‘The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of
Enforcement,
G.G. Fitzmaurice
The Modern Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 1956), 1-13.
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‘Mon Feb 707-31:19 2005THE
MODERN LAW REVIEW
Volume 19 January 1956 No.1
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT*
‘Tue subject of thie paper is generally regarded as one of the most
dificult in the whole field of international law and reletions—a fact
of which the author is only too conscious. Even if space permitted
anything in the nature of « systematic exposition, an international
lawyer taken up largely with day-today affairs may justifiably
bbe thought to lack the necessary qualifications tor such task.
Nevertheless, things occur from time to time, of situation
develop, thst make it desirable for the practising international
lawyer to devote some attention to the theory and fundamentals
of his system, and in particular to the question of ite basic autho-
rity, Such « situation exists in the world today, for international
law is being subjected to grest strains and stresses, and 8 number
of disruptive tendencies are at work, tending to impair its authority.
‘Now, to the practitioner, the question of the authority of
legal system, whether municipal ot international, presents itself
Inrgely ax a’ question of enforcement. A rule or a system has
authority if it is enforceable, and normally will be enforced. Other-
‘wise it has, or may have, comparetively little authority—or if it
nevertheless does have it, such authority must derive from other
sources. At this point it is necessary to draw attention to an
important distinetion—one frequently overlooked or blurred—
between two concepts, namely, that of the binding character of
rule or aystem of lave, and that of its authority—a term here
‘used in the tense of prestige. To ask what it is that makes a rule
hrinding, or from what its obligatory character arises, is not the
same thing as to ask what it is that gives the rule its authority,
though there is a connection that will be noticed Inter. ‘The dis-
tinction is readily seen in rogard to the question of enforcement
iteell. It appears sometimes to be supposed that roles of law are
binding if, and because, they are enforceable, This view is clearly
{hin paper ae ctiginally delivered a9 a Public Lectore at Ring's College,
Unive of London March 1, 1965
12 ‘THE MODERN LAW REVIEW Var. 19
invrrot: inden is the rwreze of caret. The te is not
binding because it is enforced: it is enforced because it is al
binding. Enforcement presupposes the existence of legal oblige.
tion imeumbent on those concemed. The prospect of enforcement
is in fact little more than a fector or motive inclining people to
obey rules that they are in any ease under an obligation to obey:
bat it is not iteelf the souree of the obligation.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that the authority of a
rule or system (using that term as denoting the sum of the factors
that confer an adequate prestige on a rule or system of Iam) is
‘very closely connected with the question of enforcement. From
‘the practical point of view, almost as much importance attaches
to the authority of a rale or system of law as to its binding character.
Te might be said that it is ite binding character that creates for
these concemed the obligation to obey the law, but that it is
its authority that causes them to obey it in fact.
Enroncramisry ao fereaxarroxal Law
With regard to the actual position concerning the enforceability
of the interaational legal system, there has always been a respect-
‘able body of international lawyers that has both considered entorce-
ability to be a necessary characteristic of any system of law,
properly so called, and has also believed that international law
Possessed this characteristic, even if only in a rough and rudi-
mentary form. Oppenheim, for instance, whose treatise may be
cited because it constitutes so very much the practitioner's Bible,
0 to speak, begins by stating (8th ed., p. 8, § 8) that “a character-
istic of rales of law is that they shall, if necessary, be enforced
by external power.” He then (ibid., p. 10, § 5) defines law as
“<4 body of rules for human conduct within « community
‘which, by common consent of this community, shall be enforced.
by external power.”
In support of this dictum, Oppenheim cites Westlake and Travers
‘Twiss. He then goes on to express the view that international
law is @ system that is both intended by States to be enforceable,
fand is actually enforceable, if necessary by a process of self-help
‘on the part of States. Finally (ibid., p. 14, § 9), he says that,
subject to the provisions of such instruments as the Charter of the
United Nations and the so-called Kellogg Pact of 1926, “war is
the ultimate instrument for defending violated legal rights.”
‘Nor are the writers of Oppenheim’s generation alone in putting
forward such a view. For instance, so great « modernist as Kelsen
seems, in one of his latest works, Principles of International Law,
published in 1959, to incline towards a similar view. He says,
8 of this work, that
law is a coercive order. It provides for socially or;
nd Chae com be ceri datingulshel om asSigioneJax, 1956 THE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
‘order on the one hand and a ‘moral order on the other
hand. As a cocreive order, the law ia that specific social
‘technique which consists in the attempt to bring about the
desired social conduct of men through the threat of & measure
‘of coercion which is to be taken iu cere of . . . legally wrong
Later, on p. 14 of the seme work, Kelsen points out that in
decentralised societies (and the international society is such a
society), enforcement of the law is accomplished through the sppli-
cation of the principle of sell-help. The legal order leaves the
enforcement function to the individuals injured by delict or
illegality. He then says:
“