Professional Documents
Culture Documents
NOTES
EVIDENCE
MA. SOLEDAD
DERIQUITO-MAWIS
DEAN
LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES
UNIVERSITY
WHAT IS EVIDENCE?
• Admissibility should be objected to at the time evidence is offered to the court or as soon
thereafter as the objection to its admissibility shall have become apparent.
• Objection to the qualification of the witness shall be made at the time such person is called to the
stand. On the other hand, objection to the testimony shall be made at the time the question is
asked or after the answer is given when the objectionable features become apparent by reason of
the answer.
• If the objection is not done within such time, the right to object is deemed waived.
DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF ADMISSIBILITY
• ConditionalAdmissibility-Whentheevidenceatthetimeitisofferedappearsto be immaterial or
irrelevant, such evidence may be received on condition that the other facts will be proved
thereafter. If not proved subsequently, the evidence given will be stricken out.
• b. Multiple Admissibility - When the evidence is relevant and competent for two or more
purposes, such evidence should be admitted for any or all the purposes for which it is offered;
provided it must satisfy all the requirements for its admissibility.
• c. CurativeAdmissibility-Therightofthepartytointroduceincompetentevidence in his behalf
where the court has admitted the same kind of evidence adduced by the adverse party.
WHAT IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
It cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly populated place, with many people conversing with each
other on the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844 of the said ordinance. The
words he allegedly shouted "Putangina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" are not slanderous, threatening or abusive,
and thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of the incident,
Balingkit Street was still teeming with people and alive with activity. Further, no one present at the place of arrest
ever complained that Ramon’s shouting disturbed the public. On the contrary, a disinterested member of the
community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely standing in front of the store of
a certain Mang Romy when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon,
immediately
handcuffed and took him away.
PEOPLE VS. COGAED
G.R. NO. 200334 - JULY 30, 2014
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge. However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The
known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the
legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
“suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of
the police officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be
mere suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to serve the purposes of the
“stop and frisk” exception.
The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for
the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for
the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying
a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. He was not even the person mentioned by the informant.
The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even
if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya,
this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search
Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was
made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was
about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee
prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified
by the police officers otherwise. It is the police officer who should observe facts
that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police
officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person.
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”
Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In
Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not
exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs
at the time he was apprehended.
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires
that an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time." That a crime
was in fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule.94 An arrest under
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime
is committed up to the
point of arrest.
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule
113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint.
Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of
the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police
officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support
a warrantless arrest.
The warrantless arrest cannot be justified as the police officers had no personal knowledge of
the fact or circumstances indicating that the petitioner was committing a crime.
STATUTORY EXCLUSION
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1405
AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY
BANKING INSTITUTION AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR.
• Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and
its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
• Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any
person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
RA 1405
AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO,
DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION AND
PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR.
• All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and
its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not
be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,
except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of
a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases
where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6426
AN ACT INSTITUTING A FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT SYSTEM IN THE
PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
• Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized
under this Act, as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized
under PD No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature
and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or
private; Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and
further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977.)
RA 4200
ANTI WIRE TAPPING LAW
• Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6426
AN ACT INSTITUTING A FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT
SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
• Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized
under this Act, as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized
under PD No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature
and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or
private; Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and
further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977.)
GANAAN V. IAC
145 SCRA 112 (1986)
• Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on
without proof because they already know them (31 C.J.S. 509). Under the amended Rule,
there are facts of which courts must now take judicial notice and of which they may take
judicial notice.
• Judicial notice is based on considerations of expediency and convenience. It displaces
evidence since, being equivalent to proof; it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended
achieve and, therefore, makes such evidence unnecessary (Alzua, et al. vs. Johnson, 21 Phil.
308).
• The power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt
on the subject must be resolved in the negative (Republic vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 54886, Sept.
10, 1981).
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
• While the courts of justice are required to take judicial notice of the laws, the rule with respect to ordinances is
different. Municipal trial courts are required to take judicial notice of the ordinances of the municipality or city wherein
they sit. However, in the case of Regional Trial Courts, they must take such judicial notice only:
a) when required to do so by statute, e.g., in Manila as required by the city charter (City of Manila vs. Garcia, et al., L-26053,
Feb. 21, 1967); and
b) in a case on appeal before them and wherein the inferior court took judicial notice of an ordinance involved in said case
(U.S. vs. Blanco, 37 Phil. 126; U.S. vs. Hernandez, 31 Phil. 342)
The appellate courts may also take judicial notice of municipal or city ordinances not only where the lower courts took
judicial notice thereof but because these are facts capable of unquestionable demonstration (Gallego vs. People, et al.,
L-18247, Aug. 31, 1963). For the same reason, courts may take judicial notice of administrative regulations (Chattamal, etal.
vs. Collector of Customs, 42 Phil. 916).
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF COURT DECISIONS?
• Courts are required to take judicial notice of the decisions of the appellate
courts but not of the decisions of coordinate trial courts, nor even of a
decision or the facts involved in another case tried by the same court itself,
unless the parties introduce the same in evidence or where the court, as a
matter of convenience, may decide to do so (Figueras vs. Serrano, 52 Phil. 28;
Baguio vs.Vda. De Jalagat, et al., L-28100, Nov. 29, 1971; T’boli Agro- Industrial
Dev., Inc. vs. Solilapsi, Adm. Case No. 4766, Dec. 27, 2002).
JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE & PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF THE JUDGE
• The judicial notice which the court is required to take should
not be confused with the personal knowledge of the judge. A
fact may be of judicial notice and not be of the judge’s personal
knowledge, and vice-versa, as this rule refers to facts which
“ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.”
JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE & FOREIGN LAWS
• The question as to what are the laws of a foreign state is one of fact, not
of law. Foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proved like any other fact (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Fluemer
vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610), except where said laws are within the actual
knowledge of the court such as when they are well and generally known
or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of
the parties claim otherwise (Phil. Commercial & Industrial Bank, etc. vs.
Escolin, etc., et al., L-67896, Mar. 29, 1974).
To prove a written foreign law, the requirements of Secs. 24 and 25, Rule 132
must be complied with, that is, by an official publication or by a duly attested and
authenticated copy thereof.
The provisions of the foreign law may also be the subject of judicial admission
under Sec. 4 of this Rule.
Absent any of the foregoing evidence or admission, the foreign law is presumed
to be the same as that in the Philippines, under the so-called doctrine of
processual presumption (In Re Testate Estate of Suntay, 50 O.G. 5321; Collector
of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher, et al., L-11622, Jan. 28, 1961). To prove an
unwritten foreign law, the provisions of Sec. 46, Rule 130 supply the evidential
sources or remedies (see Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No.
119602, Oct. 6, 2000).
WHAT ARE JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
• Judicial admissions made in one case are admissible at the trial of another
case provided they are proved and are pertinent to the issue involved in
the latter, unless (a) the said admissions were made only for purposes of
the first case, as in the rule on implied admissions and their effects under
Rule 26; (b) the same were withdrawn with the permission of the court
therein; or (c) the court deems it proper to relieve the party therefrom
(20 Am. Jur. 470).
EXCEPTIONS TO JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
• As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are
actually pending before the same judge.
• Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine
whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a
previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration”.
TABUENA VS. CA AND TABERNILLA JR.
G.R. NO. 85423 – MAY 6, 1991
• GEN RULE: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases
pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.
• EXCEPTIO:
• . . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into
the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part
of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with
the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
ON FOREIGN LAWS
• The courts of the Philippines are bound to take judicial notice of the existence of the diplomatic relations
between our country and Japan. Diplomatic relations form part of the official acts of the Executive
Department of our Government. They are also matters of public knowledge.
There is no dispute, indeed, that the Philippines and Japan have had a long history of diplomatic relations. In
1888, Japan already established a diplomatic office in Manila, and expanded it as a Consulate General in 1919.
Eventually, Japan declared its office in Manila an embassy in 1943 during the Japanese occupation of the
country. Both countries were also signatories to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, an
indication that they wished to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in each other by sending of
diplomatic missions. This further shows that both countries, being signatories to the Vienna Convention,
aimed to have the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with
the receiving state. The countless efforts to maintain their diplomatic relations no longer required the
presentation of proof of the existence of diplomatic relations.
MATTERS OF JUDICIAL NOTICE HAVE THREE MATERIAL
REQUISITES:
• Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case are conclusive. Hence, they do not require
further evidence to prove them. (PLDT vs. Pingol, G.R. No. 182622 | September 8,
2010)
• The original complaint must be offered in evidence and accepted when there is an
amended complaint filed which lacks statements from the original in order for the
statements contained in the original to be considered as judicial admissions and
thus binding. (Torres vs. CA, Santillan, et al , G.R. No. L-37420 | July 31, 1984)
REAL AND DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
RULE 130, SECTIONS 1-2
• The expanded definition of “documentary evidence” is taken from Rule 1001 of the Federal rules of
Evidence (FRE) and Rule 1001 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (URE) to embrace in the broadest
possible terms essentially every memorial that preserves written and spoken language, including
recorded sounds; hence, the inclusion of “recordings” and “sounds” in the definition of documentary
evidence. The provision that “photographs include still pictures, stored images, x-ray films, videotapes
and motion pictures” should be construed or taken as merely exemplary rather than exclusive in
order to embrace similar technology and processes that may be developed in the future (Mueller &
Kirkpatrick, Modern Evidence, section 10.2 (1995])
• In the case of Sison v. People (G.R. Nos. 108280 to 83, November 16, 1995), and in more
recent case of College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development (G.R. No. 155604,
November 22, 2007) and People vs. Zeta (G.R. No. 178541, May 27, 2008), the court
allowed the use photographs as documentary evidence if they ae relevant to the issue
and are verified. The verification need not be made by the photographer himself; it can
be made by any other competent witness who can testify as to its exactness and
accuracy.
• The Committee opted to use the term “ videos” rather than “videotapes” as the former
is the more modern term, and included “drawings” pursuant to Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.,
where the US court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “drawings” were
“writings” within the meaning of the best evidence rule, specifically, Rule 1001, FRE
WHAT IS AN OBJECT EVIDENCE?
1. When the exhibition of such object is contrary to public policy, morals or decency;
2. When to require its being viewed in court or in an ocular inspection would result in delay,
inconvenience, unnecessary expense out of proportion to the evidentiary value of such object;
3. When such object (real) evidence would be confusing or misleading, as when the purpose is to
prove the former condition of the object and there is no preliminary showing that there has been
no substantial change in said condition;
4. The testimonial or documentary evidence already presented clearly portrays the object in
question as to render a view thereof unnecessary.
PEOPLE V. SABDULA
G.R. NO. 184758, APRIL 21, 2014
• The Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the
seized drugs casts reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized
contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will
use the markings as reference. It is not enough that the seized drug be marked; the
marking must likewise be made in the presence of the apprehended violator.
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE
RULES 130 AND 132
• Section. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions2.—When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, WRITING, RECORDING, PHOTOGRAPH OR
THEIR RECORD, no evidence IS admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
• (a) When the original IS lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
• (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; OR THE
ORIGINAL CANNOT BE OBTAINED BY JUDICIAL PROCESS OR PROCEDURE;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office;
• The term “original” does not necessarily mean the first writing, recording or photograph that was made, but rather refers
to the writing, recording or photograph that is at issue in litigation.” The determination of whether a writing or recording
is an “original” depends upon what it is being offered to prove.
• With respect to photographs not only the negative but any print therefrom qualifies as an “original.”
• As to any output from a computer, the amendment adopts Section 1, rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
provides that any printout readable by sight and shown to reflect accurately the data stored in the computer is an
“original.” But is an “original” only of the data stored in the computer or diskette.
• The definition of “duplicate” in the proposed amendment follows Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
which was actually adopted from Rule 1004(4) of the FRE. The definition makes duplicates generally admissible in lieu of
the originals without showing the unavailability of the original. The amendment defines “duplicate” to mean a counterpart
produced by any reliable modern mechanical process. The rationale behind the new rule is to eliminate the best evidence
objections to copies made in clearly reliable ways, except where the objecting party can offer a good reason to support
the production of the original as indicated by the new Section 4(c).
WHAT IS THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE?
• It provides that when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
• Note: The voluminous records must be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the portion produced or
summary of the document may be tested on cross-examination.
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office (Sec. 3)
• Note: Where the issue is only as to whether such a document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant
to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
WHEN IS THIS APPLICABLE?
• Section. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.(4a)
• SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control.—If the document is in
the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he OR SHE must have reasonable notice
to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he OR SHE fails
to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.(5a)
Section 7. SUMMARIES. — THE CONTENTS OF VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTS, PHOTOGRAPHS, OR
NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS WHICH CANNOT BE CONVENIENTLY EXAMINED IN COURT AND THE
FACT SOUGHT TO BE ESTABLISHED IS ONLY THE GENERAL RESULT OF THE WHOLE, MAYBE
PRESENTED IN A FORM OF A CHART, SUMMARY OR CALCULATION.THE ORIGINALS SHALL BE
AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION OR COPYING, OR BOTH, BY THE ADVERSE PARTY AT A
REASONABLE TIME AND PLACE.THE COURT MAY ORDER THAT THEY BE PRODUCED IN COURT. (n)
Section. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.—When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.(2a)
Section. 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it.—A party who calls for the production of a document and
inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence.(6a)
NOTES:
• The new Section 7 is taken substantially from Rule 1006 of the FRE, but it retains the
requirements in the existing section 3 (c) of Rule 130 that the records must be
voluminous, that they cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the
fact sought to be established is only the general result of the whole. Since our Supreme
Court has already held that in such a case the original records must be made accessible
to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross
examination (Compana Maritima v. Allied Free Workers’ Union, 167 Phil. 381, 1997), there
is really nothing new about the proposed amendment.
WHAT IS SECONDARY EVIDENCE
• Secondary evidence is that which shows that better or primary evidence exists as to the
proof of the fact in question. It is the class of evidence that is relevant to the fact in issue,
it being first shown that the primary evidence of the fact is not obtainable. It performs
the same functions as that of primary evidence. (Francisco, p. 68, 1992 ed.)
• All originals must be first accounted for before one can resort to secondary evidence. It
must appear that all of them have been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court. The non- production of the original document, unless it falls under any of the
exceptions in Sec. 3, Rule 130, gives rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence.
WHEN MAY SECONDARY EVIDENCE BE ADMITTED
• It may be admitted only by laying the basis for its production and such requires compliance with the following:
1. The offeror must prove the due execution and existence of the original document;
2. The offeror must show the cause of its unavailability; and
3. The offeror must show that the unavailability was not due to his bad faith.
• Accordingly, the correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. This order may
be changed if necessary at the sound discretion of the court. (Citibank N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, G.R. No.
150905, Sept. 23, 2003)
• Note: Intentional destruction of the originals by a party who acted in good faith does not preclude the introduction
of secondary evidence of the contents thereof.
WHAT IS THE ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF
SECONDARY EVIDENCE?
• Where the law specifically provides for the class and quantum of
secondary evidence to establish the contents of a document, or bars
secondary evidence of a lost document, such requirement is controlling.
E.g. Evidence of a lost notarial will should consist of a testimony of at least
two credible witnesses who can clearly and distinctly establish its contents
(Sec. 6, Rule 76).
HOW MAY THE DUE EXECUTION OF THE
DOCUMENT BE PROVED?
• The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the
adverse party:
• 1) opponent’s possession of the original,
• 2) reasonable notice to the opponent to produce the original,
• (3) satisfactory proof of existence,
• (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court.
As to the first element, it is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the original is in
the actual possession of the adversary.
LEE V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 159288, OCTOBER 19, 2004
• The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the
loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror
which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise
a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be
shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the
document in the proper place or places. It has been held that where the missing
document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than
where the document is only collaterally involved.
SPS TAPAYAN V. MARTINEZ
G.R. NO. 207786, [2017]
• The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its contents are the
subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule 130. However, to set this
rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is necessary. The Court's ruling in Lorenzana v. Lelina is
instructive:
• “The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the contents of a document, no
evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section
3, Ru1e 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible
pursuant to the best evidence rule. Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a
mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered.
In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at
the proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made at the
time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the
witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which
the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to
the documentary evidence may be made. And when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived.
This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been
rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. Moreover, grounds for objection
must be specified in any case. Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall
be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus,
even on appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other ground of objection,
except those that were raised at the proper time.”
DEP ED V. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 146586 [2005]
• Vidal De Jesus' testimony does not help to establish the deed of donation's existence,
execution and contents. He testified that he never saw the deed of donation. On
cross-examination,Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information that Isaias donated the
lot to the Municipality was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad himself. If at all, DECS
offered Vidal De Jesus' testimony to establish the loss of the deed of donation.Vidal de
Jesus testified that the barangay council tried to get a copy of the deed but the
Municipality informed the barangay council that the deed was lost when the municipal
office was transferred to a new building. DECS also made a search in the DECS office in
Malolos but this proved futile too.
MMC INDUSTRIAL SALES V. SSANYONG
536 SCRA 418 [2007]
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
MALIKSI V. COMELEC , G.R. NO. 203302, [2013]
• The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original
official ballots themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149,
January 22, 2013the Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS,
are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots
filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
• That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered "original documents" simply
means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one
is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and
the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of
the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without
notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the
revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the
official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters will. In that
regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first
shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.
PEOPLE V. ENOJAS ,G.R. NO. 204894 [2014]
• As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.
[A.M. No. 01-7-01- SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
September 24, 2002.] Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. [Id., Rule 11, Section 2] Here,
PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused
in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to
the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages
and was competent to testify on them.
CADAJAS VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR NO.
247348, NOV. 16, 2021
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he OR SHE puts in issue in a VERIFIED pleading:
a. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
b. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
c. The validity of a written agreement, or;
d. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution
of the written agreement.
• The rationale for the rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement in writing, it
is presumed that they made such writing as the repository of all the terms of the agreement.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PAROL EVIDENCE RULE?
• The fact that a word or a phrase or the general sense of a document or part of it, could
equally apply to more than one things or event.
WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF AMBIGUITIES?
• The kinds of ambiguities according to Lord Bacon:
• a. Latent ambiguity – when the writing on its face is clear and unambiguous, but there are collateral
matters or circumstances which makes the meaning uncertain or the writing admits of two
constructions.
• b. Patent or extrinsic ambiguity – when the ambiguity is apparent on the face of the writing itself
and requires something to be added in order to ascertain the meaning of the word.
• c. Intermediate ambiguity – when the words in the writing are all sensible and have settled
meaning, but admit of two interpretations according to subject matter in contemplation of the
parties.
WHAT IS A MISTAKE?
The original document is available in court The original document is not available in court
Prohibits the varying the terms of the written Prohibits the introduction of substitutionary or
agreement secondary evidence
Controversy is between the parties to the Involves any parties to the action
written agreement
WHAT ARE UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS?
• Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
• (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
• (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
• (a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;
• (b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
• (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
• (d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer
accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time
some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the
time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose account
the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
• (e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
DOCTRINES:
• The parol evidence rule, however, only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement does not express
the intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject
parole evidence. (Enriquez vs Ramos, 6 SCRA 219 (1962)
• The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written
instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties to
a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding
such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the
contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way deny that the
original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that
the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent
contract. (Canuto vs Mariano, 31 Phil. 840 (1918)
• While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has
been fraud or mistake. (Yu Tek vs Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384 (1915)
• When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event,
which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence.
This is not varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic agreement, for the simple
reason that there is no contract in existence; there is nothing to which to apply the excluding
rule (Land Settlement & Dev. Corp. vs Garcia Plantation, 7 SCRA 750 (1963)
• The purpose of that prohibition is to prevent alteration, change, modification or contradiction of the terms of a
written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of parol evidence, except in the cases specifically named in the
section. The case at bar is not one where the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies or contradicts the terms of
the contract of indorsement admittedly existing. The evidence was not offered for that purpose. The purpose was
to show that no contract of indorsement ever existed; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of
such contract; that they never mutually agreed to enter into such a contract; and that there never existed a
consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded. (Maulini vs. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914)
• An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without
impairing its credit is provable by parol. (PNB vs Seeto, 91 Phil. 756 (1952)
• Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, and are not
governed by the rules on integration. Where parties prohibited from proving said representations or
inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove
misrepresentation or fraud. Furthermore, the parol evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced
when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings. (Woodhouse vs Halili, 93 Phil. 387 (1927)
• The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to
preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral
parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of
whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement,
and whether the action is at law or in equity. (Robles vs Lizarraga, 50 Phil. 756 (1952)
• The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the parties have reduced their
agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository and memorial of the
truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived or
abandoned. (Cruz vs CA, 192 SCRA 209)
• The parole evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation
against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby. (Lechugas v. CA, 143 SCRA 335 (1986).
• For the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form or be signed by
both parties. What is required is that the agreement be in writing since written evidence is so much more
certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only. (Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996)).
• Although parole evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions that are not mentioned at all in the
writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. (Ortañez v. CA, 266 SCRA 561 (1997)).
• The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of the terms of a written agreement by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract. (Spouses Paras vs. Kimwa Construction, G.R. No. 171601April 8, 2015).
• The principle of a resulting trust is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal
title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the
parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby
one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the
benefit of another. On the other hand, a constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or
generate a fiduciary relation. Constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy
the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. (Tong v. Go KiatKun, G.R. No. 196023 21 April 2014).
• An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third
person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy binds the parties to their real agreement. (Rebusquillo v. Spouses Gualvez, G.R. No. 204029 04 June 2014).
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. CAMERON
GRANVILLE
G.R. NO. 20470, NOVEMBER 24, 2014
DOCTRINE:
• The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of
assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking
evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment.
FELIX PLAZO URBAN SETTLERS VS. LIPAT, SR.
G.R. NO. 182409 20 MARCH 2017
DOCTRINE:
• It is well-settled that parol evidence can serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions, which are not mentioned at all in writing, only if there is
fraud or mistake. It is well-settled that parol evidence can serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions, which are not mentioned at all in writing, only if
there is fraud or mistake. Here, the petitioner’s claim that the reason for their failure to pay the full
purchase price was due to the failure of the respondents to settle the pending litigation involving the
subject properties is not tenable. Clearly, a perusal of the CTS executed by the parties does not show
any provision pertaining to such condition. Also, the petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence
to show that such failure was due to fraud or mistake.
INTERPRETATION OF
DOCUMENTS
(RULE 130, SECTIONS 10 – 19)
INTERPRETATION OF WRITING ACCORDING
TO ITS LEGAL MEANING.
• The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the
place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (Sec 10)
CONSTRUCTION SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT TO
ALL THE PROVISIONS.
• In the construction of an instrument, where there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. (Sec 11)
INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO
INTENTION
• In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when
a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So
a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. (Sec 12) (particular
provision shall prevail over the general provision)
INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO
CIRCUMSTANCES
• For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that
the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret. (Sec 13)
(example: sale of car which is still in the repair shop)
TERMS ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN USED IN
THEIR PRIMARY AND GENERAL ACCEPTATION
• The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general
acceptation, BUT evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance,
in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly. (Sec 14)
WRITTEN WORDS CONTROL PRINTED WORDS
• When an instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the
two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (Sec 15) (example: delivery is 5 days from receipt
of payment)
EXPERTS AND INTERPRETERS TO BE USED IN
EXPLAINING CERTAIN WRITINGS
• When the characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the
language is not understood by the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the
characters, or who understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters or the
meaning of the language. (Sec 16)
PREFERENCE OVER TWO INTERPRETATIONS
IN AN AGREEMENT
• When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different
parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other
understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper,
that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was
made. (Sec 17)
CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF NATURAL
RIGHT
• When an instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right
and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. (Sec 18)
INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO USAGE
• An instrument may be construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character.
(Sec 19).
CIVIL CODE PROVISION ON INTERPRETATION OF
CONTRACTS
• If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall control.
• If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the
former. (Art 1370) (intention should prevail)
• In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered. (Art 1371) (Chinese father buying piece of land in the name of his son)
• However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree. (Art 1372)
• If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that
import which is most adequate to render it effectual. (Art 1373)
• The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. (Art 1374)
• Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that which is most in keeping
with the nature and object of the contract. (Art 1375)
• The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities of a
contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily established. (Art 1376)
• The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity. (Art 1377)
• When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the preceding
articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least
transmission of rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be
settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
• If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it cannot be
known what may have been the intention or will of the parties, the contract shall be null and
void. (Art 1378)
• The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall likewise be observed in
the construction of contracts. (Art 1379)
DOCTRINES
a). The ability to interpret, explain, relate or communicate in a manner which can be
understood by the court, either through spoken words, writings, or sign language;
b). It must exist at the time of testifying.
a). The awareness of both a duty to tell the truth and to be liable in case of intentional lies, or
the recognition of the obligation of an oath;
b). The willingness to be placed under oath or affirmation.
Additional Requirements in cases under the Rules on
Summary Procedure
The intended witness must have:
(i) executed a sworn statement;
(ii) submitted beforehand to the court; and
(iii) is present in court and is available for clarificatory questions by
the court.
COMPETENCY OF A WITNESS DISTINGUISHED
FROM CREDIBILITY
• I. Mental Incapacity: those whose mental condition at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others.
• They include the following:
1. Medically Insane Persons unless they are testifying during their lucid intervals.
• a). Sanity is presumed, it is the opponent who must prove this ground.
b). However, the party presenting the witness must prove sanity in these
two instances:
(i) if the witness has been recently declared as of unsound mind by the
court or by a competent physician
(ii) is an inmate in an asylum or mental institution.
• II.
• Mental Immaturity: these refer to children of tender age whose mental maturity is such as to render
them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.
• Age is not the criterion but the intelligence and possession of the qualities of a witness The credibility of
Children as witness takes into account two possibilities:
• (i) children are prone to exaggerate and influenced by suggestions from adults; and
• (ii) lack of motive to testify falsely.
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
Except: Substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the
duty to tell the truth in court, the court may then conduct a competency
examination (voir dire examination) motu proprio or on motion of a party.
DOCTRINES:
1. The burden of proving incapacity rests upon the person who alleges
it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed. (Catalan vs Basa, G.R. No. 159567 – July 31, 2007).
4. Full faith and credit are accorded to police officers, for they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner in the absence of proof to the contrary.
A few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details
and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility. Instead
of weakening their testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility, because
they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed. (People vs Fernandez, et al., G.R. No. 193478
– June 23, 2014)
5. A person of feeble-mind is a competent witness so long as she could convey her ideas by
words or signs. It is sufficient that witness can sufficiently give intelligent answers to the
questions propounded by the court and the counsels and can perceive and transmit in her
own way her own perceptions to others. (People vs De Jesus ,G.R. No. L-39087 – April 27,
1984)
6. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence
that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to
or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition. (People vs Rafanan, Jr., G.R. No. L-54135 – November 21, 1991)
7. A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in
the case of other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and
credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make
them known to the court. (People vs Salomon et al. G.R. No. 96848 – January 21, 1994).
8. Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts
respecting which he is examined.
The requirements then of a child’s competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of
observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in
ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing
requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such
determination. (People vs Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791 – February 22, 1996)
282
9. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court.
As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only
limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied.
(Marcos vs The Heirs of Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr., G.R. No. 198240 – July 3, 2013)
10. Mental retardation per se does not affect a witness’ credibility so long as he/she is able to
intelligently make known their perception to others. Thus, a mental retardate may be a
credible witness. (People vs Obogne, G.R. No. 199740 – March 24, 2014)
11. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed.Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. (People vs Roxas , G.R. No. 200793, June 4, 2014)
12. To qualify as a witness, the basic test is "whether he or she can perceive and, perceiving,
can make known his or her perception to others”.
An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court.
He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If
an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court. ( People vs
Corpuz , G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017).
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE OR
THE MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE
RULE 130 SECTION 22
a. One Spouse is a party to a case, whether civil or criminal, singly or with other
third persons
b. The spouses are validly married. These include voidable marriages as well as
those where there is a presumption of a valid marriage in the absence of a
marriage contract.
Bigamous marriages and common-law relationships are excluded.
The reason behind or purpose behind the marriage is immaterial, as when the
marriage was intended precisely to prevent one from testifying
The marriage is subsisting at the time one is called to testify against
the other in that it has not been dissolved by death or by law. Thus
the prohibition is not perpetual.
The case is not one against the other.
The consent of the party spouse has not been obtained nor has he
waived the rule in
any other way.
FORM OF PROHIBITED TESTIMONY OR WHEN A
VIOLATION EXISTS
• a. In a civil case filed by one against the other. Examples: cases of annulment,
legal separation, support, declaration of mental incompetency, separation of
property.
• b. In a criminal case for a crime (i) committed by one against the other such
as those involving physical assault and violence;Violation of RA 9262;
economic abuse or (ii) against the direct ascendant or descendant of the
other
c. When the reason for the law has ceased. Where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved, nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reasons based on such
harmony and tranquility no longer apply. In such cases, the identity of interest
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on identity of interest
disappears. (The law ceases when the reason for the law ceases)
ART. 215 – FAMILY CODE
• 1.The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks ,or directly and
vitally impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the
statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other. (People v.
Castaneda, G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979).
2. The rule of waiver of objection to the competency of witnesses generally
does not require this prerequisite in the case between husband and wife.
Rather the rule makes the determination of the question hinge around the
consequences which by common sense, in justice and in fairness, should be
deemed to have been expected by the spouse who first testified naturally to
flow from his act of giving that testimony. (People v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-568
July 16, 1947)
3.When husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why
either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself
alone," and his or her testimony could operate only against himself or herself.
(Lezama v. Rodriguez , G.R. No. L-25643, June 27, 1968)
4. When an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs,
the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute
that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the
other. (Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. NO. 143439 October 14, 2005).
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF THE
DEATH OR INSANITY OF THE ADVERSE PARTY
RULE 130 SECTION 23.
Benthan criticized the Dead Man’s Statute as “blind and brainless” because in
seeking to avoid injustice to the dead it may cause injustice to the living. If a
survivor has rendered services, furnished goods or lent money to a man whom he
trusted, without an outside witness or admissible written evidence, he is helpless if
the other dies and the representative of his estate declines to pay.
The survivor’s mouth may even be closed in an action arising from a
fatal automobile collision, or in a suit upon a note or an account
which the survivor paid in cash without taking a receipt (McCormick
on Evidence, 159-160). The problem is that the survivor’s
disqualification is more likely to balk the honest than the dishonest
survivor. One who would not balk at perjury will hardly hesitate at
suborning a third person, who would not be disqualified to swear to
the false story.
Many states have swept away the disqualification entirely and their evidence
rules now permit the survivor to testify without restriction. In order,
however, to minimize the danger of injustice to the decedent’s estate, their
rules render admissible any writings of the deceased or evidence of oral
statements made by him, which would ordinarily be excluded as hearsay.
Following the lead of these states, the Sub-Committee decided to
recommend the proposed rule allowing the survivor to testify by
admitting hearsay evidence of the deceased.
APPLICABILITY
• The case must be a civil case where the defendant is the executor, administrator or
representative of the deceased person of person of unsound mind. But the rule will
not apply to a counter-claim against the plaintiff.
• The subject is a claim or demand i.e. one that affects the real or personal properties:
• The case must be a personal action for the enforcement of a debt or demand involving money
judgment, or where the defendant is demanded to deliver personal property to plaintiff
• The evidence of this claim is purely testimonial and allegedly incurred prior to the death or
insanity. They are therefore fictitious claims.
The subject of the testimony is as to a matter of fact
occurring before the death or insanity. The testimony is the
only evidence of the claim or demand.
i. The death/insanity maybe before or during the pendency of
the case so long as it was before the death/insanity.
ii. The matters prohibited are those made in the presence
and hearing of the decedent which he might testify to if alive
or sane, i.e. adverse to him, and not to those which may be
known from other sources.
THE RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FOLLOWING:
• To claims or demands which are not fictitious or those supported by evidence such as
promissory notes, contracts, or undertakings, including the testimony of disinterested
witnesses.
• Fraudulent transactions of the deceased or insane person, as when the deceased was an
illegal recruiter or that he absconded with money entrusted to him
• To mere witnesses
• Stockholders/members of a juridical entity testifying in cases filed by the
• juridical entity
• Claims favorable to the estate.
The rule maybe waived expressly or by failure to object
or by introducing evidence on the prohibited matter.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
RULE 130 SECTION 24
1. Concept
Privileged communication is an interaction between two parties in which the law recognizes a
private, protected relationship. Whatever is communicated between the parties remains
confidential, and the law cannot force their disclosure. Even disclosure by one of the parties
comes with legal limitations. There are, however, exceptions that can invalidate a privileged
communication and various circumstances under which it can be waived, either deliberately
or unintentionally. Commonly cited relationships where privileged communication exists are
those between attorney and client, doctor or therapist and patient, and priest and parishioner
and between spouses.
KINDS OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
(a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news;
(b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted;
(c) trade secrets;
(d) information contained in tax census returns;
(e) bank deposits" (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act);
(f) national security matters and intelligence information; and
(g) criminal matters. (Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville,
G.R. No. 204700, November 24, 2014)
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION: WHEN
ACTIONABLE
• Spousal privilege (also called marital or husband-wife privilege) is a term used in the law of
evidence to describe two separate privileges: the communications privilege and the
testimonial privilege, which is applied in civil and criminal cases. Both types of privilege are
based on the policy of encouraging spousal harmony, and preventing spouses from having to
condemn, or be condemned by their spouses.
• The spousal communications privilege or confidences privilege is a form of privileged
communication that protects the contents of confidential communications between
spouses during their marriage from testimonial disclosure.
Spousal testimonial privilege (also called spousal incompetency and spousal
immunity) protects the individual holding the privilege from being called to
testify in proceedings relating to his/her spouse, so that either may invoke
it to prevent the other from testifying about a confidential communication
made during marriage.
The spousal communications privilege may not be invoked if the spouses are suing each
other or each other’s estates in a civil case; if one of the spouses has initiated a criminal
proceeding against the other; or in a competency proceeding regarding one of the
spouses.
REQUISITES FOR THE PRIVILEGE TO APPLY:
• a. The former can be invoked only If one of the spouses is a party to the action,
while the latter can be claimed whether or not the spouse is a party to the action;
• b. The former applies only if the marriage is existing at the time the testimony is
offered, where the latter can be claimed even after the marriage has been dissolved;
• c. The first constitutes a total prohibition against any testimony for or against the
spouse of the witness, while the second applies only to confidential communications
between the spouses.
WHEN THE COMMUNICATION IS NOT
CONSIDERED CONFIDENTIAL IN NATURE:
• The same cannot be invoked where it was not intended to be kept in confidence by the
spouse who received the same, as in the case of a dying declaration of the husband to his
wife as to was his assailant – to which the communication was obviously intended to be
reported to the authorities;
• The privilege is lost if the communication is overheard or comes into the hands of a third
party, whether legally or not;
• It is necessary that there was no collusion with or voluntary disclosure by either spouse to
the third person, otherwise the latter becomes an agent of the spouse and would thereby be
covered by the prohibition.
MARITAL PRIVILEGE: EXCEPTION
The rule is grounded on public policy and the proper administration of justice. It is to
encourage clients to make a full disclosure of all facts relative to a problem for which he sought
the professional services of a lawyer, without fear or reservation that these facts will later be
revealed especially if the nature of the facts are such that they might adversely affect his rights,
property or reputation. This is to inspire confidence and thus it is also to enable the lawyer to
give the appropriate advice or to undertake such action that will best serve the interest of the
client.
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION BASED
ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO APPLY:
4. In case of a suit by and between the lawyer and the client, the rule does
not apply
5. When the lawyer is accused of a crime in relation to the act of the client
which was the subject of their professional relationship, he may reveal the
privileged communications to prove he had nothing to do with the crime.
C. If the Attorney, as witness to a case which does not
involve the client, divulges confidential communication
without the prior consent of the client, he may be liable
criminally, civilly and administratively.
SC TEACHINGS
• Communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of being communicated to others are
not privileged after they have been so communicated, and may be proved by the testimony of the
attorney. This rule applies to a compromise agreement perfected by the attorney with the authority and
under the instructions of his client. As to whether a waiver of the client’s privilege personally made in
open court can be withdrawn before acted upon. ( Uy Chico v. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 )
(REGALA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 262 SCRA 124, SEPTEMBER
20, 1996).
Client identity is privileged:
1. Where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged
3. Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless,
by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client’s name is privileged.
The privilege which protects communications between attorney and client does
not extend to a copy of a letter written by the client to his attorney which comes
to the hands of the adverse party. Where the authenticity of such a document is
admitted, the court will take no notice of the manner in which it was obtained.
(Barton v Leyte Asphalt Mineral Oil Co. Ltd. GR No. L-21237, March 22, 1924 )
NOTE:
The disclosure or non-disclosure is not dependent on the will of the officer but on the
determination by a competent court
- The privilege may be invoked not only during the term of office of the public officer but also
afterwards
WHAT IS THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE?
These are confidential and a court will most likely uphold the
privilege. A society may not always be able to conduct its business
with total openness and matters affecting national interest must
not be divulged.
COURT DELIBERATIONS
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege, which arises from the fundamental
requirements of fairness was emphasized. Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or
the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way.
There is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an
informer. The problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls
for balancing the state interest in protecting people from crimes against
the individual’s right to prepare his defense. The balance must be adjusted
by giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the crime
charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible significance of the
informer’s testimony, and (4) other relevant factors. (People v. Ong, 432
SCRA 470, June 21, 2004
Concept:
• Not absolute, has to be weighed against the following factors, among others:
• RA 114581 now has expanded the coverage of RA 53, it now also exempts broadcast and
online journalists as well from having to reveal their sources for their news.
• No fixed rule as to when it may be waived. It should be decided on a case to case basis. B.
Rationale:
• Exists so as to encourage citizens to report any knowledge they have of any wrongdoing or
criminal activity to law enforcement officers or agencies.
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED
AS PRIVILEGED IN OUR JURISDICTION.
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which
are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature.
The privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises not on account of the content of the
information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in
pursuit of the public interest, must be confidential.
The privilege seeks to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, in its
capacity as the sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative
with foreign nations. (Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008)
Justices of the Court cannot be compelled to testify on
JUSTICES AND JUDGES matters relating to the internal deliberations and actions
MAY NOT BE SUBJECT of the Court in the exercise of their adjudicatory
TO ANY COMPULSORY functions and duties. This is to be differentiated from a
PROCESS IN RELATION situation where the testimony is on a matter which is
external to their adjudicatory functions.
TO THE PERFORMANCE
OF THEIR With respect to Court officials and employees, the
ADJUDICATORY same rules on confidentiality that apply to
FUNCTIONS. justices and judges apply to them.
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes that they
will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and therefore, whatever
acts they do in the discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall
be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of
each case may appear to
require. (In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of
Court officials and employees as witnesses under the subpoenas and various letters for
the impeachment Prosecution Panel)
PARENTAL & FILIAL PRIVILEGE
RULE 130, SEC. 25:
B. Rationale:
•• To preserve “family cohesion”
LEE V CA (G.R. 177861, JULY 13, 2010):
First family (Lee-Keh) versus the second family (Lee-Tiu) of their father. The
Lee-Keh children wanted Tiu to testify that she is the birth mother of Emma
Lee.
Here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of
petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a
common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother.
PEOPLE V INVENCION (G.R. 131636, MARCH
25, 2003):
Rape case. Father accused of raping his own daughter. The half-brother of the victim,
Elven, who shares the same father as her, testified against him. Father raised Rule 125.
The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges.
“As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against
his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against
Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own
accord and only to tell the truth.”
NEWSMAN’S PRIVILEGE
RA 53 AS AMENDED BY RA 1477:
•Section 1:
•Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist
or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot
be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication
which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House
or Committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State.
•
(1) Concept:
•A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool,
mechanism or compound known only to its owner and
those of his employees to whom it is necessary to
confide it
•A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device, or compilation of information that: (1) is used in
one's business; and (2) gives the employer an
TRADE SECRETS opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not possess the information
•Trade secrets constitute proprietary rights
(2) Rationale:
Trade secrets have economic value from being generally
unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.
AIR PHILIPPINES V. PENNSWELL (G.R. 172835,
DECEMBER 13, 2007):
“Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions
are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information
as embodied in the Constitution.”
“We said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that,
aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or
industrial secrets as well as banking transactions are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure”
R.A. NO. 9285
“ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ACT OF 2004”
• Alternative Dispute Resolution System means any process or procedure
used to resolve a dispute or controversy, other than by adjudication of a
presiding judge of a court or an officer of a government agency, as defined in
this Act, in which a neutral third party participates to assist in the resolution of
issues, which includes arbitration, mediation, conciliation, early neutral
evaluation, mini-trial, or any combination thereof
• Arbitration means a voluntary dispute resolution process in which one or
more arbitrators, appointed in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or
rules promulgated pursuant to this Act, resolve a dispute by rendering an
award;
• Mediation means a voluntary process in which a mediator, selected by the disputing parties, facilitates
communication and negotiation, and assist the parties in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding a dispute.
• Confidential information means any information, relative to the subject of mediation or arbitration, expressly
intended by the source not to be disclosed, or obtained under circumstances that would create a reasonable
expectation on behalf of the source that the information shall not be disclosed. It shall include (1)
communication, oral or written, made in a dispute resolution proceedings, including any memoranda, notes or
work product of the neutral party or non-party participant, as defined in this Act; (2) an oral or written
statement made or which occurs during mediation or for purposes of considering, conducting, participating,
initiating, continuing of reconvening mediation or retaining a mediator; and (3) pleadings, motions
manifestations, witness statements, reports filed or submitted in an arbitration or for expert evaluation;
• Non-Party Participant means a person, other than a party or mediator, who participates in a mediation
proceeding as a witness, resource person or expert;
• SECTION 9. Confidentiality of Information. — Information obtained through mediation
proceedings shall be subject to the following principles and guidelines;
• (a) Information obtained through mediation shall be privileged and confidential.
• (b) A party, a mediator, or a nonparty participant may refuse to disclose and may prevent any other
person from disclosing a mediation communication.
• (c) Confidential Information shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any
adversarial proceeding, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. However, evidence or information that
is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not become inadmissible or protected from
discovery solely by reason of its use in a mediation.
• (d) In such an adversarial proceeding, the following persons involved or previously
involved in a mediation may not be compelled to disclose confidential information
obtained during the mediation: (1) the parties to the dispute; (2) the mediator or mediators;
(3) the counsel for the parties; (4) the nonparty participants, (5) any persons hired or
engaged in connection with the mediation as secretary, stenographer, clerk or
assistant; and (6) any other person who obtains or possesses confidential information by
reason of his/her profession.
• (e) The protections of this Act shall continue to apply even if a mediator is found to have
failed to act impartially.
• (f) A mediator may not be called to testify to provide information gathered in
mediation. A mediator who is wrongfully subpoenaed shall be reimbursed the full cost
of his attorney's fees and related expenses.
SECTION 10. Waiver of Confidentiality. — A privilege arising from the confidentiality of information may be
waived in a record, or orally during a proceeding by the mediator and the mediation parties.
• A privilege arising from the confidentiality of information may likewise be waived by a nonparty participant if
the information is provided by such nonparty participant.
• A person who discloses confidential information shall be precluded from asserting the privilege under
Section 9 of this Chapter to bar disclosure of the rest of the information necessary to a complete understanding
of the previously disclosed information. If a person suffers loss or damage as a result of the disclosure of the
confidential information, he shall be entitled to damages in a judicial proceeding against the person who
made the disclosure.
• A person who discloses or makes a representation about a mediation is precluded from asserting the
privilege under Section 9, to the extent that the communication prejudices another person in the proceeding
and it is necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the representation of disclosure.
SECTION 11. Exceptions to Privilege. —
• (a) There is no privilege against disclosure under Section 9 if mediation communication is:
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record authenticated by all parties to the agreement;
(2) available to the public or that is made during a session of a mediation which is open, or
is required by law to be open, to the public;
(3) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of violence;
(4) Intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit, or commit a crime, or conceal an
ongoing crime or criminal activity;
(5) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation in a proceeding in which a public agency is protecting the interest of
an individual protected by law; but this exception does not apply where a child
protection matter is referred to mediation by a court or a public agency
participates in the child protection mediation;
(6) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional
misconduct or malpractice filed against mediator in a proceeding; or
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional
misconduct or malpractice filed against a party, nonparty participant, or
representative of a party based on conduct occurring during a mediation.
• (b) There is no privilege under Section 9 if a court or administrative
agency, finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery of
the proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not
otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that
substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and the
mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(1) court proceeding involving a crime or felony; or
(2) a proceeding to prove a claim or defense that under the law is sufficient
to reform or avoid a liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication or
testify in such proceeding.
(d) If a mediation communication is not privileged under an exception in subsection (a) or (b),
only the portion of the communication necessary for the application of the exception for
nondisclosure may be admitted. The admission of particular evidence for the limited
purpose of an exception does not render that evidence, or any other mediation
communication, admissible for any other purpose.
SECTION 12. Prohibited Mediator Reports. — A mediator may not make a report,
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a
mediation to a court or agency or other authority that may make a ruling on a dispute that is
the subject of a mediation, except:
(a) where the mediation occurred or has terminated, or where a settlement was reached.
(b) As permitted to be disclosed under Section 13 of this Chapter.
REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 12-2018
ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 22, 2018
• Clarifies that the nature and extent of the power of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) to obtain information under Section 5 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended, serves as an exception to both the Attorney-Client
and Accountant-Client privilege.
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE EXCEPTION?
1. Rule 21.01 of the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not reveal the confidence or
secrets of his client except, among others, when required by law.
2. In Genato V. Silapan, the Supreme Court stressed that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications
or information does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of fraud. Notably,
attempt to evade or defeat tax is criminal offense defined and punishable under Section 254 of the NIRC, as amended.
3. Third, Section 29 of RA No. 9298 states that the Accountant-Client privilege does not apply if the production of
documents is through a subpoena issued by any court, tribunal, or government regulatory or administrative body.
4. Section 140.1 of the Code of Ethics of Professional Accountants provides that professional accountants shall refrain
from disclosing outside the firm or employing organization confidential information acquired as a result of professional
and business relationship unless there is a legal right or duty to disclose.
5. Finally, taxes are the lifeblood of our nation so its collection should be actively pursued without unnecessary
impediment.
• Accountant-client privilege – under RA 9298 or the Philippine Accountancy Act and the
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants stating that all papers, schedules and
memoranda made by a certified public accountant in the court of an examination, by such
CPA shall be treated confidential and privileged, and that professional accountants shall
refrain from disclosing outside the firm or employing organization confidential information
acquired as a result of professional and business relationships.
ADMISSIONS AND
CONFESSIONS
RULE 130 SECS. 26 AND 32
ADMISSIONS AGAINST
INTEREST
SECTION 26. ADMISSION OF A PARTY. — THE ACT,
DECLARATION OR OMISSION OF A PARTY AS TO A
RELEVANT FACT MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE AGAINST
HIM OR HER. (NOW SECTION 28)
WHAT IS AN ADMISSION?
• An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to
the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him (31
C.J.S. 1022). Admissions may be verbal or written, express or tacit, or judicial or extrajudicial.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR
ADMISSIBILITY?
• (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law;
• (b) be categorical and definite;
• (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and
• (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.
WHAT ARE EXPRESS AND IMPLIED
ADMISSIONS?
• Express admissions are those made in definite, certain and
unequivocal language.
• Implied admissions are those which may be inferred from the acts,
conduct, declaration or omissions of a party (e.g. conduct, silence
of a party).
EXAMPLES OF ADMISSION BY CONDUCT
• It is one which has been made extrajudicially by the party to favor his interests. It is not
admissible in evidence (Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. of Manila, 84 Phil. 330;
People vs. Demiar, 108 Phil. 651).
WHAT IS A SELF-SERVING TESTIMONY?
• Self-serving testimony refers to the extrajudicial statement of a party which is being urged for
admission in court. It does not include his testimony as a witness in court (National
Development Co. vs. WCC, et al., L-21724, April 27, 1967; Co vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 52200,
Aug. 21, 1980). It has no application to a court declaration (Sonaco vs. Angelo, [CA], 64 O.G.
13149). Where the statement was not made in anticipation of a future litigation, the same
cannot be considered self-serving (Korisu vs. Rizal Cement Co., Inc., et al., 36 O.G. 1472;
O.O. Lagman & Co. vs. Mercado, et al., [CA], 61 O.G. 2362).
Admission Confession
May be made by 3rd persons and in certain May be made only by the party himself, and in
cases admissible against a party some instances admissible against co-accused
Admission Declaration Against Interest
Need not be made against proprietary or pecuniary Must have been made against the proprietary or
interest of the party, enhances its probative weight pecuniary interest of the party
if it is
Made by the party himself, and is a primary Made by a person who is either deceased or unable
evidence and competent to testify.
• SECTION 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration made in the presence and
within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper
and possible for him OR HER to do so, may be given in evidence against him OR HER.
(now Section 34)
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION
BY SILENCE?
• (a) He must have heard or observed the act or declaration of the other person;
• (b) He must have had the opportunity to deny it (People vs. Ranario, et al., 49 Phil. 220);
• (c) He must have understood the statement;
• (d) He must have an interest to object, such that he would naturally have done so if the
statement was not true;
• (e) The facts were within his knowledge; and
• (f) The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence is material to the issue
(People vs. Paragsa, L-44060, July 20, 1978).
WHEN DOES IT APPLY?
• The rule on admission by silence applies where a person was surprised in the act (U.S. vs.
Bay, 27 Phil. 495) or even if he is already in the custody of the police (People vs. Ancheta, et
al., 106 Phil. 99). The rule applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying on
a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately
reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response
can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply (20 Am.Jur.
481-488).
WHEN DOES IT NOT APPLY?
• The rule does not apply if the statements adverse to the party were made in the course of an
official investigation(U.S. vs. De la Cruz, 12 Phil. 87), as where he was pointed out in the
course of a custodial investigation and was neither asked to reply nor comment on such
imputations (People vs. Alegre, et al., L-30423, Nov. 7, 1979), or where the party had a
justifiable reason to remain silent, as where he was acting on advice of counsel, otherwise his
right to silence would be illusory. It should further be kept in mind that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense has the right to remain silent and to be
informed of that right (Sec. 12, Art. Ill, 1987 Constitution).
DOCTRINES:
• Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with
or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant
is available as a witness. An admission against interest is the best evidence that affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute, based on the presumption that no man would
declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. It is fair to presume that the
declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. No doubt, admissions
against interest may be refuted by the declarant. In this case, however, respondent failed to
refute the contents of Exhibit “J”. (BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines Inc. vs. Total
Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc., G.R. No. 214406 -February 6, 2017)
• An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the
facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration
is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person who makes the same, and absent
any showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can
offset it, especially so in this case where respondents failed to present even one piece in their
evidence. (The Heirs of Peter Donton vs. Stier and Maggay, G.R. No. 216491 – August 23, 2017)
VIACRUCIS V. COURT OF APPEALS
44 SCRA 176 | MARCH 29, 1972 | CONCEPCION, C. J.:
DOCTRINE:
• The previous recognition by a party in physical possession of the property in dispute of
ownership in another constitutes a declaration against the interest of the former and may be
received in evidence not only against such party who made the declaration or his successors
in interest but also against 3rd persons.
EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD V. COB GROUP
MARKETING, INC.
141 SCRA 86 | JANUARY 16, 1986 |
DOCTRINE:
• The admissions of the president of a company are binding on the company under the rule
that admissions of liability by a party may be given against it.
PEOPLE V. PARAGSA
84 SCRA 105 | JULY 20, 1978 | MAKASIAR, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases.
PEOPLE V. ALEGRE
94 SCRA 109 | NOVEMBER 7, 1979 | ANTONIO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• The silence of an accused while in custody must not be taken against him.
PEOPLE V. MEJIA
275 SCRA 127 | JULY 7, 1997 |DAVIDE, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• An offer of compromise, in a criminal proceeding, is not an implied admission of guilt if
done without the consent or ratification of the accused.
COMPROMISES (RULE 130, SECTION 27)
Revised Rules on Evidence Proposed Amendments
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability,
evidence against the offeror. Neither is evidence of conduct nor
and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. statements made in compromise negotiations admissible, except
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi offenses evidence otherwise discoverable or offered for another purpose, such
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may
or prosecution.
be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi offenses (criminal
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not admissible in compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or to a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who
other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in made the plea or offer. Neither is any statement made in the course of
evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury. plea bargaining with the prosecution which does not result in a plea
of guilty or which results in a plea of guilty later withdrawn
(24a)
admissible.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses
occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injury. (27a)
WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULE 130, SECTION 27?
• The proposed amendment relating to the inadmissibility of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is derived from Rule 408 of the FRE which extends protection to all statements made in
compromise negotiations. The new rule will enable lawyers and parties to negotiate more freely without
concern that their conduct or statements will later be received into evidence as Admissions. Under the
existing Section 27, Rule 130, only the actual compromise offer and those statements inextricably linked with
the offer are protected. The proposed rule does not exclude admissibility of an offer of compromise offered
for all purposes. The exclusionary rule is designed to exclude the offer of compromise only when it is
tendered as an admission of the weakness of the offering party’s claim or defense, not when the purpose is
otherwise. The rule suggests some of the purposes for which evidence of an offer to compromise may be
admitted, to wit, proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
• The proposed amendment relating to the inadmissibility of any statement made in the course of a
plea bargaining with the prosecution is derived from Rule 140 of the FRE. The underlying purpose
of the existing rule on making a plea of guilty later withdrawn or an unaccepted offer of a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense inadmissible to evidence is to encourage and protect plea discussions or
bargaining, which is a vital aspect of the criminal justice system. To promote this objective, the
amendment renders any statement made in the course of the plea discussions or bargaining
inadmissible against the defendant, at least where those discussions fail to produce agreement or lead
to pleas later withdrawn. It will allow attorneys and defendants to negotiate freely with the
prosecution without concern that if the case ultimately goes to trial, their factual statements will be
received as admissions against the defendant.
WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF
COMPROMISE IN CIVIL CASES?
• In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF COMPROMISE
IN CIVIL CASES?
• When the party making the offer admits being indebted or liable, the offer of compromise is
admissible as evidence of liability even if made to buy peace and avoid litigation.
WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF
COMPROMISE IN CRIMINAL CASES?
• In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt.
Note:
• The accused may, however, be permitted to prove that such offer was not made under consciousness
of guilt but merely to avoid the risks of criminal action against him (U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97).
• A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not
admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer. • An offer to pay for the
actual payment of the medical, hospital or other expenses by reason of the victim’s injuries is not
admissible to prove civil or criminal liability therefor.
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF COMPROMISE
IN CRIMINAL CASES?
• Criminal cases involving criminal negligence, or the quasi-offenses contemplated in Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, are allowed to be compromised hence an offer of settlement is not an implied
admission of guilt.
• Criminal cases allowed by law to be compromised.
• In prosecutions for violation of the internal revenue laws, such offers of compromise are not
admissible in evidence as the law provides that the payment of any internal revenue tax may be
compromised, and all criminal violations may likewise be compromised, except those already filed in
court and those involving fraud (Sec. 204, R.A. 8424 [Tax Reform Act of 1997]).
Note:
• While rape cases can in effect be compromised by actual marriage of the parties since
criminal liability is thereby extinguished (Art. 344, last par., Revised Penal Code), an offer to
compromise for a monetary consideration, and not to marry the victim, is an implied
admission of guilt (People vs. Amiscua, L-31238, Feb. 27, 1971). In People vs. Manzano (L-38449,
Nov. 25, 1982), the attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case with the
complainant was considered an implied admission of guilt. At any rate, the Supreme Court
has held that an offer of marriage by the accused, during the investigation of the rape case, is
also an admission of guilt (People vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 51034, May 29, 1987).
OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF OFFERS OF COMPROMISE IN
CRIMINAL CASES BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE.
• when made merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of
guilt (U.S. vs. Hunter, 1 Cranch, C.C, 317 as cited in the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97)
• when offer was made in reply to threats of prosecution and solicitation to settle (Frain vs. State, 40
Ga., 530 317 as cited in the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97)
• when the accused, for whose benefit the offer of compromise was made, has no knowledge or did
not take part in the making of the offer (People vs. Godoy)
EL VERADERO DE MANILA V. INSULAR LUMBER CO.
G.R. NO. 21911 SEPTEMBER 15, 1924
TOPIC: COMPROMISE
DOCTRINE:
• The offer of compromise which naturally, under the general rules of evidence, must be
excluded, except that as the amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement
appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, they are relevant.
US V. REGINO TORRES ET AL
G.R. NO. 10566. AUGUST 20, 1915
TOPIC: COMPROMISE
DOCTRINE:
• An offer of compromise in a criminal case cannot be admitted as evidence of an implied
admission of guilt when the law allows such compromise.
PEOPLE V. GODOY
G.R. NOS. 115908-09 DECEMBER 6, 1995
DOCTRINE:
• The accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under the consciousness of
guilt but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which
would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.
PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN
G.R. NO. 117217 DECEMBER 2, 1996
DOCTRINE:
• A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In
criminal cases, except those involving quasi offense or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.
PEOPLE V. YPARRAGUIRRE
G.R. NO. 117702 FEBRUARY 10, 1997
DOCTRINE:
• An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the
offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after
committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and
such offer is proved.
US V. MAQUI
G.R. NO. 8931, MARCH 14, 1914
DOCTRINE:
• The weight of authority sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in
criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some
other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not
in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which
would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
PEOPLE V. PRADES
G.R. NO. 127569 JULY 30, 1998
DOCTRINE:
• In criminal cases, except those involving quasi offenses or those allowed by law to be settled
through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
SAN MIGUEL CORP. V. KALALO
G.R. NO. 185522, JUNE 13, 2012
DOCTRINE:
• A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the
part of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her
claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and
save the expense of litigation.
SPS. CARBONELL V. METROBANK
G.R. NO. 178467, APRIL 26, 2017
DOCTRINE:
• In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of liability, and is inadmissible as
evidence against the offeror.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA
(RULE 130, SECTIONS 28 – 31, REVISED RULES ON
EVIDENCE)
Revised Rules on Evidence Proposed Amendments
Section 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a Same but Section 30
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission
of another, except as hereinafter provided.
Section 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act Section 31. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act
or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the or declaration of a partner or agent AUTHORIZED BY the
scope of his authority and during the existence of the party TO MAKE A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such SUBJECT MATTER OR within the scope of his OR HER
party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence authority and during the existence of the partnership or
other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such
person jointly interested with the party. act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person
jointly interested with the party.
Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The Section 32. Admission by conspirator. — The
act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the act or declaration of a conspirator IN
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in FURTHERANCE OF the conspiracy and during
evidence against the co-conspirator after the its existence, may be given in evidence against the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
of declaration. evidence other than such act of declaration.
Section 31. Admission by privies. — Where one Section 33. Admission by privies. — Where one
derives title to property from another, the act, derives title to property from another, THE
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding LATTER’S act, declaration, or omission in relation
the title, in relation to the property, is evidence to the property, is evidence against the former if
against the former. done WHILE THE LATTER WAS HOLDING
THE TITLE.
Section 32. Admission by silence. — An act or Section 34. Admission by silence. — An act or
declaration made in the presence and within the declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says hearing or observation of a party who does or says
nothing when the act or declaration is such as nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true, naturally to call for action or comment if not true,
and when proper and possible for him to do so, and when proper and possible for him OR HER to
may be given in evidence against him. do so, may be given in evidence against him OR
HER.
ADMISSION BY THIRD PARTY.
• The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as herein provided.
(Sec 28 – new 30)
A. Meaning:
• Every act or omission results to corresponding consequences which may be beneficial or harmful. The rule answers
the question: Who are bound by an admission and who must bear the adverse consequences? It embodies the first part
of the so called Res Inter Alios Acta Alteri Nocere Non Debet Rule Things done between strangers ought not to
injure those who are not parties to it, or transactions between two persons ought not to operate to the prejudice of
third persons). The effects and consequences of an act or omission should be the sole responsibility of the actor
himself and should not affect third persons who did not participate in the act or omission. A man’s life, rights, fortune
and property should not be affected by what other people’s conduct.
B. Reason:
(i) Fairness and
(ii) Acts of third persons are irrelevant to the case involving the act of a party which is the subject of the case.
C. Exceptions:
When the conduct of a third person is admissible as evidence against a party to a case
1. In case of vicarious admissions
2. Under the Principle of Admission by Adoption
FIRST EXCEPTION: VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS
CONCEPT:
• These are admissions by one who, by virtue of a legal relationship with another, maybe
considered as acting for and in behalf of the latter. These are acts, omissions or declarations
by a person who is not a party to a pending case, but are however admissible as evidence
against one of the parties. Their admissibility as evidence is based on the identity of interest
between the stranger and the party concerned.
ADMISSION BY CO-PARTNER OR AGENT.
The act or declaration of a partner or agent authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject or within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, maybe given in evidence against such party after the partnership or
agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act
or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
(Sec 29 – new 31)
1. The rule as to co-partners is based on the identity of interest among the partners such that each partner is an agent of the other partners.
The requirements are:
a). The existence of the partnership must first be established by evidence other than the act or declaration. Proof includes formal
documents such as:
(i) the Articles of Partnership or registration papers filed with the appropriate government agency such as the SEC or DTI,
b). The act or declaration must refer to a matter within the scope of the authority of the partners, or that it relates to the partnership. Such
as:
(i). obtaining a credit or loan or incurring of a liability for the partnership, such as borrowing money to add to the capital
• The act or declaration of conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act of declaration. (Sec 30 – new 32)
• 1. The conspiracy has reference to conspiracy as a mode or manner of committing a crime
which presupposes that a crime has actually been committed by two or more persons and the
issue is whether these two or more persons maybe held equally liable. It therefore becomes
relevant to determine whether the act or declaration by one can be used as evidence against a
co-accused. The conspiracy includes both the anterior conspiracy and spontaneous
/instantaneous conspiracy.
2. The act or declaration refer to those made extra-judicially and not to acts or declarations by a
conspirator during the trial
3. Requirements:
a). The existence of the conspiracy among the accused must first be established.
(i). May be by direct proof or circumstantial evidence showing Unity of Intention or Purpose and
Unity of Action.
(ii). The act or declaration may be presented first subject to the rule on conditional admissibility
i.e. proof of the conspiracy be presented latter, or the act or declaration may be admitted to prove the
guilt of the declarant and not to prove the conspiracy.
• b). The act or declaration must relate to the conspiracy or common objective, such as:
(i). the participation of each in the commission of the crime
(ii). The manner of achieving the objective
(iii). Defenses to be made or relating to the escape
(iv). Ensuing the successful execution of the plan.
Ex: The killing of an approaching policeman by the look-out in a robbery, even if not agreed upon, but
was necessary to prevent the discovery, is the liability of all the robbers.
c). The act or declaration was made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy in
that the conspiracy must still be in existence, and not when the conspiracy has ceased. A conspiracy
ceases:
(i) when the crime agreed upon has already been committed
(ii) the accused were apprehended
(iii) as to one who left the conspiracy and did not participate in its execution
(iv) when the plan was abandoned.
Thus: statements by one of the accused while in custody; acts done upon the arrest of the several
accused, do not anymore bind the other. Examples: Statements given to the media after arrest binds
only the declarant. The act of one in killing an arresting officer in order to escape binds him alone.
• The rule applies to a “Conspiracy By Adoption”: When one joins a conspiracy after its
formation and he actively participates in it, he adopts the previous acts and declarations of his
fellow conspirators which are admissible against him.
ADMISSION OF PRIVIES.
• Where one derives title to property from another, the latter’s act, declaration, or omission, in
relation to the property, is evidence against the former if done while the latter was holding the
title. (Sec 31 – new 33)
1. Privies are those who have mutual or succession of relationship to a property either by:
• The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations.
Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the
acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. (People vs Raquel, G.R. No. 119005,
December 2, 1996)
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
• Partner’s / Agent’s Admission
• Co-conspirator’s Statement
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. (People vs Cabrera, G.R. No. L-37398, June 28, 1974)
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of
the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. (People vs Yatco, G.R.
No. L-9181, November 28, 1955)
• Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession. The
admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to
statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or
during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this
case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and not
presumptive. It must be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession. (People
vs Chaw Yaw Shun, G.R. No. L-19590, April 25, 1968)
• The rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or
declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or
confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted
source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is
nevertheless admissible and competent. (People vs Serrano, G.R. No. L-7973, April 27,
1959)
• In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. (Tamargo vs Awingan,
G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010)
ADMISSION OF CO-CONSPIRATOR FOR
CONSPIRACY
• In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it
has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. (People v
Bokingo, G.R. No. 187536 : August 10, 2011 )
ACT OR DECLARATION OF CO-CONSPIRATOR
• Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. (People vs Cachuela, G.R.
No. 191752, June 10, 2013
ADMISSION OF PRIVIES
Privies Definition
The word "privies," as used in article 1225 of the Civil Code, denotes not only the idea of
succession in right of heirship or testamentary legacy, but also succession by virtue of acts inter
vivos, as by assignment, subrogation, or purchase — in fact any act whereby the successor is
substituted in the place of the predecessor in interest. The purchaser at an execution sale is,
therefore, a privy of the execution debtor. (Alpuerto vs Pastor, G.R. No. 12794, October 14,
1918)
DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP
• Where one derives title to real estate from another, the declaration, act, or omission of the
latter to the property is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds
the title. (City of Manila vs del Rosario, G.R. No. 1284. November 10, 1905)
PEOPLE V. ALEGRE
94 SCRA 109 (1979)
• As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have
probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. 3 While there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such
exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure
to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an
inmate of the Pasay City jail.
• The better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime,
especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit
confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to
deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
• The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal right of great
importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably.
• The privilege against self-incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It
reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized
men to subject those' suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment and
abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life."
• Therefore, it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody,
in the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid
appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt.
PEOPLE V. RAQUEL
265 SCRA 248 (1996)
• The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself,
and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
• Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, those exceptions do not however apply to the present
case.
• Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants to
the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of
Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente, was negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no
person by the name of Danny Clemente.
• Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the constitutional
rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the
chief of the intelligence and investigation section of their police station.
• Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be
considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance
of counsel. These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
PEOPLE V. CABRERA
57 SCRA 715 (1974)
• The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind and perpetrator,
together with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the deceased Luis dela Cruz and
the taking of the jeep he was driving. But said statement is obviously inadmissible against appellant, who
made timely objection thereto.
• There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the investigation
conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in question.
For this reason alone, that is, that said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy
between her and appellant, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in
the hands of the authorities, Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of. Said provision reads:
• Admission by conspirator.— The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
PEOPLE V. YATCO
97 PHIL. 941 (1955)
• The Court cited Sec. 12 of Rule 123 that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
• Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as
evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even
been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less
formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy
between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that
section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude
them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
• Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in
evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to
establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the
relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges.
CONFESSION
RULE 130, SECTION 33
Revised Rules on Evidence Proposed Amendments
Section 33. Confession. The declaration of an Section 33. Confession. The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense accused acknowledging his OR HER guilt of the
charged, or of any offense necessarily included offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
therein, may be given in evidence against him. included therein, may be given in evidence against
him OR HER.
WHAT IS CONFESSION?
• There can also be a confession of judgment in a civil case where the party expressly admits
his liability.
IS THERE A REQUIRED FORM OF CONFESSION?
Such confession may either be oral or in writing, and if in writing, it need not be under oath.
1. A judicial confession is one made before a court in which the case is pending and in the course of legal
proceedings therein and, by itself, can sustain a conviction even in capital offenses.
2. An extrajudicial confession is one made in any other place or occasion and cannot sustain a conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133).
• d. The confession must have been intelligently made, the accused realizing the importance or legal significance of his
act; and
• e. There must have been no violation of Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
• f. Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing
and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the
presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be
inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding. (R.A. 7438 sec. 2(d))
General Rule: The extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding only upon himself and is not admissible
against his co-accused.
Exceptions:
• a. If the latter impliedly acquiesced in or adopted said confession by not questioning its truthfulness, as where
it was made in his presence and he did not remonstrate against his being implicated therein;
• b. If the accused persons voluntarily and independently executed identical confessions without collusion,
commonly known as interlocking confessions, which confessions are corroborated by other evidence, and
without contradiction by the co-accused who was present;
• c. Where the accused admitted the facts stated by the confessant after being apprised of such confession;
• d. If they are charged as co-conspirators of the crime which was confessed by one of the accused and said
confession is used only as a corroborating evidence;
• e. Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the
co-conspirator;
• f. Where the confessant testified for his co-defendant; or
• g. Where the co-conspirator’s extrajudicial confession is corroborated by other evidence of record.
• This section declares as admissible the confession of the accused not only with respect to the offense charged
but also any offense necessarily included therein. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution specifically
provides that illegal confessions and admissions are inadmissible against the confessant or the admitter, hence
they are admissible against the persons who violated the constitutional prohibition against obtaining illegal
confessions or admissions.
ARE INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS ADMISSIBLE?
• NO, because:
a. They are unreliable
b. On grounds of humanitarian considerations or
c. On legal considerations of their being violative of one’s constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
INDICIA OF THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A
CONFESSION:
• a. The confession contains details which the police could not have supplied or invented.
• b. The confession contains details which could have been known only to the accused.
• c. The confession contains statements which are exculpatory in nature.
• d. The confession contains corrections made by the accused in his handwriting or with his initials and which
corrected facts are best known to the accused.
• e. The accused is sufficiently educated and aware of the consequences of his act.
• f. It was made in the presence of impartial witnesses with the accused acting normally on that occasion.
• g. There is lack of motive on the part of the investigators to extract a confession, with improbabilities and
inconsistencies in the attempt of the accused to repudiate his confession.
• h. The accused questioned the voluntariness of the confession only for the first time at the trial of
the case.
• i. The contents of the confession were affirmed by the accused in his voluntary participation in the
reenactment of the crime, as shown by his silent acquiescence thereto.
• j. The facts contained in the confession were confirmed by other subsequent facts.
• k. After his confession, the accused was subjected to physical examination and there were no signs of
maltreatment, or the accused never complained thereof, but not where he failed to complain to the
judge on a reasonable apprehension of further maltreatment as he was still in the custody of his
torturers.
RULE 115
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
SECTION 1. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL. — IN ALL
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, THE ACCUSED SHALL BE
ENTITLED TO THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS:
(E) TO BE EXEMPT FROM BEING COMPELLED TO BE A
WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
• The accused is protected under this Rule from questions which tend to incriminate him, that
is which may subject him to penal liability. Section 3, Rule 132, allows a person to refuse to
answer degrading questions unless it be to the fact in issue or fact from which the fact in
issue would be presumed.
SCOPE
• Testimonial compulsion
• Furnishing evidence by any other means of any fact which the accused has the right to keep
secret
EXCEPTIONS:
• Questioning initiated by a law officer after a person has been taken into custody or deprived
of freedom
• Present where the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry and begins to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody and asked questions that lead into eliciting incriminating
statements
• Includes “invitations” to an investigation
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE
• Evidence obtained in violation of the right of a person against unreasonable searches and
seizures are inadmissible
• It refers to an object, not testimonial evidence
• It does not refer to testimony or confessions obtained illegally.
WAIVER
• Failure of the accused to invoke the privilege after the incriminating question is asked and
before his answer.
R.A. 7438
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF
PERSONS ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE
DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS
WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION?
• a. to be assisted by a counsel at all times;
• b. to be informed of his right to remain silent; to have a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of a counsel, to be provided
with one by the investigating officer;
• c. to be allowed visits by or conferences with any of his immediate family, or any medical
doctor or priest or minister chosen by him;
RULE AS REGARDS EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION AND WAIVER
• Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in
writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid
waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor,
the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise,
such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
• Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel;
otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
• "Custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
DOCTRINES:
• Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although
later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the
Constitution and as such cannot be admitted in Court.
• There is a distinction between the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and
33 of Rule 130. A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal
case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused,
direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of
other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is
insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of
guilt. (People v. Maqueda 242 SCRA 565)
• Where several accused are tried together for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given
by one during the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter. "The
extrajudicial admission or confession of a co-conspirator out of court is different from the
testimony given by a co-accused during trial. The first is admissible against the declarant
alone, but the second is perfectly admissible against his co-accused," who had the right and
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. (People v. Endino, supra)
PEOPLE V. COMPIL
G.R. NO. 95028 - MAY 15, 1995
DOCTRINE:
• Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although
later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the
Constitution and as such cannot be admitted in Court.
• Even if counsel arrives prior to the actual signing of the statement, his absence during the
making but presence during the signing will not cure the defect.
PEOPLE V. ABULENCIA
G.R. NO. 138403 - AUGUST 22, 2001
DOCTRINE:
• A confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter was
acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is
apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear.
PEOPLE V. MALNGAN
G.R. NO. 170470 - SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
DOCTRINE:
• An uncounseled confession or admission given by the accused to a private individual is not
covered by Section 12, Articles III of the Constitution where there is no showing that said
private individual was acting under police authority.
PEOPLE V. LAUGA
G.R. NO. 186228 - MARCH 15, 2010
DOCTRINE:
• An uncounseled extrajudicial confession taken by a “bantay bayan”, who is charged with the
state related function of peace-keeping, is inadmissible in evidence.
LADIANA V PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 144293 - DECEMBER 4, 2002
DOCTRINE:
• The legal formalities required by the Constitution apply only to extra-judicial confessions or
admissions obtained during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in the
constitutional provision "exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of
accused persons."
PEOPLE V. DACANAY
G.R. NO. 216064 - NOVEMBER 07, 2016
DOCTRINE:
• Verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual
and the State.
PO1 TABOBO III VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 220977 - JUNE 19, 2017
DOCTRINE:
• Declarations in an affidavit does not necessarily establish guilt. An admission of fact is starkly
different from, and is not tantamount to, a confession of guilt. It is an acknowledgment of
some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to authorize a conviction and
which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt. A confession, on the other hand, is
an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.
PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS
EVIDENCE
SECTION 36, SIMILAR ACTS AS EVIDENCE. — EVIDENCE THAT ONE DID OR DID NOT DO A CERTAIN THING AT ONE TIME IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE THAT HE OR SHE DID OR DID NOT DO THE SAME OR A SIMILAR THING AT ANOTHER TIME; BUT IT MAY BE
RECEIVED TO PROVE A SPECIFIC INTENT OR KNOWLEDGE, IDENTITY, PLAN, SYSTEM, SCHEME, HABIT, CUSTOM OR USAGE, AND THE
LIKE.
WHAT IS THE RULE IN CASE OF SIMILAR ACTS AS
EVIDENCE?
• The rule in case of similar acts as evidence states that, evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or
similar thing at another time.
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE
• The rule in unaccepted offer states that, an offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money
or to deliver a written instrument of specific property is, if rejected without cause, equivalent
to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument or property.
REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID OFFER OF PAYMENT
• The rule is intended to complement the rule on tender of payment under Article 1256 of the
New Civil Code.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
RULE 130, SECTION 37
Section 37. Hearsay. -Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the
facts asserted therein. A statement is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) a
non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him or her as an assertion.
Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as otherwise provided in these Rules.
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (a)
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition;
(b) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive; or (c) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him or her. (n)
The Supreme Court Sub-Committee opined that the current Sec. 36 which provides
that “A witness can testify only on those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception except as otherwise
provided in these rules” does not really define “hearsay” and that a clear definition of
the word is called for.
The Sub-Committee opines that the old provision confuses the hearsay rule with the
rule limiting to what the witness can describe on the basis of first hand knowledge. The
two rules are different, as may be seen from the following commentaries.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN HEARSAY RULE AND RULE
REQUIRING FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE
This is the rule that a witness qualified to testify to a fact susceptible of observation,
only it is appears that he had a reasonable opportunity to observe the fact.
Thus, if a witness testified that on a certain day flight 450 arrived at airport at X on
time, and from his other evidence it appears that he was not in X at the time in
question, and hence could only have spoken from conjecture or report of other
persons, the proper objection is NOT HEARSAY, but WANT OF PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
Conversely, if the witness testifies that his brother told him that he came on the flight and it arrived on time,
the objection for WANT OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, of when the plane arrived is inappropriate,
because the witness purports to speak from his own personal knowledge only of what his brother said, and
as to this he presumably has knowledge. If the testimony in this latter case was offered to show the time of
the plane’s arrival, the appropriate objection is hearsay.
The distinction is one in the form of the testimony, whether the witness purports to give the facts directly
upon his own credit (although it may appear later that he was speaking only on the faith of the report from
others) or whether he purports to give an account of what another has told him and this is offered to
evidence the truth of another person’s report.
However, if it appears, either from the phrasing of his testimony or from other sources that the witness is
testifying on the basis of reports from others, though he does not testify to their statements, the distinction
loses much of its significance, and court may simply apply the label hearsay.
RATIONALE
• Hearsay evidence is excluded by the rules because the party against whom the evidence is
presented is deprived of its right and an opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom
the statements or writings are attributed.
APPLICABILITY
• Hearsay evidence rule applies to oral and documentary evidence hearsay if its probative value
is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand
ESSENTIAL PRE-REQUISITE FOR ACCEPTING
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
• The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for the accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed act.
EVIDENTIARY VALUE
• The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the
truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand,
subject to the test of cross-examination.
Nature of affidavits as evidence
• Affidavits are in the nature of hearsay evidence.
Independent relevant statement
• It is a statement which is relevant to the fact in issue independently of whether they are true
or not.
Hearsay evidence is excluded because the party against whom it is
presented is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine the
persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed.
Consequently, if a party does not object to the hearsay evidence, the
same is admissible, as a party can waive his right to cross-examine
STATEMENTS WHICH CAN BE MADE BY A WITNESS
IN WHICH THE FACTS IN ISSUE MAY BE INFERRED
WITHOUT VIOLATING HEARSAY EVIDENCE
• (a) Statement of a person showing the following:
• a. State of mind;
• b. Mental condition;
• c. Belief;
• d. Intention;
• e. Ill will; and
• f. Other exemption;
• b) Statement of a person from which an inference can be made as to:
• a. State on mind of another;
• b. Knowledge;
• c. Belief;
• d. Motive;
• e. Good faith or bad faith of the latter;
Statement of a person which may identify the following:
• a. Date;
• b. Place;
• c. Person in question;
Sec. 40. Dying Delcaration - The declaration of a dying person, made under consciousness of
an impending death, may be received in any case where in his OR HER death is the subject of
inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death7
WHAT IS DYING DECLARATION?
Note: A Dying Declaration may be oral or written. If oral, the witness who heard it may testify
thereto without the necessity of reproducing the words of the decedent, if he is able to give the
substance thereof. An unsigned dying declaration may be used as a memorandum by the
witness who took it down
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR DYING DECLARATIONS
TO BE ADMISSIBLE?
• A. That the death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of such fact;
• B. That the declaration refers to the cause and the surrounding circumstances of such death;
• C. That the declaration refers to the facts which the victim is competent to testify to;
• D. That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant’s death is subject of the inquiry (the victim
necessarily must have died);
• E. That the statement must be complete in itself.
• Note: If the declarant in case of a dying declaration has survived, his declaration may be admissible as part of
the res gestae.
REASONS FOR ITS ADMISSION
• Necessity- because the declarant’s death renders impossible his taking the witness stand.
• • Trustworthiness- at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced. The mind is
induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth.
FACTORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE
DECLARANT IS CONSCIOUS OF HIS IMPENDING
DEATH:
General Rule: The intervening time from the making of a Dying Declaration up to the time of
death is IMMATERIAL in its admissibility, as long as it was made under the consciousness of
impending death.
Exceptions:
• 1. If there is retraction made by the declarant before he died; or
• 2. His declaration is ambiguous as whether he believed that his death was imminent when he
made such declaration.
DYING DECLARATIONS ONCE PROVED AND
ADMITTED - ITS CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT SHALL
BE DETERMINED LIKE ANY OTHER TESTIMONIAL
EVIDENCE.
• Circumstances such as surprise, rapidity and confusion should be taken into consideration in
giving weight to the testimony of the declarant when identifying his assailants.
• It may be impugned: in the same manner as the testimony of any other witness on the stand.
DOCTRINES:
• The dying declaration of the deceased is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in
doubt as to whether he would die or not. However, the said statement may be admitted as part of the res gestae
since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased had no sufficient time to
concoct a charge against the accused. (People vs. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 - February 28, 1985)
• The probative force of a dying declaration does not depend on the declarant not expiring immediately after its execution.— Death
did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is not
indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the
rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.
• The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to homicide or murder as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of death. (People vs. Sabio, 2 SCRA 218 - January 27, 1981)
• The declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence
and forms part of the record.
• Even if dying declaration was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an
impending death." it is still admissible as part of the res gestae. (People vs. Salison, 253 SCRA
758 – 1996)
Requisites of Dying Declarations:
• (a) The declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death;
• (b) It is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness
of impending death;
• (c) The declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and
• (d) The dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.
• Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled
to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons aware of an impending death have
been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and extremely scrupulous in their
accusations. The dying declaration is given credence on the premise that no one who knows
of one's impending death will make a careless and false accusation. Hence, not infrequently,
pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the
deceased victim. (People vs. Villariez, G.R. No. 211160 - 2 September 2015)
• For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur:
• (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
• (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his impending death;
• (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
• (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the
victim.
• In order for a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must concur:
• (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
• (b) the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
• (c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. (People vs.
Calinawan, G.R. No. 226145 - Feb. 13, 2017)
PEOPLE VS. SABIO
2 SCRA 218 - JANUARY 27, 1981
DOCTRINE:
• The probative force of a dying declaration does not depend on the declarant not expiring immediately after its
execution.— Death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It
is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that
renders the dying declaration admissible.
• The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to homicide or murder as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
RULE 130, SECTION 38 (NOW SEC. 41)
• Section 41. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased,
or unable to testify against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable PERSON in his or HER position would not have made the declaration unless he
or SHE believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself OR HERSELF or
his or HER successors in interest and against third persons. A STATEMENT TENDING
TO EXPOSE THE DECLARANT TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND OFFERED TO
EXCULPATE THE ACCUSED IS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNLESS CORROBORATING
CIRCUMSTANCES CLEARLY INDICATE THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE
STATEMENT.
WHAT IS DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST?
It is a declaration made:
• 1. By a person deceased or
• 2. unable to testify,
• 3. Against the interest of the declarant,
If the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made:
• 1. So far contrary to declarant’s own interest,
• 2. That a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration
• 3. UNLESS he believed it to be true,
May be received in evidence against:
• 1. Himself or
• 2. His successors in interest and
• 3. Against third persons
NOTES:
• In People v. Toledo (50 Phil. 825 (1928)), the Supreme Court extended the hearsay exception to a declaration against penal
interest offered in evidence to exculpate the accused. In the opinion penned by Justice Malcolm, it is significant that he
noted that “there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement.”
• To guard against the danger of a witness testifying falsely that he has heard another person (deceased or unable to
testify) confess the danger to the crime for the purpose of exculpating the accused, the Sub-Committee decided to adopt
the requirement in Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence that there must be “corroborating circumstances”
clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement.
• As to the meaning of “corroborating circumstances,” there must be an independent evidence that directly or
circumstantially tends to prove the purpose for which the statement is offered – for example, evidence supporting the
veracity of the declarant, the fact that the statement was against interest to an unusual decree, the declarant repeated the
statement, the declarant could not be motivated to falsify for the benefit of the accused, of other factors suggesting
trustworthiness’ such as spontaneity (Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Sec 8.64)
Declarations Against Interest Admissions Against Interest
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DECLARATION AGAINST
Admissible when the declarant is alive and is in court. (Available)
INTEREST AND ADMISSIONS
Admissible when the declarant is dead or unable to testify.
AGAINST INTEREST
(Unavailable)
Made against the proprietary or pecuniary interest of the parties Need not be against one’s proprietary or pecuniary interest of the
parties.
Made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party Made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or
to the suit identified in legal interest with such party.
Must have been made ante litem motam (prior to the controversy) May be made at any time before or during the trial
Admissible against himself or successor in interest and against Admissible only against the party making the admission
third parties
REQUISITES IN ORDER FOR A STATEMENT TO BE
ADMISSIBLE AS A DECLARATION AGAINST
INTEREST
• c. Pecuniary interest (an interest related to money or that which can be measured in money. For example, one has
pecuniary interest in an investment in stocks)
• It is essential that at the time of the statement, the declarant’s interest affected is
actual/real/apparent and not merely contingent/future/conditional.
• Self-Serving Declaration: Statements favorable to or intended to advance the interests of
the declarant.
• • It is inadmissible as being hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness
• • Opposite of Declaration Against Interest
DOCTRINES:
• An affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. (Dantis vs.
Maghinang, G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013)
LAZARO VS. AGUSTIN
G.R. NO. 152364 - APRIL 15, 2010
DOCTRINE:
• On the Issue of Declaration and Admission Against Interest
• There is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against interest. Admissions
against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest
with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against
interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary
evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness.
• On the issue of the notarized affidavit
• Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary
FUENTES V. CA
253 SCRA 430 – FEBRUARY 9, 1996
DOCTRINE:
• One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest.
Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded
on necessity and trustworthiness.
• There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest:
1. the declarant must not be available to testify;
2. the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and
3. the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
PEDIGREE
RULE130, SEC.41
• Section 41. Act or declaration about pedigree. – The act or declaration of a person deceased or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him or her by birth[,]
adoption, or marriage or, in the absence thereof, with whose family he or she was so intimately
associated as to be likely to have accurate information concerning his or her pedigree, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two [(2)] persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word “pedigree”
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
CONCEPT:
*The deceased person must be related to person whose pedigree is in issue by birth or
marriage. The witness need not be a relative.
What is the reason for admitting such hearsay evidence?
• 2. Trustworthiness –if there is no controversy in their family, relatives will usually not lie about their relationship to each other.
Family members are presumed to be interested in pedigree, particularly in ascertaining the truth.
• (2) The act or declaration is made by the person related to the subject by birth or marriage;
• (3) The relationship between the declarant or the actor and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration;
DOCTRINE :
• Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent;
• Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
PEOPLE V. GALLANO
G.R. NO. 184762, FEBRUARY 25, 2015
DOCTRINE:
• The following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance.
• 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of
such party.
• 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
• 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified
to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
• 1. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
• 2. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
• 3. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
• 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning
the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
• 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphasis supplied)"
FAMILY REPUTATION
OR TRADITION
REGARDING PEDIGREE
SECTION 42. FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE. —
THE REPUTATION OR TRADITION EXISTING IN A FAMILY PREVIOUS TO THE
CONTROVERSY, IN RESPECT TO THE PEDIGREE OF ANY ONE OF ITS MEMBERS, MAY
BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE IF THE WITNESS TESTIFYING THEREON BE ALSO A
MEMBER OF THE FAMILY, EITHER BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY OR ADOPTION.
ENTRIES IN FAMILY BIBLES OR OTHER FAMILY BOOKS OR CHARTS, ENGRAVINGS ON
RINGS, FAMILY PORTRAITS AND THE LIKE, MAY BE RECEIVED AS EVIDENCE OF
PEDIGREE.
WHAT DOES THE SECTION PROVE?
• a. The witness testifying thereto must be a member of the family, by consanguinity or affinity
or adoption, of the same family as the subject
• b. Such reputation or tradition must have existed in that family ante litem motam (previous to
the controversy)
EXAMPLE OF AN ANTE LITEM MOTAM UNDER
THIS SECTION?
• The person’s statement as to his date of birth and age, as he learned these from his parents or
relatives.
COMMON
REPUTATION
SECTION 43. COMMON REPUTATION. — COMMON REPUTATION. – COMMON
REPUTATION EXISTING PREVIOUS TO THE CONTROVERSY, AS TO BOUNDARIES OF
OR CUSTOMS AFFECTING LANDS IN THE COMMUNITY AND REPUTATION AS TO
EVENTS OF GENERAL HISTORY IMPORTANT TO THE COMMUNITY, OR RESPECTING
MARRIAGE OR MORAL CHARACTER, MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE. MONUMENTS
AND INSCRIPTIONS IN PUBLIC PLACES MAY BE RECEIVED AS EVIDENCE OF
COMMON REPUTATION.
WHAT DOES THE SECTION PROVE?
• It is the definite opinion of the community in which the fact to be proved is known or exists.
It means the general or substantially undivided reputation, as distinguished from a partial or
qualified one, although it need not be unanimous. Character refers to the inherent qualities of
a person, while reputation is the opinion of him by others; but, under this section, the
character of a person is permitted to be established by his common reputation.
EXAMPLE OF WHAT CAN BE PROVED?
• The reputation of a person should be that existing in the place of his residence, it may also be
that existing in the place where he is best known. Also, the character of a place as an opium
joint may be proved by its common reputation in the community.
RATIONALE FOR TAKING OUT “FACTS OF
PUBLIC OR GENERAL INTEREST”:
• The phrase is too vague to be of any useful application and the requirement that said facts
must be “more than thirty years old” further narrows the application.
RATIONALE FOR NEW AMENDMENT:
• Exception relating to land boundaries and land customs may be particularly useful in rural
communities where “general reputation about facts of community interest is generally
trustworthy.” The reputation is required to antedate the controversy, though antiquity is not a
prerequisite.
• On the substitution to “events of general history important to the community in which
located” similar also to use of reputation to establish boundaries – a need for evidence
because of likelihood that other evidence cannot be obtained, and reliability because the
testimony represents the consensus of the community. As contrast to matters affecting lands,
the reputation need not have arisen before the controversy.
• The event must have been “important to the community or state or nation in which located”
to ensure reliability since “there is high probability that the matter underwent general scrutiny
as the community reputation was formed.” It is also important because of the danger that
jurors will be unduly impressed by this form of evidence which unlike the usual oral form of
evidence relating to boundaries will often consist of a written record.
• Usually evidence admissible under this exception could frequently come under ancient
documents or business record exception, or judicial notice.
FERRER, ET. AL., VS. INCHAUSTI, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 12993 -OCTOBER 28, 1918
DOCTRINE:
• Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence
of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts;
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
• The law does not require that the entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the
occurrence of those events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to the
defect attributed to it.
CITY OF MANILA VS. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 1284 -NOV. 10, 1905
DOCTRINE:
• Testimony of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the
city does not constitute common reputation. The "common reputation" should be
equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish
the presumption referred to.
HEARSAY RULE EXCEPTION
PART OF RES GESTAE
RULE 130 SEC. 42 (45)
SECTION 44. PART OF RES GESTAE
The statements were made before the Such act must be material to the issue
declarant had the opportunity to
contrive
• 1. Be spontaneous;
• 2. Made while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent;
• 3. Relates to the circumstances of the startling occurrence; and
• 4. Must be involuntary and simultaneously wrung from the witness by the impact of the
occurrence. (People v. Tulagan)
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RES GESTAE AND
DYING DECLARATIONS
• However, if both elements for res gestae and dying declarations are present, the statements may be
admitted as both.
• Generally, statements or acts MUST be made while the declarant is under the immediate influence of
the startling occurrence. Hence, done immediately prior, during, or subsequent to the events.
• Except, in cases where:
• • The declarant is unconscious; or
• • The declarant did not have the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story.
• So, even if the statement was made hours after the startling occurrence, it will still be admissible. (People
v. Berame)
• Statements or outcries as part of res gestae are admissible when they:
• • Establish the identity of the assailant (People v. Alban);
• • Prove the complicity of another person in the crime (US v. David); and
• • Establish an admission of liability on the part of the accused (People v. Reyes).
AMENDMENT
• The existing Section 43 on “Entries in the course of business” has had little practical value
because of the unreasonable requirements that the entrant must be dead or unable to testify
and that he must have personal knowledge of the matter recorded. As noted by the
Sub—Committee that drafted the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “These stringent
requirements work undue hardship on the litigants and may render the current exception
useless.” There is no reason why the exception relating to the entries in the regular course of
business as provided in Rule 8, Section 1, rules on Electronic Evidence should not be applied
to paper based or non-electronic documents. A liberalized exception for business records is a
practical necessity in the modern business environment
WHAT IS THE RULE ON ENTRIES MADE IN THE
COURSE OF BUSINESS?
• They maybe received as prima facie evidence and maybe admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MONET’S EXPORT, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 184971, APRIL 19, 2010
TOPIC: ENTRIES IN MADE IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
DOCTRINE:
• The original documents need not be presented in evidence when it is numerous, cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result
OFFICIAL RECORDS
RULE 130, SECTION 44
• Section 46. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his or her duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. (44a)
WHAT IS THE RULE ON ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL
RECORDS?
• They maybe received as prima facie evidence and maybe admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR SUCH ENTRIES TO
BE ADMISSIBLE?
• In order to be admissible, it is necessary that:
a. The entries were made by a public officer in the performance of his duties or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
b. The entrant had personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts were acquired by him
from reports made by persons under a legal duty to submit the same; and
c. Such entries were duly entered in a regular manner in the official records.
Note:
Entries in official records may be proved and evidenced in the manner provided by Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132.
WHAT MAY BE CONSIDERED AS AN OFFICIAL
RECORD?
• An official record may be a register, a cash book, or an official return or certificate.
SPS. AFRICA V. CALTEX (PHIL.) INC. ET AL.
G. R. NO. L-12986, MARCH 31, 1966
TOPIC: ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
DOCTRINE:
• The three requisites to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule are: (a) that the entry
was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that
it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired
by him personally or through official information.
PEOPLE V. LEONES
G.R. NO. L-48727, SEPTEMBER 30, 1982
TOPIC: ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
DOCTRINE:
• Written entries in the clinical case record are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,
the said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in
the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law.
MANALO V. ROBLES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
99 PHIL 729
RULING:
• The Court ruled that the evidence is admissible. A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a
public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law and forming part of official
records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The sheriff's making the return need
not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.
• The Court also added that the law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes
they will discharge their several trust with accuracy and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they do
in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken of their public duty may
be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and
circumstances of each a case may appear to require.
PEOPLE V. CABUANG
217 SCRA 675 (1996)
RULING:
• The Court ruled that Evelyn correctly identified the suspects.
• The failure of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the doers of the horrific rape,
killing and robbery of Maria Victoria the first time she was questioned by the police, does not
adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly settled case law that the delay of a witness in
revealing to the police authority what he or she may know about a crime does not, by itself,
render the witness' testimony unworthy of belief.
• It remains only to note that entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of
performance of official duty are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries. Testimony
given in open court during the trial is commonly much more lengthy and detailed than the
brief entries made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on a police
report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence gathered in the course of the
police investigation and presented 681 in court. In the case at bar, we conclude that
prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera did positively and clearly identify Modesto Cabuang and
Nardo Matabang as among those who had raped and killed and robbed the hapless Maria
Victoria Parana.
PEOPLE V. SAN GABRIEL
253 SCRA 84 (1996)
RULING:
• The Court ruled that the Advanced Information Sheet should not be considered.
• The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be
incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of
suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that 683 pertain to the subject. It is
understandable that the testimony during the trial would be lengthier and more detailed than
the matters stated in the police blotter.
• Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by the defense
during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the
document must fail since the court cannot consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.
• Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police officer only after
interviewing Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the
attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to present Camba
on the part of the accused should militate against his cause.
• Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur:
1. The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
2. It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and,
3. The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
• Applied in the case at bar: The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception
to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible.
COMMERCIAL LISTS
RULE 130 SECTION 47
• Section 47. Commercial lists and the like. -Evidence of statements of matters of
interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or
other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (45)
PNOC SHIPPING VS. CA
299 SCRA 402 (1999)
RULING:
• The Court ruled not to admit the price quotations as evidence.
• It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists and the like"
under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals
considered private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It added, however, that these exhibits
should be admitted in evidence "until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence" because "the reception of these documentary
exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial court." Under
Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of
interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same
occupation.
• In this case, the price quotations are not considered to be commercial lists. They are not
published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter.
Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of "commercial lists" as
these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional
need and relied upon in the work of the occupation."
MERALCO VS. QUISUMBING
G.R. NO. 127598
RULING:
• The Court ruled that it cannot be admitted.
• Section 45 of Rule 130 states that:
Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon
by them therein.
• Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted only "if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein." In this case, the report is simply a newspaper account and not even a
commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for
purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody
testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in
their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a
person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent
extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible.
LEARNED TREATISES
• A witness is sought to be presented in a present case but he is dead, unable to testify such
that in lieu of his personal testimony, what is presented is his testimony in a prior proceeding.
II. REQUIREMENTS
A. The witness is dead or unable to testify. The witness may be suffering from illness or from a
mental disqualification such as having become insane or loss of memory due to age. His
whereabouts is unknown despite diligent efforts to locate him or he was prevented by a party from
appearing as witness, either by force or by deceit or by persuasion. It does not cover a situation
where the witness refuses to come to court.
B. B. Identity of the parties. This may refer to identical parties or the parties are their successor in
interest or representatives
C. C. Identity of issues. The issue or matter, in which the testimony of the witness is sought is
common to both cases, even if there are other issues involved or that the form of action is
different
Examples of cases where there is a common issue:
i. ejectment and recovery of right of ownership as both would involve the question of who has
physical possession
ii. an action for damages based on an act or omission which was the subject of a prior criminal case
such as killing, slander or libel or estafa.
D. Opportunity for cross examination by the opponent in the first proceeding
a. If the opponent, through his act or negligence, did not cross examine, or lost the right, the
rule still applies. Example: the defendant was declared in default and plaintiff then
presented evidence ex parte
b. b. Thus if the proceedings in the prior administrative cases was summary and not
adversarial/confrontational but was decided based on affidavits and position papers, the
rule does not apply
III. HOW TO PRESENT:
• Present the Transcript of Testimony which the parties may stipulate on.
• Requisites for applicability:
a) The person making the hearsay statement is credible;
b) There must be “substantial basis” for crediting the hearsay (NOT to be confused with
“substantial evidence”)
TAN VS CA,
G.R. NO. L-22793. MAY 16, 1967
DOCTRINE:
• Subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since testifying at the
first does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave cause,
almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 152375, DECEMBER 16, 2011
DOCTRINE:
• While a former testimony or deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule,
the classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally
conceded. A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130
explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the
adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in
the prior proceeding.
RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
A.M. NO. 004-07-SC
Applicability
• This rule shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused
of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal
proceedings involving child witnesses.
Objectives
• To create and maintain an environment that will allow children to give reliable and complete
evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and
facilitate the ascertainment of truth.
Child Witness
• A "child witness" is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of
eighteen (18) years. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over eighteen (18) years but is
found by the court as unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.
Guardian ad litem
a. The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a victim of, accused of, or a
witness to a crime to promote the best interests of the child. In making the appointment,
the court shall consider the background of the guardian ad litem and his familiarity with
the judicial process, social service programs, and child development, giving preference to
the parents of the child, if qualified. The guardian ad litem may be a member of the
Philippine Bar. A person who is a witness in any proceeding involving the child cannot be
appointed as a guardian ad litem.
A "guardian ad litem" is a person appointed by the court where the case is pending for a child who is
a victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to protect the best interests of the said child.
b. The guardian ad litem:
1) Shall attend all interviews, depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings in which a child participates;
2) Shall make recommendations to the court concerning the welfare of the child;
3) Shall have access to all reports, evaluations, and records necessary to effectively advocate for the child,
except privileged communications;
4) Shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of resources and special services to the child;
5) Shall explain, in language understandable to the child, all legal proceedings, including police
investigations, in which the child is involved;
(6) Shall assist the child and his family in coping with the emotional effects of crime and subsequent
criminal or non-criminal proceedings in which the child is involved;
(7) May remain with the child while the child waits to testify;
(8) May interview witnesses; and
(9) May request additional examinations by medical or mental health professionals if there is a
compelling need therefor.
(c) The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings but shall not participate in the trial.
However, he may file motions pursuant to sections 9, 10, 25, 26, 27 and 31(c). If the guardian ad litem
is a lawyer, he may object during trial that questions asked of the child are not appropriate to his
developmental level.
(d) The guardian ad litem may communicate concerns regarding the child to the court through an
officer of the court designated for that purpose.
(e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding concerning any information, statement, or
opinion received from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem, unless the court finds it
necessary to promote the best interests of the child.
(f) The guardian ad litem shall be presumed to have acted in good faith in compliance with his duties
described in sub-section (b).
COMPETENCY
• Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct a competency
examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt
exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity. - A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of
competency examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination.
(b) Burden of proof. - To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies
on the party challenging his competence.
(c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the following are allowed to attend a competency
examination:
(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;
(2) The counsel for the parties;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) One or more support persons for the child; and
(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his absence.
(d) Conduct of examination. - Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only
by the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his
discretion, ask the child.
(e) Developmentally appropriate questions. - The questions asked at the competency
examination shall be appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be
related to the issues at trial; and shall focus on the ability of the child to remember,
communicate, distinguish between truth and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify
truthfully.
(f) Continuing duty to assess competence. - The court has the duty of continuously assessing
the competence of the child throughout his testimony.
OATH OR AFFIRMATION
• Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.
EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
• The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in
open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
• The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may,
however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.
INTERPRETER FOR CHILD. -
(a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino language or is unable to
communicate in said languages due to his developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other
similar reason, an interpreter whom the child can understand and who understands the child
may be appointed by the court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child.
(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only person who can serve as an
interpreter for the child, he shall not be disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of the
child. The interpreter, however, who is also a witness, shall testify ahead of the child.
(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a true and accurate interpretation
FACILITATOR TO POSE QUESTIONS TO CHILD
(a) The court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a facilitator if it determines that the child is
unable to understand or respond to questions asked. The facilitator may be a child 704 psychologist,
psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent, or relative.
(b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for the parties shall pose questions to the
child only through the facilitator. The questions shall either be in the words used by counsel or, if the
child is not likely to understand the same, in words that are comprehensible to the child and which
convey the meaning intended by counsel.
(c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the child according to the
meaning intended by counsel.
SUPPORT PERSONS
• A "support person" is a person chosen by the child to accompany him to testify at or attend a
judicial proceeding or deposition to provide emotional support for him.
(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a deposition shall have the right to be
accompanied by one or two persons of his/her own choosing to provide him emotional
support.
(1)Both support persons shall remain within the view of the child during his testimony.
(2) One of the support persons may accompany the child to the witness stand, provided the support
person does not completely obscure the child from the view of the opposing party, judge, or hearing
officer.
(3) The court may allow the support person to hold the hand of the child or take other appropriate
steps to provide emotional support to the child in the course of the proceedings.
(4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the child during his
testimony.
(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness, the court may disapprove the
choice if it is sufficiently established that the attendance of the support person during the
testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of
the testimony of the child.
(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the court, his testimony shall be
presented ahead of the testimony of the child.
WAITING AREA FOR CHILD WITNESSES
• The courts are encouraged to provide a waiting area for children that is separate from waiting
areas used by other persons. The waiting area for children should be furnished so as to make
a child comfortable.
COURTROOM ENVIRONMENT
• To create a more comfortable environment for the child, the court may, in its discretion, direct and
supervise the location, movement and deportment of all persons in the courtroom including the 705
parties, their counsel, child, witnesses, support persons, guardian ad litem, facilitator, and court
personnel. The child may be allowed to testify from a place other than the witness chair. The witness
chair or other place from which the child testifies may be turned to facilitate his testimony but the
opposing party and his counsel must have a frontal or profile view of the child during the testimony
of the child. The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies may also be rearranged to
allow the child to see the opposing party and his counsel, if he chooses to look at them, without
turning his body or leaving the witness stand. The judge need not wear his judicial robe.
• Nothing in this section or any other provision of law, except official in-court identification
provisions, shall be construed to require a child to look at the accused.
• Accommodations for the child under this section need not be supported by a finding of
trauma to the child.
TESTIMONY DURING APPROPRIATE HOURS
• The court may order that the testimony of the child should be taken during a time of day
when the child is well-rested.
RECESS DURING TESTIMONY
• The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief while undergoing direct, cross,
re-direct, and re-cross examinations as often as necessary depending on his developmental
level.
TESTIMONIAL AIDS
• The court shall permit a child to use dolls, anatomically-correct dolls, puppets, drawings,
mannequins, or any other appropriate demonstrative device to assist him in his testimony.
EMOTIONAL SECURITY ITEM
• While testifying, a child shall be allowed to have an item of his own choosing such as a
blanket, toy, or doll.
APPROACHING THE WITNESS
• The court may prohibit a counsel from approaching a child if it appears that the child is
fearful of or intimidated by the counsel.
MODE OF QUESTIONING
• The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
LEADING QUESTIONS
• The court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will
further the interests of justice.
OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS
• When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons,
including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be
made to protect the right to privacy of the child or if the court determines on the record that
requiring the child to testify in open court would cause psychological harm to him, hinder the
ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment,
fear, or timidity. In making its order, the court shall consider the developmental level of the child, the
nature of the crime, the nature of his testimony regarding the crime, his relationship to the accused
and to persons attending the trial, his desires, and the interests of his parents or legal guardian. The
court may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced
during trial is of such character as to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also,
on motion of the accused, exclude the public from trial, except court personnel and the counsel of
the parties.
PERSONS PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING AND
LEAVING COURTROOM
• The court may order that persons attending the trial shall not enter or leave the courtroom
during the testimony of the child.
LIVE-LINK TELEVISION TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL CASES
WHERE THE CHILD IS A VICTIM OR A WITNESS
(a) The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the testimony of the
child be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by live-link
television.
Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult the prosecutor or
counsel and shall defer to the judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding the necessity of applying
for an order. In case the guardian ad litem is convinced that the decision of the prosecutor or counsel
not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma, he himself may apply for the order.
The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5) days before the trial date, unless the court
finds on the record that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable.
(b) The court may motu proprio hear and determine, with notice to the parties, the need for taking the
testimony of the child through live-link television.
(c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some comfortable place other than the
courtroom, in the presence of the support person, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and counsel for the
parties. The questions of the judge shall not be related to the issues at trial but to the feelings of the
child about testifying in the courtroom.
(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused, whose presence or conduct causes fear to
the child.
(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use of live-link television and stating the
reasons therefor. It shall consider the following factors:
(1) The age and level of development of the child;
(2) His physical and mental health, including any mental or physical disability;
(3) Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced by him;
(4) The nature of the alleged abuse;
(5) Any threats against the child;
(6) His relationship with the accused or adverse party;
(7) His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in court or elsewhere;
(8) His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was discussed with him by parents or
professionals;
(9) Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days prior to testifying;
(10) Testimony of expert or lay witnesses;
(11) The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of the members of his family regarding the
events about which he will testify; and
(12) Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and formalities of court procedure.
(f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if there is
a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the
708 accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. The trauma must be of a kind
which would impair the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child.
(g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link television:
(1) The child shall testify in a room separate from the courtroom in the presence of the guardian ad
litem; one or both of his support persons; the facilitator and interpreter, if any; a court officer
appointed by the court; persons necessary to operate the closed-circuit television equipment; and
other persons whose presence are determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and
well-being of the child;
(2) The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the parties shall be in the courtroom. The
testimony of the child shall be transmitted by live-link television into the courtroom for viewing and
hearing by the judge, prosecutor, counsel for the parties, accused, victim, and the public unless
excluded.
(3) If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at trial, the court may allow the child to enter
the courtroom for the limited purpose of identifying the accused, or the court may allow the child to
identify the accused by observing the image of the latter on a television monitor.
(4) The court may set other conditions and limitations on the taking of the testimony that it finds just
and appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the child.
(h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved on videotape, digital disc, or other similar
devices which shall be made part of the court record and shall be subject to a protective order
as provided in section 31(b).
SCREENS, ONE-WAY MIRRORS, AND OTHER
DEVICES TO SHIELD CHILD FROM ACCUSED
(a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the chair of the child or
that a screen or other device be placed in the courtroom in such a manner that the child cannot
see the accused while testifying. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this
section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third
paragraphs of section 25(a) of this Rule. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons and
describing the approved courtroom arrangement.
(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the accused while testifying in the
courtroom, the courtroom shall be arranged to enable the accused to view the child.
VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION
(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply for an order that a deposition be taken of
the testimony of the child and that it be recorded and preserved on videotape. Before the guardian ad
litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to
the second and third paragraphs of section 25(a)
(b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in open court at trial, it shall issue an order
that the deposition of the child be taken and preserved by videotape.
(c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a child. Objections to deposition testimony
or evidence, or parts thereof, and the grounds for the objection shall be stated and shall be ruled upon
at the time of the taking of the deposition. The other persons who may be permitted to be present at
the proceeding are:
(1) The prosecutor;
(2) The defense counsel;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) The accused, subject to sub-section (e);
(5) Other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and
well-being of the child;
(6) One or both of his support persons, the facilitator and interpreter, if any;
(7) The court stenographer; and
(8) Persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment.
(d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right to counsel and to confront and crossexamine the
child, shall not be violated during the deposition.
(e) If the order of the court is based on evidence that the child is unable to testify in the physical presence of the
accused, the court may direct the latter to be excluded from the room in which the deposition is conducted. In
case of exclusion of the accused, the court shall order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link
television in accordance with section 25 of this Rule. If the accused is excluded from the deposition, it is not
necessary that the child be able to view an image of the accused.
(f) The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and stenographically recorded. The videotape and the
stenographic notes shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court where the case is pending for safekeeping and
shall be made a part of the record.
(g) The court may set other conditions on the taking of the deposition that it finds just and appropriate,
taking into consideration the best interests of the child, the constitutional rights of the accused, and
other relevant factors.
(h) The videotaped deposition and stenographic notes shall be subject to a protective order as provided
in section 31(b).
(i) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unable to testify for a reason stated in section
25(f) of this Rule, or is unavailable for any reason described in section 4(c), Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the court may admit into evidence the videotaped deposition of the child in lieu of
his testimony at the trial. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons therefor.
(j) After the original videotaping but before or during trial, any party may file any motion for
additional videotaping on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The court may order an
additional videotaped deposition to receive the newly discovered evidence.
HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN CHILD ABUSE CASES
• A statement made by a child describing any act or attempted act of child abuse, not otherwise
admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in evidence in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding subject to the following rules:
(a)Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall make known to the adverse party the
intention to offer such statement and its particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to object. If the child is
available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party, require the child to be present at the presentation
of the hearsay statement for cross-examination by the adverse party. When the child is unavailable, the fact of
such circumstance must be proved by the proponent.
(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the court shall consider the time, content and
circumstances thereof which provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall consider the following factors:
(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;
(2) The general character of the declarant child;
(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;
(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant child and witness;
(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant child;
(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of 0000.the declarant child is remote; and
(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no reason to suppose the
declarant child misrepresented the involvement of the accused.
(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following situations:
(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or will be exposed
to severe psychological injury; or
(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure
his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if
corroborated by other admissible evidence.
ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEOTAPED AND AUDIOTAPED
IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATIVE OR DISCLOSURE INTERVIEWS
IN CHILD ABUSE CASES
• The court may admit videotape and audiotape in-depth investigative or disclosure interviews
as evidence, under the following conditions:
(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds and under conditions established
under section 28 (c).
(b) The interview of the child was conducted by duly trained members of a multidisciplinary
team or representatives of law enforcement or child protective services in situations where child
abuse is suspected so as to determine whether child abuse occurred.
(c) The party offering the videotape or audiotape must prove that:
1) the videotape or audiotape discloses the identity of all individuals present and at all times includes
their images and voices;
2) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make a
particular statement or is clearly shown to be the statement of the child and not the product of
improper suggestion;
3) the videotape and audiotape machine or device was capable of recording testimony;
4) the person operating the device was competent to operate it;
5) the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct; and
6) it has been duly preserved.
• The individual conducting the interview of the child shall be available at trial for examination
by any party. Before the videotape or audiotape is offered in evidence, all parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to view or listen to it and shall be furnished a copy of a written
transcript of the proceedings.
• The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or audiotaped as required by this
section shall not by itself constitute a basis to exclude from evidence out-of-court statements
or testimony of the child. It may, however, be considered in determining the reliability of the
statements of the child describing abuse.
SEXUAL ABUSE SHIELD RULE
(a) Inadmissible evidence. - The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal
proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.
(b) Exception. - Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to
prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other
physical evidence shall be admissible. A party intending to offer such evidence must:
(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically describing the evidence and
stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires a different time for
filing or permits filing during trial; and
(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three (3) days before the hearing of
the motion.
• Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in chambers and afford the child,
his guardian ad litem, the parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The motion and
the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a protective order
set forth in section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the hearing in chambers except
with his consent.
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND SAFETY
(a) Confidentiality of records. - Any record regarding a child shall be confidential and kept
under seal. Except upon written request and order of the court, a record shall only be
released to the following:
(1) Members of the court staff for administrative use;
(2) The prosecuting attorney;
(3) Defense counsel;
(4) The guardian ad litem;
(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement agencies; and (6) Other persons as determined by
the court.
(b) Protective order. - Any videotape or audiotape of a child that is part of the court record
shall be under a protective order that provides as follows:
(1) Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel, their expert witness, and the guardian ad
litem.
(2) No tape, or any portion thereof, shall be divulged by any person mentioned in sub-section (a) to
any other person, except as necessary for the trial.
(3) No person shall be granted access to the tape, its transcription or any part thereof unless he signs
a written affirmation that he has received and read a copy of the protective order; that he submits to
the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the protective order; and that in case of violation thereof,
he will be subject to the contempt power of the court.
(4) Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof made available to the parties, their counsel, and
respective agents shall bear the following cautionary notice:
• "This object or document and the contents thereof are subject to a protective order issued by
the court in (case title) , (case number) . They shall not be examined, 713 inspected, read,
viewed, or copied by any person, or disclosed to any person, except as provided in the
protective order. No additional copies of the tape or any of its portion shall be made, given,
sold, or shown to any person without prior court order. Any person violating such protective
order is subject to the contempt power of the court and other penalties prescribed by law."
(5) No tape shall be given, loaned, sold, or shown to any person except as ordered by the court.
(6) Within thirty (30) days from receipt, all copies of the tape and any transcripts thereof shall be
returned to the clerk of court for safekeeping unless the period is extended by the court on motion
of a party.
(7) This protective order shall remain in full force and effect until further order of the court.
(c) Additional protective orders. - The court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, the
child, his parents, legal guardian, or the guardian ad litem, issue additional orders to protect the
privacy of the child.
(d) Publication of identity contemptuous. - Whoever publishes or causes to be published in any
format the name, address, telephone number, school, or other identifying information of a child
who is or is alleged to be a victim or accused of a crime or a witness thereof, or an immediate
family of the child shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
(e) Physical safety of child; exclusion of evidence. - A child has a right at any court proceeding
not to testify regarding personal identifying information, including his/her name, address,
telephone number, school, and other information that could endanger his physical safety or his
family. The court may, however, require the child to testify regarding personal identifying
information in the interest of justice.
(f) Destruction of videotapes and audiotapes. - Any videotape or audiotape of a child produced
under the provisions of this Rule or otherwise made part of the court record shall be destroyed
after five (5) years have elapsed from the date of entry of judgment.
(g) Records of youthful offender. - Where a youthful offender has been charged before any city
or provincial prosecutor or before any municipal judge and the charges have been ordered
dropped, all the records of the case shall be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed
directly or indirectly to anyone for any purpose whatsoever.
• Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or dismisses the case or
commits him to an institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to Chapter 3 of P. D. No. 603,
all the records of his case shall also be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone except to determine if a defendant may have his sentence suspended under
Article 192 of P. D. No. 603 or if he may be granted probation under the provisions of P. D. No.
968 or to enforce his civil liability, if said liability has been imposed in the criminal action. The
youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law to be guilty of perjury or
of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of 714 his failure to acknowledge the case or recite
any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him for any purpose.
• "Records" within the meaning of this sub-section shall include those which may be in the
files of the National Bureau of Investigation and with any police department or government
agency which may have been involved in the case. (Art. 200, P. D. No. 603)
APPLICABILITY OF ORDINARY RULES
• This Rule shall take effect on December 15, 2000 following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
CATCH ALL:
RESIDUAL EXCEPTION
• SEC. 50 RESIDUAL EXCEPTION – A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exception, having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is
admissible if the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (b) the statement has more probative on the point for which it is offered that
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (c)
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will be best served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent makes known to the party, sufficiently in
advance of the hearing, or by the pre-trial stage in the case of a trial of the main case, to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent’s
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
the declarant.
COMMENT BY THE SC
Rather than add a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule, the Sub-Committee opted to
adopt the residual or catch all exception provided in rules 803 (24) and 804 (b)(5) of the
FRE.
The catchall exception stemmed from the case of Dallas County vs. Commercial Union
Assurance Co. LTD (286 F2nd 388 [5th Circ.1961]) which admitted an old newspaper
article to prove that fire occurred at the court tower during construction. Although not
falling under any of the recognized hearsay exceptions, the news article was admitted
because of “circumstantial; guarantee of trustworthiness based on the fact that the
individual reporting the fire had no motive to falsify and that a false report of a matter so
easily checked by readers of the paper would have subjected the reporter to considerable
embarrassment.
The Rules Committee opted for pre-trial rather than the trial stage to limit the residual
exceptions
DALLAS COUNTY, APPELLANT,V. COMMERCIAL
UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,
APPELLEES, 286 F.2D 388 (5TH CIR. 1961)
F:
The clock tower of the Dallas County Courthouse at Selma, Alabama, commenced to lean, made
loud cracking and popping noises, then fell, and telescoped into the courtroom.
Fortunately, the collapse of the tower took place on a Sunday morning; no one was injured, but
damage to the courthouse exceeded $100,000.
An examination of the tower debris showed the presence of charcoal and charred timbers.
The State Toxicologist, called in by Dallas County, reported the char was evidence that lightning
struck the courthouse.
Later, several residents of Selma reported that a bolt of lightning struck the courthouse July 2, 1957.
On this information, Dallas County concluded that a lightning bolt had hit the building causing the
collapse of the clock tower five days later. Dallas County carried insurance for loss to its
courthouse caused by fire or lightning.
The insurers' engineers and investigators found that the courthouse collapsed of its own weight.
They reported that the courthouse had not been struck by lightning; that lightning could not
have caused the collapse of the tower; that the collapse of the tower was caused by structural
weaknesses attributable to a faulty design, poor construction, gradual deterioration of the
structure, and overloading brought about by remodeling and the recent installation of an
air-conditioning system, part of which was constructed over the courtroom trusses.
In their opinion, the char was the result of a fire in the courthouse tower and roof that must
have occurred many, many years before July 2, 1957. The insurers denied liability.
The County sued its insurers in the Circuit Court of Dallas County.
As many of the suits as could be removed, seven, were removed to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama, and were consolidated for trial. The case went to
the jury on one issue: did lightning cause the collapse of the clock tower?
The County produced witnesses who testified they saw lightning strike the clock tower; the
insurers produced witnesses who testified an examination of the debris showed that lightning
did not strike the clock tower. Some witnesses said the char was fresh and smelled smoky; other
witnesses said it was obviously old and had no fresh smoky smell at all.
Both sides presented a great mass of engineering testimony bearing on the design, construction,
overload or lack of overload. All of this was for the jury to evaluate. The jury chose to believe
the insurers' witnesses and brought in a verdict for the defendants.
During the trial the defendants introduced a copy of the Morning Times of Selma for June 9, 1901.
This issue carried an unsigned article describing a fire that occurred at two in the morning of June
9, 1901, while the courthouse was still under construction. The article stated, in part: "The
unfinished dome of the County's new courthouse was in flames at the top, and * * * soon fell in.
The fire was soon under control and the main building was saved. * * *"
The insurers do not contend that the collapse of the tower resulted from unsound charred timbers
used in the repair of the building after the fire; they offered the newspaper account to show there
had been a fire long before 1957 that would account for charred timber in the clock tower.
As a predicate for introducing the newspaper in evidence, the defendants called to the stand the
editor of the Selma Times-Journal who testified that his publishing company maintains archives of
the published issues of the Times-Journal and of the Morning Times, its predecessor, and that the
archives contain the issue of the Morning Times of Selma for June 9, 1901, offered in evidence.
The plaintiff objected that the newspaper article was hearsay; that it was not a business record nor
an ancient document, nor was it admissible under any recognized exception to the hearsay
doctrine.
The trial judge admitted the newspaper as part of the records of the Selma Times-Journal.
ISSUE:
WON the newspaper report is admissible in evidence?
YES.
This appeal presents a single question — the admissibility in evidence of a newspaper to show
that the Dallas County Courthouse in Selma, Alabama, was damaged by fire in 1901. We hold that
the newspaper was admissible, and affirm the judgment below.
In matters of local interest, when the fact in question is of such a public nature it would be
generally known throughout the community, and when the questioned fact occurred so long ago
that the testimony of an eye-witness would probably be less trustworthy than a contemporary
newspaper account, a federal court, under Rule 43(a), may relax the exclusionary rules to the
extent of admitting the newspaper article in evidence. We do not characterize this newspaper as
a "business record", nor as an "ancient document", nor as any other readily identifiable and happily
tagged species of hearsay exception. It is admissible because it is necessary and trustworthy,
relevant and material, and its admission is within the trial judge's exercise of discretion in holding
the hearing within reasonable bounds.
OPINION RULE
• Sec. 51. General Rule. The opinion of a witness is not admissible except as indicated in the
rules. (Sec 51,)
I. CONCEPT OF AN OPINION AS EVIDENCE.
• Sec. 51. Opinion of an expert witness- The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training OR EDUCATION which he OR SHE is shown to
possess, maybe received in evidence.
1. By formal education such as in the case of lawyers, physicians, engineers, dentists, metallurgists, chemists
2. Through special training or seminars as in the case of ballisticians, weapons experts, finger print experts,
questioned-documents expert, masseurs, pilots
3. Through experience based on the exercise of a profession, trade, occupation, industry such as carpenters,
welders, machinists or mechanics, deep-well diggers
4. Through hobbies as in the case of stamp collectors, coin collectors, gun collectors, ornithologists,
photographers, animal breeders,
5. Through careful study and research as in the case of those who study old civilizations, or various aspects of
medicine
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EXPERT OPINION.
A. The subject of inquiry requires the opinion of an expert, or that the fact in issue requires the
opinion of an expert.
a. The use of an expert is becoming more frequent in order to explain how and why things
happened the way they did or didn’t happen the way they were supposed to, as in the following
cases:
i. In personal injury cases where physicians or surgeons are needed to prove the cause and
effect of certain injuries, so also economist as to the amount of income which was lost
ii. Products liability cases where there is need for reconstruction experts to prove the
defects in a certain products. Such as a car accident being due to factory defects in the
wheel, or a mechanical defect attributable to the manufacturer
iii. Actions relating to constructions where there is need for engineers and architects as
injury to a bridge which collapsed, or breach of contract in that the building was
constructed poorly
b. Traditional areas where expert opinion is used:
i. Questions involving handwriting
ii. Questioned documents
iii. Fingerprints
iv. Ballistics
v. Criminal cases involving injuries and death
vi. Drug cases
vii. Value of properties
viii. Blood groupings
ix. DNA Profiling
x. Forensics
B. The witness is shown to be an expert. It must be shown that the witness possesses certain
skills or knowledge and is therefore in a position to assist the court based on these skills or
knowledge
III. MANNER OF SHOWING THE WITNESS IS AN
EXPERT
1. By asking the adverse party to admit and stipulate that the witness is an expert. This is where
the witness regularly appears in court as an expert and is familiar to the court, or where the
witness occupies a position requiring certain knowledge or skill, as a medico legal officer.
2. Through the process known as “Qualifying the Expert”- propounding questions to the
witness concerning his background and eliciting answers from the witness showing he
possesses special knowledge or skill on the matter on which he is to testify
3. If the expertise is not admitted and the witness is not properly qualified, he is to be regarded
as an ordinary witness and may be objected in giving an opinion
IV. COMPONENTS OF QUALIFYING THE WITNESS
1. Show the general professional background. Questions propounded are directed to bring
about the facts concerning his:
a. education
b. degrees obtained
c. academic honors or scholarships granted or earned
d. licenses obtained
e. employment history, positions held, number of years in his position , promotions earned
2. Show the specific professional background. Questions asked are directed to bring out
answers to the specific facts or skills such as:
a. special trainings undergone
b. publications authored
c. membership in professional associations
d. as lecturer or speaker or resource person
e. how often he was called as a witness and
f. particular work experience which bear directly on the situation about which he is testifying
V. BASIS OF OPINION OR HOW TO ELICIT THE
EXPERT’S OPINION.
• A. Kind of Facts as Basis for the Opinion:
1. Facts personally known to the expert or about which he has firsthand knowledge.
2. Opinion maybe based on facts about which he has no personal knowledge or firsthand
knowledge, but are based either (i) on the report or facts as found by another expert who had
firsthand knowledge, provided the report is not hearsay or that the other expert had testified
and subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination or (ii) on facts already testified to by
witnesses and established by the records of the case
B. MANNER OF QUESTIONING
1. Where the basis are facts personally known to the expert, these facts must first be elicited
from the witness after he may be asked directly whether he has any opinion about them and to
state what his opinion is.
Example: The medico legal officer who conducted the autopsy will first be asked to state his findings
as to the nature, number, location, description, depth, trajectory, etc, of the wounds of the victim
after which he is asked to state his opinion as to the cause, weapon used, position of the victim and
assailant, cause of the death, etc..
2. By the use of “Hypothetical Questions” when the opinion is based on facts not personally
known to the witness.
a). It is a question which, for purposes of the answer, assumes certain facts which have counter parts
in the evidence, and asks the witness to give an opinion as to certain matters based on these facts.
Since the witness has no personal knowledge of these facts, he is told these facts and then is asked to
assume the facts to be true, and finally to give an opinion.
b). The question must incorporate or refer accurately to all the relevant facts- as proven- as basis for
asking the opinion
c). In case of physicians, the phraseology is usually thus: “Assuming all these facts to be true…
within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, what might have caused the injuries…?
3. The expert may be asked to state that his opinion is supported by learned treaties or shared
by others in his class.
VI. WEIGHT OF EXPERT OPINION
1. Courts are not bound as the opinions do not produce conclusive effect but are regarded as
persuasive and advisory which the court may or may not consider.
2. Opinions are to be treated on the same level as any other evidence.
3. Factors to be considered in giving weight, or points to show the opinion is of no weight:
a. The qualification of witness:
i. The degree of learning and academic background
ii. The experience, professional standing and training, or his being abreast with the latest
developments
b. The reliability of the opinion:
i. The relative objectivity of the witness such as the presence
or absence of personal or professional bias or motive; and
ii. the degree of concordance of his opinion with the facts
proven or the basis and logic of his conclusions
OPINION OF ORDINARY WITNESS
• Sec. 53. Opinion of ordinary witnesses- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding-
(a) The identity of a person about whom he OR SHE has adequate knowledge
(b) A handwriting with which he OR SHE has sufficient familiarity
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he OR SHE is sufficiently acquainted. The
witness may also testify on his OR HER impressions of the emotion, behavior, conditions
or appearance of a person.
• I. Opinion on the identity of a person. Where the issue is whether a particular person is
involved in an event. As for example: 1). the accused sets up alibi or defense of mistaken
identity; 2). in claims for insurance, determining whether a body is that of the insured 3). In
determining who the victims are
GENERAL METHOD OF IDENTIFICATION
a. Identification by scientific methods: by the teeth; fingerprints, foot prints and by DNA analysis
b. By Lay Opinion: by face, physical appearance, height, body built, sex, color of hair, racial features,
mannerisms, gait, clothing speech , defects, tattoos or marks or scars and other marks on the body,
or by any factor which distinguishes him from another.
i. Identification of a person is not solely through knowledge of his name. In fact, familiarity
with physical features, particularly of the face, is the best way to identify a person. One maybe
familiar with the face but not necessarily with the name of a person. It does not follow
therefore that to be able to identify a person, one must necessarily know his name. Example:
precisely because of the unusual bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially
victims of a crime, can remember with high degree of reliability the identity of criminals.
ii. The witness must however be able to explain his basis of identification
c. By the style of writing
B. IN-COURT AND OUT-OF-COURT
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES.
• In-court identification maybe influenced by the reliability of the out-of-court identification. The
latter consists of either:
• a. By the police Methods of Identification of suspects
• i. Show-ups-where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification
• ii. Mug file shots or based on the “Rouge’s Gallery”
• iii. Line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect form a group of persons lined up for
the purpose
• b. By circumstances: Totality of Circumstances Test. Several factors are to be considered, to
wit:
i. Witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime. These include matters such as
presence of light, distance of viewing, length of time of the event; presence of obstructions to line of
visions, the position of the witness in relation to the suspect
ii. The witness’ degree of attention at that time: to what or who was he focused on, as well as the
presence of distractions
iii. The accuracy and consistency of any prior descriptions by the witness
iv. The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of the identification. Example: the
reaction of a victim upon seeing the suspect
v. The length of time between the time of the occurrence and the time of the identification
vi. The suggestiveness of the identification process.
C. CONCEPT AND TYPES OF POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION
a. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being
an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime.
b. First Type: As direct evidence: where a witness, as an eyewitness, may identify a suspect or
accused to the very act of the commission of the crime
c. Second Type: As part of circumstantial evidence: where a witness may not have actually
witnessed the very act of the commission of the crime but is still able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the suspect/accused is
the person last seen with the victim before or right after the commission of the crime ( Baleros
vs. People, 483 SCRA 10, Feb. 22, 2006)
II. OPINION ON HANDWRITING.
• There are two instances when an ordinary person may testify on the mental sanity or state of
mind of a person:
1. Under the Civil Code it permits the opinion of a subscribing witness to a writing the validity
of which is in dispute in that the sanity or state of mind of a party thereto is put in issue.
Examples: (a). An attesting witness to a will may give his opinion on whether the testator was
of sound and disposing mind (b) A subscribing witness to a contract may give his opinion that
the party was fully conscious and aware of the nature of his acts
2. Under section 50 of Rule 130 in that it allows the opinion of an intimate acquaintance who
may give his opinion based on the external conduct of a person. Examples are family members,
immediate neighbors, household help, office and business acquaintances. Thus where the
accused puts up insanity as a defense, his friends, relatives and family members are competent
to testify on his mental sanity. But not strangers or casual acquaintances
IV. OPINIONS ON THE EMOTIONS, BEHAVIOR,
CONDUCT OR APPEARANCE OF A PERSON.
1. Examples: (a) emotions: that a person is angry, agitated, exited, tense, nervous, hesitant.
Happy, elated, grateful, afraid (b) condition or appearance- as unkempt, dirty, well groomed,
drunk, tired, sleepy, haggard, sickly
2. But a witness may not give his opinion on the motive, reason or purpose why a person did or
did not do an act unless these were communicated to the witness, such as jealousy or revenge,
or financial reward.
V. INSTANTANEOUS IMPRESSIONS OF THE MIND.
As a general rule, the age of person maybe established by: (a) the record of birth (b) Opinion of
an expert (c) Opinion of an ordinary witness who is acquainted with the person whose age is in
question, such as a relative, a contemporary, persons in the know in the community where he
lives, as well as (d) Family tradition, entries in family records
PEOPLE V. LEE
G.R. NO. 139070 - MAY 29, 2002
DOCTRINE:
• Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open court declarations because affidavits are
taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate. Oftentimes, they are
executed when the affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair
opportunity of narrating in full the incident that transpired. They are usually not prepared by
the affiant himself but by another who suggests words to the affiant, or worse, uses his own
language in taking the affiant's statements.
SULTAN V. MACABANDING
A.C. NO. 7919, OCTOBER 08, 2014
DOCTRINE:
• A handwriting expert does not have to be a linguist at the same time. To be credible, a
handwriting expert need not be familiar with the language used in the document subject of
his examination. The nature of his examination involves the study and comparison of strokes,
the depth and pressure points of the alleged forgery, as compared to the specimen or original
handwriting or signatures.
GEPULLE-GARBO V. GARABATO
G.R. NO. 200013, JANUARY 14, 2015
DOCTRINE:
• The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as
regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades,
etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not
decisive on the question of the former’s authenticity. The result of examinations of
questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is,
at best, inconclusive.
DILAG & CO., INC.V. MERCED AND ZANDUETA
O.G. 5536 – MAY 31, 1949
DOCTRINE:
• Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an
expert. A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge was
acquired through medium of practical experience rather than scientific study and research.
US V. TRONO ET AL. G.R. NO. 1344 – JANUARY 19,
2004
DOCTRINE:
• Expert testimony constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not
exclusive, on questions of a professional character. Courts, however, are not bound to submit
their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or
refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with
the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial.
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
A.M. NO. 06-11-5-SC -
OCTOBER 2, 2007
• Scope – all criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings.
• Application for DNA Testing Order – The court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a
showing of the following:
• a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
• b. The biological sample:
• i. was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
• ii. was previously subjected to DNA testing, but requires confirmation.
• c. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
• d. The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and
• e. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy of integrity of the DNA testing.
• This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
• DNA Testing Order – If the court finds that the requirements in Section 4 hereof have
been complied with, the court shall –
• Order that biological samples be taken from any person or crime scene evidence;
• Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect the integrity of the
biological sample, the testing process and the reliability of the test results, including the
condition that the DNA test results shall be simultaneously disclosed to parties involved in the
case; and
• If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the conduct of confirmatory testing
by the other or the adverse party and where additional biological samples of the same kind can no
longer be obtained, issue an order requiring all parties to the case or proceedings to witness
the DNA testing to be conducted.
• An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and shall not be appealable.
Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in any way, stay the implementation thereof,
unless a higher court issues an injunctive order. The grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed
as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result
thereof.
Post-conviction DNA Testing – may be available, without need of prior court order, to the
prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that:
• a. a biological sample exists,
• b. such sample is relevant to the case, and
• c. the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of
conviction.
Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence – the court shall consider the
following:
a. The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they
were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
b. The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the
scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
c. The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable
standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic
casework and credibility shall be properly established; and
d. The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.
Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology – the court shall consider the following:
a. The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or
technique can be and has been tested;
b. The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods;
c. The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific
community;
d. The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the
correctness of data generated;
e. The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and
f. The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in
comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations
used in comparing DNA profiles.
Evaluation of DNA Testing Results – The court shall consider
the following:
Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable
for indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented or sought to be offered and presented.
Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the
disclosure of the DNA profile of the person and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, he same may be disclosed to
the persons named in the written verified request.
Preservation of DNA Evidence – the court may order the appropriate
government agency to preserve the DNA evidence as follows:
a. In criminal cases: i. for not less than the period of time that any person is under
trial for an offense; or
ii. in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time as the accused has
served his sentence;
b. In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where the DNA
evidence was introduced has become final and executory.
* The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before the
expiration of the periods set forth above, provided that:
a. A court order has been secured; or
b. The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has consented in
writing to the disposal of the DNA evidence.
DOCTRINES:
• 1. Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an expert. A
witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge was acquired through
medium of practical experience rather than scientific study and research. (Dilag & Co., Inc. v. Merced
and Zandueta, O.G. 5536 – May 31, 1949)
• Expert testimony constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on
questions of a professional character. Courts, however, are not bound to submit their findings
necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them
any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of
conviction which may have been adduced during the trial. (US v. Trono et al., G.R. No. 1344 – January
19, 2004)
• In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the following data shall be considered:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards
and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests. (People v. Vallejo , G.R. No. 144656 - May 9, 2002)
• If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity. A disputable presumption, not contradicted is sufficient evidence
of the fact presumed, and no other evidence need be introduced. (People v. Umanito, G.R. No.
172607 – April 16, 2009).
• New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Therefore, it can be said
that the death of a party does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. (Estate of Rogelio G. Ong v. Minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz , G.R. NO. 171713 - December 17, 2007)
• New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Therefore, it can be said
that the death of a party does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. (Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710 - June 6,
2011)
PEOPLE V. ADOVISO
G.R. NO. 116196-97 – JUNE 23, 1999
DOCTRINE:
• In our jurisdiction, the Philippine courts rejects the result of polygraph tests as evidence to establish
the guilt or innocence of a person. Polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable
and ascertaining truth or deception.
• Visibility is a vital factor in determining whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the
perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the
witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should
normally be accepted.
• Familiarity with appellant’s face and appearance minimized of not erased the possibility that they
could have been mistaken as to his identity.
PEOPLE V. VALLEJO
G.R. NO. 144656 - MAY 9, 2002
DOCTRINE:
• In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the following data shall be considered:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards
and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
HERRERA V. ALBA AND HON. CUESTA-VILCHES
G.R. NO. 148220 – JUNE 15, 2005
DOCTRINE:
• DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If
the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.
• The Vallejo Guidelines:
• 1. how the samples were collected;
• 2. how they were handled;
• 3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;
• 4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
• 5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and
• 6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
PEOPLE V. UMANITO
G.R. NO. 172607 – APRIL 16, 2009
DOCTRINE:
• If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity. A disputable presumption, not contradicted is sufficient evidence
of the fact presumed, and no other evidence need be introduced.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG V. MINOR DIAZ
G.R. NO. 171713 - DECEMBER 17, 2007
DOCTRINE:
• New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or
upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Therefore,
it can be said that the death of a party does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA
testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
LUCAS V. LUCAS
G.R. NO. 190710 - JUNE 6, 2011
DOCTRINE:
• New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or
upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Therefore,
it can be said that the death of a party does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA
testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
BURDEN OF PROOF
AND PRESUMPTIONS
RULE 131, SECTIONS 1-6
BURDEN OF PROOF & BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
• Section 1. Burden of proof and burden of evidence. – Burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his OR HER claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Burden of proof never shifts.
• Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish or
rebut a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case. Burden of evidence may shift from
one party to the other in the course of the proceedings, depending on the exigencies
of the case. (1a)
WHAT IS BURDEN OF PROOF?
Old Rules of Evidence
• Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
The amended rules added that:
• Burden of proof never shifts.
• The burden of proof, or “onus probandi,” is the obligation imposed upon a party who alleges the
existence of facts necessary for the prosecution of his action or defense to establish the same by the
requisite quantum of evidence.
• Proof - the establishment of a requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact as to the fact
in issue.
WHAT IS BURDEN OF EVIDENCE?
Civil Cases
• Plaintiff: Must prove the affirmative allegations in his complaint.
• Defendant: In his counterclaim and in his affirmative defenses
Criminal Cases
• Prosecution: Must prove its affirmative allegations in the indictments (elements of the
crime and the attending circumstances).
• .Defense: As to the justifying, exempting, mitigating, and absolutory circumstances
BURDEN OF PROOF VS. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
Proof
• Does not shift as it remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed.
• Generally determined by the pleadings filed by the party
Evidence
• Shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial.
• Generally determined by the developments at the trial, or by the provisions of the substantive law or
procedural rules which may relieve the party from presenting evidence on the fact alleged
Note: In both civil and criminal cases, the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative
allegation.
HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE
• 1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt – that no other explanation can be derived from the facts except that the
defendant committed the crime, thereby overcoming the presumption that a person is innocent until proven
guilty
• 2. Clear and convincing evidence - means that the evidence being presented must be “highly” and
substantially more probable to be true rather than untrue (used in civil cases i.e. claims involving fraud; claims
involving wills and inheritances; cases involving important family decisions such as withdrawing life support
from a relative)
• 3. Preponderance of evidence - It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
• 4. Substantial evidence – has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
NEGATIVE ALLEGATIONS
• General Rule: In both civil and criminal cases, negative allegations do not have to be proved.
• Exception: Where such negative allegations are essential parts of the cause of action or defense in a
civil case, or are essential ingredients of the offense in a criminal case or the defenses thereto.
Examples:
• Civil case - for breach of contract, the plaintiff has to prove the fact that the defendant did not
comply with his obligation thereunder as, although this is a negative allegation, it is an element of the
plaintiff ’s cause of action.
• Criminal case - for illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has to prove the absence of
a license therefor even by prima facie evidence, as the prosecution has control of the better
means of proof.
• Exception to the exception: In civil cases, even if the negative allegation is an essential part
of the cause of action or defense, it does not need to be proved if it is only for the purpose of
denying the existence of a document which should properly be in the custody of the adverse
party.
• If the criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation or that a negative averment is an
essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden of proving the charge.
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
• What is Presumption?
• A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from the proof of other facts.
PRESUMPTIONS, JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Presumption
• The proponent still has to introduce evidence of the basis of the presumption.
• He or she has to introduce evidence of the existence or non-existence of the facts from
which the court can draw the inference of the fact in issue.
Judicial Notice & Judicial Admission
• The proponent does not have to introduce any evidence
CLASSIFICATIONS
• Presumptions of Law - a certain inference must be made whenever the facts appear which
furnish the basis of the inference; in the case of presumptions of fact, a discretion is vested in
the tribunal as to drawing the inference. It is reduced to fixed rules and form a part of the
system of jurisprudence.
i. Conclusive (absolute, juris et de jure)
ii. Disputable (rebuttable, juris tantum, prima facie)
• Presumptions of Fact - a discretion is vested in the tribunal as to drawing the inference.
Derived wholly and directly from the circumstances of the particular case by means of the
common experience of mankind.
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
• What are conclusive presumptions? (a) Whenever a party has, by his or her own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he or she cannot,
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; and
• (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation
of landlord and tenant between them.
• Paragraphs (a) and (b) are based upon the doctrine of estoppel in pais (Arts. 1431 to 1439 of the Civil Code.)
• Par. (a), the fact which the party in estoppel has represented to be true is conclusively presumed as against him to be true
and he is not permitted to introduce evidence to the contrary.
• Par. (b) the ownership of the landlord at the start of the tenancy relation is conclusively presumed as against the tenant
and the latter is not permitted to dispute such fact.
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself or herself for the payment of the
money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting
in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed
upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for
arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
PRESUMPTION ON PAR. (J)
• if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made of it, taken advantage of it
and profited thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.
PRESUMPTION ON PAR. (V)
• must be proved that the letter was properly addressed with postage pre-paid and that it was
actually mailed. If said letter was not returned to the sender, it is presumed that it was
received by the addressee.
PARAGRAPH (W)
• From Regalado:
• A view is held that with respect to the ordinary but continued absence of 7, 10, or 5 years
contemplated in the first two subparagraphs, the absentee was in danger under the three
instances contemplated therein, the absentee is presumed to have been died at the end of said
period, but that in the case of qualified absence where the absentee was in danger of death
under the instances contemplated therein, the absentee is presumed to have died at the time
he was exposed to such danger or peril, that is at the start of the 4 year period stated therein.
This distinction assumes significance in questions of successional rights to the estate of the
absentee arising from his presumptive death.
DISTINCTION OF PRESUMPTION UNDER PAR.
(KK) AND PAR. (JJ)
• In par. (kk), it is not required that the parties perished in a calamity and it only applies in
questions of successional rights. While in par. (jj), it applies only where the deaths occurred
during a calamity and applies to the cases not involving successional rights.
• • In par. (kk), it provided for the presumption of simultaneity in the deaths of the persons
called to succeed each other while par. (jj) provides for presumption of survivorship.
SURVIVORSHIP RULE
• If in doubt as to who died first between 2 or more persons called to succeed each other. o Burden of Proof: whoever
alleges the death of one prior to the other shall prove the same;
• Absent such proof: presumption is that they all died at the same time. There shall be no transmission of successional
rights.
• Presumption: presumption of simultaneity of deaths. When two or more persons who are called to succeed each other,
die, they shall be presumed to have died at the same time.
• Under the Rules of Court, it provided that:
• a. When two or more persons;
• b. Perish in the same calamity; and
• c. It is not shown who died first; and
• d. There are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred that one died of the other.
SPS RAMOS V. OBISPO
G.R. NO. 193804
DOCTRINE:
• In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving
them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their
own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.
• It is axiomatic that under the Rules on Evidence a party who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it. A mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of proving
his allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence.
RIVERA V. SPS. SALVADOR
G.R. NO. 184458
DOCTRINE:
• The fact of forgery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. Mere variance of signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same
was forged.
• It is a basic rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by preponderance of evidence, which simply means "evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it."
PEOPLE VS. LIPATA
G.R. NO. 200302
DOCTRINE:
• The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action
shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under Section 3 of [Rule 111] or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability
arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may
be.
PEOPLE V. PAJENADO
31 SCRA 812 (1970)
DOCTRINE:
• In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and
that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient
of the offense charged", the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove
that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly
licensed.
• It seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to
prove it.
PEOPLE V. VERZOLA
80 SCRA 600 (1977)
DOCTRINE:
• There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the
burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may justify the killing
or at least attenuate the offense committed. To establish his exculpation, or the justification
for the act, he must prove such affirmative allegation by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that
for the prosecution, for even if that were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused
himself had admitted the killing.
PEOPLE VS. BACUS
G.R. NO. L-60388
DOCTRINE:
• Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This constitutional
presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty
in an unprejudiced mind of the appellant's culpability.
SANTOS MOLINA ANDAL TAN
674
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken FIRST MOLINA GUIDELINE:
∙ Modified.
and construed independently of, but must ▪ Plaintiff- spouse must prove his or
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts (1) The burden of proof to show the her case with clear and convincing
in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, nullity of the marriage belongs to evidence.
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no the plaintiff.
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity ∙ Molina, however, is silent on what
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of ∙ One who asserts a claim must quantum of proof is required in
the basic marital covenants that prove it. Specifically, in nullity cases
concomitantly must be assumed and psychological incapacity cases,
∙ This is a quantum of proof that
discharged by the parties to the marriage it is the plaintiff-spouse who requires more than preponderant
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the proves the existence of evidence but less than proof beyond
Family Code, include their mutual psychological incapacity. reasonable doubt.
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and ∙ There is opinion that a nullity ∙ The reason is that this jurisdiction
support. There is hardly any doubt that the case under Article 36 is like any follows the presumption of validity of
intendment of the law has been to confine the civil case that requires marriages.
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the preponderance of evidence,
most serious cases of personality disorders ∙ As with any presumption — such as
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity the presumption of regularity in the
or inability to give meaning and significance issuance of public documents,
to the marriage. This psychological condition regularity in the performance of duty,
of good faith, or of sufficient
must exist at the time the marriage is
consideration — it can only be
celebrated. rebutted with clear and convincing
evidence.
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Rule 132 Sections 1-10
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. – The
examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)
Section 2. Proceedings to be recorded. – The entire proceedings of a trial
or hearing, including the questions propounded to a witness and his or
HER answer thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the
parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be
recorded by means of short-hand or stenotype or by other means of
recording found suitable by the court.
Shift from the American rule, the scope-of-direct-rule, which limits cross-examination to
matters taken up in the direct examination or anything connected therewith, to the English
Rule, or the Wide Open Rule, Which permits cross on any relevant matter.
Purpose of Cross Examination:
1. To discredit the witness
2. To discredit the testimony of the witness
3. To clarify certain matters
4. To elicit admission from witness
Q: Does your neck hurt? Q: What part of your body bothers you?
A:Yes. A: My neck
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION
TIP: Sometimes circumstances may force you to resort to asking leading questions. This is when the witness
forgets an important detail of his/her testimony and your attempts to refresh his/her memory in order to elicit
the answer fails. As a strategy, you may ask leading question (but this must be resorted to sparingly).
Q. What did the accused have in his hand when he approached you?
A. He had a cellphone in his hand.
Q. Did he have anything else?
A. I do not recall?
Q. Did he have a gun in his hand?
Defense: Objection, leading your Honor.
Court: Sustained. Prosecutor, rephrase your question.
Q. What, if anything, did the accused have in his hand aside from his cellphone?
A. He had a gun.
I. DIRECT EXAMINATION
1. Purpose
• To test the credibility of the witness.
• To elicit admissions from the witness that will either bolster your case or be adverse
to the accused’s case.
• Reveal bias on the part of the witness.
• Highlight inconsistencies with other witness’ testimony.
2. How to Conduct your Cross-Examination
Controlling the Witness on Cross-Examination
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION
There are ten key points you should follow when conducting a
cross-examination, which we can refer to as the Ten Commandments:
1. Be Brief.
2. Always ask leading questions.
3. Use short questions, plain words.
4. Don't ask a question, the answer to which you do not know in advance.
5. Listen to the witness. 6. Don't quarrel with the witness.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION
These Ten Commandments will guide you on how to control the witness during a
cross-examination.
• The first commandment is self-explanatory. A well-thought out cross-examination should be direct
and concise.
• As for the second commandment, it is important to first identify what a leading question is. Every
question asked on cross-examination must be short and at the same time contain a leading
question. To illustrate this, let’s say you want the witness to say “the car was blue.” That means you
would ask questions like “Is it a fact that the car was blue?” or “The car was blue, isn’t that
correct?” or “The car was blue, was it not?” Keep in mind, the witness may not respond with the
full statement “the car was blue,” but they will simply answer the leading question.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION
• Now that we have established what a leading question is, the next step is to ensure that it is
always preceded or followed by a short question. Listed below are rules to abide by when
coming up with short questions:
• No question should contain more than one new fact. By doing so, you eliminate the possibility of
the witness disagreeing because he/she does not agree with all the facts in the question. For
example, we want to get the witness to admit that he was sitting in the car using his phone while he
was parked by the curb when he noticed that the light was red. If the cross-examiner asks a
question such as this, “Isn’t it a fact that that you were on your phone parked by the curb when you
noticed that the light was red?” With a long question like that, it is possible for the witness to seize
this opportunity to disagree with the order of the facts and deny the statement, regardless if it was
true or not. However, if you ask short questions, it leaves them no room, but to say yes or no.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION
You will notice that the 4th question has more than one fact, but it is acceptable
as it contains only one “new fact” and the other fact has already been conceded
by the witness in the previous question. Thus, it is important to ensure that your
short question only has one “new fact.”
• Use no more than five words per question, excluding the leading phrase and
connecting words. Looking at the aforementioned questions, you will notice
that it follows this rule. By using short questions, we have control over the
witness. Every time we obtain their concession to each new fact necessary to
our goal, we prevent them from defeating our chosen line of cross.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION
• Use plain words. This gives the witness less opportunity to take some
semantic exception to your intended meaning and answer “no” when you
need them to say “yes.” Avoid “legalese” or terms of art or multi-syllable
words that may be uncommon and beyond the comprehension of the witness
and the jury. Remember, the witness cannot ask the questions, thus it is up to
you to ensure that your question is clear and to the point. The simpler the
word, the less chances for them to misconstrue your question and deny a fact.
All these rules will help you control your witness’ testimony.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION
• Asking questions without knowing the answers will only be detrimental to your crossexamination
because it may blindside you with new facts that work against you. In the same way, a question
asked in a non-leading fashion is an opportunity for the witness to escape from the control of the
cross-examiner. For this reason, only ask questions you know the answers to.
• There is no need to expound on the fifth commandment because it is straightforward.
• As the lawyer, it is natural to be frustrated when the witness is out of control. With that said, you
must never quarrel with the witness nor should you let this distract you from controlling his/her
testimony. Avoid using modifiers or generalizations because it enables witnesses to take issue with
descriptions we attempt by the use of certain words.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION
• Avoid the phrase “you testified on direct examination that…” or any other reasonable facsimile of
that phrase. Doing so will allow your witness to say I do not recall, which will force you to ask the
court to have the reporter search and read the previous statement. A process that is obnoxious,
time-consuming and even ineffective in a cross-examination. By avoiding this offending phrase, you
avoid losing control over the witness and getting into a quarrel with them or their lawyer over
what they have or have not testified to.
• In a way, the 8th commandment also coincides with commandment 7. Whenever you ask the
witness to repeat their direct testimony, you give them a chance to explain their previous
statement… “Oh yes, but what I really meant to say was…” Do not give the witness any control
over their testimony.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION
(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer
who is authorized by law to administer the same.
Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. –
(a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a sworn attestation at the end, executed by the lawyer
who conducted or supervised the examination of the witness, to the effect that:
(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions he asked and the
corresponding answers that the witness gave; and
(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him coached the witness
regarding the latter's answers.
(b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary action, including
disbarment.
Section 5. Subpoena. –
If the government employee or official, or the requested witness, who is neither the witness of
the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or
refuses without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other things under his
control available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the requesting
party may avail himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under
Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in
this case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial
affidavit shall be understood to be ex parte.
Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. –
The party presenting the judicial affidavit of his witness in place of direct testimony shall state
the purpose of such testimony at the start of the presentation of the witness. The adverse
party may move to disqualify the witness or to strike out his affidavit or any of the answers
found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall promptly rule on the motion and, if
granted, shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by placing it in brackets under the
initials of an authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence
under Section 40 of Rule 13220 of the Rules of Court.
(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits of the
prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as well as those of his
witnesses to the court within ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of each
on the public and private prosecutor, including his documentary and object evidence previously
marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve as direct testimonies of the
accused and his witnesses when they appear before the court to testify.
Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. –
(a) A party who fails to submit the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have
waived their submission. The court may, however, allow only once the late submission of the same
provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the
defaulting party pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the
court.
(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the scheduled hearing of
the case as required. Counsel who fails to appear without valid cause despite notice shall be deemed to
have waived his client's right to confront by cross-examination the witnesses there present.
(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the content
requirements of Section 3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above. The court may, however,
allow only once the subsequent submission of the compliant replacement affidavits before the hearing or
trial provided the delay is for a valid reason and would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and
provided further, that public or private counsel responsible for their preparation and submission pays a
fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.
Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules. –
The provisions of the Rules of Court and the rules of procedure governing investigating
officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence are repealed or
modified insofar as these are inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. 1âwphi1
The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are hereby
disapproved.
How will the examination on the child witness made during competency test?
Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only by the judge. Counsel for
the parties however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his discretion, ask the
child.
What are the guidelines on the questions which may be asked during competency
examination?
The questions asked at the competency examination shall be:
a. Appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child
b. It shall not be related to the issues at trial, and
c. It shall focus on the ability of the child to remember, communicate, distinguish
between truth and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.
What is the duty of the court on the competence of the child witness during
examination?
The court has the duty of continuously assessing the competence of the child throughout
his testimony.
Section 7. Oath or affirmation. –
Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.
The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may,
however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.
How will the examination of a child witness be done?
The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in
open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Can the party presenting the child witness or the guardian ad litem testify?
Yes, the party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may,
however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this rule.
Section 12. Waiting area for child witnesses. - The courts are encouraged to provide a
waiting area for children that is separate from waiting areas used by other persons. The waiting
area for children should be furnished so as to make a child comfortable.
Section 14.Testimony during appropriate hours. - The court may order that the
testimony of the child should be taken during a time of day when the child is well-rested.
Section 15. Recess during testimony. - The child may be allowed reasonable periods of
relief while undergoing direct, cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations as often as necessary
depending on his developmental level.
Section 16.Testimonial aids. - The court shall permit a child to use dolls,
anatomically-correct dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins, or any other appropriate
demonstrative device to assist him in his testimony.
Section 17. Emotional security item. - While testifying, a child shall be allowed to have an
item of his own choosing such as a blanket, toy, or doll.
Section 18. Approaching the witness. - The court may prohibit a counsel from
approaching a child if it appears that the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel.
Section 19. Mode of questioning. - The court shall exercise control over the questioning of
children so as to
(1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth,
(2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the
child,
(3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and
(4) avoid waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
What are the rights and privileges of a child witness:
During the taking of a testimony or a deposition of a child witness, he shall be entitled to the
following rights and privileges:
a. Right to be assisted by an interpreter (Sec. 9)
b. Right to be assisted by a facilitator (Sec. 10)
c. Right to support persons (Sec. 11)
d. Right to be provided with a waiting area (Sec. 12)
e. Right to have a comfortable environment (Sec. 13)
f. Right to give testimony during appropriate hours (Sec. 14)
g. Right to recess during testimony (Sec. 15)
h. Right to testimonial aids (Sec. 16)
i. Right to emotional security (Sec. 17)
j. Right not to be approached by the counsel (Sec. 18)
What is the rule on the mode of questioning of the child witness?
The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to:
1. Facilitate the ascertainment of the truth
2. Ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the
child.
3. Protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment
4. Avoid waste of time
Section 20. Leading questions. - The court may allow leading questions in all stages of
examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice.
Section 23. Excluding the public. - When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion
from the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct
interest in the case. Such an order may be made to protect the right to privacy of the child or if
the court determines on the record that requiring the child to testify in open court would cause
psychological harm to him, hinder the ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to
effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity. In making its order, the court
shall consider the developmental level of the child, the nature of the crime, the nature of his
testimony regarding the crime, his relationship to the accused and to persons attending the trial,
his desires, and the interests of his parents or legal guardian. The court may, motu proprio,
exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during trial is of such
character as to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, on motion of the
accused, exclude the public from trial, except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.
PEOPLE VS HERMOSA
G.R. NO. 131805 - JANUARY 7, 2001
There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the
incident truthfully. Indeed, the time when we degrade a child witness testimony is now pass. In the new
Child Witness Rule, every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party,
conduct a competency examination of a child.
Failure to immediately reveal the identity of the perpetrator of a felony will not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness. Even adult witnesses sometimes would not reveal at once the killers of their
loved ones for one reason or another. Fear of the criminal is one such reason.
PEOPLE VS HERMOSA
G.R. NO. 131805 - JANUARY 7, 2001
Alibi is the weakest defense as it is easy to concoct. For alibi to prosper, an accused must not only prove
that he was absent at the crime scene at the time of its commission, but also, that it was physically
impossible for him to be so situated at said distance.
GENIL VS JUDGE RIVERA
A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1619 - JANUARY 23, 2006
The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 21 November
2000) does not permit a defense counsel to even approach a child who is
testifying if it appears that the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel. xxx
Neither does the Rule require a manifestation from the child or her mother to
exclude the public from the hearing. The court may motu proprio exclude the
public from the courtroom to protect the right to privacy of the child; if requiring
the child to testify in open court would cause psychological harm to him; if it
would hinder the ascertainment of truth or result in his inability to effectively
communicate due to embarrassment, fear or timidity; and if the evidence to be
produced is of such character as to be offensive to decency or public morals.
GENIL VS JUDGE RIVERA
A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1619 - JANUARY 23, 2006
The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness provides that the court shall
exercise control over the questioning of children so as to facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth and ensure that questions are stated in a form
appropriate to their developmental level and protect them from harassment
or undue embarrassment.
PEOPLE VS. OGAN
G.R. NO. 186461 - JULY 5, 2010
To borrow from the Rule, courts must exercise control to ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the
child. Even calling her simply by her name rather than "Madame Witness"
would have made BBB more responsive and comfortable on the witness
stand. Had the Rule been followed, BBB would have been able to have an
easier time communicating with the court and the lawyers during the trial.
There would have been no confusion as to the details of her ordeal.
PEOPLE VS ESUGON
G.R. NO. 195244 - JUNE 22, 2015
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The
dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in
the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now
presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of
proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the
duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of
a party, conduct a competency examination of a child..
PEOPLE VS GOLIDAN
G.R. NO. 205307, G.R. NO. 205307 - JANUARY 11, 2018
Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the
trial court determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity
is such as to render him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he
is to be examined and of relating the facts truthfully. The testimony of the
child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known the
perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper
motive to testify. Once it is established that the child fully understands the
character and nature of an oath, the testimony is given full credence.
LEADING QUESTIONS
• Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A question which suggests to the witness the
answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
• (a) On cross examination; (b) On preliminary matters; (c) When there is a difficulty in getting
direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of
feeble mind, or a deaf-mute; (d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or (e) Of a witness who is an
adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party.
• A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he OR SHE has previously stated. It is not allowed. (10a)
LEADING QUESTION
It is one which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires. A
leading question is generally not allowed. The test whether a question is leading or not is
the suggestiveness of the conduct.
LEADING QUESTION
When allowed:
1. On cross-examination;
3. On preliminary matters;
4. When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is
of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute or a witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify or his having misled the party into calling him to the
witness stand
5. Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party; or
6. In all stages of examination of a child, if the same will further the interests of justice.
PEOPLE VS. ESTENZO
G.R. NO. L-41166 - AUGUST 25, 1976
A witness may testify only on those facts which he knows of his own knowledge.
Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except on
preliminary matters, or when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible
answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded,
or a deaf-mute. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and the orderly
dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted, if trial judges are allowed, as in the
case at bar, to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than
what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. LIMBO
G.R N0. L-24810 - MARCH 29 1926
A leading question propounded to a witness may, by creating an inference in
his mind, cause him to testify in accordance with the suggestion conveyed by
the question; his answer may be "rather an echo to the question" than a
genuine recollection of events..
..With ordinary witnesses is far worse when the witnesses are aged and
ignorant and therefore we should not discredit the testimony of a witness
who is old just because he has made some contradictions during a long and
tedious cross-examination.
PEOPLE VS. CANA
G.R. NO. 139229 - APRIL 22 2002
As a general rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, we have held
that when the witness is a child of tender years, it is proper for the court to
allow leading questions as it is usually difficult for a child of such age to state
facts without prompting or suggestion.
Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.
Here, the decision of the trial court to allow leading questions to Jovelyn
was justified, as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of
events difficult, if not uncertain.
PEOPLE VS. ESCULTOR
G.R. NOS. 149366-67 - MAY 27, 2004
The court ruled that the court may exercise a wide latitude of control in
getting the testimony of a child witness. This is done in order to: (1) to
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are
stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to
protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid
waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are
allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.
DELA PAZ VS. IAC
G.R. NO. 71537 - SEPTEMBER 17, 1987
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a
judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is
part of due process.
But we have also ruled that it is not an absolute right which a party can demand at
all times. This Court has stated that:
The right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus,
where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record
FULGADO VS. CA
G.R. NO. L-61570 - FEBRUARY 12, 1990
The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by
cross-examination is understood as requiring, not necessarily an actual
cross-examination, but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to
cross-examine if desired. There was no opportunity in this case. However,
the right to crossexamination is an essential part of due process but it may
be waived.
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION VS. NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. NO. L-6204 - JULY 31, 1956
The adverse party may cross-examine a witness for the purpose among
others, of eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue. From this
provision it may clearly be inferred that a party may cross- examine a
witness on matters not embraced in his direct examination. But this does
not mean that a party by doing so is making the witness his own.
US VS. MERCADO
G.R. NO. L-8332 - NOVEMBER 13, 1913
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been
called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or
(b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity
is bad.
While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing
that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an
examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that
he has been convicted of a high crime
IMPEACHING WITNESS
Rule 132, Section 11
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness A witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he OR SHE was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his
OR HER or her general reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence
that he OR SHE has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present,
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by
the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he OR SHE has been
convicted of an offense.
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
Reason for the amendments: Gender Inclusiveness .
A witness may be impeached:
a. By the party against whom he was called,
b. By contradictory evidence,
c. By evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or
d. By evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony.
BUT NOT: By evidence of particular wrongful acts,
EXCEPT:
- By the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment,
- That he has been convicted of an offense.
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch
for the witness’ veracity, he or she is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains
unrebutted.
Exceptions:
1. In case of a hostile witness or unwilling witness
2. Where the witness is an adverse party or the representative of a judicial person which is the adverse
party or
3. When the witness required is not voluntarily offered but is required by law to be presented. (ex.
Subscribing witness to a will)
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
A party can impeach a witness of the adverse party by:
1. Contradictory evidence from testimony in the same case
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
3. Evidence of bad character and
4. Evidence of bias, interest, prejudice, or incompetence
5. Evidence of mental, sensory derangement or defect
6. Evidence of conviction of an offense which affects credibility of witness.
SECTION 11. IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY’S
WITNESS
Rehabilitation of Witness: An impeached witness may be allowed on redirect to attempt to
rehabilitate (to restore the witness’s credibility) by the party who called the witness to the
stand.
Note: The testimony of an impeached witness is not stricken off the record.
SECTION 12. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF
CONVICTION OR CRIME
Section 12. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. - For the
purpose of impeaching a witness, evidence that he or she has been
convicted by final judgment of a crime shall be admitted if (a) the crime was
punishable by a penalty in excess of one (1) year; or (b) the crime involved
moral turpitude, regardless of the penalty.
However, evidence of conviction is not admissible if the conviction has been
the subject of an amnesty or annulment of the conviction.
SECTION 12. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF
CONVICTION OR CRIME
Explanatory notes, 2019 Proposed Amendments to the Revised Rules on Evidence:
• Instead of adopting the qualification under Rule 609 (a)(1) of the FRE allowing
impeachment “if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year,” the Sub-Committee deleted “death” because of the abolition of death penalty in
our jurisdiction
• Instead of adopting the provision in Rule 609 (a)(2) of the FRE, allowing impeachment
if the crime “ involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment,” the
SubCommittee opted to substitute the qualification “(b) [if] the crime involved moral
turpitude, regardless of penalty” considering that “moral turpitude” has settled meaning
in our law and conviction of such crime has a unquestionable bearing on honesty,
veracity and integrity.
SECTION 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OR HER
OWN WITNESS
Section 13. Party may not impeach his own witness. - Except with respect to witnesses
referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10 OF THIS RULE the party producing a
witness is not allowed to impeach his OR HER credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his OR HER adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his
OR HER having misled the party into calling him OR HER to the witness stand.
SECTION 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OR HER
OWN WITNESS
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an
adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him OR HER in all
respects as if he OR SHE had been called by the adverse party, except by
evidence of his OR HER bad character. He OR SHE may also be impeached
and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must
only be on the subject matter of his examinationin-chief.
SECTION 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OR HER
OWN WITNESS
Reason for the amendment: Gender Inclusiveness
Except with respect to witness referred to in paragraph (d. of an unwilling or hostile
witness) and (e. of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party) of section 10 of Rule 132, the party producing a witness is not allowed to
impeach his or her credibility.
SECTION 13. PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OR HER
OWN WITNESS
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by
the court upon adequate showing of:
• His or her adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or
• His or her having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
Sec. 15. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness.—A witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witnesses, or the
record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
VILLALON V. IAC
144 SCRA 443 | SEPTEMBER 24, 19866
Sec. 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements.—Before a witness
can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances
of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made
such statements, and if so; allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
PEOPLE V. RESABAL
50 PHIL. 780 (1927)
Topic: Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement
The apparent contradiction between the testimony given by the witness in the Court of
First Instance and that given in the justice of the peace court, is not sufficient to discredit it,
if he was not given ample opportunity to explain it in the CFI. The mere presentation of the
document containing said declaration made in the justice of the peace court is not a
ground for impeaching the testimony of the witness. It must be read to him in order that he
may explain the discrepancies noted.
PEOPLE VS. ZINAMPAN
G.R. NO. 126781 - SEPTEMBER 13, 2000
Previous inconsistent statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the
credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the
discrepancies and he was then given the opportunity to expalain them.
U.S.V. MERCADO
20 PHIL. 127 |NOVEMBER 13, 1913
Topic: Impeachment by Other Means
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been
called, except by showing:
1. that he has made contradictory statements: or
2. by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is
bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
MOSLEY V. COMMONWEALTH
420 S.W.2D 679 | NOVEMBER 10, 1967
Topic: Impeachment by Other Means
Generally a witness may be impeached only as specified in our Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, the modern trend is to permit the jury to consider
expert testimony in the field of mental disorders and relax the rule in sex
offense cases.
COLES V. HARSCH
276 P. 248 (OR. 1929) | JANUARY 24, 1929
Topic: Impeachment by other means
A witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other
times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony; but before this
can be done, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances
of times, places, and persons present; and he shall be asked whether he has
made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements
be in writing, they shall be shown to the witness before any question is put
to him concerning them.
US V. MEDICAL THERAPY SCIENCES INC.
NO. 927, DOCKET 78-1049
Topic: Impeachment by other means
The mandate in Rule 401 to admit all relevant evidence should be construed
to authorize the admission of supportive character evidence if the trial
judge finds in the circumstances of the particular case that the contradiction
amounted to an attack on veracity.
NEWTON V. STATE
127 A. 123, 147 MD. 71
Topic: Impeachment by other means
If the purpose of the examiner was to impeach the credibility of the witness
by showing that he had been convicted of crime, he should have asked him
that question directly, or if he had intended to show that he had in some
other case sworn to statements contrary to his testimony in the instant
case, he could have been asked whether he had made such conflicting
statements.
STATE V. OSWALT
62 WN.2D 118 (1963) 381 P.2D 617
Topic: Impeachment by other means
A witness cannot be impeached upon matters collateral to the principal
issues being tried.
CORDIAL V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-75880. SEPTEMBER 27, 1988
Topic: Impeachment by other means
Impeachment of a witness must be confined to an attack on his general
character or reputation and on his character or reputation for truth and
veracity. Such impeachment cannot be directed to any particular trait or
character, or particular facts of particular wrongful or immoral acts.
PEOPLE V. BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ
G.R. NO. 135022. JULY 11, 2002.
Topic: Refreshing Recollection
The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily
with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their
behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well as their
understanding of the obligation of an oath.
PEOPLE V. DEL CASTILLO
G.R. NO. L-16941 | OCTOBER 29, 1968
Topic: Recalling Witness
The court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion,
as the interests of justice may require. (Rule 132 Section 14)
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC.VS. SU
G.R. NO. L-28499 – SEPT. 30, 1977
Topic: Recalling Witness
Once a witness has been subjected to extensive cross-examination, the
motion to recall him as rebuttal witness may be denied
PEOPLE VS. RIVERA
G.R. NO. 98376 – AUGUST 16, 1991
Topic: Recalling Witness
The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an
applicant's mere general statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the
interest of justice," or "in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his
case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many points and questions that should
have been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such
as these as sufficient ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of
witness no longer discretionary but ministerial.
PEOPLE VS. RIVERA
G.R. NO. 98376 – AUGUST 16, 1991
Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional
questions is essential before the Court's discretion may rightfully be exercised to
grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete,
substantial ground for the recall. There must be a satisfactory showing on the
movant's part, for instance, that particularly identified material points were not
covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital documents
were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, or that the
cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual
absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat, there would be no foundation
for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.
PEOPLE VS. ORTILLAS
G.R. NO. 137666 – MAY 20, 2004
Topic: Recalling Witnesses
After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness
cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The Court will grant or withhold
leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
That the interest of justice required that appellant should have been given the
opportunity to crossexamine witness, as it was not his fault that witness had not
been cross-examined.
PEOPLE VS. ABATAYO
G.R. NO. 139456 – JULY 7, 2004
Topic: Recalling Witnesses
The task of recalling a witness for cross-examination is imposed on the party who
wishes to exercise said right, and stressed that it should be the opposing counsel
who should move to crossexamine the plaintiff's witness.
EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES
Rule 132, Section 15
1. What is the amended Rule 132 Sec. 15?
Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — The court, at its own initiative or at
the request of the party, shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses. This rule does not authorize exclusion of
(a) A party who is a natural person
(b) A duly designated representative of a judicial entity which is a party to the case
(c) A person whose presence is essential to the presentation of the party’s cause
(d) A person authorized by statute to be present.
The court may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from
conversing with one another directly or through intermediaries until all shall have been
examined.
2.To whom does the rule of exclusion apply?
The power of exclusion applies only to the witnesses and not to the parties in a civil case.
Parties have a right to be present at the trial either by themselves or by their attorneys, as
well as to reasonable notice of the time fixed therefore (Muerteguy, et al. vs. Delgado, 22
Phil. 109).
Since they have such right, by necessary implication they cannot be divested thereof by an
exclusion order. This is a reiteration of an earlier ruling of the Supreme Court that “(a)
party to an action has a right to be present in court while his case is being tried, and the rule
authorizing the exclusion of witnesses during the trial cannot be understood to extend to
him” (Paez vs. Berenguer, 8 Phil. 457, citing Streeter vs. Evans, 44 Vt. 27).
The same right against exclusion also applies to the accused in a criminal case since, as has
earlier been explained, he has the right to be present and defend in person and by counsel
at every stage of the proceedings, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the
judgment, unless he expressly or impliedly waives his presence (Sec. l[c], Rule 115).
3. What is the discretion of the Court?
If the witness violates the order of exclusion, the court may bar him from testifying
(People vs. Sandal, et al., 54 Phil. 883) or give little weight to his testimony, aside from his
liability for contempt.
It has also been held that it is within the power of the trial judge to refuse to order the
exclusion of the principal witness of the government during the hearing of a criminal case
and it may not, on that count alone, be considered as an abuse of his discretion (People vs.
Lua Chu, et al., 56 Phil. 44).
4. Rationale for the new exclusions
1. A party who is a natural person - based upon considerations of fundamental fairness,
and in criminal cases, exclusion would raise constitutional issues relating to confrontation and
effective assistance of counsel.
2. A duly designated representative of a judicial entity which is a party to the case –
designed to extend parity of treatment to parties who are not natural persons.
3. A person whose presence is essential to the presentation of the party’s cause –
open-ended addressed to the discretion of the judge.
4. A person authorized by statute to be present – is intended to allow for possible future
exemptions that may be granted by law.
5. Other examples of exemptions from exclusion
a. Agent of a party who handled the transaction.
b. One who committed the act causing injury for which recovery is sought.
c. Experts because they are allowed to testify to opinions or inferences based on facts or
data made known at the hearing.
d. Some states in the US exempt victims or complaining witnesses in criminal cases.
(example of by statute)
JURISPRUDENCE
PEOPLE VS. SANDAL
G.R. NOS. 32394, 32395 – SEPT. 5, 1930
Topic: Exclusion of Witnesses
Under the circumstances of the case, it lies within the trial court's discretion to allow or
not to allow a witness to testify, who, notwithstanding the order excluding witnesses from
the court room, remained there, although this court believes that the testimony of said
witnesses should have been admitted. And since there is nothing to show what this witness
would have stated in his testimony, it cannot be held that his failure to testify has materially
affected the appellants' defense.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA ET. AL.
A.M. NO. 01-4-03-SC – JUNE 29, 2001
Topic: Exclusion of Witnesses
Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the
hearings intended to assure a fair trial.
DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS.
ERISTINGCOL
G.R. NO. 193966 – FEBRUARY 19, 2014
Topic: Exclusion of Witnesses
Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or
ordering that these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent
them from conversing with one another. The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify
to the truth by preventing them from being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In
other words, this measure is meant to prevent connivance or collusion among witnesses.
The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has long been recognized as a means of
discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any motion from the
opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a
witness from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses.
DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS.
ERISTINGCOL
G.R. NO. 193966 – FEBRUARY 19, 2014
Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court
cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the
latter heard the testimony of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's
counsel to protect the interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses.
AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF
DOCUMENTS
Rule 132, Sections 19-33
Old Rules Proposed Amendment
SECTION 19. Classes of documents SECTION 19. Classes of documents
For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private. documents are either public or private.
Public documents are: Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts or records of the official (a) The written official acts, or records of the sovereign
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
tribunals and public officers, whether of the officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
Philippines, or of a foreign country; country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments; and except last wills and testaments;
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private (c) documents that are considered public documents
documents required by law to be entered therein. under treaties and conventions which are in force
All other writings are private. between the Philippines and the country of source;
and
(d) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Authentication – the process of proving the due execution and genuineness of the document.
CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS
Doctrine of self-authentication
• Where the facts in the writing could only have been known to the writer.
Note:
Sec. 22 merely enumerates the methods of proving handwriting but does not give preference or priority to a
particular method (Lopez v. CA)Note
AUTHENTICITY AND DUE EXECUTION OF A PRIVATE
DOCUMENT IS PROVED BY EVIDENCE OF THE
GENUINENESS OF THE HANDWRITING OF THE MAKER.
Handwriting is proved by:
1. Testimony of the purported writer (Sec. 22)
2. A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument (Sec. 20a)
3. A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion thereon, such
opinion being an exception to the opinion rule (Sec. 22)
4. A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted genuine
specimens thereof (Sec. 22)
5. Expert Evidence (Sec. 49)
Section 20. Proof of private documents. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By other evidence showing its due execution and authenticity.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (20)
Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. - Where a private document is more than
thirty (30) years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any
alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given. (21)
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. - The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he or she has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to
be his or hers upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge. (22)
AUTHENTICATION OF A DOCUMENT IS NOT
REQUIRED WHEN:
1. The writing is an Ancient Document (Sec. 21)
2. When the writing is a public document on record (Sec. 19)
3. When it is a notarial document, acknowledged, proved and certified in
accordance with Sec. 30
4. When the authenticity and due execution of the document has been
expressly and impliedly admitted by failure to deny the same under oath
(e.g., actionable documents)
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE
If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, which is a contracting party to a treaty or convention to which the
Philippines is also a party, or considered a public document under such treaty or convention pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 19
hereof, the certificate or its equivalent shall be in the form prescribed by such treaty or convention subject to reciprocity granted to
public documents originating from the Philippines.
For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a contracting party to a treaty or convention referred to in the next
preceding sentence, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his or her office.
A document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate
or its equivalent being prima facie evidence of the due execution and
genuineness of the document involved. The certificate shall not be required when a treaty or convention between a foreign country and
the Philippines has abolished the requirement, or has exempted the document itself from this formality.
Sec. 24 lays down the requirements for the admissibility in evidence of a foreign public
document.
Absent the attestation of the proper officer, a mere copy of the foreign
document is not admissible as evidence to prove the foreign law. (Wildvalley Shipping Co.
v. CA)
Amendment
The amendments are envisioned to distinguish between public documents (e.g., official
records) that emanate from countries that are signatories or parties to treaties or
conventions to which the Philippines is a party and countries that are not signatories or
parties to such treaties or conventions
SECTION 25. What attestation of copy must state.
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be
any, or if he or she be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
SECTION 26. Irremovability of public record.
Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept,
except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record
is essential to the just determination of a pending case.
Generally, a public record cannot be removed from the office which it is kept.
Except, it may be removed by order of the court but only when essential to the just
determination of a pending case (e.g., subpoena duces tecum). The rule however, refers
only to a public record, an official copy of which could be made available to the interested
party and is admissible in evidence.
SECTION 27. Public record of a private document
An authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested
by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody.
If a private writing itself is inserted officially into a public record, its record, its recordation
or its incorporation into the public record becomes a public document but that does not
make the private writing itself a public document so as to make it admissible without
authentication. (Republic v. Worldwide Insurance & Surety)
SECTION 28. Proof of lack of record.
A written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his or her deputy that, after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his or her office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his or her office contain no
such record or entry.
SECTION 29. How judicial record impeached.
Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of:
(a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer;
(b) collusion between the parties; or
(c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the
proceedings.
SECTION 30. Proof of notarial documents.
Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.
Notarial Document is one which is duly acknowledged before a notary public, who must
be duly authorized and must have notarized said document in accordance with the Notarial
Law. Notarial documents are public documents.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE PROVED BY:
• Those issued by priests during the Spanish regime are considered as public
documents. (Adriano v. De Jesus)
• Those issued after the Spanish regime are considered as private documents and
cannot even be considered as prima facie evidence of the fact that gave rise to
its execution and it is considered hearsay. Unless, the priest who performed the
baptismal rites are produced. (People v. Barcebal)
• A baptismal certificate is proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized
the child but not the veracity of the declarations and statements in the certificate
concerning the relationship of the person baptized. (Macadangdang v. CA)
RULES ON BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATES:
However, under the 1987 Constitution, the official languages are Filipino and, until
otherwise provided by law, English, with the regional languages as auxiliary official
languages in the region (Sec. 7, Art. XIV).
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents of the affidavit in open court
and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse party
RULE 11: AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO
AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
SECTION 1. AUDIO,VIDEO AND SIMILAR EVIDENCE
For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
a. Addressee refers to a person who is intended by the originator to receive the
electronic data message or electronic document. The term does not include a person
acting as an intermediary with respect to that electronic data message or electronic
document.
b. Computer refers to any device or apparatus which, by electronic, electro-mechanical
or magnetic impulse, or by other means, is capable of receiving, recording, transmitting,
storing, processing, retrieving, or producing information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression according to mathematical and logical rules or of
performing any one or more of those functions.
SEC. 5. DEFINITION OF TERMS
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of
an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the
information not being presented or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has
remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement
and any change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage
and display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the
purpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all
relevant circumstances
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Until the Supreme Court by appropriate rules shall have so provided, electronic
documents, electronic data messages and electronic signatures, shall be
authenticated by demonstrating, substantiating and validating a claimed identity of
a user, device, or another entity in an information or communication system,
among other ways, as follows:
(a) The electronic signature shall be authenticated by proof that a letter,
character, number or other symbol in electronic form representing the
persons named in and attached to or logically associated with an electronic
data message, electronic document, or that the appropriate methodology or
security procedures, when applicable, were employed or adopted by a person
and executed or adopted by such person, with the intention of authenticating
or approving an electronic data message or electronic document;
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
(b) The electronic data message and electronic document shall be
authenticated by proof that an appropriate security procedure, when applicable
was adopted and employed for the purpose of verifying the originator of an
electronic data message and/or electronic document, or detecting error or
alteration in the communication, content or storage of an electronic document
or electronic data message from a specific point, which, using algorithm or
codes, identifying words or numbers, encryptions, answers back or
acknowledgement procedures, or similar security devices.
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
The Supreme Court may adopt such other authentication procedures,
including the use of electronic notarization systems as necessary and
advisable, as well as the certificate of authentication on printed or hard
copies of the electronic document or electronic data messages by
electronic notaries, service providers and other duly recognized or
appointed certification authorities.
The person seeking to introduce an electronic data message and electronic
document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity
by evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic data message
and electronic document is what the person claims it to be.
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the information
and communication system in which an electronic data message or
electronic document is recorded or stored may be established in any legal
proceeding –
(a) By evidence that at all material times the information and communication
system or other similar device was operating in a manner that did not affect
the integrity of the electronic data message and/or electronic document, and
there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the
information and communication system;
SEC. 11. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
(b) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document
was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in
interest to the party using it; or
(c) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document
was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a
person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the
control of the party using the record.
SEC. 12. ADMISSIBILITY AND EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT
OF ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE AND ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS.
– In any legal proceedings, nothing in the application of the rules on evidence shall
deny the admissibility of an electronic data message or electronic document in
evidence –
a. On the sole ground that it is in electronic form; or
b. On the ground that it is not in the standard written form and electronic data message or
electronic document meeting, and complying with the requirements under Sections 6 or 7
hereof shall be the best evidence of the agreement and transaction contained therein.
In assessing the evidential weight of an electronic data message or electronic document, the
reliability of the manner in which it was generated, stored or communicated, the reliability of
the manner in which its originator was identified, and other relevant factors shall be given due
regard.
SEC. 13. RETENTION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGE AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
Notwithstanding any provision of law, rule or regulation to the contrary –
(a) The requirement in any provision of law that certain documents be
retained in their original form is satisfied by retaining them in the form of an
electronic data message or electronic document which –
i. Remains accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference;
ii. Is retained in the format in which it was generated, sent or
received, or in a format which can be demonstrated to accurately
represent the electronic data message or electronic document
generated, sent or received;
SEC. 13. RETENTION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGE AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
iii. Enables the identification of its originator and addressee, as well
as the determination of the date and the time it was sent or
received.
(b) The requirement referred to in paragraph (a) is satisfied by using the
services of a third party, provided that the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (i),
(ii) and (iii) of paragraph (a) are met.
SEC. 14. PROOF BY AFFIDAVIT.
• An Apostille is a certificate that authenticates the origin of a public document. It is issued by a country that is
party to the Apostille Convention to be used in another country which is also a party to the Convention.
•
On 14 May 2019, the Philippines became a party to the Apostille Convention. Authentication is still
required for all Philippine documents to be used abroad, but this time with an Apostille instead of an
Authentication Certificate (“red ribbon”) as proof of authentication.
•
After authentication (Apostillization) by DFA-OCA, as Competent Authority, there is no more need for
authentication (legalization) by the Embassies or Consulates except for non-Apostille countries and those that
objected to the Philippine accession.
APOSTILLE APPLIES TO
• The Apostille Convention only applies if both the country where the public document
was issued and the country where the public document is to be used are parties to the
Convention.
• Like in non-Apostille countries, the Philippine Apostille cannot be readily used in Austria,
Finland, Germany and Greece (Apostille countries that objected to the Philippine
accession). Documents from and to such countries will require legalization by the
concerned Embassy or Consulate.
BENEFITS OF APOSTILLE
• The Apostille streamlines the whole authentication procedure of documents for use
abroad resulting to more convenience, less cost and processing time for the applicants.
Before Apostille, a Philippine document to be used abroad needs a Certification by the
relevant government agency or office, Authentication by the DFA and Authentication
(Legalization) by the Embassy or Consulate of the country of destination.
•
With the Apostille, the aforementioned document will no longer require legalization by
the Foreign Embassy or Consulate if the country of destination is also an Apostille
country.
EFFECTS OF APOSTILLE
• Just like the Authentication Certificate (or “red ribbon”), an Apostille only
certifies the origin of the public document to which it relates: it certifies the
authenticity of the signature or seal of the person or authority that signed or
sealed the public document and the capacity in which this was done.
•
An Apostille does not certify the content of the public document to which it
relates.
OFFER OF EVIDENCE
Rule 132 Sections 34 - 36
SECTION 34. OFFER OF EVIDENCE.
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
SECTION 35. WHEN TO MAKE AN OFFER
Note: Documents which may have been marked as exhibits during the hearing but were
not formally offered in evidence cannot be considered as evidence nor can they be given
any evidentiary value.
SECTION 36. OBJECTION
Section 36. Objection. – ALL EVIDENCE MUST BE offered orally AND THE
OBJECTION THERETO must be made immediately after the offer is made.
OBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS FOR LACK OF A FORMAL
OFFER MUST BE MADE AS SOON AS THE WITNESS BEGINS TO TESTIFY.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a
witness MUST be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably
apparent. The grounds for the objections must be specified
WHEN TO MAKE OBJECTION:
Note: Objection not made at the proper time will be considered WAIVED.
Objection must be specific:
1. So that the judge may understand the question raised and that the adversary may have an opportunity to
remedy the defect, if possible;
2. To make a proper record for the reviewing court in the event of an appeal;
JURISPRUDENCE
PEOPLE VS CARIÑO ET AL
G.R. NO. 73876 – SEPTEMBER 26, 1988
Evidence not formally offered cannot be considered by the court.
INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC.VS AVILES
G.R. NO. 86062 – JUNE 6, 1990
Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it
was formally offered, and not when the particular document is
marked as identified and as an exhibit.
DELOS REYES VS IAC
G.R. NO. 74768 – AUGUST 11, 1989
Formal offer of evidence is hardly applicable in summary
proceedings where no full-blown trial is held in the interest of a
speedy administration of justice.
PEOPLE VS YATCO
G.R. NO. L-9181 – NOVEMBER 28, 1955
The right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may
waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not
reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court
has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL
INSURANCE CO., INC.VS SWEET LINES, INC.
G.R. NO. 87434 – AUGUST 5, 1992
When the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are
deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make
a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be
presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an
admitted fact.
OBJECTION
Rule 132. Sections 37-38a
Revised Rules on Evidence Proposed Amendments
Section 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. — Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. – When it
When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the
examination of a witness that the question being propounded examination of a witness that the questions being
are of the same class as those to which objection has been propounded are of the same class as those to which objection
made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it has been made, whether such objection was sustained or
shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it
sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing being sufficient for the adverse party to record his OR HER
objection to such class of questions. (37a) continuing objection to such class of questions. (37a)
The party may just enter a general and continuing objection to the same class of evidence and the
ruling of the court shall be applicable to all such evidence of the same class. The court may also motu
proprio treat the objection as a continuing one,
WHEN MUST THE RULING OF THE COURT BE
GIVEN? (SECTION 38)
● Immediately AFTER the objection is made,
● UNLESS the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform
itself on the question presented;
BUT THE RULING SHALL ALWAYS BE MADE:
The concept that the evidence submitted may have its own probative value
but in the appreciation thereof proper degrees are considered by the
Court.
3. IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN AFFIDAVIT
AND TESTIMONY WHICH HAS MORE WEIGHT?
The testimony should be given more weight.
4. WHAT IS THE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY
VALUE?
The hierarchy of evidentiary value shall be
a. Proof beyond reasonable doubt;
b. Clear and convincing evidence;
c. Preponderance of evidence;
d. Substantial evidence.
5. WHAT IS PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?
It is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight
of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence”.
6. WHAT IS THE CHARACTERISTIC OF
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?
It is evidence which is more convincing to the Court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
7. WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE?
It refers to evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing, than that
which is offered in opposition to it.
8. WHAT ARE THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?
the Court may consider:
a. All the facts and circumstances of the case;
b. The witnesses’ manner of testifying
c. Their intelligence
d. Their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying
e. The nature of the facts to which they testify
f. The probability or improbability of their testimony
8. WHAT ARE THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?
g. Their interest or want of interest
h. Also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial
i. The Court may also consider the number of witnesses, through the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
9. WHAT IS THE EFFECT IF THE PARTY WAS NOT ABLE TO
ESTABLISH THE CASE BY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE?
In civil case if the plaintiff was not able to prove his claim by preponderance
of evidence, the defendant may file a demurrer to evidence based on
insufficiency of evidence.
10. WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT?
Refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body
or substance of the crime.
16. WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT
CONFESSION IS ADMISSIBLE?
It must be voluntary and the burden of proof rests on defense to prove that
it was involuntarily done.
19. WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE
INADMISSIBILITY OF INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION?
The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any
particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more
witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be
additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution.
(Sec. 6, Rule 133 of the ROC)
30. WHAT IS THE RULE ON EVIDENCE ON MOTION?
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may
hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective
parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly
on oral testimony or depositions.
CASE DOCTRINES
SULTAN VS MACABANDING
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability
of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being
no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt
of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only.
PEOPLE VS SOLANO, JR.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." In this case, it is beyond
doubt that all the circumstances taken together point to the singular
conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, committed the
crime.
ESPINELI VS. PEOPLE