makes the meaning uncertain or the writing admits of two
constructions.
• b. Patent or extrinsic ambiguity – when the ambiguity is apparent on the face of the writing itself
and requires something to be added in order to ascertain the meaning of the word.
• c. Intermediate ambiguity – when the words in the writing are all sensible and have settled
meaning, but admit of two interpretations according to subject matter in contemplation of the
parties.
WHAT IS A MISTAKE?

• An error in action ; a blunder (Coombs vs Santos, 24 Phil. 451)


• In order that mistake will be an exception to the parol evidence rule it must comply with the
following requisites;
a. That the mistake should be one of fact;
b. That the mistake must be common to both parties;
c. That it must be alleged and proved by clear and convincing evidence.
WHAT ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PAROL
EVIDENCE AND ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE?

Parol Evidence Rule Original Document Rule

The original document is available in court The original document is not available in court

Prohibits the varying the terms of the written Prohibits the introduction of substitutionary or
agreement secondary evidence

Controversy is between the parties to the Involves any parties to the action
written agreement
WHAT ARE UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS?

• Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
• (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
• (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
• (a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;

• (b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;

• (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;

• (d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer
accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time
some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the
time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose account
the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;

• (e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;

• (f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
DOCTRINES:

• The parol evidence rule, however, only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement does not express
the intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject
parole evidence. (Enriquez vs Ramos, 6 SCRA 219 (1962)
• The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written
instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties to
a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding
such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the
contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way deny that the
original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that
the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent
contract. (Canuto vs Mariano, 31 Phil. 840 (1918)
• While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has
been fraud or mistake. (Yu Tek vs Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384 (1915)
• When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event,
which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence.
This is not varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic agreement, for the simple
reason that there is no contract in existence; there is nothing to which to apply the excluding
rule (Land Settlement & Dev. Corp. vs Garcia Plantation, 7 SCRA 750 (1963)
• The purpose of that prohibition is to prevent alteration, change, modification or contradiction of the terms of a
written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of parol evidence, except in the cases specifically named in the
section. The case at bar is not one where the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies or contradicts the terms of
the contract of indorsement admittedly existing. The evidence was not offered for that purpose. The purpose was
to show that no contract of indorsement ever existed; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of
such contract; that they never mutually agreed to enter into such a contract; and that there never existed a
consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded. (Maulini vs. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914)
• An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without
impairing its credit is provable by parol. (PNB vs Seeto, 91 Phil. 756 (1952)
• Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, and are not
governed by the rules on integration. Where parties prohibited from proving said representations or
inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove
misrepresentation or fraud. Furthermore, the parol evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced
when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings. (Woodhouse vs Halili, 93 Phil. 387 (1927)
• The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to
preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral
parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of
whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement,
and whether the action is at law or in equity. (Robles vs Lizarraga, 50 Phil. 756 (1952)
• The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the parties have reduced their
agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository and memorial of the
truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived or
abandoned. (Cruz vs CA, 192 SCRA 209)
• The parole evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation
against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby. (Lechugas v. CA, 143 SCRA 335 (1986).
• For the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form or be signed by
both parties. What is required is that the agreement be in writing since written evidence is so much more
certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only. (Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996)).
• Although parole evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions that are not mentioned at all in the
writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. (Ortañez v. CA, 266 SCRA 561 (1997)).
• The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of the terms of a written agreement by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract. (Spouses Paras vs. Kimwa Construction, G.R. No. 171601April 8, 2015).
• The principle of a resulting trust is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal
title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the
parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby
one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the
benefit of another. On the other hand, a constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or
generate a fiduciary relation. Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy
the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. (Tong v. Go KiatKun, G.R. No. 196023 21 April 2014).
• An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third
person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy binds the parties to their real agreement. (Rebusquillo v. Spouses Gualvez, G.R. No. 204029 04 June 2014).
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. CAMERON
GRANVILLE
G.R. NO. 20470, NOVEMBER 24, 2014
DOCTRINE:
• The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of
assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking
evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment.
FELIX PLAZO URBAN SETTLERS VS. LIPAT, SR.
G.R. NO. 182409 20 MARCH 2017
DOCTRINE:
• It is well-settled that parol evidence can serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions, which are not mentioned at all in writing, only if there is
fraud or mistake. It is well-settled that parol evidence can serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions, which are not mentioned at all in writing, only if
there is fraud or mistake. Here, the petitioner’s claim that the reason for their failure to pay the full
purchase price was due to the failure of the respondents to settle the pending litigation involving the
subject properties is not tenable. Clearly, a perusal of the CTS executed by the parties does not show
any provision pertaining to such condition. Also, the petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence
to show that such failure was due to fraud or mistake.
INTERPRETATION OF
DOCUMENTS
(RULE 130, SECTIONS 10 – 19)
INTERPRETATION OF WRITING ACCORDING
TO ITS LEGAL MEANING.
• The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the
place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (Sec 10)
CONSTRUCTION SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT TO
ALL THE PROVISIONS.
• In the construction of an instrument, where there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. (Sec 11)
INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO
INTENTION
• In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when
a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So
a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. (Sec 12) (particular
provision shall prevail over the general provision)
INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO
CIRCUMSTANCES
• For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that
the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret. (Sec 13)
(example: sale of car which is still in the repair shop)
TERMS ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN USED IN
THEIR PRIMARY AND GENERAL ACCEPTATION

• The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general
acceptation, BUT evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance,
in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly. (Sec 14)
WRITTEN WORDS CONTROL PRINTED WORDS

• When an instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the
two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (Sec 15) (example: delivery is 5 days from receipt
of payment)
EXPERTS AND INTERPRETERS TO BE USED IN
EXPLAINING CERTAIN WRITINGS
• When the characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the
language is not understood by the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the
characters, or who understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters or the
meaning of the language. (Sec 16)
PREFERENCE OVER TWO INTERPRETATIONS
IN AN AGREEMENT
• When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different
parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other
understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper,
that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was
made. (Sec 17)
CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF NATURAL
RIGHT
• When an instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right
and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. (Sec 18)
INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO USAGE

• An instrument may be construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character.
(Sec 19).
CIVIL CODE PROVISION ON INTERPRETATION OF
CONTRACTS
• If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall control.
• If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the
former. (Art 1370) (intention should prevail)
• In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered. (Art 1371) (Chinese father buying piece of land in the name of his son)
• However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree. (Art 1372)
• If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that
import which is most adequate to render it effectual. (Art 1373)
• The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. (Art 1374)
• Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that which is most in keeping
with the nature and object of the contract. (Art 1375)
• The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities of a
contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily established. (Art 1376)
• The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity. (Art 1377)
• When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the preceding
articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least
transmission of rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be
settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
• If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it cannot be
known what may have been the intention or will of the parties, the contract shall be null and
void. (Art 1378)
• The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall likewise be observed in
the construction of contracts. (Art 1379)
DOCTRINES

• Plain meaning of words should be enforced.


Contracts should be enforced as they read. If from the words the meaning is plain, the contract should
be enforced according to its words. x x x It is to be presumed that persons mean what they say; and
interpretation and construction should not be resorted to when the English used is plain. (Leon Lambert
v. T.J. Fox, G.R. No. 7991, January 29, 1914).
• Ambiguity Doctrine or Contra Proferentem Rule
The doctrine provides that in the interpretation of documents, ambiguities are to construed against the
drafter. By its very nature, the precept assumes the existence of an ambiguity in the contract. (Cahayag v.
Commercial Credit Corp., G.R. No. 168078)
• Where the terms of a contract prepared by the lawyer of the obligee seems to be vague or ambiguous, the
doubt must be resolved against the latter and in accordance with the real intention of the parties. (Capital
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Esteban Sandang and Maria Lachica, G.R. No. L-18857).
• Contract to sell does not transfer ownership – A contract to sell, standing alone, does not transfer ownership. At the
point of perfection, the seller under a contract to sell does not even have the obligation to transfer ownership
to the buyer. The obligation arises only when the buyer fulfills the condition: full payment of the purchase price. In
other words, the seller retains ownership at the time of the execution of the contract to sell.
• Registration of the mortgage bound the buyers under the Contract to Sell – Registration of the mortgage establishes a real
right or lien in favor of the mortgagee, as provided by Articles 1312 and 2126 of the Civil Code. Corollary to
the rule, the lien has been treated as "inseparable from the property inasmuch as it is a right in rem." In other
words, it binds third persons to the mortgage. x x x The purpose of registration is to notify persons other
than the parties to the contract that a transaction concerning the property was entered into. Ultimately,
registration, because it provides constructive notice to the whole world, makes the certificate of title reliable,
such that third persons dealing with registered land need only look at the certificate to determine the status of
the property. (Cahayag v. Commercial Credit Corp., G.R. Nos. 168078 &168357, [January 13, 2016], 778 PHIL
8-41)
EFFECT OF DEFECT IN OR LACK OF
NOTARIZATION.
• The absence of notarization of the deed of sale would not invalidate the transaction evidenced therein; it merely reduces
the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which requires proof of its due execution and
authenticity to be admissible as evidence. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to
test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence. (Diampoc v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 200383, [March 19,
2018])
• Although Article 1358 of the Civil Code states that the sale of real property must appear in a public instrument, the
formalities required by this article is not essential for the validity of the contract but is simply for its greater efficacy or
convenience, or to bind third persons, and is merely a coercive means granted to the contracting parties to enable them
to reciprocally compel the observance of the prescribed form. Consequently, the private conveyance of the house is
valid between the parties. (Diampoc v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 200383, [March 19, 2018])
EVEN ILLITERATES ARE PRESUMED TO
KNOW WHAT THEY SIGNED
• The rule that one who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents has been applied even to contracts of illiterate
persons x x x If a person cannot read the instrument, it is as much his duty to procure some reliable persons to read and
explain it to him, before he signs it, as it would be to read it before he signed it if he were able to do so and his failure to
obtain a reading and explanation of it is such gross negligence as will estop him from avoiding it on the ground that he
was ignorant of its contents. (Diampoc v. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 200383, [March 19, 2018])
• The law nor the courts will not extricate the party from an unwise or undesirable contract - It is also a well-settled principle that "the
law will not relieve parties from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous agreement they entered into with all the
required formalities and with full awareness of what they were doing. Courts have no power to relieve them from
obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise
investments. Neither the law nor the courts will extricate them from an unwise or undesirable contract which they
entered into with all the required formalities and with full knowledge of its consequences”. (Diampoc v. Buenaventura, G.R.
No. 200383, [March 19, 2018])
QUALIFICATION OF WITNESS: QUALITIES OF A
WITNESS
• Testimonial Quality of Perception
a). Capacity to perceive means to be able to observe by the use of the senses including the
ability to receive impressions from the outside world and to grasp or understand these
• impressions;
b). This must exist at the time of the occurrence of the event to which the witness is
testifying
• even if it is lost at the time of testifying.
• 2. Testimonial Quality of Memory
a). Ability to retain the impressions received or observations made and to recollect them in
court;
b). This must exist at the time of testifying;
c). Selective memory or lapses in memory affect merely credibility.

3. Testimonial Quality of Narration or Communication

a). The ability to interpret, explain, relate or communicate in a manner which can be
understood by the court, either through spoken words, writings, or sign language;
b). It must exist at the time of testifying.

4. Testimonial Quality of Sincerity

a). The awareness of both a duty to tell the truth and to be liable in case of intentional lies, or
the recognition of the obligation of an oath;
b). The willingness to be placed under oath or affirmation.
Additional Requirements in cases under the Rules on
Summary Procedure
The intended witness must have:
(i)  executed a sworn statement;
(ii)  submitted beforehand to the court; and
(iii)  is present in court and is available for clarificatory questions by
the court.
COMPETENCY OF A WITNESS DISTINGUISHED
FROM CREDIBILITY

• Competency is the legal fitness or legal capacity of a person to testify as


a witness. Competency involves a determination of whether the person
offered as a witness has all the qualifications prescribed by law and is not
among those disqualified by law or by the rules of evidence.
• Credibility on the other hand, goes to the character of the witness to be
believable or not. This goes to the truth of the testimony. It includes the
ability of the witness to inspire belief or not. Hence a witness maybe
competent but is not credible.
PRESUMPTION OF CAPACITY

• Art. 37, New Civil Code


• Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity
to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may
be lost.
• When a person is offered as a witness, he is presumed to be competent.
He who claims otherwise has the burden of proving the existence of a
ground for disqualification.
METHOD OF QUESTIONING THE COMPETENCY

• Raising an objection to the presentation of the witness or to his continued testimony;


b.) The time to raise an objection is as soon as the ground becomes apparent which may
either
• be:
(i) at the time the person is offered and presented to be a witness and before he
actually
• testifies; or
(ii). At the time he is actually testifying.
General Rule: Only those expressly covered under the enumerations by law
may be disqualified from testifying.

The following are not grounds for disqualification:


(i)  Interest in the outcome of a case;
(ii)  Relationship to a party, as both affect merely credibility;
(iii)  Sex;
(iv)  Race;
(v)  Creed;
(vi)  Property; or
(vii)  Prior conviction of a crime.
KINDS OF DISQUALIFICATION

• 1. Total or absolute - the person is disqualified from being a witness due


to a physical or mental cause.
• 2. Partial or relative - the witness is disqualified from testifying only on
certain matters but not as to other facts.
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION (PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS)

• The examination conducted by the court on the competency of a


witness whenever there is an objection to the competency of the
witness and is usually made before the witness starts with his
testimony.
• The party objecting maybe allowed to present evidence on his
objection or the court itself may conduct the questioning on the
witness.
GROUNDS FOR ABSOLUTE INCAPACITY

• I. Mental Incapacity: those whose mental condition at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others.
• They include the following:
1. Medically Insane Persons unless they are testifying during their lucid intervals.
• a). Sanity is presumed, it is the opponent who must prove this ground.
b). However, the party presenting the witness must prove sanity in these
two instances:
(i) if the witness has been recently declared as of unsound mind by the
court or by a competent physician
(ii) is an inmate in an asylum or mental institution.

2. Persons medically sane may be considered as legally insane if at the


time they are to be presented as witness, they are incapable of testifying
truthfully or of being aware of the obligation to testify. Included here are
drunks, those under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or suffering from
some temporary mental disability.
Mental defects such as idiots, imbeciles or morons and other mental
retardates are not disqualified by this reason alone although this may
affect their credibility.

Deaf mutes are not disqualified so long as they are able to


communicate in some manner which can be understood and, in case of
the use of sign-language, the interpretation thereof can be verified.
MENTAL IMMATURITY

• II.
• Mental Immaturity: these refer to children of tender age whose mental maturity is such as to render
them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.
• Age is not the criterion but the intelligence and possession of the qualities of a witness The credibility of
Children as witness takes into account two possibilities:
• (i)  children are prone to exaggerate and influenced by suggestions from adults; and
• (ii)  lack of motive to testify falsely.
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness

General rule: Every child is presumed to be qualified to be a witness.

Except: Substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the
duty to tell the truth in court, the court may then conduct a competency
examination (voir dire examination) motu proprio or on motion of a party.
DOCTRINES:
1. The burden of proving incapacity rests upon the person who alleges
it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed. (Catalan vs Basa, G.R. No. 159567 – July 31, 2007).

2. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province


and expertise of the trial. (People vs Abaigar, G.R. No. 199442 – April 7,
2014)
3. In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the
stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that
will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Only the judge trying the case can see all
these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict. (People vs.
Paras, G.R. No. 192912 – June 4, 2014)

4. Full faith and credit are accorded to police officers, for they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner in the absence of proof to the contrary.

A few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details
and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility. Instead
of weakening their testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility, because
they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed. (People vs Fernandez, et al., G.R. No. 193478
– June 23, 2014)
5. A person of feeble-mind is a competent witness so long as she could convey her ideas by
words or signs. It is sufficient that witness can sufficiently give intelligent answers to the
questions propounded by the court and the counsels and can perceive and transmit in her
own way her own perceptions to others. (People vs De Jesus ,G.R. No. L-39087 – April 27,
1984)

6. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence
that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to
or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition. (People vs Rafanan, Jr., G.R. No. L-54135 – November 21, 1991)

7. A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in
the case of other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and
credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make
them known to the court. (People vs Salomon et al. G.R. No. 96848 – January 21, 1994).
8. Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts
respecting which he is examined.
The requirements then of a child’s competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of
observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in
ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing
requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such
determination. (People vs Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791 – February 22, 1996)
282
9. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court.
As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only
limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied.
(Marcos vs The Heirs of Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr., G.R. No. 198240 – July 3, 2013)
10. Mental retardation per se does not affect a witness’ credibility so long as he/she is able to
intelligently make known their perception to others. Thus, a mental retardate may be a
credible witness. (People vs Obogne, G.R. No. 199740 – March 24, 2014)

11. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed.Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. (People vs Roxas , G.R. No. 200793, June 4, 2014)

12. To qualify as a witness, the basic test is "whether he or she can perceive and, perceiving,
can make known his or her perception to others”.
An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court.
He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If
an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court. ( People vs
Corpuz , G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017).
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE OR
THE MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE
RULE 130 SECTION 22

Sec. 22.Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their


marriage, the husband OR the wife, CANNOT testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants
or ascendants.
STATEMENT OF THE RULE:

During the marriage neither spouse ( i.e. the witness


spouse) may testify for or against the other (i.e. the
Party spouse) without the consent of the affected
spouse ( i.e. the party spouse).
REASON FOR THE RULE

Identity of Interest: hence compelling a person to testify against the


spouse is tantamount to compelling the witness to testify against
himself.
To avoid the danger of admitting perjured testimony and to prevent
the witness spouse from being liable for perjury.
As a matter of public policy of preserving the marital relationship,
family unity, solidarity and harmony.
To prevent the danger of punishing the party spouse through hostile
testimony, especially in cases of domestic troubles between the
spouses.
REQUISITES FOR APPLICABILITY

a. One Spouse is a party to a case, whether civil or criminal, singly or with other
third persons

b. The spouses are validly married. These include voidable marriages as well as
those where there is a presumption of a valid marriage in the absence of a
marriage contract.
Bigamous marriages and common-law relationships are excluded.
The reason behind or purpose behind the marriage is immaterial, as when the
marriage was intended precisely to prevent one from testifying
The marriage is subsisting at the time one is called to testify against
the other in that it has not been dissolved by death or by law. Thus
the prohibition is not perpetual.
The case is not one against the other.
The consent of the party spouse has not been obtained nor has he
waived the rule in
any other way.
FORM OF PROHIBITED TESTIMONY OR WHEN A
VIOLATION EXISTS

• When the spouse is actually called in court to testify as a witness to facts.


• When the witness is asked to submit objects, or documents or other evidence in court
even if not actually called to testify
• When a third person is presented as a witness and is asked to divulge declarations or
information revealed to the third person by the spouses, which declarations or information
affect the liability of the party spouse.
• The revelation must be in confidence
• If the declaration was made in the presence or hearing of another person, then there is
no violation of the rule.
WAIVER OF THE RULE

• a. Expressly, or when the party spouse give consents


• b. Impliedly:
• as when the party spouses interposes no objection to the presentation of the witness spouse
• when the party-spouse presents his/her spouses as his/her own witness
• When the party-spouse imputes the wrongdoing to the other spouse, the latter
• may testify to rebut the imputation.
EXCEPTIONS WHEN SPOUSE MAY TESTIFY:

• a. In a civil case filed by one against the other. Examples: cases of annulment,
legal separation, support, declaration of mental incompetency, separation of
property.
• b. In a criminal case for a crime (i) committed by one against the other such
as those involving physical assault and violence;Violation of RA 9262;
economic abuse or (ii) against the direct ascendant or descendant of the
other
c. When the reason for the law has ceased. Where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved, nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reasons based on such
harmony and tranquility no longer apply. In such cases, the identity of interest
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on identity of interest
disappears. (The law ceases when the reason for the law ceases)
ART. 215 – FAMILY CODE

•No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to


testify against his parents and grandparents, except
when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against
the descendant or by one parent against the other.
SC TEACHINGS

• 1.The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks ,or directly and
vitally impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the
statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other. (People v.
Castaneda, G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979).
2. The rule of waiver of objection to the competency of witnesses generally
does not require this prerequisite in the case between husband and wife.
Rather the rule makes the determination of the question hinge around the
consequences which by common sense, in justice and in fairness, should be
deemed to have been expected by the spouse who first testified naturally to
flow from his act of giving that testimony. (People v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-568
July 16, 1947)
3.When husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why
either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself
alone," and his or her testimony could operate only against himself or herself.
(Lezama v. Rodriguez , G.R. No. L-25643, June 27, 1968)
4. When an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs,
the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute
that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the
other. (Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. NO. 143439 October 14, 2005).
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF THE
DEATH OR INSANITY OF THE ADVERSE PARTY
RULE 130 SECTION 23.

Sec. 40. Statement of Decedent or Person of Unsound Mind. IN AN


ACTION against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon the claim or demand
against the estate of THE deceased person or against THE person of unsound
mind, WHERE A PARTY OR ASSIGNOR OF A PARTY OR A PERSON IN
WHOSE BEHALF AS CASE IS PROSECUTED TESTIFIES ON A matter
of fact occurring before the death of the deceased person or before the person
became of unsound mind,
ANY STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED OR THE PERSON OF
UNSOUND MIND, MAY BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE IF THE
STATEMENT WAS MADE UPON THE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF THE DECEASED OR PERSON OF UNSOUND MIND AT A TIME
WHEN THE MATTER HAD BEEN RECENTLY PERCEIVED BY
HIM OR HER AND WHILE HIS OR HER RECOLLECTION WAS
CLEAR. SUCH STATEMENT, HOWEVER, IS INADMISSIBLE IF
MADE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATING ITS LACK OF
TRUSTWORTHINESS.
SC NOTES

Benthan criticized the Dead Man’s Statute as “blind and brainless” because in
seeking to avoid injustice to the dead it may cause injustice to the living. If a
survivor has rendered services, furnished goods or lent money to a man whom he
trusted, without an outside witness or admissible written evidence, he is helpless if
the other dies and the representative of his estate declines to pay.
The survivor’s mouth may even be closed in an action arising from a
fatal automobile collision, or in a suit upon a note or an account
which the survivor paid in cash without taking a receipt (McCormick
on Evidence, 159-160). The problem is that the survivor’s
disqualification is more likely to balk the honest than the dishonest
survivor. One who would not balk at perjury will hardly hesitate at
suborning a third person, who would not be disqualified to swear to
the false story.
Many states have swept away the disqualification entirely and their evidence
rules now permit the survivor to testify without restriction. In order,
however, to minimize the danger of injustice to the decedent’s estate, their
rules render admissible any writings of the deceased or evidence of oral
statements made by him, which would ordinarily be excluded as hearsay.
Following the lead of these states, the Sub-Committee decided to
recommend the proposed rule allowing the survivor to testify by
admitting hearsay evidence of the deceased.
APPLICABILITY

• The case must be a civil case where the defendant is the executor, administrator or
representative of the deceased person of person of unsound mind. But the rule will
not apply to a counter-claim against the plaintiff.
• The subject is a claim or demand i.e. one that affects the real or personal properties:
• The case must be a personal action for the enforcement of a debt or demand involving money
judgment, or where the defendant is demanded to deliver personal property to plaintiff
• The evidence of this claim is purely testimonial and allegedly incurred prior to the death or
insanity. They are therefore fictitious claims.
The subject of the testimony is as to a matter of fact
occurring before the death or insanity. The testimony is the
only evidence of the claim or demand.
i. The death/insanity maybe before or during the pendency of
the case so long as it was before the death/insanity.
ii. The matters prohibited are those made in the presence
and hearing of the decedent which he might testify to if alive
or sane, i.e. adverse to him, and not to those which may be
known from other sources.
THE RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FOLLOWING:

• To claims or demands which are not fictitious or those supported by evidence such as
promissory notes, contracts, or undertakings, including the testimony of disinterested
witnesses.
• Fraudulent transactions of the deceased or insane person, as when the deceased was an
illegal recruiter or that he absconded with money entrusted to him
• To mere witnesses
• Stockholders/members of a juridical entity testifying in cases filed by the
• juridical entity
• Claims favorable to the estate.
The rule maybe waived expressly or by failure to object
or by introducing evidence on the prohibited matter.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
RULE 130 SECTION 24
1. Concept

Privileged communication is an interaction between two parties in which the law recognizes a
private, protected relationship. Whatever is communicated between the parties remains
confidential, and the law cannot force their disclosure. Even disclosure by one of the parties
comes with legal limitations. There are, however, exceptions that can invalidate a privileged
communication and various circumstances under which it can be waived, either deliberately
or unintentionally. Commonly cited relationships where privileged communication exists are
those between attorney and client, doctor or therapist and patient, and priest and parishioner
and between spouses.
KINDS OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

Rule 130 Sec 24 provides that communication between or involving the


following are privileged:
(a) between husband and wife;
(b) between attorney and client;
(c) between physician and patient;
(b) (d) between priest and penitent; and
(c) (e) public officers and public interest.
Privileged communications is premised on an accepted need to protect a
trust relationship. The Supreme Court has previously cited other privileged
matters such as the following:

(a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news;
(b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted;
(c) trade secrets;
(d) information contained in tax census returns;
(e) bank deposits" (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act);
(f) national security matters and intelligence information; and
(g) criminal matters. (Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville,
G.R. No. 204700, November 24, 2014)
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION: WHEN
ACTIONABLE

A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if


the author has acted in bad faith. This class includes allegations or
statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or
during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as
answers given by the witness in reply to questions propounded to them in
the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or
statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are
responsive to the questions propounded to said witnesses.
BELEN VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 211120, FEB. 13, 2017

A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the


author has acted in bad faith. This class includes allegations or statements
made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or during the
hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as answers given by
the witness in reply to questions propounded to them in the course of said
proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant
to the issues, and the answers are responsive to the questions
propounded to said witnesses.
MARITAL PRIVILEGE
RULE 130, SEC. 24(A)

Sec. 24 Disqualification by reason of privileged communications. –


The following person cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by
one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.
RATIONALE:

• Spousal privilege (also called marital or husband-wife privilege) is a term used in the law of
evidence to describe two separate privileges: the communications privilege and the
testimonial privilege, which is applied in civil and criminal cases. Both types of privilege are
based on the policy of encouraging spousal harmony, and preventing spouses from having to
condemn, or be condemned by their spouses.
• The spousal communications privilege or confidences privilege is a form of privileged
communication that protects the contents of confidential communications between
spouses during their marriage from testimonial disclosure.
Spousal testimonial privilege (also called spousal incompetency and spousal
immunity) protects the individual holding the privilege from being called to
testify in proceedings relating to his/her spouse, so that either may invoke
it to prevent the other from testifying about a confidential communication
made during marriage.

The spousal communications privilege may not be invoked if the spouses are suing each
other or each other’s estates in a civil case; if one of the spouses has initiated a criminal
proceeding against the other; or in a competency proceeding regarding one of the
spouses.
REQUISITES FOR THE PRIVILEGE TO APPLY:

a. There was a valid marital relation;


b. The privilege is invoked with respect to a confidential communication
between the spouses during said marriage; and
c. The spouse against whom such evidence is being offered has not given his or
her consent to such testimony
Accordingly, the privilege cannot be claimed with respect to communications
made prior to the marriage of the spouses.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RULES ON
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
(DRM) & MARITAL PRIVILEGE RULE (MPR):

• a. The former can be invoked only If one of the spouses is a party to the action,
while the latter can be claimed whether or not the spouse is a party to the action;
• b. The former applies only if the marriage is existing at the time the testimony is
offered, where the latter can be claimed even after the marriage has been dissolved;
• c. The first constitutes a total prohibition against any testimony for or against the
spouse of the witness, while the second applies only to confidential communications
between the spouses.
WHEN THE COMMUNICATION IS NOT
CONSIDERED CONFIDENTIAL IN NATURE:

• The same cannot be invoked where it was not intended to be kept in confidence by the
spouse who received the same, as in the case of a dying declaration of the husband to his
wife as to was his assailant – to which the communication was obviously intended to be
reported to the authorities;

• The privilege is lost if the communication is overheard or comes into the hands of a third
party, whether legally or not;

• It is necessary that there was no collusion with or voluntary disclosure by either spouse to
the third person, otherwise the latter becomes an agent of the spouse and would thereby be
covered by the prohibition.
MARITAL PRIVILEGE: EXCEPTION

When an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the


conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statuTe that one
shall not shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other. (People v.
Castañeda, G.R. No. L-46306, February 27, 1979)
ATTORNEY – CLIENT PRIVILEGE

SEC 24 Disqualification by reason of privileged communications. – The following


person cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(b) An attorney OR PERSON REASONABLY BELIEVED BY THE CLIENT TO BE
LICENSED TO ENGAGE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW , cannot, without the consent of
THE client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him OR HER, or
his OR HER advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk OR OTHER PERSON
ASSISTING THE ATTORNEY be examined, without the consent of the client and his or
her employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such a
capacity, except in the following cases:
(I) FURTHERANCE OF CRIME OR FRAUD. IF THE SERVICES OR
ADVICE OF THE LAWYER WERE SOUGHT OR OBTAINED TO ENABLE
OR AID ANYONE TO COMMIT OR PLAN TO COMMIT WHAT THE
CLIENT KNEW OR REASONABLY SHOUD HAVE KNOWN TO BE A
CRIME OR FRAUD;
(ii) CLAIMANTS THROUGH SAME DECEASED CLIENT. AS TO A
COMMUNICATION RELEVANT TO AN ISSUE BETWEEN PARTIES WHO
CLAIM THROUGH THE SAME DECEASED CLIENT, REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER THE CLAIMS ARE BY TESTATE OR INTESTATE OR BY INTER
VIVOS TRANSACTION;
(iii) BREACH OF DUTY BY LAWYER OR CLIENT. AS TO A COMMUNICATION
RELEVANT TO AN ISSUE OF BREACH OF DUTY BY THE LAWYER TO HIS OR HER
CLIENT OR BY THE CLIENT TO HIS OR HER LAWYER;

(iv) DOCUMENT ATTESTED BY THE LAWYER. AS TO A COMMUNICATION


RELEVANT TO AN ISSUE CONCERNING AN ATTESTED DOCUMENT TO WHICH THE
LAWYER IS AN ATTESTING WITNESS; OR

(v) JOINT CLIENTS. AS TO A COMMUNICATION RELEVANT TO A MATTER OF


COMMON INTEREST BETWEEN TWO OR MORE CLIENTS IF THE COMMUNICATION
WAS MADE BY ANY OF THEM TO A LAWYER RETAINED OR CONSULTED IN
COMMON, WHEN OFFERED IN AN ACTION BETWEEN ANY OF THE CLIENTS.
RATIONALE:

The rule is grounded on public policy and the proper administration of justice. It is to
encourage clients to make a full disclosure of all facts relative to a problem for which he sought
the professional services of a lawyer, without fear or reservation that these facts will later be
revealed especially if the nature of the facts are such that they might adversely affect his rights,
property or reputation. This is to inspire confidence and thus it is also to enable the lawyer to
give the appropriate advice or to undertake such action that will best serve the interest of the
client.
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION BASED
ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO APPLY:

1. There is an attorney and client relationship;


2. The privilege is invoked with respect to a confidential communication
between them
in the course of professional employment;
3. The client has not given his consent to the attorney’s testimony.
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION

❖ The attorney must have been consulted in his professional


capacity even if no fee has been paid.
❖ It includes preliminary communications made for the purpose
of creating the Attorney-Client relationship and verbal
statements as well as documents or papers entrusted to the
attorney.
❖ Note: The client owns the privilege and therefore he alone can
invoke it.
THE FOLLOWING ARE INSTANCES WHEN THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE DOES NOT APPLY:

a). those intended to be made public


b). or intended to be communicated to a third person
c). intended for an unlawful purpose or for a future crime or act
d). received from a third person not acting in behalf or as agent of the client
e). those made in the presence of third persons
f). those which are irrelevant
g). the effects of a crime as well as weapons or instruments of a crime.
h). opinions on abstract questions or hypothetical questions of law
DURATION AND WAIVER

A. The duration is perpetual even after the Attorney-Client relationship has


already ceased.
B. The rule maybe waived by the client alone, or by his representatives in case
of his death, expressly or by implication.
1. If he is a party to a case and his lawyer was called as a witness by his opponent:
(a) by failure of the client to object to the questions concerning the privileged
communications
or
(b) having objected on direct, the client cross-examines on the privileged
communications.
2. When the client presents evidence on the privileged communication, the
opposing party may call on the lawyer to rebut the evidence.

3. When the client calls on the lawyer to testify on the privileged


communication

4. In case of a suit by and between the lawyer and the client, the rule does
not apply

5. When the lawyer is accused of a crime in relation to the act of the client
which was the subject of their professional relationship, he may reveal the
privileged communications to prove he had nothing to do with the crime.
C. If the Attorney, as witness to a case which does not
involve the client, divulges confidential communication
without the prior consent of the client, he may be liable
criminally, civilly and administratively.
SC TEACHINGS

• Communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of being communicated to others are
not privileged after they have been so communicated, and may be proved by the testimony of the
attorney. This rule applies to a compromise agreement perfected by the attorney with the authority and
under the instructions of his client. As to whether a waiver of the client’s privilege personally made in
open court can be withdrawn before acted upon. ( Uy Chico v. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 )
(REGALA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 262 SCRA 124, SEPTEMBER
20, 1996).
Client identity is privileged:
1. Where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.

2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged

3. Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless,
by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client’s name is privileged.
The privilege which protects communications between attorney and client does
not extend to a copy of a letter written by the client to his attorney which comes
to the hands of the adverse party. Where the authenticity of such a document is
admitted, the court will take no notice of the manner in which it was obtained.
(Barton v Leyte Asphalt Mineral Oil Co. Ltd. GR No. L-21237, March 22, 1924 )

When part of a writing is introduced in evidence by one litigant, his adversary is


entitled to use other parts of the same writing, so far as relevant to the issues in
the case; and to this end the attorney of the latter has a right to inspect the writing
and to require its production in court. The introduction in evidence of part of a
paper writing by one party waives privilege as to other parts of the same writing.
(Orient Insurance Company vs. Revilla, Teal Motor Co. GR No. 34098, September
17, 1930 )
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NOS. 115439-41, JULY 16, 1997
Privileged communication not confined to verbal or written
communication
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidentiary rule
was taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential
communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is
not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to
his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the
client to the attorney by other means.
Privilege must be for a lawful purpose
In order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful
purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been
pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable
relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of
privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not
only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under
certaincircumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice.
HADJULA VS. MADIANDA
A.C. NO. 6711

Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the


attorney-client privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

Sec. 24 Disqualification by reason of privileged communications. – The following person


cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

(c) A PHYSICIAN, PSYCHOTHERAPIST OR PERSON REASONABLY BELIEVED BY THE


PATIENT TO BE AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE OR PSYCHOTHERAPY CANNOT
IN A CIVIL CASE, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF A PATIENT, BE EXAMINED AS TO ANY
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION MADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIAGNOSIS OR
TREATMENT OF THE PATIENT’S PHYSICAL, MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL CONDITION,
INCLUDING ALCOHOL OR DRUG ADDICTION, BETWEEN THE PATIENT AND HIS OR HER
PHYSICIAN OR PSYCHOTHERAPIST.
THIS PRIVILEGE ALSO APPLIES TO PERSONS, INCLUDING
MEMBERS OF THE PATIENT’S FAMILY, WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN
THE DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT OF THE PATIENT UNDER THE
DIRECTION OF THE PHYSICIAN OR PSYCHOTHERAPIST.
A “PSYCHOTHERAPIST” IS:
(a)  A PERSON LICENSED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE ENGAGED IN
THE DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT OF A MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL
CONDITION,
OR
(b)  A PERSON LICENSED AS A PSYCHOLOGIST BY THE
GOVERNMENT WHILE SIMILARLY ENGAGED
RATIONALE:

First, to inspire confidence in patients and encourage them to make a full


disclosure of all facts, circumstances or symptoms of their sickness, without
fear of their future disclosure, so that a physician can form an opinion and
be enabled to safely and effectively treat the patient. Second, to protect the
patient’s reputation.
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION
BASED ON PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE TO
APPLY:
1. The physician is authorized to practice medicine or psychiatry or psycho therapy or those
reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed as such OR THIS PRIVILEGE ALSO APPLIES
TO PERSONS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE PATIENT’S FAMILY, WHO HAVE
PARTICIPATED IN THE DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT OF THE PATIENT UNDER THE
DIRECTION OF THE PHYSICIAN OR
2. The information was acquired or the advice or treatment was given by him in his
professional capacity for the purpose of treating and curing the patient;
3. The information, advice or treatment, if revealed would blacken the reputation of the
patient;
4. The privilege is invoked in a civil case, whether patient is a party or not.
Note: The privilege extends to all forms of communications as well as to the professional
observations and examinations of the patient.
SC TEACHINGS

The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he


attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him to "safely
and efficaciously treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be
emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The
mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the
number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as
the subjet commUnicated is not stated (Lim v. CA 214 SCRA 273, (1992)
2. Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is the patient’s husband
who testifies on a document executed by medical practitioners, his testimony does
not have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the
patient and executed the report. Plainly, this does not fall within the prohibition.
(Krohn vs CA 23 SCRA 273)

3. The right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the


documents to be disclosed are "not privileged.” Hospital records in relation to the
diagnosis or treatment of the patient are covered by the privilege, and is not
limited to testimonial evidence by a physician in court. To allow, however, the
disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or
treatment he gave him— would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the patient’s consent. (Chan vs. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013)
PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
RULE 130 SECTION 24 (D)

• d) A MINISTER, PRIEST OR PERSON REASONABLY BELIEVED TO


BE SO CANNOT, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE AFFECTED
PERSON, BE EXAMINED AS TO ANY COMMUNICATION OR
CONFESSION MADE TO OR ANY ADVICE GIVEN BY HIM IN HIS
PROFESSIONAL CHARACTER IN THE COURSE OF DISCIPLINE
ENJOINED BY THE CHURCH TO WHICH THE MINISTER OR
PRIEST BELONGS
STATE SECRETS
RULE 130, SECTION 24 (E)

• Sec. 24 (e) A public officer cannot be examined:


• 1. During or after his or her tenure
• 2. As to communications made to
• him or her in official confidence,
• 3. When the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE
DISQUALIFICATION ON PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION TO PUBLIC OFFICERS TO APPLY?
That it was made to the public officer in official confidence;
That public interest would suffer by the disclosure of such communication, as in the case
of State Secrets.
When no public interest will be prejudiced, this rule will not APPLY:

NOTE:

The disclosure or non-disclosure is not dependent on the will of the officer but on the
determination by a competent court
-  The privilege may be invoked not only during the term of office of the public officer but also
afterwards
WHAT IS THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE?

The executive privilege is the power of the executive branch of


government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and
Congress. The president and those who assist him must be free to
explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately.
WHAT IS THE PUBLIC INTEREST ON
NON-DISCLOSURE?

At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized


with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar
matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount
importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a
private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot
enforce his rights.
WHAT ARE THE 2 KINDS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

1. Presidential Communication Privilege – Pertains to communications,


documents, or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that which the President believes should remain confidential.

2. Deliberative Process Privilege – Includes advisory opinions, recommendations,


and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated.
RATIONALE FOR PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION
PRIVILEGE
• U.S. v. Nixon, it is a onstitutionally-recognized "presumptive privilege" on the confidentiality of presidential
communications. The rationale for such privilege is expressed in the following disquisition:
• The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens, and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him
must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping polices and making decisions and to do so in a
way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the consideration justifying a presumptive
privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. 2
WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
In United States vs. Nixon, the Court laid out the three elements needed to
be complied with in order for the executive privilege to be valid . These are:

a. The protected communication must relate to a quintessential (ESSENTIAL)


and non-delegable power

b. The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close


advisor of the President or the President himself. (Operational Proximity test
General Rule: An advisor must be in operational proximity with the
President

3. The PCP remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a


showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority

1. Exception to the Presidential Communications Privilege: If there is


adequate need and unavailability
WHAT IS THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE

The privilege covers documents reflecting advisory opinions,


recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated. The privileged status of
such documents rests not on the need to protect national security but, on
the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among
themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page
news, the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency
decision.
PRE-DECISIONAL AND DELIBERATIVE
REQUIREMENT:

To qualify for protection under the


Deliberative Process Privilege, the agency
must show that the document is both
pre-decisional and deliberative.
Pre-decisional – precedes, in temporal
sequence, the decision to which it relates; made
on attempt to make a final decision

Deliberative - whether disclosure of the


information would discourage candid
discussion among the agency
WHAT ARE STATE SECRETS

These are confidential and a court will most likely uphold


the privilege. A society may not always be able to conduct
its business with total openness and matters affecting
national interest must not be divulged.
WHAT IS JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE?

These are confidential and a court will most likely uphold the
privilege. A society may not always be able to conduct its business
with total openness and matters affecting national interest must
not be divulged.
COURT DELIBERATIONS

Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be disclosed


to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as
authorized by the Court. Enables the court to "freely discuss
the issues without fear of criticism for holding unpopular
decisions, or fear of humiliation for one's comments”.
WHAT IS GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGE?

It holds as confidential what a government decision maker thinks while a


case is pending. It also protects from disclosure documents reflecting
communications, advisory opinions recommendations and deliberations
that are part of a process by which government decisions and policies are
formulated.

The privilege is meant to enhance the quality of decisions, by protecting


from inquiry open and frank discussion among those who make them
within the government. (Riano)
SC TEACHINGS

1.The privilege is intended for the protection of the public interest.


The privilege in Section 24, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is intended not for
the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where
there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be
applicable.
The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made
to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that
the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. (Banco Filipino v.
Monetary Board, G.R. No. L-70054, July 8, 1986)
The purpose of the privilege is for the furtherance and protection of the
public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the
obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of
crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity,
encourages them to perform that obligation. (People v. Ong, 432 SCRA 470,
June 21, 2004)
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT PRIVILEGE:
LIMITATION
Where the disclosure of the contents of the communication will not tend to reveal the
identity of an informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the
informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the
communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.

A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege, which arises from the fundamental
requirements of fairness was emphasized. Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or
the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way.
There is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an
informer. The problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls
for balancing the state interest in protecting people from crimes against
the individual’s right to prepare his defense. The balance must be adjusted
by giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the crime
charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible significance of the
informer’s testimony, and (4) other relevant factors. (People v. Ong, 432
SCRA 470, June 21, 2004
Concept:
• Not absolute, has to be weighed against the following factors, among others:

(a) the crime charged;


(b) the possible defenses;
(c) the possible significance of the informer’s testimony; (d) other relevant factors.

• RA 114581 now has expanded the coverage of RA 53, it now also exempts broadcast and
online journalists as well from having to reveal their sources for their news.

• No fixed rule as to when it may be waived. It should be decided on a case to case basis. B.

Rationale:
• Exists so as to encourage citizens to report any knowledge they have of any wrongdoing or
criminal activity to law enforcement officers or agencies.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED
AS PRIVILEGED IN OUR JURISDICTION.

The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which
are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature.

The privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises not on account of the content of the
information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in
pursuit of the public interest, must be confidential.

The privilege seeks to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, in its
capacity as the sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative
with foreign nations. (Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008)
Justices of the Court cannot be compelled to testify on
JUSTICES AND JUDGES matters relating to the internal deliberations and actions
MAY NOT BE SUBJECT of the Court in the exercise of their adjudicatory
TO ANY COMPULSORY functions and duties. This is to be differentiated from a
PROCESS IN RELATION situation where the testimony is on a matter which is
external to their adjudicatory functions.
TO THE PERFORMANCE
OF THEIR With respect to Court officials and employees, the
ADJUDICATORY same rules on confidentiality that apply to
FUNCTIONS. justices and judges apply to them.
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes that they
will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and therefore, whatever
acts they do in the discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall
be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of
each case may appear to

require. (In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of
Court officials and employees as witnesses under the subpoenas and various letters for
the impeachment Prosecution Panel)
PARENTAL & FILIAL PRIVILEGE
RULE 130, SEC. 25:

Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person


may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants, EXCEPT
WHEN SUCH TESTIMONY IS INDISPENSABLE IN A CRIME
AGAINST THAT PERSON OR BY ONE PARENT AGAINT
THE OTHER
A. Concept:  
•It is not a rule of disqualification but is a privilege not to testify;
•Under the Family Code, the descendant may be compelled to testify against his
parents and grandparents, if such testimony is indispensable in prosecuting a crime
against the descendant or by one parent against the other (Art. 215).
•May be invoked or waived.
•Only applies to ascendants or descendants in the direct line

B. Rationale:
•• To preserve “family cohesion”
LEE V CA (G.R. 177861, JULY 13, 2010):

First family (Lee-Keh) versus the second family (Lee-Tiu) of their father. The
Lee-Keh children wanted Tiu to testify that she is the birth mother of Emma
Lee.

Here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of
petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a
common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother.
PEOPLE V INVENCION (G.R. 131636, MARCH
25, 2003):

Rape case. Father accused of raping his own daughter. The half-brother of the victim,
Elven, who shares the same father as her, testified against him. Father raised Rule 125.
The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges.

“As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against
his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against
Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own
accord and only to tell the truth.”
NEWSMAN’S PRIVILEGE
RA 53 AS AMENDED BY RA 1477:

•Section 1:
•Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist
or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot
be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication
which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House
or Committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State.
•    
(1) Concept:
•A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool,
mechanism or compound known only to its owner and
those of his employees to whom it is necessary to
confide it

•A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device, or compilation of information that: (1) is used in
one's business; and (2) gives the employer an
TRADE SECRETS opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not possess the information 


•Trade secrets constitute proprietary rights
(2) Rationale:
Trade secrets have economic value from being generally
unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.
AIR PHILIPPINES V. PENNSWELL (G.R. 172835,
DECEMBER 13, 2007):

“Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions
are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information
as embodied in the Constitution.”

“We said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that,
aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or
industrial secrets as well as banking transactions are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure”
R.A. NO. 9285
“ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ACT OF 2004”
• Alternative Dispute Resolution System means any process or procedure
used to resolve a dispute or controversy, other than by adjudication of a
presiding judge of a court or an officer of a government agency, as defined in
this Act, in which a neutral third party participates to assist in the resolution of
issues, which includes arbitration, mediation, conciliation, early neutral
evaluation, mini-trial, or any combination thereof
• Arbitration means a voluntary dispute resolution process in which one or
more arbitrators, appointed in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or
rules promulgated pursuant to this Act, resolve a dispute by rendering an
award;
• Mediation means a voluntary process in which a mediator, selected by the disputing parties, facilitates
communication and negotiation, and assist the parties in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding a dispute.
• Confidential information means any information, relative to the subject of mediation or arbitration, expressly
intended by the source not to be disclosed, or obtained under circumstances that would create a reasonable
expectation on behalf of the source that the information shall not be disclosed. It shall include (1)
communication, oral or written, made in a dispute resolution proceedings, including any memoranda, notes or
work product of the neutral party or non-party participant, as defined in this Act; (2) an oral or written
statement made or which occurs during mediation or for purposes of considering, conducting, participating,
initiating, continuing of reconvening mediation or retaining a mediator; and (3) pleadings, motions
manifestations, witness statements, reports filed or submitted in an arbitration or for expert evaluation;
• Non-Party Participant means a person, other than a party or mediator, who participates in a mediation
proceeding as a witness, resource person or expert;
• SECTION 9. Confidentiality of Information. — Information obtained through mediation
proceedings shall be subject to the following principles and guidelines;
• (a) Information obtained through mediation shall be privileged and confidential.
• (b) A party, a mediator, or a nonparty participant may refuse to disclose and may prevent any other
person from disclosing a mediation communication.
• (c) Confidential Information shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any
adversarial proceeding, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. However, evidence or information that
is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not become inadmissible or protected from
discovery solely by reason of its use in a mediation.
• (d) In such an adversarial proceeding, the following persons involved or previously
involved in a mediation may not be compelled to disclose confidential information
obtained during the mediation: (1) the parties to the dispute; (2) the mediator or mediators;
(3) the counsel for the parties; (4) the nonparty participants, (5) any persons hired or
engaged in connection with the mediation as secretary, stenographer, clerk or
assistant; and (6) any other person who obtains or possesses confidential information by
reason of his/her profession.
• (e) The protections of this Act shall continue to apply even if a mediator is found to have
failed to act impartially.
• (f) A mediator may not be called to testify to provide information gathered in
mediation. A mediator who is wrongfully subpoenaed shall be reimbursed the full cost
of his attorney's fees and related expenses.
SECTION 10. Waiver of Confidentiality. — A privilege arising from the confidentiality of information may be
waived in a record, or orally during a proceeding by the mediator and the mediation parties.
• A privilege arising from the confidentiality of information may likewise be waived by a nonparty participant if
the information is provided by such nonparty participant.
• A person who discloses confidential information shall be precluded from asserting the privilege under
Section 9 of this Chapter to bar disclosure of the rest of the information necessary to a complete understanding
of the previously disclosed information. If a person suffers loss or damage as a result of the disclosure of the
confidential information, he shall be entitled to damages in a judicial proceeding against the person who
made the disclosure.
• A person who discloses or makes a representation about a mediation is precluded from asserting the
privilege under Section 9, to the extent that the communication prejudices another person in the proceeding
and it is necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the representation of disclosure.
SECTION 11. Exceptions to Privilege. —
• (a) There is no privilege against disclosure under Section 9 if mediation communication is:
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record authenticated by all parties to the agreement;
(2) available to the public or that is made during a session of a mediation which is open, or
is required by law to be open, to the public;
(3) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of violence;
(4) Intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit, or commit a crime, or conceal an
ongoing crime or criminal activity;
(5) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation in a proceeding in which a public agency is protecting the interest of
an individual protected by law; but this exception does not apply where a child
protection matter is referred to mediation by a court or a public agency
participates in the child protection mediation;
(6) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional
misconduct or malpractice filed against mediator in a proceeding; or
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional
misconduct or malpractice filed against a party, nonparty participant, or
representative of a party based on conduct occurring during a mediation.
• (b) There is no privilege under Section 9 if a court or administrative
agency, finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery of
the proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not
otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that
substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and the
mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(1) court proceeding involving a crime or felony; or
(2) a proceeding to prove a claim or defense that under the law is sufficient
to reform or avoid a liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication or
testify in such proceeding.
(d) If a mediation communication is not privileged under an exception in subsection (a) or (b),
only the portion of the communication necessary for the application of the exception for
nondisclosure may be admitted. The admission of particular evidence for the limited
purpose of an exception does not render that evidence, or any other mediation
communication, admissible for any other purpose.
SECTION 12. Prohibited Mediator Reports. — A mediator may not make a report,
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a
mediation to a court or agency or other authority that may make a ruling on a dispute that is
the subject of a mediation, except:
(a) where the mediation occurred or has terminated, or where a settlement was reached.
(b) As permitted to be disclosed under Section 13 of this Chapter.
REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 12-2018
ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 22, 2018

• Clarifies that the nature and extent of the power of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) to obtain information under Section 5 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended, serves as an exception to both the Attorney-Client
and Accountant-Client privilege.
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE EXCEPTION?

1. Rule 21.01 of the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not reveal the confidence or
secrets of his client except, among others, when required by law.

2. In Genato V. Silapan, the Supreme Court stressed that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications
or information does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of fraud. Notably,
attempt to evade or defeat tax is criminal offense defined and punishable under Section 254 of the NIRC, as amended.

3. Third, Section 29 of RA No. 9298 states that the Accountant-Client privilege does not apply if the production of
documents is through a subpoena issued by any court, tribunal, or government regulatory or administrative body.

4. Section 140.1 of the Code of Ethics of Professional Accountants provides that professional accountants shall refrain
from disclosing outside the firm or employing organization confidential information acquired as a result of professional
and business relationship unless there is a legal right or duty to disclose.

5. Finally, taxes are the lifeblood of our nation so its collection should be actively pursued without unnecessary
impediment.
• Accountant-client privilege – under RA 9298 or the Philippine Accountancy Act and the
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants stating that all papers, schedules and
memoranda made by a certified public accountant in the court of an examination, by such
CPA shall be treated confidential and privileged, and that professional accountants shall
refrain from disclosing outside the firm or employing organization confidential information
acquired as a result of professional and business relationships.
ADMISSIONS AND
CONFESSIONS
RULE 130 SECS. 26 AND 32
ADMISSIONS AGAINST
INTEREST
SECTION 26. ADMISSION OF A PARTY. — THE ACT,
DECLARATION OR OMISSION OF A PARTY AS TO A
RELEVANT FACT MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE AGAINST
HIM OR HER. (NOW SECTION 28)
WHAT IS AN ADMISSION?

• An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to
the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him (31
C.J.S. 1022). Admissions may be verbal or written, express or tacit, or judicial or extrajudicial.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR
ADMISSIBILITY?
• (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law;
• (b) be categorical and definite;
• (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and
• (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.
WHAT ARE EXPRESS AND IMPLIED
ADMISSIONS?
• Express admissions are those made in definite, certain and
unequivocal language.
• Implied admissions are those which may be inferred from the acts,
conduct, declaration or omissions of a party (e.g. conduct, silence
of a party).
EXAMPLES OF ADMISSION BY CONDUCT

• Flight from justice is an admission of conduct and circumstantial evidence of consciousness


of guilt (US v. Sarikala, 37 Phil 486)
• Attempt to suppress evidence such as destruction of evidence are admissible
WHAT ARE JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS?
• A judicial admission is one made in connection with a judicial
proceeding in which it is offered (see Sec. 4, Rule 129), while an
extrajudicial admission is any other admission. Secs. 26 and 32 of
this Rule refer to extrajudicial admissions.
WHAT IS A SELF-SERVING DECLARATION?

• It is one which has been made extrajudicially by the party to favor his interests. It is not
admissible in evidence (Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. of Manila, 84 Phil. 330;
People vs. Demiar, 108 Phil. 651).
WHAT IS A SELF-SERVING TESTIMONY?

• Self-serving testimony refers to the extrajudicial statement of a party which is being urged for
admission in court. It does not include his testimony as a witness in court (National
Development Co. vs. WCC, et al., L-21724, April 27, 1967; Co vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 52200,
Aug. 21, 1980). It has no application to a court declaration (Sonaco vs. Angelo, [CA], 64 O.G.
13149). Where the statement was not made in anticipation of a future litigation, the same
cannot be considered self-serving (Korisu vs. Rizal Cement Co., Inc., et al., 36 O.G. 1472;
O.O. Lagman & Co. vs. Mercado, et al., [CA], 61 O.G. 2362).
Admission Confession

Statement of fact which does not involve an Involves an acknowledgment of guilt or


acknowledgment of guilt or liability liability

Express or tacit Express

May be made by 3rd persons and in certain May be made only by the party himself, and in
cases admissible against a party some instances admissible against co-accused
Admission Declaration Against Interest

Need not be made against proprietary or pecuniary Must have been made against the proprietary or
interest of the party, enhances its probative weight pecuniary interest of the party
if it is

Made by the party himself, and is a primary Made by a person who is either deceased or unable
evidence and competent to testify.

Made any time Made ante litem motam


WHAT IS ADMISSION BY SILENCE?

• SECTION 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration made in the presence and
within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper
and possible for him OR HER to do so, may be given in evidence against him OR HER.
(now Section 34)
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION
BY SILENCE?
• (a) He must have heard or observed the act or declaration of the other person;
• (b) He must have had the opportunity to deny it (People vs. Ranario, et al., 49 Phil. 220);
• (c) He must have understood the statement;
• (d) He must have an interest to object, such that he would naturally have done so if the
statement was not true;
• (e) The facts were within his knowledge; and
• (f) The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence is material to the issue
(People vs. Paragsa, L-44060, July 20, 1978).
WHEN DOES IT APPLY?

• The rule on admission by silence applies where a person was surprised in the act (U.S. vs.
Bay, 27 Phil. 495) or even if he is already in the custody of the police (People vs. Ancheta, et
al., 106 Phil. 99). The rule applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying on
a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately
reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response
can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply (20 Am.Jur.
481-488).
WHEN DOES IT NOT APPLY?

• The rule does not apply if the statements adverse to the party were made in the course of an
official investigation(U.S. vs. De la Cruz, 12 Phil. 87), as where he was pointed out in the
course of a custodial investigation and was neither asked to reply nor comment on such
imputations (People vs. Alegre, et al., L-30423, Nov. 7, 1979), or where the party had a
justifiable reason to remain silent, as where he was acting on advice of counsel, otherwise his
right to silence would be illusory. It should further be kept in mind that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense has the right to remain silent and to be
informed of that right (Sec. 12, Art. Ill, 1987 Constitution).
DOCTRINES:

• Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with
or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant
is available as a witness. An admission against interest is the best evidence that affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute, based on the presumption that no man would
declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. It is fair to presume that the
declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. No doubt, admissions
against interest may be refuted by the declarant. In this case, however, respondent failed to
refute the contents of Exhibit “J”. (BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines Inc. vs. Total
Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc., G.R. No. 214406 -February 6, 2017)
• An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the
facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration
is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person who makes the same, and absent
any showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can
offset it, especially so in this case where respondents failed to present even one piece in their
evidence. (The Heirs of Peter Donton vs. Stier and Maggay, G.R. No. 216491 – August 23, 2017)
VIACRUCIS V. COURT OF APPEALS
44 SCRA 176 | MARCH 29, 1972 | CONCEPCION, C. J.:
DOCTRINE:
• The previous recognition by a party in physical possession of the property in dispute of
ownership in another constitutes a declaration against the interest of the former and may be
received in evidence not only against such party who made the declaration or his successors
in interest but also against 3rd persons.
EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD V. COB GROUP
MARKETING, INC.
141 SCRA 86 | JANUARY 16, 1986 |
DOCTRINE:
• The admissions of the president of a company are binding on the company under the rule
that admissions of liability by a party may be given against it.
PEOPLE V. PARAGSA
84 SCRA 105 | JULY 20, 1978 | MAKASIAR, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases.
PEOPLE V. ALEGRE
94 SCRA 109 | NOVEMBER 7, 1979 | ANTONIO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• The silence of an accused while in custody must not be taken against him.
PEOPLE V. MEJIA
275 SCRA 127 | JULY 7, 1997 |DAVIDE, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• An offer of compromise, in a criminal proceeding, is not an implied admission of guilt if
done without the consent or ratification of the accused.
COMPROMISES (RULE 130, SECTION 27)
Revised Rules on Evidence Proposed Amendments

Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability,
evidence against the offeror. Neither is evidence of conduct nor
and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. statements made in compromise negotiations admissible, except
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi offenses evidence otherwise discoverable or offered for another purpose, such
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may
or prosecution.
be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi offenses (criminal
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not admissible in compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or to a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who
other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in made the plea or offer. Neither is any statement made in the course of
evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury. plea bargaining with the prosecution which does not result in a plea
of guilty or which results in a plea of guilty later withdrawn
(24a)
admissible.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses
occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injury. (27a)
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULE 130, SECTION 27?
• The proposed amendment relating to the inadmissibility of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is derived from Rule 408 of the FRE which extends protection to all statements made in
compromise negotiations. The new rule will enable lawyers and parties to negotiate more freely without
concern that their conduct or statements will later be received into evidence as Admissions. Under the
existing Section 27, Rule 130, only the actual compromise offer and those statements inextricably linked with
the offer are protected. The proposed rule does not exclude admissibility of an offer of compromise offered
for all purposes. The exclusionary rule is designed to exclude the offer of compromise only when it is
tendered as an admission of the weakness of the offering party’s claim or defense, not when the purpose is
otherwise. The rule suggests some of the purposes for which evidence of an offer to compromise may be
admitted, to wit, proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
• The proposed amendment relating to the inadmissibility of any statement made in the course of a
plea bargaining with the prosecution is derived from Rule 140 of the FRE. The underlying purpose
of the existing rule on making a plea of guilty later withdrawn or an unaccepted offer of a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense inadmissible to evidence is to encourage and protect plea discussions or
bargaining, which is a vital aspect of the criminal justice system. To promote this objective, the
amendment renders any statement made in the course of the plea discussions or bargaining
inadmissible against the defendant, at least where those discussions fail to produce agreement or lead
to pleas later withdrawn. It will allow attorneys and defendants to negotiate freely with the
prosecution without concern that if the case ultimately goes to trial, their factual statements will be
received as admissions against the defendant.
WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF
COMPROMISE IN CIVIL CASES?
• In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF COMPROMISE
IN CIVIL CASES?
• When the party making the offer admits being indebted or liable, the offer of compromise is
admissible as evidence of liability even if made to buy peace and avoid litigation.
WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF
COMPROMISE IN CRIMINAL CASES?
• In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt.
Note:
• The accused may, however, be permitted to prove that such offer was not made under consciousness
of guilt but merely to avoid the risks of criminal action against him (U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97).
• A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not
admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer. • An offer to pay for the
actual payment of the medical, hospital or other expenses by reason of the victim’s injuries is not
admissible to prove civil or criminal liability therefor.
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF COMPROMISE
IN CRIMINAL CASES?

• Criminal cases involving criminal negligence, or the quasi-offenses contemplated in Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, are allowed to be compromised hence an offer of settlement is not an implied
admission of guilt.
• Criminal cases allowed by law to be compromised.
• In prosecutions for violation of the internal revenue laws, such offers of compromise are not
admissible in evidence as the law provides that the payment of any internal revenue tax may be
compromised, and all criminal violations may likewise be compromised, except those already filed in
court and those involving fraud (Sec. 204, R.A. 8424 [Tax Reform Act of 1997]).
Note:
• While rape cases can in effect be compromised by actual marriage of the parties since
criminal liability is thereby extinguished (Art. 344, last par., Revised Penal Code), an offer to
compromise for a monetary consideration, and not to marry the victim, is an implied
admission of guilt (People vs. Amiscua, L-31238, Feb. 27, 1971). In People vs. Manzano (L-38449,
Nov. 25, 1982), the attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case with the
complainant was considered an implied admission of guilt. At any rate, the Supreme Court
has held that an offer of marriage by the accused, during the investigation of the rape case, is
also an admission of guilt (People vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 51034, May 29, 1987).
OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF COMPROMISE IN
CRIMINAL CASES BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE.

• when made merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of
guilt (U.S. vs. Hunter, 1 Cranch, C.C, 317 as cited in the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97)

• when offer was made in reply to threats of prosecution and solicitation to settle (Frain vs. State, 40
Ga., 530 317 as cited in the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97)

• when the accused, for whose benefit the offer of compromise was made, has no knowledge or did
not take part in the making of the offer (People vs. Godoy)
EL VERADERO DE MANILA V. INSULAR LUMBER CO.
G.R. NO. 21911 SEPTEMBER 15, 1924
TOPIC: COMPROMISE
DOCTRINE:
• The offer of compromise which naturally, under the general rules of evidence, must be
excluded, except that as the amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement
appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, they are relevant.
US V. REGINO TORRES ET AL
G.R. NO. 10566. AUGUST 20, 1915
TOPIC: COMPROMISE
DOCTRINE:
• An offer of compromise in a criminal case cannot be admitted as evidence of an implied
admission of guilt when the law allows such compromise.
PEOPLE V. GODOY
G.R. NOS. 115908-09 DECEMBER 6, 1995
DOCTRINE:
• The accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under the consciousness of
guilt but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which
would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.
PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN
G.R. NO. 117217 DECEMBER 2, 1996
DOCTRINE:
• A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In
criminal cases, except those involving quasi offense or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.
PEOPLE V. YPARRAGUIRRE
G.R. NO. 117702 FEBRUARY 10, 1997
DOCTRINE:
• An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the
offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after
committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and
such offer is proved.
US V. MAQUI
G.R. NO. 8931, MARCH 14, 1914
DOCTRINE:
• The weight of authority sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in
criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some
other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not
in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which
would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
PEOPLE V. PRADES
G.R. NO. 127569 JULY 30, 1998
DOCTRINE:
• In criminal cases, except those involving quasi offenses or those allowed by law to be settled
through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
SAN MIGUEL CORP. V. KALALO
G.R. NO. 185522, JUNE 13, 2012
DOCTRINE:
• A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the
part of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her
claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and
save the expense of litigation.
SPS. CARBONELL V. METROBANK
G.R. NO. 178467, APRIL 26, 2017
DOCTRINE:
• In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of liability, and is inadmissible as
evidence against the offeror.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA
(RULE 130, SECTIONS 28 – 31, REVISED RULES ON
EVIDENCE)
Revised Rules on Evidence Proposed Amendments

Section 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a Same but Section 30
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission
of another, except as hereinafter provided.

Section 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act Section 31. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act
or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the or declaration of a partner or agent AUTHORIZED BY the
scope of his authority and during the existence of the party TO MAKE A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such SUBJECT MATTER OR within the scope of his OR HER
party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence authority and during the existence of the partnership or
other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such
person jointly interested with the party. act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person
jointly interested with the party.
Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The Section 32. Admission by conspirator. — The
act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the act or declaration of a conspirator IN
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in FURTHERANCE OF the conspiracy and during
evidence against the co-conspirator after the its existence, may be given in evidence against the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
of declaration. evidence other than such act of declaration.

Section 31. Admission by privies. — Where one Section 33. Admission by privies. — Where one
derives title to property from another, the act, derives title to property from another, THE
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding LATTER’S act, declaration, or omission in relation
the title, in relation to the property, is evidence to the property, is evidence against the former if
against the former. done WHILE THE LATTER WAS HOLDING
THE TITLE.
Section 32. Admission by silence. — An act or Section 34. Admission by silence. — An act or
declaration made in the presence and within the declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says hearing or observation of a party who does or says
nothing when the act or declaration is such as nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true, naturally to call for action or comment if not true,
and when proper and possible for him to do so, and when proper and possible for him OR HER to
may be given in evidence against him. do so, may be given in evidence against him OR
HER.
ADMISSION BY THIRD PARTY.
• The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as herein provided.
(Sec 28 – new 30)

“RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE”

A. Meaning:

• Every act or omission results to corresponding consequences which may be beneficial or harmful. The rule answers
the question: Who are bound by an admission and who must bear the adverse consequences? It embodies the first part
of the so called Res Inter Alios Acta Alteri Nocere Non Debet Rule Things done between strangers ought not to
injure those who are not parties to it, or transactions between two persons ought not to operate to the prejudice of
third persons). The effects and consequences of an act or omission should be the sole responsibility of the actor
himself and should not affect third persons who did not participate in the act or omission. A man’s life, rights, fortune
and property should not be affected by what other people’s conduct.
B. Reason:
(i) Fairness and
(ii) Acts of third persons are irrelevant to the case involving the act of a party which is the subject of the case.

C. Exceptions:
When the conduct of a third person is admissible as evidence against a party to a case
1. In case of vicarious admissions
2. Under the Principle of Admission by Adoption
FIRST EXCEPTION: VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS
CONCEPT:
• These are admissions by one who, by virtue of a legal relationship with another, maybe
considered as acting for and in behalf of the latter. These are acts, omissions or declarations
by a person who is not a party to a pending case, but are however admissible as evidence
against one of the parties. Their admissibility as evidence is based on the identity of interest
between the stranger and the party concerned.
ADMISSION BY CO-PARTNER OR AGENT.

The act or declaration of a partner or agent authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject or within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, maybe given in evidence against such party after the partnership or
agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act
or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
(Sec 29 – new 31)
1. The rule as to co-partners is based on the identity of interest among the partners such that each partner is an agent of the other partners.
The requirements are:

a). The existence of the partnership must first be established by evidence other than the act or declaration. Proof includes formal
documents such as:

(i) the Articles of Partnership or registration papers filed with the appropriate government agency such as the SEC or DTI,

(ii) by the contract of partnership, or

(iii) by the acts of the partners,

(iv). by the principle of estoppel.

b). The act or declaration must refer to a matter within the scope of the authority of the partners, or that it relates to the partnership. Such
as:

(i). obtaining a credit or loan or incurring of a liability for the partnership, such as borrowing money to add to the capital

(ii). execution of a promissory note or execution of a similar contracts

(iii). statements as to the financial condition of the partnership

(iv). declarations as to the ownership of partnership properties

c). It was made during the existence of the partnership.


• 2. Rule as to Agent-Principal. The agent is deemed an extension of the principal such that the act of the agent is the act
of the principal.
a). The requirements are similar to that among partners
b). The relationship include:
(i). Those expressly created by virtue of a grant of a General or Special Power of Attorney, or Letters of
Administration and similar formal documents, or when professional services have been retained as in the case of a
lawyer-client.
(ii). Agency by Estoppel
(iii). “Agency By Referral”: when one party expressly refers another to a specific third person in regard to a matter in
dispute, the declaration of the third person binds the party who made the referral. In effect he made the third person his
agent.
3. As to Joint Owners, they need not be equal owners. Joint debtors refer to solidary debtors.
The requirements are similar to that among partners, agent-principal.
ADMISSION BY CONSPIRATOR.

• The act or declaration of conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act of declaration. (Sec 30 – new 32)
• 1. The conspiracy has reference to conspiracy as a mode or manner of committing a crime
which presupposes that a crime has actually been committed by two or more persons and the
issue is whether these two or more persons maybe held equally liable. It therefore becomes
relevant to determine whether the act or declaration by one can be used as evidence against a
co-accused. The conspiracy includes both the anterior conspiracy and spontaneous
/instantaneous conspiracy.
2. The act or declaration refer to those made extra-judicially and not to acts or declarations by a
conspirator during the trial
3. Requirements:
a). The existence of the conspiracy among the accused must first be established.
(i). May be by direct proof or circumstantial evidence showing Unity of Intention or Purpose and
Unity of Action.
(ii). The act or declaration may be presented first subject to the rule on conditional admissibility
i.e. proof of the conspiracy be presented latter, or the act or declaration may be admitted to prove the
guilt of the declarant and not to prove the conspiracy.
• b). The act or declaration must relate to the conspiracy or common objective, such as:
(i). the participation of each in the commission of the crime
(ii). The manner of achieving the objective
(iii). Defenses to be made or relating to the escape
(iv). Ensuing the successful execution of the plan.

Ex: The killing of an approaching policeman by the look-out in a robbery, even if not agreed upon, but
was necessary to prevent the discovery, is the liability of all the robbers.
c). The act or declaration was made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy in
that the conspiracy must still be in existence, and not when the conspiracy has ceased. A conspiracy
ceases:
(i) when the crime agreed upon has already been committed
(ii) the accused were apprehended
(iii) as to one who left the conspiracy and did not participate in its execution
(iv) when the plan was abandoned.
Thus: statements by one of the accused while in custody; acts done upon the arrest of the several
accused, do not anymore bind the other. Examples: Statements given to the media after arrest binds
only the declarant. The act of one in killing an arresting officer in order to escape binds him alone.
• The rule applies to a “Conspiracy By Adoption”: When one joins a conspiracy after its
formation and he actively participates in it, he adopts the previous acts and declarations of his
fellow conspirators which are admissible against him.
ADMISSION OF PRIVIES.
• Where one derives title to property from another, the latter’s act, declaration, or omission, in
relation to the property, is evidence against the former if done while the latter was holding the
title. (Sec 31 – new 33)
1. Privies are those who have mutual or succession of relationship to a property either by:

(a) law, such as heirship or hereditary succession, or purchase in a public sale, or


(b). by the act of the former owner, such as instituting an heir, legatee, or devisee, or naming a donee;
or
(c). by mutual consent between the former and present owner, such as by deed of sale.
Concept of the Rule:
• The present owner of a property acquires the property subject to the same burdens,
obligations, liabilities or conditions which could have been enforced against the previous
owner
Illustrations of acts of the prior owner which bind the present owner:
a). The previous acts of the owner alienating a portion of the property, or creating a lien in
favor of a third person
b). Contracts of Lease, mortgages
c). Statements by the prior owner that he obtained the property by fraud, or that he has only a
limited interest in the property
DOCTRINE:

Res Inter Alios Act


a. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible
and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other
accused are concerned. (People vs Alegre, G.R. No. L-30423, November 7, 1979)

• The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations.
Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the
acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. (People vs Raquel, G.R. No. 119005,
December 2, 1996)
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
• Partner’s / Agent’s Admission
• Co-conspirator’s Statement
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. (People vs Cabrera, G.R. No. L-37398, June 28, 1974)
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of
the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. (People vs Yatco, G.R.
No. L-9181, November 28, 1955)
• Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession. The
admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to
statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or
during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this
case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and not
presumptive. It must be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession. (People
vs Chaw Yaw Shun, G.R. No. L-19590, April 25, 1968)
• The rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or
declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or
confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted
source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is
nevertheless admissible and competent. (People vs Serrano, G.R. No. L-7973, April 27,
1959)
• In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. (Tamargo vs Awingan,
G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010)
ADMISSION OF CO-CONSPIRATOR FOR
CONSPIRACY
• In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it
has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. (People v
Bokingo, G.R. No. 187536 : August 10, 2011 )
ACT OR DECLARATION OF CO-CONSPIRATOR

• Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. (People vs Cachuela, G.R.
No. 191752, June 10, 2013
ADMISSION OF PRIVIES

Privies Definition
The word "privies," as used in article 1225 of the Civil Code, denotes not only the idea of
succession in right of heirship or testamentary legacy, but also succession by virtue of acts inter
vivos, as by assignment, subrogation, or purchase — in fact any act whereby the successor is
substituted in the place of the predecessor in interest. The purchaser at an execution sale is,
therefore, a privy of the execution debtor. (Alpuerto vs Pastor, G.R. No. 12794, October 14,
1918)
DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP

• Where one derives title to real estate from another, the declaration, act, or omission of the
latter to the property is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds
the title. (City of Manila vs del Rosario, G.R. No. 1284. November 10, 1905)
PEOPLE V. ALEGRE
94 SCRA 109 (1979)
• As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have
probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. 3 While there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such
exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure
to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an
inmate of the Pasay City jail.
• The better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime,
especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit
confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to
deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
• The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal right of great
importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably.
• The privilege against self-incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It
reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized
men to subject those' suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment and
abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life."
• Therefore, it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody,
in the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid
appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt.
PEOPLE V. RAQUEL
265 SCRA 248 (1996)
• The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself,
and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
• Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, those exceptions do not however apply to the present
case.

• Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants to
the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of
Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente, was negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no
person by the name of Danny Clemente.

• Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the
chief of the intelligence and investigation section of their police station.

• Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be
considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance
of counsel. These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
PEOPLE V. CABRERA
57 SCRA 715 (1974)
• The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind and perpetrator,
together with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the deceased Luis dela Cruz and
the taking of the jeep he was driving. But said statement is obviously inadmissible against appellant, who
made timely objection thereto.
• There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the investigation
conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in question.
For this reason alone, that is, that said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy
between her and appellant, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in
the hands of the authorities, Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of. Said provision reads:
• Admission by conspirator.— The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
PEOPLE V. YATCO
97 PHIL. 941 (1955)
• The Court cited Sec. 12 of Rule 123 that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
• Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as
evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even
been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less
formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy
between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that
section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude
them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
• Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in
evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to
establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the
relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges.
CONFESSION
RULE 130, SECTION 33
Revised Rules on Evidence Proposed Amendments

Section 33. Confession. The declaration of an Section 33. Confession. The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense accused acknowledging his OR HER guilt of the
charged, or of any offense necessarily included offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
therein, may be given in evidence against him. included therein, may be given in evidence against
him OR HER.
WHAT IS CONFESSION?

• A confession is a categorical acknowledgment of guilt made by an accused in a criminal case,


without any exculpatory statement or explanation. If the accused admits having committed
the act in question but alleges a justification therefor, the same is merely an admission.
APPLICATION ON CIVIL CASES

• There can also be a confession of judgment in a civil case where the party expressly admits
his liability.
IS THERE A REQUIRED FORM OF CONFESSION?
Such confession may either be oral or in writing, and if in writing, it need not be under oath.

1. A judicial confession is one made before a court in which the case is pending and in the course of legal
proceedings therein and, by itself, can sustain a conviction even in capital offenses.
2. An extrajudicial confession is one made in any other place or occasion and cannot sustain a conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133).

• A confession may either be judicial or extrajudicial.


• This section refers to extrajudicial confessions
REQUISITIES FOR ADMISSIBILITY

• a. The confession must involve an express and categorical acknowledgment of guilt;

• b. The facts admitted must be constitutive of a criminal offense;

• c. The confession must have been given voluntarily;

• d. The confession must have been intelligently made, the accused realizing the importance or legal significance of his
act; and

• e. There must have been no violation of Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.

• f. Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing
and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the
presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be
inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding. (R.A. 7438 sec. 2(d))
General Rule: The extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding only upon himself and is not admissible
against his co-accused.
Exceptions:
• a. If the latter impliedly acquiesced in or adopted said confession by not questioning its truthfulness, as where
it was made in his presence and he did not remonstrate against his being implicated therein;
• b. If the accused persons voluntarily and independently executed identical confessions without collusion,
commonly known as interlocking confessions, which confessions are corroborated by other evidence, and
without contradiction by the co-accused who was present;
• c. Where the accused admitted the facts stated by the confessant after being apprised of such confession;
• d. If they are charged as co-conspirators of the crime which was confessed by one of the accused and said
confession is used only as a corroborating evidence;
• e. Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the
co-conspirator;
• f. Where the confessant testified for his co-defendant; or
• g. Where the co-conspirator’s extrajudicial confession is corroborated by other evidence of record.
• This section declares as admissible the confession of the accused not only with respect to the offense charged
but also any offense necessarily included therein. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution specifically
provides that illegal confessions and admissions are inadmissible against the confessant or the admitter, hence
they are admissible against the persons who violated the constitutional prohibition against obtaining illegal
confessions or admissions.
ARE INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS ADMISSIBLE?

• NO, because:
a. They are unreliable
b. On grounds of humanitarian considerations or
c. On legal considerations of their being violative of one’s constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
INDICIA OF THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A
CONFESSION:
• a. The confession contains details which the police could not have supplied or invented.
• b. The confession contains details which could have been known only to the accused.
• c. The confession contains statements which are exculpatory in nature.
• d. The confession contains corrections made by the accused in his handwriting or with his initials and which
corrected facts are best known to the accused.
• e. The accused is sufficiently educated and aware of the consequences of his act.
• f. It was made in the presence of impartial witnesses with the accused acting normally on that occasion.
• g. There is lack of motive on the part of the investigators to extract a confession, with improbabilities and
inconsistencies in the attempt of the accused to repudiate his confession.
• h. The accused questioned the voluntariness of the confession only for the first time at the trial of
the case.
• i. The contents of the confession were affirmed by the accused in his voluntary participation in the
reenactment of the crime, as shown by his silent acquiescence thereto.
• j. The facts contained in the confession were confirmed by other subsequent facts.
• k. After his confession, the accused was subjected to physical examination and there were no signs of
maltreatment, or the accused never complained thereof, but not where he failed to complain to the
judge on a reasonable apprehension of further maltreatment as he was still in the custody of his
torturers.
RULE 115
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
SECTION 1. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL. — IN ALL
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, THE ACCUSED SHALL BE
ENTITLED TO THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS:
(E) TO BE EXEMPT FROM BEING COMPELLED TO BE A
WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

• The accused is protected under this Rule from questions which tend to incriminate him, that
is which may subject him to penal liability. Section 3, Rule 132, allows a person to refuse to
answer degrading questions unless it be to the fact in issue or fact from which the fact in
issue would be presumed.
SCOPE

• Testimonial compulsion
• Furnishing evidence by any other means of any fact which the accused has the right to keep
secret
EXCEPTIONS:

• Purely mechanical acts


• e.g: a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy;
• accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and have substance taken from his body;
• to be photographed or measured.
• Immunity Statute

• e.g: Sec.8, RA 1379- Forfeiture of illegally obtained wealth


• P.D 749- Bribery and Graft cases
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

• Questioning initiated by a law officer after a person has been taken into custody or deprived
of freedom
• Present where the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry and begins to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody and asked questions that lead into eliciting incriminating
statements
• Includes “invitations” to an investigation
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE

• Evidence obtained in violation of the right of a person against unreasonable searches and
seizures are inadmissible
• It refers to an object, not testimonial evidence
• It does not refer to testimony or confessions obtained illegally.
WAIVER

• Failure of the accused to invoke the privilege after the incriminating question is asked and
before his answer.
R.A. 7438
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF
PERSONS ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE
DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS
WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION?
• a. to be assisted by a counsel at all times;
• b. to be informed of his right to remain silent; to have a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of a counsel, to be provided
with one by the investigating officer;
• c. to be allowed visits by or conferences with any of his immediate family, or any medical
doctor or priest or minister chosen by him;
RULE AS REGARDS EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION AND WAIVER
• Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in
writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid
waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor,
the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise,
such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
• Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel;
otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
• "Custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
DOCTRINES:

• Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although
later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the
Constitution and as such cannot be admitted in Court.

• While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details


which could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence uncovered
by the investigators, still the Court cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional
infirmity. (People v. Compil 244 SCRA 135)
• By affixing signatures on the boxes of and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit
admission of the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by law. These
signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounseled extra-judicial confession which is not
sanctioned by the Bill of Rights. They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any
admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible
against them. (People v. Wong Chuen Ming 256 SCRA 182)
• Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to
counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. (People v. Yip
Wai Ming 264 SCRA 224)
THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF AN
ACCUSED IS BINDING ONLY UPON HIMSELF AND
IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED
• As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is
not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay
evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. (People v. Alegre 94 SCRA 109)
• Exception: If the accused persons voluntarily and independently executed identical
confessions without conclusion, commonly known as interlocking confessions (People v.
Encipido 146 SCRA 478)
• What is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the
general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against
the declarants thereof. (People v. Endino 352 SCRA 307)
CONFESSION OR ADMISSION?

• There is a distinction between the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and
33 of Rule 130. A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal
case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused,
direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of
other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is
insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of
guilt. (People v. Maqueda 242 SCRA 565)
• Where several accused are tried together for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given
by one during the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter. "The
extrajudicial admission or confession of a co-conspirator out of court is different from the
testimony given by a co-accused during trial. The first is admissible against the declarant
alone, but the second is perfectly admissible against his co-accused," who had the right and
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. (People v. Endino, supra)
PEOPLE V. COMPIL
G.R. NO. 95028 - MAY 15, 1995
DOCTRINE:
• Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although
later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the
Constitution and as such cannot be admitted in Court.
• Even if counsel arrives prior to the actual signing of the statement, his absence during the
making but presence during the signing will not cure the defect.
PEOPLE V. ABULENCIA
G.R. NO. 138403 - AUGUST 22, 2001
DOCTRINE:
• A confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter was
acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is
apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear.
PEOPLE V. MALNGAN
G.R. NO. 170470 - SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
DOCTRINE:
• An uncounseled confession or admission given by the accused to a private individual is not
covered by Section 12, Articles III of the Constitution where there is no showing that said
private individual was acting under police authority.
PEOPLE V. LAUGA
G.R. NO. 186228 - MARCH 15, 2010
DOCTRINE:
• An uncounseled extrajudicial confession taken by a “bantay bayan”, who is charged with the
state related function of peace-keeping, is inadmissible in evidence.
LADIANA V PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 144293 - DECEMBER 4, 2002
DOCTRINE:
• The legal formalities required by the Constitution apply only to extra-judicial confessions or
admissions obtained during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in the
constitutional provision "exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of
accused persons."
PEOPLE V. DACANAY
G.R. NO. 216064 - NOVEMBER 07, 2016
DOCTRINE:
• Verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual
and the State.
PO1 TABOBO III VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 220977 - JUNE 19, 2017
DOCTRINE:
• Declarations in an affidavit does not necessarily establish guilt. An admission of fact is starkly
different from, and is not tantamount to, a confession of guilt. It is an acknowledgment of
some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to authorize a conviction and
which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt. A confession, on the other hand, is
an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.
PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS
EVIDENCE
SECTION 36, SIMILAR ACTS AS EVIDENCE. — EVIDENCE THAT ONE DID OR DID NOT DO A CERTAIN THING AT ONE TIME IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE THAT HE OR SHE DID OR DID NOT DO THE SAME OR A SIMILAR THING AT ANOTHER TIME; BUT IT MAY BE
RECEIVED TO PROVE A SPECIFIC INTENT OR KNOWLEDGE, IDENTITY, PLAN, SYSTEM, SCHEME, HABIT, CUSTOM OR USAGE, AND THE
LIKE.
WHAT IS THE RULE IN CASE OF SIMILAR ACTS AS
EVIDENCE?
• The rule in case of similar acts as evidence states that, evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or
similar thing at another time.
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE

• Applicable to both civil and criminal cases.


EXCEPTIONS
• Similar acts as evidence be received to prove:
(a) Specific intent;
(b) Knowledge;
(c) Identity;
(d) Plan;
(e) System;
(f) Habit;
(g) Custom;
(h) Usage.
U.S. V. PINEDA
37 PHIL. 457 (1918)
DOCTRINE:
• Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature
of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of
irrelevancy are not favored. "Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show
motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant.
PEOPLE V. IRANG
64 PHIL. 285 (1937)
DOCTRINE:
• While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is
admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the
perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the
vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected
with the crime.
PEOPLE V. SOLIMAN
53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
DOCTRINE:
• Proof of character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction
that a prompt defensive action was necessary." This rule does not apply in the case of
murder.
PEOPLE V. BABIERA
G.R. NO. 28871, SEPTEMBER 1, 1928
DOCTRINE:
• While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may
prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking disposition, yet the proof must
be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated and specific acts.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. BELAGAN
GR. NO. 132164 | 19 OCTOBER 2004
DOCTRINE:
• Evidence of one's character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from
the time in question. What is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at
the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of
the suit. Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the
type of offense charged.
PEOPLE V. LEE
G.R. NO. 139070 | 29 MAY 2002
DOCTRINE:
• Proof of the bad moral character of the victim must be relevant to determine the probability or
improbability of his killing. Proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of
murder committed with treachery and premeditation. While good or bad moral character may be
availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense,
such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or
premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show “that it
has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary. This rule does not apply to cases of
murder.
UNACCEPTED OFFER
RULE 130, SECTION 35
[MOVED TO SECTION 37]
SECTION 35. UNACCEPTED OFFER. — AN OFFER IN WRITING TO PAY A
PARTICULAR SUM OF MONEY OR TO DELIVER A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT OR
SPECIFIC PERSONAL PROPERTY IS, IF REJECTED WITHOUT VALID CAUSE,
EQUIVALENT TO THE ACTUAL PRODUCTION AND TENDER OF THE MONEY,
INSTRUMENT, OR PROPERTY.
EFFECT OF UNACCEPTED OFFER

• The rule in unaccepted offer states that, an offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money
or to deliver a written instrument of specific property is, if rejected without cause, equivalent
to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument or property.
REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID OFFER OF PAYMENT

• (a) The offer of payment must be made in writing;


• (b) The offer of payment must be followed by the consignation of the amount in court.
REASON FOR THE RULE

• The rule is intended to complement the rule on tender of payment under Article 1256 of the
New Civil Code.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
RULE 130, SECTION 37
Section 37. Hearsay. -Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the
facts asserted therein. A statement is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) a
non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him or her as an assertion.
Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as otherwise provided in these Rules.

A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (a)
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition;
(b) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive; or (c) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him or her. (n)
The Supreme Court Sub-Committee opined that the current Sec. 36 which provides
that “A witness can testify only on those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception except as otherwise
provided in these rules” does not really define “hearsay” and that a clear definition of
the word is called for.
 
The Sub-Committee opines that the old provision confuses the hearsay rule with the
rule limiting to what the witness can describe on the basis of first hand knowledge. The
two rules are different, as may be seen from the following commentaries.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN HEARSAY RULE AND RULE
REQUIRING FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE
 
This is the rule that a witness qualified to testify to a fact susceptible of observation,
only it is appears that he had a reasonable opportunity to observe the fact.
 
Thus, if a witness testified that on a certain day flight 450 arrived at airport at X on
time, and from his other evidence it appears that he was not in X at the time in
question, and hence could only have spoken from conjecture or report of other
persons, the proper objection is NOT HEARSAY, but WANT OF PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
 
Conversely, if the witness testifies that his brother told him that he came on the flight and it arrived on time,
the objection for WANT OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, of when the plane arrived is inappropriate,
because the witness purports to speak from his own personal knowledge only of what his brother said, and
as to this he presumably has knowledge. If the testimony in this latter case was offered to show the time of
the plane’s arrival, the appropriate objection is hearsay.
 
The distinction is one in the form of the testimony, whether the witness purports to give the facts directly
upon his own credit (although it may appear later that he was speaking only on the faith of the report from
others) or whether he purports to give an account of what another has told him and this is offered to
evidence the truth of another person’s report.
 
However, if it appears, either from the phrasing of his testimony or from other sources that the witness is
testifying on the basis of reports from others, though he does not testify to their statements, the distinction
loses much of its significance, and court may simply apply the label hearsay.
RATIONALE

• Hearsay evidence is excluded by the rules because the party against whom the evidence is
presented is deprived of its right and an opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom
the statements or writings are attributed.
APPLICABILITY

• Hearsay evidence rule applies to oral and documentary evidence hearsay if its probative value
is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand
ESSENTIAL PRE-REQUISITE FOR ACCEPTING
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
• The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for the accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed act.
EVIDENTIARY VALUE

• Hearsay evidence has no probative value.


• 6. Theory of the hearsay evidence rule

• The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the
truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand,
subject to the test of cross-examination.
Nature of affidavits as evidence
• Affidavits are in the nature of hearsay evidence.
Independent relevant statement

• It is a statement which is relevant to the fact in issue independently of whether they are true
or not.
Hearsay evidence is excluded because the party against whom it is
presented is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine the
persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed.
Consequently, if a party does not object to the hearsay evidence, the
same is admissible, as a party can waive his right to cross-examine
STATEMENTS WHICH CAN BE MADE BY A WITNESS
IN WHICH THE FACTS IN ISSUE MAY BE INFERRED
WITHOUT VIOLATING HEARSAY EVIDENCE
• (a) Statement of a person showing the following:
• a. State of mind;
• b. Mental condition;
• c. Belief;
• d. Intention;
• e. Ill will; and
• f. Other exemption;
• b) Statement of a person from which an inference can be made as to:
• a. State on mind of another;
• b. Knowledge;
• c. Belief;
• d. Motive;
• e. Good faith or bad faith of the latter;
Statement of a person which may identify the following:
• a. Date;
• b. Place;
• c. Person in question;

Statement of lack of credibility of the witness.


EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE
• (a) Dying declaration ;
• (b) Declaration against interest;
• (c) Acts or declaration about pedigree;
• (d) Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree;
• (e) Common reputation;
• (f) Res gestae;
• (g) Entries in the course of business;
• (h) Entries in the official records;
• (i) Commercial list and the like;
• (j) Learned treatise;
• (k) Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.
EXCEPTION: ADOPTIVE ADMISSION
(RP VS. KENRICK DEV’T CORP, G.R. NO. 149576 AUGUST 8,
2006
• A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s statement. Where it appears that a party clearly and
unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him.  This is the
essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
• An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. By adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes
the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:
• (a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another; 
• (b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it; 
• (c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; 
• (d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the other
make  or
• (e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. 
PEOPLE V. BRIOSO
GR. NO. L-28482 | 30 JANUARY 1971
DOCTRINE:
• When affidavits are rejected as hearsay; Affiants should be placed on witness stand.—Affidavits are
generally not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another who uses his own language
in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the
one writing them. For this reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a
judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand
to testify thereon.
PEOPLE V. CUSI
GR. NO. L-20986 | 14 AUGUST 1965
DOCTRINE:
• Such testimony will not be considered hearsay evidence if the purpose is only to establish the
fact that the statement was made OR to prove the tenor of such statement.
• Not hearsay if purpose is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made.—While the testimony
of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth
of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose
of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was
made or the tenor of such statement.
PEOPLE V. GADDI
GR. NO. 74065 | 27 FEBRUARY 1989
DOCTRINE:
• Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can be presented in evidence
without violating the hearsay rule which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those
facts which he merely learned from other persons but not as to those facts which he knows
of his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception.
UNCHUAN VS. LOZADA
G.R. NO. 172671 (2009)
DOCTRINE:
• Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency
and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced.
• There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence:
(1) absence of cross-examination;
(2) absence of demeanor evidence; and
(3) absence of oath.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE

• DYING DECLARATIONS Rule 130, Section 37 (now Sec 40)

Sec. 40. Dying Delcaration - The declaration of a dying person, made under consciousness of
an impending death, may be received in any case where in his OR HER death is the subject of
inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death7
WHAT IS DYING DECLARATION?

• It is the declaration of a dying person, made under consciousness of an impending death,


may be received in any case where his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
• Note: it is also known as “Ante Mortem Statements” or “Statement in Articulo Mortis”
FORMS OF DYING DECLARATIONS

• May be Oral or Written or


• Made by signs which could be interpreted and testified to by a witness.

Note: A Dying Declaration may be oral or written. If oral, the witness who heard it may testify
thereto without the necessity of reproducing the words of the decedent, if he is able to give the
substance thereof. An unsigned dying declaration may be used as a memorandum by the
witness who took it down
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR DYING DECLARATIONS
TO BE ADMISSIBLE?

• A. That the death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of such fact;
• B. That the declaration refers to the cause and the surrounding circumstances of such death;
• C. That the declaration refers to the facts which the victim is competent to testify to;
• D. That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant’s death is subject of the inquiry (the victim
necessarily must have died);
• E. That the statement must be complete in itself.
• Note: If the declarant in case of a dying declaration has survived, his declaration may be admissible as part of
the res gestae.
REASONS FOR ITS ADMISSION

• Necessity- because the declarant’s death renders impossible his taking the witness stand.
• • Trustworthiness- at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced. The mind is
induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth.
FACTORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE
DECLARANT IS CONSCIOUS OF HIS IMPENDING
DEATH:

• A. The words or statements of the declarant on the same occasion;


• B. His conduct at the time the declaration was made; and
• C. The serious nature of his wounds as would necessarily engender a belief on his part that he
would not survive therefrom.
Note: The dying declaration of the deceased is NOT admissible as an ante-mortem declaration
when the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. It may, however, be
admissible as part of res gestae when it is made immediate after a startling occurrence.
TIME INTERVAL

General Rule: The intervening time from the making of a Dying Declaration up to the time of
death is IMMATERIAL in its admissibility, as long as it was made under the consciousness of
impending death.
Exceptions:
• 1. If there is retraction made by the declarant before he died; or
• 2. His declaration is ambiguous as whether he believed that his death was imminent when he
made such declaration.
DYING DECLARATIONS ONCE PROVED AND
ADMITTED - ITS CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT SHALL
BE DETERMINED LIKE ANY OTHER TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE.

• Circumstances such as surprise, rapidity and confusion should be taken into consideration in
giving weight to the testimony of the declarant when identifying his assailants.
• It may be impugned: in the same manner as the testimony of any other witness on the stand.
DOCTRINES:

• The dying declaration of the deceased is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in
doubt as to whether he would die or not. However, the said statement may be admitted as part of the res gestae
since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased had no sufficient time to
concoct a charge against the accused. (People vs. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 - February 28, 1985)
• The probative force of a dying declaration does not depend on the declarant not expiring immediately after its execution.— Death
did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is not
indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the
rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.
• The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to homicide or murder as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of death. (People vs. Sabio, 2 SCRA 218 - January 27, 1981)
• The declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence
and forms part of the record.
• Even if dying declaration was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an
impending death." it is still admissible as part of the res gestae. (People vs. Salison, 253 SCRA
758 – 1996)
Requisites of Dying Declarations:
• (a) The declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death;
• (b) It is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness
of impending death;
• (c) The declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and
• (d) The dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.
• Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled
to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons aware of an impending death have
been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their
accusations. The dying declaration is given credence on the premise that no one who knows
of one's impending death will make a careless and false accusation. Hence, not infrequently,
pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the
deceased victim. (People vs. Villariez, G.R. No. 211160 - 2 September 2015)
• For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur:
• (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
• (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his impending death;
• (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
• (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the
victim.
• In order for a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must concur:
• (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
• (b) the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
• (c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. (People vs.
Calinawan, G.R. No. 226145 - Feb. 13, 2017)
PEOPLE VS. SABIO
2 SCRA 218 - JANUARY 27, 1981
DOCTRINE:
• The probative force of a dying declaration does not depend on the declarant not expiring immediately after its
execution.— Death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It
is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that
renders the dying declaration admissible.
• The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to homicide or murder as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
RULE 130, SECTION 38 (NOW SEC. 41)
• Section 41. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased,
or unable to testify against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable PERSON in his or HER position would not have made the declaration unless he
or SHE believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself OR HERSELF or
his or HER successors in interest and against third persons. A STATEMENT TENDING
TO EXPOSE THE DECLARANT TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND OFFERED TO
EXCULPATE THE ACCUSED IS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNLESS CORROBORATING
CIRCUMSTANCES CLEARLY INDICATE THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE
STATEMENT.
WHAT IS DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST?
It is a declaration made:
• 1. By a person deceased or
• 2. unable to testify,
• 3. Against the interest of the declarant,

If the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made:
• 1. So far contrary to declarant’s own interest,
• 2. That a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration
• 3. UNLESS he believed it to be true,
May be received in evidence against:
• 1. Himself or
• 2. His successors in interest and
• 3. Against third persons
NOTES:

• In People v. Toledo (50 Phil. 825 (1928)), the Supreme Court extended the hearsay exception to a declaration against penal
interest offered in evidence to exculpate the accused. In the opinion penned by Justice Malcolm, it is significant that he
noted that “there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement.”
• To guard against the danger of a witness testifying falsely that he has heard another person (deceased or unable to
testify) confess the danger to the crime for the purpose of exculpating the accused, the Sub-Committee decided to adopt
the requirement in Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence that there must be “corroborating circumstances”
clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement.
• As to the meaning of “corroborating circumstances,” there must be an independent evidence that directly or
circumstantially tends to prove the purpose for which the statement is offered – for example, evidence supporting the
veracity of the declarant, the fact that the statement was against interest to an unusual decree, the declarant repeated the
statement, the declarant could not be motivated to falsify for the benefit of the accused, of other factors suggesting
trustworthiness’ such as spontaneity (Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Sec 8.64)
Declarations Against Interest Admissions Against Interest
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DECLARATION AGAINST
Admissible when the declarant is alive and is in court. (Available)
INTEREST AND ADMISSIONS
Admissible when the declarant is dead or unable to testify.
AGAINST INTEREST
(Unavailable)

Made against the proprietary or pecuniary interest of the parties Need not be against one’s proprietary or pecuniary interest of the
parties.

Made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party Made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or
to the suit identified in legal interest with such party.

Secondary Evidence Primary Evidence

Exception to the Hearsay Rule Covered by the Hearsay Rule

Must have been made ante litem motam (prior to the controversy) May be made at any time before or during the trial

Admissible against himself or successor in interest and against Admissible only against the party making the admission
third parties
REQUISITES IN ORDER FOR A STATEMENT TO BE
ADMISSIBLE AS A DECLARATION AGAINST
INTEREST

• 1. That the declarant is dead and unable to testify;


• 2. That it relates to facts against the interest of the declarant;
• 3. That at the time he made the said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was
contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
• 4. That the declarant had no motive to falsify and he believed such to be true.
REASONS FOR SUCH ADMISSION

• Necessity: Such declarations are the only mode of proof available


• Trustworthiness: Persons do not make statements that are disadvantageous to themselves
without substantial reason to believe that the statements are true. Self-interest induces men to
be cautious in saying anything against themselves.
INTEREST COVERED:

• a. Proprietary Interest (ownerships of assets, rights, interests, profits)


• b. Penal Interest • A justifiable theory because one who is criminally liable is also civilly liable.
• • A declaration admitting that he was the one who killed the victim, made by a declarant who died
shortly thereafter, is admissible where another person was subsequently charged as the killer of the
same victim. (People v. Toledo, 51 Phil. 825, August 6, 1928)

• c. Pecuniary interest (an interest related to money or that which can be measured in money. For example, one has
pecuniary interest in an investment in stocks)
• It is essential that at the time of the statement, the declarant’s interest affected is
actual/real/apparent and not merely contingent/future/conditional.
• Self-Serving Declaration: Statements favorable to or intended to advance the interests of
the declarant.
• • It is inadmissible as being hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness
• • Opposite of Declaration Against Interest
DOCTRINES:

Distinction between Admissions against Interest and Declarations Against Interest.


• Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with
or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant
is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is
neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute
an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable
as a witness. (Lazaro vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010)
PRESUMPTION IS ALWAYS FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE
MATRIMONY
• The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against
his penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio (the
presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage/matrimony) and the presumption "that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.” (People v. Majuri, 96 SCRA 472, March 12, 1980)
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST IS AN EXCEPTION TO
THE HEARSAY RULE,
• One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest.
Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded
on necessity and trustworthiness.
• There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest:
• 1. the declarant must not be available to testify;
• 2. the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and
• 3. the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. (Fuentes v. CA, 253 SCRA 430,
February 9, 1996)
HEARSAY RULE
• Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced.
• The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons:
• 1. absence of cross- examination;
• 2. absence of demeanor evidence; and
• 3. absence of oath.

• An affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. (Dantis vs.
Maghinang, G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013)
LAZARO VS. AGUSTIN
G.R. NO. 152364 - APRIL 15, 2010
DOCTRINE:
• On the Issue of Declaration and Admission Against Interest
• There is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against interest. Admissions
against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest
with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against
interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary
evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness.
• On the issue of the notarized affidavit
• Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary
FUENTES V. CA
253 SCRA 430 – FEBRUARY 9, 1996
DOCTRINE:
• One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest.
Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded
on necessity and trustworthiness.
• There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest:
1. the declarant must not be available to testify;
2. the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and
3. the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
PEDIGREE
RULE130, SEC.41

• Section 41. Act or declaration about pedigree. – The act or declaration of a person deceased or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him or her by birth[,]
adoption, or marriage or, in the absence thereof, with whose family he or she was so intimately
associated as to be likely to have accurate information concerning his or her pedigree, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two [(2)] persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word “pedigree”
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
CONCEPT:

It covers all matters or information relating to a person’s:


• 1. Descent: his paternity, or genealogy or family tree.
• 2. The circumstances of a person’s own birth, marriage, death, legitimacy.
• 3. Descendants or issues if he has any including the circumstances of their birth, marriage ,
death
• 4.Siblings,i.e.brothers or sisters, whether by blood or by affinity, whether full or half-blood,
legitimate or illegitimate or by formal adoption, as well as circumstances of their birth,
marriage, death, families.
• 5. All facts concerning family history intimately connected with pedigree
• Proof of Pedigree:
• The best proof of a person’s pedigree would be:
• 1).The records kept in the Office of the Local Civil Registry
• 2).As provided by Article172 of the Civil Code as to filiations; and
• 3).By DNA examinations.
• However if the foregoing are not available, proof consists of the presentation of a witness
who testifies to:
• 1. The declaration or admission of a relative by birth or by marriage.
• 2. The Family Tradition or reputation provided the witness testifying is a member of the
family either by consanguinity or affinity.
• 3. Entries in Family Bibles, Family Books, Charts, Engraving, Rings, and the like.
HOW MANY PERSONS ARE INVOLVED HERE?

• 1. declarant – person whose hearsay statement is subject of the inquiry


• 2. witness – to whom the declarant told it to
• 3. person whose pedigree is in issue

*The deceased person must be related to person whose pedigree is in issue by birth or
marriage. The witness need not be a relative.
What is the reason for admitting such hearsay evidence?

• 1. Necessity – the declarant is deceased/ unable to testify

• 2. Trustworthiness –if there is no controversy in their family, relatives will usually not lie about their relationship to each other.
Family members are presumed to be interested in pedigree, particularly in ascertaining the truth.

Requirements for Admissibility

• (1) The actor or declarant is dead or unable to testify;

• (2) The act or declaration is made by the person related to the subject by birth or marriage;

• (3) The relationship between the declarant or the actor and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration;

• (4) The act or declaration was made prior to the controversy.


GRAVADOR V. MAMIGO
G.R. NO. L-24989
DOCTRINE:
• Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may
testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony
in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.
• Statements made ante litem motam (before a suit is brought) by a deceased relative, this
statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning
of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE V. ALEGADO
G.R. NO. 93030-31, AUGUST 21, 1991
DOCTRINE:
• It is long-settled, as early as in the cases of U.S. v. Bergantino, that the testimony of a
person as to his age is admissible although hearsay and though a person can have no
personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a person has of his age
is acquired from what he is told by his parents, he may testify as to his age as he had
learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of
family tradition.
MENDOZA V. CA
G.R.NO.86302, SEPTEMBER24,1991
DOCTRINE:
• An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by:
• 1)Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,
• 2)According to the Civil Code, or
• 3)Evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father, according to the Family
Code.
TISON V. CA
G.R.NO.121027,JULY31,1997
DOCTRINE :
• When the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim directly from
the declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable
are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in
controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without
other proof of the fact of relationship
DELA CRUZ V. GRACIA
G.R. NO. 177728, JULY 31, 2009

DOCTRINE :
• Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent;
• Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
PEOPLE V. GALLANO
G.R. NO. 184762, FEBRUARY 25, 2015
DOCTRINE:
• The following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance.
• 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of
such party.

• 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

• 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified
to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

• 1. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

• 2. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

• 3. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

• 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning
the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

• 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphasis supplied)"
FAMILY REPUTATION
OR TRADITION
REGARDING PEDIGREE
SECTION 42. FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE. —
THE REPUTATION OR TRADITION EXISTING IN A FAMILY PREVIOUS TO THE
CONTROVERSY, IN RESPECT TO THE PEDIGREE OF ANY ONE OF ITS MEMBERS, MAY
BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE IF THE WITNESS TESTIFYING THEREON BE ALSO A
MEMBER OF THE FAMILY, EITHER BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY OR ADOPTION.
ENTRIES IN FAMILY BIBLES OR OTHER FAMILY BOOKS OR CHARTS, ENGRAVINGS ON
RINGS, FAMILY PORTRAITS AND THE LIKE, MAY BE RECEIVED AS EVIDENCE OF
PEDIGREE.
WHAT DOES THE SECTION PROVE?

• Pedigree of a person may be proved by reputation or tradition existing in his family, or by


entries of family bibles, family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like even if it is hearsay evidence.
WHAT ARE ITS REQUISITES?

• a. The witness testifying thereto must be a member of the family, by consanguinity or affinity
or adoption, of the same family as the subject
• b. Such reputation or tradition must have existed in that family ante litem motam (previous to
the controversy)
EXAMPLE OF AN ANTE LITEM MOTAM UNDER
THIS SECTION?

• The person’s statement as to his date of birth and age, as he learned these from his parents or
relatives.
COMMON
REPUTATION
SECTION 43. COMMON REPUTATION. — COMMON REPUTATION. – COMMON
REPUTATION EXISTING PREVIOUS TO THE CONTROVERSY, AS TO BOUNDARIES OF
OR CUSTOMS AFFECTING LANDS IN THE COMMUNITY AND REPUTATION AS TO
EVENTS OF GENERAL HISTORY IMPORTANT TO THE COMMUNITY, OR RESPECTING
MARRIAGE OR MORAL CHARACTER, MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE. MONUMENTS
AND INSCRIPTIONS IN PUBLIC PLACES MAY BE RECEIVED AS EVIDENCE OF
COMMON REPUTATION.
WHAT DOES THE SECTION PROVE?

• a. As to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community


• b. Reputation as to events of general history important to the community
• c. Marriage
• d. Moral character
WHAT IS COMMON REPUTATION?

• It is the definite opinion of the community in which the fact to be proved is known or exists.
It means the general or substantially undivided reputation, as distinguished from a partial or
qualified one, although it need not be unanimous. Character refers to the inherent qualities of
a person, while reputation is the opinion of him by others; but, under this section, the
character of a person is permitted to be established by his common reputation.
EXAMPLE OF WHAT CAN BE PROVED?

• The reputation of a person should be that existing in the place of his residence, it may also be
that existing in the place where he is best known. Also, the character of a place as an opium
joint may be proved by its common reputation in the community.
RATIONALE FOR TAKING OUT “FACTS OF
PUBLIC OR GENERAL INTEREST”:
• The phrase is too vague to be of any useful application and the requirement that said facts
must be “more than thirty years old” further narrows the application.
RATIONALE FOR NEW AMENDMENT:

• Exception relating to land boundaries and land customs may be particularly useful in rural
communities where “general reputation about facts of community interest is generally
trustworthy.” The reputation is required to antedate the controversy, though antiquity is not a
prerequisite.
• On the substitution to “events of general history important to the community in which
located” similar also to use of reputation to establish boundaries – a need for evidence
because of likelihood that other evidence cannot be obtained, and reliability because the
testimony represents the consensus of the community. As contrast to matters affecting lands,
the reputation need not have arisen before the controversy.
• The event must have been “important to the community or state or nation in which located”
to ensure reliability since “there is high probability that the matter underwent general scrutiny
as the community reputation was formed.” It is also important because of the danger that
jurors will be unduly impressed by this form of evidence which unlike the usual oral form of
evidence relating to boundaries will often consist of a written record.
• Usually evidence admissible under this exception could frequently come under ancient
documents or business record exception, or judicial notice.
FERRER, ET. AL., VS. INCHAUSTI, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 12993 -OCTOBER 28, 1918
DOCTRINE:
• Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence
of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts;
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
• The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the
occurrence of those events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to the
defect attributed to it.
CITY OF MANILA VS. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 1284 -NOV. 10, 1905
DOCTRINE:
• Testimony of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the
city does not constitute common reputation. The "common reputation" should be
equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish
the presumption referred to.
HEARSAY RULE EXCEPTION
PART OF RES GESTAE
RULE 130 SEC. 42 (45)
SECTION 44. PART OF RES GESTAE

STATEMENTS MADE BY A PERSON WHILE A STARTLING OCCURRENCE IS TAKING PLACE OR


IMMEDIATELY PRIOR OR SUBSEQUENT THERETO UNDER THE STRESS OF EXCITEMENT
CAUSED BY THE OCCURRENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES THEREOF, MAY BE
GIVEN IN EVIDENCE AS PART OF RES GESTAE. SO, ALSO, STATEMENTS ACCOMPANYING AN
EQUIVOCAL ACT MATERIAL TO THE ISSUE, AND GIVING IT A LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE, MAY BE
RECEIVED AS PART OF THE RES GESTAE.
RES GESTAE LITERALLY MEANS, “THINGS
DONE”, AND MAY REFER TO:
1. Spontaneous statements
• Statements in connection with a startling occurrence relating to that fact and in effect
forming part thereof; or
2. Verbal Acts
• Statements accompanying an equivocal act, on the theory that they are the verbal parts of the
act to be explained.
Spontaneous statements Verbal acts
The principal act or res gestae, must be The principal act or res gestae, must
a startling occurrence be equivocal

The statements were made before the Such act must be material to the issue
declarant had the opportunity to
contrive

REQUISITES The statements must refer to the


occurrence in question and its attending
The statements must accompany the
equivocal act
circumstances
The statements must be spontaneous The statements give a legal
significance to the equivocal act

Statements may be made prior, during, Verbal act must be contemporaneous


or immediately after the startling with or accompany the equivocal act.
occurrence.
IN ORDER TO BE ADMISSIBLE, THE
STATEMENT MUST:

• 1. Be spontaneous;
• 2. Made while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent;
• 3. Relates to the circumstances of the startling occurrence; and
• 4. Must be involuntary and simultaneously wrung from the witness by the impact of the
occurrence. (People v. Tulagan)
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RES GESTAE AND
DYING DECLARATIONS
• However, if both elements for res gestae and dying declarations are present, the statements may be
admitted as both.
• Generally, statements or acts MUST be made while the declarant is under the immediate influence of
the startling occurrence. Hence, done immediately prior, during, or subsequent to the events.
• Except, in cases where:
• • The declarant is unconscious; or
• • The declarant did not have the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story.
• So, even if the statement was made hours after the startling occurrence, it will still be admissible. (People
v. Berame)
• Statements or outcries as part of res gestae are admissible when they:
• • Establish the identity of the assailant (People v. Alban);
• • Prove the complicity of another person in the crime (US v. David); and
• • Establish an admission of liability on the part of the accused (People v. Reyes).
AMENDMENT

• The addition of the words “UNDER THE STRESS OF EXCITEMENT CAUSED BY


THE OCCURRENCE” is designed to underscore the rationale for the hearsay exception –
the elimination of the declarant’s reflective capacity, because the statement was made under
the stress of excitement. The amendment is to emphasize that the statement must really be a
spontaneous reaction to the exciting occurrence and that courts should be conscious that the
time interval between the startling occurrence and the statement should not be long enough
to permit reflective thought.
PEOPLE V. LUNGAYAN
162 SCRA 100 | JUNE 10, 1988 | GANCAYCO, J.
• DOCTRINE:
• For a statement to be part of the res gestae, it must not only be spontaneous but also be
made at a time when there was no opportunity to concoct or develop a story.
PEOPLE V. PUTIAN
74 SCRA 133 | NOVEMBER 29, 1976 | AQUINO, J.
DOCTRINE:
• Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the
expectation of a certain and impending death, and for this reason, is not admissible as a dying
declaration, such declaration can fall squarely in the rule on res gestae.
PEOPLE V. TOLENTINO
218 SCRA 337 | FEBRUARY 2, 1993 | NOCON, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• For the res gestae rule to apply, the following must be present: 1) that the principal act, the
res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) that the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and 3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence
in question and their immediately attending circumstances.
DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE V. RADIO
MINDANAO NETWORK
G.R. NO. 147039 | JANUARY 27, 2006 | AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• Although statements were made by bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said
however, that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they
had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood.
PEOPLE V. FELICIANO
G. R. NO. 196735 | MAY 5, 2014 | LEONEN, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• Bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety
of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore,
must be given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
PEOPLE V. ESTIBAL G. R. NO. 208749 | NOVEMBER 26,
2014 | REYES, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• Unless the prosecution succeeded in invoking res gestae, their testimonies must be dismissed
as hearsay, since AAA’s statements were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with
the constitutional right of the accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.
ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS RULE 130,
SECTION 45
Section 45. Records of regularly conducted business activity. - A memorandum, report, record or
data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by writing, typing,
electronic, optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of
information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a
business activity, and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence. (43a)
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE AMENDMENTS

• The existing Section 43 on “Entries in the course of business” has had little practical value
because of the unreasonable requirements that the entrant must be dead or unable to testify
and that he must have personal knowledge of the matter recorded. As noted by the
Sub—Committee that drafted the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “These stringent
requirements work undue hardship on the litigants and may render the current exception
useless.” There is no reason why the exception relating to the entries in the regular course of
business as provided in Rule 8, Section 1, rules on Electronic Evidence should not be applied
to paper based or non-electronic documents. A liberalized exception for business records is a
practical necessity in the modern business environment
WHAT IS THE RULE ON ENTRIES MADE IN THE
COURSE OF BUSINESS?
• They maybe received as prima facie evidence and maybe admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MONET’S EXPORT, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 184971, APRIL 19, 2010
TOPIC: ENTRIES IN MADE IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
DOCTRINE:
• The original documents need not be presented in evidence when it is numerous, cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result
OFFICIAL RECORDS
RULE 130, SECTION 44
• Section 46. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his or her duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. (44a)
WHAT IS THE RULE ON ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL
RECORDS?
• They maybe received as prima facie evidence and maybe admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR SUCH ENTRIES TO
BE ADMISSIBLE?
• In order to be admissible, it is necessary that:
a. The entries were made by a public officer in the performance of his duties or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
b. The entrant had personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts were acquired by him
from reports made by persons under a legal duty to submit the same; and
c. Such entries were duly entered in a regular manner in the official records.
Note:
Entries in official records may be proved and evidenced in the manner provided by Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132.
WHAT MAY BE CONSIDERED AS AN OFFICIAL
RECORD?
• An official record may be a register, a cash book, or an official return or certificate.
SPS. AFRICA V. CALTEX (PHIL.) INC. ET AL.
G. R. NO. L-12986, MARCH 31, 1966
TOPIC: ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
DOCTRINE:
• The three requisites to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule are: (a) that the entry
was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that
it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired
by him personally or through official information.
PEOPLE V. LEONES
G.R. NO. L-48727, SEPTEMBER 30, 1982
TOPIC: ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
DOCTRINE:
• Written entries in the clinical case record are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,
the said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in
the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law.
MANALO V. ROBLES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
99 PHIL 729
RULING:
• The Court ruled that the evidence is admissible. A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a
public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law and forming part of official
records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The sheriff's making the return need
not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.
• The Court also added that the law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes
they will discharge their several trust with accuracy and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they do
in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken of their public duty may
be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and
circumstances of each a case may appear to require.
PEOPLE V. CABUANG
217 SCRA 675 (1996)
RULING:
• The Court ruled that Evelyn correctly identified the suspects.
• The failure of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the doers of the horrific rape,
killing and robbery of Maria Victoria the first time she was questioned by the police, does not
adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly settled case law that the delay of a witness in
revealing to the police authority what he or she may know about a crime does not, by itself,
render the witness' testimony unworthy of belief.
• It remains only to note that entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of
performance of official duty are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. Testimony
given in open court during the trial is commonly much more lengthy and detailed than the
brief entries made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on a police
report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence gathered in the course of the
police investigation and presented 681 in court. In the case at bar, we conclude that
prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera did positively and clearly identify Modesto Cabuang and
Nardo Matabang as among those who had raped and killed and robbed the hapless Maria
Victoria Parana.
PEOPLE V. SAN GABRIEL
253 SCRA 84 (1996)
RULING:
• The Court ruled that the Advanced Information Sheet should not be considered.
• The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be
incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of
suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that 683 pertain to the subject. It is
understandable that the testimony during the trial would be lengthier and more detailed than
the matters stated in the police blotter.
• Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by the defense
during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the
document must fail since the court cannot consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.
• Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police officer only after
interviewing Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the
attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to present Camba
on the part of the accused should militate against his cause.
• Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur:
1. The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
2. It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and,
3. The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
• Applied in the case at bar: The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception
to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible.
COMMERCIAL LISTS
RULE 130 SECTION 47
• Section 47. Commercial lists and the like. -Evidence of statements of matters of
interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or
other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (45)
PNOC SHIPPING VS. CA
299 SCRA 402 (1999)
RULING:
• The Court ruled not to admit the price quotations as evidence.
• It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists and the like"
under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals
considered private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It added, however, that these exhibits
should be admitted in evidence "until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence" because "the reception of these documentary
exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial court." Under
Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of
interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same
occupation.
• In this case, the price quotations are not considered to be commercial lists. They are not
published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter.
Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of "commercial lists" as
these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional
need and relied upon in the work of the occupation."
MERALCO VS. QUISUMBING
G.R. NO. 127598
RULING:
• The Court ruled that it cannot be admitted.
• Section 45 of Rule 130 states that:
Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon
by them therein.
• Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted only "if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein." In this case, the report is simply a newspaper account and not even a
commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for
purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody
testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in
their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a
person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent
extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible.
LEARNED TREATISES

• Sec. 48. Learned treatises. -A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of


history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his or her
profession or calling as expert in the subject
• In this section, a published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law,
science, or art is admissible as long as:
1. The court takes judicial notice, or
2. An expert witness testifies that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical, or
pamphlet is recognized in his or her profession or calling as an expert in the subject
PAJE VS. CASINO
G.R. NO. 207257
RULING:
• The Court ruled not to admit the evidence.
• Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness
knows of his other personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness’ own
perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned
from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned.
This is known as the hearsay rule. Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the
general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements. There
are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which are learned
treatises under Section 46 of Rule 130:
"SEC. 46. Learned treatises. -A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein
if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert in the subject.“
• The alleged scientific studies mentioned in the Petition cannot be classified as learned treatises.
Petitioners cited various scientific studies or articles and websites culled from the internet. However,
the said scientific studies and articles including the alleged Key Observations and Recommendations
on the EIS of the Proposed RPE Project by Rex Victor O. Cruz (Exhibit "DDDDD") attached to
the Petition, were not testified to by an expert witness, and are basically hearsay in nature and cannot
be given probative weight. The article purportedly written by Rex Victor O. Cruz was not even
signed by the said author, which fact was confirmed by Palatino. Petitioners’ witness, Lacbain,
admitted that he did not personally conduct any study on the environmental or health effects of a
coal-fired power plant, but only attended seminars and conferences pertaining to climate change; and
that the scientific studies mentioned in the penultimate whereas clause of Resolution No. 2011-149
(Exhibit "AAAAA") of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales is based on what he read on the
internet, seminars he attended and what he heard from unnamed experts in the field of
environmental protection.
PRIOR TESTIMONY
RULE 130, SECTIONS 47 – 50,
RULES ON EVIDENCE RULES ON EXAMINATION OF A
CHILD WITNESS
Prior Testimony
Section 49. Testimony or deposition in a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or OUT OF THE PHILLIPINES OR CANNOT, WITH DUE
DILIGENCE, BE FOUND THEREIN, OR IS UNAVAILABLE OR OTHERWISE
UNABLE TO TESTIFY, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse
party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
I. CONCEPT:

• A witness is sought to be presented in a present case but he is dead, unable to testify such
that in lieu of his personal testimony, what is presented is his testimony in a prior proceeding.
II. REQUIREMENTS

A. The witness is dead or unable to testify. The witness may be suffering from illness or from a
mental disqualification such as having become insane or loss of memory due to age. His
whereabouts is unknown despite diligent efforts to locate him or he was prevented by a party from
appearing as witness, either by force or by deceit or by persuasion. It does not cover a situation
where the witness refuses to come to court.
B. B. Identity of the parties. This may refer to identical parties or the parties are their successor in
interest or representatives
C. C. Identity of issues. The issue or matter, in which the testimony of the witness is sought is
common to both cases, even if there are other issues involved or that the form of action is
different
Examples of cases where there is a common issue:
i. ejectment and recovery of right of ownership as both would involve the question of who has
physical possession
ii. an action for damages based on an act or omission which was the subject of a prior criminal case
such as killing, slander or libel or estafa.
D. Opportunity for cross examination by the opponent in the first proceeding
a. If the opponent, through his act or negligence, did not cross examine, or lost the right, the
rule still applies. Example: the defendant was declared in default and plaintiff then
presented evidence ex parte
b. b. Thus if the proceedings in the prior administrative cases was summary and not
adversarial/confrontational but was decided based on affidavits and position papers, the
rule does not apply
III. HOW TO PRESENT:

• Present the Transcript of Testimony which the parties may stipulate on.
• Requisites for applicability:
a) The person making the hearsay statement is credible;
b) There must be “substantial basis” for crediting the hearsay (NOT to be confused with
“substantial evidence”)
TAN VS CA,
G.R. NO. L-22793. MAY 16, 1967
DOCTRINE:
• Subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since testifying at the
first does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave cause,
almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 152375, DECEMBER 16, 2011
DOCTRINE:
• While a former testimony or deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule,
the classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally
conceded. A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130
explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the
adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in
the prior proceeding.
RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
A.M. NO. 004-07-SC
Applicability
• This rule shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused
of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal
proceedings involving child witnesses.
Objectives
• To create and maintain an environment that will allow children to give reliable and complete
evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and
facilitate the ascertainment of truth.
Child Witness
• A "child witness" is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of
eighteen (18) years. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over eighteen (18) years but is
found by the court as unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.
Guardian ad litem
a. The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a victim of, accused of, or a
witness to a crime to promote the best interests of the child. In making the appointment,
the court shall consider the background of the guardian ad litem and his familiarity with
the judicial process, social service programs, and child development, giving preference to
the parents of the child, if qualified. The guardian ad litem may be a member of the
Philippine Bar. A person who is a witness in any proceeding involving the child cannot be
appointed as a guardian ad litem.
A "guardian ad litem" is a person appointed by the court where the case is pending for a child who is
a victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to protect the best interests of the said child.
b. The guardian ad litem:
1) Shall attend all interviews, depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings in which a child participates;
2) Shall make recommendations to the court concerning the welfare of the child;
3) Shall have access to all reports, evaluations, and records necessary to effectively advocate for the child,
except privileged communications;
4) Shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of resources and special services to the child;
5) Shall explain, in language understandable to the child, all legal proceedings, including police
investigations, in which the child is involved;
(6) Shall assist the child and his family in coping with the emotional effects of crime and subsequent
criminal or non-criminal proceedings in which the child is involved;
(7) May remain with the child while the child waits to testify;
(8) May interview witnesses; and
(9) May request additional examinations by medical or mental health professionals if there is a
compelling need therefor.
(c) The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings but shall not participate in the trial.
However, he may file motions pursuant to sections 9, 10, 25, 26, 27 and 31(c). If the guardian ad litem
is a lawyer, he may object during trial that questions asked of the child are not appropriate to his
developmental level.
(d) The guardian ad litem may communicate concerns regarding the child to the court through an
officer of the court designated for that purpose.
(e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding concerning any information, statement, or
opinion received from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem, unless the court finds it
necessary to promote the best interests of the child.
(f) The guardian ad litem shall be presumed to have acted in good faith in compliance with his duties
described in sub-section (b).
COMPETENCY

• Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct a competency
examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt
exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity. - A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of
competency examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination.
(b) Burden of proof. - To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies
on the party challenging his competence.
(c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the following are allowed to attend a competency
examination:
(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;
(2) The counsel for the parties;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) One or more support persons for the child; and
(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his absence.
(d) Conduct of examination. - Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only
by the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his
discretion, ask the child.
(e) Developmentally appropriate questions. - The questions asked at the competency
examination shall be appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be
related to the issues at trial; and shall focus on the ability of the child to remember,
communicate, distinguish between truth and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify
truthfully.
(f) Continuing duty to assess competence. - The court has the duty of continuously assessing
the competence of the child throughout his testimony.
OATH OR AFFIRMATION

• Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.
EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS

• The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in
open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
• The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may,
however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.
INTERPRETER FOR CHILD. -

(a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino language or is unable to
communicate in said languages due to his developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other
similar reason, an interpreter whom the child can understand and who understands the child
may be appointed by the court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child.
(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only person who can serve as an
interpreter for the child, he shall not be disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of the
child. The interpreter, however, who is also a witness, shall testify ahead of the child.
(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a true and accurate interpretation
FACILITATOR TO POSE QUESTIONS TO CHILD

(a) The court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a facilitator if it determines that the child is
unable to understand or respond to questions asked. The facilitator may be a child 704 psychologist,
psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent, or relative.
(b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for the parties shall pose questions to the
child only through the facilitator. The questions shall either be in the words used by counsel or, if the
child is not likely to understand the same, in words that are comprehensible to the child and which
convey the meaning intended by counsel.
(c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the child according to the
meaning intended by counsel.
SUPPORT PERSONS

• A "support person" is a person chosen by the child to accompany him to testify at or attend a
judicial proceeding or deposition to provide emotional support for him.
(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a deposition shall have the right to be
accompanied by one or two persons of his/her own choosing to provide him emotional
support.
(1)Both support persons shall remain within the view of the child during his testimony.
(2) One of the support persons may accompany the child to the witness stand, provided the support
person does not completely obscure the child from the view of the opposing party, judge, or hearing
officer.
(3) The court may allow the support person to hold the hand of the child or take other appropriate
steps to provide emotional support to the child in the course of the proceedings.
(4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the child during his
testimony.
(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness, the court may disapprove the
choice if it is sufficiently established that the attendance of the support person during the
testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of
the testimony of the child.
(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the court, his testimony shall be
presented ahead of the testimony of the child.
WAITING AREA FOR CHILD WITNESSES

• The courts are encouraged to provide a waiting area for children that is separate from waiting
areas used by other persons. The waiting area for children should be furnished so as to make
a child comfortable.
COURTROOM ENVIRONMENT

• To create a more comfortable environment for the child, the court may, in its discretion, direct and
supervise the location, movement and deportment of all persons in the courtroom including the 705
parties, their counsel, child, witnesses, support persons, guardian ad litem, facilitator, and court
personnel. The child may be allowed to testify from a place other than the witness chair. The witness
chair or other place from which the child testifies may be turned to facilitate his testimony but the
opposing party and his counsel must have a frontal or profile view of the child during the testimony
of the child. The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies may also be rearranged to
allow the child to see the opposing party and his counsel, if he chooses to look at them, without
turning his body or leaving the witness stand. The judge need not wear his judicial robe.
• Nothing in this section or any other provision of law, except official in-court identification
provisions, shall be construed to require a child to look at the accused.
• Accommodations for the child under this section need not be supported by a finding of
trauma to the child.
TESTIMONY DURING APPROPRIATE HOURS

• The court may order that the testimony of the child should be taken during a time of day
when the child is well-rested.
RECESS DURING TESTIMONY

• The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief while undergoing direct, cross,
re-direct, and re-cross examinations as often as necessary depending on his developmental
level.
TESTIMONIAL AIDS

• The court shall permit a child to use dolls, anatomically-correct dolls, puppets, drawings,
mannequins, or any other appropriate demonstrative device to assist him in his testimony.
EMOTIONAL SECURITY ITEM

• While testifying, a child shall be allowed to have an item of his own choosing such as a
blanket, toy, or doll.
APPROACHING THE WITNESS

• The court may prohibit a counsel from approaching a child if it appears that the child is
fearful of or intimidated by the counsel.
MODE OF QUESTIONING

• The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to


(1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth,
(2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, 706
(3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and
(4) avoid waste of time.

• The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
LEADING QUESTIONS

• The court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will
further the interests of justice.
OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS

• Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse,


frighten, or intimidate the child.
CORROBORATION

• Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by


itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the
standard of proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.
EXCLUDING THE PUBLIC

• When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons,
including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be
made to protect the right to privacy of the child or if the court determines on the record that
requiring the child to testify in open court would cause psychological harm to him, hinder the
ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment,
fear, or timidity. In making its order, the court shall consider the developmental level of the child, the
nature of the crime, the nature of his testimony regarding the crime, his relationship to the accused
and to persons attending the trial, his desires, and the interests of his parents or legal guardian. The
court may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced
during trial is of such character as to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also,
on motion of the accused, exclude the public from trial, except court personnel and the counsel of
the parties.
PERSONS PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING AND
LEAVING COURTROOM
• The court may order that persons attending the trial shall not enter or leave the courtroom
during the testimony of the child.
LIVE-LINK TELEVISION TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL CASES
WHERE THE CHILD IS A VICTIM OR A WITNESS
(a) The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the testimony of the
child be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by live-link
television.
Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult the prosecutor or
counsel and shall defer to the judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding the necessity of applying
for an order. In case the guardian ad litem is convinced that the decision of the prosecutor or counsel
not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma, he himself may apply for the order.
The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5) days before the trial date, unless the court
finds on the record that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable.
(b) The court may motu proprio hear and determine, with notice to the parties, the need for taking the
testimony of the child through live-link television.
(c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some comfortable place other than the
courtroom, in the presence of the support person, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and counsel for the
parties. The questions of the judge shall not be related to the issues at trial but to the feelings of the
child about testifying in the courtroom.
(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused, whose presence or conduct causes fear to
the child.
(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use of live-link television and stating the
reasons therefor. It shall consider the following factors:
(1) The age and level of development of the child;
(2) His physical and mental health, including any mental or physical disability;
(3) Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced by him;
(4) The nature of the alleged abuse;
(5) Any threats against the child;
(6) His relationship with the accused or adverse party;
(7) His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in court or elsewhere;
(8) His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was discussed with him by parents or
professionals;
(9) Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days prior to testifying;
(10) Testimony of expert or lay witnesses;
(11) The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of the members of his family regarding the
events about which he will testify; and
(12) Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and formalities of court procedure.
(f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if there is
a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the
708 accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. The trauma must be of a kind
which would impair the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child.
(g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link television:
(1) The child shall testify in a room separate from the courtroom in the presence of the guardian ad
litem; one or both of his support persons; the facilitator and interpreter, if any; a court officer
appointed by the court; persons necessary to operate the closed-circuit television equipment; and
other persons whose presence are determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and
well-being of the child;
(2) The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the parties shall be in the courtroom. The
testimony of the child shall be transmitted by live-link television into the courtroom for viewing and
hearing by the judge, prosecutor, counsel for the parties, accused, victim, and the public unless
excluded.
(3) If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at trial, the court may allow the child to enter
the courtroom for the limited purpose of identifying the accused, or the court may allow the child to
identify the accused by observing the image of the latter on a television monitor.
(4) The court may set other conditions and limitations on the taking of the testimony that it finds just
and appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the child.
(h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved on videotape, digital disc, or other similar
devices which shall be made part of the court record and shall be subject to a protective order
as provided in section 31(b).
SCREENS, ONE-WAY MIRRORS, AND OTHER
DEVICES TO SHIELD CHILD FROM ACCUSED
(a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the chair of the child or
that a screen or other device be placed in the courtroom in such a manner that the child cannot
see the accused while testifying. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this
section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third
paragraphs of section 25(a) of this Rule. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons and
describing the approved courtroom arrangement.
(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the accused while testifying in the
courtroom, the courtroom shall be arranged to enable the accused to view the child.
VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION

(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply for an order that a deposition be taken of
the testimony of the child and that it be recorded and preserved on videotape. Before the guardian ad
litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to
the second and third paragraphs of section 25(a)
(b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in open court at trial, it shall issue an order
that the deposition of the child be taken and preserved by videotape.
(c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a child. Objections to deposition testimony
or evidence, or parts thereof, and the grounds for the objection shall be stated and shall be ruled upon
at the time of the taking of the deposition. The other persons who may be permitted to be present at
the proceeding are:
(1) The prosecutor;
(2) The defense counsel;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) The accused, subject to sub-section (e);
(5) Other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and
well-being of the child;
(6) One or both of his support persons, the facilitator and interpreter, if any;
(7) The court stenographer; and
(8) Persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment.
(d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right to counsel and to confront and crossexamine the
child, shall not be violated during the deposition.
(e) If the order of the court is based on evidence that the child is unable to testify in the physical presence of the
accused, the court may direct the latter to be excluded from the room in which the deposition is conducted. In
case of exclusion of the accused, the court shall order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link
television in accordance with section 25 of this Rule. If the accused is excluded from the deposition, it is not
necessary that the child be able to view an image of the accused.
(f) The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and stenographically recorded. The videotape and the
stenographic notes shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court where the case is pending for safekeeping and
shall be made a part of the record.
(g) The court may set other conditions on the taking of the deposition that it finds just and appropriate,
taking into consideration the best interests of the child, the constitutional rights of the accused, and
other relevant factors.
(h) The videotaped deposition and stenographic notes shall be subject to a protective order as provided
in section 31(b).
(i) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unable to testify for a reason stated in section
25(f) of this Rule, or is unavailable for any reason described in section 4(c), Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the court may admit into evidence the videotaped deposition of the child in lieu of
his testimony at the trial. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons therefor.
(j) After the original videotaping but before or during trial, any party may file any motion for
additional videotaping on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The court may order an
additional videotaped deposition to receive the newly discovered evidence.
HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN CHILD ABUSE CASES

• A statement made by a child describing any act or attempted act of child abuse, not otherwise
admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in evidence in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding subject to the following rules:
(a)Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall make known to the adverse party the
intention to offer such statement and its particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to object. If the child is
available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party, require the child to be present at the presentation
of the hearsay statement for cross-examination by the adverse party. When the child is unavailable, the fact of
such circumstance must be proved by the proponent.
(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the court shall consider the time, content and
circumstances thereof which provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall consider the following factors:
(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;
(2) The general character of the declarant child;
(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;
(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant child and witness;
(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant child;
(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of 0000.the declarant child is remote; and
(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no reason to suppose the
declarant child misrepresented the involvement of the accused.
(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following situations:
(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or will be exposed
to severe psychological injury; or
(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure
his attendance by process or other reasonable means.

(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if
corroborated by other admissible evidence.
ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEOTAPED AND AUDIOTAPED
IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATIVE OR DISCLOSURE INTERVIEWS
IN CHILD ABUSE CASES
• The court may admit videotape and audiotape in-depth investigative or disclosure interviews
as evidence, under the following conditions:
(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds and under conditions established
under section 28 (c).
(b) The interview of the child was conducted by duly trained members of a multidisciplinary
team or representatives of law enforcement or child protective services in situations where child
abuse is suspected so as to determine whether child abuse occurred.
(c) The party offering the videotape or audiotape must prove that:
1) the videotape or audiotape discloses the identity of all individuals present and at all times includes
their images and voices;
2) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make a
particular statement or is clearly shown to be the statement of the child and not the product of
improper suggestion;
3) the videotape and audiotape machine or device was capable of recording testimony;
4) the person operating the device was competent to operate it;
5) the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct; and
6) it has been duly preserved.
• The individual conducting the interview of the child shall be available at trial for examination
by any party. Before the videotape or audiotape is offered in evidence, all parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to view or listen to it and shall be furnished a copy of a written
transcript of the proceedings.
• The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or audiotaped as required by this
section shall not by itself constitute a basis to exclude from evidence out-of-court statements
or testimony of the child. It may, however, be considered in determining the reliability of the
statements of the child describing abuse.
SEXUAL ABUSE SHIELD RULE

(a) Inadmissible evidence. - The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal
proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.

(b) Exception. - Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to
prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other
physical evidence shall be admissible. A party intending to offer such evidence must:
(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically describing the evidence and
stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires a different time for
filing or permits filing during trial; and
(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three (3) days before the hearing of
the motion.
• Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in chambers and afford the child,
his guardian ad litem, the parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The motion and
the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a protective order
set forth in section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the hearing in chambers except
with his consent.
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND SAFETY

(a) Confidentiality of records. - Any record regarding a child shall be confidential and kept
under seal. Except upon written request and order of the court, a record shall only be
released to the following:
(1) Members of the court staff for administrative use;
(2) The prosecuting attorney;
(3) Defense counsel;
(4) The guardian ad litem;
(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement agencies; and (6) Other persons as determined by
the court.
(b) Protective order. - Any videotape or audiotape of a child that is part of the court record
shall be under a protective order that provides as follows:
(1) Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel, their expert witness, and the guardian ad
litem.
(2) No tape, or any portion thereof, shall be divulged by any person mentioned in sub-section (a) to
any other person, except as necessary for the trial.
(3) No person shall be granted access to the tape, its transcription or any part thereof unless he signs
a written affirmation that he has received and read a copy of the protective order; that he submits to
the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the protective order; and that in case of violation thereof,
he will be subject to the contempt power of the court.
(4) Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof made available to the parties, their counsel, and
respective agents shall bear the following cautionary notice:
• "This object or document and the contents thereof are subject to a protective order issued by
the court in (case title) , (case number) . They shall not be examined, 713 inspected, read,
viewed, or copied by any person, or disclosed to any person, except as provided in the
protective order. No additional copies of the tape or any of its portion shall be made, given,
sold, or shown to any person without prior court order. Any person violating such protective
order is subject to the contempt power of the court and other penalties prescribed by law."
(5) No tape shall be given, loaned, sold, or shown to any person except as ordered by the court.
(6) Within thirty (30) days from receipt, all copies of the tape and any transcripts thereof shall be
returned to the clerk of court for safekeeping unless the period is extended by the court on motion
of a party.
(7) This protective order shall remain in full force and effect until further order of the court.

(c) Additional protective orders. - The court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, the
child, his parents, legal guardian, or the guardian ad litem, issue additional orders to protect the
privacy of the child.
(d) Publication of identity contemptuous. - Whoever publishes or causes to be published in any
format the name, address, telephone number, school, or other identifying information of a child
who is or is alleged to be a victim or accused of a crime or a witness thereof, or an immediate
family of the child shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
(e) Physical safety of child; exclusion of evidence. - A child has a right at any court proceeding
not to testify regarding personal identifying information, including his/her name, address,
telephone number, school, and other information that could endanger his physical safety or his
family. The court may, however, require the child to testify regarding personal identifying
information in the interest of justice.
(f) Destruction of videotapes and audiotapes. - Any videotape or audiotape of a child produced
under the provisions of this Rule or otherwise made part of the court record shall be destroyed
after five (5) years have elapsed from the date of entry of judgment.
(g) Records of youthful offender. - Where a youthful offender has been charged before any city
or provincial prosecutor or before any municipal judge and the charges have been ordered
dropped, all the records of the case shall be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed
directly or indirectly to anyone for any purpose whatsoever.
• Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or dismisses the case or
commits him to an institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to Chapter 3 of P. D. No. 603,
all the records of his case shall also be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone except to determine if a defendant may have his sentence suspended under
Article 192 of P. D. No. 603 or if he may be granted probation under the provisions of P. D. No.
968 or to enforce his civil liability, if said liability has been imposed in the criminal action. The
youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law to be guilty of perjury or
of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of 714 his failure to acknowledge the case or recite
any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him for any purpose.
• "Records" within the meaning of this sub-section shall include those which may be in the
files of the National Bureau of Investigation and with any police department or government
agency which may have been involved in the case. (Art. 200, P. D. No. 603)
APPLICABILITY OF ORDINARY RULES

• The provisions of the Rules of Court on deposition, conditional examination of witnesses,


and evidence shall be applied in a suppletory character.
EFFECTIVITY

• This Rule shall take effect on December 15, 2000 following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
CATCH ALL:
RESIDUAL EXCEPTION
• SEC. 50 RESIDUAL EXCEPTION – A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exception, having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is
admissible if the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (b) the statement has more probative on the point for which it is offered that
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (c)
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will be best served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent makes known to the party, sufficiently in
advance of the hearing, or by the pre-trial stage in the case of a trial of the main case, to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent’s
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
the declarant.
COMMENT BY THE SC
 
Rather than add a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule, the Sub-Committee opted to
adopt the residual or catch all exception provided in rules 803 (24) and 804 (b)(5) of the
FRE.
 
The catchall exception stemmed from the case of Dallas County vs. Commercial Union
Assurance Co. LTD (286 F2nd 388 [5th Circ.1961]) which admitted an old newspaper
article to prove that fire occurred at the court tower during construction. Although not
falling under any of the recognized hearsay exceptions, the news article was admitted
because of “circumstantial; guarantee of trustworthiness based on the fact that the
individual reporting the fire had no motive to falsify and that a false report of a matter so
easily checked by readers of the paper would have subjected the reporter to considerable
embarrassment.
 
The Rules Committee opted for pre-trial rather than the trial stage to limit the residual
exceptions
DALLAS COUNTY, APPELLANT,V. COMMERCIAL
UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,
APPELLEES, 286 F.2D 388 (5TH CIR. 1961)
 
F:

The clock tower of the Dallas County Courthouse at Selma, Alabama, commenced to lean, made
loud cracking and popping noises, then fell, and telescoped into the courtroom.
Fortunately, the collapse of the tower took place on a Sunday morning; no one was injured, but
damage to the courthouse exceeded $100,000.
An examination of the tower debris showed the presence of charcoal and charred timbers.
The State Toxicologist, called in by Dallas County, reported the char was evidence that lightning
struck the courthouse.
Later, several residents of Selma reported that a bolt of lightning struck the courthouse July 2, 1957.
On this information, Dallas County concluded that a lightning bolt had hit the building causing the
collapse of the clock tower five days later. Dallas County carried insurance for loss to its
courthouse caused by fire or lightning.
The insurers' engineers and investigators found that the courthouse collapsed of its own weight.
They reported that the courthouse had not been struck by lightning; that lightning could not
have caused the collapse of the tower; that the collapse of the tower was caused by structural
weaknesses attributable to a faulty design, poor construction, gradual deterioration of the
structure, and overloading brought about by remodeling and the recent installation of an
air-conditioning system, part of which was constructed over the courtroom trusses.
In their opinion, the char was the result of a fire in the courthouse tower and roof that must
have occurred many, many years before July 2, 1957. The insurers denied liability.
The County sued its insurers in the Circuit Court of Dallas County.
As many of the suits as could be removed, seven, were removed to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama, and were consolidated for trial. The case went to
the jury on one issue: did lightning cause the collapse of the clock tower?
The County produced witnesses who testified they saw lightning strike the clock tower; the
insurers produced witnesses who testified an examination of the debris showed that lightning
did not strike the clock tower. Some witnesses said the char was fresh and smelled smoky; other
witnesses said it was obviously old and had no fresh smoky smell at all.
Both sides presented a great mass of engineering testimony bearing on the design, construction,
overload or lack of overload. All of this was for the jury to evaluate. The jury chose to believe
the insurers' witnesses and brought in a verdict for the defendants.
During the trial the defendants introduced a copy of the Morning Times of Selma for June 9, 1901.
This issue carried an unsigned article describing a fire that occurred at two in the morning of June
9, 1901, while the courthouse was still under construction. The article stated, in part: "The
unfinished dome of the County's new courthouse was in flames at the top, and * * * soon fell in.
The fire was soon under control and the main building was saved. * * *"
The insurers do not contend that the collapse of the tower resulted from unsound charred timbers
used in the repair of the building after the fire; they offered the newspaper account to show there
had been a fire long before 1957 that would account for charred timber in the clock tower.
As a predicate for introducing the newspaper in evidence, the defendants called to the stand the
editor of the Selma Times-Journal who testified that his publishing company maintains archives of
the published issues of the Times-Journal and of the Morning Times, its predecessor, and that the
archives contain the issue of the Morning Times of Selma for June 9, 1901, offered in evidence.
The plaintiff objected that the newspaper article was hearsay; that it was not a business record nor
an ancient document, nor was it admissible under any recognized exception to the hearsay
doctrine.
The trial judge admitted the newspaper as part of the records of the Selma Times-Journal.
ISSUE:
 
WON the newspaper report is admissible in evidence?
 
YES.

This appeal presents a single question — the admissibility in evidence of a newspaper to show
that the Dallas County Courthouse in Selma, Alabama, was damaged by fire in 1901. We hold that
the newspaper was admissible, and affirm the judgment below.
In matters of local interest, when the fact in question is of such a public nature it would be
generally known throughout the community, and when the questioned fact occurred so long ago
that the testimony of an eye-witness would probably be less trustworthy than a contemporary
newspaper account, a federal court, under Rule 43(a), may relax the exclusionary rules to the
extent of admitting the newspaper article in evidence. We do not characterize this newspaper as
a "business record", nor as an "ancient document", nor as any other readily identifiable and happily
tagged species of hearsay exception. It is admissible because it is necessary and trustworthy,
relevant and material, and its admission is within the trial judge's exercise of discretion in holding
the hearing within reasonable bounds.
OPINION RULE

• Sec. 51. General Rule. The opinion of a witness is not admissible except as indicated in the
rules. (Sec 51,)
I. CONCEPT OF AN OPINION AS EVIDENCE.

• This consists of the conclusion or inference of a witness on the existence or non-existence of


a fact in issue. The opinion maybe based on facts personally known to him or as relayed to
him by others.
II. EVIDENTIARY VALUE. GENERALLY OPINIONS ARE
NOT ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE:
a. The making of an opinion is the proper function of the court. The witness supplies the
facts and for the court to form an opinion based on these facts.
b. Opinions are not reliable because they are often influenced by his own personal bias,
ignorance, disregard of truth, socio-cultural background, or religion, and similar personal
factors. Thus there may be as many diverse opinions as there are witnesses.
c. The admission of opinions as evidence would open the floodgate to the presentation of
witnesses testifying on their opinion and not on facts.
III. EXAMPLES OF MATTERS ON WHICH OPINIONS
ARE IRRELEVANT
1. The final outcome of a case such as whether an accused should be acquitted or not, or who
should win a case, the amount of damages to be awarded to the winner
2. The question of care or negligence
3. Motives or reasons behind the action of a person, unless these were relayed to the witness
4. Valuation of properties
5. Cause of an event as being due to an accident, mechanical defect or human error or action of
nature
IV. EXCEPTIONS OR WHEN AN OPINION IS
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE
1. In case of expert opinions given by an expert.
2. In case of lay opinions on certain specific matters.
EXPERT OPINION

• Sec. 51. Opinion of an expert witness- The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training OR EDUCATION which he OR SHE is shown to
possess, maybe received in evidence.
1. By formal education such as in the case of lawyers, physicians, engineers, dentists, metallurgists, chemists
2. Through special training or seminars as in the case of ballisticians, weapons experts, finger print experts,
questioned-documents expert, masseurs, pilots
3. Through experience based on the exercise of a profession, trade, occupation, industry such as carpenters,
welders, machinists or mechanics, deep-well diggers
4. Through hobbies as in the case of stamp collectors, coin collectors, gun collectors, ornithologists,
photographers, animal breeders,
5. Through careful study and research as in the case of those who study old civilizations, or various aspects of
medicine
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EXPERT OPINION.
A. The subject of inquiry requires the opinion of an expert, or that the fact in issue requires the
opinion of an expert.
a. The use of an expert is becoming more frequent in order to explain how and why things
happened the way they did or didn’t happen the way they were supposed to, as in the following
cases:
i. In personal injury cases where physicians or surgeons are needed to prove the cause and
effect of certain injuries, so also economist as to the amount of income which was lost
ii. Products liability cases where there is need for reconstruction experts to prove the
defects in a certain products. Such as a car accident being due to factory defects in the
wheel, or a mechanical defect attributable to the manufacturer
iii. Actions relating to constructions where there is need for engineers and architects as
injury to a bridge which collapsed, or breach of contract in that the building was
constructed poorly
b. Traditional areas where expert opinion is used:
i. Questions involving handwriting
ii. Questioned documents
iii. Fingerprints
iv. Ballistics
v. Criminal cases involving injuries and death
vi. Drug cases
vii. Value of properties
viii. Blood groupings
ix. DNA Profiling
x. Forensics
B. The witness is shown to be an expert. It must be shown that the witness possesses certain
skills or knowledge and is therefore in a position to assist the court based on these skills or
knowledge
III. MANNER OF SHOWING THE WITNESS IS AN
EXPERT
1. By asking the adverse party to admit and stipulate that the witness is an expert. This is where
the witness regularly appears in court as an expert and is familiar to the court, or where the
witness occupies a position requiring certain knowledge or skill, as a medico legal officer.
2. Through the process known as “Qualifying the Expert”- propounding questions to the
witness concerning his background and eliciting answers from the witness showing he
possesses special knowledge or skill on the matter on which he is to testify
3. If the expertise is not admitted and the witness is not properly qualified, he is to be regarded
as an ordinary witness and may be objected in giving an opinion
IV. COMPONENTS OF QUALIFYING THE WITNESS

1. Show the general professional background. Questions propounded are directed to bring
about the facts concerning his:
a. education
b. degrees obtained
c. academic honors or scholarships granted or earned
d. licenses obtained
e. employment history, positions held, number of years in his position , promotions earned
2. Show the specific professional background. Questions asked are directed to bring out
answers to the specific facts or skills such as:
a. special trainings undergone
b. publications authored
c. membership in professional associations
d. as lecturer or speaker or resource person
e. how often he was called as a witness and
f. particular work experience which bear directly on the situation about which he is testifying
V. BASIS OF OPINION OR HOW TO ELICIT THE
EXPERT’S OPINION.
• A. Kind of Facts as Basis for the Opinion:
1. Facts personally known to the expert or about which he has firsthand knowledge.
2. Opinion maybe based on facts about which he has no personal knowledge or firsthand
knowledge, but are based either (i) on the report or facts as found by another expert who had
firsthand knowledge, provided the report is not hearsay or that the other expert had testified
and subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination or (ii) on facts already testified to by
witnesses and established by the records of the case
B. MANNER OF QUESTIONING

1. Where the basis are facts personally known to the expert, these facts must first be elicited
from the witness after he may be asked directly whether he has any opinion about them and to
state what his opinion is.
Example: The medico legal officer who conducted the autopsy will first be asked to state his findings
as to the nature, number, location, description, depth, trajectory, etc, of the wounds of the victim
after which he is asked to state his opinion as to the cause, weapon used, position of the victim and
assailant, cause of the death, etc..
2. By the use of “Hypothetical Questions” when the opinion is based on facts not personally
known to the witness.
a). It is a question which, for purposes of the answer, assumes certain facts which have counter parts
in the evidence, and asks the witness to give an opinion as to certain matters based on these facts.
Since the witness has no personal knowledge of these facts, he is told these facts and then is asked to
assume the facts to be true, and finally to give an opinion.
b). The question must incorporate or refer accurately to all the relevant facts- as proven- as basis for
asking the opinion
c). In case of physicians, the phraseology is usually thus: “Assuming all these facts to be true…
within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, what might have caused the injuries…?
3. The expert may be asked to state that his opinion is supported by learned treaties or shared
by others in his class.
VI. WEIGHT OF EXPERT OPINION

1. Courts are not bound as the opinions do not produce conclusive effect but are regarded as
persuasive and advisory which the court may or may not consider.
2. Opinions are to be treated on the same level as any other evidence.
3. Factors to be considered in giving weight, or points to show the opinion is of no weight:
a. The qualification of witness:
i. The degree of learning and academic background
ii. The experience, professional standing and training, or his being abreast with the latest
developments
b. The reliability of the opinion:
i. The relative objectivity of the witness such as the presence
or absence of personal or professional bias or motive; and
ii. the degree of concordance of his opinion with the facts
proven or the basis and logic of his conclusions
OPINION OF ORDINARY WITNESS

• Sec. 53. Opinion of ordinary witnesses- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding-
(a) The identity of a person about whom he OR SHE has adequate knowledge
(b) A handwriting with which he OR SHE has sufficient familiarity
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he OR SHE is sufficiently acquainted. The
witness may also testify on his OR HER impressions of the emotion, behavior, conditions
or appearance of a person.
• I. Opinion on the identity of a person. Where the issue is whether a particular person is
involved in an event. As for example: 1). the accused sets up alibi or defense of mistaken
identity; 2). in claims for insurance, determining whether a body is that of the insured 3). In
determining who the victims are
GENERAL METHOD OF IDENTIFICATION

a. Identification by scientific methods: by the teeth; fingerprints, foot prints and by DNA analysis
b. By Lay Opinion: by face, physical appearance, height, body built, sex, color of hair, racial features,
mannerisms, gait, clothing speech , defects, tattoos or marks or scars and other marks on the body,
or by any factor which distinguishes him from another.
i. Identification of a person is not solely through knowledge of his name. In fact, familiarity
with physical features, particularly of the face, is the best way to identify a person. One maybe
familiar with the face but not necessarily with the name of a person. It does not follow
therefore that to be able to identify a person, one must necessarily know his name. Example:
precisely because of the unusual bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially
victims of a crime, can remember with high degree of reliability the identity of criminals.
ii. The witness must however be able to explain his basis of identification
c. By the style of writing
B. IN-COURT AND OUT-OF-COURT
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES.
• In-court identification maybe influenced by the reliability of the out-of-court identification. The
latter consists of either:
• a. By the police Methods of Identification of suspects
• i. Show-ups-where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification
• ii. Mug file shots or based on the “Rouge’s Gallery”
• iii. Line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect form a group of persons lined up for
the purpose
• b. By circumstances: Totality of Circumstances Test. Several factors are to be considered, to
wit:
i. Witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime. These include matters such as
presence of light, distance of viewing, length of time of the event; presence of obstructions to line of
visions, the position of the witness in relation to the suspect
ii. The witness’ degree of attention at that time: to what or who was he focused on, as well as the
presence of distractions
iii. The accuracy and consistency of any prior descriptions by the witness
iv. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of the identification. Example: the
reaction of a victim upon seeing the suspect
v. The length of time between the time of the occurrence and the time of the identification
vi. The suggestiveness of the identification process.
C. CONCEPT AND TYPES OF POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION
a. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being
an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime.
b. First Type: As direct evidence: where a witness, as an eyewitness, may identify a suspect or
accused to the very act of the commission of the crime
c. Second Type: As part of circumstantial evidence: where a witness may not have actually
witnessed the very act of the commission of the crime but is still able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the suspect/accused is
the person last seen with the victim before or right after the commission of the crime ( Baleros
vs. People, 483 SCRA 10, Feb. 22, 2006)
II. OPINION ON HANDWRITING.

• A handwriting maybe proved to be that of a particular person by any of the following:


1.By the opinion of an expert
2. By the admission of the author/owner of the handwriting
3. By the testimony of witnesses or those who actually saw the person write, they maybe subscribing
witnesses or eye witnesses
4. By the testimony of those who have gained sufficient familiarity with the handwriting of the
person.
a) By the fact that he has seen writing purporting to be that of the other person upon which he has acted or
been charged. Example: persons in receipt of demand letters, notices, purchase orders, letters of inquiry,
directive, memorandum, letters of authority
b) Familiarity has been acquired due to close personal, business, social or professional relations which
include the regular receipt, sending and reading of mutual written hand-written communications between
the witness and the other person. Examples are (i) Personal or social relations such as pen-pals, spouses,
lovers, classmates (ii) Business such as between the employee such as secretary and employer, teacher and
student
5. By the testimony of those who are in receipt of reply letters (Identification by subject matter)
6. Identification by the court based on a comparison between the genuine handwriting and the
one in issue
7. Identification by the style of writing
III. OPINION ON THE SANITY OF A PERSON.

• There are two instances when an ordinary person may testify on the mental sanity or state of
mind of a person:
1. Under the Civil Code it permits the opinion of a subscribing witness to a writing the validity
of which is in dispute in that the sanity or state of mind of a party thereto is put in issue.
Examples: (a). An attesting witness to a will may give his opinion on whether the testator was
of sound and disposing mind (b) A subscribing witness to a contract may give his opinion that
the party was fully conscious and aware of the nature of his acts
2. Under section 50 of Rule 130 in that it allows the opinion of an intimate acquaintance who
may give his opinion based on the external conduct of a person. Examples are family members,
immediate neighbors, household help, office and business acquaintances. Thus where the
accused puts up insanity as a defense, his friends, relatives and family members are competent
to testify on his mental sanity. But not strangers or casual acquaintances
IV. OPINIONS ON THE EMOTIONS, BEHAVIOR,
CONDUCT OR APPEARANCE OF A PERSON.
1. Examples: (a) emotions: that a person is angry, agitated, exited, tense, nervous, hesitant.
Happy, elated, grateful, afraid (b) condition or appearance- as unkempt, dirty, well groomed,
drunk, tired, sleepy, haggard, sickly
2. But a witness may not give his opinion on the motive, reason or purpose why a person did or
did not do an act unless these were communicated to the witness, such as jealousy or revenge,
or financial reward.
V. INSTANTANEOUS IMPRESSIONS OF THE MIND.

1. These include opinions on the conditions or state of things, or of persons or things in


motion such as on the weather, speed of vehicles, distance, value of his personal things or
property, or value of services
VI. OPINION ON THE AGE OF A PERSON.

As a general rule, the age of person maybe established by: (a) the record of birth (b) Opinion of
an expert (c) Opinion of an ordinary witness who is acquainted with the person whose age is in
question, such as a relative, a contemporary, persons in the know in the community where he
lives, as well as (d) Family tradition, entries in family records
PEOPLE V. LEE
G.R. NO. 139070 - MAY 29, 2002
DOCTRINE:
• Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open court declarations because affidavits are
taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate. Oftentimes, they are
executed when the affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair
opportunity of narrating in full the incident that transpired. They are usually not prepared by
the affiant himself but by another who suggests words to the affiant, or worse, uses his own
language in taking the affiant's statements.
SULTAN V. MACABANDING
A.C. NO. 7919, OCTOBER 08, 2014
DOCTRINE:
• A handwriting expert does not have to be a linguist at the same time. To be credible, a
handwriting expert need not be familiar with the language used in the document subject of
his examination. The nature of his examination involves the study and comparison of strokes,
the depth and pressure points of the alleged forgery, as compared to the specimen or original
handwriting or signatures.
GEPULLE-GARBO V. GARABATO
G.R. NO. 200013, JANUARY 14, 2015
DOCTRINE:
• The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as
regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades,
etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not
decisive on the question of the former’s authenticity. The result of examinations of
questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is,
at best, inconclusive.
DILAG & CO., INC.V. MERCED AND ZANDUETA
O.G. 5536 – MAY 31, 1949
DOCTRINE:
• Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an
expert. A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge was
acquired through medium of practical experience rather than scientific study and research.
US V. TRONO ET AL. G.R. NO. 1344 – JANUARY 19,
2004
DOCTRINE:
• Expert testimony constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not
exclusive, on questions of a professional character. Courts, however, are not bound to submit
their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or
refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with
the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial.
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
A.M. NO. 06-11-5-SC -
OCTOBER 2, 2007
• Scope – all criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings.
• Application for DNA Testing Order – The court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a
showing of the following:
• a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
• b. The biological sample:
• i. was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
• ii. was previously subjected to DNA testing, but requires confirmation.
• c. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
• d. The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and
• e. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy of integrity of the DNA testing.
• This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
• DNA Testing Order – If the court finds that the requirements in Section 4 hereof have
been complied with, the court shall –
• Order that biological samples be taken from any person or crime scene evidence;
• Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect the integrity of the
biological sample, the testing process and the reliability of the test results, including the
condition that the DNA test results shall be simultaneously disclosed to parties involved in the
case; and
• If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the conduct of confirmatory testing
by the other or the adverse party and where additional biological samples of the same kind can no
longer be obtained, issue an order requiring all parties to the case or proceedings to witness
the DNA testing to be conducted.
• An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and shall not be appealable.
Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in any way, stay the implementation thereof,
unless a higher court issues an injunctive order. The grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed
as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result
thereof.
Post-conviction DNA Testing – may be available, without need of prior court order, to the
prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that:
• a. a biological sample exists,
• b. such sample is relevant to the case, and
• c. the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of
conviction.
Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence – the court shall consider the
following:

a. The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they
were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
b. The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the
scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
c. The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable
standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic
casework and credibility shall be properly established; and
d. The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.
Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology – the court shall consider the following:

a. The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or
technique can be and has been tested;
b. The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods;
c. The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific
community;
d. The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the
correctness of data generated;
e. The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and
f. The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in
comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations
used in comparing DNA profiles.
Evaluation of DNA Testing Results – The court shall consider
the following:

a. The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the


relevance of mismatching DNA evidence;
b. The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the
other evidence presented in the case; and that
c. DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity
shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of the
Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the
DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence.
If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher
there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
Post-conviction DNA Testing – Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict – The convict or the prosecution may file a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case the
court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of
the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.
A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a
hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.
Confidentiality –Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall only be
released to any of the following:

a. Person from whom the sample was taken;


b. Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
c. Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
d. Other persons as determined by the court.

Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable
for indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented or sought to be offered and presented.
Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the
disclosure of the DNA profile of the person and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, he same may be disclosed to
the persons named in the written verified request.
Preservation of DNA Evidence – the court may order the appropriate
government agency to preserve the DNA evidence as follows:
a. In criminal cases: i. for not less than the period of time that any person is under
trial for an offense; or
ii. in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time as the accused has
served his sentence;

b. In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where the DNA
evidence was introduced has become final and executory.

* The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before the
expiration of the periods set forth above, provided that:
a. A court order has been secured; or
b. The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has consented in
writing to the disposal of the DNA evidence.
DOCTRINES:

• 1. Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an expert. A
witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge was acquired through
medium of practical experience rather than scientific study and research. (Dilag & Co., Inc. v. Merced
and Zandueta, O.G. 5536 – May 31, 1949)
• Expert testimony constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on
questions of a professional character. Courts, however, are not bound to submit their findings
necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them
any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of
conviction which may have been adduced during the trial. (US v. Trono et al., G.R. No. 1344 – January
19, 2004)
• In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the following data shall be considered:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards
and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests. (People v. Vallejo , G.R. No. 144656 - May 9, 2002)
• If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity. A disputable presumption, not contradicted is sufficient evidence
of the fact presumed, and no other evidence need be introduced. (People v. Umanito, G.R. No.
172607 – April 16, 2009).
• New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Therefore, it can be said
that the death of a party does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. (Estate of Rogelio G. Ong v. Minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz , G.R. NO. 171713 - December 17, 2007)
• New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Therefore, it can be said
that the death of a party does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. (Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710 - June 6,
2011)
PEOPLE V. ADOVISO
G.R. NO. 116196-97 – JUNE 23, 1999
DOCTRINE:
• In our jurisdiction, the Philippine courts rejects the result of polygraph tests as evidence to establish
the guilt or innocence of a person. Polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable
and ascertaining truth or deception.
• Visibility is a vital factor in determining whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the
perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the
witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should
normally be accepted.
• Familiarity with appellant’s face and appearance minimized of not erased the possibility that they
could have been mistaken as to his identity.
PEOPLE V. VALLEJO
G.R. NO. 144656 - MAY 9, 2002
DOCTRINE:
• In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the following data shall be considered:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards
and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
HERRERA V. ALBA AND HON. CUESTA-VILCHES
G.R. NO. 148220 – JUNE 15, 2005
DOCTRINE:
• DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If
the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.
• The Vallejo Guidelines:
• 1. how the samples were collected;
• 2. how they were handled;
• 3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;
• 4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
• 5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and
• 6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
PEOPLE V. UMANITO
G.R. NO. 172607 – APRIL 16, 2009
DOCTRINE:
• If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity. A disputable presumption, not contradicted is sufficient evidence
of the fact presumed, and no other evidence need be introduced.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG V. MINOR DIAZ
G.R. NO. 171713 - DECEMBER 17, 2007
DOCTRINE:
• New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or
upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Therefore,
it can be said that the death of a party does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA
testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
LUCAS V. LUCAS
G.R. NO. 190710 - JUNE 6, 2011
DOCTRINE:
• New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or
upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Therefore,
it can be said that the death of a party does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA
testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
BURDEN OF PROOF
AND PRESUMPTIONS
RULE 131, SECTIONS 1-6
BURDEN OF PROOF & BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

• Section 1. Burden of proof and burden of evidence. – Burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his OR HER claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Burden of proof never shifts.
• Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish or
rebut a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case. Burden of evidence may shift from
one party to the other in the course of the proceedings, depending on the exigencies
of the case. (1a)
WHAT IS BURDEN OF PROOF?
Old Rules of Evidence
• Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
The amended rules added that:
• Burden of proof never shifts.
• The burden of proof, or “onus probandi,” is the obligation imposed upon a party who alleges the
existence of facts necessary for the prosecution of his action or defense to establish the same by the
requisite quantum of evidence.
• Proof - the establishment of a requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact as to the fact
in issue.
WHAT IS BURDEN OF EVIDENCE?

• Burden of EVIDENCE is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish or


rebut a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case.
• Burden of evidence may shift from one party to the other in the course of the proceedings,
depending on the exigencies of the case.
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED

Quantum of Evidence Required


1. Civil Cases: Preponderance of Evidence
2. Charges of misconduct against judges :Clear and convincing evidence and Beyond
reasonable doubt for their removal
3. Agrarian Cases: Substantial evidence (such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as sufficient to support a conclusion)
• This definition and quantum of evidence has now been adopted for cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies.
WHO HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF?

•Civil Cases : On the plaintiff, with respect to his


complaint
•Criminal Cases: The burden of proof is always with the
prosecution.
WHO HAS THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE?

Civil Cases
• Plaintiff: Must prove the affirmative allegations in his complaint.
• Defendant: In his counterclaim and in his affirmative defenses
Criminal Cases
• Prosecution: Must prove its affirmative allegations in the indictments (elements of the
crime and the attending circumstances).
• .Defense: As to the justifying, exempting, mitigating, and absolutory circumstances
BURDEN OF PROOF VS. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
Proof
• Does not shift as it remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed.
• Generally determined by the pleadings filed by the party
Evidence
• Shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial.
• Generally determined by the developments at the trial, or by the provisions of the substantive law or
procedural rules which may relieve the party from presenting evidence on the fact alleged

Note: In both civil and criminal cases, the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative
allegation.
HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE

• 1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt – that no other explanation can be derived from the facts except that the
defendant committed the crime, thereby overcoming the presumption that a person is innocent until proven
guilty
• 2. Clear and convincing evidence - means that the evidence being presented must be “highly” and
substantially more probable to be true rather than untrue (used in civil cases i.e. claims involving fraud; claims
involving wills and inheritances; cases involving important family decisions such as withdrawing life support
from a relative)
• 3. Preponderance of evidence - It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
• 4. Substantial evidence – has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
NEGATIVE ALLEGATIONS
• General Rule: In both civil and criminal cases, negative allegations do not have to be proved.
• Exception: Where such negative allegations are essential parts of the cause of action or defense in a
civil case, or are essential ingredients of the offense in a criminal case or the defenses thereto.

Examples:
• Civil case - for breach of contract, the plaintiff has to prove the fact that the defendant did not
comply with his obligation thereunder as, although this is a negative allegation, it is an element of the
plaintiff ’s cause of action.
• Criminal case - for illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has to prove the absence of
a license therefor even by prima facie evidence, as the prosecution has control of the better
means of proof.
• Exception to the exception: In civil cases, even if the negative allegation is an essential part
of the cause of action or defense, it does not need to be proved if it is only for the purpose of
denying the existence of a document which should properly be in the custody of the adverse
party.
• If the criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation or that a negative averment is an
essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden of proving the charge.
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

• (1) Facts which are presumed (Rule 131);


• (2) Facts which are of judicial notice (Rule 129); and
• (3) Facts which are judicially admitted (Rule 129).
PRESUMPTIONS

• What is Presumption?
• A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from the proof of other facts.
PRESUMPTIONS, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Presumption
• The proponent still has to introduce evidence of the basis of the presumption.
• He or she has to introduce evidence of the existence or non-existence of the facts from
which the court can draw the inference of the fact in issue.
Judicial Notice & Judicial Admission
• The proponent does not have to introduce any evidence
CLASSIFICATIONS

• Presumptions of Law - a certain inference must be made whenever the facts appear which
furnish the basis of the inference; in the case of presumptions of fact, a discretion is vested in
the tribunal as to drawing the inference. It is reduced to fixed rules and form a part of the
system of jurisprudence.
i. Conclusive (absolute, juris et de jure)
ii. Disputable (rebuttable, juris tantum, prima facie)
• Presumptions of Fact - a discretion is vested in the tribunal as to drawing the inference.
Derived wholly and directly from the circumstances of the particular case by means of the
common experience of mankind.
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
• What are conclusive presumptions? (a) Whenever a party has, by his or her own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he or she cannot,
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; and

• (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation
of landlord and tenant between them.

• The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

• Paragraphs (a) and (b) are based upon the doctrine of estoppel in pais (Arts. 1431 to 1439 of the Civil Code.)

• They are considered as conclusive presumptions:

• Par. (a), the fact which the party in estoppel has represented to be true is conclusively presumed as against him to be true
and he is not permitted to introduce evidence to the contrary.

• Par. (b) the ownership of the landlord at the start of the tenancy relation is conclusively presumed as against the tenant
and the latter is not permitted to dispute such fact.
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS

What are disputable presumptions?


• The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
• (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong; • Applies to both civil and criminal cases
• • The legislature may provide for prima facie evidence of guilt, provided there be a rational
connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed.
• • This presumption accompanies the accused throughout the trial down to the moment of
conviction. This presumption disappears after conviction and the appellate court then will presume
the accused guilty.
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his or her voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
Requisites for Presumption (e) to Apply:
1. That the evidence is material;
2. That the party had the opportunity to produce the same;
3. That the said evidence is available only to said party.
When Presumption (e) Will Not Apply:
4. When the evidence in question is equally available to both parties;
5. When the evidence is merely corroborative or merely cumulative, or is unnecessary;
6. When the suppression of evidence is not willful;
7. When the suppression is an exercise of privilege.
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him or her;

Facts to Be Proved By the Prosecution for Presumption (J) to Apply:

8. The crime was actually committed;


9. The crime was committed recently;
10. The stolen property was found in possession of the accused; and
11. The accused is unable to satisfactorily explain his possession thereof.

To Conclusively Prove Possession, It is Necessary That:

12. The possession must be unexplained by any innocent origin;


13. The possession must be fairly recent; and
14. The possession must be exclusive.
Convictions in cases involving the foregoing assumptions are not actually sustained upon a
presumption of law but rest wholly upon an inference of fact as to the guilt of the accused.

(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself or herself for the payment of the
money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting
in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed
upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for
arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
PRESUMPTION ON PAR. (J)

• if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made of it, taken advantage of it
and profited thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.
PRESUMPTION ON PAR. (V)

• must be proved that the letter was properly addressed with postage pre-paid and that it was
actually mailed. If said letter was not returned to the sender, it is presumed that it was
received by the addressee.
PARAGRAPH (W)

• From Regalado:
• A view is held that with respect to the ordinary but continued absence of 7, 10, or 5 years
contemplated in the first two subparagraphs, the absentee was in danger under the three
instances contemplated therein, the absentee is presumed to have been died at the end of said
period, but that in the case of qualified absence where the absentee was in danger of death
under the instances contemplated therein, the absentee is presumed to have died at the time
he was exposed to such danger or peril, that is at the start of the 4 year period stated therein.
This distinction assumes significance in questions of successional rights to the estate of the
absentee arising from his presumptive death.
DISTINCTION OF PRESUMPTION UNDER PAR.
(KK) AND PAR. (JJ)

• In par. (kk), it is not required that the parties perished in a calamity and it only applies in
questions of successional rights. While in par. (jj), it applies only where the deaths occurred
during a calamity and applies to the cases not involving successional rights.
• • In par. (kk), it provided for the presumption of simultaneity in the deaths of the persons
called to succeed each other while par. (jj) provides for presumption of survivorship.
SURVIVORSHIP RULE

• If in doubt as to who died first between 2 or more persons called to succeed each other. o Burden of Proof: whoever
alleges the death of one prior to the other shall prove the same;
• Absent such proof: presumption is that they all died at the same time. There shall be no transmission of successional
rights.
• Presumption: presumption of simultaneity of deaths. When two or more persons who are called to succeed each other,
die, they shall be presumed to have died at the same time.
• Under the Rules of Court, it provided that:
• a. When two or more persons;
• b. Perish in the same calamity; and
• c. It is not shown who died first; and
• d. There are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred that one died of the other.
SPS RAMOS V. OBISPO
G.R. NO. 193804
DOCTRINE:
• In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving
them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their
own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.
• It is axiomatic that under the Rules on Evidence a party who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it. A mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of proving
his allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence.
RIVERA V. SPS. SALVADOR
G.R. NO. 184458
DOCTRINE:
• The fact of forgery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. Mere variance of signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same
was forged.
• It is a basic rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by preponderance of evidence, which simply means "evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it."
PEOPLE VS. LIPATA
G.R. NO. 200302
DOCTRINE:
• The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action
shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under Section 3 of [Rule 111] or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability
arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may
be.
PEOPLE V. PAJENADO
31 SCRA 812 (1970)
DOCTRINE:
• In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and
that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient
of the offense charged", the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove
that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly
licensed.
• It seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to
prove it.
PEOPLE V. VERZOLA
80 SCRA 600 (1977)
DOCTRINE:
• There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the
burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing
or at least attenuate the offense committed. To establish his exculpation, or the justification
for the act, he must prove such affirmative allegation by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that
for the prosecution, for even if that were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused
himself had admitted the killing.
PEOPLE VS. BACUS
G.R. NO. L-60388
DOCTRINE:
• Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This constitutional
presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty
in an unprejudiced mind of the appellant's culpability.
SANTOS MOLINA ANDAL TAN

674
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken FIRST MOLINA GUIDELINE:
∙ Modified.
 
and construed independently of, but must   ▪ Plaintiff- spouse must prove his or
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts (1) The burden of proof to show the her case with clear and convincing
in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, nullity of the marriage belongs to evidence.
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no the plaintiff.  
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity   ∙ Molina, however, is silent on what
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of ∙ One who asserts a claim must quantum of proof is required in
the basic marital covenants that prove it. Specifically, in nullity cases
 
concomitantly must be assumed and psychological incapacity cases,
∙ This is a quantum of proof that
discharged by the parties to the marriage it is the plaintiff-spouse who requires more than preponderant
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the proves the existence of evidence but less than proof beyond
Family Code, include their mutual psychological incapacity. reasonable doubt.
obligations to live together, observe love,    
respect and fidelity and render help and ∙ There is opinion that a nullity ∙ The reason is that this jurisdiction
support. There is hardly any doubt that the case under Article 36 is like any follows the presumption of validity of
intendment of the law has been to confine the civil case that requires marriages.
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the preponderance of evidence,  
most serious cases of personality disorders ∙ As with any presumption — such as
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity the presumption of regularity in the
or inability to give meaning and significance issuance of public documents,
to the marriage. This psychological condition regularity in the performance of duty,
of good faith, or of sufficient
must exist at the time the marriage is
consideration — it can only be
celebrated. rebutted with clear and convincing
evidence.
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Rule 132 Sections 1-10
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. – The
examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)
Section 2. Proceedings to be recorded. – The entire proceedings of a trial
or hearing, including the questions propounded to a witness and his or
HER answer thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the
parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be
recorded by means of short-hand or stenotype or by other means of
recording found suitable by the court.

A transcript of record of the proceedings made by the official


stenographer, steno typist or recorder and certified as correct by him
shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.
Section 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. — A witness must answer
questions, although his answer may tend to establish a claim against him
OR HER. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and
from harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him OR HER to a
penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation,
unless it to be the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in
issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his
OR HER previous final conviction for an offense.
Section 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. — The
order in which the individual witness may be examined is as follows;
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent.
Section 5. Direct examination. — Direct examination is the
examination-in-chief of a witness by the party presenting him OR HER
on the facts relevant to the issue.

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the


termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross
examined by the adverse party ON ANY RELEVANT MATTER, with
sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue.
Section 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. — After the
crossexamination of the witness has been concluded, he OR SHE may be
re-examined by the party calling him OR HER, to explain or supplement
his OR HER answers given during the cross-examination. On
re-direct-examination, questions on matters not dealt with during the
cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its discretion.

Section 8. Re-cross-examination. — Upon the conclusion of the re-direct


examination, the adverse party may re-cross-examine the witness on
matters stated in his OR HER re-direct examination, and also on such
other matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
Section 9. Recalling witness. — After the examination of a witness by
both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without
leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion,
as the interests of justice may require.
Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A question which
suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is
a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination; (b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers
from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble
mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet
testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which he OR SHE has
previously stated. It is not allowed.
General Rule: To be admissible, the testimony of the witness must be given in open court.

Exception: That such requirement may be supplanted


a. In civil cases, by depositions pursuant to and under the limitations of Rule 23 (Depositions pending
actions) and Rule 24 (Depositions before Action or pending appeal)
b. In criminal cases, by depositions or conditional examinations, pursuant to Section 12 (Application
for examination of witness for accused before trial), Section 13 (Examination of defense witness),
Section 14 (Bail to secure appearance of material witness) and Rule 15 (examination of witness for
the prosecution) of Rule 119 and Section 1, Rule 123, or by the records of preliminary investigation,
under the circumstances of Section 1(f), Rule 115.

The testimony of the witness should be elicited by questions of counsel.


• The Court itself may propound questions either on direct or cross-examination of the witness;
• That the Court should be given reasonable leeway to ascertain the truth, and the extent to which
such examination may be conducted rests in its discretion and will not be controlled in the absence
of abuse of discretion to the prejudice of either party.
The testimony of a witness in court cannot be considered self-serving since he can
be subjected to cross-examination.
• Self-serving evidence is one made out of court and is excluded on the same ground as
hearsay evidence
o Ex. Deprivation of the right of cross-examination.

What is Direct Examination


• It is the examination of a witness by the party presenting him other on the fact relevant to
the issue.

Reason for the amendment on Section 6 (Cross-examination)


• Gender Inclusiveness
• Deleted “as to many matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith”
• Replaced with “on any relevant matter”

Shift from the American rule, the scope-of-direct-rule, which limits cross-examination to
matters taken up in the direct examination or anything connected therewith, to the English
Rule, or the Wide Open Rule, Which permits cross on any relevant matter.
Purpose of Cross Examination:
1. To discredit the witness
2. To discredit the testimony of the witness
3. To clarify certain matters
4. To elicit admission from witness

Scope and limits of Cross Examination:


• American Rule: restrict cross-examination to facts which are connected with the matters that
have been stated in the direct examination of the witness
• English Rule: A witness may be cross examined, not only upon matters testified to by him or her
on his or her direct examination, but also on all matters relevant to the issue.

Doctrine of Incomplete Testimony


When cross-examination cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party who
offered the witness, the incomplete testimony is rendered incompetent.
General rule: Incomplete testimony should be stricken from the record. Exception: In criminal cases
when the prosecution witness was extensively cross-examined on the material points (essential
elements of the crime) and thereafter failed to appear and cannot be produced despite a warrant for
his or her arrest. Thus, Striking out is not warranted.
JURISPRUDENCE
GALMAN VS. PAMARAN
138 SCRA 294 – 1985
The privilege of the right against self-incrimination and the right to due
process extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in
which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or
not.
THE ART OF DIRECT AND
CROSS-EXAMINATION
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION

1. What is Direct Examination?


Direct Examination is when the prosecutor questions his/her own witness in order to elicit facts
favorable to his/her case.

2. What is its purpose?


• To build up the prosecutor’s case by proving the allegations in the Information – all the
elements of the offense and that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime.
• To rebut the accused’s defense and evidence.
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION

3. How to Conduct Direct Examination18 .


• Questions should be simple, clear and brief.
• Avoid asking leading questions – questions that suggest the answer or are answerable by a yes
or no. Any question beginning with words like "did," "didn't," "does," "doesn't," "is," "isn't,"
"aren't," "will," "won't," "can," "can't," "could," "couldn't," "would, " "wouldn't," will always call for
a yes or no answer.
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION

LEADING QUESTION NON-LEADING QUESTION


Q: Did you see the shooting? Q: What, if anything, did you observe?
A:Yes. A: I saw the shooting.

Q: Does your neck hurt? Q: What part of your body bothers you?
A:Yes. A: My neck
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION

LEADING QUESTION NON-LEADING QUESTION


Q. Isn’t it that you went to the police Q. Where did you go immediately after the
station immediately after the accident? accident?
A.Yes A. To the police station
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION

3. How to Conduct Direct Examination18 .


• Leading Questions are not allowed during Direct-Examination
Exceptions
• When the witness is unwilling or hostile or ignorant, a child, feeble minded or a deaf mute
(leading question may be allowed at the discretion of the judge)
• On preliminary matters (e.g. “You are a policeman, are you not?”)
• When there is no real danger of improper suggestion (e.g. “Is your name Washington Dee
Sy?”)
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION

TIP: Sometimes circumstances may force you to resort to asking leading questions. This is when the witness
forgets an important detail of his/her testimony and your attempts to refresh his/her memory in order to elicit
the answer fails. As a strategy, you may ask leading question (but this must be resorted to sparingly).
Q. What did the accused have in his hand when he approached you?
A. He had a cellphone in his hand.
Q. Did he have anything else?
A. I do not recall?
Q. Did he have a gun in his hand?
Defense: Objection, leading your Honor.
Court: Sustained. Prosecutor, rephrase your question.
Q. What, if anything, did the accused have in his hand aside from his cellphone?
A. He had a gun.
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION

Suggesting the answer can also be done in a subtler way.


Q. How close did you get to the accused before he shot the deceased?
A. I was facing him about less than a meter.
Q. What did you notice about him?
A. He was very angry with his eyes wide open and red.
Q. Did you notice anything else?
A. No.
Q. What if anything did you notice about his breath?
A. He smelled alcohol.
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions should be open-ended: 5 Ws and 1 H – What, When, Where, Who,


Why and How.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

1. Purpose
• To test the credibility of the witness.
• To elicit admissions from the witness that will either bolster your case or be adverse
to the accused’s case.
• Reveal bias on the part of the witness.
• Highlight inconsistencies with other witness’ testimony.
2. How to Conduct your Cross-Examination
Controlling the Witness on Cross-Examination
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

There are ten key points you should follow when conducting a
cross-examination, which we can refer to as the Ten Commandments:
1. Be Brief.
2. Always ask leading questions.
3. Use short questions, plain words.
4. Don't ask a question, the answer to which you do not know in advance.
5. Listen to the witness. 6. Don't quarrel with the witness.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

7. Don't allow the witness to repeat his direct testimony.


8. Don't permit the witness to explain his answers.
9. Don't ask one question too many.
10. Save the ultimate point for summation.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

These Ten Commandments will guide you on how to control the witness during a
cross-examination.
• The first commandment is self-explanatory. A well-thought out cross-examination should be direct
and concise.
• As for the second commandment, it is important to first identify what a leading question is. Every
question asked on cross-examination must be short and at the same time contain a leading
question. To illustrate this, let’s say you want the witness to say “the car was blue.” That means you
would ask questions like “Is it a fact that the car was blue?” or “The car was blue, isn’t that
correct?” or “The car was blue, was it not?” Keep in mind, the witness may not respond with the
full statement “the car was blue,” but they will simply answer the leading question.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

• Now that we have established what a leading question is, the next step is to ensure that it is
always preceded or followed by a short question. Listed below are rules to abide by when
coming up with short questions:
• No question should contain more than one new fact. By doing so, you eliminate the possibility of
the witness disagreeing because he/she does not agree with all the facts in the question. For
example, we want to get the witness to admit that he was sitting in the car using his phone while he
was parked by the curb when he noticed that the light was red. If the cross-examiner asks a
question such as this, “Isn’t it a fact that that you were on your phone parked by the curb when you
noticed that the light was red?” With a long question like that, it is possible for the witness to seize
this opportunity to disagree with the order of the facts and deny the statement, regardless if it was
true or not. However, if you ask short questions, it leaves them no room, but to say yes or no.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

Q:You were sitting in your car, were you not?


A:Yes.
Q: Were you on your phone at the time?
A:Yes.
Q:You were parked by the curb, were you not?
A:Yes.
Q: Is it correct that you were parked by the curb when you noticed the light?
A:Yes.
Q: And was the light red?
A:Yes.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

You will notice that the 4th question has more than one fact, but it is acceptable
as it contains only one “new fact” and the other fact has already been conceded
by the witness in the previous question. Thus, it is important to ensure that your
short question only has one “new fact.”
• Use no more than five words per question, excluding the leading phrase and
connecting words. Looking at the aforementioned questions, you will notice
that it follows this rule. By using short questions, we have control over the
witness. Every time we obtain their concession to each new fact necessary to
our goal, we prevent them from defeating our chosen line of cross.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

• Use plain words. This gives the witness less opportunity to take some
semantic exception to your intended meaning and answer “no” when you
need them to say “yes.” Avoid “legalese” or terms of art or multi-syllable
words that may be uncommon and beyond the comprehension of the witness
and the jury. Remember, the witness cannot ask the questions, thus it is up to
you to ensure that your question is clear and to the point. The simpler the
word, the less chances for them to misconstrue your question and deny a fact.

All these rules will help you control your witness’ testimony.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

• Asking questions without knowing the answers will only be detrimental to your crossexamination
because it may blindside you with new facts that work against you. In the same way, a question
asked in a non-leading fashion is an opportunity for the witness to escape from the control of the
cross-examiner. For this reason, only ask questions you know the answers to.
• There is no need to expound on the fifth commandment because it is straightforward.
• As the lawyer, it is natural to be frustrated when the witness is out of control. With that said, you
must never quarrel with the witness nor should you let this distract you from controlling his/her
testimony. Avoid using modifiers or generalizations because it enables witnesses to take issue with
descriptions we attempt by the use of certain words.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION
• Avoid the phrase “you testified on direct examination that…” or any other reasonable facsimile of
that phrase. Doing so will allow your witness to say I do not recall, which will force you to ask the
court to have the reporter search and read the previous statement. A process that is obnoxious,
time-consuming and even ineffective in a cross-examination. By avoiding this offending phrase, you
avoid losing control over the witness and getting into a quarrel with them or their lawyer over
what they have or have not testified to.
• In a way, the 8th commandment also coincides with commandment 7. Whenever you ask the
witness to repeat their direct testimony, you give them a chance to explain their previous
statement… “Oh yes, but what I really meant to say was…” Do not give the witness any control
over their testimony.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION

• Avoid the use of a modifier or generalization is applicable to this commandment as well.


We must not use modifiers or generalize until we have pinned the witness down to the
underlying facts. Even if you have successfully controlled the witness so far, there is still a
chance for you to lose if you ask one question too many. Therefore, stop while you are
ahead.
• End on a high note. STOP when you have attained the purpose of your cross-examination
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC
Section 1. Scope. –
(a) This Rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and incidents requiring the reception of
evidence before:
(1) The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Shari' a Circuit Courts but shall not
apply to small claims cases under A.M. 08-8-7-SC;
(2) The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari'a District Courts;
(3) The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Appeals, and the Shari'a
Appellate Courts;
(4) The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive
evidence, including the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP); and
(5) The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of procedure are subject to
disapproval of the Supreme Court, insofar as their existing rules of procedure
contravene the provisions of this Rule.
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. –
(a) The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed
courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled
hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct
testimonies; and
(2) The parties' documentary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial
affidavits and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the
plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his
possession, he may, after the same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in
his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a faithful copy or
reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring the original document or
object evidence for comparison during the preliminary conference with the attached copy,
reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the
original when allowed by existing rules.

Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. –


A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language known to the witness and, if not in English
or Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of
the witness and the place where the examination is being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious
that he does so under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false testimony or
perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively
numbered, that:
(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which he
testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents;
and
(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their
authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer
who is authorized by law to administer the same.
Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. –
(a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a sworn attestation at the end, executed by the lawyer
who conducted or supervised the examination of the witness, to the effect that:
(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions he asked and the
corresponding answers that the witness gave; and
(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him coached the witness
regarding the latter's answers.

(b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary action, including
disbarment.
Section 5. Subpoena. –
If the government employee or official, or the requested witness, who is neither the witness of
the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or
refuses without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other things under his
control available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the requesting
party may avail himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under
Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in
this case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial
affidavit shall be understood to be ex parte.
Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. –
The party presenting the judicial affidavit of his witness in place of direct testimony shall state
the purpose of such testimony at the start of the presentation of the witness. The adverse
party may move to disqualify the witness or to strike out his affidavit or any of the answers
found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall promptly rule on the motion and, if
granted, shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by placing it in brackets under the
initials of an authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence
under Section 40 of Rule 13220 of the Rules of Court.

Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit. –


The adverse party shall have the right to cross-examine the witness on his judicial affidavit and
on the exhibits attached to the same. The party who presents the witness may also examine
him as on redirect. In every case, the court shall take active part in examining the witness to
determine his credibility as well as the truth of his testimony and to elicit the answers that it
needs for resolving the issues.
Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. –
(a) Upon the termination of the testimony of his last witness, a party shall immediately
make an oral offer of evidence of his documentary or object exhibits, piece by piece, in
their chronological order, stating the purpose or purposes for which he offers the
particular exhibit.
(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state the legal ground for
his objection, if any, to its admission, and the court shall immediately make its ruling
respecting that exhibit.
(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial affidavits that
describe and authenticate them, it is sufficient that such exhibits are simply cited by their
markings during the offers, the objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the description
of each exhibit.
Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. –

(a) This rule shall apply to all criminal actions:


(1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;
(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the penalty
involved; or
(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved are.
(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five days
before the pre-trial, serving copies if the same upon the accused. The complainant or public
prosecutor shall attach to the affidavits such documentary or object evidence as he may have,
marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial affidavit, documentary, or object
evidence shall be admitted at the trial.
Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. –

(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits of the
prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as well as those of his
witnesses to the court within ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of each
on the public and private prosecutor, including his documentary and object evidence previously
marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve as direct testimonies of the
accused and his witnesses when they appear before the court to testify.
Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. –

(a) A party who fails to submit the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have
waived their submission. The court may, however, allow only once the late submission of the same
provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the
defaulting party pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the
court.
(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the scheduled hearing of
the case as required. Counsel who fails to appear without valid cause despite notice shall be deemed to
have waived his client's right to confront by cross-examination the witnesses there present.
(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the content
requirements of Section 3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above. The court may, however,
allow only once the subsequent submission of the compliant replacement affidavits before the hearing or
trial provided the delay is for a valid reason and would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and
provided further, that public or private counsel responsible for their preparation and submission pays a
fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.
Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules. –
The provisions of the Rules of Court and the rules of procedure governing investigating
officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence are repealed or
modified insofar as these are inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. 1âwphi1
The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are hereby
disapproved.

Section 12. Effectivity –


This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its publication in two newspapers of
general circulation not later than September 15, 2012. It shall also apply to existing cases.
A.M. NO. 15-06-10-SC DATED 25 APRIL 2017,THE “REVISED
GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS TRIAL OF CRIMINAL
CASES”

• 11. Form of Testimony 


(a) For First Level Courts 
In all criminal cases, including those covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, the testimonies
of witnesses shall consist of the duly subscribed written statements given to law enforcement or
peace officers or the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating prosecutor,
and if such are not available, testimonies shall be in the form of judicial affidavits, subject to
additional direct and cross-examination questions. 
The trial prosecutor may dispense with the sworn written statements submitted to the law
enforcement or peace officers and prepare the judicial affidavits of the affiants or modify or revise
the said sworn statements before presenting it as evidence. 
(b) For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan and Court ofTax Appeals 
In criminal cases where the demeanor of the witness is not essential in determining the
credibility of said witness, such as forensic chemists, medico-legal officers, investigators,
auditors, accountants, engineers, custodians, expert witnesses and other similar witnesses,
who will testify on the authenticity, due execution and the contents of public documents
and reports, and in criminal cases that are transactional in character, such as falsification,
malversation, estafa, or other crimes where the culpability or innocence of the accused can
be established through documents, the testimonies of the witnesses shall be the duly
subscribed written statements given to law enforcement or peace officers or the affidavits
or counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating prosecutor, and if such are not
available, testimonies shall be in the form of judicial affidavits, subject to additional direct
and cross-examination questions. 
In all other cases where the culpability or the innocence of the accused is based on the
testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses, the testimonies of these witnesses shall be in oral
form. 
JURISPRUDENCE
TAM VS CHINA BANKING CORP.
G.R. NO. 214054
Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its application
adverse party and hostile witnesses. For the presentation of
these types of witnesses, the provisions on the Rules of Court
under the Revised Rules of Evidence and all other correlative
rules including the modes of deposition and discovery rules shall
apply.
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORP.VS. PO
G.R. NO. 217694
In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or object
evidence to the affidavits is required when there would be a pre-trial
or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As stated earlier,
where a defendant fails to file an answer, the court shall render
judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based solely
on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
Thus, where there is no answer, there is no need for a pre-trial,
preliminary conference or hearing.
LARA’S GIFTS AND DECORS VS. PNB GE INSURERS
G.R. NO. 230429

The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally


proscribe the submission of additional evidence even after trial
had already commenced.
LAGON V.VELASCO
G.R. NO. 230429
The failure to comply with Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule
shall result to a waiver of the submission of the required judicial
affidavits and exhibits. However, the court may, upon valid cause
shown, allow the late submission of the judicial affidavit, subject
to specific penalties, constituting a fine of not less than One
thousand pesos (Php 1,000.00), nor more than Five thousand
pesos (Php 5,000.00) at the discretion of the court.
RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD
WITNESS
A.M. NO. 004-07-SC, November 21, 2000
Who has the duty to present proof to show necessity of competency examination?
A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of competency
examination.

Will the age of a minor be sufficient basis for competency examination?


No, under the rules, age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency
examination.

Who has the burden to proof to rebut the presumptions?


To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies on
the party challenging his competence.
Who are the persons allowed during the competency examination?

Only the following persons are allowed to attend a competency examination:


1. Judge and necessary court personnel
2. Counsel for the parties
3. Guardian ad litem
4. One or more support persons for the child
5. The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his
absence

How will the examination on the child witness made during competency test?
Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only by the judge. Counsel for
the parties however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his discretion, ask the
child.
What are the guidelines on the questions which may be asked during competency
examination?
The questions asked at the competency examination shall be:
a. Appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child
b. It shall not be related to the issues at trial, and
c. It shall focus on the ability of the child to remember, communicate, distinguish
between truth and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.

What is the duty of the court on the competence of the child witness during
examination?
The court has the duty of continuously assessing the competence of the child throughout
his testimony.
Section 7. Oath or affirmation. –
Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.

What is the duty of the child before testifying?


Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.

Section 8. Examination of a child witness. –


The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in
open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may,
however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.
How will the examination of a child witness be done?
The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in
open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

Can the party presenting the child witness or the guardian ad litem testify?
Yes, the party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may,
however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this rule.

Section 9. Interpreter for child. –


(a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino language or is unable to
communicate in said languages due to his developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or
other similar reason, an interpreter whom the child can understand and who understands
the child may be appointed by the court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for
the child.
(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only person who can serve as an
interpreter for the child, he shall not be disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of the
child. The interpreter, however, who is also a witness, shall testify ahead of the child.
(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a true and accurate
interpretation.

Section 10. Facilitator to pose questions to child. –


(a) The court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a facilitator if it determines that the
child is unable to understand or respond to questions asked. The facilitator may be a child
psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent,
or relative.
(b) Of the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for the parties shall pose
questions to the child only through the facilitator. The questions shall either be in the
words used by counsel or, if the child is not likely to understand the same, in words that
are comprehensible to the child and which convey the meaning intended by counsel.
(c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the child according to the
meaning intended by counsel.

Section 11. Support persons. –


(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a deposition shall have the right to be
accompanied by one or two persons of his own choosing to provide him emotional support.
(1) Both support persons shall remain within the view of the child during his testimony.
(2) One of the support persons may accompany the child to the witness stand, provided the
support person does not completely obscure the child from the view of the opposing party,
judge, or hearing officer.
(3) The court may allow the support person to hold the hand of the child or take other
appropriate steps to provide emotional support to the child in the course of the proceedings.
(4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the child during
his testimony. The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the
child during his testimony.
(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness, the court may disapprove the
choice if it is sufficiently established that the attendance of the support person during the
testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of
the testimony of the child.
(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the court, his testimony shall be
presented ahead of the testimony of the child.

Section 12. Waiting area for child witnesses. - The courts are encouraged to provide a
waiting area for children that is separate from waiting areas used by other persons. The waiting
area for children should be furnished so as to make a child comfortable.
Section 14.Testimony during appropriate hours. - The court may order that the
testimony of the child should be taken during a time of day when the child is well-rested.

Section 15. Recess during testimony. - The child may be allowed reasonable periods of
relief while undergoing direct, cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations as often as necessary
depending on his developmental level.

Section 16.Testimonial aids. - The court shall permit a child to use dolls,
anatomically-correct dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins, or any other appropriate
demonstrative device to assist him in his testimony.

Section 17. Emotional security item. - While testifying, a child shall be allowed to have an
item of his own choosing such as a blanket, toy, or doll.

Section 18. Approaching the witness. - The court may prohibit a counsel from
approaching a child if it appears that the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel.
Section 19. Mode of questioning. - The court shall exercise control over the questioning of
children so as to
(1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth,
(2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the
child,
(3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and
(4) avoid waste of time.

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
What are the rights and privileges of a child witness:
During the taking of a testimony or a deposition of a child witness, he shall be entitled to the
following rights and privileges:
a. Right to be assisted by an interpreter (Sec. 9)
b. Right to be assisted by a facilitator (Sec. 10)
c. Right to support persons (Sec. 11)
d. Right to be provided with a waiting area (Sec. 12)
e. Right to have a comfortable environment (Sec. 13)
f. Right to give testimony during appropriate hours (Sec. 14)
g. Right to recess during testimony (Sec. 15)
h. Right to testimonial aids (Sec. 16)
i. Right to emotional security (Sec. 17)
j. Right not to be approached by the counsel (Sec. 18)
What is the rule on the mode of questioning of the child witness?
The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to:
1. Facilitate the ascertainment of the truth
2. Ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the
child.
3. Protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment
4. Avoid waste of time

Can the child witness narrate his testimony?


Yes, the court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.

Section 20. Leading questions. - The court may allow leading questions in all stages of
examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice.

Section 21. Objections to questions. - Objections to questions should be couched in a


manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten, or intimidate the child.
Section 22. Corroboration. - Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child.
His testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or
judgment subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.

Section 23. Excluding the public. - When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion
from the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct
interest in the case. Such an order may be made to protect the right to privacy of the child or if
the court determines on the record that requiring the child to testify in open court would cause
psychological harm to him, hinder the ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to
effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity. In making its order, the court
shall consider the developmental level of the child, the nature of the crime, the nature of his
testimony regarding the crime, his relationship to the accused and to persons attending the trial,
his desires, and the interests of his parents or legal guardian. The court may, motu proprio,
exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during trial is of such
character as to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, on motion of the
accused, exclude the public from trial, except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.
PEOPLE VS HERMOSA
G.R. NO. 131805 - JANUARY 7, 2001
There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the
incident truthfully. Indeed, the time when we degrade a child witness testimony is now pass. In the new
Child Witness Rule, every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party,
conduct a competency examination of a child.
Failure to immediately reveal the identity of the perpetrator of a felony will not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness. Even adult witnesses sometimes would not reveal at once the killers of their
loved ones for one reason or another. Fear of the criminal is one such reason.
PEOPLE VS HERMOSA
G.R. NO. 131805 - JANUARY 7, 2001
Alibi is the weakest defense as it is easy to concoct. For alibi to prosper, an accused must not only prove
that he was absent at the crime scene at the time of its commission, but also, that it was physically
impossible for him to be so situated at said distance.
GENIL VS JUDGE RIVERA
A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1619 - JANUARY 23, 2006
The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 21 November
2000) does not permit a defense counsel to even approach a child who is
testifying if it appears that the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel. xxx
Neither does the Rule require a manifestation from the child or her mother to
exclude the public from the hearing. The court may motu proprio exclude the
public from the courtroom to protect the right to privacy of the child; if requiring
the child to testify in open court would cause psychological harm to him; if it
would hinder the ascertainment of truth or result in his inability to effectively
communicate due to embarrassment, fear or timidity; and if the evidence to be
produced is of such character as to be offensive to decency or public morals.
GENIL VS JUDGE RIVERA
A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1619 - JANUARY 23, 2006
The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness provides that the court shall
exercise control over the questioning of children so as to facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth and ensure that questions are stated in a form
appropriate to their developmental level and protect them from harassment
or undue embarrassment.
PEOPLE VS. OGAN
G.R. NO. 186461 - JULY 5, 2010
To borrow from the Rule, courts must exercise control to ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the
child. Even calling her simply by her name rather than "Madame Witness"
would have made BBB more responsive and comfortable on the witness
stand. Had the Rule been followed, BBB would have been able to have an
easier time communicating with the court and the lawyers during the trial.
There would have been no confusion as to the details of her ordeal.
PEOPLE VS ESUGON
G.R. NO. 195244 - JUNE 22, 2015
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The
dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in
the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now
presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of
proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the
duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of
a party, conduct a competency examination of a child..
PEOPLE VS GOLIDAN
G.R. NO. 205307, G.R. NO. 205307 - JANUARY 11, 2018

Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the
trial court determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity
is such as to render him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he
is to be examined and of relating the facts truthfully. The testimony of the
child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known the
perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper
motive to testify. Once it is established that the child fully understands the
character and nature of an oath, the testimony is given full credence.
LEADING QUESTIONS

• Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A question which suggests to the witness the
answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
• (a) On cross examination; (b) On preliminary matters; (c) When there is a difficulty in getting
direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of
feeble mind, or a deaf-mute; (d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or (e) Of a witness who is an
adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party.
• A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he OR SHE has previously stated. It is not allowed. (10a)
LEADING QUESTION

It is one which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires. A
leading question is generally not allowed. The test whether a question is leading or not is
the suggestiveness of the conduct.
LEADING QUESTION

When allowed:

1. On cross-examination;

2. Of an unwilling witness or hostile witness;

3. On preliminary matters;

4. When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is
of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute or a witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify or his having misled the party into calling him to the
witness stand

5. Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party; or

6. In all stages of examination of a child, if the same will further the interests of justice.
PEOPLE VS. ESTENZO
G.R. NO. L-41166 - AUGUST 25, 1976
A witness may testify only on those facts which he knows of his own knowledge.
Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except on
preliminary matters, or when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible
answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded,
or a deaf-mute. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and the orderly
dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted, if trial judges are allowed, as in the
case at bar, to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than
what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. LIMBO
G.R N0. L-24810 - MARCH 29 1926
A leading question propounded to a witness may, by creating an inference in
his mind, cause him to testify in accordance with the suggestion conveyed by
the question; his answer may be "rather an echo to the question" than a
genuine recollection of events..
..With ordinary witnesses is far worse when the witnesses are aged and
ignorant and therefore we should not discredit the testimony of a witness
who is old just because he has made some contradictions during a long and
tedious cross-examination.
PEOPLE VS. CANA
G.R. NO. 139229 - APRIL 22 2002
As a general rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, we have held
that when the witness is a child of tender years, it is proper for the court to
allow leading questions as it is usually difficult for a child of such age to state
facts without prompting or suggestion.
Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.
Here, the decision of the trial court to allow leading questions to Jovelyn
was justified, as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of
events difficult, if not uncertain.
PEOPLE VS. ESCULTOR
G.R. NOS. 149366-67 - MAY 27, 2004
The court ruled that the court may exercise a wide latitude of control in
getting the testimony of a child witness. This is done in order to: (1) to
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are
stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to
protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid
waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are
allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.
DELA PAZ VS. IAC
G.R. NO. 71537 - SEPTEMBER 17, 1987
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a
judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is
part of due process.
But we have also ruled that it is not an absolute right which a party can demand at
all times. This Court has stated that:
The right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus,
where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record
FULGADO VS. CA
G.R. NO. L-61570 - FEBRUARY 12, 1990
The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by
cross-examination is understood as requiring, not necessarily an actual
cross-examination, but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to
cross-examine if desired. There was no opportunity in this case. However,
the right to crossexamination is an essential part of due process but it may
be waived.
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION VS. NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. NO. L-6204 - JULY 31, 1956
The adverse party may cross-examine a witness for the purpose among
others, of eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue. From this
provision it may clearly be inferred that a party may cross- examine a
witness on matters not embraced in his direct examination. But this does
not mean that a party by doing so is making the witness his own.
US VS. MERCADO
G.R. NO. L-8332 - NOVEMBER 13, 1913
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been
called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or
(b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity
is bad.
While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing
that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an
examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that
he has been convicted of a high crime
IMPEACHING WITNESS
Rule 132, Section 11
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS

Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness A witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he OR SHE was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his
OR HER or her general reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence
that he OR SHE has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present,
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by
the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he OR SHE has been
convicted of an offense.
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
Reason for the amendments: Gender Inclusiveness .
A witness may be impeached:
a. By the party against whom he was called,
b. By contradictory evidence,
c. By evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or
d. By evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony.
BUT NOT: By evidence of particular wrongful acts,
EXCEPT:
- By the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment,
- That he has been convicted of an offense.
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch
for the witness’ veracity, he or she is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains
unrebutted.

Exceptions:
1. In case of a hostile witness or unwilling witness
2. Where the witness is an adverse party or the representative of a judicial person which is the adverse
party or
3. When the witness required is not voluntarily offered but is required by law to be presented. (ex.
Subscribing witness to a will)
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
A party can impeach a witness of the adverse party by:
1. Contradictory evidence from testimony in the same case
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
3. Evidence of bad character and
4. Evidence of bias, interest, prejudice, or incompetence
5. Evidence of mental, sensory derangement or defect
6. Evidence of conviction of an offense which affects credibility of witness.
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
Rehabilitation of Witness: An impeached witness may be allowed on redirect to attempt to
rehabilitate (to restore the witness’s credibility) by the party who called the witness to the
stand.
Note: The testimony of an impeached witness is not stricken off the record.
SECTION 12. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF
CONVICTION OR CRIME
Section 12. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. - For the
purpose of impeaching a witness, evidence that he or she has been
convicted by final judgment of a crime shall be admitted if (a) the crime was
punishable by a penalty in excess of one (1) year; or (b) the crime involved
moral turpitude, regardless of the penalty.
However, evidence of conviction is not admissible if the conviction has been
the subject of an amnesty or annulment of the conviction.
SECTION 12. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF
CONVICTION OR CRIME
Explanatory notes, 2019 Proposed Amendments to the Revised Rules on Evidence:
• Instead of adopting the qualification under Rule 609 (a)(1) of the FRE allowing
impeachment “if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year,” the Sub-Committee deleted “death” because of the abolition of death penalty in
our jurisdiction
• Instead of adopting the provision in Rule 609 (a)(2) of the FRE, allowing impeachment
if the crime “ involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment,” the
SubCommittee opted to substitute the qualification “(b) [if] the crime involved moral
turpitude, regardless of penalty” considering that “moral turpitude” has settled meaning
in our law and conviction of such crime has a unquestionable bearing on honesty,
veracity and integrity.
SECTION 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OR HER
OWN WITNESS

Section 13. Party may not impeach his own witness. - Except with respect to witnesses
referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10 OF THIS RULE the party producing a
witness is not allowed to impeach his OR HER credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his OR HER adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his
OR HER having misled the party into calling him OR HER to the witness stand.
SECTION 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OR HER
OWN WITNESS
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an
adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him OR HER in all
respects as if he OR SHE had been called by the adverse party, except by
evidence of his OR HER bad character. He OR SHE may also be impeached
and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must
only be on the subject matter of his examinationin-chief.
SECTION 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OR HER
OWN WITNESS
Reason for the amendment: Gender Inclusiveness
Except with respect to witness referred to in paragraph (d. of an unwilling or hostile
witness) and (e. of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party) of section 10 of Rule 132, the party producing a witness is not allowed to
impeach his or her credibility.
SECTION 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OR HER
OWN WITNESS
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by
the court upon adequate showing of:
• His or her adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or
• His or her having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared or the witness, who is an


adverse party, may be impeached:
• By the party representing him or her in all respects as if he or she had been called
by the adverse party,
• Except by evidence of his bad character.
SECTION 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OR HER
OWN WITNESS
He or she may be impeached and cross-examined:
• By the adverse party,
• But such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief.
Note: A party can impeach his own witness only by:
1. Evidence contradictory to his statements or
2. 2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
In case of hostile witnesses, adverse witnesses or involuntary witnesses, they may
be impeached other than by evidence contradictory to his statements or evidence
of prior inconsistent statements.
SECTION 14. HOW WITNESS IMPEACHED BY
EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Section 14. Party may not impeach his own witness. Before a witness can be impeached by
evidence that he OR SHE has made at other times statements inconsistent with his OR
HER present testimony, the statements must be related to him OR HER, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he OR SHE must be
asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to
him OR HER concerning them.
SECTION 14. HOW WITNESS IMPEACHED BY
EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Reason for the amendment: Gender Inclusiveness
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he or she has made at
other times statements inconsistent with his or her present testimony
• The statements must be related to him or her, with the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present, and
• He or she must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to
explain them.
If the statements be in writing
• They must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him or her
concerning them.
SECTION 14. HOW WITNESS IMPEACHED BY
EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Note: Contradictory Evidence refers to the other testimony of the same witness or
other evidence presented by him or her in the same case.
Prior Inconsistent Statements refers to statements, oral or documentary, made by the
witness sought to be impeached on occasions other than trial in which he is testifying.
Impeaching under this is done by “laying the predicate”:
1. By confronting him or her with such statements, with the circumstances under which they
were made
2. By asking him or her whether he or she made such statements and
3. By giving him or her a chance to explain the inconsistency.
Note: Unless the witness is given the opportunity to explain the discrepancies, the
impeachment is incomplete. However, such defect is deemed waived if no objection on
that ground and when the document involved are offered for admission.
JURISPRUDENCE
GOMEZ VS. GOMEZ-SAMSON
G.R. NO. 156284, FEBRUARY 6, 2007
Topic: Impeaching One’s Own Witness
A party calling a witness may not impeach his own witness. This rule is based on
the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being
worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness would
enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a
good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his hands of destroying his
credit, if he spoke against him. Neither had there been declaration by the court
that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile witness. Jose Sebastian is also
neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing agent of a public
or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party.
IMPEACHMENT BY BIAS
1. What is an Impeachment by Bias?
It refers to evidence of bias, interest, prejudice or hostile feeling against the
adverse party.
2. What does bias mean?
It refers to that which motivates the disposition to see and report matters
as they are wished for rather than as they are. It is present when a
witnesses’ relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an
incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements or to suppress
or pervert the truth, or to state what is false.
IMPEACHMENT BY BIAS
Note: Bias is NOT a factor when the witnesses on both sides are equally
interested or biased, especially if there is no numerical preponderance on
either side. The testimony of an interested witness is not necessarily biased,
incredible or self-serving
JURISPRUDENCE
U.S. V. ABEL
469 U.S. 45 - DECEMBER 10, 1984
Topic: Impeachment by Bias
Evidence of bias introduced for purposes of impeachment is admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. A showing of bias on the part of the
witness has the tendency to make the facts to which they testify less
probable and is therefore, relevant.
U.S.V. HARVEY
469 U.S. 45 - DECEMBER 10, 1984
Topic: Impeachment by Bias
The right to "place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of
his testimony and his credibility to a test" is an essential safeguard to a fair
trial. Exercise of this right is particularly crucial where the witness offers
damaging identification testimony, because in the absence of independent
contrary evidence, a defendant must rely upon impeachment of the
witness's credibility.
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT
Rule 132, Section 13
1. How is a witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements?
According to Section 13, Rule 132, a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with
the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he
made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them.
If the statements are in writing, they must be shown to the witness BEFORE any question is put to him
concerning them.
2. What are the proposed amendments on Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statements?

• Section 14. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a


witness can be impeached by evidence that he or she has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his or her present testimony, the statements must be
related to him or her, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he or she must be asked whether he or she made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the
witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
3. What is Contradictory Evidence?
It refers to other testimony of the same witness, or other evidence presented by him in the same case.

4. What are Prior Inconsistent Statements?


These are statements, oral or documentary, made by the witness sought to be impeached on occasions
other than trial in which he is testifying. Impeaching under prior inconsistent statements is done by
“laying the predicate”:
a. By confronting him with such statements, with the circumstances under which they were made;
b. By asking him whether he made such statements and; c. By giving him a chance to explain the
inconsistency.
Note: Unless the witness is given the opportunity to explain the discrepancies, the impeachment is
incomplete. However, such defect is deemed waived if no objection on that ground is raised when the
document involved is offered for admission.

Laying the Predicate Laying the Foundation or Bases


Refers only to impeachment of a witness through prior Refers to a situation where evidence which is incompetent will
inconsistent statement be introduced in evidence because it falls under the
exceptions to the rule on exclusion
5. Impeaching “by laying the predicate” may be dispensed with in case of Prior
Inconsistent Statements (PIS)
a. As to the testimony of the Adverse Party: If the PIS appears in a deposition of the
adverse party and not a mere witness. The deposition may be used by any party for
any purpose.
b. When the previous statements of a witness are offered as evidence of an admission,
and not merely to impeach him

6. Rationale for Laying the Predicate


a. To avoid unfair surprise to the adversary
b. To save time (an admission will make extrinsic proof unnecessary)
c. To give the witness a chance to explain
Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — The court, at its own
initiative or at the request of the party, shall order witnesses excluded so
that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. This rule does not
authorize exclusion of
(1) a party who is a natural person,
(2) a duly designated representative of a judicial entity which is a party to
the case,
(3) a person whose presence is essential to the presentation of the party’s
cause, or
(4) a person authorized by statute to be present.
The court may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be
prevented from convening with one another directly or through
intermediaries until all shall have been examined.
Section 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to
refresh his OR HER memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by
himself OR HERSELF or under his OR HER direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in
his OR HER memory and knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but
in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the
adverse party, who may, if he OR SHE chooses, cross examine the witness upon it, and
may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such writing or record,
though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he OR SHE is able to swear
that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution.
Section 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in
evidence, the remainder, the remainder admissible. — When part of
an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be
inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence.

Section 18. Right to respect writing shown to witness. — Whenever


a writing is shown to a witness, it may be inspected by the adverse
party.
JURISPRUDENCE
JURISPRUDENCE
VILLALON V. IAC
144 SCRA 443 | SEPTEMBER 24, 19866
Topic: Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement

Sec. 15. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness.—A witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witnesses, or the
record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
VILLALON V. IAC
144 SCRA 443 | SEPTEMBER 24, 19866
Sec. 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements.—Before a witness
can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances
of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made
such statements, and if so; allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
PEOPLE V. RESABAL
50 PHIL. 780 (1927)
Topic: Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement
The apparent contradiction between the testimony given by the witness in the Court of
First Instance and that given in the justice of the peace court, is not sufficient to discredit it,
if he was not given ample opportunity to explain it in the CFI. The mere presentation of the
document containing said declaration made in the justice of the peace court is not a
ground for impeaching the testimony of the witness. It must be read to him in order that he
may explain the discrepancies noted.
PEOPLE VS. ZINAMPAN
G.R. NO. 126781 - SEPTEMBER 13, 2000
Previous inconsistent statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the
credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the
discrepancies and he was then given the opportunity to expalain them.
U.S.V. MERCADO
20 PHIL. 127 |NOVEMBER 13, 1913
Topic: Impeachment by Other Means
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been
called, except by showing:
1. that he has made contradictory statements: or
2. by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is
bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
MOSLEY V. COMMONWEALTH
420 S.W.2D 679 | NOVEMBER 10, 1967
Topic: Impeachment by Other Means
Generally a witness may be impeached only as specified in our Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, the modern trend is to permit the jury to consider
expert testimony in the field of mental disorders and relax the rule in sex
offense cases.
COLES V. HARSCH
276 P. 248 (OR. 1929) | JANUARY 24, 1929
Topic: Impeachment by other means
A witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other
times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony; but before this
can be done, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances
of times, places, and persons present; and he shall be asked whether he has
made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements
be in writing, they shall be shown to the witness before any question is put
to him concerning them.
US V. MEDICAL THERAPY SCIENCES INC.
NO. 927, DOCKET 78-1049
Topic: Impeachment by other means
The mandate in Rule 401 to admit all relevant evidence should be construed
to authorize the admission of supportive character evidence if the trial
judge finds in the circumstances of the particular case that the contradiction
amounted to an attack on veracity.
NEWTON V. STATE
127 A. 123, 147 MD. 71
Topic: Impeachment by other means
If the purpose of the examiner was to impeach the credibility of the witness
by showing that he had been convicted of crime, he should have asked him
that question directly, or if he had intended to show that he had in some
other case sworn to statements contrary to his testimony in the instant
case, he could have been asked whether he had made such conflicting
statements.
STATE V. OSWALT
62 WN.2D 118 (1963) 381 P.2D 617
Topic: Impeachment by other means
A witness cannot be impeached upon matters collateral to the principal
issues being tried.
CORDIAL V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-75880. SEPTEMBER 27, 1988
Topic: Impeachment by other means
Impeachment of a witness must be confined to an attack on his general
character or reputation and on his character or reputation for truth and
veracity. Such impeachment cannot be directed to any particular trait or
character, or particular facts of particular wrongful or immoral acts.
PEOPLE V. BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ
G.R. NO. 135022. JULY 11, 2002.
Topic: Refreshing Recollection
The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily
with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their
behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well as their
understanding of the obligation of an oath.
PEOPLE V. DEL CASTILLO
G.R. NO. L-16941 | OCTOBER 29, 1968
Topic: Recalling Witness
The court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion,
as the interests of justice may require. (Rule 132 Section 14)
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC.VS. SU
G.R. NO. L-28499 – SEPT. 30, 1977
Topic: Recalling Witness
Once a witness has been subjected to extensive cross-examination, the
motion to recall him as rebuttal witness may be denied
PEOPLE VS. RIVERA
G.R. NO. 98376 – AUGUST 16, 1991
Topic: Recalling Witness
The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an
applicant's mere general statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the
interest of justice," or "in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his
case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many points and questions that should
have been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such
as these as sufficient ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of
witness no longer discretionary but ministerial.
PEOPLE VS. RIVERA
G.R. NO. 98376 – AUGUST 16, 1991
Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional
questions is essential before the Court's discretion may rightfully be exercised to
grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete,
substantial ground for the recall. There must be a satisfactory showing on the
movant's part, for instance, that particularly identified material points were not
covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital documents
were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, or that the
cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual
absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat, there would be no foundation
for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.
PEOPLE VS. ORTILLAS
G.R. NO. 137666 – MAY 20, 2004
Topic: Recalling Witnesses
After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness
cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The Court will grant or withhold
leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
That the interest of justice required that appellant should have been given the
opportunity to crossexamine witness, as it was not his fault that witness had not
been cross-examined.
PEOPLE VS. ABATAYO
G.R. NO. 139456 – JULY 7, 2004
Topic: Recalling Witnesses
The task of recalling a witness for cross-examination is imposed on the party who
wishes to exercise said right, and stressed that it should be the opposing counsel
who should move to crossexamine the plaintiff's witness.
EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES
Rule 132, Section 15
1. What is the amended Rule 132 Sec. 15?
Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — The court, at its own initiative or at
the request of the party, shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses. This rule does not authorize exclusion of
(a) A party who is a natural person
(b) A duly designated representative of a judicial entity which is a party to the case
(c) A person whose presence is essential to the presentation of the party’s cause
(d) A person authorized by statute to be present.
The court may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from
conversing with one another directly or through intermediaries until all shall have been
examined.
2.To whom does the rule of exclusion apply?
The power of exclusion applies only to the witnesses and not to the parties in a civil case.
Parties have a right to be present at the trial either by themselves or by their attorneys, as
well as to reasonable notice of the time fixed therefore (Muerteguy, et al. vs. Delgado, 22
Phil. 109).

Since they have such right, by necessary implication they cannot be divested thereof by an
exclusion order. This is a reiteration of an earlier ruling of the Supreme Court that “(a)
party to an action has a right to be present in court while his case is being tried, and the rule
authorizing the exclusion of witnesses during the trial cannot be understood to extend to
him” (Paez vs. Berenguer, 8 Phil. 457, citing Streeter vs. Evans, 44 Vt. 27).

The same right against exclusion also applies to the accused in a criminal case since, as has
earlier been explained, he has the right to be present and defend in person and by counsel
at every stage of the proceedings, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the
judgment, unless he expressly or impliedly waives his presence (Sec. l[c], Rule 115).
3. What is the discretion of the Court?
If the witness violates the order of exclusion, the court may bar him from testifying
(People vs. Sandal, et al., 54 Phil. 883) or give little weight to his testimony, aside from his
liability for contempt.

It has also been held that it is within the power of the trial judge to refuse to order the
exclusion of the principal witness of the government during the hearing of a criminal case
and it may not, on that count alone, be considered as an abuse of his discretion (People vs.
Lua Chu, et al., 56 Phil. 44).
4. Rationale for the new exclusions
1. A party who is a natural person - based upon considerations of fundamental fairness,
and in criminal cases, exclusion would raise constitutional issues relating to confrontation and
effective assistance of counsel.
2. A duly designated representative of a judicial entity which is a party to the case –
designed to extend parity of treatment to parties who are not natural persons.
3. A person whose presence is essential to the presentation of the party’s cause –
open-ended addressed to the discretion of the judge.
4. A person authorized by statute to be present – is intended to allow for possible future
exemptions that may be granted by law.
5. Other examples of exemptions from exclusion
a. Agent of a party who handled the transaction.
b. One who committed the act causing injury for which recovery is sought.
c. Experts because they are allowed to testify to opinions or inferences based on facts or
data made known at the hearing.
d. Some states in the US exempt victims or complaining witnesses in criminal cases.
(example of by statute)
JURISPRUDENCE
PEOPLE VS. SANDAL
G.R. NOS. 32394, 32395 – SEPT. 5, 1930
Topic: Exclusion of Witnesses
Under the circumstances of the case, it lies within the trial court's discretion to allow or
not to allow a witness to testify, who, notwithstanding the order excluding witnesses from
the court room, remained there, although this court believes that the testimony of said
witnesses should have been admitted. And since there is nothing to show what this witness
would have stated in his testimony, it cannot be held that his failure to testify has materially
affected the appellants' defense.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA ET. AL.
A.M. NO. 01-4-03-SC – JUNE 29, 2001
Topic: Exclusion of Witnesses
Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the
hearings intended to assure a fair trial.
DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS.
ERISTINGCOL
G.R. NO. 193966 – FEBRUARY 19, 2014
Topic: Exclusion of Witnesses
Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or
ordering that these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent
them from conversing with one another. The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify
to the truth by preventing them from being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In
other words, this measure is meant to prevent connivance or collusion among witnesses.
The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has long been recognized as a means of
discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any motion from the
opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a
witness from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses.
DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS.
ERISTINGCOL
G.R. NO. 193966 – FEBRUARY 19, 2014
Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court
cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the
latter heard the testimony of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's
counsel to protect the interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses.
AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF
DOCUMENTS
Rule 132, Sections 19-33
Old Rules Proposed Amendment
SECTION 19. Classes of documents SECTION 19. Classes of documents
For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private. documents are either public or private.
Public documents are: Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts or records of the official (a) The written official acts, or records of the sovereign
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
tribunals and public officers, whether of the officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
Philippines, or of a foreign country; country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments; and except last wills and testaments;
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private (c) documents that are considered public documents
documents required by law to be entered therein. under treaties and conventions which are in force
All other writings are private. between the Philippines and the country of source;
and
(d) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Authentication – the process of proving the due execution and genuineness of the document.
CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS

1. Public Documents – a document acknowledged before persons


authorized to administer oaths. “Official Documents”
• A document to be public must be an official written act of a public officer
• A foreign decision purporting to be the written record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country is a public writing.
CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS

2. Private Documents – includes commercial documents


PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRIVATE DOCUMENTS
Generally, are admissible in evidence NOT Self Authenticating. It must be proved
without further proof of its genuineness and relative to its genuineness and due execution
due execution (Antillon v. Barcelon); before it may be received in evidence
Except, where a special rule of law requires
proof thereof despite its being a document
acknowledged (e.g., probate of notarial
wills).
Binds and can be used in evidence even Binds only the parties who executed it or
against 3rd persons, of the fact which gave their privies, insofar as due execution and
rise to its due execution and to the date of the date of the document concerned.
latter.
CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS

However, private documents required by law to be entered in public


records may be considered “public documents.”
If a private writing itself is inserted officially into a public record, its record,
its recordation or its incorporation into the public record becomes a public
document but that does not make the private writing itself a public
document so as to make it admissible without authentication. (Republic v.
Worldwide Insurance & Surety)
SECTIONS 20, 21, AND 22 ARE RULES ON THE
AUTHENTICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS.

Doctrine of self-authentication
• Where the facts in the writing could only have been known to the writer.

Doctrine of authentication of the adverse party


• Where the reply of the adverse party refers to and affirms the transmittal
to him and his receipt of the letter in question, a copy of which the
proponent is offering in evidence.
REQUISITES FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A PRIVATE
DOCUMENT
SECTION 20. Proof of private document.
Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By other evidence showing its due execution and authenticity.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
SECTION 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he or she has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his or hers upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge.

Note:
Sec. 22 merely enumerates the methods of proving handwriting but does not give preference or priority to a
particular method (Lopez v. CA)Note
AUTHENTICITY AND DUE EXECUTION OF A PRIVATE
DOCUMENT IS PROVED BY EVIDENCE OF THE
GENUINENESS OF THE HANDWRITING OF THE MAKER.
Handwriting is proved by:
1. Testimony of the purported writer (Sec. 22)
2. A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument (Sec. 20a)
3. A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion thereon, such
opinion being an exception to the opinion rule (Sec. 22)
4. A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted genuine
specimens thereof (Sec. 22)
5. Expert Evidence (Sec. 49)
Section 20. Proof of private documents. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By other evidence showing its due execution and authenticity.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (20)

Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. - Where a private document is more than
thirty (30) years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any
alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given. (21)

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. - The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he or she has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to
be his or hers upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge. (22)
AUTHENTICATION OF A DOCUMENT IS NOT
REQUIRED WHEN:
1. The writing is an Ancient Document (Sec. 21)
2. When the writing is a public document on record (Sec. 19)
3. When it is a notarial document, acknowledged, proved and certified in
accordance with Sec. 30
4. When the authenticity and due execution of the document has been
expressly and impliedly admitted by failure to deny the same under oath
(e.g., actionable documents)
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE

• Section 23. Public documents as evidence. - Documents


consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter. (23)
RISE TO THEIR EXECUTION AND OF THE DATE OF
THE LATTER.
• The law does not specifically provide that the contents of public
instruments without distinction are equally evidence against 3rd parties.
• The probative value of public instruments depends on the kind of
document that is presented in evidence.
SECTION 24. Proof of official record.
The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his or her deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.

If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, which is a contracting party to a treaty or convention to which the
Philippines is also a party, or considered a public document under such treaty or convention pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 19
hereof, the certificate or its equivalent shall be in the form prescribed by such treaty or convention subject to reciprocity granted to
public documents originating from the Philippines.

For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a contracting party to a treaty or convention referred to in the next
preceding sentence, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his or her office.

A document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate
or its equivalent being prima facie evidence of the due execution and
genuineness of the document involved. The certificate shall not be required when a treaty or convention between a foreign country and
the Philippines has abolished the requirement, or has exempted the document itself from this formality.
Sec. 24 lays down the requirements for the admissibility in evidence of a foreign public
document.
Absent the attestation of the proper officer, a mere copy of the foreign
document is not admissible as evidence to prove the foreign law. (Wildvalley Shipping Co.
v. CA)

Amendment
The amendments are envisioned to distinguish between public documents (e.g., official
records) that emanate from countries that are signatories or parties to treaties or
conventions to which the Philippines is a party and countries that are not signatories or
parties to such treaties or conventions
SECTION 25. What attestation of copy must state.
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be
any, or if he or she be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
SECTION 26. Irremovability of public record.
Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept,
except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record
is essential to the just determination of a pending case.

Generally, a public record cannot be removed from the office which it is kept.
Except, it may be removed by order of the court but only when essential to the just
determination of a pending case (e.g., subpoena duces tecum). The rule however, refers
only to a public record, an official copy of which could be made available to the interested
party and is admissible in evidence.
SECTION 27. Public record of a private document
An authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested
by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody.

If a private writing itself is inserted officially into a public record, its record, its recordation
or its incorporation into the public record becomes a public document but that does not
make the private writing itself a public document so as to make it admissible without
authentication. (Republic v. Worldwide Insurance & Surety)
SECTION 28. Proof of lack of record.
A written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his or her deputy that, after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his or her office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his or her office contain no
such record or entry.
SECTION 29. How judicial record impeached.
Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of:
(a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer;
(b) collusion between the parties; or
(c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the
proceedings.
SECTION 30. Proof of notarial documents.
Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.

Notarial Document is one which is duly acknowledged before a notary public, who must
be duly authorized and must have notarized said document in accordance with the Notarial
Law. Notarial documents are public documents.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE PROVED BY:

1. the original copy;


2. an official publication thereof; or
3. a certified true copy thereof.
TO BE ADMISSIBLE, A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY, WHEN
PRESENTED, SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING:

1. The provisions that should appear in the certification or attestation of


the said copy. (Sec. 24-25)
2. It must have the documentary stamp affixed unless specifically exempted
as in the case of baptismal or birth certificate.
It is presumed that the requisite stamps have been affixed to the original copy of a
document where only the carbon copies thereof are available. (Mahilum, et. al. v. CA)

When a Special Power of Attorney is executed and acknowledged before a notary


public or other competent officer in a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in evidence
in RP courts unless it is certified as such in accordance with Sec. 24. (Lopez v. CA)
RULES ON BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATES:

• Those issued by priests during the Spanish regime are considered as public
documents. (Adriano v. De Jesus)
• Those issued after the Spanish regime are considered as private documents and
cannot even be considered as prima facie evidence of the fact that gave rise to
its execution and it is considered hearsay. Unless, the priest who performed the
baptismal rites are produced. (People v. Barcebal)
• A baptismal certificate is proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized
the child but not the veracity of the declarations and statements in the certificate
concerning the relationship of the person baptized. (Macadangdang v. CA)
RULES ON BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATES:

• However, foregoing doctrines have been modified by the Supreme Court in


determining the minority of a victim in statutory rape or where that fact is an
element of qualified rape. While recognizing the primacy of a birth certificate as
proof of the victim’s age, it held that, in the absence of such evidence, the victim’s
minority may be proved by other documentary evidence such as her baptismal
certificate or other authentic records. (People v. Llandelar)
• o The status of some of the plaintiffs was proved by their baptismal certificates as
acceptable documentary evidence of their legitimate filiation, and those of the
others were established by proof of the destruction of the pertinent birth
certificates in the office of the local civil registrar and/or were buttressed by
testimonial evidence that they enjoyed that common reputation in their community
or continuously possessed the status of legitimate children. (Cruz, et. al. v. Cristobal)
A death certificate is not proof of the cause of death, its probative value
being confined only to the fact of death, and the statement therein
contained regarding the duration of illness and the cause of death are
mere hearsay. (Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada)

However, it has been held that a death certificate is admissible to


prove the residence of the deceased at the time of his death. (Garcia Fule
v. Malvar, etc., et al.)
SECTION 33. Documentary evidence in an
unofficial language.
Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be
admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption
of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed
to have such translation prepared before trial.
SECTION 32. Seal.
There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed
private documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence
is concerned.

SECTION 33. Documentary evidence in an


unofficial language.
Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be
admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation
into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings,
parties or their attorneys are directed to have such
translation prepared before trial.
The 1935 Constitution (Sec. 3, Art. XIV) provided that “until otherwise provided by law,
English and Spanish shall continue as official languages.” The 1973 Constitution (Sec. 3[3],
Art. XV) provided that “until otherwise provided by law, English and Pilipino shall be the
official languages.”

However, under the 1987 Constitution, the official languages are Filipino and, until
otherwise provided by law, English, with the regional languages as auxiliary official
languages in the region (Sec. 7, Art. XIV).
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC             July 17, 2001


SECTION 1. BURDEN OF PROVING AUTHENTICITY
The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided in this Rule.
SECTION 2. MANNER OF AUTHENTICATION
Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have
signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be
authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic
documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the
judge.
SECTION 3. PROOF OF ELECTRONICALLY
NOTARIZED DOCUMENT
A document electronically notarized in accordance with the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public
document and proved as a notarial document under the Rules of Court.
RULE 6: ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
SECTION 1. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE.
An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticated in the manner
prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent
of the signature of a person on a written document.
SECTION 2. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURES
An electronic signature may be authenticated in any of the following
manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital
signature and verify the same;
(b) By any other means provided by law; or
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the
genuineness of the electronic signature.
SECTION 3. DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS RELATION
TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
Upon the authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:
(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating
or approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person’s
consent to the transaction embodied therein; and
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic signature operated
without error or fault.
SECTION 4. DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS RELATING
TO DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Upon the authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to
those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:
(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
(c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the
time it was signed; and
(d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein
RULE 9: METHOD OF PROOF
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
SECTION 1. AFFIDAVIT OF EVIDENCE

All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an


electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct
personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The
affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on
the matters contained therein.
SECTION 2. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEPONENT

The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents of the affidavit in open court
and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse party
RULE 11: AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO
AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
SECTION 1. AUDIO,VIDEO AND SIMILAR EVIDENCE

Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall


be admissible provided is shall be shown, presented or displayed to the
court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who
made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the
accuracy thereof.
SECTION 2. EPHEMERAL ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATION
Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In
the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence
may be admitted. A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral
electronic communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding
section. If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an
electronic document, then the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT
Sections 5, 6-15
SEC. 5. DEFINITION OF TERMS

For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
a. Addressee refers to a person who is intended by the originator to receive the
electronic data message or electronic document. The term does not include a person
acting as an intermediary with respect to that electronic data message or electronic
document.
b. Computer refers to any device or apparatus which, by electronic, electro-mechanical
or magnetic impulse, or by other means, is capable of receiving, recording, transmitting,
storing, processing, retrieving, or producing information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression according to mathematical and logical rules or of
performing any one or more of those functions.
SEC. 5. DEFINITION OF TERMS

c. Electronic Data message refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by


electronic, optical or similar means.
d. Information and communication system refers to a system intended for and capable of
generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or
electronic documents and includes the computer system or other similar device by or in
which data is recorded or stored and any procedures related to the recording or storage of
electronic data message or electronic document.
e. Electronic signature refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic
form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the
electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures
employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention
of authenticating or approving an electronic data message or electronic document.
SEC. 5. DEFINITION OF TERMS

f. Electronic document refers to information or the representation of information, data,


figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a
fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
g. Electronic key refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive
information that crosses over public channels into a form decipherable only with a
matching electronic key.
h. Intermediary refers to a person who in behalf of another person and with respect to
a particular electronic document sends, receives and/or stores or provides other
services in respect of that electronic document.
SEC. 5. DEFINITION OF TERMS

i. Originator refers to a person by whom, or on whose behalf, the


electronic document purports to have been created, generated and/or
sent . The term does not include a person acting as an intermediary with
respect to that electronic document.
j. Service provider refers to a provider of –
(i) On-line services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor,
including entities offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for
online communications, digital or otherwise, between or among points specified by
a user, of electronic documents of the user’s choosing; or
(ii) The necessary technical means by which electronic documents of an originator
may be stored and made accessible to a designated or undesignated third party;
SEC. 5. DEFINITION OF TERMS

Such service providers shall have no authority to modify or alter the


content of the electronic data message or electronic document received
or to make any entry therein on behalf of the originator, addressee or
any third party unless specifically authorized to do so, and who shall
retain the electronic document in accordance with the specific request
or as necessary for the purpose of performing the services it was
engaged to perform.
SEC. 6. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF DATA MESSAGES

Information shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely


on the grounds that it is in the data message purporting to give rise to such
legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in that electronic data message.
SEC. 7. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS
Electronic documents shall have the legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other
document or legal writing, and –
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an
electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability
and can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that –\
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the
addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arises in
the normal course of communication, storage and display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was
generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
SEC. 7. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not being presented or
retained in its original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original form,
that requirement is met by an electronic document if –
(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the
time when it was first generated in its final form; and
(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be
presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all
requirements of existing laws on formalities required in the execution of
documents for their validity.
SEC. 7. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional
equivalent of a written document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of
electronic data messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating
to authentication and best evidence.
SEC. 8. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURES
An electronic signature on the electronic document shall be equivalent to the signature of
a person on a written document if that signature is proved by showing that a prescribed
procedure, not alterable by the parties interested in the electronic document, existed
under which –
a.) A method is used to identify the party sought to be bound and to indicate
said party’s access to the electronic document necessary for his consent or
approval through the electronic signature;
b.) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose for which the
electronic document was generated or communicated, in the light of all the
circumstances, including any relevant agreement;
SEC. 8. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURES
c.) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in order to proceed further with
the transaction, to have executed or provided the electronic signature; and
d.) The other party is authorized and enabled to verify the electronic signature and to
make the decision to proceed with the transaction authenticated by the same.
SEC. 9. PRESUMPTION RELATING TO ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURES
In any proceedings involving an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that –
a.) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates;
and
b.) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing
or approving the electronic document unless the person relying on the
electronically signed electronic document knows or has notice of defects in or
unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic signature is not
reasonable under the circumstances.
SEC. 10. ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

(1) Where the law requires information to be presented or retained in its


original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data message or
electronic document if:
(a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first
generated in its final form, as an electronic data message or electronic
document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and
(b) where it is required that information be presented, that the
information is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to
be presented.
SEC. 10. ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of
an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the
information not being presented or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has
remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement
and any change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage
and display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the
purpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all
relevant circumstances
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Until the Supreme Court by appropriate rules shall have so provided, electronic
documents, electronic data messages and electronic signatures, shall be
authenticated by demonstrating, substantiating and validating a claimed identity of
a user, device, or another entity in an information or communication system,
among other ways, as follows:
(a) The electronic signature shall be authenticated by proof that a letter,
character, number or other symbol in electronic form representing the
persons named in and attached to or logically associated with an electronic
data message, electronic document, or that the appropriate methodology or
security procedures, when applicable, were employed or adopted by a person
and executed or adopted by such person, with the intention of authenticating
or approving an electronic data message or electronic document;
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
(b) The electronic data message and electronic document shall be
authenticated by proof that an appropriate security procedure, when applicable
was adopted and employed for the purpose of verifying the originator of an
electronic data message and/or electronic document, or detecting error or
alteration in the communication, content or storage of an electronic document
or electronic data message from a specific point, which, using algorithm or
codes, identifying words or numbers, encryptions, answers back or
acknowledgement procedures, or similar security devices.
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
The Supreme Court may adopt such other authentication procedures,
including the use of electronic notarization systems as necessary and
advisable, as well as the certificate of authentication on printed or hard
copies of the electronic document or electronic data messages by
electronic notaries, service providers and other duly recognized or
appointed certification authorities.
The person seeking to introduce an electronic data message and electronic
document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity
by evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic data message
and electronic document is what the person claims it to be.
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the information
and communication system in which an electronic data message or
electronic document is recorded or stored may be established in any legal
proceeding –
(a) By evidence that at all material times the information and communication
system or other similar device was operating in a manner that did not affect
the integrity of the electronic data message and/or electronic document, and
there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the
information and communication system;
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
(b) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document
was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in
interest to the party using it; or
(c) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document
was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a
person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the
control of the party using the record.
SEC. 12. ADMISSIBILITY AND EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT
OF ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE AND ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS.
– In any legal proceedings, nothing in the application of the rules on evidence shall
deny the admissibility of an electronic data message or electronic document in
evidence –
a. On the sole ground that it is in electronic form; or
b. On the ground that it is not in the standard written form and electronic data message or
electronic document meeting, and complying with the requirements under Sections 6 or 7
hereof shall be the best evidence of the agreement and transaction contained therein.
In assessing the evidential weight of an electronic data message or electronic document, the
reliability of the manner in which it was generated, stored or communicated, the reliability of
the manner in which its originator was identified, and other relevant factors shall be given due
regard.
SEC. 13. RETENTION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGE AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
Notwithstanding any provision of law, rule or regulation to the contrary –
(a) The requirement in any provision of law that certain documents be
retained in their original form is satisfied by retaining them in the form of an
electronic data message or electronic document which –
i. Remains accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference;
ii. Is retained in the format in which it was generated, sent or
received, or in a format which can be demonstrated to accurately
represent the electronic data message or electronic document
generated, sent or received;
SEC. 13. RETENTION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGE AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
iii. Enables the identification of its originator and addressee, as well
as the determination of the date and the time it was sent or
received.
(b) The requirement referred to in paragraph (a) is satisfied by using the
services of a third party, provided that the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (i),
(ii) and (iii) of paragraph (a) are met.
SEC. 14. PROOF BY AFFIDAVIT.

The matters referred to in Section 12, on admissibility and Section 9, on the


presumption of integrity, may be presumed to have been established by an
affidavit given to the best of the deponent’s knowledge subject to the rights
of parties in interest as defined in the following section.
SEC. 15. CROSS-EXAMINATION.

(1) A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section 14 that has been


introduced in evidence may be cross-examined as of right by a party to the
proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party who has introduced the
affidavit or has caused the affidavit to be introduced.
(2) Any party to the proceedings has the right to cross-examine a person
referred to in Section 11, paragraph 4, sub-paragraph c.
JURISPRUDENCE
BUNAG V. CA
158 SCRA 299 | FEBRUARY 29, 1988 | CORTES, J.:
The validity and authenticity of the execution of an unnotarized
deed of absolute sale must be proven, more so if such was signed
by a mere thumbmark and that there were no instrumental
witnesses.
HEIRS OF LACSA V. CA
197 SCRA 234 | MAY 20, 1991 | PADILLA, J.:
The requirements for the application of the “Ancient Document Rule” is that the document must be:
1) at least 30 years old;
2) is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
3) unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. Also, when the copy of a document is
certified as an exact copy by a public office in which the original is located, said copy is considered as
compliant with the 2nd requirement mentioned above.
(N.B. Under Section 21 of R. 132 . When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. - Where a
private document is more than thirty (30) years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found
if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity
need be given. (21)
BARTOLOME V. IAC
183 SCRA 102 | MARCH 12, 1990 | FERNAN, C.J.:
The requirements for the application of the “Ancient Document Rule” is that the
document must be:
1) at least 30 years old;
2) is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine;
and
3) unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. Also, when the
copy of a document is certified as an exact copy by a public office in which the
original is located, said copy is considered as compliant with the 2 nd requirement
mentioned above.
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING V. NLRC
161 SCRA 122 | MAY 6, 1988 | FELICIANO, J.:
A copy of a decision of a foreign court sought to be enforced in the Philippines
must be attested by the legal custodian of the original with a certificate from the
Philippine embassy and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Documents written in an unofficial language must be accompanied by a translation
into English or Filipino made by an official court interpreter, an interpreter
competent in both languages whose identity is revealed, or a translator agreed
upon by the parties. The translation may also be one sworn to by translator as an
accurate translation of the original or the translation may be agreed upon by the
parties as a true and faithful one.
ZALAMEA V. CA
228 SCRA 23 | NOVEMBER 18, 1993 | NOCON, J.:
Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officers having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
PEOPLE V. MONLEON
74 SCRA 263 | DECEMBER 10, 1976 | AQUINO, J.:
Affidavits written entirely in local dialects must be accompanied
by a translation for it to be admitted in court.
PEOPLE V. LAZARO
G.R. NO. 112090, OCTOBER 26, 1999
Either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of
illegal firearms.
PEOPLE VS. BURGOS, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 92739, AUGUST 02, 1991
Technically and realistically speaking, diskettes are deemed
integral parts of a computer system, the diskettes constituting
one of the "input-output devices" or "peripherals," in the same
manner that the keyboard is an "input-output device" and the
monitor, keyboard and printer are "peripherals" in relation to the
memory or central processing unit (CPU) of a computer system.
IBM PHILS. INC.V. NLRC
G.R. NO. 117221, APRIL 13, 1999
Computer print-outs to be admissible must be properly certified
or authenticated or have an assurance of their authenticity.
AZNAR VS. CITITBANK
G.R. NO. 164273, MARCH 28, 2007
Whenever any private document offered as authentic is received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
NUEZ V. CRUZ
A.M. NO. CA-05-18-P : APRIL 12, 2005
“Ephemeral electronic communication” which refers to
telephone conversations, text messages and other electronic
forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded
or retained,” must be proven by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof.
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS V. SALUD
A.M. NO. CA-05-20-P, SEPTEMBER 09, 2007
The Court ruled that text messages have to comply with the requirements on proof of evidence. The
complainant in administrative proceedings has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by
substantial evidence. If a court employee is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him
must be competent and derived from direct knowledge; as such, charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence. Thus, if the complainant fails to substantiate a claim of corruption
and bribery, relying on mere conjectures and suppositions, the administrative complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit. However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to
establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.
The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason
of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.
PATULA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 164457, APRIL 11, 2012
RULING:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented
as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has
been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with
the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is
self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person
without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or
agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or
the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by
law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.
PATULA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 164457, APRIL 11, 2012
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of
Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity
of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse
party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted,
or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
PATULA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 164457, APRIL 11, 2012
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private
documents because private individuals executed or generated them for private or
business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of
the four exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against
petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the
manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz:
PATULA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 164457, APRIL 11, 2012
Section 20. Proof of private documents. – Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document
need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
HEIRS OF OCHOA V. G.S TRANSPORT
G.R. NO. 170071, JULY 16, 2012
RULING:
The CA sweepingly concluded that the USAID Certification is self-serving and
unreliable without elaborating on how it was able to arrive at such a conclusion. A
research on USAID reveals that it is the “principal [United States] agency to extend
assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging
in democratic reforms.” It is an “independent federal government agency that receives
over-all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of the State [of the United States].”
HEIRS OF OCHOA V. G.S TRANSPORT
G.R. NO. 170071, JULY 16, 2012
Given this background, it is highly improbable that such an agency will issue a
certification containing unreliable information regarding an employee’s income. Besides,
there exists a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Absent any
showing to the contrary, it is presumed that Cruz, as Chief of Human Resources
Division of USAID, has regularly performed his duty relative to the issuance of said
certification and therefore, the correctness of its contents can be relied upon. This
presumption remains especially so where the authenticity, due execution and
correctness of said certification have not been put in issue either before the trial court
or the CA.
CERCADO-SIZA V. CERCADO, JR.
G.R. NO. 185374, MARCH 11, 2015
RULING
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early
as in the case of U.S. v. Evangelista, it has been settled that church registries
of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public
writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are
private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all
other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.
CERCADO-SIZA V. CERCADO, JR.
G.R. NO. 185374, MARCH 11, 2015
Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that
it is a duplicate original, hence, the original need not be produced. The Court does
not agree. The Court had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals that " a
signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the
original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without
accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified
document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is
because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy."
CERCADO-SIZA V. CERCADO, JR.
G.R. NO. 185374, MARCH 11, 2015
On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligaya’s kinship is a
Joint Affidavit executed by two persons to the effect that she was born to
Vicente and Benita. These two affiants were never presented in court. Thus,
their statement is tantamount to hearsay evidence.
CERCADO-SIZA V. CERCADO, JR.
G.R. NO. 185374, MARCH 11, 2015
Petitioners also presented certifications from the local civil registrar certifying that
the records of birth from 1930 to 1946 were destroyed by fire and/or war. In said
documents, there contains an advice that petitioners may make a further
verification with the NSO because the local civil registrar submits a copy of the
birth certificate of every registered birth with the NSO. The advice was not
heeded. Petitioners failed to present a certification from NSO whether such
records do exist or not. Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of
the marriage between Vicente and Benita, it follows that they do not have a cause
of action in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.
DIZON V. BELTRAN
G.R. NO. 221071, JAN. 18, 2017
RULING:
With respect to deeds of sale or conveyance, what spells the difference
between a public document and a private document is the acknowledgment
in the former that the parties acknowledging the document appear before
the notary public and specifically manifest under oath that they are the
persons who executed it, and acknowledge that the same are their free act
and deed.
DIZON V. BELTRAN
G.R. NO. 221071, JAN. 18, 2017
In the instant petition,Vida impliedly admits the irregularity of the Deed’s notarization as both
of the vendors were not personally present. Consequently, due execution can no longer be
presumed. Besides, the extant circumstances surrounding the controversy constitute
preponderant evidence suggesting that forgery was committed. Eddie promptly filed a criminal
case for falsification of documents and a civil case to nullify the Deed. Later, the Office of the
Davao City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Vida for falsification. Consequently, the
issue of ownership cannot be disregarded in the unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing
though that while the RTC aptly resolved the issue of ownership, it is at best preliminary and
shall not be determinative of the outcome of the two other cases filed by Eddie against Vida.
REPUBLIC V. GALENO
G.R. NO. 215009, JANUARY 23, 2017
RULING:
The foregoing documentary evidence presented by the respondent are not
sufficient to warrant the correction prayed for. SC cannot accord probative
weight upon them in view of the fact that the public officers who issued the
same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated therein. In Republic v.
Medida, the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical
Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein, holding that:
REPUBLIC V. GALENO
G.R. NO. 215009, JANUARY 23, 2017
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
be entered therein.
REPUBLIC V. GALENO
G.R. NO. 215009, JANUARY 23, 2017
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to
in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
“Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are
evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.”
REPUBLIC V. GALENO
G.R. NO. 215009, JANUARY 23, 2017
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do
not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first
sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect “entries
in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer,”
such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a
ship captain in the ship’s logbook. The certifications are not the certified
copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal
custody of a government office.
APOSTILLE
(FROM THE CONSULAR.DFA.GOV.PH)

• An Apostille is a certificate that authenticates the origin of a public document. It is issued by a country that is
party to the Apostille Convention to be used in another country which is also a party to the Convention.

On 14 May 2019, the Philippines became a party to the Apostille Convention. Authentication is still
required for all Philippine documents to be used abroad, but this time with an Apostille instead of an
Authentication Certificate (“red ribbon”) as proof of authentication.

After authentication (Apostillization) by DFA-OCA, as Competent Authority, there is no more need for
authentication (legalization) by the Embassies or Consulates except for non-Apostille countries and those that
objected to the Philippine accession.
APOSTILLE APPLIES TO

• The Apostille Convention only applies if both the country where the public document
was issued and the country where the public document is to be used are parties to the
Convention.
• Like in non-Apostille countries, the Philippine Apostille cannot be readily used in Austria,
Finland, Germany and Greece (Apostille countries that objected to the Philippine
accession). Documents from and to such countries will require legalization by the
concerned Embassy or Consulate.
BENEFITS OF APOSTILLE

• The Apostille streamlines the whole authentication procedure of documents for use
abroad resulting to more convenience, less cost and processing time for the applicants.
Before Apostille, a Philippine document to be used abroad needs a Certification by the
relevant government agency or office, Authentication by the DFA and Authentication
(Legalization) by the Embassy or Consulate of the country of destination.

With the Apostille, the aforementioned document will no longer require legalization by
the Foreign Embassy or Consulate if the country of destination is also an Apostille
country.
EFFECTS OF APOSTILLE

• Just like the Authentication Certificate (or “red ribbon”), an Apostille only
certifies the origin of the public document to which it relates: it certifies the
authenticity of the signature or seal of the person or authority that signed or
sealed the public document and the capacity in which this was done.

An Apostille does not certify the content of the public document to which it
relates.
OFFER OF EVIDENCE
Rule 132 Sections 34 - 36
SECTION 34. OFFER OF EVIDENCE.

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
SECTION 35. WHEN TO MAKE AN OFFER

Section 35. When to make offer. - The offer OF THE


TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS IN EVIDENCE must be made at
the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the
presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be
done orally.
WHEN TO MAKE OFFER OF EVIDENCE:

Testimonial/Oral Evidence Documentary and Object Evidence


must be made at the time the witness After the party has presented his
is called to testify. testimonial evidence, before he rests.
Note: Implied offer – Every time a question is asked of a witness, there is an implied automatic offer of the
evidence sought to be elicited by the question. If there is any objection to the question, the same must be
raised immediately otherwise there is a waiver.

Thus, oral evidence is always being offered TWICE:


1. Before the witness testifies; and
2. Every time a question is asked of him.
PROCEDURE BEFORE DOCUMENTARY AND OBJECT
EVIDENCE CAN BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT:
1. Marking;
2. Identification;
3. Authentication; (may be dispensed with if document is a pubic document
or document has been duly executed and genuine)
4. Formal offer; and
5. If the evidence is excluded, an offer of proof.
PROCEDURE BEFORE DOCUMENTARY AND OBJECT
EVIDENCE CAN BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT:
Identification Formal Offer
Done in the course of the trial and is Done when the party has presented his
accompanied by the marking of the evidence testimonial evidence.
as an exhibit.

Note: Documents which may have been marked as exhibits during the hearing but were
not formally offered in evidence cannot be considered as evidence nor can they be given
any evidentiary value.
SECTION 36. OBJECTION

Section 36. Objection. – ALL EVIDENCE MUST BE offered orally AND THE
OBJECTION THERETO must be made immediately after the offer is made.
OBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS FOR LACK OF A FORMAL
OFFER MUST BE MADE AS SOON AS THE WITNESS BEGINS TO TESTIFY.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a
witness MUST be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably
apparent. The grounds for the objections must be specified
WHEN TO MAKE OBJECTION:

Depends on the manner the evidence is offered.

Manner of Offering Time to Make Objection


Evidence offered orally Immediately after the offer is made
Testimony of a witness for lack of a As soon as the witness begins to
formal offer testify
Questions propounded in the course As soon as the grounds therefor
of the oral examination of a witness become reasonably apparent

Note: Objection not made at the proper time will be considered WAIVED.
Objection must be specific:
1. So that the judge may understand the question raised and that the adversary may have an opportunity to
remedy the defect, if possible;
2. To make a proper record for the reviewing court in the event of an appeal;
JURISPRUDENCE
PEOPLE VS CARIÑO ET AL
G.R. NO. 73876 – SEPTEMBER 26, 1988
Evidence not formally offered cannot be considered by the court.
INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC.VS AVILES
G.R. NO. 86062 – JUNE 6, 1990
Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it
was formally offered, and not when the particular document is
marked as identified and as an exhibit.
DELOS REYES VS IAC
G.R. NO. 74768 – AUGUST 11, 1989
Formal offer of evidence is hardly applicable in summary
proceedings where no full-blown trial is held in the interest of a
speedy administration of justice.
PEOPLE VS YATCO
G.R. NO. L-9181 – NOVEMBER 28, 1955
The right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may
waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not
reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court
has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL
INSURANCE CO., INC.VS SWEET LINES, INC.
G.R. NO. 87434 – AUGUST 5, 1992
When the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are
deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make
a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be
presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an
admitted fact.
OBJECTION
Rule 132. Sections 37-38a
Revised Rules on Evidence Proposed Amendments
Section 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. — Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. – When it
When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the
examination of a witness that the question being propounded examination of a witness that the questions being
are of the same class as those to which objection has been propounded are of the same class as those to which objection
made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it has been made, whether such objection was sustained or
shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it
sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing being sufficient for the adverse party to record his OR HER
objection to such class of questions. (37a) continuing objection to such class of questions. (37a)

Section 38. Ruling. — The ruling of the court must be given


immediately after the objection is made, unless the court
desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the
question presented; but the ruling shall always be made
during the trial and at such time as will give the party against
whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation
presented by the ruling. No amendments
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not
be stated. However, if the objection is based on two or more
grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of
them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon. (38a)
WHEN IS A REPETITION OF OBJECTION
UNNECESSARY? (SECTION 37)
It shall not be necessary to repeat the objection when it becomes reasonably apparent in
the course of the examination of a witness:
● That the question being propounded are of the same class as those to which objection has been made;
● Whether such objection was sustained or overruled.
● It being sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions.

The party may just enter a general and continuing objection to the same class of evidence and the
ruling of the court shall be applicable to all such evidence of the same class. The court may also motu
proprio treat the objection as a continuing one,
WHEN MUST THE RULING OF THE COURT BE
GIVEN? (SECTION 38)
● Immediately AFTER the objection is made,
● UNLESS the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform
itself on the question presented;
BUT THE RULING SHALL ALWAYS BE MADE:

● During the trial and


● At such time as will give the party against whom it is made an
opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
MUST THE REASON FOR SUSTAINING OR
OVERRULING AN OBJECTION NEED TO BE STATED?
No. However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds a
ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them must
specify the ground or grounds relied upon.
JURISPRUDENCE
CATUIRA V. CA
236 SCRA 398
Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse
party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object.
But such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the
objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there
is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections.
SHERATON PALACE V. QUIJANO
64 O.G. 9116
The admission of the said affidavit without any objection on the part of the
defendant merely means that the same was admitted for the purpose for
which it was offered but such admission does not mean that the defendant
is precluded from presenting evidence to contradict the facts in the said
Exhibit including the statement therein that the defendant is indebted to
plaintiff.
VDA. DE OÑATE V. CA
250 SCRA 283
Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial
court provided the following requirements are present, viz .: first, the same
must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the
same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
HEIRS OF PASAG VS. PAROCHA
G.R. NO. 155483
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a
formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver
to submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall be
excluded and rejected.
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE
Rule 133, Sections 1-7
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases,
the party having burden of proof must establish his OR HER case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses'
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far
as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal, unless his OR HER guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind

Section 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. — An


extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

INFERENCES CANNOT BE BASED ON ANOTHER INFERENCE.


Section 5. Weight to be given to opinion of expert witness, how determined.
– In any case where the opinion of an expert witness is received in evidence
the court has a wide latitude of discretion in determining the weight to be
given to such opinion and for that purpose may consider the following:
(A) whether the opinion is based upon sufficient facts or data;
(B) whether it is the product of of reliable principles and methods;
(C) whether the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case, and
(d) such other factors as the court may deem helpful to make such
determination.
Old Rule Proposed Amendment
Section 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed Change in section number only (Section 6)
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact
may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
Section 6. Power of the court to stop further Section 7. Power of the court to stop further
evidence. — The court may stop the introduction of evidence. — The court may stop the introduction of
further testimony upon any particular point when the further testimony upon any particular point when the
evidence upon it is already so full that more evidence upon it is already so full that more
witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably
expected to be additionally persuasive. But this expected to be additionally persuasive. But this
power should be exercised with caution. power SHALL be exercised with caution.
Section 7. Evidence on motion. — When a motion is
based on facts not appearing of record the court may
hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented Transposed to Section 15 on Motions of the
by the respective parties, but the court may direct Proposed Rules on Civil Procedure.
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.
1. WHAT IS WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE?

The balance or preponderance of evidence; the inclination of the greater


amount of credible evidence offered in a trial to support one side of the
issue rather than the other.
2. WHAT IS SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE?

The concept that the evidence submitted may have its own probative value
but in the appreciation thereof proper degrees are considered by the
Court.
3. IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN AFFIDAVIT
AND TESTIMONY WHICH HAS MORE WEIGHT?
The testimony should be given more weight.
4. WHAT IS THE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY
VALUE?
The hierarchy of evidentiary value shall be
a. Proof beyond reasonable doubt;
b. Clear and convincing evidence;
c. Preponderance of evidence;
d. Substantial evidence.
5. WHAT IS PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?

It is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight
of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence”.
6. WHAT IS THE CHARACTERISTIC OF
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?
It is evidence which is more convincing to the Court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
7. WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE?
It refers to evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing, than that
which is offered in opposition to it.
8. WHAT ARE THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?
the Court may consider:
a. All the facts and circumstances of the case;
b. The witnesses’ manner of testifying
c. Their intelligence
d. Their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying
e. The nature of the facts to which they testify
f. The probability or improbability of their testimony
8. WHAT ARE THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?
g. Their interest or want of interest
h. Also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial
i. The Court may also consider the number of witnesses, through the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
9. WHAT IS THE EFFECT IF THE PARTY WAS NOT ABLE TO
ESTABLISH THE CASE BY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE?
In civil case if the plaintiff was not able to prove his claim by preponderance
of evidence, the defendant may file a demurrer to evidence based on
insufficiency of evidence.
10. WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT?

In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is


shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
11. WHAT IS THE MEANING OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT?
Such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty.
12. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER TO
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILTLESSNESS?
In order to overcome the presumption of guiltlessness, it must pass the test
of relevancy and competency in accordance with Section 3, Rule 128 of the
Rules of Court.
13. WHAT IS EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION?

A declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily, and without


compulsion or inducement, stating or acknowledging that he has committed
or participated in the commission of a crime. (People vs Mojica)
14. WHAT IS THE REQUIREMENT IN ORDER THAT
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION SHALL BE A GROUND FOR
CONVICTION?
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient
ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
15. WHAT IS THE MEANING OF “CORPUS DELICTI”?

Refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body
or substance of the crime.
16. WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT
CONFESSION IS ADMISSIBLE?

Confession in order to be admissible must concur with the following requisites:


a. The confession must involve an express and categorical acknowledgement of
guilt.
b. The facts admitted must be constitutive of a criminal offense.
c. The confession must have been given voluntarily and intelligently.
d. There must be no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused under Sec.
12, Art. III of the Phil. Constitution
17. WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERLOCKING
CONFESSION? WHAT IS ITS NATURE AND BINDING
EFFECT AGAINST A CO-ACCUSED?
Extrajudicial confessions were independently made without collusion are
identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the
other.
18. WHO HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CASE OF
CONFESSION?

It must be voluntary and the burden of proof rests on defense to prove that
it was involuntarily done.
19. WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE
INADMISSIBILITY OF INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION?

The reason for inadmissibility of an involuntary confession is that they are


unreliable, and on the grounds of humanitarian consideration, and it is
violative of the constitutional right against selfincrimination.
20. WHAT IS THE BINDING EFFECT OF AN EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION? WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS?

As a general rule, extrajudicial confession is binding only on the accused and


NOT on his co-accused.
If the latter did impliedly acquiesce in or adopt said confession by not
questioning its truthfulness as where it was made in his presence and he did
not remonstrate against his being implicated therein.
21. WHAT IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

That evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference


which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.
22. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION?

a. There is more than one circumstances;


b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and;
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
23. WHAT IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

Such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as


adequate to justify a conclusion.
24. WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
IN ADMINISTRATIVE OR QUASI-ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
25. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE?

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, and it is such relevant


evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
26. WHAT IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE?

Clear and convincing evidence is a kind of evidence which established in the


minds of a trier of facts a firm belief on the existence of the fact in issue.
27. WHAT IS THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IN CASE
OF ALIBI TO BE SUSTAINED?

Alibi is to be given weight and credit must be proven by clear and


convincing evidence.
28. WHAT IS THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE IN ORDER
THAT THE DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP BE ADMISSIBLE?

Defense of frame-up to be admissible should be established by clear and


convincing evidence.
29. WHEN CAN THE COURT ORDER THE PARTY TO
STOP FURTHER PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE?

The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any
particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more
witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be
additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution.
(Sec. 6, Rule 133 of the ROC)
30. WHAT IS THE RULE ON EVIDENCE ON MOTION?

When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may
hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective
parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly
on oral testimony or depositions.
CASE DOCTRINES
SULTAN VS MACABANDING

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is


preponderance of evidence. When the complainant adduced preponderant
evidence that his signature was indeed forged in an affidavit which the
respondent notarized and submitted to the COMELEC, respondent should
be held administratively liable for his action.
DALURAYA VS OLIVA, GR NO. 210148

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability
of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being
no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt
of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only.
PEOPLE VS SOLANO, JR.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." In this case, it is beyond
doubt that all the circumstances taken together point to the singular
conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, committed the
crime.
ESPINELI VS. PEOPLE

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances


must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus,
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from
which a court may draw its finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to
rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The records reveal
that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below
were forced to render their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence as
sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA VS HEIRS OF MENDOZA

In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on


the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon
the trial.
TABUADA VS TABUADA

Although documentary evidence may be preferable as proof of a legal


relationship, other evidence of the relationship that are competent and
relevant may not be excluded. The preponderance of evidence, the rule that
is applicable in civil cases, is also known as the greater weight of evidence.
There is a preponderance of evidence when the trier of facts is led to find
that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its
non-existence. In short, the rule requires the consideration of all the facts
and circumstances of the cases, regardless of whether they are object,
documentary, or testimonial.
JURISPRUDENCE
US V. LASADA
18 PHIL. 90
It is always incumbent upon the prosecution in a criminal cause to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if there remains a reasonable
doubt of guilt, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused and he must be
acquitted.
Reasonable Doubt. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may
arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon moral certainty is
required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.
PEOPLE V. ABENDAN
82 PHIL. 711 (1948)
It is not improbable that who admittedly had connection with the Japanese
garrison, was responsible for the death of the victim.; and his disappearance
lends support to that probability. As a matter of fact, the prosecution has
implicated him in this case as a co-principal. And where there are two
likelihoods, that which is consistent with the presumption of innocence will
be adopted.
PEOPLE V. SOLAYAO
262 SCRA 255 (1996)
An admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the commission of the crime charged. By its very nature, an „admission is the
mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be
inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish
his guilt. In other words, it is a statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to
issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove
guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction. From the above
principles, this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged.
PEOPLE V. LORENZO
240 SCRA 624 (1995)
What must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the
testimony of the person to whom the confession is made, and the
corroborative evidence required is that of the corpus delicti.
LEJANO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 176389 14 DECEMBER 2010
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains
doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all
possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it
would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt
hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
On Witnesses
The positive identification must meet at least two criteria. first, the positive identification
of the offender must come from a credible witness, and, second, the witness’ story of
what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.
SISON-BARIAS V. RUBIA
A.M. NO. RTJ-14-2388 10 JUNE 2014
A disinterested witness’ testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack
of interest in the outcome of the case. A disinterested witness’ testimony is
afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of interest in the outcome of the
case. This lack of stake makes the disinterested witness’ testimony more
believable. To actively take part in litigation as a party or a witness entails
willingness to commit to the arduous and exacting nature of most judicial
proceedings. The disinterested witness' candor and submission to the proceedings
before the court add credibility and believability to the content of his or her
testimony.
SULTAN V. MACABANDING
A.C. NO. 7919 08 OCTOBER 2014
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly
prove allegations by preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence
means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.
SULTAN V. MACABANDING
A.C. NO. 7919 08 OCTOBER 2014
Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the
facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or
want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it
does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
SULTAN VS MACABANDIN
A.C. NO. 7919, OCTOBER 8, 2014
RULING:
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence. In Rodica v. Lazaro, the Court expounded:
In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr., this Court reiterated its oft[-] repeated ruling that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by
preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this Court declared
thus:
SULTAN VS MACABANDIN
A.C. NO. 7919, OCTOBER 8, 2014
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior
to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule
133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider
the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
SULTAN VS MACABANDIN
A.C. NO. 7919, OCTOBER 8, 2014
The complainant adduced preponderant evidence that his signature was indeed forged in an affidavit which
the respondent notarized and submitted to the COMELEC. Consequently, the respondent should be held
administratively liable for his action. “Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed
upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.”29
“It should be noted that a notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must
discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary
public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts
they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.” In fact, the respondent admitted that the affidavit was notarized in his office without the
presence of the complainant.
SULTAN VS MACABANDIN
A.C. NO. 7919, OCTOBER 8, 2014
Side Note: Contrary to petitioner’s basic stance, a handwriting expert does not have to be a
linguist at the same time. To be credible, a handwriting expert need not be familiar with the
language used in the document subject of his examination.The nature of his examination
involves the study and comparison of strokes, the depth and pressure points of the
alleged forgery, as compared to the specimen or original handwriting or signatures.
DALURAYA VS OLIVA
G.R. NO. 210148, DECEMBER 8, 2014
RULING:
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of
the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v.
CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their
concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of
the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a
person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot
and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
DALURAYA VS OLIVA
G.R. NO. 210148, DECEMBER 8, 2014
There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action,
if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance
of evidence only.
DALURAYA VS OLIVA
G.R. NO. 210148, DECEMBER 8, 2014
In Dayap v. Sendiong, the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him
on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability
of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from
or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil
action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.
DALURAYA VS OLIVA
G.R. NO. 210148, DECEMBER 8, 2014
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused
has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court
also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not
yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only
evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court
should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence
and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the
accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall
render judgment on the civil aspect of the case. (Emphases supplied)
DALURAYA VS OLIVA
G.R. NO. 210148, DECEMBER 8, 2014
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.“
A punctilious examination of the MeTC's Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that
Daluraya's acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish
that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and
categorical when the MeTC declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused
precisely committed the crime charged against him."
DALURAYA VS OLIVA
G.R. NO. 210148, DECEMBER 8, 2014
Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC's Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated
and firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan
Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva"[38] and that "there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that
the accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva.“
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya's
acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a
quo for the reception of Daluraya's evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya's acquittal was
based on the fact that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the
failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him.
Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
PEOPLE VS SOLANO, JR.,
GR NO. 199871
RULING:
The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are SUFFICIENT to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt."
PEOPLE VS SOLANO, JR.,
GR NO. 199871
In this case, it is beyond doubt that all the circumstances taken together point to the
singular conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, committed the crime. As
found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the victim was last seen in the
presence of the appellant. Edwin Jr. saw appellant chasing the victim. Nestor also saw
appellant dragging the motionless body of "AAA." The body of the victim was eventually
found buried in the mud near the place where she was last seen with the appellant.
Appellant admitted holding a grudge against the family of "AAA" because he believes that a
relative of "AAA" had raped his [appellant’s] sister. The autopsy report showed that "AAA"
was raped and strangled. Likewise, appellant could not ascribe any ill-motive on the part of
prosecution witnesses Edwin Jr., Edwin Sr. and Nestor whom he even considered as friends.
PEOPLE VS SOLANO, JR.,
GR NO. 199871
We agree with the appellate court’s ratiocination that
x x x while no direct evidence was adduced by the prosecution, We, however, agree with
the trial court that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to hold [appellant] for the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. As proven by the prosecution, AAA was last
seen in the company of [appellant] as the person chasing the victim on a grassy area located at
the outskirts of their barangay. Contrary to the [appellant’s] supposition, We find that the
distance of about 50-60 meters is enough for one person to recognize another person’s face.
This is especially true since it had been established by one witness that [appellant] turned his face
towards him x x x and that he was able to see him before AAA ran towards the knee-high
cogon grass.
PEOPLE VS SOLANO, JR.,
GR NO. 199871
The same is true with respect to the accounts of Nestor. [Appellant’s] attempt to taint the
truthfulness of his testimony on the mere fact that he failed to testify on ‘how he was able
to reach the area’ or the reason why he was on that place at the time he saw [appellant]
and AAA, finds no leg to stand on. Needless to state, the circumstances alluded [to] by
[appellant] are trivial and merely refer to insignificant matters which hardly affect the
credibility of the witness. What is more important is that Nelson’s testimony, which had
been considered worthy of credit by the trial court, had withstood the gruelling
cross-examination of the defense.
ESPINELI VS PEOPLE
GR. NO. 179535
RULING:
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. Direct evidence of
the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt. The rules of
evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The records
reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to
render their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court.
ESPINELI VS PEOPLE
GR. NO. 179535
In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person are the following:
1. Petitioner was heard telling his co-accused Sotero “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” before
boarding a red car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol;
2. The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness to be the same car he had sold to Sotero for
₱10,000.00;
3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot by unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding a red car; and
4. Post-mortem examination of the victim’s body showed that he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature,
severity and characteristics of which indicate that they were inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly an armalite
rifle and .22 caliber pistol.
ESPINELI VS PEOPLE
GR. NO. 179535
Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain
of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for the killing
of the victim. The trial court’s factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions
drawn from the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual
findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA, as in this
case.
HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA VS HEIRS OF MENDOZA
G .R. NO. 209132, JUNE 5, 2017
RULING:
The heirs of Syquia never adduced evidence tending to prove that Lot No. 5663 refers to Maria
Angco, that Lot No. 5666 or that Lot No. 5667-A pertains to the heirs of Esperanza Florentino, that
Quirino Boulevard is Provincial Road, and that Lot No. 6167 is Colun Americano. The CA, in its
Amended Decision, tried to justify its new ruling by explaining that since Lot No. 5667 had already
been subdivided into two (2) lots, the boundaries and size of the property, as reflected in the tax
declaration, would no longer match the boundaries and size of the lot covered by the free patent,
which is Lot No. 5667-B, to wit; resultantly, with the subdivision of plaintiffs-appellants' Lot No.
5667 into two (2) lots, the boundaries and area as stated in plaintiffs-appellants' Tax Declaration
would no longer match with the boundaries and area as stated in the Free Patent No. 38444
subsequently issued in favor of defendant-appellee Villanueva.
HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA VS HEIRS OF MENDOZA
G .R. NO. 209132, JUNE 5, 2017
The heirs of Syquia failed to adequately prove that the area of their
property in the tax declaration coincides with the area of either Lot 5667-B
which is 4,497 square meters or Lot 5667 which is 9,483 square meters.
They likewise failed to show, based on the boundaries that the lot they claim
to have inherited is actually either Lot 5667-B, the property in dispute, or
Lot 5667, the cadastral survey of which lists the Syquias as claimants.
Certainly, the Syquias were not able to identify their land with that degree
of certainty required to support their affirmative allegation of ownership.
Simply put, the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA VS HEIRS OF MENDOZA
G .R. NO. 209132, JUNE 5, 2017
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof
is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact
in issue by the amount of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the burden
of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. Section 1. In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA VS HEIRS OF MENDOZA
G .R. NO. 209132, JUNE 5, 2017
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on
the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon
the trial.
HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA VS HEIRS OF MENDOZA
G .R. NO. 209132, JUNE 5, 2017
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. As the rule
indicates, preponderant evidence refers to evidence that is of greater
weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to it. It
is proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of the
contested fact is more probable than its non-existence.
HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA VS HEIRS OF MENDOZA
G .R. NO. 209132, JUNE 5, 2017
In the instant case, aside from the tax declarations covering an unirrigated
riceland in Tamag,Vigan, the Syquia heirs failed to present any other proof of
either ownership or actual possession of the lot in question, or even a mere
indication that they exercised any act of dominion over the property.
In fact, they were not able to show that they have been in actual possession
of the property since they allegedly inherited the same in 1992. The Syquias'
own evidence would reveal that several houses have been constructed on
the lot and third persons have actually been occupying the subject property,
despite the presence of their supposed caretaker.
BUBBLE THEORY

• SECTION 5. Presumptions in civil actions and proceedings. In all civil actions


and proceedings not otherwise provided for by law or these Rules, a
presumption imposes on the party against who it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumptions.
If presumptions are inconsistent, the presumption
that is founded upon weightier consideration of
policy shall apply. If considerations of policy are of
equal weight, neither presumption applies.
 
SECTION 6. Presumptions against an accused in
criminal cases. If a presumed fact that establishes
guilt is an element of the offenses charges or
negates a defense, the existence of the basic fact
must be proved beyond reasonable doubts and the
presumed fact follows from the basic fact beyond
reasonable doubt.
SC COMMENT
 For Section 5:
 
The proposed am amendment clarifies that presumptions should affect only the
burden of evidence or production. This view, referred as “bursting bubble”
approach to presumptions is actually the prevailing view in the US. Since
presumption does not shift the burden of proof; the bursting bubble theory says
“that a presumption disappears where sufficient counter proof is introduced.” A
presumption, it is said, “smokes out” the opponent making him produce
counterproof, but the presumption is “put to flight” when he produces enough.
Hence, presumptions are like “bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but
disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts.”
 
 
The second paragraph relates to conflicting presumptions. SC
has held that, in case of conflicting presumptions, it is
necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and
determine what logical or social basis exists for each
presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as
the more important and entitled to prevail over the other..,
(People v Godoy).
Thus, between a presumptions that “a young Filipina will not
charge a person with rape, if it is not true” and the
presumption of innocence, the latter should prevail because is
founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere
form but a substantial part of the law. (Pp vs. Godoy)
 
Sec. 6:
 
SC COMMENT
 
Sec 6 is designed to deal with a situation in a criminal case where the prosecution relies
solely upon a presumption to establish guilt or the element of a crime and not any other
evidence. The court may view the presumption in such a case as conclusive or as
shifting the burden of proof. The following is what McCormick says in a situation
where the prosecution relies solely upon a presumption and not any other evidence.
 
In the Allen case, the court stated that the prosecution could not rest its case entirely on
a presumption unless the facts proved were sufficient to support the inference of guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, where the prosecution relies solely upon a
presumption and not any other evidence., as in Allen, not only must the presumed flow
beyond a reasonable doubt from the basic facts, but the jury must be able to find the
basic facts beyond reasonable doubt.
 
 

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