april 30, 2022
Trade Unions and Political Imagination
The Amazon Labor Union’s success in the United States reiterates the politics of organising labour.
W
orkers at Big Tech giant Amazon’s JFK8 warehouse in
Staten Island, New York voted in favour of a union,
becoming the first Amazon workplace to do so in the
United States (US). The Amazon Labor Union (ALU) has spear-
headed this landmark victory for labour in the US. Its success en-
sures that Amazon—now the second largest employer in the
US—will have to formally enter collective bargaining for fixing
wages, working conditions, health, and safety with the ALU. The
significance of this moment in US history cannot be lost, consid-
ering the decline in the organised workforce since the 1980s, along
with an institutional apathy for worker’s rights and unionising,
most epitomised in the Ronald Reagan presidency and pursued
overtly or covertly by subsequent administrations and buttressed
by the efforts of corporate America, including Big Tech, now.
Meanwhile, media reports have consistently exposed the ex-
tremely precarious working conditions at these facilities, such as
low wages, bare-minimum break time, threat of sudden termi-
nation, and poor social security, all of which got worse during the
COVID-19 pandemic with the intensification of work amid an ex-
ponential growth in demand for logistics and package delivery.
The ALU, the protagonist, marks a shift from this bleak narra-
tive. Its membership and support base, consisting of immigrants
and precariously placed workers from diverse and marginalised
socio-economic backgrounds, cannot afford to lose their jobs. Add
to this a workplace armed with technological surveillance, well-
funded union-busting machinery, a high employee turnover
rate, and minimal tolerance for any protest. The ALU faced an
uphill task. The common chorus in such situations—“a union is
simply not possible.” Despite this, persistent organising, active
pursuit of membership, constant worker engagement, innova-
tive publicity materials, among other tactics saw an increase in
their support base and eventually helped clinch the vote.
The ALU’s victory has resonated across similar work regimes and
signals a deeper ongoing transformative moment in labour politics.
Most of these workers are still dealing with the after-effects of the
2008 financial crisis along with the rise of Big Tech and its increas-
ing domination of economic activity. Many of them are from immi-
grant and/or minority racial backgrounds and have faced an in-
creasing social marginalisation with the rise of organised White su-
premacy movements. Yet, they have found meaning in the vibrant
social movements that have evolved in response to these crises.
Bernie Sanders’s rise as a political figure, Black Lives Matter, and the
women’s movement have posed fundamental social and political
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lViI no 18
questions to the American public. Unsurprisingly, several ALU mem-
bers acknowledge their support or involvement in these move-
ments. The calibrated and money-driven US electoral system’s im-
munity, notwithstanding, these movements have managed to gen-
erate critical action and collective resistance at multiple sites. The
momentum from these movements against the deep-rooted social
and economic inequalities in the US found resonance with the im-
mediate demands at these workplaces. The organising effort bene-
fited from this “politicisation” at the grassroots.
Moreover, the ALU germinated among workers with a first-hand
sense of the goings-on at the workplace. Being worker-led gave
it a wider support base and moral strength to reject the corporate
union-busting propaganda, of the proverbial “outsider” union
organiser who is always a “threat” to the worker as opposed to the
“friendly” employer. Meanwhile, the ALU’s leadership was also able
to generate support from larger organisations and unions while
consciously resisting appropriation, thus revealing a nuanced
understanding of solidarity with the wider labour movement.
While the ALU and similar efforts may have a long journey ahead,
possibly facing harsher obstacles from corporations, they open spac-
es for reflective global solidarity. In India, the last two years have
seen a drastic overhaul of the labour legislation architecture into the
four labour codes that have further weakened the position of labour,
especially its capacity to organise, form unions and hold employers
accountable. Further, Big Tech has been expanding its presence,
consumer base, and employee strength in India through a lethal
combination of attractive incentives and precarious working condi-
tions in a general climate of employment insecurity. Hence, with a
small dwindling formal organised workforce in India and the cur-
rent dispensation’s marauding of labour regulation before and dur-
ing the pandemic, the situation merits great concern. The right to
form a union or strike has been severely curtailed in the new codes,
instead activating a vague facilitation process, self-certification, and
irregular inspection. A regime of fixed-term contracts, where the in-
dividual worker goes directly into contract with the employer as op-
posed to previous tenures of employment—permanent, temporary,
casual or probationer, etc—has found legal sanction. Both fixed-term
contracts and facilitation, in essence, defeat the bulwark of indus-
trial relations—the collective persona of labour against the inher-
ently unequal employer–employee relationship under capitalism.
However, if the ALU experience reveals something, it is that the
momentum to protect and enhance workers’ rights cannot be sep-
arated from a broader politically imaginative activism. As the
7
COMMENT

opposition in India deals with the ruling dispensation’s onslaught
on the marginalised and oppressed, they would do well to note that
the majority of the workers come from these very historically mar-
ginalised and exploited sections working at factories and homes
and cannot be reduced to only agents of localised workplace
resistance alone, but also should be part of a project for social
transformation. While the ruling dispensation’s bulldozers tear
through lives, they also destroy workplaces, and on this May Day,
if anything, the ALU experience should remind us that a workers’
politics cannot be separated from the politics of the worker.

8 april 30, 2022 vol lViI no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENT
A Firm Step in the Long Road to Safety of Women in Cinema
A public interest litigation brings film units under the ambit of the POSH Act, 2013.
Bina Paul writes:
T
he High Court of Kerala, after protracted legal proceedings,
delivered a landmark judgment on 17 March 2022 that
mandated the establishment of a grievance redressal cell in
the form of an internal complaints committee in all film production
units. This ruling came in response to a public interest litigation
(PIL) filed in 2018 by the Women in Cinema Collective (WCC) with
a plea for the setting up of internal complaints committees as per
the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereafter the POSH Act).
The shocking abduction and sexual assault of a leading actor of
the Malayalam film industry had led many to seriously question
the notion of safety of women working in the industry. The WCC
was constituted in the aftermath of this horrific crime. While the
case relating to the abduction and sexual assault has been ongo-
ing, the WCC, at the very onset, began questioning some of the en-
demic problems plaguing the industry—the entrenched prejudic-
es of male co-workers, the systemic gender bias, the lack of basic
facilities, and the all-pervasive “casting couch,” leading to lesser
women choosing to work in the film field.
The WCC received numerous complaints of sexual harass-
ment in its first year of existence itself, although it was working
as an advocacy group. What was appalling was that even after
the enactment of the POSH Act, 2013, the Malayalam film indus-
try had no compliant redressal mechanisms in place and was, in
fact, violating the law. The usual arguments presented against
its implementation were that it was impractical as film units
were temporary workspaces, employing mostly contractual
workers, and that the nature of employment in the industry did
not warrant the imposition of this law. However, rampant ex-
ploitation and abuse took place during preparation processes,
such as auditions, script readings, and post-shooting hours.
Such blatant disregard for both law and dialogue in the Malay-
alam film industry led to the filing of the PIL. One of the counter
affidavits stated that the PIL was a mere publicity stunt, and even
though all the respondents, in their counter affidavits, accepted
the need for mechanisms to prevent sexual harassment, they
shunned any responsibility. The WCC, in the meanwhile, reached
out to other organisations and appealed to the government to take
cognisance. The Cine and TV Artistes, Association decided to im-
plead in the PIL and so did the Kerala Women’s Commission,
which took suo moto cognisance and impleaded in the case.
During the course of the legal proceedings, associations in the
industry, such as the Association of Malayalam Artistes and Film
8 april 30, 2022
Employees Federation of Kerala set up the “so-called internal
complaints committees.” However, these were just conciliatory
gestures as the members of these internal complaints committees
were appointed without much thought and most of the members
were unaware of its existence. The court’s judgment has clearly
addressed such ad hocism as the Posh Act, 2013 defines the con-
stitution of an internal complaints committee and its functioning.
The Producers Union has recently issued a directive that all film
units in Malayalam cinema are to constitute their internal com-
plaints committees. The implications of the judgment go much be-
yond this, for it is for the first time that the court has recognised
what a workplace is in an unorganised sector like the film industry.
The court has explicitly spelled out the producer and production
unit as an establishment, making them hitherto responsible for en-
suring the dignity of women at the workplace as mandated by the
law: “We also make it clear that any organisations, establishments,
private institutions employing workers whether for wages or not in
contemplation of the provisions of the Act, 2013 coming under the
definition of employer, employee and workplace, they are duty
bound to constitute an Internal Complaints Committee.” Further,
the judgment states that (the setting up of the internal complaints
committees) “would in turn protect the dignity, and make the right
to life and personal liberty of the women in the film industry more
meaningful and fruitful.” This is indeed a victory for the WCC
whose members had been pilloried and denied work in the industry.
The judgment has far-reaching implications for film industries
operating across the country, especially with regard to upholding
the human rights of their women stakeholders. Ensuring the
safety and dignity of women at the workplace is an imperative
and not something to be granted—this has been clearly stated
in the judgment, and internal complaints committees are to be
formed following both the letter and the spirit of the law. Although
a necessary mechanism, the internal complaints committees,
however, are not the solution to the prevention of sexual harass-
ment. The stakeholders in the Malayalam film industry would
need to steadily make headway towards attitudinal and behav-
ioural changes from their entrenched feudal and patriarchal
mindsets. In fighting against regressive attitudes towards women
and challenging the long-standing inequities in the industry, the
role of the WCC and the public scrutiny it garnered has been crucial.
Bina Paul (binapaul86@gmail.com) is a founder member of the Women in
Cinema Collective.
vol lViI no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
FROM THE EDITOR’S DESK
Can Arbitrariness in State Action Be Defended?
A
ccording to some observers and commentators, recent
actions by different state agencies such as the Enforce-
ment Directorate (ED) and the police point towards an
arbitrariness, which according to the former is difficult to de-
fend on constitutional or legal grounds. This observation makes
it necessary for us to address the question that is raised in the
title of this column itself. To answer this question, we need to
delimit the meaning of arbitrariness by separating it from the
universal humanitarian context.
Arbitrariness or an action involving a discriminatory element,
when viewed from the humanitarian concerns, is likely to receive
unconditional endorsement from the sentient or morally decent
public. Such a public will condone humanitarian acts such as the
traffic police allowing the ambulance carrying a critically ill pa-
tient to cross the traffic signals on priority. Or, the disaster man-
agement task force saving small children on priority during a
flood disaster, without waiting to follow the official protocols or
guidelines, would not receive any objection, at least not on norma-
tive grounds. These actions that overtly look arbitrary, however,
could be defended on the grounds that such state actions are
aimed at restoring an ethical moral element in the administrative
process. Put differently, arbitrariness that is driven by humanitar-
ian consideration is less likely to enjoy the support of those de-
fenders of a kind of positivism according to which the set proce-
dures cannot be compromised on any moral ethical grounds.
However, one needs to understand the phenomenon of arbitrar-
iness that has come to be associated with the state actions under-
way through different state agencies such as the ED and local ad-
ministrative agencies currently active with the bulldozers. The
government may define it as legitimate on the grounds that the
targets of the ED show readiness to cooperate with the investiga-
tion. But this action suffers from a bare or blatant form of arbi-
trariness in terms of selective targeting of leaders from the opposi-
tion parties. Moreover, the “opportune time,” which also happens
to be election time, indicates an element of arbitrariness in the
government action. Detecting financial irregularity is almost a job
following set legal procedures that must be taken up on a regular
basis. This point has already been made earlier in the same col-
umn in the pages of EPW. Thus, from the state’s point of view, the
investigation may look legitimate, but it is unfairly discriminatory
as far as the leaders from the opposition are concerned.
In an understanding of arbitrariness, what is ethically more
problematic is the protracted uncertainty and insecurity that
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lViI no 18
has come to be associated with this so-called legitimate arbi-
trariness. This arbitrariness, which is practised through differ-
ent investigating agencies of the state, indeed generates the cat-
egory of protracted uncertainty. The supporters of the ruling
dispensation keep tossing in the public a long list of opponents
who are likely to be booked by these agencies or whose houses
would be bulldozed. The protracted insecurity does not seem to
end with judicial intervention, that is to say, a series of first in-
formation reports impatiently wait for a person who can walk
out on bail in one case but then is trapped in another. The case
of a Dalit leader from Gujarat being the most recent one in this
regard. Meanwhile, the bulldozer action is out-and-out arbitrary
and does not even require legitimation, either legal or moral.
At the political level, arbitrariness in state action may look overtly
legitimate for some but is inherently political both in terms of se-
lecting its targets and the strategic timing. At the moral level, arbi-
trariness causes much more serious damage on the ground since it
is likely to produce among opposition leaders a deep sense of pro-
tracted uncertainty and insecurity coiled into “secret files” that are
under the possession of the ruling power. Ironically, protracted un-
certainty and insecurity is going to be a permanent political condi-
tion for those leaders who are likely to be booked for investigation
should they resist the arbitrariness of state action. Protracted inse-
curity, by implication, keeps the “erstwhile avant-garde” leaders
under constant surveillance. These leaders lose the capacity to resist
the state’s act of arbitrariness that not only ethically but also indi-
vidually paralyses them. Such leaders also lose the stamina to take
initiative in challenging the arbitrariness that implicates others in
an unfair state action. Protracted uncertainly induced by arbitrari-
ness in state action ultimately leads in empowering dominant po-
litical forces to seek the acquiescence of those who began their po-
litical activism with avant-garde qualities. They are compelled to
participate in a kind of trade-off, which may suggest the following
arrangement: “you give me protection and I, in turn, will guarantee
you electoral support.” Both the political judgment and power posi-
tion will be surreptitiously regulated by the political forces that have
gained control over the delicate details that form part of the secret
file. The secret file has thus become the source of retaining and re-
maining in power. These leaders, trapped in the destructive logic
of the secret files, cease to maintain the desire to gain power but
would choose to remain near power.
9
COMMENTARY
Growth and Decomposition
of Nutri-cereals in India
(1960–61 to 2019–20)
Diptimayee Jena, Srijit Mishra
The decline in production growth
for nutri-cereals was observed
since the 1990s, and the decline
for the same in terms of area
growth was observed since the
1970s. With the United Nations
adopting 2023 as the International
Year of Millets, more needs to be
done for these hitherto neglected,
nutritionally beneficial, and
climate-resilient crops.
An earlier version of the article was presented
at the 81st Annual Conference of Indian
Society of Agricultural Economics, Shri Mata
Vaishno Devi University, Katra (Jammu and
Kashmir), 1–3 December 2021. The usual
disclaimers apply.
Diptimayee Jena (deepika24jena@gmail.com)
is with the Nabakrushna Choudhury Centre for
Development Studies, Bhubaneswar.
Srijit Mishra (srijit@igidr.ac.in) is with the
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development and
Research, Mumbai.
10
G
reater incidence of malnutrition,
including calorie deficiency, is
observed in the semi-arid and
dry subhumid hydro climates of the
world (Wani et al 2009). About 50% of
the world’s total calorie intake is derived
directly from cereals (Awika 2011). In
India, the increase in area under crops like
rice, sugar cane, and cotton with intense
water requirements has led to depletion
of groundwater that could accelerate
drylands expansion and adversely affect
production of staple cereals (Sharma
2016). Further, procurement and public
distribution of rice and wheat in India
has transformed the staple diets from
nutri-cereals (millets) to rice and wheat
(Kumar 2019). Synthesising scientific evi-
dence (Pingali et al 2019) shows how cli-
mate change has been influencing crop
and livestock productivity, which in turn
affects food and nutritional security.
In this context, cultivation of nutri-ce-
reals, because of their nutritional advan-
tages and climatic resilience that are
grown under rain-fed conditions, assumes
importance (Suresh et al 2014; Rao et al
2017; Bandyopadhyay et al 2017). Rain-fed
agriculture in India is practised in 60% of
the total cropped area, contributing to
48% of the area under food crops and
68% of that under non-food crops
(Angles et al 2011). It can be inclusive
and sustainable (Mishra et al 2013) and
one can take advantage of its knowledge
systems in variability and diversity
through mixed cropping and cultivation
of nutri-cereals (Raina et al 2015). Recog-
nising their importance, the union gov-
ernment has issued a notification that
replaces the usage of coarse cereals with
nutri-cereals (Government of India 2018)
and also introduced a draft resolution
(A/75/L 63 under agenda item 14), leading
april 30, 2022
to adoption of adopting International
Year of Millets, 2023 by the United Na-
tions General Assembly (UNGA 2021).
Against this backdrop, this article exa-
mines growth and instability of produc-
tion, area and yield, and decomposition
of production into area, yield and inter-
action effects for nutri-cereals and other
crop groups.
Data and Methods
The study uses Economic & Political
Weekly Research Foundation (EPWRF)
India Time Series Agricultural Data from
1960–61 to 2019–20, wherein a three-
year moving average is categorised into
six decadal sub-periods, namely, 1960s:
triennium ending (TE) 1962–63 to TE
1970–71; 1970s: TE 1970–71 to TE 1980–81;
1980s: TE 1980–81 to TE 1990–91; 1990s:
TE 1990–91 to TE 2000–01; 2000s: TE
2000–01 to TE 2010–11; and 2010s: TE
2010–11 to TE 2019–20. The analysis has
six crop groups, namely nutri-cereals
(comprising ragi, jowar, bajra, and small
millets), other cereals (comprising rice,
wheat, maize, and barley), pulses (com-
prising arhar, gram, lentil, and other
pulses), oilseeds (comprising groundnuts,
sesamum, castor, sunflower, safflower,
niger, mustard, linseed, and soya bean),
fibres (comprising cotton, jute, and mes-
ta), sugar cane, and each of the four
nutri-cereal crops independently.
To eliminate discontinuity between
sub-periods, growth rates are estimat-
ed using kinked-exponential model of
Boyce (1986),
InZit
଺ ଺ ଺
‫ן‬ଵ + Ⱦଵ ቌDଵ t + ෍ D୨ Kଵ ቍ + Ⱦଶ ቌDଶ t െ ෍ D୨ Kଵ + ෍ D୨ K ଶ ቍ
୨ୀଶ ୨ୀଶ ୨ୀଷ
6 6 6 6
+Ⱦ3 ቌD3 t െ ෍ Dj K 2 + ෍ Dj K 3 ቍ + Ⱦ4 ቌD4 t െ ෍ Dj K 3 + ෍ Dj K 4 ቍ
j=3 j=4 j=4 j=5
6
+Ⱦ5 ቌD5 t െ ෍ Dj K 4 + D6 K 5 ቍ + Ⱦ଺ (D଺ t െ D଺ K ହ ) + ɂ୲ ... (1)
j=5
In equation (1), ln is natural logarithm,
Zit denotes production, Pit, or area, Ait, or
yield, Yit, of ith crop/crop group at time
t, 1 is intercept, Dj and βj denote dum-
my variables and growth rates, respec-
tively, for j = 1,...,6 decadal sub-periods.
Estimates of instability, following Boyce
(1987) and Chattopadhyay (2001), use
ǀXitǀ instead of lnZit in equation (1) where
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

Xit = (Zit – Z^it )/Z^it is a de-trended series six crop groups and four nutri-cereal bajra. In decomposition, positive prod-
with Z^it being the predicted value based crops for India for six decades—from uction change for nutri-cereals, other ce-
on equation (1) with lnZit. If the depend- the 1960s to 2010s. It compares growth reals, oilseeds, and sugar cane was on
ent variable in equation (1) is ǀXitǀ, then a rates of other crop groups as also specific account of area, yield, and interaction
statistically significant βj > 0 (βj < 0) indi- nutri-cereal crops with the crop group effects. Negative production change for
cates increasing (decreasing) instability. nutri-cereals, and also compares growth pulses was on account of area and inter-
Decomposition of production change, rate for each crop group/crop with its action effects, and for fibres was on acc-
following Minhas and Vaidyanathan (1965) growth rate in the previous decade. It ount of area and yield effects. Production
and Narain (1977), computes area, yield, also indicates instability. The decompo- and area growth for other cereals and
and interaction effects, sition of production change to area, production growth for bajra was signifi-
yield and interaction effects for crop cantly greater than that for nutri-cere-
ΔPit = ΔAitYiτ, + ΔYitAiτ + ΔAitΔYiτ ... (2)
groups and nutri-cereal crops are in als. Increasing instability was observed
In equation (2), ΔPit = Pit – Piτ , ΔAit = Ait – Tables 2 and 3 (p 12), respectively. with declining production, area, and
Aiτ, and ΔYit = Yit – Piτ denote change in yield for fibres, with declining produc-
production, area, and yield, respectively, The 1960s: Production growth was posi- tion and area for pulses and small mil-
of ith crop group/crop at time t over time tive and significant for nutri-cereals, lets, and with declining area for ragi.
τ, which in our analysis are the end and other cereals, oilseeds, and sugar cane
start time, respectively, for each decadal among crop groups, and bajra among The 1970s: Production growth was posi-
sub-period. nutri-cereals. This was on account of tive and significant for nutri-cereals,
positive and significant yield growth for other cereals, oilseeds, fibres, and sugar
Results and Discussions nutri-cereals, and by both area growth cane among crop groups and ragi and
Table 1 shows kinked exponential growth and yield growth being positive and sig- jowar among nutri-cereals. This was on
rates of production, area, and yield across nificant for other cereals, sugar cane and account of yield growth being positive
Table 1: Kinked Exponential Growth of Nutri-cereals and Other Crop Groups in India (%) and significant for all of them, and area
Item Crop Groups/Crops 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s growth being positive and significant for
Production Nutri-cereals 1.22*↑ 1.25* 0.28 –1.31*‡↓ –0.54 2.82*‡ other cereals, fibres, sugar cane and ragi.
Ragi 0.36↑ 3.16*#‡↓ –0.58‡↑ –0.65 –2.92*#↑ –4.45* In decomposition, positive production
Jowar –0.52↓ 1.63*↑ 0.95* –3.45*#‡↓ –2.46*↑ –6.82*#‡ change for other cereals, oilseeds, fibres,
Bajra 5.51*#↑ –0.48‡↓ 1.30* *1.71*#↑ 3.03*# 0.02↓
and sugar cane was on account of area,
Small millets –1.40*#↑ –0.29# –4.12*#‡↑ –6.27*#‡↑ –3.15*#‡↑ –0.96‡
yield, and interaction effects, and for
Other cereals 4.52*#↑ 2.18*‡ 4.03*#‡↓ 2.46*#‡↓ 0.87*‡↑ 0.50#↑
nutri-cereals on account of yield effect.
Pulses –0.73↑ 0.36↑ 1.88*#‡↓ –0.26‡↓ 1.53*#‡↓ 4.79*#‡↓
Oilseeds 1.97*↑ 1.17* 6.30*#‡↓ 2.40*#‡↓ 1.89*#↓ 0.20
Negative production change for pulses
Fibres –1.31#↑ 2.49*‡ 1.99*# 1.70*#↓ 5.12*#‡↓ –1.03‡↓ continues from the 1960s, but in the 1970s
Sugar cane 2.57* 2.51*↑ 3.31*#↓ 2.90*#↑ –0.05‡ –0.48↑ it is on account of yield and interaction
Area Nutri-cereals 0.02↑ –0.81*↑ –1.16*↓ –2.88*‡↑ –1.70*‡ –3.10*‡ effects. The increasing instability in pro-
Ragi –0.28↑ 0.73*# –1.81*‡↑ –2.65*↑ –2.57*↑ –3.68*↑ duction and area for pulses also continues.
Jowar –0.82*↓ –0.37↑ –1.30*↑ –3.89*#‡↓ –2.60*‡↓ –4.85*#‡ Compared to nutri-cereals, area growth
Bajra 1.33*↑ –1.14*‡↓ –0.38↓ –1.49*#‡↑ 0.18#‡↑ –1.83*‡↑ for five other crop groups, and production
Small millets –0.38↑ –0.65*↑ –5.41*#‡↑ –5.90*#↑ –4.38*#‡↑ –5.38*#↑ growth and area growth for ragi, a nutri-
Other cereals 1.70*#↑ 0.94*#↑ 0.86*#↓ 0.67*#‡↓ 0.17#↓ –0.75#↓
cereal taken independently, were signi-
Pulses –1.32*↑ 0.32#‡↑ 0.20#↓ –0.77*#‡↓ 0.48#‡↓ 2.45*#‡↓
ficantly greater. Compared to the 1960s,
Oilseeds 0.87↑ 0.65#↑ 3.48*#‡↓ 0.61#‡↓ 0.65#↓ –1.59*‡↓
production growth and yield growth for
Fibres –0.99↑ 0.75*#↑ –1.13*‡ 1.50*#‡↓ 1.21*#↓ 1.62*#↓
Sugar cane 1.25*↑ 0.99*# 1.74*#↓ 2.33*#↓ 0.63#‡↓ –0.35#↓
other cereals while continuing to be pos-
Yield Nutri-cereals 1.29*↑ 1.82*↓ 1.66*↑ 1.62* 1.42*↓ 0.15↑ itive were significantly lower. Among
Ragi 0.95↓ 2.61*↑ 1.10*↓ 1.99*↑ –0.03‡↓ –1.83*↓ nutri-cereals, in comparison to the 1960s,
Jowar 0.59 2.16*↓ 1.90* 0.22↑ 0.43 –2.58*‡ production growth for ragi was signifi-
Bajra 3.74* 0.55‡↑ 2.01*↑ 3.01*‡ 2.66* 2.65*↑ cantly greater while production, area, and
Small millets –0.29↓ 0.25# 0.90* 0.10#↓ 1.13*↑ 4.75*#‡↑ yield growth for bajra was significantly
Other cereals 2.80* 1.17*‡↑ 3.54*#‡↓ 1.74*‡↑ 0.49‡↓ 1.10*↑ lower. Increasing instability was observed
Pulses 0.59 –0.03# 1.74*‡↑ 0.26‡↓ 1.03*↑ 2.55*#↓ with declining area for nutri-cereals,
Oilseeds 0.65↑ 0.84*↓ 2.89*‡ 1.87*↑ 1.46*↓ 0.60
particularly for jowar, and small millets.
Fibres –0.13↑ 1.48*↓ 3.25*#‡ 0.26‡↓ 4.26*#‡↓ –2.64*#‡
Sugar cane 1.16*↓ 1.26*↑ 1.70*↓ 0.84*↑ –0.81*#‡↓ 0.62‡
Growth estimated for triennium ending (TE) data that starts from TE 1962–63 with kinks at TE 1970–71, TE 1980–81,
The 1980s: Production growth was posi-
TE 1990–91, TE 2000–01, and TE 2010–11, respectively, and ends at TE 2019–20. * different from zero at 95% confidence tive and significant for jowar and bajra
interval (CI), # different from nutri-cereals of that decade at 95% CI, ‡ different from previous decade at 95% CI,
↑(↓) instability is increasing (decreasing) at 95% CI.
among nutri-cereals and the other five crop
Source: The authors’ estimates based on EPWRF India Time Series Agricultural Statistics Data. groups. This was on account of increased
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 11
COMMENTARY

area for other cereals, oilseeds, and sugar of yield effect. Production growth for while growth of both production and
cane. In addition, yield growth was posi- five non-nutri-cereal crop groups, area area for ragi and small millets were neg-
tive and significant for nutri-cereal and growth for four of them after excluding ative and significantly lower. Increasing
for each of the four constitutive crops. In fibres, and yield growth for other cereals instability was obser ved with declining
decomposition, positive production change and fibres were significantly greater production and area for ragi and small
for other cereals, pulses (a reversal from than that for nutri-cereals. Compared to millets, and a declining area for jowar.
the previous two decades), oilseeds, and 1970s, growth of production, area and
sugar cane was on account of all three yield for oilseeds, production and yield The 1990s: Production growth was neg-
effects, it was positive for nutri-cereals for other cereals and pulses, and yield ative and significant for nutri-cereals
(including jowar and bajra) on account for fibres were significantly greater (also for jowar and small millets) on ac-
count of area growth being negative and
Table 2: Decomposition of Production Change of Crop Groups in India, 1960s to 2010s (%)
Crop Effect 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
significant. It was positive and signifi-
Nutri-cereals Area 22.68 –104.90 –112.54 131.89 –1982.38 227.55 cant for other cereals, oilseeds, fibres,
Yield 75.27 227.71 236.95 –43.50 2486.75 –177.31 and sugar cane on account of positive
Interaction 2.05 –22.81 –24.41 11.61 –404.37 49.76 and significant growth in area for all,
p 2.01 1.79 1.88 –4.54 0.15 –2.22 and in yield for all except fibres. Among
Other cereals Area 43.32 42.61 11.90 32.50 16.73 14.95 nutri-cereals, it was positive and signifi-
Yield 49.67 50.62 83.43 62.16 81.22 81.88 cant for bajra on account of yield being
Interaction 7.02 6.77 4.67 5.34 2.06 3.17 positive and significant. In decomposi-
p 17.36 22.14 43.65 36.02 26.09 51.44
tion, negative production change for
Pulses Area 151.51 –51.75 13.59 230.47 51.18 43.57
nutri-cereals was on account of area and
Yield –56.40 146.07 82.96 –143.02 44.20 46.57
interaction effects. Positive production
Interaction 4.89 5.68 3.45 12.55 4.63 9.86
p –0.69 –0.85 3.20 –0.52 2.69 7.69
change for ragi was on account of yield
Oilseeds Area 39.32 83.43 35.35 32.95 30.94 –40.96 effect; for other cereals, oilseeds, and
Yield 57.99 14.56 49.06 63.04 62.64 149.08 sugar cane it was on account of area,
Interaction 2.70 2.01 15.59 4.01 6.42 –8.12 yield and interaction effects and for fi-
p 0.85 1.33 8.45 3.45 7.06 3.77 bres it was on account of area effect.
Fibres Area 29.45 16.85 –51.64 107.14 17.11 169.43 Negative production change for pulses
Yield 72.95 77.36 166.85 –6.10 73.52 –56.93 persists for the third decade, and this
Interaction –2.40 5.79 –15.21 –1.05 9.37 –12.49 time it was on account of area and inter-
p –1.36 4.83 2.77 2.96 15.95 4.84
action effects like the 1960s. Production
Sugar cane Area 41.79 47.19 46.21 63.62 173.03 27.77
growth, area growth, and yield growth
Yield 52.47 49.84 43.04 30.22 –68.26 67.71
for small millets were significantly lower
Interaction 5.75 2.97 10.75 6.15 –4.77 4.52
p 26.73 16.22 78.31 71.45 11.90 73.77
than that for nutri-cereals. Compared to
Decomposition estimated for triennium ending data, as in Table 1, with kinks therein being end and start of the two the 1980s, production growth and area
intervening decades. Area, yield and interaction effects are in per cent and will add up to 100 for each crop group/crop in growth for nutri-cereals, other cereals and
each decade. p is change in production (million tonnes for all except for fibres where it is million bales). If p<0 then a
negative (positive) effect will be positive (negative) in actual value. pulses, and production growth for oil-
Source: The authors’ estimates based on EPWRF India Time Series Agricultural Statistics Data. seeds and among nutri-cereals, produc-
tion growth for jowar and small millets,
Table 3: Decomposition of Production Change of Nutri-cereals in India, 1960s to 2010s (%) and area growth for jowar and bajra were
Nutri-cereals Effect 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
significantly lower. Increasing instability
Ragi Area –78.70 12.16 133.28 –1681.57 118.72 118.22
Yield 179.17 83.71 –38.30 2362.74 –24.47 –23.30
was observed with declining production
Interaction -0.48 4.14 5.02 –581.17 5.75 5.09 for small millets, and a declining area
p 0.01 0.80 -0.27 0.04 -0.50 -0.38 for nutri-cereals along with ragi, bajra
Jowar Area –450.90 –52.13 –270.67 108.97 160.30 102.62 and small millets.
Yield 554.52 171.15 411.55 –13.14 –79.42 –4.26
Interaction –3.62 –19.02 –40.88 4.17 19.12 1.65 The 2000s: Production growth was neg-
p 0.01 1.96 0.41 –3.37 –1.23 –2.63 ative and significant for ragi on account
Bajra Area 19.27 76.10 –1.44 188.93 –8.54 –197.14 of negative and significant area growth.
Yield 72.67 26.61 102.07 –106.03 111.61 366.02
It was positive and significant for other
Interaction 8.06 –2.71 –0.64 17.10 –3.07 –68.88
cereals, pulses, oilseeds, fibres, and bajra.
p 2.09 –0.77 2.15 –0.61 2.09 0.82
This was on account of yield growth being
Small millets Area 45.18 115.51 144.19 93.04 124.94 446.46
Yield 56.13 –17.87 –69.33 12.72 –42.42 –602.74
positive and significant for pulses and
Interaction –1.31 2.36 25.15 –5.75 17.48 256.28 oilseed, and both area growth and yield
p –0.10 –0.21 –0.41 –0.59 –0.21 –0.04 growth being positive and significant
Note and Source: Same as Tables 1 and 2. for fibres. In decomposition, production
12 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

change was positive for all six crop groups.
This was on account of all three effects for
other cereals, pulses, oilseeds, and fibres,
area effect for sugar cane, and yield effect
for nutri-cereals. Production growth for
pulses, oilseeds, and fibres, area growth
for all five non-nutri-cereal crop groups,
and yield growth for fibres were signifi-
cantly greater than nutri-cereals. Com-
pared to the 1990s, production growth
and yield growth for other cereals were
significantly lower, and production growth
and yield growth for pulses and fibres
were significantly greater. Increasing
instability was observed with declining
production for ragi, jowar and small mil-
lets, and with declining area for ragi,
and small millets.
The 2010s: Production growth was neg-
ative and significant for nutri-cereals
(also for ragi and jowar) on account of
area growth and yield growth being
negative and significant. Besides, for ba-
jra and small millets area growth was
negative and significant while yield
growth was positive and significant.
Production growth was positive and sig-
nificant for pulses on account of both
area growth and yield growth being
positive and significant like a continua-
tion of its revival in the 2000s. In decom-
position, production change was positive
for all the crop groups excluding nutri-
cereals and for bajra among nutri-cereals.
This was on account of all three effects
for other cereals, pulses, and sugar cane,
area effect for fibres, and yield effect for
oilseeds and bajra. Production growth
for other cereals was significantly great-
er than nutri-cereals. A silver lining is the
positive and significant yield growth in
small millets, which is also significantly
greater than the previous decade. Incre-
asing instability was observed with dec-
lining production for sugar cane, and, as in
the previous two decades, with declining
area for ragi, bajra, and small millets.
Conclusions
The decline in production growth for
nutri-cereals was observed since the
1990s, and the decline in area growth was
observed since 1970s. For specific nutri-
cereal crops, the decline in production is
borne out for small millets from the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
1960s, for ragi from the 1980s, and for
jowar, the 1990s. There was no decline
for bajra except for a dip in the 1970s. For
each of the four nutri-cereal crops, the
decline in area growth was observed
since the 1960s, with the exception of
ragi in the 1970s and bajra in the 1960s
and 2000s. The increase in production
of nutri-cereals in the first three decades
was on account of yield effect, and the
decrease in production of nutri-cereals
in the last three decades was on account
of area effect. For other crop groups,
while not ruling out some ups and
downs, the secular decline in area and
production is not evident. In fact, the de-
cline in nutri-cereals was on account of
greater emphasis through policy inter-
ventions to other cereals like rice and
wheat under the green revolution. In the
last two decades, the production of and
the area under pulses have also in-
creased. There have been some recent
policy initiatives to revive nutri-cereals
in Odisha (Government of Odisha 2016;
for a discussion on growth and decom-
position of millets in Odisha, see Jena
and Mishra 2022) among others and the
union government declared millets as a
nutri-cereal and also introduced a reso-
lution leading to the adoption of Inter-
national Year of Millets, 2023 by the
United Nations. Clearly, more needs to
be done for the nutritionally-beneficial
and climate-resilient nutri-cereals, the
scheduled and orphaned crops that have
been neglected for long.
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Siddhivinayak Enterprises
B-006, Amntohill Warehousing
Wadala East
Mumbai 400 037
13
COMMENTARY
Is Growth Enough for Poverty
Reduction?
A Micro-perspective from Two
South Indian States
Priyabrata Sahoo, Kirtti Ranjan Paltasingh
Both Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana registered a slower
decline in poverty from 1993–94
to 2004–05 but witnessed a faster
poverty decline from 2004–05
to 2011–12. However, Telangana,
with lower monthly per capita
expenditure growth, achieved
faster poverty reduction in the
second period than AP due to a
high growth elasticity of poverty.
Priyabrata Sahoo (priyabrata.s@bhu.ac.in)
teaches at the Department of Economics,
Banaras Hindu University. Kirtti Ranjan
Paltasingh (kirttiecon@gmail.com) teaches at
the School of Economics, SMVD University,
Jammu and Kashmir.
14
T
he discontentment with growth
not being beneficial to all became a
highly debated topic in academia
and the arena of policymaking during
the latter phase of reform when India
achieved higher economic growth but
sluggish poverty reduction. Realising the
importance of this debate, the Govern-
ment of India also targeted “inclusive
growth” as a strategy to ensure that eco-
nomic progress is pro-poor and inclu-
sive. Accordingly, India’s Eleventh and
Twelfth Five Year Plans envisioned the
concept of inclusive growth and incor-
porated all concrete strategies to enhance
the welfare and participation of socially
and economically disadvantaged groups
(Planning Commission 2012). In the era
of inclusive growth policies, for the bal-
anced development of a country, a pro-
found study of the same for local econo-
mies at the subnational level becomes
equally important. It is because all states
of the Indian union are quite diverse
from the perspective of political economy
as well as geography. Most Indian states
have achieved higher growth during the
post-reform period, especially during the
2000s (Kumar and Subramanian 2012;
Sahoo and Paltasingh 2019), but whether
that growth has reduced poverty among
all the regions needs to be explored.
This study attempts to examine the
economic growth and poverty reduction
in the case of the two newly formed states
of the undivided Andhra Pradesh (AP),
that is, AP and Telangana. The rationale for
considering two Telugu-speaking Indian
states spawns from several facts: first,
the 2000s decade in both states of un-
divided AP has recorded a faster growth
rate than the 1990s (Vakulbharanam and
Motiram 2014). Nevertheless, there have
been increased regional disparities and
inequality across socio-religious and
april 30, 2022
economic groups, and also between rural
and urban areas during the post-reform
period (Dev and Ravi 2003; Dev 2008;
Reddy and Bantilan 2012; Sahoo and
Khan 2018; Sahoo et al 2019; Sahoo et al
2021; Sahoo and Paltasingh 2022). The
long-standing demand for a separate
state of Telangana1 was based on the issue
of gross economic neglect by the govern-
ment of undivided AP (Rao 2011). It has
been argued that the districts of Telan-
gana are more poverty-ridden and back-
ward. Though there are a large number
of studies looking at the relationships
between growth, poverty, and inequality
(Radhakrishna 2015; Panagariya and
Mukim 2014; Chauhan et al 2016), no
such study has been attempted on intra-
regional disparities in poverty reduction
among regions of states in comparison
to the state average. This article is an
attempt in this regard to compare pov-
erty reduction among the regions of
these newly formed states of Telangana
and AP during the post-reform period
with undivided AP. The broad question
this article tries to answer is: Which of
these newly formed states witnessed a
faster reduction in poverty in the post-
reform period?
Figure 1 (p 15) presents the poverty
head-count ratio (HCR) for both rural and
urban areas for 1993–94 (55th National
Sample Survey Office [NSSO] round),
2004–05 (61st NSSO round), and 2011–12
(68th NSSO round) in these two states.
The decline in HCR is higher during the
second period than in the first period,
both in rural and urban areas. While the
poverty HCR declined by 2.95%, annual-
ly, during the first period, the decline
during the second period was about
9.85% annually for the undivided AP.
The decline in poverty HCR during the
first period was higher for AP, while in the
second period, the decline was higher in
Telangana. In the second period, the
poverty HCR for AP declined by about
8.87% annually, whereas the decline for
Telangana was about 11.15%, annually.
In the post-reform period as a whole
(1993–94 to 2011–12), the decline in pov-
erty HCR was higher in Telangana than
in AP. From Figure 1, Telangana seems to
have witnessed a faster reduction in
poverty in comparison to AP. The article
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Figure 1: Poverty Headcount Ratio in UndividedChart
Andhra
50
40
30
20
10
0 us which state has done better than the
Poverty HCR
Telangana
Andhra Pradesh
Source: Authors’ calculation from the National Sample Survey Office's (NSSO) CES unit-level data.
tries to answer the question of reduction in
poverty through the decomposition of an-
nual changes in poverty among these
regions of undivided AP.
Data and Methods
Data: The NSSO unit-level data for the
“Consumer Expenditure Survey” (CES)
on three rounds (1993–94 [50th], 2004–
05 [61st], and 2011–12 [68th]) has been
used for the analysis. To measure the
HCR for both the states as well as undi-
vided AP, the poverty line recommended
by the Tendulkar Committee, which rec-
ommended mixed reference period
(MRP) data on monthly per capita expen-
diture (MPCE), has been used for the
analysis. The nominal MPCEs for the re-
spective NSSO rounds figures are con-
verted into the real MPCE at 2004–05
base by taking the implicit price deflator,
calculated from the Tendulkar poverty
line for rural and urban areas of undi-
vided AP for the respective CES rounds.
The poverty line recommended by the
committee for rural and urban regions
of undivided AP is used to calculate the
poverty ratio and pro-poor indices for
both the newly formed states.
Analytical Framework
Let θ (z, y, σ) be a poverty measure that
is a function of a particular poverty line z,
mean per capita income y, and some
measure of inequality σ. We can define
the growth elasticity of poverty (with
respect to the growth of mean income) as:
β = – ((d log θ)/(d log y)) ... (1)
The β measures the percentage fall in
poverty due to one percentage increase
Economic & Political Weekly
TitlePradesh and Its Regions
1993–94
2004–05
2011–12
United AP
Rural HCR
Telangana
United AP
Urban HCR
Telangana
Andhra Pradesh
Andhra Pradesh
in the mean per capita income, indicat-
ing the poverty reduction efficiency of
growth within a particular region or
group over time. The value of β is always
negative, but its greater absolute value
indicates greater efficiency of growth
spells in reducing poverty.
Following Besley et al (2005), we de-
lineate another way of looking at β. The
explained component of poverty reduc-
tion between two time periods will be a
function of both growth elasticity of
poverty (β) and growth rate (g) of that
region as follows:
θ̂t = βg
A poverty decomposition is motivated
by the fact that the region’s perfor-
mance, in the form of poverty reduction,
is due to its growth record against that
part, which is due to the anti-poverty
effectiveness of the given amount of
growth. The decomposition is found by
adding and subtracting the terms (β g)
and, (βs g), in equation (2), we get:
θ̂st = β g +(βs – β)g +(gs – g) βs
where β = 1/N∑βi is the average growth
elasticity of poverty (here, in this case, it
is that of undivided AP), and N is the
number of states, βs is growth elasticity
of poverty of a state s (AP and/or Telan-
gana), g = 1/N∑gi is the average growth
rate of consumption expenditure, and gs
is the growth rate of consumption expend-
iture of a state. The first term (β g) is the
average reduction in poverty; the second
term (βs – β)g indicates the efficacy of
growth in reducing poverty, which is based
on the intuition that one of the routes of
poverty reduction can be achieved by
EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18
COMMENTARY
having higher-than-average growth elas-
ticities. The third term (gs – g) βs indi-
cates the effect of growth, again, based
on the idea of reducing poverty, given its
effectiveness by having higher-than-av-
erage growth rates. So, there are two di-
mensions of poverty reduction concern-
ing only growth rate (g) and growth
elasticity of poverty. The values will tell
United AP
average in any of these dimensions.
Empirical Results and Discussion
Growth and its anti-poverty efficacy:
This section presents the decomposition
of the annual changes in poverty bet-
ween the two points of time into the
growth effect and its efficacy in reducing
poverty. Table 1 (p 16) compares the dif-
ferences in poverty elasticity and growth
rates of the two states with undivided AP.
The intuition behind this decomposition
is that poverty reduction can be achieved
through growth effect (having higher-
than-average growth) and higher growth
efficacy in reducing poverty (having-
higher-than-average growth elasticity of
poverty). The annual change in poverty
in a region can be decomposed into:
... (2)
(i) average reduction in poverty in the
state, (ii) the difference in the growth ef-
ficacy of poverty reduction, and (iii) the
difference in the growth effect of the
region compared to the state average.
A higher reduction in rural poverty,
during the first period, is due to the
higher growth in MPCE in AP than in un-
divided AP and Telangana. During this
period, the poverty elasticity of both re-
gions, more or less, remained the same.
... (3)
However, in the second period, the rural
areas of Telangana witnessed a higher
decline in poverty than AP. Though the
available at
Pathak Brothers Nagpur
Shop No 07,
Meher Prasad Complex
Beside Hotel Centre Point
Nagpur 400 010
15
COMMENTARY
Table 1: Decomposition of Change in Poverty into Growth Efficacy and Growth Effect
Decomposition Efficacy of Growth in
Reducing Poverty
Rural 1993–94 to 2004–05 to
2004–05 2011–12
Andhra Pradesh 0.000 -0.022
Telangana 0.001 0.039
Undivided Andhra Pradesh
Urban 1993–94 to 2004–05 to
2004–05 2011–12
Andhra Pradesh 0.002 -0.044
Telangana -0.004 0.064
Undivided Andhra Pradesh
Source: Authors’ estimation from NSSO CES unit-level data.
growth in MPCE, more or less, remains
the same in both the regions, Telangana
shows higher efficacy in the reduction of
poverty during this period than AP. This
implies that growth in the second period
was more inclusive and pro-poor in Tel-
angana than in AP.
In the urban sector, during the first
period, AP witnessed a faster reduction
in poverty than Telangana. AP shows
both higher efficacy in reducing poverty
and higher growth in MPCE than Telan-
gana during this period. However, dur-
ing the second period, in the urban area,
the poverty decline in Telangana was
twice as fast as compared to its counter-
part. The higher decline in poverty in
Telangana, in comparison to AP, during
the second period, was mostly due to a
higher efficacy in reducing poverty.
Even though Telangana shows lower
growth than AP, because of its high effi-
cacy in reducing poverty, Telangana wit-
nessed a faster poverty reduction. The
efficacy in the reduction of poverty in
the urban region of Telangana was high-
er than in rural Telangana during the
second period. The possible factors caus-
ing a higher efficacy in reducing poverty
might be the anti-poverty measures and
the increase in social spending that the
government of undivided AP introduced
for the regions of Telangana; this can be
explored and considered for future re-
search. Hence, the claim of backward-
ness of the regions of Telangana in com-
parison to AP, at least on the poverty
front, cannot be justified.
Concluding Remarks
Though AP, on a relative basis, perfor-
med well in poverty reduction during
the first period (1993–2004), Telangana
witnessed a faster poverty reduction in
16
Social Sector, and Regional Disparities,”
Growth-level Total Reduction in Working Paper No 1497.
Difference Poverty Dev, S M and C Ravi (2003): “Macroeconomic
1993–94 to 2004–05 to 1993–94 to 2004–05 to Scene: Performance and Policies,” Economic &
2004–05 2011–12 2004–05 2011–12 Political Weekly, Vol 38, Nos 12 and 13, pp 1143–57.
0.005 0.000 0.041 0.132 Kumar, U and A Subramanian (2012): “Growth in
-0.009 0.001 0.028 0.193 India’s States in the First Decade of the 21st
Century: Four Facts,” Economic & Political
0.036 0.154 Weekly, Vol 47, No 3, pp 48–57.
1993–94 to 2004–05 to 1993–94 to 2004–05 to Panagariya, A and M Mukim (2014): “A Compre-
2004–05 2011–12 2004–05 2011–12
hensive Analysis of Poverty in India,” Asian De-
0.004 0.002 0.042 0.153 velopment Review, Vol 31, No 1, pp 1–52.
-0.008 -0.010 0.025 0.250 Planning Commission (2012): Twelfth Five Year
0.037 0.195 Plan (2012–17), Faster, More Inclusive and Sus-
tainable Growth, Vol I, New Delhi: SAGE Publi-
cations India, https://niti.gov.in/planningcom-
the second period (2004–11). The de- mission.gov.in/docs/plans/planrel/fiveyr/12th/
pdf/12fyp_vol1.pdf.
composition of annual change in poverty Radhakrishna, R (2015): “Well-being, Inequality,
shows that AP has a higher growth rate Poverty, and Pathways Out of Poverty in
India,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 50,
in MPCE than Telangana in both the peri-
No 41, pp 59–71.
ods. The higher efficacy in poverty re- Rao, C H H (2011): “Srikrishna Committee on Telan-
duction in Telangana leads to its faster gana: Recommendations at Variance with the
Analysis,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 46,
poverty reduction during the second pe- No 5, pp 33–36.
riod. From the analysis, we derive the Reddy, A and M C S Bantilan (2012): “Regional Dis-
inference that although income growth parities in Andhra Pradesh, India,” Local Econ-
omy, Vol 28, No 1, pp 123–35.
is necessary, what is vital is the distribu-
Sahoo, P, and Paltasingh, K R (2019): “Examining
tion of income. This causes a high growth Growth–Inequality Nexus in Post-reform Odis-
elasticity of poverty and makes the ha: A Sectoral Decomposition Analysis,” Jour-
nal of Development Policy and Practice, Vol 4,
growth pro-poor. No 1, pp 12–34.
Sahoo, P and M K Khan (2018): “Dynamics of Urban
Note Poverty in United Andhra Pradesh,” Journal of
1 Telangana was finally carved out of undivided Economic Policy and Research, Vols 12 and 13,
Andhra Pradesh (AP) in 2014 by dividing the Nos 1 and 2, pp 28–42.
erstwhile AP into AP and Telangana. It was a Sahoo, P, S Indrakanta and P Panda (2019): “Dy-
long-standing demand, which started in the namics of Rural Poverty in United Andhra
1960s, but the movement turned violent in Pradesh,” Journal of Income and Wealth, Vol 41,
2013–14. No 1, pp 107–18.
Sahoo, P, K C Pradhan and T Nayak (2021): “’Inclu-
siveness of Poverty Reduction: A Study of
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“Operationalising Pro-poor Growth: India 00194662211063575.
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april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

The Sustainable Development Goals
A Future within or beyond Reach?
Shiladitya Chatterjee
India’s official publications
have focused on interstate
comparisons, but insufficient
attention has been paid to the
national progress in the
Sustainable Development Goals.
The available data suggest,
however, that India is falling
behind many global and East Asia
averages and may not achieve
several of the SDGs. Regular
stocktaking of India’s SDG
progress is therefore essential.
Shiladitya Chatterjee (shilochatterjee@gmail.com)
is the former head of the poverty unit and
the advisor, strategy and policy department,
Asian Development Bank, and is currently an
independent development consultant.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
I
n the domestic discussions of India’s
economy and development, the issue
of India’s progress on the Sustaina-
ble Development Goals (SDGs), which are
to be achieved by 2030, has not figured
prominently. For instance, the Economic
Surveys, the annual flagship publications
of the government on the state of the
economy have covered, since 2016 after
the SDGs were adopted, only certain as-
pects of development contained in the
SDGs but not the SDGs specifically.1 There-
fore, the attention provided to the SDGs
in the Economic Survey (Finance Ministry
2022) with a whole chapter devoted to
the topic under “Sustainable Development
and Climate Change” naturally raised
expectations that there would hence-
forth be more focus on them.
The SDGs were adopted by India along
with all countries in the world at a United
Nations (UN) summit on sustainable de-
velopment in 2015 in order to address
the core development issues facing the
planet, and to embrace priorities in so-
cial, economic, and environmental are-
as (United Nations 2015).2 These core
global development priorities were iden-
tified through widespread consultations
leading to a global consensus. The lack
of discussion on India’s progress to-
wards the SDGs keeps domestic stake-
holders ignorant of where their country
is heading in these vital development
areas. The SDGs should not suffer the
same fate as befell the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs) that ended in
2015, remaining largely unknown and
ignored in domestic development dis-
courses. The lack of sufficient discussion
and feedback may have contributed to
their mixed outcomes for India. Assess-
ments conducted on India’s performance
on the MDGs (Chatterjee et al 2017) show
that its performance on the MDGs left
much to be desired.
With only eight years remaining for the
SDGs to end, more attention to achieving
vol lVii no 18
COMMENTARY
them is therefore called for. In addition,
in the last two years, the COVID-19 pan-
demic has not only decelerated India’s
progress on the SDGs, but in some cases,
it likely has even reversed them, such as
extreme poverty. Both the World Bank
(2020) and Asian Development Bank
(2021) simulations indicate that COVID-19
has harmed progress towards the SDGs
significantly.3 Therefore, bringing the
country back on track to achieve them
by 2030 must be an overriding task post
the COVID-19 development priority.
However, a reading of the chapter on
the SDGs in the Economic Survey 2021–22
leaves one somewhat disappointed on
several counts.
The chapter discusses mainly compar-
ative progress on the SDGs between
Indian states and union territories with
hardly any discussion on India’s overall
progress as a country. The inclusion of
specific themes and topics in the Economic
Survey, which is released just before the
union budget, leads usually to an expec-
tation that it would provide rationale for
adjustment in budgetary allocations or
major changes in policies, etc, concern-
ing the topic. However, the focus almost
entirely on the states and union territories
in the chapter on SDG belies this. While
obviously achieving the SDGs are the col-
lective responsibility of both the centre
and the states, each have major roles to
play. More attention to India’s overall
status on the SDGs and the centre’s role in
achieving them was, therefore, necessary.
A similar neglect of India’s overall
performance on the SDGs can be obser-
ved in the SDG reports that have been
brought out by the NITI Aayog.4 While
an assessment of the progress being
made by the states and union territo-
ries—measured through an SDG index
and dashboard developed by the NITI
Aayog—is very useful, the SDG reports
should also deal prominently with the
country’s progress as a whole, which has
been largely missing.
Moreover, while the Economic Survey
chapter as well as data in the NITI Aayog
reports show that India as a whole is mak-
ing progress, it does not confirm whether
the progress is sufficient to attain the tar-
gets specified by 2030. For this, some ex-
ercise to assess the likelihood of reaching
17
COMMENTARY
the 2030 targets would have been desir-
able so that corrective action can be ini-
tiated in time.
In addition, the NITI Aayog composite
indices are subject to several weaknesses:
they hide the actual state of the individual
indicators; the choice of indicators in the
composite is somewhat arbitrary, as are
the choice of weights for indicators, to
compute the indices. Also, the indicator
set has been changed over the years mak-
ing inter-temporal comparisons difficult.
Some of these weaknesses have been
pointed out by the NITI Aayog itself
(NITI Aayog 2021: 61). Given that there
are multiple issues with the composite
indices, it may be simpler and more mean-
ingful, therefore, to look at the status and
progress of individual indicators, which
this article proposes to do.
Progress on the SDGs
As indicated earlier, the chapter on SDG
in the Economic Survey 2021–22 provides
only minimal reference to India’s pro-
gress as a whole, merely stating that
India’s overall score on the NITI Aayog SDG
India Index and Dashboard improved to 66
in 2020–21 from 60 in 2019–20 and 57 in
2018–19, showing progress in India’s journey
towards achieving the SDGs. (Ministry of Fi-
nance 2022: 197)
Such a statement may lead to the erro-
neous conclusion that India is making
rapid progress towards achieving the SDGs
since the overall index improved by 10%
in 2020–21 over the previous year and
reaching a score of 100 in another 10 years
would therefore appear to be easily in
India’s grasp. In fact, the actual picture
is quite different. Using the NITI Aayog’s
own data gleaned from the three years
that the SDG reports have appeared, India’s
individual composite indices for 15 SDGs
with data are presented in Table 1. Simple
forecasts using linear regression of these
indices for 2030 using the previous data
points provides some idea of the likeli-
hood of the targets (that is, maximum
value of 100) being achieved. The results
show that as many as eight of the 15 SDGs
with data are unlikely to be achieved,
including the important goals of poverty;
hunger; education; employment; inequa-
lity; climate action; life on land; and
peace, justice, and institutions.
18
But these overall Goal indices are too countries, and developing Pacific Island
aggregative and therefore deceptive, as countries/nations. With India’s aspira-
discussed earlier, as they do not reveal tions towards a $5 trillion economy, we
the true situation as far as critical constitu- should be doing better than the world
ent indices are concerned. Also, the com- average, which consists overwhelming-
posite indicators are not comparable as ly of developing countries and soon
the composition of sub-indices has varied catching up or exceeding the EAP coun-
over the years. Hence, it will be useful to tries’ average.
take a more disaggregated look, focusing Forty-one indicators, mainly from the
more attention on individual SDG indica- World Bank’s SDG database,7 were chosen,
tors, which the rest of this article will do. primarily on the basis of data availability,
To better appreciate the status of some to conduct this comparison. These rep-
critical SDG indicators, two questions will resent the most relevant indicators for the
be sought to be answered: (i) How does concerned Goals among those with data
India stand vis-à-vis the world and East availability. These are shown against the
Asia and the Pacific? and (ii) What is the corresponding Goals and the concerned
likelihood of India achieving the SDGs with target numbers.
respect to these individual indicators? The results are tabulated in Table 2
(p 19). The data are the latest available and
Geographical Comparisons the years have been indicated.8 Cells in
One way to assess India’s standing on the last column are colour-coded in grey-
the SDGs is to compare the current lev- scale and show the comparative position
els of attainment with other countries. To bet ween India and these two groups of
facilitate this, two important comparisons countries. If India’s latest indicator value
are being made: the world average (which is better than both the world and the EAP
includes apart from developed coun- averages,9 then it is assigned “white”; if its
tries, 155 developing countries with over value is worse than both, it is indicated
84% of the world’s population);5 and the in “black”; and if India’s value is worse
average of countries of East Asia and than either the world average or the EAP
the Pacific (EAP), excluding high-income average, then it is indicated in “grey.”
countries,6 to which India is compared Of the 41 indicators, 19 (46.3%) show
with, comprising China, South East Asian that India’s present SDG indicator has a
Table 1: India’s Aggregate NITI Aayog SDG Index lower value than both the world and EAP
Scores and Forecast averages. In the case of another 13 indi-
No Goals 2018 2019 2020 2030
cators (31.7%), India’s attainment is either
1 End poverty 54 50 60 88
worse than the world or worse than the
2 End hunger 48 35 47 38
3 Health for all 52 61 74 100
EAP average. Together, these two sets of
4 Education for all 58 58 57 52 indicators represent 78% of all the indi-
5 Gender equality 36 42 48 100 cators and indicate a relatively poor
6 Access to water state of attainment of India’s SDG indi-
and sanitation 63 88 83 100 cators, when matched with other coun-
7 Access to clean energy 51 70 92 100 tries’ performance.
8 Expand growth and
employment 65 64 61 41
Forecasting India’s SDG Status
9 Expand infrastructure
and industry 44 65 55 100 Apart from the current status of the SDGs,
10 Reduce inequality 71 64 67 45 compared to other countries, it is neces-
11 Make cities liveable 39 53 79 100 sary to make some assessment of wheth-
12 Sustainable consumption er India’s progress on the SDGs is suffi-
and production NA 55 74 100
cient for achieving them by 2030 or not.
13 Climate action NA 60 54 0
If progress is weak, efforts must be
15 Life on land 90 66 66 0
16 Peace, justice,
stepped up in the lagging areas to ensure
and institutions 71 72 74 89 that India does not fail to attain the
Black colour coding for forecasts indicates “goal not targets. This type of exercise needs to
achieved.” Forecasting by linear regression method used.
As values cannot exceed 100 or fall below zero, those that be carried out regularly by the central
do are terminated at these maximum or minimum limits. government and the results be made
Source: NITI Aayog SDG Reports for 2018, 2019, and 2020
data and author’s forecasts for 2030. available to the public.
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

This article has made an attempt to con- using all the available data on each varia- These methods are simple and are bia-
duct such an exercise. In order to conduct ble;10 and (ii) using the first and last obser- sed towards more favourable results than
the forecasts, two methods were used: vations only to forecast a linear model.11 using (more realistic) growth rates which
(i) forecasting by fitting ordinary least Thereafter, the most favourable of the two decline over time as terminal values
squares regressions on the time series data forecast values, for 2030, were taken. are approached (for example, reducing
Table 2: Sustainable Development Goal Indicators and India’s Achievement Compared to the World and East Asia and the Pacific
Goal Indicator India Year World Year EAP Year Category
1. End poverty 1.1 Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) 22.5 2011 9.3 2017 1.6a 2016
2. End hunger 2.1 Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population) 15.3 2019 8.9 2019 4.5 2019
2.2 Prevalence of underweight, weight for age (% of children under five years) 33.4 2017 12.6 2020 12.1a 2018
2.3 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added per worker (constant 2015 $) 2,076 2019 4,035 2019 4,703 2019
3. Good health 3.1 Maternal mortality ratio (modelled estimate, per 1,00,000 live births) 145 2017 201 2017 73 2017
for all 3.2 Mortality rate, under five years (per 1,000 live births) 34.3 2019 37.7 2019 15.0 2019
3.4 Mortality from CVD, cancer, diabetes or CRD between exact ages of 30 and 70 years (%) 21.9 2019 18.3 2019 17.8 2019
3.6 Mortality caused by road traffic injury (per 1,00,000 population) 15.6 2019 16.7 2019 17.7 2019
3c Physicians, nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people) 3.3 2019 5.7 2017 4.5 2017
4. Education for all 4.1 Lower secondary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) 84.6 2020 77.0 2020 91.2 2020
4.2 School enrolment, pre-primary (% gross) 61.1 2020 61.0 2020 83.4 2020
4.5.1 Gender parity index in primary and secondary education 1.01 2020 0.99 2019 1.01 2019
4.5.2 Gender parity index in tertiary education 1.11 2020 1.13 2020 1.16 2020
4.6 Literacy rate, youth total (% of people aged 15–24 years) 91.7 2018 91.9 2020 98.8 2020
5 Gender equality 5.1 Women business and the law index score (scale 1–100) 74.38 2020 – – 75.8a 2020
5.3 Women who were first married by age 18 (% of women aged 20–24 years) 25.3 2016 – – 15.9b 2017
5.5 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) 14.4 2020 25.6 2020 21.5 2020
6 Clean water and 6.1 People using at least basic drinking water services (% of population) 90.5 2020 90.0 2020 93.6 2020
sanitation 6.2 People using at least basic sanitation services (% of population) 71.3 2020 78.0 2020 89.9 2020
7 Access to clean 7.1.1 Access to electricity (% of population) 97.8 2019 90.1 2019 97.7 2018
energy for all 7.1.2 Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (% of population) 64.2 2019 66.2 2019 64.5 2019
7.2 Renewable electricity output (% of total electricity output) 15.3 2015 22.9 2015 23.4 2015
7.3 Energy intensity level of primary energy (MJ/$2011 PPP GDP) 4.7 2015 5.8 2012 4.9 2015
8 Decent work 8.1 Per capita economic growth (annual) % -8.2 2020 -4.3 2020 0.9 2020
and economic 8.5 Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) (national estimate) 4.7 2020 5.7 2019 4.4 2019
growth 8.6 Proportion of youth not in employment, education or training
(target to be achieved by 2020) 28.2 2020 – – 17.7b 2020
8.10 Account ownership at a financial institution or with
a mobile-money-service provider (% of population aged 15+ years) 79.9 2017 68.5 2017 70.6 2017
9 Industry, 9.2 Manufacturing, value added (% of the GDP) 13.1 2020 15.9 2020 25.2 2020
innovation, and 9.4 CO2 emissions (metric tonnes per capita) 1.8 2018 4.5 2018 5.7 2018
infrastructure 9.5 Research and development expenditure (% of the GDP) 0.7 2018 2.2 2018 2.0 2018
10 Reduce 10.1.1 Income share held by lowest 20% 8.1 2011 – – 6.8a 2018
inequality 10.1.2 Gini coefficient 35.7 2011 – – 37.9a 2018
11 Sustainable 11.1 Population living in slums (% of urban population) 35.2 2018 29.2 2018 26.4 2018
cities 11.6 PM 2.5 air pollution, mean annual exposure
(micrograms per cubic metre) 90.9 2017 45.5 2017 42.6 2017
12 Responsible 12.1 Adjusted net savings, excluding particulate emission damage 16.2 2019 11.7 2019 23.2 2019
production and (% of the gross national income [GNI])ᵈ
consumption
14 Protect marine 14.1 Marine protected areas (% of territorial waters) 0.17 2018 11.5 2018 4.24 2018
resources
15 Terrestrial 15.1 Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area) 6.0 2018 14.6 2018 14.6 2018
ecosystems 15.2 Forest area (% of land area) 24.3 2020 30.7 2016 30.4 2020
16 Peace, justice, 16.1 Intentional homicides (per 1,00,000 people) 3.1 2018 5.3 2015 1.5 2015
and strong 16.5 Firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials (% of firms) 15.3 2014 12.6 2020 21.7 2020
institutions 16.9 Completeness of birth registration (%) 79.7 2016 70.6 2017 89.8ᵇ 2016
(a) Simple average of China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam; (b) simple average of Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam; (d) adjusted net saving (ANS) is gross
saving with four adjustments: (i) consumption of fixed capital is deducted; (ii) public expenditure on education is added; (iii) estimates of the depletion of a variety of natural resources are
deducted; and (iv) deductions are made for damages from carbon dioxide and particulate emissions. A higher value indicates improvement.
Indicators have been classified into the following categories colour coded in the last column in the following way.
No colour indicates India is better than both world and East Asia and Pacific (EAP) averages.
Light grey indicates India is worse than either world or EAP averages.
Dark grey indicates is worse than both world and EAP averages.
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI)—Sustainable Development Goals (https://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgs/), including both data from tables and charts to include
maximum data points for all indicators except 10.1.1 Income share of lowest 20% and 10.1.2 Gini coefficient, which are taken from the WDI main website (https://data.worldbank.org/); and
4.1 on secondary education gross enrolment ratio (GER) which is taken from Economic Survey 2021–22, Chapter 10.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 19
COMMENTARY

the last vestiges of poverty is more diffi- enrolment at earlier stages). With more Also, it is important to note that these
cult than reducing poverty at earlier time and resources, more accurate re- forecast results that simply project past
stages; or encouraging the last group of sults can no doubt be reached but the trends in the data assume that business-
children remaining out of school to current method is useful for a prelimi- as-usual and past conditions continue.
attend is more daunting than increasing nary analysis. Among the parameters that may change
Table 3: Forecast of Likelihood of SDG and Indicators Reaching Targets by 2030
Goal Indicators Target Forecast On Track (Y) or
Basis Value Value Off Track (N)
1 End poverty 1.1 Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) Eradicate 0.0 0.0 Y
2 End hunger 2.1 Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population) End 0.0 12.9 N
2.2 Prevalence of underweight, weight for age (% of children under five) End 0.0 22.9 N
2.3 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added per worker (constant 2015 $) Double 3,335 2,552 N
3 Good health 3.1 Maternal mortality ratio (modelled estimate, per 1,00,000 live births) Reduce below 70 <70 0.0 Y
for all 3.2 Mortality rate, under five (per 1,000 live births) Reduce below 25 < 25 0.0 Y
3.4. Mortality from CVD, cancer, diabetes, or CRD Reduce by one-third <15.1 19.9 N
between exact ages of 30 and 70 years (%)
3.6 Mortality caused by road traffic injury (per 1,00,000 population) Halve <7.8 14.5 N
3.c Physicians, nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people)a WHO targetᵇ >4.45 4.25 N
4 Education 4.1 Gross enrolment ratio in secondary school enrolment (%) Universal access 100 85.3 N
for all 4.2. School enrolment, pre-primary (% gross) Universal access 100 84.6 N
4.5.1 Gender parity index in primary and secondary education Eliminate disparity 1.0 >1.0 Y
4.5.2 Gender parity index in tertiary education Eliminate disparity 1.0 >1.0 Y
4.6 Literacy rate, youth total (% of people aged 15–24 years) Ensure all 100 100 Y
5 Gender 5.1 Women business and the Law Index Score (scale 1–100) End disparity 100 80.8 N
equality 5.3 Women who were first married by age 18 (% of women aged 20–24 years) Eliminate 0 10.1 N
5.5 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) Indian Billᵈ 33 17 N
6 Clean water and 6.1 People using at least basic drinking water services (% of population) Universal access 100 95.6 N
sanitation 6.2 People using at least basic sanitation services (% of population) Sanitation for all 100 100 Y
7 Access to clean 7.1.1 Access to electricity (% of population) Universal access 100 100 Y
energy for all 7.1.2 Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (% of population) Universal access 100 88.4 N
7.2 Renewable electricity output (% of the total electricity output) Paris Commitment 40 19.4 N
7.3 Energy intensity level of primary energy (MJ/$2011 PPP GDP)ᵋ Double rate of imp. 6.2 5.2 N
8 Decent work and 8.1 Per capita economic growth (annual) % Sustain growth >0 7.8 Y
economic growth 8.5 Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) (national estimate) Achieve full empl. 0.0 5.7 N
8.6 Proportion of youth not in employment, education, or training Substantially Substantially 28.2e N
(target is substantially reduce by 2020) reduce below less than 28.9
2015 (2015 est)
8.10 Account ownership at a financial institution or with a
mobile-money-service provider (% of population aged 15+ years) Expand access >53.1g 100 Y
9 Industry, 9.2 Manufacturing, value added (% of the GDP) Increase significantly > 15.6g 13.6 N
innovation, and 9.4 CO2 emissions per capita (metric tonnes per capita) Reduce < 1.64ᵍ g 2.27 N
infrastructure
9.5. Research and development expenditure (% of the GDP) Increase >0.69g 0.60 N
10 Reduce 10.1.1 Income share held by lowest 20% Increase >8.1k 8.0 N
inequality 10.1.2 Gini coefficient Decrease <35.7k 38.0 N
11 Sustainable 11.1 Population living in slums (% of urban population) Reduce <24.0m 20.5 Y
cities 11.6 PM 2.5 air pollution, mean annual exposure (micrograms per cubic metre) Reduce <89.3g 96.7 N
12 Responsible 12.2.1 Adjusted net savings, excluding particulate
production and emission damage (% of GNI)h Increase >20.5 24.3 Y
consumption
14 Protect marine 14.1 Marine protected areas (% of territorial waters) Substantially
resources (substantially protect by 2020) protect >0.17u 0.17v N
15 Terrestrial 15.1 Terrestrial protected areas (% of the total land area)
ecosystems (ensure conservation by 2020) Expand >6.0u 6.0v N
15.2 Forest area (% of land area) (increase afforestation by 2020) Expand >23.8g 24.3v Y
16 Peace, justice, 16.1 Intentional homicides (per 1,00,000 people) Reduce <3.4g 2.3 Y
and strong 16.5 Firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials (% of firms) Reduce <15.3m 0.0 Y
institutions
16.9 Completeness of birth registration (%) For all 100 100 Y
(a) For indicator 3c physicians, etc, data for nurses and midwives combined with physicians; (b) WHO has established in WHO (2016); (d) the Women’s Reservation Bill; (ɛ) the target requires doubling
the rate of improvement in energy efficiency that implies doubling rate of the decline of energy intensity; the rate of decline has been calculated for 2015 and doubled to provide target value
and also forecasted for 2030; (e) this target fails as forecast figure for 2020 is only 2.5% lower, which is not substantial; (g) 2015 value; (k) 2011 (latest) value; (m) 2014 value; (h) this indicator is for
indicator 12.2 regarding sustainable management of natural resources, which has been explained in note (d) in Table 2; (t) three-year average of 2013–15; (u) 2016 value; (v) 2020 forecast value.
Source: WDI—Sustainable Development Goals (https://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgs/), including both data from tables and charts to include maximum data points for all indicators
except 10.1.1 Income share of lowest 20% and 10.1.2 Gini coefficient, which are taken from the WDI main website (https://data.worldbank.org/); and 4.1 on secondary education GER,
which is taken from Economic Survey 2021–22, Chapter 10.

20 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

the more important ones and may bring
about a better outcome than the fore-
casted ones, are, (i) improvement of the
gross domestic product (GDP) growth
rates; (ii) allocation of more resources—
financial and human—towards SDGs by
the centre and states; and (iii) changes
in policy and institutional arrangements
to facilitate the SDG attainment.
Given a “business-as-usual” assump-
tion, the forecasts for the SDG indicators
are presented in Table 3 (p 20). The table
shows that 25 of the 41 indicators (61 %)
are not meeting their targets. If arriving
within 5% of the target value can be con-
sidered as cut-off for declaring achieve-
ment, then 22 (54%) fail to meet the
target.12 In any case, significantly, more
than half of these crucial indicators are
likely not to meet the SDG target.
This emphasises the need to put in more
efforts by allocating more resources, tar-
geting attention to areas and states and
union territories falling behind, and gen-
erally assisting the recovery process so
that successful SDG outcomes are achieved.
Goals That Are of Concern
Considering both international compari-
sons and the likelihood of missing SDG
targets, the following goals and high-
lighted areas within them are of concern
and more efforts should be focused on
attaining them.
Goal 2: Hunger—especially incidence in
children; and low agricultural produc-
tivity given by low cereal yields.
Goal 3: Health—particularly non-com-
municable diseases and insufficient health
personnel. Reducing high deaths from
road accidents is also a priority.
Goal 4: Education—concerns are regard-
ing ensuring education for all at pre-
primary, primary, and secondary.
Goal 5: Gender equality—several indica-
tors show that considerable gender ine-
quality persists.
Goal 7: Clean energy—concerns are about
inadequate access to clean fuels for cook-
ing; and insufficient renewable energy
mix in the total electricity production.
Goal 8: Decent work—the main concern
is the rising unemployment in general
and particularly among youth.
Goal 9: Industry and innovation–concerns
are related to inadequate manufacturing
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
share in the GDP and insufficient spend-
ing on research and development (R&D).
Goal 10: Reducing inequalities—rising
inequality is a major concern.
Goal 11: Liveable cities—air pollution is
a major problem.
Goals 14 and 15: Protection of natural re-
sources—insufficient protection is being
provided for both marine and terrestrial
natural resources.
Conclusions
This article attempts to present a quick
assessment of India’s status on the SDGs.
It is clear from even a preliminary pe-
rusal of the data that India’s current sta-
tus compared to other developing coun-
tries is unsatisfactory; and its progress
towards achieving the SDGs by 2030 is
slow for more than half of the critical in-
dicators that could be studied. India is
falling behind in several critical econom-
ic, human, and environmental areas of
development. The COVID-19 pandemic
has further hampered the development
efforts, and unless India rebounds quickly
from the pandemic, the effort to attain
the SDGs will falter even further.
To rectify the situation, the first action
needed is to make a full and thorough
assessment of India’s overall SDG perfor-
mance, in addition to that for the states. A
regular national-level stocktaking is es-
sential so that appropriate policies can
be designed to rectify what is obviously
an unsatisfactory situation and bring the
SDGs well within India’s reach.
notes
1 These include climate change (in the 2016–17
report), agriculture and food security (2017–18
report), sanitation (2018–19 report), the cost of
food (2019–20 report), and health and basic
needs (2020–21 report).
2 At the summit on sustainable development in
2015, more than 150 world leaders met at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York to
approve a new agenda for sustainable develop-
ment called “Transforming Our World: The
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by
2030.” It included a declaration adopting 17 SDGs
with the aim to improve the lives of people, to
eradicate poverty, to promote prosperity and
well-being for all, to protect the environment,
and to fight against climate change.
3 The World Bank’s Poverty and Shared Prosperity
Report 2020, for example, finds that COVID-19
will cause extreme poverty to increase in 2020 for
the first time since 1998. In 2020, 88–115 million
people worldwide will be pushed into poverty
setting back progress towards the SDG of ending
extreme poverty. South Asia will be hardest hit,
with 49–57 million additional people pushed into
extreme poverty. Similarly, the Asian Development
vol lVii no 18
COMMENTARY
Bank’s simulations in its 2021 report confirm sig-
nificant increase in poverty, unemployment, ine-
quality, and slowing in progress on hunger, edu-
cation, health, and other SDG outcomes.
4 See NITI Aayog (2018, 2019, 2021).
5 According to Khokar et al (2015), the low- and
middle-income groups taken together are re-
ferred to in the World Bank (and elsewhere) as
the “developing world.” Their share in the total
world’s population is a little over 84%.
6 World Bank’s EAP classification of countries of
East Asia and the Pacific excludes high-income
countries of the subregion and comprises Cam-
bodia, China, DPR Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiri-
bati, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solo-
mon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.
7 Available at https://datatopics.worldbank.org/
sdgs/. In the case of indicators for Goal 10 (reduce
inequalities), the Target 10.1 relates to increas-
ing the share of the bottom 40% of the popula-
tion. As data on this were not available for In-
dia, it was replaced with an indicator relating
to the bottom 20% and the Gini coefficient.
8 As 2020 could be considered a non-representa-
tive year because of COVID-19, the data for 2019
was checked to see whether the comparisons
with the world and EAP averages change: they do
not change except for the GDP per capita growth
where India’s growth at 3.0% is better than the
world average (1.5%) but worse than EAP (5.2%).
9 In some cases, the World Development Report
database does not have an EAP value. In such
cases, the arithmetic averages of the main coun-
tries have been taken as indicated in the foot-
notes against the EAP indicator.
10 For this, the Excel program FORECAST.LINE-
AR was used using all the data points to fit the
regression line and extend it to 2030.
11 The simple linear model for indicators with
increasing values is:
Y2030 = Y L + sI(2030-t L)
where Y2030 is the forecasted indicator value in
2030, Y L is the latest indicator value, t L is year
with the latest indicator value and sI denotes
the average unit increase per period between t L
and the initial data year t0 given by:
sI= (Y L – Y0)/(t L- t0)
where Y0 is the initial year’s value of the con-
cerned indicator. SI is assumed to remain the
same in the forecast period between t L and
2030. For indicator values that decrease, the
model is:
Y2030 = Y L – sd(2030-t L) and
sd = (Y0 - Y L)/( t L- t0)
To calculate the forecasted values using this
model, only the initial and latest data were
used in the Excel program FORECAST.LINEAR.
A brief discussion of forecasting methods em-
ployed by the UN in forecasting the MDGs,
which use several methods, including one of
those employed here (that is, the linear model),
can be seen in the technical note in UNESCAP-
ADB-UNDP (2007).
12 These are: 3c. Physicians, nurses and mid-
wives; 6.1. People using at least basic drinking
water services; and 10.1.1. Income share held
by lowest 20%.
References
Asian Development Bank (2021): Key Indicators
for Asia and the Pacifi c 2021, Metro Manila,
Philippines: Asian Development Bank Institute.
Chatterjee, S, M Hammill, N D Kumar and
S Panda (2017): “An Assessment of India’s Ag-
gregative and Comparative States’ Perfor-
mance on the Millennium Development Goals
21
COMMENTARY
and Identification of Key Drivers of Inter-State
Variations,” Indian Economic Journal, Vol 64,
Nos 1–4, pp 1–22.
Khokar, Tariq and Umar Serajuddin (2015): “Should
We Continue to Use the Term ‘Developing
World?” World Bank Blogs, Published on Data
Blogs, 16 November, https://blogs.worldbank.
org/opendata/should-we-continue-use-term-
developing-world.
Ministry of Finance (2022): Economic Survey 2021–22,
Department of Economic Affairs, New Delhi:
Government of India.
22
NITI Aayog (2018): “SDG India Index Baseline Report
2018,” New Delhi.
— (2019): “SDG India Index and Dashboard
2019–20,” New Delhi.
— (2021): “SDG India Index and Dashboard
2020–21: Partnerships in the Decade of Action,”
New Delhi.
United Nations (2015): “Transforming Our World:
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,”
Resolution 70/1 adopted by the General Assem-
bly on 25 September.
april 30, 2022
UNESCAP-ADB-UNDP (2007): “The Millennium
Development Goals: Progress in Asia and the
Pacific 2007,” Joint Report of UNESCAP, ADB
and UNDP, Bangkok, October.
World Bank (2020): “Poverty and Shared Prosperity
2020: Reversals of Fortune,” Washington, DC.
WHO (2016): “Health Workforce Requirements for
Universal Health Coverage and the Sustainable
Development Goals,” Human Resources for
Health Observer Series No 17, World Health
Organization.
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
No Coups and No-confidence
Pakistan’s Constitutional Moment
Afiya Shehrbano Zia
The Shakespearean events
leading to the constitutional
removal of Pakistan’s populist
Prime Minister Imran Khan have
entered the final act, but the
question remains: Is any of this
good for democracy?
Afiya Shehrbano Zia (alfi yaszia@yahoo.com)
is a feminist scholar in Karachi, Pakistan and
the author of Faith and Feminism in Pakistan:
Religious Agency or Secular Autonomy? (2018).
Currently, she is a visiting faculty of feminist
studies at Wesleyan University, Connecticut.
22
R
efusing to accept defeat in the
2013 elections, a defiant Imran
Khan staged mass-attended dhar-
nas against Nawaz Sharif’s newly formed
government. Already a celebrity cricketer,
protest from atop a shipping container
for months converted Khan into a proper
populist. Having drifted in a political
wilderness for 22 years, it was clear that
his one-man party (Pakistan Tehreek-e-
Insaf [PTI]) could not win conventional-
ly and so, the two most potent forces that
determine Pakistan’s democratic fate—the
army and organised religion—stepped
in to fix Khan’s unelectability and aided
his elevation to the office of prime mini-
ster in August 2018.
Four turbulent years later, on 9 April,
this ‘‘hybrid regime’’ dissolved quite dra-
matically at the stroke of midnight when
a no-confidence vote by the opposition
parties removed Khan from office. The
journey to this point has been character-
ised by sheer incompetency, economic
collapse, near coups, ultimatums, real
and feigned foreign threats and most of
all, polarising emotions. The endgame re-
mains uncertain but for a country where
the military has been a broker and
breaker of civilian leaders and parties,
one unwitting outcome could very well
be the best ‘‘revenge’’ yet— democracy. 1
Faustian Bargains
By the time of the general election of
2018, it was not just a genuine fan base of
young people and pious middle classes
april 30, 2022
but factions within Pakistan’s highly
politicised army too, were desperate for
an ‘‘incorruptible’’ leader who would save
Jinnah’s Pakistan from the tainted politi-
cal parties and make it naya (new) at the
same time. In 2006, the leaders of the
two mainstream parties of the Pakistan
Peoples Party (PPP), Benazir Bhutto and
Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N), Nawaz
Sharif, had signed a charter of democra-
cy and cautiously succeeded in restrict-
ing military interference in governance
(Dawn 2006a). For the army, whose offi-
cial motto is imaan, taqwa, jihad,2 Khan
presented the appropriate alternative to
these intransigent leaders. He possessed
all the qualities of the historic figure of
the javanmard—the youthful brave lead-
er who exemplifies the Sufi ideal of pious
Muslim masculinity.
In 2017, the military did the heavy
lifting. Allegations of corruption are never
enough in Pakistan but religion is a
potent weapon; so first, a campaign was
orchestrated with the support of the
Barelvi uprising of the Tehreek-e-Labbaik
Pakistan (TLP) to discredit the elected
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as an
Ahmedi-sympathiser (Butt 2017). In the
absence of evidence against Sharif in
the Panama Papers case, the judiciary
(headed by the moral crusader, Chief
Justice Pakistan, Saqib Nisar) applied
the transcendent clauses3 62 and 63 of the
Constitution to disqualify Sharif from
the electoral politics for life (Bhatti 2017).
Khan’s redeemed piety and new backers
shielded him against similar petitions
filed for his failure to declare assets, and
for fathering a child out of wedlock
(Malik 2018).
Then, several career kingmakers and
Punjab’s political stalwarts were encour-
aged to join and bankroll the PTI into a
viable electoral party. Khan was then
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

scripted onto “the same page” and, final-
ly, assisted in getting elected as prime
minister (Zaafir et al 2019).
These surrogate relationships quickly
proved tenuous and led to the loss of
many original, ideologue members of
the PTI, but Khan had a single-minded
ambition—to become the prime minis-
ter any which way. This included marry-
ing his spiritual advisor and third wife,
the Sufi devotee, Bushra Bibi, and pros-
trating at the shrine of Baba Farid on the
eve of elections (Kazmi 2018). Not even
Khan’s worst critics were prepared though,
for his sheer inexperience and incompe-
tence, or the opportunities missed by the
technocrats and defectors inducted from
the other parties (Jamal 2020), or the
outright buffoonery of the neophytes of
the PTI (Ashfaque 2020).
Solipsism and Stunts
Almost as a symptom of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), in his four years
in office, Khan has constantly reminded
Pakistanis that his redemption as a Mus-
lim came due to his rejection of Western
secular hedonism and that he has sacri-
ficed contentment to selflessly serve as
prime minister. From his inaugural speech,
it was clear that Khan was never going
to stay on script—quite literally, he took
pride in not reading from the prepared
parchees (notes) like his insincere oppo-
nents (News International 2018a). De-
spite outrageous gaffes (Raj 2019), even
the liberal intelligentsia was taken in by
his grand narratives on Islamophobia,
Western conspiracies, support for Mus-
lim lands (Kashmir) against brutal infi-
del regimes and his stated empathy for
widows, malnourished children and the
pietist mission of turning Pakistan into
an Islamic welfare state or “Riyasat-e-
Madina.” The discomfiture followed when
rhetoric translated into sweeping arrests,
including of Maryam Nawaz—the young
and popular daughter of Nawaz Sharif—
and hate-speech and slurs were directed
at opposition parliamentarians by the
prime minister and his ministers. Even
the judiciary was criticised for not indict-
ing the “crooks,” regardless of due pro-
cess or lack of evidence.
Despite his promise of appointing only
young and independent members, Khan
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
COMMENTARY
packed his cabinet with the praetorians overseas by the “corrupt mafia” of oppo-
who had served in General Pervez Mush- sition politicians that he promised to
arraf’s government (1999–2008) and recover so that Pakistan would become
special advisors from the military estab- sovereign, was not just overestimated
lishment (News18 2018). He soon earned but then dissipated in the curious case of
the moniker of U-turn Khan for his con- real estate tycoon, Malik Riaz (Ali 2021).
stant reversals and status quo decisions The prime minister conceded that his
but his populism shielded him from criti- government was utterly confused about
cism, despite glaring contradiction with economic statistics and hoped to hit a
his pre-electoral calls for revolutionary jackpot gas reserve to salvage the crisis
tabdeeli (change). (Dawn 2019).
Even before the first 100 days of his Meanwhile, the thwarting of the revo-
government were over, it was clear that lution that Khan had promised from his
Khan had lots of populist appeal but no dharna days frustrated his cult-like sup-
plan. Instead, a series of disorganised porters and critics, alike. Despite being
stunts (including, the selling of buffaloes, adamant that no one would be offered
promises of turning the Prime Minister’s reprieve via the National Reconciliation
House into a university, and raising funds Ordinance, Nawaz Sharif was allowed to
for building a dam supported by a leave the country on the pretext of medi-
megalomaniacal Chief Justice of Pakistan) cal treatment. Provincial autonomies were
were initiated under the guise of austeri- undermined with constant refrains to
ty drives of “Islamic simplicity” (Hussain reverse the 18th amendment, while dis-
2018). These ploys fell embarrassingly sent from the tribal areas that had mobi-
short of achieving much and Pakistan’s lised young men and women to form the
economy plummeted to historically Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), was
low growth and peaked with highest sharply crushed by the state (Shah
in flation rates and loans accumulated 2020). The controversial appointment of
(Husain 2020). the feeble south Punjabi, Usman Buzdar,
Khan’s pre-electoral vow to commit to the powerful position of Punjab chief
suicide rather than beg for loans from minister led to gross mismanagement of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the administration and almost paralysed
remained unrealised and, ultimately, the Pakistan’s most efficient bureaucracy and
deal was delayed and poorly negotiated. police force (Abbas 2019).
This was followed by speculative invest- The opposition parties allied as the
ment schemes, continuation of subsidies Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM)
to the elite rentier economy, and non- and Bilawal Bhutto and Maryam Nawaz,
productive real estate Ponzi initiatives, as heir apparents of their respective par-
which jettisoned any hopes for a naya ties, raised the political temperature
Pakistan. The pipe dream of financing with their own street campaigns and
Pakistan by retrieving the stolen wealth referred to Khan as the “selected prime
from corrupt opposition leaders led to minister” and “blue-eyed boy” of the
gross excesses by an incompetent Na- military. This was countered by gen-
tional Accountability Bureau and a vague dered slurs and school-boy mimicking
Asset Recovery Unit (Paktribune 2021). acts by the prime minister at public rallies
The “stolen loot” allegedly siphoned off (Khaleej Times 2019). Turbulent masculinist
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vol lVii no 18 23
COMMENTARY
exchanges dominated nightly television
programmes and the prime minister’s
insults to opposition leaders as dakoos
and chorrs (dacoits and thieves) were
echoed by his party members, as televi-
sion anchors abandoned any pretence of
journalistic integrity.
After the orthodoxies protested against
the appointment of the renowned Prin-
ceton University economist, Atif Mian,
because he was a member of the declared-
heretic Ahmedi community, Khan’s gov-
ernment removed him from its Economic
Advisory Council (Chaudhry 2018). Con-
troversially, during a parliamentary ses-
sion, Khan referred to Osama bin Laden
as shaheed (martyr) (Khan 2020). The
hypermasculinist governance of Khan with
its sponsorship of gendered propriety in
light of Muslim pietist ikhlaqiyat or eth-
ics created an enabling environment for
victim-blaming. In 2020, the Office of the
Capital City Police Officer Lahore blamed
the woman raped on the motorway for
driving out late at night (Dawn 2020);
the prime minister’s jurisconsult Tariq
Jameel claimed that women’s immodesty
invited the scourge of the Covid-19 pan-
demic (Shahid 2020); in 2021, the prime
minister invited international reproach
for his comments relating women’s clothes
to sex crimes (Tariq 2021).
Conflict of interest, dictatorial censo-
rious press policies, persecution of reli-
gious minorities and even, non-compli-
ant judges, disinterest in gender issues
and outright sexism observed by Khan’s
government continued to fuel anger
within civil society over the four years.
One of his first policy steps was the par-
tisan decision to erase Benazir Bhutto’s
image from the cards issued for cash
handouts under the Benazir Income
Support Programme and to subsume it
under an umbrella project, renamed
Ehsaas (Zia 2019). Naya Pakistan was
less invested in the new and more con-
cerned about expunging the old.
Despite a restrained handling of the
tensions with India in 2019 (Safi and
Zahra-Malik 2019), Khan’s foreign policy
has been to regularly contact world lead-
ers (including, Facebook chief executive
officer [CEO], Mark Zuckerberg) to urge
them to ban any Islamophobic content on
par with Holocaust denial (Dawn 2021).
24
There has been a diplomatic impasse substance, rhetorical appeals to supporters’
with the United States (US) but, more sense of righteousness seem to vindicate a
recently, he found himself visiting lingering rage against failed govern-
Vladimir Putin on the eve of the war on ance that is pivoted entirely on the past.
Ukraine, which implied a partisan ges- Rather than challenging global economic
ture that diverged from Pakistan’s con- elites, or religious power groups, or
ventional policy and caused anxiety to amending laws and policies that exclude
the military establishment (Dawn 2022a). marginalised peoples—even the ones in
A series of financial “scandals” involv- the tribal areas who Khan constantly sym-
ing his primary financier and political pathised with during the “war on terror”
broker in Punjab—Jahangir Khan Tareen years—a “precolonial melancholia” is
(Tahir 2021a) and minister Khusro Bak- directed at abusing the allegedly corrupt
htiar (Tahir 2021b) as well as his sister, opposition and invoking the imaginary of
Aleema Khan (Asad 2018), and his new seventh-century Islamic rule in Medina.
wife’s former husband (News Inter-
national 2018) and her friend (Dawn Trust Deficits
2022b)—threatened to taint Khan’s clean It has been observed that Pakistan’s poli-
image but these were always “managed.” tics is underwritten by the three factors,
As PTI’s pre-poll outrage failed to trans- namely “Allah, Army and America” (Abbas
late into any practical steps, and the 2005). Although, the disenchantment with
2020 pandemic offered a genuine chal- Khan’s economic policies weighed heavily
lenge, characteristically, Khan retreated on citizens burdened by runaway infla-
his attention to piety-inspired pet pro- tion, the pragmatic casualty that led to his
jects, such as langars (community soup ouster was the unseaming of this trinity.
kitchens/shelters) and issuing health cards The bumbling handling of the extension of
for free medical treatment (which await the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Qamar
a social and financial audit). He devoted Javed Bajwa in 2019 (Sareen 2019), and
himself to giving unending television in- the more meaningful dithering over the
terviews to sycophantic journalists and, notification of the new Inter-Services
bizarrely, to celebrities and performing Intelligence chief at the end of 2021 (Re-
artists, and meeting with Turkish soap uters 2021), exacerbated reported intra-
opera crews. Moralising is what Khan military tensions (Kermani 2022). It is
does best, even if it is his repeated and said that the military is invested in a sta-
recycled conclusion that moral and so- ble economy, and tried foreign relations,
cial degradation in Pakistan are due to and brokers no tolerance for interference
the influences of Hollywood and Bolly- in its internal hierarchies and procedures.
wood and “sex, drugs, and rock and roll” Khan—unwittingly, and not as some
(Hum News 2020). revolutionary radical—interrupted or
After the war on terror period, the redefined all of these.
politics of piety in Pakistan has come full In 2018, Khan only managed to win 116
circle with Khan’s performative and seats in the 342-member National Assem-
abstract claims substituting for econo- bly and became prime minister with the
mic or social policies. Even if there is no aid of smaller allies—the “King’s party”
ANNOUNC
Institute for Social and Economic Change
Bengaluru
Professor P. R. Brahmananda Endowment Research Grant
No. Acad. Sec./Awards/1.1/2022-23 28th April 2022
The Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru, invites proposals under Professor
P. R. Brahmananda Endowment Research Fund for writing Paper on topics pertaining
to Monetary Policy and Macro Economics. Please visit our website www.isec.ac.in for
more details in this regard and for downloadable application form.
Registrar
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (PML-Q), the
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM),
Balochistan Awami Party, Balochistan
National Party, Grand Democratic Alli-
ance, Awami Muslim League, and Jam-
hoori Wattan Party. The first electoral
chink in his thin majority came in March
2021 when the former Prime Minister
Yousuf Raza Gillani defeated Khan’s
(and his own former) finance minister,
the perennial Hafeez Shaikh (who had
also served General Musharraf’s regime)
for a vacant seat in the upper-house Sen-
ate elections. To recover from the face
loss, Khan called for and went on to win
the trust vote in the National Assembly
with 178 votes and since the opposition
alliance (PDM) inexplicably boycotted the
session, the crisis was temporarily avert-
ed. It was clear that the state establish-
ment was not going to tolerate dissent and
so the opposition parties with cases piled
up against them in court, abstained from
attempting any upset.
One year later, on 8 March 2022, the
leader of the opposition, Shehbaz Sharif
and PML-N president, tabled a no-confi-
dence motion in the National Assembly,
that had been brewing since the end of
2021. It claimed that Khan had failed to
steer the economic crisis, which was
near irreparable, and was approved by
161 votes, which signalled that PTI law-
makers were intending defection—near-
ly two dozen of them. Khan immediately
issued show-case notices to the dissent-
ers and the entire cabinet began a cam-
paign against the opposition, alleging
horse trading and violation of the consti-
tutional Clause 69. The alliance parties
started weighing their options while the
PTI attempted to quell potential dissi-
dence by issuing show cause notices to
all members. But it seemed that the um-
pire—a euphemistic reference to the mili-
tary establishment—was, in fact, playing
neutral now and was no longer invested
in saving Khan. The PTI finally sacrificed
their contentious and ineffectual chief
minister of Punjab, Usman Buzdar and
replaced him with Pervez Ilahi from the
kingmaker, PML-Q party. It was too little,
too late.
One knows there is a crisis in Pakistan
when cricket metaphors start raining in
political commentary. By the end of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
March, the number game made it clear
that the opposition had the numbers for
a successful no-confidence vote. Consti-
tutionally, the speaker of the assembly is
meant to be neutral but Asad Qaiser of
the PTI leveraged his position and adjour-
ned the house until 3 April as a tactic to
delay the vote. Meanwhile, Khan dug his
heels in, threatening that he would not
resign as the pressure mounted from his
own allies and vowed, “I will play till the
last ball … and I will surprise them a day
before as they are still under pressure,”
and promised to play his “trump card.”
Red Letter or Red Herring?
Over the next three days, the besieged
prime minister addressed the nation on
television and called for massive public
rallies where he declared without any
evidence that Pakistan was the target of a
foreign conspiracy hatched to overthrow
his government and resolved that he
will never compromise on matters of
national interest. Having already bran-
dished at a prior rally, what he claimed
was a secret diplomatic cable, Khan
interpreted the communique between
Pakistan Ambassador Asad Majeed with
US Assistant Secretary of State for South
and Central Asia, Donald Lu, as an al-
leged threat by the US to remove Khan
from office (Dawn 2022c). He pledged to
save Pakistan from enslavement and the
dictates of foreign powers. In a television
address, he named the US (later retracted)
as the architect of intended regime
change. He vowed to brave unspecified
threats to his life and to prevail despite
anticipated character assassinations tar-
geted at him and his wife. He revealed
that the country’s establishment had
given him three choices: to accept the no-
confidence vote, resign, or call early elec-
tions. Khan categorically refuted the idea
of resigning and called on his supporters
to protest peacefully (Dawn 2022d).
On 3 April, the nation was politically
suspended in a day-long series of political
manoeuvres. Within half an hour of
parliamentary proceedings, the deputy
speaker, Qasim Suri (illegally) rejected
the no-confidence motion on the basis of
a possible nexus between the motion
and a regime-change conspiracy hatched
by the US. This clear violation of the
vol lVii no 18
COMMENTARY
Constitution stunned the opposition and
the prime minister (in absentia) went on
to announce the dissolution of the as-
sembly.4 This “fraud on the constitu-
tion,” that is subject to treason (Raja
2022), was immediately challenged in
the Supreme Court and given the history
of past verdicts (Bangash 2022); many
constitutionalists were cynical but deeply
relieved when the bench ruled to quash the
deputy speaker’s ruling, the prime min-
ister’s advice to dissolve the national as-
sembly as well as the president’s compli-
ance with that advice. The court ordered
the vote to be held within the constitu-
tional time frame no later than 9 April.
Equally importantly, the court simul-
taneously struck down the punitive
additions made by the PTI government
to the already restrictive Prevention of
Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 that had
been challenged by the Pakistan Federal
Union of Journalists. The amendments
struck at the core of freedom of expres-
sion and were leveraged by state insti-
tutions, like the Federal Investigation
Agency, to crush dissent, especially on
social media. They cast a chilling effect
by criminalising defamation and by ar-
bitrary arrests and imprisonment to
“protect reputations.”
Dishonourable Discharge
On 9 April, the speaker finally called the
mandated parliamentary session but the
prime minister called a cabinet meeting at
9 pm, risking a violation of the Supreme
Court orders to hold the no-confidence
vote prior to midnight. As the deadline
loomed, panic levels increased about a
desperate prime minister clinging to
power and his intent to issue a notifica-
tion to dismiss CoAS General Bajwa,
which, in turn, triggered fears about an
impending reprisal coup.
More rumours circulated about the
army leadership visiting the prime min-
ister at his house and reportedly, not-so-
politely dissuading him, subsequently
denied by the Inter-Services Public Rela-
tions (Siddiqui 2022). There were reports
of an emergency opening of the courts
to hear a pre-emptive petition to prevent
this notification of dismissal. Meanwhile,
the clock was ticking and just 15 minutes
before midnight the speaker finally held
25
COMMENTARY

the session and referred to “important
documents” (the diplomatic cable), for
which he invited the leader of the oppo-
sition and the Chief Justice of Pakistan
to see and then submitted his resigna-
tion. Another speaker nominated by the
opposition then held the no-confidence
vote, which passed with 174 votes—none
by suspected dissenters from the PTI.
Khan made history as the first prime
minister to have been removed from of-
fice through a constitutionally inspired
no-confidence vote.5
Resolving political crises in Pakistan
is not the privilege of civilian govern-
ments. None of the prime ministers of
Pakistan have successfully completed
their term and the military has perfect-
ed the method of de-seating civilian
elected prime ministers. The trope of
corruption and ghaddari (treachery) has
been a playbook classic used by the mili-
tary establishment. But the sense of
betrayal by the PTI supporters across the
country, as seen by their mass response
to Khan’s call for protests, suggests that
he has stolen this rhetorical clutch and
boomeranged it onto the COAS. General
Bajwa has been painted as complicit
with the opposition parties, who Khan
and his supporters refer to as an enslaved
and “imported government.”6
chor hai (the nightwatchman [Bajwa] is
a thief) and the hashtag #Bajwasurren-
der is trending in millions, implying that
the COAS has sold out to the US’s plan to
overthrow the only honest pious man in
Pakistan (Jamal 2022).
Reportedly, the discontent is intimate
—ex-officers and children of upper class
military families have expressed their
social media disapproval of the army elite
for betraying Khan. He has actually
successfully weaponised the state’s fa-
voured trope of ghaddari and rebound-
ed it on to the army. In reaction, the mil-
itary has been coerced to get off the
same page, reclaim the narrative, and
resort to crackdowns on these social me-
dia trends (ironically, using the same
laws that the PTI wished to strengthen),
while staging a formation commander
conference to sound out the support to
General Bajwa for upholding the Consti-
tution (Daily Times 2022).
On 11 April, a new Prime Minister,
Shehbaz Sharif—ex-chief minister of Pun-
jab and brother to Nawaz Sharif—was
sworn in as the opposition’s consensus
candidate. At his oath-taking, Shehbaz
paid tribute to the leaders of the joint op-
position and vowed that the “new regime
would not indulge in politics of revenge”
(Chaudhry 2022). The best revenge
would be to stabilise the economy, up-
hold the Constitution, normalise demo-
cratic processes and norms, and shed
the decoy of piety politics, so as to get on
with routine material governance. How-
ever, ordinary politics is counter to the
core ideology of the PTI that believes in
the hubris of Khan as the only honest
Muslim man in Pakistan.
Individualist cult politics will not per-
mit democratic entrenchment, but beat-
ing the powerful army at the populist
game has revealed that a recalibrated
civil-military relationship in Pakistan is
quite possible. How soon this could hap-
pen depends on Khan’s ability to rise
above his political and pious narcissism
and become a democrat who works col-
lectively for temporal, not heavenly
ret urns. For the moment though, Khan
is back to “container politics” and the
surging crowds at each rally are con-
vinced by the fictitious script of nation-
al insecurity that he has spun. But there
is no protest against the IMF bailout
that the new finance minister, Miftah
Ismail has just brokered and so, it re-
mains to be seen if the Allah–America–
Army pact will stabilise Pakistan’s ten-
uous democracy or if Khan’s tantrums
can convert into unintended changes in
the political landscape.

Midnight’s Children Redux W EPWRF India Time Series

NE
Khan’s container politics is his de facto
mode and he is driven by defiance with-
out a cause, other than piety and self-
preservation. His critics call him a fas-
cist and recognise his Muslim masculin-
ist preoccupation with saving Islam and
a fear of zillat or humiliation at failing to
do so. The army seems exhausted by its
hybrid experiment, carrying two institu-
tions where the civilian one is not deliv-
ering governance and only widening the
rumoured power schisms within the
military (Siddiqui 2022).
Khan’s ouster has resulted in a nation-
wide wave of injured sentiment suffered
by his supporters who have taken his
removal personally, including diasporic
communities—many of who do not vote,
pay taxes, or speak the lingua franca.
Young, outraged, and weeping Pakistani
men and women are protesting on the
streets chanting the slogans of chowkidar
26
(www.epwrfits.in)
Wage Rates in Rural India
The EPW Research Foundation has added a module on Wage Rates in Rural India to
its online database, EPWRF India Time Series (EPWRFITS).
This module provides average daily wage rates, month-wise, in rupees, for various
agricultural and non-agricultural occupations in Rural India for 20 states starting from
July 1998 (also available, data for agricultural year July 1995–June 1996). Additionally,
it presents quarterly and annual series (calendar year, financial year and agricultural
year), derived as averages of the monthly data.
The wage rates for agricultural occupations are provided for ploughing/tilling, sowing,
harvesting, winnowing, threshing, picking, horticulture, fishing (inland, coastal/deep-
sea), logging and wood cutting, animal husbandry, packaging (agriculture), general
agricultural segment and plant protection.
The non-agricultural occupation segment presents wage rates for carpenters, blacksmiths,
masons, weavers, beedi makers, bamboo/cane basket weavers, handicraft workers,
plumbers, electricians, construction workers, LMV and tractor drivers, porters, loaders,
and sweeping/cleaning workers.
The data have been sourced from Wage Rates in Rural India, regularly published by the
Labour Bureau, Shimla (Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India).
With this addition, the EPWRFITS now has 27 modules covering both economic (real
and financial sectors) and social sectors.
For subscription details, visit www.epwrfits.in or e-mail us at its@epwrf.in
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Notes
1 A phrase attributed to the assassinated Prime
Minister, Benazir Bhutto (1953–2007).
2 Faith, piety, and jihad.
3 These prescribe saintly prerequisites for parlia-
mentarians to be sadiq and ameen—honest and
righteous.
4 The disregard for the Constitution was not sur-
prising given that Khan’s government passed
some 53 Ordinances in three years to bypass
parliamentary debate and legislation.
5 Before him, Shaukat Aziz in 2006 and Benazir
Bhutto in 1989 had survived the moves against
them.
6 Neither is this a new paranoia. In 2006, when
Khan had just one seat in the assembly, he abs-
tained from voting for the reform of the anti-
women and discriminatory Zina law passed by
General Zia in 1979, alleging that this was an
attempt to impose a “made-in-Washington”
Islamic system in the country (Dawn 2006b).
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27
Ideas Definitely Matter!
Satyendra Ranjan
T
he book—When Ideas Matter: De-
mocracy and Corruption in India—
makes a powerful argument that
when rulers/ruling elites face a “credi-
bility crisis” in a democracy, their ideas/
ideology become the determining factor
that guides their response to it.
With his in-depth studies of two of
India’s “anti-corruption” movements and
the responses of the respective rulers
(governments) to them, Bilal A Baloch
rightly advises that one must take ideas of
political elites seriously. These two well-
known episodes of post-independence
India’s history are now widely referred
to as the Jayaprakash movement (JPM)
and India Against Corruption (IAC), in-
formally, the Anna movement. The rulers
they were pitted against were Indira
Gandhi-led Congress and Sonia Gandhi–
Manmohan Singh-led United Progres-
sive Alliance (UPA). At the very outset,
the author raises this pertinent question
as to why Indira Gandhi responded by
“suppressing” the JPM, while the UPA
government looked incoherent in its
dealing with the IAC movement. Obvi-
ously, in his answer, the difference lies
in the ideas/ideology of the respective
ruling dispensations.
The narration of the book is convinc-
ing. It successfully brings out the impor-
tance and power of ideas in a democratic
polity. But as one pays attention to the
nuances of language and terms of the
narration, they are reminded of the fact
that ideas matter, even for the narrator.
The many terms unhesitatingly used by
the author indicate, in no uncertain terms,
that his perspective of looking into the
things is guided by neo-liberal or so-called
Washington Consensus ideas. Therefore,
he terms Indira Gandhi’s centre-left pol-
itics as “populist,” her counter-response
to ideologically opposed movement
(as the book establishes, with its con-
vincing narration), “suppression,” ac-
cepts the claims of both the movements
28
book reviewS
When Ideas Matter: Democracy and Corruption
in India by Bilal A Baloch, New Delhi: Cambridge
University Press, 2021; pp xxiii + 335, `995 (hardcover).
as being “anti-corruption,” refrains from
questioning the role of corporate and
corporate-controlled media in fuelling
those movements (especially in the case
of IAC movement), and does not try to go
into the sociocultural regressive (one
can loosely call it counter-revolutionary)
character of those movements.
At this point, one may be inclined to
give the benefit of doubt to the author
because his topic of investigation in this
book is the role of the ideology of rulers
in times of “credibility crisis,” not of those
who pose challenges to them. But any
analysis or narration that ignores the
role of class (attitudes) and contexts
cannot present the whole picture of any
historical chapter.
The book examines India’s experience
of experimenting with democracy and
facing the issue of corruption without
analysing the class character of different
political forces representing or working
on behalf of different interests. After
all, if a political/ideological interven-
tion disturbs the balance of power in a
social order, there are bound to be reac-
tionary responses.
The Indian Constitution was such an
intervention as B R Ambedkar had
warned at the very outset that it tried
to establish a democratic constitutional
order in an essentially undemocratic
society. Nehruvian socialism and at the
later stage Indira Gandhi’s socialist poli-
cies were implemented under the same
(what Ambedkar had called as) “age of
contradiction.” Jawaharlal Nehru’s poli-
cies cannot be dissociated from those of
Indira Gandhi’s. So, one may ask, why
and how Indira Gandhi’s policies could
be characterised as “populist”?
april 30, 2022
Actually this is a problematic (and
derisive) term. It references an under-
standing that assumes political parties/
forces are meant to arrange the state-
craft in a manner that even though look-
ing “democratic,” in essence it protects
and promotes the interests of capitalist/
moneyed classes. The government that
proclaims or adopts policies that may
hurt the interests of these classes in any
manner is declared left of right-wing
“populism.” In this way, it is a status-
quoist understanding. The influence of
such understanding remains obvious
throughout the book, be it while analy-
sing the events of the 1970s or that of
2011 IAC movement.
Congress’s Credibility Crisis
The author has described the periods of
“credibility crisis” as evolved from “corrupt
state narrative.” But the book ignores the
question of credibility crisis in the eyes
of whom? The students led “Navnirman
Andolan” of Gujarat, started and eclipsed
in 1973 (Jayaprakash Narayan had no
role in it, though opposition parties had
jumped into it). The Bihar movement
(again started by students but later on
led by Jayaprakash) began in March 1974
and had run its course by November the
same year. In the meanwhile, assembly
elections were held in Uttar Pradesh (the
author counts this state among the areas
of influence of the JPM) in 1974. The
Congress, led by Indira Gandhi, got clear
majority in that election. Was this the
evidence of “credibility crisis”?
There may have been such crisis in the
eyes of traditional social elites and capi-
talist classes who were hit by the land
reforms (even being limited in scope),
constitutional reservation policy, assign-
ment of prominent role to the public sector
in the economy, policy of nationalisation,
and so on. However, one cannot ignore the
fact that these very classes control the
media and they often are successful in
presenting their perception as the larger
social view. This power of fabrication of
narratives became more obvious during
the days of IAC movement and later on.
The other factor missing from this
narration is the context of those events.
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

In the 1970s, the Cold War was at its
climax. Indira Gandhi had invited the
wrath of the right-wing forces by aligning
her foreign policy with the erstwhile
Soviet Union. On the other hand, the
“Bangladesh war” had proved costly in
economic terms for India. At the same
time, international oil crisis had hit heavily.
These factors had put inflationary pressure
and created hardships for the common
people. This fuelled mass dissatisfaction,
which was the main reason behind Gujarat
and Bihar movements as well as many
strikes and labour actions. There were
some cases of corruption as well. But as a
political narrative, this issue was imposed
on the prevailing situation and made pro-
minent by the opposition’s political forces.
Again, while discussing the IAC agita-
tion one must raise the question, was it
really a movement against corruption or
the issue of corruption was used to be-
leaguer the UPA arrangement that had
surprisingly strengthened its parliamen-
tary position in the 2009 general elec-
tions? Why did many of the UPA govern-
ment’s dubious actions lead to such an
angry uprising but no such public outcry
has emerged during the last seven years
of the succeeding Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP)-led regime, even though many of its
actions have been equally or even more
dubious? If we differentiate between the
real issues of corruption and politics of
anti-corruption campaigns, we may find
answers to the above questions.
Though the book ignores these ques-
tions (may be due to the author’s own
perspective), it still makes a very signi-
ficant contribution; it counters the impres-
sion (especially propagated by the news
media) that democratic politics is all
about personal ambitions and electoral
calculations. Instead, it emphasises that
political leaders/parties, at least in times
of crisis, respond on the basis of their
ideas/beliefs. If it is true, then one may
argue that their ideas always play an im-
portant role in their political/adminis-
trative decisions, even though that might
not be visible all the time.
Take It Seriously
The book has two central arguments. As
has been stated: “First, in most develop-
ing democracies, state institutions are not
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
neutral decision-making apparatus, but
rather reflect the government decision-
maker’s perspective and power.” (One
may ask why the author has this propo-
sition only for developing countries.)
However, his second argument is “ideas
render interests actionable.” To his cred-
it, he has forcefully built up his case. As
a reader progresses with the book, the
author’s arguments seem more convinc-
ing. The strength of this book is the rich
resources, used and referenced, in it.
These references bring out certain inside
information and stories of those tumul-
tuous times. With his commendable re-
search work, the author has given us
some unrevealed facts about the two po-
litical movements that, in the garb of
fighting corruption, in reality, became
an instrument in the hands of commu-
nal right-wing forces in their pursuit of
taking over the Indian polity.
After proposing its theory (that ideas
matter), the book goes into the narrative
parts of JPM and IAC movements and res-
pective government’s response to them.
In this process it tries to identify and de-
marcate the ideas of Indira Gandhi as
well as Manmohan Singh-led govern-
ments and locates their way of response
in the ruling arrangement’s ideology.
According to the book, “Indira Gandhi-
led Congress advanced concepts of nation
anchored in secularism, with preference
for socialism and minority rights.” As the
JPM became a platform of disparate anti-
Congress forces, Indira Gandhi took this
movement as an ideological challenge.
With quite justification, the Congress
under her concluded that the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was the main
force behind the JPM. The RSS had been
an ideological rival to the Congress from
the days of independence movement.
Going into the discourse of the mid-1970s,
the author has commented,
Overall, where the JPM relied on RSS as mo-
bilisation vehicle, the RSS found in the JPM a
vessel to integrate itself into more legitimate
form of political engagement.
In June 1975, the JPM got a big boost
when Indira Gandhi’s election to the Lok
Sabha was invalidated by the Allahabad
High Court. Even after the judgment was
stayed by the Supreme Court, Jayaprakash-
led opposition in its campaign to remove
vol lVii no 18
BOOK REVIEW
Indira Gandhi from Prime Minister’s
post went to the extent of calling securi-
ty forces to disobey the government.
This was the background of the declara-
tion of internal emergency under the ex-
isting constitutional provision. The book
argues that Indira Gandhi’s belief in her
ideology led her to this extreme step of
“suppression” of the JPM.
The crux of this argument is: Indira
Gandhi, her government, and the Con-
gress party could act boldly and without
any hesitation against the JPM because
of their ideological coherence. Four dec-
ades later, when a similar challenge arose,
the same party, but in a different setting,
looked directionless. The reason behind
that difference was not only the “com-
pulsion of alliance politics” but within
the Congress. The book argues that at
the time, when the IAC movement again
raised the “corrupt state narrative” and
created “credibility crises,” the Congress,
leading the UPA government, got tangled
in internal bickering of ideas.
The book identifies three different
ideological strands within the Congress
at that time, represented by: (i) secular
nationalists (politicians who spent careers
as elected or nominated members of
Parliament); (ii) the market liberals (the
technocrats holding authoritative posi-
tions in the UPA, including the Prime
Minister); and (iii) the social reformers
(technocrats and activists who entered
the government as part of the National
Advisory Council (NAC)—that was work-
ing as a de facto parallel cabinet). Accord-
ing to the book, secular nationalists,
in line with their 1970s’ predecessors,
took the IAC movement as an ideological
challenge. The market liberals accepted
the importance of “public anger” against
the issue of corruption but rejected the
efforts to discredit the government by
conflating “economic growth mecha-
nisms” with corruption. The social refor-
mers, due to their activist backgrounds,
sympathised with the IAC agitation and
put pressure on the party/government
leadership to reform its course.
Those who observed developments
then, knew that such division or differ-
ences were certainly there. But, on the
ideological plane, market liberals and
“social reforms” could be characterised
29
BOOK REVIEW
as part of the same project. After all,
when the Congress transformed itself
from a party of “secular socialism” to
market liberalism (neo-liberalism), it re-
quired a cover that could give “economic
reforms” launched by it, in India, a
“human face.” Having lost a large part of
its support base in the 1990s due to these
reforms, in the 2000s under the new
political circumstances, the Congress
invented that cover with the creation of
the NAC. It exposed the lack of ideologi-
cal clarity and intellectual capital within
the party. So, bickering among different
30
strands, especially under the crisis situa-
tion, was a natural culmination.
In the end, the book briefly discusses
similar “credibility crisis” situations, and
the then government’s responses in some
other countries, that are at a similar
developmental stage as India. The argu-
ment brought out of the whole saga is,
the “ideologies (of ruling elites) matter.”
The book forcefully concludes it, even
though the author reaches this conclu-
sion from a particular point of view that
sympathises with ideas that have domi-
nated the world discourse since the 1990s.
april 30, 2022
The irony is that the book has come at a
time when the legitimacy of those ideas
is under severe challenge, as neo-liberal
models have failed to live up to their
promises. Consequently, an alternative
understanding of democracy as well as
corruption is gaining ground the world
over. But the relevance of the book may
survive this transformation as ideas
would still, or even more, matter in the
post-neo-liberal world.
Satyendra Ranjan (satyendra.ranjan@gmail.
com) is a Delhi-based journalist.
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
BOOK REVIEW
Untangling the Labyrinth of Health
Inequities in India
Indranil Mukhopadhyay
The underlying hypothesis (of the political
economy of health) is that economic and po-
litical institutions and decisions that create,
enforce, and perpetuate economic and social
privilege and inequality are the root—or
“fundamental”—causes of social inequali-
ties in health.
—Krieger N (2001)
A
n enquiry into the fundamental
causes of social inequalities
has fascinated public health
researchers and policymakers around
the world. The questions as to why
gender-, class-, race-, and caste-based
differences in health outcomes have
been approached from various theoret-
ical points of view—they have ranged
from the structural to the cultural/
behavioural explanations to the ten-
dency to treat inequalities in health as
an artefact. The framework put forward
by the Commission on Social Determi-
nants of Health (SDH) by the World
Health Organization tries to synthesise
some of these perspectives into a
comprehensive framework. Prasad and
Jesani (2019), in their edited volume
titled Equity and Access: Health Care
Studies in India, adopt a political econo-
my approach to locate the changing na-
ture of inequalities in health in India
within and across social structures while
critiquing the SDH framework.
30
Equity and Access: Health Care Studies in India
edited by Purendra Prasad and Amar Jesani, India: OUP,
2019; pp xiv + 418, `1,195 (hardcover).
Political Economy has its origin in
classical economics where it was prem-
ised on the perspective that economics
and politics cannot be separated. In
healthcare studies, political economy
draws its origin from a Marxist tradi-
tion influenced by the famous work of
Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the
Working Class in England (1845). The
essence of the Marxist political economy
of health is well captured by Krieger in
the quotation at the begining of this text.
Despite considerable analytical po-
tential to explain health inequalities,
the application of the political econo-
my approach is relatively rare in
public health literature (Harvey 2021).
Moreover, other non-Marxist theoretical
traditions, including the Keynesians,
neoclassical, institutional, and rational
choice theories have subsequently
used the term “political economy of
health” in widely discrepant ways to
address different sets of questions,
thus leading to confusion. Further am-
biguities have been created by crudely
reductionist debate over “race versus
class” within the Marxist tradition, even
april 30, 2022
though there is a rich literature that
tries to explain the relationship be-
tween capitalism and racism (Harvey
2021). Contemporary Marxist thinking
on the political economy of health rec-
ognises that historically marginalised
and oppressed people often face out-
sized material deprivation and com-
pounded forms of discrimination and
exploitation in the workplace and so-
ciety writ large (Harvey 2021).
Even though Prasad and Jesani (2019)
do not explicitly mention it, they have
essentially adopted a contemporary Marx-
ist approach of political economy, while
also drawing from the feminist and
Foucauldian critical discourses to dem-
onstrate that social relations along the
intersecting axes of race, ethnicity, sex,
gender, sexuality, ability, and citizen-
ship shape the power relations and the
distribution of resources.
The book consists of 17 chapters,
segregated into four broad sections,
contributed by some of the leading
thinkers of public health in India. The
section titled “State, Market, and Health
Care” demonstrates how social inequali-
ties have been perpetuated by a series
of health policy reforms. Historically,
health policies in India have, as argued
by the authors, served the interest of
private capital and the elites—essentially
reflecting on the class character of the
Indian state. The section “Pharmaceuti-
cals and Experimentation” exposes the
vulnerability of the Indian state to the
global policies and market in the realm
of pharmaceuticals as well as biomedical
and clinical research. The subsequent
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

section “Equity Issues in Health Care—
Gender, Caste, Disability, and Vio-
lence” depicts the interplay of social
institutions of patriarchy, caste and
class, and the state apparatus to repro-
duce multiple axes of inequality. The
section titled “Right to Health and
Universal Health Strategies” explores
the possibilities of addressing the ine-
qualities through the frameworks of
health rights and universal health
coverage (UHC).
Bourgeoisie State and the
Medico–Industrial Complex
Ritu Priya in her essay, “State, Commu-
nity, and Primary Health Care,” enquires
into the reasons of failure of the main-
stream health system to incorporate the
essence of comprehensive primary health-
care in health programmes and policies
in India. The author synthesises three
strands of understanding—the liberal
democratic analysis, the dialectic mate-
rialist analysis, and the politics of kno-
wledge framework to explain the rela-
tionship between state, community, and
the design of primary healthcare app-
roach that was adopted. She argues that
the elitist nature of the ruling class and
the characteristics of the Indian state,
which are not adequately democratic
and welfarist, have led to the tenden-
cies of over-medicalisation of healthcare
under capitalism and the establishment
of cultural hegemony of Western medi-
cine. Priya brings out Foucault’s exami-
nation of the links between state power
and modern scientific knowledge to
explain how state policies are dictated
by the market forces, while voices, knowl-
edge, and perspectives of the people
get marginalised.
Priya observes that even the most pro-
gressive discourses on health, like the
Alma-Ata Declaration, which proposes
an alternative bottom-up approach to
primary health, propose to have the role
of communities and traditional practi-
tioners as “trusted informal influencers
of community health behaviour” while
falling short of acknowledging the con-
tribution of their own knowledge and
skills (p 38). She brings in the framework
of knowledge politics to point out the
contradictions between the logic of big
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
capital and integration of traditional
medicine into the state-led provisioning
of healthcare. A radical reorientation
and democratisation of health policy
cannot be completed without due recog-
nition of the organic link between folk
medicine, textual indigenous systems,
and peoples’ perceptions.
Rama Baru in her essay, “Medical–
Industrial Complex: Trends in Corpora-
tization of Health Services,” delves into
the root causes of consolidation of capi-
tal in healthcare. She explores the ent-
renched networks of power relations,
the rise of business lobby and their influ-
ence on policy, and the role of state as an
active agent to promote the market to
explain the genesis of medico–industrial
complex. Baru analyses the cases of Pratap
Reddy and the Apollo Hospitals to dem-
onstrate how the state played a critical
role in providing all the subsidies and
tax concessions for importing high-
end medical equipment to establish the
business of super-specialty care during
the 1980s.
She points out that the healthcare in-
dustry is going through a rapid transi-
tion—growing partnerships between hos-
pital chains and insurance companies,
the dynamic nature of relationship
between individual practitioners, small
nursing homes, and corporate chains,
along with the changing landscape of
foreign investments due to the penetra-
tion of hot money into the healthcare
system. She further argues that the nex-
us between politicians, real estate, liq-
uor industry, and religious bodies are
shaping the health policy and practices
on the ground.
Elitist Roots of Medical Education
The lack of access to healthcare is struc-
turally linked to the mismatch between
medical education system and the
healthcare needs of people. The tenden-
cies of super-specialisation and lower
priorities for primary care are intrinsi-
cally linked to the hegemony of Western
medical education system on the one
hand, and the expansion of private
medical care and education system on
the other. Neha Madhiwalla in her es-
say, “Social Roots of Medical Educa-
tion,” explores how the dominance of
vol lVii no 18
BOOK REVIEW
Western medicine system was estab-
lished through the expansion of West-
ern medical education in India and the
role played by the metropolitan elites.
She argues that the first generation of
medical graduates were from the presi-
dency towns, mostly Westernised mid-
dle class, who patronised colonial medi-
cal education. They settled down to
practice where they trained, leading to
the concentration of medical practition-
ers in cities, catering to the needs of the
urban middle class while remaining
largely oblivious to the primary care
needs of the rural population. The prac-
titioners of Western medicine, though
few in number and marginal to the pro-
vision of primary care, had the political
power to maintain the monopoly over
the healthcare system.
Several authors have pointed out that
the orientation of medical education
largely remains disconnected from the
healthcare needs of the population. The
orientation of medical education has
been geared towards super-specialisa-
tion and a greater dependence on high-
end technologies and equipments. The
growth of private medical education
has perpetuated the urban elitist bias.
The expansion of public-funded medical
education system has largely remained
limited. Thus, the potential role of reser-
vation in bringing out greater inclusion
and positive transformation to create an
alternative to the commodified metro-
politan model of medicine remains un-
fulfilled. Madhiwala argues that the ins-
titutional culture of medical education
and practice is geared towards super-
specialisation because the informal lea-
dership of the profession continues to
rest with the private practitioners located
in the metro cities. Along with Madhi-
wala, Baru and Zacharia also make the
same point in their respective pieces.
The growth of private medical education
as a lucrative business has fed on the
willingness of the middle class to make
large investments in professional educa-
tion. Both Madhiwala and Zacharia argue
that the expansion of private medical
education remains the main driver of the
interstate and rural–urban inequalities in
the availability of medical professionals.
It needs to be noted that the tendency
31
BOOK REVIEW
towards super-specialisation is intrinsi-
cally linked to the need of the market to
discriminate its product from others to
garner monopoly power and hence is
essentially exclusionary in nature.
Zacharia uses the case of ischaemic
and rheumatic heart diseases (IHDs and
RHDs) to demonstrate how mindless
applications of knowledge systems,
structures, and practices derived from
Western sociocultural contexts hinder
the development of appropriate knowl-
edge and practices in India. He argues
that the orientation and emphasis of
the discipline of cardiology revolve
around the problem of IHDs. Private
sector care for IHDs has centred on the
metropolis catering largely to the rich-
er sections. Whereas public hospitals
do not have adequate specialists and
neither do they invest on capital-inten-
sive technologies, leading to considerable
rural–urban and rich–poor inequities.
The RHDs, even though they continue
to affect a large section of the Indian
population, remain neglected because
in the Western world the problem de-
clined even before cardiology became a
specialty. Hence, the prevention and
treatment of rheumatic fever did not
receive the sustained academic and re-
search attention required to eliminate
RHDs in India.
Hypocrisies of
Neo-liberal Reforms
Prasad, in his essay “Health Care Re-
forms: Do They Ensure Social Protection
for the Labouring Poor?” argues that the
growing inequalities in the access to
health are a result of declining public
investment in primary and secondary
care, rapid growth of the private and
corporate sector, and dependence on
private out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE)
as a means of financing healthcare. Prasad
points out that the consequences of
OOPE on the labouring poor are quite
severe as informal lending, distress sale of
household assets, etc, are on the rise. He
reviews the performance of eight central-
and state-run general government reve-
nue-funded health insurance schemes to
argue that though these schemes claim
to address the issue of the growing finan-
cial hardship, these reforms have been
32
ineffective in improving access and
reducing the OOPE. He points out that
these schemes are essentially a form of
public–private partnership where, in the
name of better social protection, public
resources are being used to promote the
unregulated expansion of the healthcare
market. Instead of reducing OOPE, these
schemes have created opportunities for
unethical care, unnecessary procedures,
and over-medicalisation, thereby increas-
ing inefficiency and costs. It is worth
noting that the formal sector workers
have earned their social security enti-
tlements through struggles; the un-or-
ganised, non-unionised workers in the
informal sector would gain health rights
only as part of the general rights or in
a manner in which the class interests
of the capitalist system are retained
and propagated.
The transformation of the Indian
pharmaceutical industry into a promi-
nent supplier of cheaper generic medi-
cines for the developing world was an
outcome of a pragmatic policy regime,
which prevented exclusive monopoly
rights over medicines. However, under
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectu-
al Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement,
India was obligated to amend its Patents
Act and introduce a product patent by
2005. Amit Sengupta, in his essay “Glo-
balization, Intellectual Property Rights,
and Pharmaceuticals,” brings out the
political tussles around the Patents
(Amendment) Act of 2005. He illustrates
how the ruling dispensation was reluc-
tant to build some of the key health
safeguards like the compulsory licens-
ing, parallel imports, and stricter pa-
tentability criteria into the act under
the influence of the big pharma and the
rich countries. However, the government
had to eventually buckle down to pres-
sure from the left in Parliament and in-
corporate these key amendments. The
Patents Act of India, over time, became
a model act and many developing coun-
tries introduced similar provisions into
their acts. Sengupta demonstrates that
despite having the provisions of com-
pulsory licensing introduced within the
act, the multinational pharmaceutical
lobby has tried its best to prevent the
use of its provisions.
april 30, 2022
Though India is regarded as the phar-
macy of the Global South, as it provides
access to cheaper generic medicines to
millions of poor and vulnerable people
in developing and developed world, a
large part of the Indian population does
not have adequate access to medicines
and gets pushed into poverty as it has to
incur heavy OOPE on medicines. Sengup-
ta also discusses how under the new pat-
ent regime, the generic pharmaceutical
industry is increasingly tying up with
multinational companies (MNCs) to reach
the global export market, while the policy-
makers, under pressure from the big
pharma from the United States and
European Union, are continuously pro-
moting further liberalisation of the
pharmaceutical industry. These tenden-
cies are adversely affecting the structure
and composition of the pharma industry
in India. S Srinivasan and Malini Aisola,
in their essay titled “Access to Pharmace-
uticals: Role of State, Industry, and
Market,” point out that the lack of effec-
tive regulation and price control leads
to the proliferation of irrational medi-
cine production and prescription prac-
tices and corresponding escalation of
costs of medicines.
Sengupta had always been vocal
about the coercive tactics of big pharma
to safeguard the interests of profit, often
ignoring the huge human costs. Some of
these tendencies are getting played out
aggressively during the current pan-
demic and the united resistance of the
developing countries against patent pro-
tection is getting systematically stifled.
Had Sengupta been amidst us, he would
have definitely been one of the strongest
and the most passionate global voices
of resistance—he is missed immensely
within the health movement.
Under the Patents (Amendment) Act
of 2005, in compliance with the TRIPS
regime, multi-sited clinical trials were
allowed in India in 2005. This opened
up newer opportunities for the domestic
clinical research community and led to
the blossoming of the commercial clini-
cal research industry, which depicts the
classical political economy contradic-
tions of powers and intellectual domi-
nance. Roger Jeffery and his colleagues,
in their piece “Structure, Organization,
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

and Knowledge Production of Clinical
Trial Industry,” argue that the domestic
regulators and research organisations
were largely unaware of the complexi-
ties involved in regulating the global
clinical trial industry. As a result, the
terms of participation for the Indian
research community were set by their
global counterparts in accordance with
the global aspirations and standards.
These arrangements provided the global
pharma and trial sponsors with access to
heterogeneous trial subjects and finan-
cial opportunities to contract research
organisations (CROs). It also exposed a
population faced with multiple socio-
economic disadvantages to further ex-
perience exploitation and vulnerabilities
as the regulatory safeguards were either
at a nascent stage or absent.
The authors tracked the websites of
around 120 CROs to investigate their
role and the scale of financial opera-
tions to argue that they have very little
access to the key processes of knowl-
edge production and largely remain
engaged with the execution of the pre-
defined research. There have been in-
stances of violation of ethical principles
and the safeguards of trial participants
have been compromised. The point is
also elaborated in the piece, “Body as
‘Resource’ in Surrogacy and Bio-Medical
Research,” authored by Sarojini Nadimpally
and Vrinda Marwah. These instances
have been brought to notice by the civil
society and media. Consequently, the
Supreme Court has brought about re-
forms to strengthen the safeguards.
However, Jeffery and his colleagues
note that some of the compensation
clauses depart significantly from the ex-
isting standards in other countries.
Innovations for Marginalisation
The advancements in science and tech-
nology have led to the emergence of
newer markets and innovative forms
of exploitation of women’s bodies
throughout the history of human civili-
sation, and particularly under capital-
ism—commercial surrogacy being the lat-
est form. The plight of surrogate women,
depicted by Sarojini and Marwah in
their piece, exemplifies how the health
system thrives on the vulnerabilities of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
the working-class women and perpetu-
ates inequalities. The doctors and the
agents exploit the information asym-
metries to co-opt the surrogates to enter
into contracts that largely cater to the
interests of the intended parents rather
than the surrogates. In a globalised
economy, working-class women are in-
creasingly being pushed into work that
is largely conforming their role as care-
givers and is also more home-based and
informal in nature with little social sec-
urity. Commercial surrogacy further
impinges on the reproductive rights of
women and takes away their autonomy
over their body and impinges on other
forms of basic freedoms. In a way, by
alienating the rights of surrogates over
the child, commercial surrogacy equates
childbirth with other commodities and
services produced under capitalism where
the worker who produces the output with
her labour does not retain any rights
over the product.
Madhumita Biswal, in her essay “Caste,
Class, and Gender on the Margins of
the State: An Ethnographic Study among
Community Health Workers,” explores
how gender, class, and caste biases are
perpetuated through the delivery of the
health services by the state, even
though the state tries to project itself to
be working on the principles of univer-
sal rationality that transcends identi-
ties. The author brings out special and
scalar hierarchies nested within the
system of health services by the state
through an ethnographic study of the
accredited social health activist and
anganwadi workers. On the one hand,
these women frontline health workers
act as representatives of the community
and, on the other, act as an agent of
the state, being present at the bureau-
cratic margin of the state apparatus.
These frontline health workers, often
belonging to the upper castes or domi-
nant communities, promote discrimi-
natory practices while performing
their duties of catering to the most
marginalised communities. The author
quotes Gopal Guru’s seminal work on
untouchability to argue that these
functionaries are able to retain their
sovereignty over their domestic space
through the creation of a dichotomy of
vol lVii no 18
BOOK REVIEW
space between public/private and do-
mestic/state (Guru 2009).
Infirmities of UHC Discourse
Srinath Reddy and Manu Mathur, in
their essay “Universal Health Coverage:
How Viable?” bring out the various no-
tions of UHC and clarify that health as-
surance and UHC should not be equated
with publicly subsidised health insur-
ance programmes that are currently in
practice in India. They emphasise that a
path to UHC in India has to be one with
the central focus on a well-functioning
health system with emphasis on SDH. This
can be achieved with increased public
investment in publicly oriented services,
greater emphasis on primary care, and
with a continuum of care established
with the tertiary care services through a
single-payer system to provide compre-
hensive healthcare. The authors have
predicted that such reforms are likely to
be resisted by those forces who stand to
gain from a profit-driven system, includ-
ing those within the public sector and
private healthcare and insurance indus-
try. They emphasise that through steady
investments and systematic strengthen-
ing of the public system with increased
capacity and quality, better governance,
and greater accountability, it would be
necessary to rebuild peoples’ faith in the
public system. According to the authors,
UHC is a political battle that cannot be
fought only through technical designing,
and rather has to be fought on the prin-
ciples of social solidarity and health justice.
Sunil Nandraj and Devaki Nambiar, in
their piece “Kerala’s Early Experience:
Moving towards Universal Health Cov-
erage,” have examined the progress of
UHC in Kerala, a state with levels of de-
velopment similar to many high-income
countries, to propose certain important
pathways towards achieving UHC. They
make a strong case for viable public sec-
tor-driven model with a greater focus on
population-based strategies of preven-
tion, early detection, and promotion as
well as provision of quality care for
acute diseases. This could provide an
alternative to highly privatised and ter-
tiary healthcare and reduce reliance
on financial protection-based schemes.
Ravi Duggal, in his essay “A Financing
33
BOOK REVIEW

Strategy for Universal Access to Health
Care: Maharashtra Model,” argues for a
combination of increased public invest-
ment and an expansion of collective fi-
nancing mechanisms like social insur-
ance as a path to universalise health-
care access where public and private
resources should be used to organise
care around public values rather than
the motivations of profit.
Kajal Bharadwaj, Veena Johari, and
Vivek Divan, in their essay “The Right to
Health: A Winding Road to Actualization,”
analyse the role of laws, policies, and
litigations related to health, with a focus
on the role of the Supreme Court in hold-
ing the state accountable for the provi-
sion of care and regulation of healthcare
markets. They point out the compromis-
ing role of state, which arbitrates be-
tween public interest and private profit
and continuously brings out policies in
favour of the market and those who vio-
late health rights; examples of HIV pro-
gramme or free medicines programme
in Tamil Nadu or Rajasthan demonstrate
that despite repeated attempts to weaken
the public sector, it can provide high-
quality care. They argue that progressive
realisation of the right to health requires a
central role for the public sector, which
needs to be streng thened and made
accountable to people through popular
struggles and movements.
This edited volume provides a compre-
hensive and multifaceted understanding
of the structural causes of health ine-
qualities, with fascinating insights, rich
analysis, and diverse perspectives. Every
public health scholar, every citizen pas-
sionate about bringing about progres-
sive change in the Indian health system,
and every well-intentioned policymaker
should read this book. The fault lines of
the Indian health system, its elitist biases,
the insensitivities of the state apparatus
towards the overwhelming majority of
working people, its complete surrender
to the interests of profit, and its deafen-
ing silence against irrationalities and
exploitation of market that we have
observed during the pandemic have
already been highlighted in the book,
even though it was written much before.
The book is immensely relevant today—
much more than ever before; it provides
insights to avert such human calamities
in the future.
The arguments presented in the vol-
ume could have been complemented
with empirical analysis of the nature,
trends, and patterns of inequities in
India. The book could also have bene-
fited if the editors had systematically
presented the multiple forms of market
failures that private, for-profit health-
care organisations bring into the system.
Some of these structural deficiencies
of the market are theoretically and
practically impossible to counter un-
less a robust publicly oriented and pub-
licly provided alternative healthcare
delivery system is built on the princi-
ples of rights and democratisation.
However, the political economy per-
spective brought about in this noteworthy
volume clearly points out that such a
progressive alternative system can only
be realised through political struggles
and a shift of balance of power in favour
of the working class.
Indranil Mukhopadhyay (imukhopadhyay@
jgu.edu.in) teaches at O P Jindal Global
University, Sonipat.
References
Doyal, L and I Pennel (1979): Political Economy of
Health, London, UK: Pluto Press.
Engels, F (2009): The Condition of the Working
Class in England, Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Guru, Gopal (2009): “Archaeology of Untouchabil-
ity,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 44, No 37,
pp 49–56.
Harvey, M (2021): “The Political Economy of
Health: Revisiting Its Marxian Origins to
Address 21st-Century Health Inequalities,”
American Journal of Public Health, February,
Vol 111, No 2, pp 293–300.
Krieger, N (2001): “Theories of Social Epidemio-
logy in the 21st Century: An Eco-social Per-
spective,” International Journal of Epidemio-
logy, Vol 30, pp 668–77.
Prasad, Purendra and Amar Jesani (2019): Equity and
Access: Health Care Studies in India, India: Oxford
University Press.

MONEY, BANKING and FINANCE

March 28, 2020

Questioning the Orthodoxies —Partha Ray

Finance and Monetary Policy beyond Neo-liberalism: The Way Ahead for Emerging Markets —Rakesh Mohan
Regime Shifts in Indian Monetary Policy and Tenures of RBI Governors —Utso Pal Mustafi, Rajeswari Sengupta
Economic Slowdown and Financial Fragility: The Structural Malaise of India’s Growth Process —Zico Dasgupta
Financial Misconduct, Fear of Prosecution and Bank Lending —Abhiman Das, Avijit Bansal, Saibal Ghosh
Time-varying Nature of Stock Market Interdependence: A Global Perspective —Avishek Bhandari, Kamaiah Bandi

For copies write to:

Circulation Manager,
Economic & Political Weekly,
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email: circulation@epw.in

34 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
PERSPECTIVES
The Political Economy of
the Crisis in Sri Lanka
Devaka Gunawardena, Ahilan Kadirgamar
Sri Lanka is facing the worst
economic downturn since
independence. The economic
establishment is proposing
austerity to continue the
neo-liberal trajectory, which the
working people are bound to
resist. Will this conjuncture lead
to a progressive social contract
between the state and the people
based on democratic alternatives
of redistribution or further
repressive liberalisation with
dispossession?
Devaka Gunawardena (devakagunawardena@
gmail.com) is a political economist and
independent researcher. Ahilan Kadirgamar
(ahilan.kadirgamar@gmail.com) is a
political economist and teaches at the
University of Jaffna, Sri Lanka.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
S
ri Lanka is going through the
worst economic crisis since the
1930s and the most formidable
protests since the Great Hartal of 1953.
The interpretations of the crisis are as
diverse as the competing political fac-
tions trying to shape the narrative about
the ongoing protests. According to the
Gotabaya Rajapaksa government, exter-
nal shocks, especially the COVID-19 pan-
demic and, most recently, the war in
Ukraine, are to blame for the country’s
woes. Meanwhile, the opposition argues
that the government itself is responsible,
pointing to its tax cuts when it came to
power in 2019. The Rajapaksa regime
must indeed take the lion’s share of the
blame for wasting precious time and
focusing solely on its political consoli-
dation during its tenure. However, we
must examine the underlying structural
characteristics to explain the profound
shifts in the political economy of Sri
Lanka that have caused the crisis. These
are further reflected in the changes in
the global economy.
Since 1978, Sri Lanka has been a
poster child of economic liberalisation
in the wider South Asian region. On
the advice of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, the
country undertook major economic
reforms, such as floating the rupee,
reducing import tariffs, slashing wel-
fare, including the food subsidy, and
generally making the country more
open to international trade and finance.
Indeed, the country’s elites themselves
demanded these changes.
Sri Lanka had experimented with
import substitution industrialisation
since the late 1950s. The last left-lean-
ing regime, the United Front govern-
ment of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was
besieged by intractable crises, includ-
ing the global economic downturn and
vol lVII no 18
the oil shock of 1973. Due to further
changes in its political coalition, the
broader parliamentary left was se-
verely restricted in room for manoeu-
vre. The elite classes accumulated
wealth within the interstices of the
economy. They demanded further lib-
eralising changes when these became
politically possible.
Subsequently, the next government that
came to power, led by J R Jayewardene,
developed an authoritarian political
approach to impose economic reforms.
Many have argued that neo-liberalism
has required a hardened state appara-
tus to push through economic changes
that benefit the rich. Or as Ben Fine
(2013: 58) puts it, neo-liberalism has
been “associated with a strong not a
weak state, and an authoritarian one as
opposed to one that upholds personal
liberties.” David Harvey has further re-
ferred to neo-liberalism as a “class pro-
ject.” In Sri Lanka’s case, Jayewardene
came into power as an authoritarian
populist. He consolidated power by re-
placing Sri Lanka’s Westminster parlia-
mentary democracy with an executive
presidency, crushing organised labour,
and pursuing repressive legal measures,
such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(PTA) of 1979.
Today, Sri Lanka is facing the chal-
lenge of getting President Rajapaksa
out of power. The institution of the ex-
ecutive presidency itself has come un-
der renewed attack. In recent weeks, the
leader of the opposition, Sajith Premadasa,
for example, has called for its abolition.
Furthermore, many within the opposi-
tion argue that an IMF-led economic re-
form package requires political credi-
bility, not just stability. But to address
the underlying causes of Sri Lanka’s
crisis, we must analyse the economic
changes that were imposed through
the executive presidency, the broader
transformation of the relationship be-
tween state and society it epitomised,
and the dead end at which this process
of liberalisation has arrived. Only by
thinking through the required political
reforms within a progressive econo-
mic paradigm can we avert existential
35
PERSPECTIVES
threats to democracy that accompany
severe upheaval.
Waves of Neo-liberalism
When Sri Lanka implemented its initial
economic reforms, the IMF and World
Bank extended significant leeway for
the country to engage in major deficit-
financed infrastructure projects. As Ronald
Herring (1987: 329) observed, “The for-
eign contribution to financing of the net
cash budget deficit in 1976 was 32.5%;
in 1980, 70.4%.” The centrepiece was
the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme,
which involved the construction of dams.
These projects reflected the fact that
Sri Lanka did not initially undertake a
full-blown austerity programme. Never-
theless, economic liberalisation involved
major changes.
Growing inequality increased pressures
on poorer households, many of which
were forced to send family members
into newly created industries such as
the export garment sector. The uneven
impact of the open economy created
economic grievances that were trans-
muted into growing ethnic antagonisms,
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36
especially towards the Tamil community
(Gunasinghe 1984). Eventually, the riots
culminated in the devastating anti-Ta-
mil massacres in July 1983, which killed
over 2,000 people. Meanwhile, the major
infrastructure and settlement projects
reinforced the centralising ambitions of
the state, which reflected the hegemony
of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. These
dynamics contributed to the outbreak of
the civil war in 1983.
As for the donors who had set Sri Lanka
on the neo-liberal path, they soon re-
stricted international aid. The IMF and
World Bank demanded further economic
reforms, such as privatisation and further
cuts to consumer and producer subsidies.
By 1980, Herring (1987: 329) remarked
that the IMF and World Bank began put-
ting greater pressure on Sri Lanka to
“cut the current account and budget def-
icits and to raise more resources inter-
nally.” The IMF recommendations included
“devaluation and cuts in subsidies to mass
consumption” (Herring 1987: 329). These
changes were ultimately pursued, how-
ever, in relatively circumspect ways be-
cause of the civil war. Although Sri Lanka
april 30, 2022
began privatising public assets during
the 1990s, for example, experts and com-
mentators argued that Sri Lanka required
political stability before foreign invest-
ment would flow into the country.
With the defeat of the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the govern-
ment led by Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2009,
Sri Lanka set itself on the path of further
integration into the global economy. The
terms of integration had by that point
shifted from the initial phase of economic
liberalisation, when eager investors from
places such as East Asia sought out cheap
labour. Instead, the new wave of specu-
lative capital flows was characterised by
the predominance of finance capital, es-
pecially the flow of capital into emerging
markets in the aftermath of the financial
crisis of 2008 in Western countries.
This dynamic was also present at the
start of Sri Lanka’s liberalisation. The
boom in the construction sector paved
the way for further speculation in areas
such as real estate. By 1979, for example,
construction grew by 21%. In comparison,
domestic industrial output grew only by
4% (Ganesan 1982: 6). The second wave
Features
Data is from 1954
onwards based on
availability.
Structured in six
major sections :
• Demography
• Health Status
• Infrastructure
• Health Manpower
• Education Facilities
• Health Finance
vol lVII no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

of neo-liberalism near the end of the war
in 2009, however, took this process into
overdrive (Kadirgamar 2013). Financial-
isation in Sri Lanka accelerated to un-
precedented levels, especially the issuing
of sovereign bonds from 2007 onwards,
which now constitute around 40% of the
external debt.
Although the international media em-
phasises a Chinese debt trap, the reality
is that Sri Lanka’s loan obligations re-
flect a broader shift towards global fi-
nance capital. Loans from China only
make up 10% of external debt. The
build-up of foreign loan obligations
running into severe problems prevented
them from being rolled over with new
loans, as in the past, because of the on-
set of the COVID-19 pandemic in early
2020. The collapse of tourism and the
decline in remittances from migrant
workers led to balance of payment prob-
lems. International rating agencies down-
graded Sri Lanka, which put an end to
commercial borrowing from the interna-
tional capital markets.
Meanwhile, throughout the history of
the country’s economic liberalisation,
despite high-flown rhetoric about the
need to incentivise foreign direct in-
vestment, the vast bulk of foreign ex-
change has been earned by working
people, especially working women from
the periphery, who experienced severe
wage repression. They have sustained
major industries such as tea and gar-
ment exports, in addition to working
abroad as migrant and domestic labour
under harsh conditions in places such
as West Asia. Amid the current upsurge,
protestors in areas such as the Katunay-
ake Free Trade Zone, for example, ask,
“where did our money go?”
Divergent Recovery
Those who identified the dangers early
on, called for changes in the structure
of the economy, especially import
controls during the drought period of
2016 to 2017 (Kadirgamar 2016). Yet
these calls mostly went unheeded.
Working people have paid a significant
price. Now with the social explosion
caused by the ongoing protests oppos-
ing Rajapaksa, however, the time has
come to acknowledge that there is no
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
alternative to major political economic
transformation.
The mainstream economists are pro-
posing the same solution of exports as
the way out of the crisis, along with fu-
ture tourist earnings. However, there
are major changes in the global econo-
my that have critical ramifications for
Sri Lanka. According to the World
Trade Organization, world trade has
declined from being three times the
global gross domestic product (GDP)
growth during the peak of the hyper-
globalisation decade of the 1990s, to
contracting by one and a half times as a
proportion of negative global GDP growth
in 2020. Specifically, GDP growth was
-3.6%, compared to global trade growth
of -5.3%. Even after the rebound in
global trade growth in 2021, in 2022
global trade growth is expected to be
on par with global GDP growth.
The update to the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development’s
(UNCTAD) Report in 2022 observes that
In combination with GDP declines and weak
exports from developing countries, this ac-
counted for an increase of the aggregate
external debt to GDP ratio of developing
countries from 57.4% to 69.5%, and of the
external debt to exports ratio from 176.2 to
252.6 in 2020.
These statistics reveal a deeper, long-
term, global economic trend that the
COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced. Ac-
cordingly, the idea that Sri Lanka can
overcome the crisis through an increase
in exports when global trade growth is
weak is a non-starter.
Similarly, tourism revenues have ex-
perienced a significant decline since
the start of the global pandemic. Tour-
ism itself was a justification for specu-
lative real estate investment and large-
scale infrastructure build-out in Sri
Lanka during the post-war boom. It
exposed the country to greater finan-
cial vulnerabilities because of the ex-
pansion of liabilities, such as sovereign
bonds, to capitalise on the country’s
supposed potential for growth. In re-
cent times, there is a global shift to-
wards specific services. While there
was a rebound in merchandise trade in
2021, the UNCTAD (2022: 14) update
notes, for example, that
vol lVII no 18
PERSPECTIVES
Digitally deliverable services such as com-
puter, financial and business services, together
with air freight transport, have registered
robust performances while other sectors
like the ones relating to travel and tourism
are still severely depressed.
Meanwhile, Sri Lanka’s import bill
has only grown larger. Even during the
pandemic, in 2021, for example, imports
grew to their highest level, that is, $20.6
billion. Because of the country’s result-
ing foreign exchange crisis, essential
goods are in short supply and have be-
come even more expensive. These short-
ages and rising prices are in large part
the cause of the recent protests opposing
the Rajapaksa regime. They reflect a
structural trend that many identify as
the next phase in a potential global food
crisis. Similarly, oil prices have in-
creased rapidly because of the war in
Ukraine. All these events mark not only
a critical moment in the uneven, fragile,
and increasingly divergent recovery in
the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic,
but secular constraints on global growth.
The IMF and the State–Society
Relationship
In this context, solutions to Sri Lanka’s
crisis proposed by mainstream econo-
mists are likely to deepen the crisis for
working people. The IMF in its recent
Article IV Staff Report released on 25
March 2022, for example, has proposed
many recommendations, including in-
creased indirect and direct taxes, mar-
ket-oriented energy pricing reforms,
fiscal retrenchment, and floating the
rupee. The economic establishment in
Sri Lanka and abroad frames the IMF as
the only solution, neglecting other pos-
sibilities. Furthermore, after announc-
ing that it would suspend debt repay-
ments on 12 April, Sri Lanka has no lev-
erage at this point. It is largely at the
mercy of external actors in its negotia-
tions, in the absence of a strong resist-
ance movement.
In contrast to the 16 previous agree-
ments Sri Lanka pursued with the IMF,
this time there is little space to negoti-
ate. In this regard, the programme could
be just as dramatic and impactful as the
initial reforms that led to the opening of
the economy in 1978 (Kadirgamar 2022).
37
PERSPECTIVES
The economic establishment tries to sof-
ten its rhetoric for different audiences,
arguing that the IMF is not necessarily
pursuing a regressive agenda as it did in
the past. But its overarching ideological
framing of the programme in terms of
austerity gives us enough clues as to
where it is likely to head in the absence
of collective opposition.
Moreover, the proposed solutions for
the vulnerable and poor reproduce many
of the same problems that have been
criticised elsewhere. These include the
fact that targeting and narrowing wel-
fare measures is a flawed strategy that
often leaves people out and ends up cre-
ating more pressure on the administra-
tion. Or as a report published in collabo-
ration with major global trade union
federations and policy think tanks put it,
“targeting to the poor should not be
viewed as a panacea, since there are ma-
jor problems associated with means-
testing” (Ortiz and Cummins 2019). In a
period during which most Sri Lankans
are exposed to harsh effects of the crisis,
relying solely on mechanisms such as
cash transfers will not address the un-
derlying problems created by supply
shortages and rising prices.
Finally, Sri Lanka is unlikely to re-
cover through a programme like the
one currently formulated not only by
the IMF, but by the economic establish-
ment. Even if the country manages to
secure several billion dollars in loans,
in addition to whatever other financing
it can cobble together from multilateral
donors, this sum is hardly enough to
cover the roughly $51 billion in loan
repayments that are due for repayment
over the coming years. A large part
of the strategy appears to hinge on re-
gaining access to international capital
markets to roll over debt, which is an
extremely dubious proposition at best.
The crisis will instead likely be pro-
longed for years, if not longer, resulting
in a lost decade on par, or even worse,
than what occurred in Greece during
the implementation of its austerity pro-
gramme during the 2010s.
The reason behind the economic es-
tablishment’s apparently implacable be-
lief in an IMF-led programme, despite all
historical evidence to the contrary, is
38
that it is convinced that Sri Lanka has
never engaged in comprehensive macro-
economic reforms. Specifically, it argues
that the country ultimately needs to
bring in more foreign investment. How-
ever, the reality in Sri Lanka has been
that the majority of the so-called foreign
direct investment, not to mention port-
folio investment, has been concentrated
in speculation, including investment in
real estate. Such investment flies in and
out of the country, exacerbating the vul-
nerabilities created through the process
of financial liberalisation.
The Sri Lankan economic establish-
ment’s ideological framing is an extreme
market-oriented vision that almost seems
to be rooted in relish for the prospect of
austerity. Technocratic think tanks insu-
lated by donor funding are divorced from
people’s suffering. Although the country
is already undergoing severe duress, they
only offer the people more pain, claim-
ing that this strategy will contribute to
the country’s macroeconomic stability.
But if the protests opposing the Rajapaksa-
led government have shown anything,
it is that politics cannot be separated
from the economic landscape. The ques-
tion is, who makes who pay? The people
are already refusing to allow the current
government to offload the costs of the
crisis onto them. How can we expect
them to willingly accept similar terms
under a supposedly more liberal govern-
ment after regime change?
The historical reality is that Sri Lanka
has been down this path before, and it
has not ended well. From the failure of
Ranil Wickremesinghe’s peace and re-
form package that he proposed as Prime
Minister between 2002 and 2004, to the
more recent steep decline in the popu-
larity of the coalition government that
defeated Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015,
long before the Easter Sunday attacks of
2019,1 the working people are unlikely to
acquiesce to neo-liberal development
solutions. The bigger danger is that given
the scale of the current crisis, there are
graver implications of political swings,
including to the extreme right. Such
forces could take advantage of the orig-
inal methods of concentrating power and
imposing repression that emerged both
to push through economic liberalisation
april 30, 2022
and to try and suppress the social un-
rest it created.
There are bound to be upheavals if
the economic establishment can only
offer economic stability at the price of
greater mass suffering. In this regard,
whatever solution emerges through ne-
gotiation with external actors, includ-
ing the IMF, must reflect redistribution
within Sri Lanka, including by taxing
the wealthy classes, rather than in-
creasing the burden on the working
people. Only this alternative can pre-
vent external shock from becoming a
more dramatic transformation of the
relationship between state and society
towards a far right, authoritarian, and
potentially even fascist direction.
Domestic Production
There is an urgent need for self-critique,
especially within the political opposition
that hopes to capitalise on the ongoing
protest movement. Up to this point Sri
Lanka’s elites have been able to post-
pone a significant reckoning with the
economic model of liberalisation. Now
that the crisis is gripping the country,
however, they are forced to recognise
that not only working people, but busi-
nesses themselves are facing severe eco-
nomic pressure. The central bank doubled
interest rates to 14% on 8 April 2022 in a
time when the purchasing capacity for
goods are in decline. The lack of afford-
able working capital is likely to contribute
to the folding of many businesses as well
as undermine the production and in-
comes of smaller producers.
The working people who have been at
the forefront in the protest movement
have provided the organising backbone
that is now attracting people from di-
verse walks of life. Yet to strengthen this
movement requires conceptualising the
emerging counter-hegemony that will
shape policymaking in response to the
breakdown of the elite consensus. If we
are clear on the causes of the crisis, then
the solutions become easier to under-
stand. In particular, the reality is that
generic “inflation”—or “money print-
ing” to use the term of the day—itself is
not the cause of the crisis. It is an inade-
quate concept for describing the trend
of rising prices that have put so much
vol lVII no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

pressure on working people across the
world, especially in the Global South.2
Sri Lanka is at the forefront of this
challenge. Any solution that speaks di-
rectly to the politics of social reproduc-
tion must address the concrete circum-
stances of production to resolve the
problem. The example of food is critical.
Sri Lanka managed to achieve self-suffi-
ciency in rice, which was stimulated by
the historic need to provide a food sub-
sidy to people. This food subsidy had ini-
tially been created through the imple-
mentation of a ration system during
World War II. Yet it took on a life of its
own. Working people claimed ownership
of the food subsidy when the govern-
ment at the time in 1953 attempted to
cut it on the advice of the World Bank.
The resulting Great Hartal of 1953 left
an indelible mark on elite consciousness.
It forced the elites to recognise that
there was a minimum standard of living
that had to be maintained, and dipping
below that is bound to lead to tremen-
dous protests by working people.
The problem is that this struggle over
social reproduction had a more difficult
time penetrating and transforming the
social relations of production. Initial
attempts at land reform in 1958 via the
Paddy Lands Act, for example, were blunt-
ed. Meanwhile, successive governments
imported greater quantities of agricultural
inputs such as fertiliser. The current gov-
ernment of Rajapaksa made the disastrous
decision to ban chemical fertilisers over-
night, when it needed to invest more in
domestic food production. The ruling
regime’s decision reveals a story about
the larger changes in agriculture that
must take place for the country to avert
immediate food shortages and ultimately
become more self-sufficient.
If earlier efforts at land reform were
stymied, now is the time to consider an
emergency programme to distribute land
to people, especially in peripheral com-
munities, so that they can sustain them-
selves and others. Earlier ethnic majori-
tarian attempts at agrarian colonisation
were predicated on the idea that large-
scale infrastructure projects would solve
food supply issues. Today’s moment offers
an opportunity to reconsider the role of
producer cooperatives and other social
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
PERSPECTIVES
institutions in coordinating and aligning Similarly, this vision is not predicated
rural producers’ needs so that they can on industrialisation for industrialisa-
gain the market advantage of scale. But tion’s sake, or what the political econo-
this strategy further requires financial mist Samir Amin referred to as “depend-
and technical support from the state, ent capital accumulation.” Instead, it
without subordinating or eliminating the requires thinking in terms of the inter-
productive autonomy of local institu- linked industries embedded within a
tions to make their own decisions regard- vision of agrarian transformation. This
ing the choice of crops and agrarian framing can bypass the current debate
ventures to prioritise. New initiatives between the economic establishment,
with producer co-operatives, including which now argues that macroeconomic
cooperative forms of agricultural credit stability is the priority, versus those
and marketing, may provide avenues opposing them who argue that growth
for addressing the current food crisis. through industrialisation is what is nec-
essary. In this debate, the short term and
From Dependency to long term are counterposed to each
Self-sufficiency other in unproductive ways. The resulting
This pattern of domestic food produc- impasse enables the economic estab-
tion must be inserted into the broader lishment to frame its solution as the
paradigm of self-sufficiency in which the only realistic option, while in fact ne-
reproductive needs of working people glecting immediate priorities such as
determine which industries require fur- food distribution to avert shortages and
ther investment. To the extent that in- even potential starvation.
puts, for example, can be substituted, If the tourism-driven financialised
this process will require contemporary economy has led Sri Lanka to the current
research on the agrarian question in state of collapse, then any emergency
dialogue with consumer and producer programme must question its basic as-
groups across society, for the purpose sumptions if it is to claim the mantle of
of identifying appropriate alternatives. a sustainable solution to the country’s
The historical example of the Hector most immediate crisis. The state has
Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and many opportunities to experiment with
Training Institute at the height of its and reorganise state-owned enterprises
most generative research phase during on a mission-driven basis, to meet the
the 1970s shows the ways in which demand for critical inputs. Even private
knowledge about Sri Lanka’s agriculture businesses that are on the verge of col-
can be embedded in a wider project to lapse could be brought under the public
transform social relations. umbrella, with opportunity given for
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vol lVII no 18 39
PERSPECTIVES
workers to form their own councils in
which they can make day-to-day produc-
tion decisions. They could operate with-
in a progressive, overarching framework
to strengthen investment in critical in-
dustries that can help sustain, for example,
domestic food production. In contrast,
austerity and disinvestment during an
economic depression, whether it is in the
state or private sector, can have devas-
tating consequences for production and
unemployment.
These changes to the state require a
deeper reckoning with its political eco-
nomic foundations. While the excessive
concentration of executive power vis-à-
vis the legislature is the main focus to-
day, with demands such as abolishing
the executive presidency back on the
table, there is also a need to reorganise
the Sri Lankan state on a fundamental
level to accommodate workable economic
alternatives. Specifically, this process
requires reactivating the country’s pro-
vincial councils—a key demand of
minority ethnic communities seeking
devolved governance—through fiscal
devolution, thereby enabling them to
develop cooperatives and other rural
social institutions. This process would
not only realise a concrete political de-
mand, but it could also reinforce the
broader project of social transformation
by actively engaging communities in the
project of economic transformation to
deal with the immediate crisis.
A New Social Contract
At the core of these potential initiatives
is the idea that Sri Lanka can and
should spend to get out of the crisis, but
that the method matters as much as the
headline figures. Meanwhile, for the
economic establishment, only by adopt-
ing fiscal surplus targets can the coun-
try attract global capital, including re-
gaining access to international capital
markets. However, there are deeper
changes in the global economy that
make this scenario increasingly unreal-
istic. Capital is becoming even more
risk-averse due to the rise in the so-
called inflation that is driving higher
global interest rates. Furthermore, the
disruption of global markets due to the
war in Ukraine and the long economic
40
downturn that has coincided with the
pandemic rule this option out.
In this context, progressive analysis
in Sri Lanka requires a determined
push to bring self-sufficiency back into
the debate. Specifically, the theoretical
move requires delinking the fiscal defi-
cit from the external deficit, to pro-
mote sustained spending through the
former, while prioritising imports to
reduce the latter. For the economic
establishment, import substitution is
considered anathema because it impairs
the efficiency of the market.
But as John Maynard Keynes (1933: 2)
himself put it in an essay written at the
height of the Great Depression during
the 1930s, there are benefits to “gradu-
ally bringing the producer and the con-
sumer within the ambit of the same
national, economic and financial organi-
sation that outweigh concerns about
efficiency alone.” Keynes looked at the
crisis from the vantage point of the im-
perialist core, but there is a kernel of truth
in his argument that must be broadened
to include countries in the global periph-
ery that are facing renewed crisis today.
The next objection is that this system
would create opportunities for corruption
and rent-seeking. But the reality is that,
in addition to the fact that developmental
states have been central to every sus-
tained effort to overcome economic bar-
riers throughout history, there is a criti-
cal social dimension that determines the
way in which elites operate within the
state. Bureaucracy can be efficient, to
the extent that it is shaped by a mission-
driven project that is widely accepted
throughout society (Johnson 1999). The
countervailing power of working people’s
protest can circumscribe the domain
within which bureaucrats operate. Or as
Lance Taylor (2004: 377) puts it, the pro-
cess requires an “autonomous bureau-
cracy accepted by (and embedded in)
the society.”
Furthermore, to the extent that the
Sri Lankan economic establishment, for
example, is calling for loss-making state-
owned enterprises to be privatised, it
fundamentally misunderstands the fact
that the market economy itself is em-
bedded within and can only be sus-
tained by a society in which all have
april 30, 2022
reasonable access to the goods neces-
sary to survive. Without these decom-
modified institutions, as Karl Polanyi
(2001: 76) put it, people will die from
“social exposure.” These heterodox ide-
as have defined the enduring, if rela-
tively hidden, tradition of political eco-
nomic analysis. Yet they must be fur-
ther operationalised in terms of a criti-
cal understanding of the relationship
between state, society, and market.
Specifically, the market must again be
subordinated to the democratic trans-
formation of the relationship between
state and society.
Sri Lanka has had a long and success-
ful history of engaging in this process
through the pioneering social welfare
institutions that were created during the
1940s and 1950s, especially its world-
famous universal healthcare and free
education systems. But these have been
underfunded and weakened with liber-
alisation. Even now, the country faces
shortages that undermine the capacity
of these institutions to operate effec-
tively. To solve the immediate crisis
requires strengthening these services
while acknowledging the extent to which
they must be embedded in a broader
transformation of society, specifically,
by reorganising the state to undertake
major changes in production. Ultimately,
it is strengthening the link between this
complex of entitlements and the formal,
procedural aspects of democracy, including
the right to protest, that has the greatest
chance of averting disaster.
The Fascist Danger and
Progressive Possibility
Thinking through alternatives is part
of a broad attempt to grapple with the
relationship between production and
social reproduction, or productive con-
sumption as articulated by Karl Marx
in the Grundrisse. The way in which
something is consumed matters as much
as what is consumed. To the extent that
Sri Lanka is undergoing a profound eco-
nomic crisis that has become a political
crisis, it is raising a whole series of ques-
tions about not only what the country
must produce to overcome the crisis, but
also the way in which to make goods and
services available to people to consume
vol lVII no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

under increasingly dire circumstances. In
the most urgent case, this requires set-
ting up a public distribution system to
offer rations to people, by further rec-
ognising the extreme reproductive burden
imposed on women, as recently articu-
lated by a statement issued by the Feminist
Collective for Economic Justice (2022).
The IMF adjustment is already under-
way. The current government has begun
floating the rupee, raising interest rates,
and defaulting on its loans, claiming it
will repay its lenders with the support
of the IMF. This path has existential
implications for Sri Lanka’s political
economy. To speak about price controls
or prioritising imports appears unaccep-
table when supposedly the only thing
that can be negotiated with the IMF is
the extent of the cuts to welfare, along
with the need for austerity and privati-
sation. However, the working people
will not endure the deepening crisis
silently. The danger is great that as the
suffering increases with austerity, xeno-
phobic populists or even fascists can
use the situation to take power, with
horrifying political consequences.
Given the profound failure of the
dominant economic framework and the
popular upsurge against the Rajapaksa
regime, however, there is also a mo-
mentary, critical opportunity to reinter-
pret the social changes that are occur-
ring from a progressive viewpoint. We
must also consider that any immediate
solution must not only expand public
distribution, but also identify other ways
of reducing the severest impacts of the
crisis on people, by modifying the very
definition of everyday life. For example,
given the scale of Sri Lanka’s energy
imports, any serious effort to curtail
these would require a drastic reconfigu-
ration of the built environment. Meas-
ures could include demarcating public
space for small vendors to operate, and
providing free public transport, includ-
ing improving and extending the bus
system within the rural periphery.
This process could further help curtail
the extreme imbalance between rural
and urban areas, with roughly 40%
of the GDP concentrated in Colombo
and the Western Province. If Rajapaksa’s
most famous development project, for
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
example, was urban beautification dur-
ing an earlier phase in his family’s rule,
then the alternative requires taking se-
riously the need for people to sustain
their livelihoods in a wider, dispersed
network of towns and villages. This spa-
tial distribution resists subordination to
the colonising logic of speculative capital.
The latter has compounded Sri Lanka’s
crisis by creating vast monuments to
wasteful, energy-consuming luxury in a
moment when the country literally cannot
keep the lights on.
Accordingly, the crisis is not just a crisis
of the regime, but that of an entire para-
digm of governance and development.
The executive presidency, the PTA, and
the centralised structures of a national
security state—initiated with liberalisa-
tion and entrenched with militarisation
that has continued throughout the pro-
tracted civil war and long after its end—
need to be dismantled. That process of
radical reform would open the democrat-
ic space for resisting repression and ar-
ticulating economic alternatives in times
ahead that are bound to be tumultuous
and extremely uncertain.
Traversing the vast gap between a
political revolution that successfully
dislodges Rajapaksa—what is already
an extremely uncertain and precarious
task—and a more general transforma-
tion of the country’s political and eco-
nomic structures, will require a strong
push from the progressive actors that
claim to offer organisation to working
people-led protests. The obligation is
clear. Political economic analysis and
debates should create democratic alter-
natives to be taken up with the appro-
priate force and specificity, to send
not only the Rajapaksas home, but
decades-long flawed economic think-
ing along with them.
notes
1 While the Easter Sunday terror attacks of April
2019 are commonly considered the cause for
Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s landslide victory in the
president elections of November 2019, the po-
litical tide had shifted by 2017 as a drought
ravaged the country in the preceding years.
The Rajapaksas split from the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP) and formed their own Sri Lanka
Podujana Perumuna (SLPP), which swept the
local government polls of February 2018.
2 The UNCTAD update observes: “For many
developing countries, currency devaluation
against the dollar is an important driver of
vol lVII no 18
PERSPECTIVES
inflation: domestic currency depreciation rais-
es the domestic price of imported goods and
therefore headline inflation measures. As the
Fed and other central banks in developed
countries central banks tighten, the currencies
of developing countries are likely to devalue
further. Policy tightening in the North, in re-
sponse to supply-side bottlenecks, thus wors-
ens the problem of rising prices in developing
countries” (p 17).
Grappling with the underlying macroeconom-
ic theory, heterodox economists further argue
that these price increases are reflected in
a relatively narrow basket of commodities,
especially food and energy, which have
their own distinctive challenges and solutions.
J W Mason summarises the problem in a blog-
post published in 2021, arguing, “We should
not think of cyclical inflation as an across the
board increase in prices, but rather as an in-
crease in the price of a fairly small set of mar-
ket-priced, inelastically supplied goods rela-
tive to others.”
References
Feminist Collective for Economic Justice (2022):
“Urgent Plea by Sri Lankan Feminists to
Address the Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis
Caused by the Economic Collapse in Sri Lanka,”
6 April, https://www.cadtm.org/spip.php?
page=imprimer&id_article=20714.
Fine, Ben (2013): “Financialisation from a Marxist
Perspective,” International Journal of Political
Economy, Vol 42, No 4, pp 47–66.
Ganesan, Sivaguru (1982): “The Construction
Industry in Sri Lanka,” World Employment
Programme Research Working Paper, Interna-
tional Labour Organization.
Gunasinghe, Newton (1984): “The Open Economy
and Its Impact on Ethnic Relations,” Committee
for Rational Development (ed), New Delhi:
Navrang.
Herring, Ronald J (1987): “Economic Liberalisation
Policies in Sri Lanka: International Pressures,
Constraints and Supports,” Economic & Politi-
cal Weekly, Vol 22, No 8, pp 325–33.
Johnson, Chalmers (1999): “The Developmental
State: Odyssey of a Concept,” The Developmen-
tal State, Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed), Cornell:
Cornell University Press.
Kadirgamar, Ahilan (2013): “Second Wave of Neo-
liberalism: Financialisation and Crisis in Post-
War Sri Lanka,” Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol 48, No 35, pp 7–8.
— (2016): “Time to Look Within, Not Westwards,”
Hindu, 13 January.
— (2022): “Sri Lanka Stares at Bankruptcy or Re-
demption,” Hindu, 16 April.
Keynes, John Maynard (1933): “National Self-suffi-
ciency,” Yale Review, Vol 22, No 4, pp 755–69.
Marx, Karl (1973): The Grundrisse, New York: Penguin.
Mason, J W (2021): “Alternative Visions of Infla-
tion,” 27 July, http://jwmason.org/slackwire/
alternative-visions-of-inflation/.
Ortiz, Isabel and Matthew Cummins (2019): “Aus-
terity: The New Normal—A Renewed Wash-
ington Consensus, 2010–24,” Initiative for Poli-
cy Dialogue, New York.
Polanyi, Karl (2001): The Great Transformation:
The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,
Boston: Beacon Press.
Taylor, Lance (2004): Reconstructing Macroeco-
nomics: Structuralist Proposals and Critiques of
the Mainstream, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press.
UNCTAD (2022): “Tapering in a Time of Confl ict:
Trade and Development Report Update,”
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development.
41
INSIGHT
Nationalist Rhetoric and
the Politics of Panic
The Political Aftermath of the Plague
Epidemic of 1896 in Western India
Prabodhan Pol
The unfolding of the plague crisis
of 1896 in the Bombay Presidency
played an instrumental role in
shaping a new vocabulary of
nationalism and regional politics in
western India. The plague epidemic
led to further consolidation of the
upper caste-led conservative
politics in western India. It was in
the aftermath of the deadly plague
crisis that the political discourse
of cultural revivalism dominated
by the Brahmins gathered
incredible momentum, resulting
in the consolidation of Hindu
nationalist voices in western India.
Prabodhan Pol (prabodhanpol@gmail.com) is
a postdoctoral fellow at the Manipal Centre
for Humanities, Manipal Academy of Higher
Education, Manipal.
42
T
he decades between 1890 and 1930
had been enormously painful for
the Indian subcontinent. Since
1896, the havoc created by the bubonic
plague not only generated a health crisis
of immense proportion but also led to a
serious political crisis for the colonial state.
Around 10 million deaths occurred in
India due to the plague epidemic from
the period between 1896 and 1930 (Arnold
1993: 164). Among the different regions
affected by the epidemic crisis in India,
it was the Bombay Presidency that was
one of the hardest hit provinces. It led to a
colossal destruction of lives. The chaos
witnessed by two prominent cities of the
province, Bombay and Poona pertinently
symbolised the gravity of the crisis. From
the inception of the bubonic plague in
1896 to the commencement of the World
War I in 1914, the number of deaths record-
ed in Bombay city alone, during this peri-
od, was around two million (Klein 1988:
734). On the contrary, the city of Poona
recorded more than 50,000 deaths in
the same period. Contemporary Marathi-
speaking journalists compared this huge
crisis and enormous loss of the lives with
the “reign of terror” (Mahratta, 25 April
1897). Along with the rising mortality in
both cities, large-scale displacement of
the population also led to the reframing
and reworking of provincial politics.
This article would be precisely dealing
with this aspect of the plague aftermath.
In this article, first, I argue that the un-
folding of the plague crisis in the Bombay
Presidency played an important role in
shaping the new vocabulary of politics in
western India. This vocabulary was not
just confined to the plague measures
adopted by the colonial rule, nor was it
april 30, 2022
only about the concomitant response of
the nationalists to the plague crisis. It
rather went beyond the realm of epide-
mic and healthcare and led to the creation
of new forms of political hegemony in
western India. Scholars and historians
have worked on different aspects of the
history of medicine and public healthcare
system in colonial India. Insofar as the
scholarship concerning the history of
plague epidemic is concerned, scholars
have mostly focused solely on the health-
related aspects of colonial response to
the plague crisis. Few of them have tried
to look beyond the calamity in order to
grasp the significance of the crisis (Arnold
1993; Chandavarkar 1998; Kidambi 2004;
Pati and Harrison 2009). The caste ques-
tion and its link to the larger vocabulary
of politics have not been fully addressed.
I argue that the plague epidemic led to
further consolidation of the upper caste-
led conservative politics in western India.
It was in the aftermath of a deadly plague
crisis that the political discourse of cultural
revivalism dominated by the Brahmins
gathered incredible momentum. In this
period, it largely revolved around the
political articulation and activism of Bal
Gangadhar Tilak, a prominent leader of
Congress from the region. The intellectual
and political ecosystem created by the epi-
demic clearly led to the strengthening of
Hindu nationalist politics in western India.
Second, I argue that due to the decline
of the Satyashodhak Samaj (originally
founded by Jotirao Phule in 1873) in the
aftermath of the plague epidemic of 1896,
the lower-caste voices lost their efficacy in
the public sphere. The loss of prominent
Satyashodhak activists caused by plague
deaths eventually led to the inevitable or-
ganisational downfall of the Satyashodhak
Samaj. It indirectly helped in strengthen-
ing the political edifice of conservatism
and the politics of cultural revivalism in
western India. Due to the absence of an
effective challenge from the non-Brahmins
in the early years of the 20th century, the
conservative nationalist politics under
Tilak’s leadership received major push
in the 1890s and the early 1910s. It was
only in the 1930s that the Brahmins
permanently lost their control over
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

the affairs of provincial politics to the
non-Brahmins.
Third, I also argue that the possibility
of resistance to the politics of cultural
revivalism in western India was simul-
taneously sown during the period domi-
nated by the plague epidemic. It was
manifested in the form of politically as-
sertive non-Brahminism, developed un-
der the Marathas (a dominant caste, as-
sociated with the legendary ruler of the
Marathas, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj),
which eventually led to the ouster of
Brahmin domination from the political
sphere. The political template of non-
Brahminism, with Marathas leading the
camp, was actually developed during
this period.
Plague Epidemic and the Decline
of Non-Brahmin Voices
In order to understand the effect of the
plague epidemic on the larger political
fabric of western India, it is important to
critically explore the politics of the non-
Brahmin/Satyashodhak movement of the
19th century. It was in the middle of the
19th century that “non-Brahmin,” a term
used for a social class other than the
Brahmins, began to evolve as a category
of social and political discourse in western
India. Despite many problems in its con-
ceptualisation, it foregrounded the first
modern and radical critique of caste in
the region. Phule, a foremost anti-caste
radical established the Satyashodhak
Samaj in 1873. By the end of the 19th cen-
tury, the Satyashodhak Samaj posed a
serious challenge to the nationalist poli-
tics, which was mostly confined to urban
centres. It was with the founding of
Satyashodhak activism under Phule in the
late 19th century that new forms of organ-
isational politics began to take roots in
western India in the succeeding century.
Satyashodhak Samaj was actively in-
volved in voicing the grievances of the
peasants, women, non-Brahmins, and the
untouchables. Before the launch of the
Satyashodhak Samaj, Phule had estab-
lished himself as one of the most power-
ful critics of social conservatism and re-
ligious nationalism in western India. His
polemical work, Gulamgiri, published in
1873, provided innovative approach to
understand the caste question in the 19th
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
century. He suggested that Brahmins con-
stitute a distinct culture that sets them
apart from the non-Brahmins (Keer and
Malshe 1969). By the 1870s, he had be-
come one of the leading and well-
known non-Brahmin leaders of the re-
gion. His ability to connect the caste
question with women’s oppression and
patriarchy deeply influenced the agen-
da of social reforms in the later period.
His phenomenal contribution in pro-
moting women’s education by establish-
ing schools for girls, highlighting to the
government the growing need for com-
pulsory education, and even organising
resistance movement for the widows,
attracted many to join his movement
(Phadke 1991: 715–25).
The death of Phule in 1890 was a major
setback to the Satyashodhak Samaj. How-
ever, the organisation was able to continue
its usual activism under the leadership of
Savitribai Phule (wife of Phule), Narayan
Meghaji Lokhande, and Krishnarao
Bhalekar. Savitribai took keen interest in
the activities of the Satyashodhak Samaj.
She presided over the 20th annual session
of the Satyashodhak Samaj conference
held at Saswad. Many contemporary ac-
counts have highlighted the phenomenal
role played by Savitribai in the activities
of the Satyashodhak Samaj (Narke 1993).1
On the contrary, Lokhande had already
established himself as one of the leading
voices of the industrial working class of
Bombay city in the 1880s. His activism
crucially retained the radical anti-caste
content of Phule’s articulations. He chal-
lenged the conservative nationalists of
his time and equally opposed the sec-
tarian inter pretation of non-Brahminism
(O’Hanlon 1985: 292). Lokhande has been
associated in the founding of the Bombay
Mill Hands Association, the first labour
union in India in 1884 (Pandit 1997: 327).
Simultaneously, he edited the Deenband-
hu, one of the most vocal non-Brahmin
periodicals in the Marathi public sphere.
Before the taking over of the Deenbandhu
by Lokhande, it was edited by Krishnarao
Bhalekar of Poona. Bhalekar was one of
the most articulate colleagues of Phule. It
was under Bhalekar’s leadership that Phule
was able to expand the organisational
network of the Satyashodhak Samaj in
the countryside (Omvedt 1976: 141).
vol lVii no 18
INSIGHT
However, with the arrival of the plague
in the Bombay Presidency in 1896, the
organisational politics of the Satyashodhak
Samaj collapsed completely. Two of the
foremost leaders of the Samaj, Savitribai
and Lokhande succumbed to plague in
1897. Savitribai got infected with bubonic
plague while carrying a 10-year-old plague
victim from a Dalit neighbourhood in
Poona in order to get him treated at her
son Yashwant Phule’s plague clinic. She
died on 10 March 1897 in Poona. On the
contrary, due to the overwhelming fear
of plague deaths, mass migrations from
the cities of Bombay and Poona to the
countryside, became the constant pheno-
mena for the next few years. Bhalekar also
had to permanently relocate himself out
of Poona. In contrast, the countryside was
not just affected by the plague, but it had
to deal with the lethal wrath of famine.
Studies have already pointed out that the
impact of the bubonic plague in the first
few years was mostly concentrated in the
cities like Bombay and Poona. Within two
or three years, it began affecting many
smaller towns of the presidency, thereby
spreading to the countryside. It was in
the countryside, in the later period, that
substantial mortality occurred.
As a result, the plague had considerably
weakened the economic capabilities of the
ordinary peasants living in the country
side. This affected the organisational
activism of the Satyashodhak Samaj. It
could not revive itself for more than a
decade. It was only after 1911 that it was
able to conduct its organisational meeting
at a regional level (Omvedt 1976: 128–39).2
In the 1920s, the challenge to the politics
of conservative nationalism began to
emerge. Therefore, the plague not only
played a significant role in weakening the
voices of the non-Brahmins but also led to
the strengthening of conservative nation-
alist politics in the region. With the decline
of the Satyashodhak Samaj after 1896,
city-based nationalist organisations, for
example, the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha,
established in Poona in 1870, began
to represent the grievances of the rural
society. It was an organisation largely
dominated by Brahmin nationalists who
actively worked on the matters concerning
governance and administration. On the
contrary, it always had to balance between
43
INSIGHT
political questions and the conservative
agenda of revival and reorganisation of
Hindu cultural life (Tucker 1976: 322).
Therefore, as compared to the Satyashod-
hak Samaj, the ideological positioning of
the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha was con-
spicuously different.
In one of the rare accounts on the state
of affairs, an organisational report on
the activities of the Satyashodhak Samaj
in the 1890s had poignantly commented
on the unfolding of the new politics of
caste hegemony and conservative nation-
alism in the Bombay Presidency.
[…] and because of plague, cholera, locust
attack on crops and famine for five or ten
years after, the old Satyashodhak leaders
had to go here and there to survive and a
sort of cloud of indifference came onto the
Satya Samaj. Those who began to campaign
against, those traitors organised festivals
like the Ganpati mela and the Chhatrapati
Shivaji Maharaj festival, filled many of the
ignorant masses with artificial patriotism
and again began a grandiose scheme to try
to establish the Peshwai. (Omvedt 1976: 140)
Therefore, the collapse of the city-based
activism of the Satyashodhak Samaj after
the onslaught of the plague epidemic of
1896 helped in furthering the ascendance
of upper caste hegemony in the Bombay
Presidency. The plague was followed by
famine and deadly bouts of cholera spread
across the countryside that resulted in a
complete collapse of the organisational
strength of the Satyashodhak Samaj.
Cultural Revivalism and
Conservative Nationalism
Questions concerning caste, gender, and
social reforms resulted in the social and
intellectual churning in western India.
By the 1870s, the Marathi public sphere
had consolidated itself with an emphatic
and explicit nationalistic overtones. How-
ever, the manifest domination of the
educated Brahmin middle class over the
literary public sphere peculiarly shaped
the content of social and political discus-
sions. Consequently, virulent debates on
social questions had begun to polarise the
region since the 1830s. The supporters of
political reforms vehemently argued in
favour of orthodoxy and devolution of
political power over the demands concern-
ing social reforms. Tilak and Vishnushastri
Chiplunkar became the leading voices of
44
this camp. Between the two, it was Tilak
who led the nationalist camp that fer-
vently channelised its critique against
colonialism and social reformist politics.
He was widely known for his passionate
advocacy of conservative causes that
consequently made him an ardent oppo-
nent of social reforms.
On the contrary, the major intervention
made by Phule led him to become a lead-
ing voice of the non-Brahmins in the 19th
century. He actively organised and arti-
culated on behalf of the “non-Brahmins,”
a relatively novel and creative socio-
political category that eventually gained
substantial momentum in the colonial
period. He not only opposed the conser-
vative politics of the nationalists but also
established a long-lasting political tradi-
tion of cultural critique and mass mobili-
sation in western India. The emergence of
Tilak and Phule, therefore, epitomised
the crystallisation of two different ideo-
logical camps in western India. The legacy
of the conflict between the two contend-
ing camps generated a profound impact
on the political culture of the region
even after their deaths.
The implication of the conflict between
these two contending camps can be best
discerned by examining the political dis-
course of western India from 1896 to 1930.
The period, mostly influenced by the
spread of the plague epidemic, unfolds pe-
culiar dialectics that changed the con-
tours of social and political fabric of the
Bombay Presidency. The establishment
of the Indian National Congress (INC) in
1885 instigated new forms of political
activism in India. Western India was no
different from other regions. However,
the nationalist voices in western India
began to receive substantial attention only
in the last few years of the 19th century. It
was due to the beginning of a new form
of radical political activism that simulta-
neously opposed colonialism and social
reformist discourse. The nationalists be-
gan to break away from the comfort
zones of the petition-centric politics. The
nationalists of Poona particularly cen-
tered their focus on the different strate-
gies to mobilise masses against coloni-
alism, Muslims, and social reforms. This
was done through the organisation of
festivals and conferences as well as
april 30, 2022
through the dissemination of ideas. It
was the outcome of the plague politics of
1896 that actually enabled them to fore-
ground their politics on firm grounds.
On 23 September 1896, the first case of
the bubonic plague was found in the
Bombay Presidency (Snow 1897: 3). It
eventually created a widespread panic that
culminated into a spectacular decline of
the local population from Poona and
Bombay. The response offered by the
colonial government to cope with the
epidemic was premised on many factors.
According to Raj Chandavarkar (1998:
241), one of the most compelling dangers
envisaged by the British colonisers about
India was the imminent threat of diseases
like the Black Death that could possibly
cripple Europe and the British Empire.
The unusual intrusion of the colonial state
into the private domain of the colonised
subjects, particularly during the onslaught
of the plague epidemic of 1896, could
also be linked with the profound appre-
hensions and deep anxieties the colo-
nisers had about the wrath caused by
the epidemic in India.
There were other factors as well that
led to the shaping of the measures under-
taken by the colonial state in the times
of the epidemic. One study has argued
that the obligation to comply with the
international sanitary regulations forced
the colonial state to respond to the epi-
demic in an aggressive manner in India
(Mishra 2009: 32–34). The International
Sanitary Conference held at Constanti-
nople in 1866 required governments to
clean up the cities, regulate the shipping,
and establish domestic quarantine in the
ports under its control (Pati and Harrison
2009: 2). The overall response of the colo-
nial state was unprecedented. As a result,
it made considerable investments in the
development of health and health-related
infrastructure in India. As far as the
Bombay Presidency was concerned, the
establishment of institutions like the
Bombay Port Trust, the Haffkine Institute
for Training, Research and Testing, and
a plague hospital in Poona as well as the
incorporation of ideas pertaining to sani-
tation were one of the few important
legacies of the plague epidemic.
Simultaneously, the plague epidemic
crisis also shaped the political ambience
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

of the presidency. Against the backdrop
of the deadly spread of the bubonic plague,
there were two important events that
shaped the trajectory of politics in western
India in the late 19th century. First was
the sensational murder of Walter Charles
Rand, the British plague commissioner of
Poona in July 1897. In his short tenure,
Rand had attained immense notoriety
for his forceful approach to contain the
spread of the epidemic in the city. He
was murdered by three Brahmin brothers,
Damodar Hari Chapekar, Balkrishna Hari
Chapekar, and Vasudev Hari Chapekar,
who opposed Rand’s strict actions to deal
with the plague epidemic in the city. The
murder not only manifested the growing
discontentment against colonial rule but
also signalled the strengthening of con-
servative nationalist voices in the social
and political spheres.
The Chapekar brothers were also locally
known for their hostility towards social
reforms. Damodar had expressed his ap-
prehension towards the social reforms
movement in his memoir published after
his execution. Here, he fondly remembered
his public confrontations with many social
reformers of the time. While Damodar was
critical of the non-Brahmins, he was
equally critical of the late 19-century liberal
Brahmin social reformers. In his memoir,
he attacked Brahmin liberal reformers
of Poona for mobilising people in sup-
port of widow remarriage and women’s
education (Khobrekar 1974: 25–40). He
termed Gopal Ganesh Agarkar, one of the
leading Brahmin liberal voices of Poona
as a “sinner,” who managed to escape his
chastisement due to the latter’s untimely
death in 1895 (Khobrekar 1974: 28). There-
fore, the murder of Rand by the Chapekar
brothers in 1897 was not just a random
nationalist act against repressive colonial
policies. It was rather an indication of
a particular kind of political discourse
gaining substantial strength in the garb of
nationalism. This discourse was primarily
directed against the ideas of political in-
clusivism and the social reforms.
Another event that contributed to the
change was the infamous sedition case im-
posed by the colonial state on Tilak,
which finally culminated into his arrest.
The passage of the draconian Epidemic
Diseases Act of 1897 and further tightening
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
of colonial administrative authority in the
Bombay Presidency led to the aggressive
positioning of the nationalist voices in the
region. Tilak’s arrest generated enormous
furor among the nationalists of western
India and elsewhere. It was primarily
through this arrest and active interventions
in the plague aftermath that Tilak became
the foremost figure of Indian politics. He
rose to prominence to become one of the
earliest mass leaders of the INC. The emer-
gence of Tilak’s politics was also linked
to substantial domination of Brahmins in
the regional politics. Numerically domi-
nant castes like the Marathas and the un-
touchable caste like the Mahars were yet to
emerge as a political force. However, in
the aftermath of the plague epidemic, the
Satyashodhak Samaj, an organisation
that largely catered to the non-Brahmin
masses, had already lost its substantial or-
ganisational presence in western India. In
this context, the educated and politi-
cised Brahmins under the leadership of
Tilak emerged unchallenged in the public
sphere. Tilak’s anti-Muslim stance and
his profound aversion for social reforms
considerably helped to position himself in
the changed political environment.
Consequently, the changed political
circumstances post 1897 collectively
usered in a new political era of conserva-
tism and nationalism in western India.
The outbreak of the plague epidemic was
one of the main reasons for the increased
attention being given to the nationalists
of western India. The controversial han-
dling of the epidemic by the colonial ad-
ministration generated overwhelmingly
passionate response against the colonial
state. It was particularly conspicuous in
Poona, which contributed in setting the
tone of regional politics for the next three
decades in western India. The period not
only produced radical articulations of
nationalism and anti-social reformist
agenda but also created an enabling milieu
for the Brahmin hegemony. Simultane-
ously, social reformist voices that once
influenced the public discourse also lost
considerably in the plague aftermath.
There were evident changes in the
social and political alignments after the
advent of the plague epidemic of 1896.
After 1896, the Marathi periodicals
witnessed a steady rise in its numbers
vol lVii no 18
INSIGHT
as well as its circulation. The nationalist
periodicals gained immense strength
in this period, particularly after the
emergence of the Swadeshi movement
in western India after 1905. On the con-
trary, non-Brahmin newspapers, includ-
ing Deenbandhu, experienced a major
setback in this period (India Office
Library and Records 1901).3 Subscription
of the most prominent nationalist news-
paper, Kesari, increased substantially. For
example, the number of subscribers of
Kesari between 1897 and 1904 rose from
6,750 to 14,000 (India Office Library and
Records 1904).
Developing Possibilities
of Resistance
The plague epidemic of 1896 set the tone
for the new political churning in the
Bombay Presidency. Apart from being a
deadly disease that killed thousands and
caused the displacement of millions from
the cities, the plague affected a transfor-
mational shift in the Marathi public sphere.
In her work on the 19th-century Marathi
public sphere, Veena Naregal has pointed
out that by the end of the 1870s and the
1880s, the upper caste hold over the
Marathi public sphere was already streng-
thened (Naregal 1999: 3446). In such a
milieu, Phule’s objection to the exclusivist
and oppressive aspects of Brahminism
were only answered with a derisive chau-
vinism that, at best, inculcated a patro-
nising arrogance (Naregal 1999: 3452).
However, due to the palpable presence
of organisational activism of the non-
Brahmins through the Satyashodhak
Samaj, the caste hegemony of conservative
nationalists was far from complete in
western India. The barber’s strike organ-
ised by Savitribai in 1890 could serve as an
example of how the challenge was posed
by the non-Brahmins in the then public
sphere. The strike was called to protest
against the inhuman tonsuring of Brahmin
widows (Narke 2008: 18). It was success-
ful enough to attract the attention of The
Times (London), which published the news
of the strike. Thus, various activities initi-
ated by the Satyashodhak Samaj contrib-
uted in mobilising a large mass base in
the cities as well as the countryside. In
his memoir, Damodar, one of the assassins
of Rand, had bitterly acknowledged the
45
INSIGHT
overwhelming influence of Phule and the
Satyashodhak Samaj on Marathi-speaking
soldiers belonging to non-Brahmin castes
(Khobrekar 1974: 41). He criticised the
radicalism of Satyashodhak leaders and
blamed them for stalling the possibility
of an armed revolt against the British.
Similarly, Bombay-based activism led
by Lokhande made crucial interventions in
the working class politics of the late 19th
century. It consequently posed a strong
challenge to the nationalist politics led by
Tilak. This was peculiarly evident in the
pacifying role he played during the Hindu–
Muslim riots of 1893. He not only opposed
Tilak’s anti-Muslim rhetoric but also strate-
gically mobilised masses against the
riots. In an attempt to establish harmony
between Hindus and Muslims, Lokhande
and his colleagues had organised a public
meeting that was attended by 60,000
people and was held in Bombay (Kadam
2002: 144–45; Pandit 1997: 329). This was
an example of the powerful role played
by Lokhande in neutralising the conser-
vative politics before his death during the
plague epidemic. Before the advent of the
plague epidemic in western India, there-
fore, it was difficult for a leaders like
Tilak to get adequate mass support from
Bombay’s working classes before 1896.
In the absence of a non-Brahmin chal-
lenge in the Bombay Presidency, the
nationalists of western India profoundly
influenced the political discourse in the
early years of the 20th century. It initiated,
particularly in the cities and towns, a new
politics of cultural revivalism and con-
servative nationalism. Due to absence of
non-Brahmin leadership, the nationalist
voices became the sole political voice in
the region. Questions earlier asked by
Satyashodhak activists about representa-
tion, untouchability, and non-Brahmins
were completely absent in the political
articulation of the nationalists. Although,
caste was invoked in the nationalist
articulations, it was its content that was
reframed. For example, Tilak never shied
away from asserting the hegemony of
Brahmins over other classes. While mak-
ing his argument against the inclusion of
lower castes in the political sphere, Tilak
wrote in Kesari, his own newspaper,
The government of the United States of
America had once considered transferring its
46
entire black population to central Africa.
As compared to the Americans, the Aryans
were at least kind enough to include the
Shudras into their civilisation. Thus, the
Shudras need to be more grateful to the
Aryans and should desist, in every possible
way, from claiming their superiority over
Brahmins. (Pol 2015: 24)
Social reformers and the non-Brahmin
activists were regularly criticised in the
nationalist periodicals and public festi-
vals.4 Ganesh Festival and Shiv Jayanti,
started by Tilak, soon became the plat-
forms to vent out anger against the social
reformers and non-Brahmin activists.5
While attempts were being made to in-
corporate non-Brahmins into the nation-
alist discourse, the orientation of the dis-
course remained unequivocally Brahmin-
centric. It acted as a precursor to the poli-
tics of Hindutva nationalism in western
India. Consequent to the murder of Rand,
a radical and conservative variety of
nationalism received a thriving environ-
ment in western India. Accordingly, radical
nationalist activists like Vinayak Damodar
Savarkar, Anant Laxman Kanhere (who
murdered the collector of Nashik in
1909), B B Bhopatkar (the editor of a
prominent Marathi periodical, Bhala),
and B S Moonje (the leader of the Hindu
Mahasabha) emerged in the first decade
of the 20th century. Most among them,
barring Kanhere, held crucial positions
in shaping the politics of Hindu nation-
alism in the 20th century.6
In the midst of this stirring, the role
played by the colonial state further ena-
bled the strengthening of Hindu conserva-
tive voices. The partition of Bengal and the
rise of the Swadeshi movement further
deepened the nationalist voices in the
presidency. The constitutional reforms of
1909 and the arrival of separate elector-
ate marked a new phase of a relationship
between Hindus and Muslims. The period
between 1896 and 1920 was largely domi-
nated by the political discourses of
nationalism, conservativism, and cultural
revivalism. But it also witnessed a crucial
development of a solid ground for a new
political churning heralded by the non-
Brahmin and organised Dalit politics,
which significantly altered the future
course of politics of Maharashtra. It was
during this period that the most potent
vocabulary of non-Brahminism evolved.
april 30, 2022
The Vedokta controversy provoked an
assertive era of non-Brahminism in west-
ern India.7 During this period, the role
played by Chhatrapati Shahu, the ruler
of the princely state of Kolhapur, instru-
mentally shaped the politics of western
India. It was largely under his patronage
that new possibilities of political resist-
ance to conservative hegemony devel-
oped in western India.
The constitutional reforms of 1919 (or
the Government of India Act, 1919) most
importantly set the background for organ-
ised non-Brahmin assertion in western
India. Shahu’s efforts ultimately fructified
in the 1920s and the 1930s, when the
non-Brahmin political movement was able
to successfully overpower the singular
hegemony of Brahmins in the political
sphere of western India. Despite this
evident tension among them, the non-
Brahmin politics strongly challenged the
Brahmin dominance in the public sphere.
Simultaneously, the emergence of organ-
ised Dalit politics under B R Ambedkar’s
leadership signalled the arrival of a new
political force in the provincial and na-
tional politics.
Moreover, the measures adopted by
the colonial state in the aftermath of the
plague epidemic not only affected the
public health infrastructure but also led to
long-term changes in the urban infrastruc-
ture. Consequent to the large number of
plague deaths and extensive displacement of
its residents, a very important intervention
happened in the form of the establishment
of the Bombay City Improvement Trust
(BIT) in 1898. It was established by the co-
lonial government to develop residential
establishments with better sanitary condi-
tions to house the city’s working classes.
Although the BIT experiment did not work
too long, it was replaced by the Bombay
Development Department. Thus, the resi-
dential apartments constructed in the af-
termath of the plague epidemic of 1896
provided a fertile ground for strong
working class and Dalit activism that not
only affected the city but also beyond.
In Conclusion
In the aftermath of the plague epidemic of
1896, the Bombay Presidency witnessed
large-scale destruction and displacement
of several lives. This continued for the
vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

next two decades. Therefore, it crucially
affected the political discourse of the
region. In this context, this article tried
to argue that after the epidemic of 1896,
the political landscape of the region
witnessed significant transformation. The
handling of the epidemic crisis by the colo-
nial state led to a variety of responses from
different social groups. The ideologues
of social conservatism, mostly dominated
by urban Brahmins, used nationalist
rhetoric to reinforce the discourse of con-
servatism in the province. This led to far-
reaching changes in the political fabric of
the Bombay Presidency. It resulted in the
establishment of the complete hegemony
of conservative chauvinism and radical
nationalism in the early decade of the
20th century. Although the Brahmin-led
conservative voices lost its hegemony in
the region in the decades after the 1930s, it
nevertheless significantly affected the
politics of the region and beyond. It is
important to note here that it was during
this period that the ideological founda-
tions of the Hindu nationalism were
strengthened, which eventually led to
the consolidation of a new organisation
like the Hindu Mahasabha in the region.
However, it would be too simplistic to
say that there were no internal tensions
within this strand of political discourse. In
fact, the man who killed Rand, Damodar
was an ardent opponent of the INC in-
cluding Tilak (Khobrekar 1974: 55–56).
Despite the overwhelming differences
within the conservative strand of nation-
alist discourse, from 1896 to 1920, the
supremacy of the conservative Brahmins
in the political sphere of the province
was unqualified.
notes
1 Mama Parmanand, one of the leading social
reformers and a prominent colleagues of Phule,
provides a testimony in 1890 regarding the
extraordinary contribution made by Savitribai. In a
letter to the Dewan of the Maharaja of Baroda, he
wrote about Savitribai, “The woman deserves
even more than the man for cooperating with her
husband and suffering with him in that work in
a manner not yet witnessed in the highest edu-
cated of the higher castes” (Narke 1993: 115).
2 After several years of inactivity, the Satya-
shodhak Samaj held a conference in Poona in
April 1911. It was presided over by Bhaskarrao
Jadhav, who became one of the faces of the
non-Brahmin politics in the early 20th century
(Omvedt 1976: 128–39).
3 India Office Library and Records (1901), for ex-
ample, can show the complete domination of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
nationalist Brahmins in the Marathi newspapers.
Barring, few non-Brahmins, most of the editorial
positions were occupied by the Brahmins (India
Office Library and Records 1901).
4 Many prominent nationalist periodicals con-
sistently supported Tilak’s orthodox views.
For example, in the August 1909 issue of the
Granthamala, an important periodical based
in Kolhapur, supported the practice of un-
touchability and argued that it was necessary
for the organisation of functional social order.
Bhala, another known Pune-based periodical by
a Tilak loyalist, openly flaunted its supremacist
views by supporting the caste division and
untouchability to be necessary elements for
“national” development (Pol 2015: 24).
5 Offensive and abusive language against the
liberal social reformers and non-Brahmin activ-
ists was often invoked during Ganesh festivals
held every year. Historian and scholar, Y D Phadke
(1984: 6–7) has provided some examples in his
work on western India. One of the poems (of
1921) that was sung during Ganesh festival or-
ganised by the nationalists of Pune reflect the
language directed against social reformers and
untouchable women: तझ
ु िमळे न महािरन कोणी,
वाकडी ती सात िठकाणी! काळंु दरी घब
ु डावानी. मग तू
राजी आिण ती राणी!!
It can be roughly translated as: You will get a
Mahar woman, who has crooked features. She is
as ugly as an owl [And] she will be your queen of
hearts.
6 The Hindu nationalist politics, conceptualised
through the concept of Hindutva, did try to
address the caste question through employing
limited social reform agenda. However, the
framework of social reformist agenda was
largely concerned to mobilise Hindus vis-à-vis
emerging organised Muslim politics. Although,
the Hindu nationalist political leadership was
keen to incorporate members from lower eche-
lons of society into its organisational structure,
they were immensely averse to share organisa-
tional power with them.
7 Vedokta controversy began in 1899 when the
royal Brahmin priest of Kolhapur princely
state openly declined to perform Vedokta
rituals for the ritual event organised by Shahu,
the erstwhile ruler of Kolhapur. When Shahu
Maharaj insisted, he argued that Vedokta rituals
were meant for the Kshatriyas (along with the
Brahmins and Vaishyas who were “Dvijas”)
and not permitted for the Shudras. This inci-
dent occurred in 1900.
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47
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Women and National Liberation Movements
Revisiting the Discourse on Agency
Bi Bi Ishrat Hassan
A critical evaluation of the burgeoning body of feminist
scholarship on the expression of agency by women in
conflict settings is undertaken in this paper, more
specifically in the course of nationalist resistance
movements. Patently, this strand of literature assumes
significance, in that it seeks to challenge the masculinist
exclusiveness of the mainstream literature on
nationalism, revolution, and resistance that pushes
women into political oblivion either as passive victims or
as bystanders of their own history and that of their
nations, rendering invisible their historical contributions.
While acknowledging the need for shifting of scholarly
lenses from an exclusive focus on the narratives of
victimhood to the aspects of women’s agency, this
paper—by way of revisiting the structure–agency
binary in social theory—challenges the unqualified
emphasis on agency and a comparative undervaluation
of the deeply entrenched “structures” of local patriarchy,
and the constraints that these prevalent structures
impose on the capacity of the individual agent.
Bi Bi Ishrat Hassan (ishrattissmumbai@gmail.com) is a PhD researcher
at the Centre for Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policies, Tata
Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
58
I
n the classical literature on nationalism, revolution, and
state formation, women remain conspicuous by their
absence because of masculinist exclusiveness of this lit-
erature. Feminist theorists argue that “the result of this gen-
der exclusion has been to render invisible women’s hands in
the making of nations and states” (Nagel 1998: 243). Lately,
there has, however, been a proliferation of theory and research
on gender or more specifically women in the nationalist politics
and national liberation movements. Very often, the nation-
alist struggles take the form of armed conflicts between the
forces of occupation and the nationalist guerrillas; the women
are portrayed as “passive victims” sandwiched between the
two combating forces. It is undeniable that women tend to be
the worst victims of myriad forms of violence during the course
of an armed conflict, especially the deliberate war tactic of
sexual aggression employed by the state. The female body being
viewed as an embodiment of the community identity and
honour becomes the part of “privilege of the conqueror” and
therefore the primary site of sexual violence (Chenoy 2002).
The victimisation of women due to political violence and
the brutality of militarisation has been documented in a bur-
geoning body of literature and deservingly so. However,
many feminist scholars have started advocating for a move
away from the victimhood paradigm towards a discourse on
women’s agency. The motivation for this shift of focus may
very well be attributed to the feminist concern of recogni-
tion, the significant role that women play during the strug-
gles for national liberation. In emphasising the active agency
of women, the feminist scholars are well-intentioned in
their attempt of bringing women to the centre-stage of na-
tionalist politics, lest they fall into political oblivion as “passive
victims” who could not be partners in scripting the history of
the national project.
While acknowledging the need for shifting of scholarly
lenses from an exclusive focus on the narratives of victim-
hood to aspects of women’s agency during the nationalist
struggles, this paper attempts to strike a cautionary note that
an unqualified emphasis on agency risks glossing over the
insurmountable constraints that the exercise of this agency
faces within the deeply entrenched local patriarchal struc-
tures. Even as the debilitating impact of “patriarchy of milita-
risation” is recognised, the focus should also be on critically
analysing the framework of gender relations within the
nationalist movements themselves, which often tend to be
uncritically acknowledged as languages of liberation bereft of
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

any elements of exclusion embedded either within their
structure or in their rhetoric.
Women’s ‘Proper Place’ in National Liberation Movements
Before analysing the gendered power relations within the nation-
alist movements and the exclusion of women from the key decision-
making structures, it is imperative to underline that in eminent
feminist scholarship, the project of nationalism itself has been
conceptualised as a masculine project having “sprung from mas-
culinised memory, masculinised humiliation and masculinised
hope” (Enloe 1990: 45). Highlighting the intimate relationship
between militarism and nationalism, Joane Nagel (1998: 249)
persuasively argues that the notion of “hegemonic masculinity”
is central to both and that “the modern form of Western masculin-
ity emerged at about the same time and place as modern nation-
alism.” Further, Nagel (1998: 251–52) points towards the reso-
nance of the culture of nationalism and masculine cultural themes:
Terms like honour, patriotism, cowardice, bravery and duty are hard
to distinguish as either nationalist or masculinist, since they seem so
thoroughly tied both to the nation and to manliness ... that the “micro-
culture” of masculinity in everyday life articulates very well with the
demands of nationalism, particularly its militaristic side.
In the same vein, Anne McClintock (1991: 105) argues,
In the chronicles of male nationalism, women, too, are all too often figured
as mere scenic backdrops to the big-brass business of masculine armies and
uprisings ... No nationalism in the world has granted women and men the
same privileged access to the resources of the nation-state. So far, all na-
tionalisms are dependent on powerful constructions of gender difference.
Notwithstanding the feminist assertion that the full member-
ship within any national collectivity is a gendered affair, one has
to take a break from history lessons to assert that women have not
played a crucial role in nationalist politics. Feminist scholarship
has challenged the gender blindness of masculinist historio-
graphy by trying to resurrect from the annals of history those
women who have led movements or participated in national or
oppositional politics while also exposing the “mechanisms of
exclusion” that ensured a systematic distancing of women from
decision-making processes and other power positions (Nagel
1998). While Nagel (1998: 243) argues for a theoretical focus on
“gender relations” rather than an exclusive focus on “women,” she
acknowledges that the “focus on women revolutionists, women
leaders, women’s hidden labour, women’s exploitation, women’s
resistance to domination” has served to fill a critical gap in the
study of nationalism and national politics. Nira Yuval-Davis and
Floya Anthias propose five major forms of women’s engagement
with the national processes that paradoxically are reflective of both
relations of subordination as well as the centrality of such engage-
ment to the project of nation-building. The five ways of partici-
pation as indicated by Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1989: 7) are:
(i) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities;
(ii) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups;
(iii) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of
the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture; (iv) as signi-
fiers of ethnic/national differences as a focus and symbol in
ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction, and
transformation of ethnic/national collectivities; and (v) as par-
ticipants in national, economic, political, and military struggles.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18
SPECIAL ARTICLE
While there is a clear recognition of women as participants
in national struggles, the feminist scholarship has been equally
heedful of the gendered power relations, not least the fact that
nationalist movements themselves tend to be masculine pre-
serves. Recognition of the role played by women in the nationalist
politics is accompanied by feminist insistence on the fact that
the scripts in which these (women’s) roles are embedded are written
primarily by men, for men and about men, and that women are by
design, supporting actors whose roles reflect masculinist notions of
feminity and of women’s “proper place.” (Nagel 1998: 243)
This relegation of women to symbolic and supportive roles as
nurturers of male nationalists has been evocatively reflected
by Cynthia Enloe in her book Bananas, Beaches and Bases:
Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (1990). Enloe
argued about the complexity and “fraught nature” of women’s
relationship with nationalist movements due to the imposition
of symbolic roles on women by male nationalists. In her opin-
ion, “stories of those complexities have often been silenced—
in history books, in national holiday celebrations, in national
museum exhibitions” (Enloe 1990: 89).
Women have had distinctly uneasy relationships with nationalism. On the
one hand, thousands of women have discovered in nationalist move-
ments a new public persona and an opening for new political partici-
pation. Seeing themselves as, and being seen by others as, members of
a nation have given these women an identity larger than that defined by
domesticated motherhood or marriage. On the other hand, even when
they have been energised by nationalism, many women have discov-
ered that, in practice, as women, they often have been treated by male
nationalist leaders and intellectuals chiefly as symbols—patriarchally
sculpted symbols—of the nation. Women have served as symbols of the
nation violated, the nation suffering, the nation reproducing itself, the
nation at its purest. Being reduced to a symbol has meant that women
have not been treated as genuine participants (with their own ideas,
goals, and skills) in the nationalist movements. (Enloe 1990: 88)
A clear division of labour is often visible within nationalist
movements as women, “true to their station,” take on supportive
roles like messengers, escorts, nurses, or providers of shelter to
guerrillas, while men, obeying the standards of hegemonic mas-
culinity, tend to be real actors “who are defending their freedom,
their honour, their homeland and their women” (Nagel 1998: 244).
Even where women take an active part in direct combat, it
would be fallacious to conclude that this participation works to-
wards feminising the political spaces; the fact of the matter being
that women continue to operate within these masculine structures
in a relationship of subordination often obliged to prove them-
selves to be “men enough” for having dared to venture into the
spaces that as per the notion of femininity are not meant to be
theirs. Notwithstanding their political subordination, the symbolic
projection of women as “mothers of the fatherland” during nation-
alist struggles comes with lot of repercussions on women’s bodily
autonomy. The male nationalists tend to view themselves as legiti-
mate guardians of women’s sexuality and their sexual purity, for
women are thought “to embody family and national honour;
women’s shame is the family’s shame, the nation’s shame, the
man’s shame” (Nagel 1998: 254). Therefore, rather than conflat-
ing the term “empowerment” with “participation” of women in
nationalist institutions and processes, the feminist scholars should
hold to critical scrutiny not only the conditions under which such
participation takes place but also the acts of “mobilisation” that
59
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underlie this participation as to who mobilises whom to what end.
Within the restrictive patriarchal norms of a particular society, it
is not hard to conceive of the patriarchs of the nationalist move-
ment viewing the participation of women as only instrumental
in fulfilling their own “patriarchal vision” of the new nation. If it
is not so, then one has to question why women, in view of their
active contributions to resistance, end up becoming the
object of masculine meta-narrative ... as just heroines, martyrs or some
other idealised category that will erase what they have done by turning
them into national symbols. (Cooke 1996: 180)
Structure of Patriarchy and Subversion of Agency
The structure–agency debate has been a central one in social
theory, which has its genesis in a fundamental normative enquiry
of whether human behaviour and action are solely determined
by the will of the individual actor or by some supra-individual
pregiven relations and established patterns in the complex
structures of the social formations. While the structural accounts
turn down the argument that individual agents are the sole causes
of events, the deterministic structuralism is in turn criticised for
“denial and neglect of the potential for ‘agents’ to not only make
choices but shape their circumstances” (Conner 2009: 3). Patently,
social theory has progressed ahead of the controversy generated
by the structure–agency dichotomy, especially with Anthony
Giddens’s (1993: 5) theory of structuration that sought to un-
derline the interdependence of action and structure by arguing
that “every social actor knows a great deal of the conditions of
the reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member.”
There has been an increasing recognition that “people collec-
tively construct the structures of the world and that the world is
alterable through and by human agency” (Conner 2009: 17).
Giddens (1993: 81) defined “agency” as “the stream of actual
or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in
the ongoing process of events-in-the-world.” In his under-
standing, what is analytical to the concept of agency is “(i) that
a person ‘could have acted otherwise,’ and (ii) that the world
as constituted by a stream of events-in process independent of
the agent does not hold out a predetermined future” (Giddens
1993: 81). The element of “choice” is, therefore, central to the
conceptualisation of agency; every or any action does not rep-
resent agency, only a freely chosen action does. While the
notion of agency “recognises the potential of individuals to exhi-
bit conscious goal driven activity and exercise power” (Connor
2009: 17), one must also recognise the constraints imposed by
prevailing structures to the capacity of the individual agent.
Against this theoretical background, one needs to revisit the
discourse on “women’s agency” that emerges predominantly from
an analysis of recent feminist literature on women in armed
conflicts in general and their role in armed resistance movements
in particular. It has to be recognised that underlying this discur-
sive representation of women as agents might be a sympathetic
concern that with the image of passive victimhood, women may
become bystanders of their own history and thus risk slipping into
the terrain of subalternity. However, the apprehension in the use of
rhetorical device of “agency” is that while it symbolises women’s
control over their history, a more nuanced understanding of
60
the crippling structures of patriarchy and the insurmountable
structural constraints they pose to agency is being lost sight of.
For instance, in the case of armed resistance in Kashmir, Rita
Manchanda (2005: 4739) locates “agency” in that
the housewives stepped outside the cultural framework of the family
to make rounds of detention centres and torture cells looking for the
disappeared and negotiated with institutional power structures of the
enemy, the army, administration and the court.
In war, the dominant image of women as losers—as victims—
has grave consequences for a true awareness of the differential
impact of conflict on women’s and men’s lives and the creative
strategies that women forge for the survival of their families and
communities. That is, the hardships and compulsions that push
them to take on decision-making roles, entering into negotiations
with conflict in the public sphere, becoming peace activists, or
participating in the militarised struggle. The challenge is to
shore up the “gains” wrought by conflict in the experiences of
both civilian and combatant women (Manchanda 2005: 4739).
This understanding of agency is gravely problematic in the
sense that it exaggerates on the one hand that women are being
partners in scripting the history of the nation, and on the other,
ignoring the fact that this is not being accomplished in the cir-
cumstances of their own choosing. While agency signifies control,
here we observe the lack of it—the lack of control that these
women would have liked to have over their own lives. To borrow
from Giddens, one may ask, could these women have acted other-
wise? Where does one draw a fine line in discursive space between
victimhood and agency—in the lack of alternatives, “the hard-
ships and compulsions” for these women that “push them to take
on decision-making roles” (Manchanda 2005: 4739, emphasis
added). The act of entering into negotiations and that of getting
pushed into negotiating with the predatory institutions in the
public sphere are essentially different; to what extent could one
remain assured that rather than signifying agency, the unwill-
ing and imposed necessity of encounter with the public sphere
in a patriarchal society with institutionalised forms of margin-
alisation and control does not signify exacerbated vulnerabi-
lity, powerlessness, and exposure to exploitation. To empha-
sise agency, one of the blunt examples given by Manchanda
(2005: 4739) is that of Nepal where a civil war ensued in the wake
of a Maoist-inspired peasant struggle that “denuded the whole
villages of men.” In the case of Nepalese women, she observes:
Women traditionally form the backbone of the subsistence agrarian
economy, but now have crossed the gendered division of labour to take
on taboo areas—ploughing and thatching of roofs. The absence of men
opened new opportunities for women to step into public life. (Manchanda
2005: 4739; emphasis added)
This representation embodies irony; rather than an image of
women as agents acting in opposition to or in negotiating with
institutionalised patriarchy, it projects them in the proverbial
“cat being away and the mice will play” frame.
The extremism of the agent–victim binary, that is, women being
either “passive victims who lack the ability to make choices or
active agents who have full control of their circumstances”
(Constable 2009: 57) is amenable to challenge, especially in the
case of national liberation movements in that while women are
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

positioned into decision-making roles, their action does not trans-
late into any effective reconstitution of the structures within which
they act. With the local structures of patriarchy intact, women
under compelling circumstances may take on non-traditional roles
in the process of “forging the survival strategies for their families
and community,” what remains unchanged are the stereotypi-
cal assumptions about women’s proper role in the conservative
social set-up. Not surprisingly, women who are compelled into
non-traditional (may be improper) roles, though not of their own
choosing, may be subject to humiliation and stigmatisation under
the prevailing cultural norms. For instance, in Kashmir, Dabla
(2012: 258) observes about the conditions of labour market par-
ticipation for those women whose participation was an outcome
of the enforced disappearance of their husbands (the “half-wid-
ows”) in the course of the nationalist armed struggle:
After disappearance of their husbands, half-widows experienced ex-
treme economic downfall ... In that situation, they were compelled to
come out of their homes and work for their families. Several studies
revealed that these women who usually worked in handicraft sector
and their children in child labour sector, were often abused, discrimi-
nated, harassed and exploited.
Their presence in non-traditional spaces invited social ostra-
cism, which Dabla (2012: 257) observes, was supported by
“allegations on their chastity, purity and dignity.” These exam-
ples problematise the notion of paradoxical “gains” of conflict
vis-à-vis women’s agency by highlighting the overwhelming
constraints posed by the structures of patriarchy that confer
disproportionate power to men for “keeping the women in
their place” even during the times when the community is
waging an armed resistance against the “outside other.”
National Liberation and Women’s Emancipation
Also relevant to the appraisal of agency discourse, as has been
alluded to in the preceding sections, is to reassess the bracket-
ing together of women as actors/participants in the nationalist
struggle and women as agents in the nation-making process. If
this participation is one based on the uncompromised traditional
notions of womanhood as evidenced by most armed movements
employing women in tangential or subordinate roles, this kind
of participation may not meaningfully contribute in bringing
about any substantial remoulding of women’s consciousness or
collective action around issues of gender equality. By thrusting
women into existing structures and spaces defined by hegemonic
masculinity standards, one may be “engendering the resistance”
slightly appropriating and adopting Anne Phillips’ (1991) phrase
“engendering democracy” as a matter of symbolic representation,
this symbolism may lead to the subversion of women’s political
agency in a larger sense. For instance, McClintock (1991: 115) ob-
serves how by means of the incorporation of few elite educated
Christian women into the organisational structure of the African
National Congress (ANC) in the initial years, “women’s-potential
militancy was muted, and their political agency domesticated,
by the language of female service and subordination.” In their
zeal of foregrounding agency with its connotation of empower-
ment in contrast with passive victimhood, on a conceptual plane,
many feminist theorists’ seek to corroborate their argument
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18
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with an undue emphasis on “women veterans of the struggle,”
who quite expectedly are often few in number. An enquiry into
the social and class origins of these veterans may shed light on
some other important yet underexplored facets, like the political
economy of the conflict, which often see certain groups or in-
dividuals accruing some capital, not necessarily economic alone,
thus gaining capacity to initiate action. This submission is not to
undermine the contribution of these women leaders but equating
it with collective agency of women as an undifferentiated cat-
egory would be to disregard the notion of intersectionality, the
fact that women’s capacity to act is substantially determined
by numerous other factors like their social class, location in the
caste hierarchy, race, and the geographical location.
Occupancy of different social positions—as defined, for example, by
gender, wealth, social prestige, class, occupation, ethnicity, generation,
sexual preference or education, gives people knowledge of different
schemas and access to different kinds and amounts of resources and
hence different possibilities for transformative action. (Sewell 1992: 20)
It may not be a legitimate assertion to be entirely dismissive
of agency in various forms of women’s participation like pro-
test demonstrations, peaceful processions, or direct combat;
nevertheless, the scholarly analysis shall also weigh in the pos-
sibility of patriarchal manoeuvring at mass mobilisation—the
instrumental rationality of the patriarchs of the liberation
movement to mobilise women towards the end of strengthen-
ing the nationalist movement to the utter neglect of issues of
gender hierarchy. After all, it is not uncommon to witness that
“a nationalist movement that encourages women’s participa-
tion in the name of national liberation often balks at feminist
demands for gender equality” (Nagel 1998: 253). Women’s rights
are often seen as luxuries which a society striving for national
liberation cannot afford. With regard to women’s issues, a
strange rendition of personal–political divide is usually played
out; the tyranny of patriarchal structures tends to be viewed as the
community’s “personal” issue (or a non-issue) while the tyranny of
occupation gains primacy as “political” that needs to be con-
tested and fought against first. Raising the “frivolous”
issues of women’s subordination in the midst of a nationalist
movement is at best seen as a strategic attempt to divert the
valuable attention from the “real” issue of national liberation.
Therefore, not surprisingly, the very term “feminism” acquires
a conspiratorial connotation, a belief bolstered by the fact of
its “foreign-rootedness” or Western origin. For instance, in
Kashmir, this aversion towards or apprehension of feminist
consciousness being counter-nationalistic has meant that the
term “feminism” has not managed a welcome entry into the
lexicons of even the most literate sections of the society.
Not only men but women also imbibe the patriarchal idea of
incompatibility between the struggle for national liberation
and the one for women’s emancipation. Through this qualita-
tive gradation of oppression, women’s subjugation under the
debilitating local patriarchal institutions is stripped off of any
immediacy of concern; the hegemonic “common sense” in a
Gramcian sense dictates the masculine priority for national
liberation, while women’s issues—being an internal matter—
can wait, may be endlessly. McClintock (1991: 118) quotes a
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female member of the ANC: “It would be suicidal for us to adopt
feminist ideas. Our enemy is the system and we cannot exhaust
our energies on women's issues.” Nagel (1998) recognises that
in course of a resistance movement, women’s agency is stifled
by enormous structural constraints as they are not able to
challenge the patriarchal impositions of their community, lest
this might be construed as “division of loyalty” or, more pre-
cisely, their disloyalty to the national cause. The women activ-
ists of Palestine also reflected their acquiescence to this patri-
archal relegation of gender issues as secondary during the na-
tional liberation movement:
We can’t open up a second front now. Our battle is not with men. In the
context of struggling against the occupation ... we have to postpone ques-
tions of gender liberation till after liberation. When we have our own state,
we will work on women’s issues. (Augustin, as quoted in Nagel 1998: 255)
The absence of expressed resistance to the relations of subordi-
nation within the community does not completely erase the
agency of women in resisting the patriarchy of militarism and
occupation; however, it does expose serious structural limita-
tions to its exercise. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s
concept of habitus could be adapted to understand these limi-
tations to agency and the resilience of existing structures. The
concept underscores the constraints imposed by internalised
influences on the behaviour of social agents. “The habitus—
embodied history, internalised as a second nature and so forgotten
as history—is the active presence of the whole past of which it
is the product” (Bourdieu quoted in Österlind 2008: 75). Bourdieu
recognises that the capacity for agency, while inherent in all
individuals, is shaped and constrained by socialisation of the
agent into the long-enduring social structures that leads the agent
to view certain power-laden relations as power neutral and
natural, and hence not amenable to contestation. This analysis
partly explains the acquiescence of women to patriarchal defini-
tions of a woman’s “proper role” during the course of a national
liberation movement, the role of being a mother, “the symbol
of the national hearth and home” (Nagel 1998: 256).
The suppression of women’s agency by the overbearing struc-
tures of patriarchy also implies that post-liberation societies have
often had little to offer in terms of women’s emancipation. View-
ing national liberation as one supreme goal, the nationalist move-
ments manifest their masculine character in their disapproval
of articulation of any feminist agenda as “weakening” of the
movement. While the women members in the masculine organi-
sations of nationalist resistance are relegated to auxiliary roles and
subjected to male prejudice, and their attempts at “double mili-
tancy” are denounced as betrayal of the national cause.
Double militancy means being active on two fronts: working within na-
tional liberation movements; and working in women's organisations
concerned with establishing and gaining women’s rights within the con-
text of the broader political struggle. (Davies 1983: 878)
This disapproval of the double militancy exposes the instru-
mental connections of encouraging mass participation of
women; sticking to the “national” and not “straying” into the
“feminist” is set as a condition for gaining legitimacy in the
eyes of nationalist patriarchs. Reflecting the paradox of women’s
nationalist activity, Nagel (1998: 253) observes that
Despite their bravery, sometimes taking on traditional male military
roles, and despite the centrality of their contribution to many nation-
alist struggles, it is often the case that feminist nationalists find them-
selves once again under the thumb of institutionalised patriarchy once
national independence is won.
She refers to the Algerian liberation movement known for its
involvement of women, in which reportedly thousands of them
joined active resistance and some 2,000 of them joined the armed
combat. “Despite this extensive involvement,” Nagel (1998: 254)
argues, “once the independence was won, Algerian women found
themselves ‘back in the kitchen.’” The persistence of oppressive
patriarchal structures in the aftermath of “national liberation”
is also reflected by Anabella Rodriques of Mozambique who, at
the age of 16 years, had joined the Liberation Front and after
four years of national liberation pointed out that
It is easier to eliminate the colonial, bourgeois influences that were im-
posed on us and identified with the enemy than to eliminate generations
of tradition from within our own society. (quoted in Davies 1983: 877)
Conclusions
Clearly, patriarchal leanings of nationalist movements result in a
peculiar determinism that sees women’s liberation contingent
only upon the liberation of the “motherland” from the “outside
oppressor” while favouring the unquestioning prevalence of
status quo of social and gender relations within the community.
Evidently, women’s emancipation does not follow as an ineluc-
table corollary of victory of a nationalist movement itself
“informed by masculinist pride and holding a patriarchal vision
of new nation-state” (Nagel 1998: 261).

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Philadelphia: Penn State Press.
Sewell Jr, William H (1992): “A Theory of Structure:
Duality, Agency and Transformation,” American
Journal of Sociology, Vol 98, No 1, pp 1–29.
Walker, Cherryl (1991): Women and Resistance in
South Africa, New York: Monthly Review Press.
Yuval-Davis, Nira (1993): “Gender and Nation,”
Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol 16, No 4, pp 621–32.

62 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Numbers as a Means to Power
Politics of Caste as a Census Category in Colonial India c 1871–1941
Pritam Singh
Historians working on colonial India have often argued
that the colonial censuses hardened caste divides in
Indian society. Contrarily, this paper showcases that the
history of colonial caste census is more complicated than
what was assumed by historians who simplistically
identify it as a divisive colonial instrument. Caste as a
census category was especially crucial for the lower
castes. Caste data in the census reports highlighted the
marginalisation of the lower castes and was used by
them to make their claims for power. These demands of
the lower castes were seen by the upper-caste
nationalists and reformers as divides created through
the colonial censuses. Hence, due to the demands of the
upper castes, caste as a census category was dropped
for the 1941 Census. This was a massive setback to the
lower castes who were using the census figures to
legitimise their representation in the public sector.
Pritam Singh (psingh3@jgu.edu.in) is an academic tutor at O P Jindal
Global University, Sonipat.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18
T
here have been demands in India for the release of caste
census data from the Census of 2011 (Trivedi 2021;
Alluri and Mateen 2021). Additionally, in the past few
weeks many of the backward caste groups have approached the
government to include caste in the Census of 2021 (Swaroop
2021; Kumar 2021). However, the most important argument in
the news reports against the release of caste census data and the
use of caste as a census category is that such data will further
create caste divides and be used for divisiveness by political
parties (Sarkar 2015). This argument follows from the argu-
ments given by historians that caste as a census category intro-
duced by the colonial rulers created and hardened the caste
divides (Dirks 1992; Cohn 1987; Appadurai 1993).1 Historians
argue that these caste-based censuses were only challenged in
the 1930s when Indian nationalists and reformers “denounced
the government’s caste listings as divisive tools of imperialism
and urged their readers not to provide the census enumerators
with details of their varna and jati” (Bayly 1999: 244). This
denunciation by the Indian nationalists and reformers led to the
colonial decision of dropping caste as a census category after
the Census of 1931, thus leading to the absence of caste category
in the Census of 1941 (Bayly 1999: 244).
However, this paper moves away from simplistically seeing
caste-based censuses as a part of the colonial structure that cre-
ated divisiveness and went against the nationalist currents.
Instead, it argues that the colonial census formed a critical in-
strument that could help in understanding the marginalisation
of the lower castes. The census figures highlighted that literates
of the Indian society were mostly found among the upper castes.
They also proved that the upper castes hegemonised the public
sector. During the 1920s and the 1930s, when the British govern-
ment introduced the reforms for self-governance through the
Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, Simon Commission of
1928, and the Round Table Conferences of the early 1930s, the
census data had become useful for the lower castes to make
claims for their political representation. However, the upper
castes saw the power-sharing claims of the lower castes as threat-
ening to the nationalist movement. Hence, the upper castes
indulged in the idea of censuses creating caste divides (an idea
that has now found space in the recent historiography on caste
censuses). Thus, the upper castes protested against caste as a
census category. This led to the colonial decision of dropping
caste from the decennial Census of 1941. This decision came
against the interests of the lower caste groups who used caste
censuses to legitimise their claims to power.
63
SPECIAL ARTICLE
This argument has been made in two sections. The first sec-
tion discusses the caste-related data provided by the colonial
census reports. It suggested the hegemony of the upper castes
in the public and the education sector. The colonial census
data has been marginalised in recent scholarly works because
of the belief that censuses were merely a part of the colonial
apparatuses to create caste divides among Indians. A look at
this data reveals that the census reports were attached to caste
politics. The second section looks at the period between the
1920s and 1930s when the anti-caste groups started using
census data to make their claims for representation in the pub-
lic sphere. The section also discusses how the upper castes
countered the demands of the lower castes through the
nationalistic rhetoric of caste divisions created by the colonial
censuses. This rhetoric led the upper-caste nationalists to pro-
test against the use of caste category in the colonial censuses.
The section ends by suggesting that the upper-caste opposition
led to the colonial rulers dropping caste as a census category.
Through this historical analysis of the caste censuses in colo-
nial India, the paper concludes by arguing in favour of the ne-
cessity of the census data in current times. The data from the
2011 and the 2021 Censuses can be used to understand the
marginalisation of the lower castes and the hegemony of the
upper castes in the political sphere. Thus, the recent census
data can be used to correct the caste divides present in con-
temporary India. Moreover, the dropping of caste as a census
category in modern India cannot be seen as an act against the
caste-based divisions. The history of the colonial censuses
showcases that the removal of caste as a census category
worked in the favour of the upper castes who wanted to main-
tain their political hegemony and against the interests of the
lower castes who aimed for their political representation.
Caste and Numbers in the Colonial Census
Colonial censuses provided essential data that highlighted the
marginalisation of the lower castes. This becomes clear with
the census reports concerning different provinces of colonial
India. It was reported in the first census of Madras that the
learned professions were majorly held by the Brahmins, and
the personal services were performed by the lower castes
such as the Pariahs (Cornish 1874: 212, 284). While the
Brahmins formed the most educated group after the Eurasians
and the Europeans, the lower castes such as the Pariahs were
among the least-educated groups in Madras in 1871 (Cornish
1874: 195, 360). These trends concerning the dominance of the
upper castes in Madras followed in the 20th century as well.
For instance, the Census of 1911 reported that while among
every 1,000 Brahmins, around 400 were literate; among unto-
uchable castes such as the Malas, only seven were literate
(Chatterton 1912: 132). The representation of the lower castes
in education went down even further if numbers of only the
literate ones in English were counted. The Malas in 1911 had
only 0.2 of every thousand persons literate in English. The
Brahmins, on the other hand, contributed 155 as literates
in every group of thousand persons (Chatterton 1912: 132).
Similarly, in 1931, while among every 1,000 Tamil Brahmins,
64
625 were found to be literate; in the case of untouchables
castes like Madigas, only five of 1,000 persons were found to
be literate (Yeats 1932: 276). The data concerning government
services also suggested Brahmin hegemony. For instance, data
collected in 1931 for the state of Pudukkottai in Madras prov-
ince suggested that the Brahmins took 70% of the government
jobs while the depressed classes had almost zero representa-
tion. This meant the over-representation of Brahmins in the
public sector as they only formed around 3% of the total popu-
lation (Yeats 1932: 416).
The case of Punjab, a north Indian state, was not any diffe-
rent. Starting from the 19th century, the census highlighted the
hegemony of the upper castes over the public sphere. In the 1891
Census, it was reported that the upper castes like the Brahmins,
Syeds, Khatris and Aroras were the most educated groups and
the untouchable castes like the Jhinwars, Nais, and Arains
were the least educated (Maclagan 1892: 252–54). This trend
continued until the last caste Census of 1931. In 1931 when
out of every 1,000 Brahmins, 250 were educated, the literates
among the untouchable castes like Chuhras remained 20 times
less than the number found among the Brahmins, that is,
merely 12 (Ahmad 1933: 258). While education was minimal
among the lower castes of Punjab, so was their representation
in the state services. The Punjab Census of 1921 reported that
there was little to no representation of untouchable castes in
the state services (Middleton 1923: 362). Jobs in the public ser-
vices were held by higher castes like the Brahmins, Khatris,
Aroras, Syeds and Sheikhs (Middleton 1923: 362). The same
census suggested that around 70% of individuals from the
Chuhra caste indulged in menial occupations (Middleton 1923:
362). Also, the 1931 Punjab Census suggests that apart from
doing menial jobs, many of the lower castes remained stuck
in their traditional occupations. For instance, around 40%
of the Julahas among the Sikhs and 80% of Julahas among
the Muslims followed the traditional occupation of weaving
(Yeats 1932: 343). Similarly, among Lohars and Tarkhans, the
percentage of people involved in the caste-based occupation of
iron smithing and carpentering, respectively, was seen to be
around 60% among Sikhs, 45% among Hindus and 70%
among Muslims (Yeats 1932: 343).
These trends were not merely unique to Madras and Punjab.
The censuses reveal similar trends for the other provinces too.
Detailed notes on how caste affected the education status and
the occupational category of individuals coming from different
provinces were published in the All India Census of 1931. In all
the provinces, the least-educated groups were the untouch-
ables, and the highest educated were the Brahmins, Baniyas,
Sheikhs, and Syeds (Hutton 1933: 330, 342–45). For instance,
in the central provinces too, out of every 1,000 Brahmins, 581
were literate, and out of 1,000 Chamars, only 16 were found to
be literate (Hutton 1933: 343). In addition to this, the occupa-
tional statistics of all India suggested that the lower castes
were forced to work in their traditional occupations. Around
60% of the Bhangis in 1931 reported that their primary occu-
pation was that of scavenging (Hutton 1933: 295). Also, censuses
clearly suggested that the upper castes hijacked the legislative
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

councils of the states. For example, in 1931, the legislative
council of the central provinces had the majority of its elected and
nominated members from among the Brahmins with almost
no representation of the lower castes (Hutton 1933: 333). These
statistics at the all-India level and at the provincial level sug-
gested the backwardness of the lower castes. While the lower
castes performed menial jobs and were stuck in their caste-
based occupations, the upper castes had hegemonised the
public sector. The censuses revealed that the depressed classes
who formed over 50 million in the total population of India in
the 1920s and the 1930s had little to no representation in the
assemblies and councils of the colonial state, the public services,
and the education system. This data in the census reports and
concerning the marginalisation of the lower caste groups was
to be used by the anti-caste leaders during the reforms of the
1920s and 1930s to demand political representation.
Census, Reforms, and Anti-caste Demands
By the 1920s, the British Indian government had started a process
that aimed for self-governance by the Indian groups. This process
made statistics important for political representation. Repre-
sentation through elections or nominations was to be based on
the population of a community. In 1918, the Southborough
Committee with the aim to initiate processes of communal
representation brought the lower castes into the discourse of
political representation. The proceedings of the committee
showcased that the census reports had become a political site
of caste interests. During the proceedings of this committee,
B R Ambedkar, the foremost anti-caste leader, claimed for the
representation of the lower caste groups in the Bombay Legis-
lative Council on the basis of the census reports prepared by the
British government (Ambedkar 2014a: 258). He argued using the
census figures that 8% of the elected members of the legislative
council should come from the untouchable caste groups as they
constituted 8% of the total population (Ambedkar 2014a: 258).
So far the representation of the untouchable castes was nil in
the Bombay Legislative Council despite constituting 8% of the
total population (Ambedkar 2014a: 258).
Although the Southborough Committee ignored the demands
of the lower castes for political representation, the outrage of
the lower castes to seek participation in the political sphere
continued. While fighting for representation in the legislative
councils and assemblies, the depressed classes demanded the
widening of the franchise based on their numbers provided in
the census reports.2 Such demands forced the British to recog-
nise their rights in this period of constitutional reforms for
self-governance. Thus, when the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms
for self-governance appeared, it was written therein:
So with the depressed classes. We intend to make the arrangements
that we can for their representation in order that they too may ulti-
mately learn the lesson of self-protection. But if it is found that their
interests suffer and that they do not share in the general progress, we
must retain the means in our own hands of helping them.3
Thus, through the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms, the colonial
state started recognising the rights of representation of the
lower castes who were now to rely on census figures for their
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18
SPECIAL ARTICLE
claim of power-sharing. However, even after the Montagu–
Chelmsford Reforms, the position of the lower castes remained
weak. It only got stronger by the late 1920s and the early 1930s
with the continuous rise of the anti-caste movements, particu-
larly led by Ambedkar. In the Simon Commission of 1928,
Ambedkar again relied on the census figures to argue for the
representation of the lower castes in the Bombay Legislative
Assembly according to their proportion to the total population
of the province (Ambedkar 2014b: 315–491). Following the
Simon Commission came the Round Table Conferences,
where Ambedkar raised the demands for separate electorates
and the proportional representation of the lower castes in all
the provinces of India according to the Census of 1931
(Ambedkar 2014b: 551). These demands of Ambedkar were
not any different from the demands raised by the Self-Respect
Movement which was running in South India. Separate elec-
torates were especially important because the lower castes
did not want the upper caste electorates to be choosing their
lower-caste leaders.
Also, the 1931 Census was important for the lower castes to
demand voting rights. After failing to widen the franchise in
1919, the depressed classes demanded the same again in 1931.
When the Indian Franchise (Lothian) Committee was formed
to look into franchise problems, the depressed classes de-
manded their rights to vote that were in coherence with the
population figures in the census reports.4 The census figures
were important for the lower castes in all the committees and
conferences. The census figures not only provided data on the
lack of representation of the lower castes and the hegemony of
the upper castes over the legislative assemblies, but they also
provided statistics on the exact numbers of each caste group.
The census figures showcased the reality of the caste composi-
tion of the Indian assemblies and councils that could be per-
fectly used for anti-caste interests.
The census figures combined with the constitutional reforms
gave an opportunity for the lower caste groups to make their
representation possible in the public services and in the educa-
tion sector. For instance, Thiyyas, an untouchable caste in
Malabar, held a protest to argue for the representation of the
lower castes in the public services and in the village offices.5
They suggested that “if the political leaders of India were dis-
satisfied with the foreign administration, the Thiyyas were
dissatisfied with the caste Hindu administration.”6 Similarly,
Ambedkar argued at an all-India level that the representation
of the lower castes in the public services was far from being
proportional to their total population. He argued for reserva-
tions of seats in the public services offices of the Indian state
(Ambedkar 2014b: 367). The governments of various provinces
like Bombay and Bengal were forced to provide communal
representation to the Scheduled Castes (SCs) in the public
services.7 In addition to this, the lower castes now put forward
the demands for their representation within the school boards
so that their educational backwardness could come to an end.
The Bahishkrit Hitakarini Sabha (the Depressed Class Institute of
Bombay) cited the census figures for the representation of the
lower castes in the school boards to argue that the advanced
65
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Hindus who formed only a small part of the total population
of India had been unfairly the highest educated in the country
(Ambedkar 2014b: 407–28).
Upper-caste Opposition
These demands of the lower castes were definitely threatening
to the interests of the upper castes. Upper-caste Hindus spoke
against the reservation of seats for the depressed classes.8 The de-
mands of the lower castes were seen by the upper-caste na-
tionalists as the creation of caste divides by the colonial rul-
ers’ policies. However, when in fact the lower castes were only
using the state’s machinery and census reports in their favour.
When discussions were being conducted by the Indian Franchise
(Lothian) Committee, an upper-caste group from Punjab said,
“we are opposed on principle to any separate representation of races
or castes, whether they are depressed as alleged, or not, by either sep-
arate electorates, reservation of seats or nominations in the legislative
council or legislative assembly” because “they perpetuate class divi-
sions the creation of political camps organised against each other and
teach men to think as partisans and not as citizens.”9
Another upper-caste person suggested during the commit-
tee proceedings that “special representation will tend to per-
petuate the already prevalent class differences.”10 Similar to
these, M K Gandhi suggested that the idea of separate elector-
ates could “vivisect Hinduism.”11
When the demands of the lower castes to seek representa-
tion in the public sphere were seen as caste divisions created
by the policies of the colonial state, then the upper castes started
thinking of censuses as the most prominent cause for the pro-
motion of such divisions. Soon, the upper-caste nationalists
who had not contended against the census reports in the late
19th and early 20th centuries started arguing against the
censuses. Gandhi, the foremost upper-caste nationalist of the
period, suggested that “untouchables are a human manufacture
and that too by census enumerators.”12 For him, “if the census
operations ignored untouchability,” the people would stop prac-
ticing it.13 Gandhi even denied the numbers of the untouch-
ables as specified in the census by suggesting that the censuses
did not provide the real parameters for caste because they
were prepared by the enumerators who had no knowledge of
Hinduism and were themselves not Hindus.14 Additionally,
there were also upper caste intellectuals who argued in a similar
direction. For instance, G S Ghurye, a prominent sociologist,
suggested that caste censuses were against nationalism. In
1932, he published his book, Caste and Race in India. In this
book, he argued against the colonial census by claiming that
they were the major reason behind the caste divides present
in India then.15
This idea of the creation of caste divides through the colo-
nial census led the upper castes to fight against the caste cate-
gory in the decennial censuses. Fighting the caste census came
to be seen as a fight against the caste order itself. upper-caste
groups argued that the lower castes were to be recorded as
just Hindus in the censuses as a symbol of the fight against
caste divides. The Indian National Social Conference, a group
formed by upper-caste nationalists and social reformers,
66
published a pamphlet under the heading of “Abolition of
Caste.” They urged their readers to not mention their caste to the
census officials during the 1931 Census.16 Similarly, the Bombay
branch of the Congress party held a conference to argue that
caste should be dropped as a census category because it “perpet-
uated ‘the mischief of social hierarchy.’”17 The Jat-Pat-Todak
Mandal, a wing of the Arya Samaj formed by upper-caste Hindu
nationalists, protested against the colonial government and
argued that the untouchables should be recorded as Hindus
alone.18 The Hindu League, a Hindu nationalist organisation,
requested its adherents to not mention their caste in the census
and only to mention themselves as Aryas.19 B S Moonje, a
leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, argued that Hindus should be
recorded without their castes.20 In a similar vein, Gandhi said
that “we do not want on our registers and our censuses, unto-
uchables specified as a separate class” (cited in Ambedkar
2014c: 68). The case of the upper-caste Sikhs and Muslims was
not any different. The upper-caste Sikh, like Khatris, and upper-
caste Muslims coming from the castes of Syeds and Sheikhs
who had equally hegemonised the public sector, started argu-
ing that they should only be recorded as Sikhs and Muslims,
irrespective of their caste groups.21
The upper-caste nationalists boycotted the British censuses.
The Congress party boycotted the Census of 1931. Jawaharlal
Nehru announced that nobody should cooperate in the census
operations.22 Another Congress member, V K Krishna Menon,
wrote a note saying,
No one should give out his caste and name. Each man who gets this
note must persuade his friends to withdraw from this. Request that
you will boycott the census in all possible ways.23
Thus, various reports in the Times of India claimed that data
could not be collected from Ahmedabad, the home of the
Congress party, because the residents refused to cooperate.
The municipal corporation headed by the Congress party
boycotted the census.24 In fact, civil disobedience and non-
cooperation effectively became protests against the caste cen-
sus. In 1930, C Rajagopalachari, a Congress leader from Tamil
Nadu, gave a speech where he asked for non-cooperation with
census operations.25 In Tamil Nadu, civil disobedience led
to the boycott of the census operations by the Congress
activists.26 Similar reports came from Bombay, Bengal, Mewar,
Rajputana and Nagpur.27
Because of the protests of the upper castes, the colonial
administration agreed to not tabulate and provide statistics on
caste and its various facets in the Census of 1941. It was argued
that instead of recording caste, race and tribe in the census
reports, only community statistics were to be provided (Yeatts
1942: 20). M W W M Yeatts, who compiled the Census of 1941
suggested that caste had become irrelevant in censuses, with
more and more people refusing to return to their caste identities
(Yeatts 1942: 20). It was lost to him that such people refusing
to return to their caste identities came from the upper-caste
groups only. In the 1941 Census, populations of certain caste
groups were calculated only in certain provinces on the basis
of the limited responses received. However, the conditions
of the lower castes with respect to their representation in
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 SPECIAL ARTICLE

education and the public sphere did not find a place in the
census reports. The numbers of certain castes were calculated
in certain provinces for the 1941 Census because the colonial
government was of the view that “in many provinces, an elab-
orate distribution of appointments and other matters rests on
a caste basis. In the Punjab Community subdivisions are neces-
sary for the purpose of agriculturist legislation in the province.
While in Sind and Balochistan, Tribes are in some ways the
real units of the population” (Yeatts 1942: 20).
When the upper-caste reformers and nationalists protested
and were successful in removing caste as a census category,
the lower caste groups wanted their enumeration and classifi-
cation in the census reports, understanding well enough that
it was an important way to make their claim for power. In this
regard, before the Census of 1931, the Depressed Classes
Sabha of Punjab had requested the government to record
the untouchable castes separately.28 In the Census of 1931,
which was boycotted by the upper castes, the lower castes
supported the census operations. One of the census officials
working on the ground during the 1931 Census wrote: “the
bulk of the labouring classes and all non-Hindu communities,
responded to the census authorities to furnish data. Opposi-
tion was confined chiefly to the Hindu literate castes.”29 It
was reported in the Times of India that, “a procession of about
1,000 Bhangis, Chamars and other Untouchables headed by
Mr Bansi, MLC, went towards government house” to protest
against “their inclusion as Hindus and Sikhs in the ensuing
[1941] Census.”30 Similarly, a lower caste minister, Pyare Lal
Kureel, had requested the government to enumerate and
tabulate the untouchable castes in the census reports sepa-
rately.31 According to him, this was the only way to under-
stand the true educational and political status of different
caste groups. A report in the Times of India suggested that the
SCs opposed the Census of 1941 on accounts of non-inclusion
of the caste category.32 Ansaris, lower-caste Muslims, also
suggested that they wanted to be recorded by their caste and
not simply by their religion.33
However, the dropping of the caste category from the census
figures was a setback to the anti-caste movement. They could
no longer prove the continuing hegemony of the upper castes
in the public sphere. Their claim of power-sharing became
weak. For the lower castes, a means to justify proportional
representation in the colonial period were the caste census
reports. However, after the 1931 Census, the means for the
lower castes to justify their political representation vanished
with the removal of caste as a census category.
Conclusions
The aim of the paper was to argue against the simplistic idea
that colonial caste censuses were an aspect of the colonial
design that created caste-based divisions and went against
nationalism. The paper instead argued that census figures
were important to understand the hegemony of the upper
castes and the marginalisation of the lower castes. The census
reports were instruments for the lower castes to make their
claim for power. However, it was the upper-caste nationalists
and social reformers who saw caste censuses as tools of
divisiveness that could hamper the nationalist movement. The
dropping of the caste category in the Census of 1941 actually
worked in the interests of the upper castes and hampered the
interests of the lower castes.
This argument was presented in two sections. The first section
of the paper looked at the figures of colonial censuses to argue
about how censuses provided data that showcased the margin-
alisation of the lower caste groups. While the lower castes
were the least educated, and their representation in the insti-
tutions of the colonial state was almost negligible, the upper-
caste groups hegemonised the education sector, the public
services and the legislative councils, the census figures were
used by the anti-caste reformers to make their claim for repre-
sentation in the public sphere during the constitutional
reforms of the 1920s and 1930s. However, these claims were
seen by the upper-caste nationalists and reformers as caste di-
visions created by the colonial censuses. Thus, the upper-caste
nationalists protested against caste as a census category and
boycotted the census operations. Given these protests of the
upper castes, the colonial state decided to drop caste as a
census category.
It can be argued that the withholding of the caste data of 2011
and the non-inclusion of caste category in the 2021 Census by
the current government goes against the interests of the lower
caste groups. The new data can reveal the extent of upper caste
hegemony in the public sphere. The data revealed from the
census might as well be used to correct the caste divides that
are present in the Indian political structure today. Thus, one
can argue that the absence of caste census data since 1931 has
not solved the caste problem of India. It has rather remained
intact, irrespective of the census officials recognising it.

Notes
1 The argument given by Appaudrai is substan-
tially different from the ones given by Nicholas
Dirks. Appadurai concedes that caste was not a
colonial construction, but he still argues that
colonial census operations hardened caste
consciousness.
2 “Depressed Classes: Deputation to Sir C S
Nair,” Times of India, 30 July 1919, p 7.
3 Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms (1918),
Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing,
p 99.
4 “Depressed Classes Memorandum to Lothian
Committee,” Times of India, 31 March 1932, p 7.
5 “Thiyyas Condemn Caste Tyranny,” Times of
India, 24 March 1934, p 5.
6 See Note 5.
7 “Bengal Controversy over the Services Ratio,”
Times of India, 17 May 1939, p 15; “Backward
Classes in Public Services,” Times of India,
20 February 1925, p 12.
8 “Poona Pact Must Go,” Times of India, 12 Janu-
ary 1933, p 10.
9 Indian Franchise Committee (1933): Volume 3,
Memoranda Submitted by the Local Govern-
ments, Calcutta, Government of India, Central
Publication Branch, p 331.
10 Report of the Indian Franchise Committee (1932),
London, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, p 207.
11 British Government’s Award in the Interest of
Depressed Classes, 13 September 1932, p 10.
12 “Human Manufacture,” Harijan, 6 May 1933, p 2.
13 “Human Manufacture,” Harijan, 6 May 1933, p 3.
14 “Untouchables and Shastras: Mr Gandhi’s
Views,” Times of India, 12 November 1934, p 10.
15 “Caste and Indian Nationhood: A New Book by
Bombay Sociologist,” Times of India, 5 May 1932,
p 8, also see Ghurye (1932).
16 Indian National Social Conference—(i) Corre-
spondence regarding List and 42nd Session
of—(ii) resolutions adopted, constitution, pre-
sidential addresses, etc, Digitised by National
Archives of India, Roll-00028, File No 254,
p 53.

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17 “Fortnightly Report on the Political Situations
In India for the Month of January 1928,” Digitised
by National Archives of India, PR_000003031912,
Home_Political_NA_1928_NA_F–1_January, p 31,
18 “Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal,” Times of India, 19 Au-
gust 1938, p 15.
19 Confidential Documents, Digitised by National
Archives of India, PR_000003010460, Home_
Political_I_1940_NA_F–153_40KWPART-II, p 151.
20 “Civil Disobedience Movement Weekly Apprecia-
tion of the Situation from Provinces,” Volume 1
(January–February), Digitised by National
Archives of India, PR_000003012020, Home_
Political_I_1941_NA_F–3-3_41, Part–II, p 185.
21 “Civil Disobedience Movement Weekly Appre-
ciation of the Situation from Provinces,” Vol-
ume 1 (January–February), Digitised by Na-
tional Archives of India, PR_000003012020,
Home_Political_I_1941_NA_F–3–3_41, Part–II,
p 157. For the resolution of the Sikhs, see Pro-
posed Resolution by Bhai Man Singh on Sikh
Classification, Digitised by National Archives
of India, PR_000003007207, Education and
Health_Census_Deposit_1922_JUL_44.
22 “Boycott by the Congress of Census 1931,” Digi-
tised by National Archives of India,
PR_000003033198, Home_Political_NA_1932_
NA_F–222_32, p 233.
23 See Note 22.
24 “Census Boycott: Ahmedabad Municipality Re-
affirms Resolution,” Times of India, 8 January
1931, p 3; “Thoughts on the Indian Census,”
Times of India, 1 September 1931, p 6; Census
Boycotted in Ahmedabad, Times of India,
19 February 1931, p 3.
25 “Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political
Situation in India for the Month of October
1930,” Digitised by National Archives of India,
PR_000003032395, Home_Political_NA_1930_
NA_F–18–Xi–October, p 7.
26 “Interception Correspondence on the Subject
the Preparation and Publication by Correspon-
dence Full History of the Civil Disobedience
Movement,” Digitised by National Archives of
India, PR_000003033338, Home_Political_
NA_1932_NA_F–5–62_32, p 7.
27 “Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political
Situation in India for the Month of February
1931,” Digitised by National Archives of India,
Home_Political_NA_1931_NA_F–18-I_Feb_
Part–I, pp 48, 64, 79.
28 “Untouchables and the Census,” Times of India,
14 October 1930, p 8.
29 “Boycott by the Congress of Census 1931,”
Digitised by National Archives of India,
PR_000003033198, Home_Political_NA_1932_
NA_F–222_32, p 359.
30 “Punjab Processionists Help up by Police: A
Census Grievance,” Times of India, 17 February
1931, p 8.
31 “Cut Motion and a Resolution Regarding the
Inaccuracies In The Census for Scheduled
Castes,” Digitised by National Archives of India,
PR_ 000005002243, File No 2/1/45–Public.
32 “Census Returns by the End of March,” Times of
India, 11 March 1941, p 7.
33 “Civil Disobedience Movement Weekly Appre-
ciation of the Situation from Provinces,” Vol-
ume 1 (January–February), Digitised by National
Archives of India, PR_000003012020, Home_
Political_I_1941_NA_F–3–3_41PART-II, p 207.
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Review of Women’s Studies

April 24, 2021
An Unfettered Freefall: Taking Stock of the Gendered Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic —Prabha Kotiswaran,
V Geetha
The Continuing Saga of Women’s Work during COVID-19 —Sirisha C Naidu
COVID-19 and Women’s Labour Crisis: Reiterating an Inclusive Policy Response —Sona Mitra, Dipa Sinha
Will COVID-19 Hamper Strides towards Gender Equality in Ireland? —Nata Duvvury, Caroline Forde,
Stacey Scriver
Occupational Hazards in Healthcare Settings: A Study of Invisibilised Frontline Workers in Bengaluru —Sylvia Karpagam, Jerald Dsouza
The Macro Frames of Microwork: Indian Women Workers on AMT in the Post-pandemic Moment —Anita Gurumurthy, Khawla Zainab,
Sadhana Sanjay
An Ongoing Pandemic: Domestic Violence during COVID-19 —Anuradha Kapoor

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email: circulation@epw.in

68 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
India’s Household Leverage and the COVID-19 Crisis
Ramifications for the Post-pandemic Recovery Phase
Isha Gupta
The outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis has deepened the
recession in the Indian economy and caused a significant
leap in household financial savings given their cutbacks
in consumption and reduced demand for credit amid
rising income uncertainties. Banks have also tightened
lending due to asset quality concerns. This shift in
household financial behaviour was caused by the
continuous amplification of household leverage in the
pre-COVID-19 years, resulting from a sharp increase in
household financial liabilities on account of the robust
growth in personal loans. As demonetisation created
surplus liquidity in the banking system, it brought about
a persistent build-up of unsecured household debt.
This paper analyses trends in credit deployment across
different sectors of the economy to illustrate the rising
share of household credit concentrated in credit card
receivables and other personal loans post demonetisation.
The author would like to thank the anonymous referee for providing
constructive comments that greatly helped in improving the analysis of
this paper.
Isha Gupta (isha.gupta106@gmail.com) teaches economics at
Ramanujan College (University of Delhi) and is a research scholar
at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.
48
T
he 2010s ended with the unprecedented COVID-19 pan-
demic, which caused a public health emergency as well
as economic instability as a result of the associated
lockdowns, resulting in the further deterioration of the Indian
economy that was already experiencing a growth slowdown
prior to the crisis. The growth rate of the real gross domestic
product (GDP) had precipitously plummeted to a six-year low
of 4.5% in 2018–19 during the pre-COVID-19 years due to a
slowdown in domestic economic activity caused primarily by
a deceleration in investments, exports, and private consump-
tion. However, as the data for the second quarter of the finan-
cial year 2020–21 from the National Statistical Office indicated
a much shallower contraction compared to the pandemic-
imposed retrenchment in the previous quarter, this elevated
expectation that the real GDP growth would break into posi-
tive territory over December 2020 and January 2021, taking
into consideration the underlying trends from October and
November 2020, which revealed signs of buoyancy and momen-
tum in economic activity.
The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) monthly bulletins for No-
vember and December 2020 (RBI 2020d, 2020e) point to sig-
nificant headwinds, an anticipated bouncing back, and a pos-
sible steady reflation of the Indian economy towards the last
quarter of 2020–21 based on the update of the economic ac-
tivity index. This is in light of some key background forces,
including the bending of the COVID-19 infection curve, im-
provements in recovery rates, an increase in consumer spend-
ing, and enhancement of business confidence on the back of
“vaccine optimism.” These forces have brightened near-term
prospects and stirred up the revival of the Indian economy
beyond the mere satiation of pent-up demand following the
lifting of lockdowns.
However, these monthly trends alone leave no room for
complacency, because, in addition to these developments,
household financial savings have also seen a significant jump
from 8.3% of the GDP in 2019–20 to 21.4% in 2020–21 (RBI 2020d).
Households showed a marked propensity to save during the
pandemic, resulting in a considerable increase in both forced
and precautionary savings. While the forced savings compo-
nent has been observed in the formal sector where lockdown
measures prohibited households from spending on their normal
expenditures, the surge in precautionary savings has resulted
from lowering consumption in the informal sector due to
income uncertainties. This has been further supplemented by
a sizeable decrease in households’ demand for credit, which
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

accompanied by banks’ reluctance to lend, has notably moder-
ated the growth in households’ financial liabilities to the same
level as earlier in the decade. Although this huge contraction in
household borrowing had already begun in 2019–20 due to
stagnant incomes in a slowing economy, it has been accentuated
further by the virus-led crisis—households have been forced to
increase their savings by reducing their consumption in re-
sponse to the significant downward revision of their future in-
come expectations. This contrasts with the sharp increase in
household financial liabilities and the rising share of retail
credit, leading to the persistent build-up of household leverage
and robust growth of unsecured personal loans in the 2010s,
which rapidly expanded in the post-demonetisation years. This
implies that as the current crisis has nudged households to
smoothen their savings, it has not only altered their financial
behaviour but has also induced indebted households to sub-
stantially cut back on spending even as banks have tightened the
credit supply owing to the growing risk aversion and asset quality
concerns. This, in turn, has triggered household deleveraging,
which—in combination with the corporate deleveraging of the
past six years—is going to pose acute challenges for the economy’s
post-pandemic recovery phase, taking into consideration its
effects on the two main drivers of aggregate demand.
This paper analyses the trends in the organisation- and sec-
tor-wise deployment of credit to show how household credit
gained prominence during the 2010s. The paper then investi-
gates the growth of retail credit across different population
groups and its speedy expansion to below-prime borrowers in
the post-demonetisation years, followed by an analysis of its
repercussions for the post-COVID-19 recovery period.
Disruptions and Dislocation
With the spread of COVID-19, the resultant lockdowns on domes-
tic movements severely disrupted supply chains, blocked man-
ufacturing activities, and dislocated labour even as the efforts
to arrest the contagion were escalated. As these dislocations
resulted in income and demand-side shocks, they have not
only exacerbated the already depleted aggregate demand with
further postponement of non-essential consumption, but they
have also triggered a severe crisis at a time when the Indian
economy had already been showing lacklustre performance.
The resurgence of the informal sector, which employs nearly
90% of the workforce, has also been jeopardised not only
because of the uncertainty caused by the health crisis but also
because this segment had already been enduring the twin
shocks of demonetisation and the introduction of the goods
and services tax (GST). Moreover, unlike past crises, this is the
first time that Indian households have been leveraged with
significantly lower financial and physical savings as they entered
the pandemic, which has made it difficult for them to absorb
income losses as the unemployment rate mounted to an all-
time high in April 2020 and has shown a small recovery so far.
The prolonged downward spiral of the Indian economy during
the 2010s initially stemmed from the home market problem—
weakening of domestic demand conditions owing to a shrink-
ing consumption base—which overturned the euphoria of the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 1: Household Debt and Growth Rates in Households’ Financial
Assets/Liabilities
80 12
60 10
40 8
20 6
0 4
-20 2
-40 0
2000–01
2001–02
2002–03
2003–04
2004–05
2005–06
2006–07
2007–08
2008–09
2009–10
2010–11
2011–12
2012–13
2013–14
2014–15
2015–16
2016–17
2017–18
2018–19
Annual growth rate in financial assets of households
Annual growth rate in financial liabilities of households
Household debt as percentage of GDP
Source: RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy (2019c) and CEIC data (2020).
2000s that was steered by all the primary engines of growth
and marked an unmistakable story of economic distress and a
sharp structural slowdown. When considering the household
debt-to-GDP ratio from 2000–01 to 2018–19 (Figure 1), one
observes a commonality in the trends during the 2000s and
2010s. This ratio, which had previously peaked in the high-
growth phase of 2003–08 to a value of 10.2%, surpassed this
to reach an elevated value of 10.9% in the low-growth years of
2015–18. As of March 2020, this figure stands at 12.4% of the
GDP. This is supplemented by a similar movement in the
growth rate of financial liabilities among households, which
hit the highest value of 53% in the 2000s and has increased
significantly to 58% in 2017–18 during the post-demonetisation
period. However, as households accumulated financial liabili-
ties, the 2000s also witnessed a continued upward trajectory
in savings and an improved physical investment rate among
households that reached an average of 23.8% and 12.7% of
the GDP, respectively. Economic growth averaged 9% in real
terms during this period. In contrast, an unusual feature of
the 2010s was the incessant decline in all forms of household
savings since 2011–12, of which households’ fixed investments,
particularly in “dwellings, other buildings and structures,”
have faced a steep decline (Figure 2, p 50).
The Economic Survey of 2019–20 (Ministry of Finance 2020),
in an illustration of the growth slowdown, describes a “virtuous
cycle of growth” (p 20, “State of the Economy,” Vol 2) between
fixed investments, the GDP, and consumption. If this virtuous
cycle rotates swiftly, then a higher rate of fixed investments
accelerates GDP growth, which in turn induces a higher growth
in consumption and an increase in investments so that the
nexus of higher fixed investment, higher GDP growth, and
higher consumption growth generates economic development
in the country. But when this cycle reduces speed because of a
decline in fixed investments, it decelerates GDP growth, which
subsequently reduces consumption growth as well. Since
2011–12, the Indian economy has experienced a substantial
tapering of this virtuous cycle owing to a drastic decline in
fixed investments, which has languished at around 30% of the
GDP. With regard to the institutional break-up of fixed invest-
ments, while private corporate investments have remained
mostly sluggish at approximately 11.5% of the GDP, it is the
steep decline in the households’ fixed investments that
49
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 2: Household Savings
Proportion ofofNet
Proportion netSaving
savingin Household Disposable
in household 80 25
Income
disposable income
70
Savings ofofHousehold
Savings householdSector as proportion
sector of Gross
as proportion of
Savings 20
gross savings
60
GFCF by
GFCF byHouseholds
householdassector
a proportion of GDP (Right
as a proportion of
axis)GDP (right axis) 50
the 15

Investment
Investment bybyhouseholds
households in dwellings
in Dwellings and
& Other 40
Buildings
other Structures
buildings as proportion
structures of GDP (Right
as proportion of
10
axis)GDP (right axis)
the 30
Household Saving
Household savingasas
proportion of GDP
proportion (Right
of the GDPaxis)
(right axis) 20
5
Household Financial
Household Assets
financial as proportion
assets of GDP
as proportion of 10
(Right
the GDPaxis)
(right axis)
0 0
2011o12 201o13
2012–13 2013o14 2014o15 2015o16 2016o17 2017o18 2018o19
Proportion
Proportion ofofNet
netSaving
savingininHousehold
household disposable
Disposable income
Income 25.93 24.33 21.57 20.97 19.23 19.63 21.12 19.37
Savings of
Savings ofHousehold
householdSector
sectorasas
proportion of Gross
proportion Savings
of gross savings 68.24 66.34 63.34 60.67 57.79 57.76 59.17 60.33
GFCF by Households as a proportion
household sector of GDP (Right
as a proportion of theaxis)
GDP (right axis) 15.75 14.63 12.52 12.06 9.41 10.28 11.03 11.37
Investment by
Investment byhouseholds
households in in
Dwellings & Other
dwellings Buildings
and other Structures

buildings
12.85 11.61 11.11 10.24 7.31 7.26 7.49 7.76
as proportion
structures as of GDP (Rightofaxis)
proportion the GDP (right axis)
Household Saving
Household savingasasproportion
proportion of GDP (Right
of the GDPaxis)
(right axis) 23.64 22.48 20.34 19.56 17.97 18.11 19.17 18.17
Household Financial
Household financialAssets
assetsasasproportion
proportionof GDP (Right
of the GDPaxis)
(right axis) 10.68 10.7 10.6 10.08 10.86 10.49 12.05 10.52
GFCF: gross fixed capital formation.
Source: Computed from the National Accounts Statistics (NAS), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation 2019, and RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy (2019c).

Figure 3: Household Debt, Financial Liabilities, Consumption Expenditures, and Weighted Average Call Money Rate
Household
Householdfinal
Finalconsumption
Consumptionexpenditure as
Expenditure 90 16
as proportion
proportion of Household
of household Disposable
disposable income
Incomes 80 14
Householdfinal
Household Finalconsumption
Consumption Expenditure
expenditure as
as proportion
proportion of GDP
of the GDP 70
12
Household
Householdfinancial
Financialliabilities as proportion
Liabilities as of 60
proportion
the of axis)
GDP (right GDP (Right axis) 10
50
Household
Householdfinancial liabilities
Financial as proportion
Liabilities as of 8
proportiondisposable
household of Household
incomeDisposable
(right axis) 40
Incomes (Right axis) 6
Householddebt
Household Debtasasproportion
proportion of
of household 30
Householdincome
disposable Disposable
(rightIncomes
axis) (Right axis)
4
20
Annualweighted
Annual Weightedaverage
Average
callCall Money
money rates
Rates axis)
(Right axis) 10 2
(right

0 0
2011–12
2011-12 2012-13
2012–13 2013-14
2013–14 2014-15
2014–15 2015-16
2015–16 2016-17
2016–17 2018–19
2017-18 2018-19
2017–18
Household
Householdfinal
Finalconsumption
Consumption expenditure as proportion
Expenditure of
as proportion
73.19 73.94 75.52 77.36 79.01 79.87 80.05 79.28
of Household
household disposable incomeDisposable Incomes
Household
Householdfinal
Finalconsumption
Consumption expenditure as proportion
Expenditure of
as proportion
56.21 56.46 57.65 58.13 59.01 59.29 59.02 59.32
the GDP of GDP
Household
Householdfinancial
Financial liabilities as proportion
Liabilities of the
as proportion ofGDP
GDP
3.32 3.32 3.19 3.02 2.79 3.04 4.32 4.04
(right axis) (Right axis)
Household
Householdfinancial
Financial liabilities as proportion
Liabilities of household
as proportion of
4.32 4.35 4.18 4.02 3.75 4.1 5.86 5.39
Household
disposable Disposable
income Incomes (Right axis)
(right axis)
Household
Householddebt Debtasasproportion
proportion of household
of Householddisposable
Disposable
11.19 11.47 11.86 12.22 13.02 13.69 14.79 15.05
income (right axis) Incomes (Right axis)
Annual
Annualweighted
Weighted average
Average callCall
money ratesRates
Money (right(Right
axis) axis) 8.22 8.09 8.28 7.97 6.98 6.25 5.94 6.27
Source: Computed from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (2019), RBI (2019c), and CEIC (2020).

explains most of the deterioration in the overall fixed invest-
ments during the given period. Slower growth in the purchase
of houses by households is also reflected in stalled real estate
projects, which have led to a build-up of unsold inventory over
the years. This, in turn, has subdued the growth of housing
prices since 2015–16 (RBI 2019a, 2019b). Further, as household
savings in physical assets nosedived, neither household
savings in gold and silver nor net household financial savings
rose in their proportion of the GDP, which implies that these
resources were typically expended on consumption. With regard
50
to the trends in households’ financial liabilities since 2011–12
(Figure 3), they rose sharply during the post-demonetisation
years because of a sudden drop in the weighted average lend-
ing rate (WALR) of banks in an environment of surplus liquidity
and a consequent decline in the overall cost of household bor-
rowing. This escalated the proportion of household debt in
disposable incomes and resulted in a co-movement with the
rise in the share of household consumption expenditures
during this period. However, towards the end of 2018–19,
both household liabilities and financial savings showed signs
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

Figure 4: Organisation-wise Distribution of Outstanding Credit Figure 5: Sector-wise Distribution of Non-food Credit
60 50

50 40

40 30

30 20

20 10

10 0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020
March2008

March2009

March2010

March2011

March2012

March2013

March2014

March2015

March2016

March2017

March2018

March2019

March2020
March,

March,

March,

March,

March,

March,

March,

March,

March,

March,

March,

March,

March,
0
Jun-2015
Sep-2015

Jun-2016
Sep-2016

Jun-2017
Sep-2017

Jun-2018
Sep-2018

Jun-2019
Sep-2019

Jun-2020
Mar-2014
Dec-2014
Mar-2015

Dec-2015
Mar-2016

Dec-2016
Mar-2017

Dec-2017
Mar-2018

Dec-2018
Mar-2019

Dec-2019
Mar-2020
Credit to agriculture and allied activities as percent of non-food credit
Share
Share of Public
publicSector
sector Share
Share ofofPrivate
private corporate
Corporate Sectorsector
Credit to industry (micro, small, medium and large) as percent of non-food credit
Share
Share of Household
household sector
Sector Share ofofMicro
Share Finance Institutions
microfinance institutions
Share
Share of Non-Profit
non-profit institutions
Institutions servingserving
Households Credit to services as percent of non-food credit
households Personal loans as percent of non-food credit
Source: Computed from RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy (2019c). Source: Computed from RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy (2019c).

of a marginal decrease and increase, respectively, which have
further intensified amid the COVID-19 crisis. This means that
the build-up of household leverage in recent years, accompa-
nied by the consistent diminution of all forms of household
savings, which could have otherwise provided adequate cush-
ioning during the pandemic, are going to pose a critical
downside risk for stimulating consumption and infusing busi-
ness confidence, thus making the “virtuous cycle of growth”
more difficult to realise.
Deployment of Credit: Trends and Analysis
In India, credit to households is provided by the scheduled
commercial banks (SCBs) and non-banking financial companies
(NBFCs). Under bank credit, the time series data on outstand-
ing loans are classified based on organisation and sector. The
latter denotes household credit towards “personal loans” (or
retail loans), which includes advances for consumer durables,
housing, advances against fixed deposits, outstanding credit
card debt, education loans, vehicle loans, and other personal
loans. The distribution of outstanding credit according to an
organisation-wise classification (Figure 4) since 2014–15 indi-
cates that as the private corporate sector’s share of credit de-
creased, the same has consistently increased for the household
sector and has reached 50.2%, even as the share of credit of
other categories remained mostly unchanged. Correspondingly,
the sector-wise distribution of outstanding credit (Figure 5)
points to a striking slowdown in credit to industry after reach-
ing a peak in 2013–14, a mild increase in credit to services,
and a more or less constant rate in credit to agriculture since
2009–10. There has been a shift in the lending pattern of
bank credit from industry to personal loans, which emerged
as the preferred choice in these years. Considering India has a
relatively low ratio of personal loans to personal disposable
incomes compared to other developing countries, retail lend-
ing has enormous potential to maximise credit in this under-
exploited area, particularly when the exposure of the retail
sector to debt had been in moderation along with its low
default rates. Although the growth rate in household credit
reached its peak at 18.3% during the given period, it decreased
Economic & Political Weekly
to 8.9% in June 2020, while the credit growth of the private
corporate sector dropped to −4.13%.
During the high-growth years of the 2000s, the Indian economy
observed large capital inflows from abroad and a gradually
deregulated banking system driven by a huge build-up of
excess liquidity in the economy, which triggered a credit
splurge and expedited lending to the private sector, especially
to new avenues of infrastructure and personal loans. This
resulted in a rapid expansion of private investment in the
2000s, which grew at a breakneck speed not only in the tradi-
tional sectors of manufacturing and services but also in the
infrastructure sector, where it overshot the target of 30% set
in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007–12) (Azad et al 2017).
The share of personal loans in the total bank credit increased
sharply, reaching around 25% in 2005–06 with extensive
lending for housing, consumer durables, and automobiles,
which explains the upsurge in household financial liabilities
during the 2000s.
However, with the global economic crisis in 2008–09, the
continued credit splurge by both the public and private sectors
on infrastructure-based investments helped prolong the boom
and sustain the growth momentum beyond the crisis years.
But as the investment spree of the private sector started going
downhill from 2012–13 onwards because of the escalating im-
practicability of existing projects, it not only marked the end of
the expansionary phase of the economy but also accelerated
the accumulation of bad debts and defaults on infrastructure
loans. In contrast, retail lending was kept in check by the RBI
in view of the rapid credit expansion in housing and personal
loans during 2003–06, which was flagged as a concern. This
resulted in pre-emptive countercyclical measures through in-
creases in the risk-weight applicable to these loans, a rise in
general provisioning requirements on standard advances in
these sectors, and the calibration of the overall credit growth
to around 20% in 2006–07 from a growth of above 30% as
inflationary expectations had started firming up during this
period (RBI 2010). That is why personal loans’ share in the
total credit after 2008–09 faced a steady decline and fol-
lowed a U-shaped trajectory. Consequently, in the post-crisis
EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 51
SPECIAL ARTICLE

period, bank credit was exclusively directed to an unusual in the post-demonetisation period (Table 2). As commercial
area of infrastructure lending by offering concessions and banks were inundated with excess liquidity after demonetisa-
cheap credit to the private sector despite the long gestation tion, they channelled this money to these shadow banking
periods and high illiquidity associated with these projects. companies to exhaust the extra cash at their disposal due to
However, with the accumulating debts of private firms and pil- the pressure on them to invest and earn a profit, while most of
ing non-performing assets (NPAs) of the SCBs, this has substan- their NPAs remained unresolved. As the NBFCs directed a major
tially curbed the flow of credit to industry since 2013–14. Con- part of this lending to the infrastructure, retail, and real estate
versely, as industrial credit was reined in, lending to the retail sectors, it provided a threefold opportunity—potential lend-
sector—where defaults had been relatively low thus far—has ing to new areas, a space for NBFCs to flourish, and an opportu-
experienced a notable surge since 2014, triggered by the de- nity for banks to transfer risks out of their balance sheets
cline in lending rates like WALR. In effect, this hints at a quali- (Chandrasekhar 2020). This resulted in the proliferating share
tative shift by the commercial banks through quantitative ad- of retail loans in the total NBFC non-food credit since 2016–17,
justments in favour of this sector. Thus, the resurgence of per- where lending for housing, automobiles, and consumer dura-
sonal loans during the 2010s has largely been an outcome of bles absorbed a major portion of their loan portfolios. As loans
the withdrawal from the infrastructural lending of the 2000s. to infrastructure and real estate sectors turned bad, causing
Table 1 represents the growth of credit deployment across difficulties in the rollover of credit, it resulted in the NBFC cri-
various sectors of the economy, including the different compo- sis in 2018 that engulfed the economy and led to the radical
nents of personal loans since 2009–10, which indicate that the decline in the shares of housing and consumer durable loans.
growth of total credit has been diminishing since 2013–14. As Vehicle loans, however, contracted due to poor consumer sen-
commercial banks continued to grapple with the structural timent and persistent weakness in the household demand for
problem of accumulated NPAs in their portfolios, it constrained automobiles because of sinking incomes and a declining de-
their overall lending and reduced the availability of aggregate mand for fresh loans. This engendered the consequent slow-
credit to the economy. If we observe the growth rates of sector- down in auto sales (RBI 2019b). In contrast, the shares of both
wise credit allocations, we see that while the growth of out- “credit card receivables” and “other retail loans” in outstanding
standing loans to agriculture and industry has decelerated NBFC retail credit portrayed unwavering growth for the entire
severely, lending to services fluctuated around the average duration even as the trouble in the financial system and its ripple
credit growth of 15%. In contrast, credit growth for personal effects intensified the liquidity crunch across the economy.
loans has more than doubled and has been distinctly accelerat- Table 2: Retail Credit by NBFCs
ing since 2014–15. Further, within personal loans, the subcate- Components End-March End-March End-March End-March End-March
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
gories of “credit cards outstanding” and “other personal loans”
Retail loans as proportion
recorded maximum growth in the post-demonetisation period
of total credit 15.4 17.5 18.3 19.5 23.3
and, consequently, epitomise the intensification of personal loans
As proportion of
in this period. “Vehicle loans” have been the revealing signs of outstanding retail loans
retreat and lending for “education” and “consumer durables” Housing loans 7.2 6.2 3.7 3.5 3.9
shows marked deterioration, whereas “housing loans” show Consumer durables 1.5 2.1 2.4 1.1 0.9
modest expansion on account of the affordable housing scheme Vehicle loans 56.2 40.8 45.7 44.7 43.4
promoted by the government. Education loans 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.9 1.6
This lending pattern is also observed in retail loans sanc- Credit card receivables 4.5 4.9 4.8 5.1 5.8
tioned by the NBFCs, an added source of credit to households, Other retail loans 25.2 39.2 36.8 40.0 42.7
Source: Computed from RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy (2019c).
Table 1: Growth Rate in Sector-wise Non-food Credit
Component Between Between Between Between Between Between Analysis of non-food credit data from bank and non-bank
2008–09 2010–11 2012–13 2014–15 2016–17 2018–19
and and and and and and sources therefore shows that the amplification of personal
2009–10 2011–12 2013–14 2015–16 2017–18 2019–20 loans since 2014 has largely been concentrated in the unsecured
Non-food credit 17.4 18.8 13.5 8.8 8.4 9.5
loan segment of “credit cards” and “other personal loans,”
Agriculture and
allied activities 22.9 14.7 10.4 15.1 8.1 6.0 which expanded without wavering in the post-demonetisation
Industry 23.6 21.5 13.9 4.2 -0.6 3.8 years. This implies that as overleveraged financial institutions
Services 15.1 18.7 14.4 7.4 15.4 12.6 directed their attention to retail loans in search of a new
Personal loans 5.9 15.6 13.6 17.4 17.1 15.7 growth driver and made inroads into this area considering the
Housing 7.5 14.9 16.5 17.8 14.2 17.2 low-risk and insufficient exposure to debt, they were further
Consumer durables -7.6 -5.4 35.3 17.7 5.9 -10.2 propelled by demonetisation that caused sudden increases in
Advances against deposits and created large surplus liquidity conditions in the
fixed deposits 4.0 8.4 5.7 2.5 4.4 5.1
banking system. This, in turn, allowed several banks to sub-
Vehicle loans 4.3 18.2 10.2 19.9 11.4 7.8
stantially lower their WALR on both outstanding and fresh-
Education loans 34.1 16.4 9.6 6.6 1.1 -2.9
Credit cards -11.6 1.4 10.8 23.1 35.0 25.5 rupee loans even when the policy rates changed only slightly.
Other personal loans 3.9 24.7 11.9 21.8 31.1 19.6 This significantly reduced the overall cost of borrowing, espe-
Source: Computed from RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy (2019c). cially for credit card loans, where the WALR fell the hardest
52 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 6: Growth Rates of a formal credit system. As a result, financial institutions
25
extensively dealt in credit cards and other personal loans that
helped shore up their profit margins since the interest rates
20
charged on these segments is much higher than other advances.
Household disposable income This is also supported by the fact that the share of unsecured
loans increased from 2.4% to 4.1% of the GDP during 2015–16
15 to 2019–20, whereas the share of housing loans increased
from 5.5% to 6.5%. Vehicle, education, and consumer durable
loans diminished noticeably in the given duration. This
10
implies that in this expansionary phase of unsecured lending,
the universe of consumers to whom credit could be extended
5 was widened, which could end up including those belonging
Household debt to the “below-prime” category. The period consequently also
saw a sharp acceleration in the growth rate of household debt
0 that considerably outpaced the growth rate of household dispos-
2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (2019) and CEIC (2020).
able incomes (Figure 6). This examination therefore ascertains
that with the easy availability of credit for personal loans, Indi-
between December 2016 and December 2017. Moreover, an households increasingly accumulated debt in short-term,
pushed by cashless modes of transactions and the penetration smaller-valued consumer lending products besides significantly
of smartphones and cheap mobile data, Indian households cutting down on their savings over this period, which is
have demonstrated digital preparedness as seen in the in- uncharacteristic of their perpetually savings-prone and debt-
creased transactions in the form of retail electronic payments, averse outlook.
whose growth surged in both volume and value terms (RBI
2017). With lower output growth translating to job losses and Demonetisation, Financial Excesses, and Unsecured Debt
declining average monthly incomes in this period, flexible This section delves into the sector-wise growth rates of non-
digital loans offered an easy route for instant gratification of food credit across four population groups—rural, semi-urban,
people’s daily needs. This is why the demand for unsecured urban, and metropolitan (Table 3)—to survey the spread and
loans went through a pointed upward spiral and provided distribution of various components of the total credit, espe-
room not only for the fast growth of demand for these products cially personal loans, in different tiers of the economy from
from a large proportion of the credit-underserved population 2014–15 onwards. We note that similar to the aggregate data,
but also gave them the incentives to be brought under the ambit while the growth rate of the total outstanding credit has
Table 3: Average Y-o-Y Growth in Outstanding Credit
Component 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 Component 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20
(a) Rural (b) Semi-urban
Total credit 12.9 5.8 4.3 10.1 14.5 10.8 Total credit 13.6 10.1 13.3 13.7 12.4 8.7
Agriculture 11.3 8.3 6.5 8.7 11.3 6.3 Agriculture 13.9 10.3 11.5 9.5 8.8 4.7
Industry 30.2 -8.1 2.9 12.9 10.3 6.5 Industry 10.6 -0.6 7.5 11.4 5.6 -0.5
Services 9.5 0.9 -12.4 1.8 22.9 22.2 Services 15.7 9.9 12.1 14.5 16.4 9.3
Personal loans 15.9 11.1 12.3 22.7 18.8 15.2 Personal loans 14.3 16.1 17.9 19.6 17.6 16.2
Housing 20.9 9.1 11.6 25.5 18.3 13.1 Housing 22.0 15.3 16.7 19.2 16.8 15.5
Consumer durables 13.6 27.8 -21.9 -50.4 91.3 13.0 Consumer durables 9.1 14.6 -24.9 -40.4 47.4 13.1
Vehicle loans 21.3 13.5 26.9 26.7 10.8 5.4 Vehicle loans 20.4 22.2 32.4 23.6 9.8 5.9
Education 14.3 2.4 -2.4 -1.7 -0.5 -1.3 Education 14.3 4.6 1.2 1.0 1.2 3.2
Credit cards 124.6 -3.4 105.9 148.4 239.3 173.2 Credit cards 55.2 87.3 126.2 1,661.6 1,921.4 62.3
Other personal loans 9.4 15.1 16.9 30.3 23.6 21.3 Other personal loans 2.8 20.2 21.6 23.7 21.2 21.5
(c) Urban (d) Metropolitan
Total credit 10.5 0.7 5.1 14.7 11.4 6.8 Total credit 8.3 9.4 6.8 12.3 9.2 4.8
Agriculture 8.9 5.8 8.0 9.1 5.3 1.2 Agriculture -4.4 18.8 15.6 34.7 10.3 -11.7
Industry 6.6 -8.1 -2.5 5.1 6.2 0.1 Industry 6.8 5.7 0.2 2.9 2.4 0.1
Services 12.9 1.9 5.7 20.7 8.5 2.9 Services 9.9 7.5 7.6 20.2 17.7 8.4
Personal loans 15.3 8.8 10.2 20.1 18.9 17.7 Personal loans 13.6 24.6 22.9 16.8 13.4 14.9
Housing 18.1 4.8 6.5 15.6 22.7 16.4 Housing 17.6 20.4 18.6 12.6 17.4 14.2
Consumer durables 7.8 -2.3 -34.6 -12.9 18.3 5.8 Consumer durables -31.1 11.5 34.5 67.4 46.4 -23.6
Vehicle loans 19.5 20.7 19.9 18.9 10.4 5.9 Vehicle loans 15.4 27.9 28.9 24.5 6.9 5.1
Education 11.7 2.6 -0.9 4.7 6.3 6.5 Education 14.2 23.9 19.4 7.2 11.1 8.4
Credit cards 160.1 18.1 109.9 471.0 305.5 29.9 Credit cards 23.3 34.9 29.3 18.4 12.4 9.1
Other personal loans 9.4 16.6 16.1 25.5 10.2 26.3 Other personal loans 2.1 34.4 31.5 24.4 6.9 25.2
Source: Computed from RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy (2019c).

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 53
SPECIAL ARTICLE
broadly decreased for all the population groups, personal
loans increased in all cases, particularly in the post-demoneti-
sation period. During this period, loans for “credit cards” and
“other personal loans” expanded at a skyrocketing pace, rep-
resenting acute intensification among rural, semi-urban, and
urban groups. In contrast, “education loans” showed a severe
turnaround and continuous diminution as this was proving to
be a high default area due to the inability to find suitable jobs.
Both “consumer durables” and “vehicle loans” started declining
after demonetisation due to the slump in non-compulsory
consumption (RBI 2018b, 2018c, 2019d). Consumer durable
loans, however, expanded briefly in 2019, fuelled by lucrative
discounts and a retail loan push from banks. From 2016 to
2018, housing loans rose, mostly driven by the credit-linked
subsidy scheme, “Housing for All by 2022,” launched by the
government in 2015; the total disbursement of home loans up
to `10 lakh recorded robust growth, mainly steered by public
sector banks (RBI 2018a, 2018b).
However, these loans declined sharply in the third quarter
of 2019, mirroring the overall slowdown in the economy. For
the metropolitan group, however, all subcategories indicated
minor fluctuations in their average growth without any sporadic
occurrence in the given period. To compare trends in personal
loans among all population groups, Figure 7 (p 55) displays
the sector-wise outstanding personal loans in each lending
subcategory. This representation corroborates the unprece-
dented development in the post-demonetisation period—the
shares of both “credit cards” and “other personal loans” rapidly
snowballed among the rural and semi-urban population
groups, while the shares of all other types of personal loans
largely subsided. Interestingly, for rural and semi-urban popu-
lations, respectively, the share of “other personal loans”
reached 39.3% and 35.2% in 2019–20, which is not only the
highest since 2013–14 but also now comparable to the predom-
inant subcategory of “housing loans,” whose share stands at
41% and 45.2%, respectively. This underlines that as commer-
cial banks consolidated their positions in the field of consumer
finance during the post-demonetisation phase of expansionary
lending, they actively dealt with high-risk and untested bor-
rowers by making forays into low-tier cities and rural territo-
ries. The targeting of “below-prime” customers with high-
priced loans brought about the uninterrupted progression of
unsecured lending products and helped banks improve their
profit margins even as the continuing recession dragged out in
the economy.
This assessment is also substantiated by the quarterly reports
of TransUnion CIBIL, which state that credit card receivables were
the foremost beneficiaries of demonetisation as it led to
far-reaching changes in the digital transaction behaviours of
consumers, while unsecured personal loans also remained
steadfast (TransUnion 2019a, 2019b, 2020). Credit card balances
increased by 52.3% during 2019 in semi-urban and rural areas,
indicating an increased use of cards for payment. This is also
associated with the increased shift towards higher-risk
consumers, since 32.1% of credit card loans were extended to
below-prime consumers in 2019 compared to 26.4% in 2018.
54
Unsecured personal loans also observed a marked expansion,
with 44.8% of the total loans originating from below-prime con-
sumers during 2019 compared to 36.4% in 2018. These were
predominantly mobilised by NBFCs since 50% of their loan
originations were aimed at these borrowers. The average loan
size of NBFCs to this sector was around `40,000, while public
and private sector banks maintained their average loan size in
the range of `3,00,000–`4,00,000 in this segment. This means
that as banks and non-banks widened their retail lending busi-
ness, it was bolstered by the increased number of consumers
with access to credit. A majority of banks and non-banks began
targeting high-risk or below-prime segments as opposed to
extending additional credit to the same pool of borrowers. Be-
sides the easy availability of retail credit, this course of action
was further facilitated by the buoyant factors of digitalisation
and low credit penetration, which drove the robust growth in
short-term, small-ticket unsecured lending in these years.
Thus, stimulated by the rising dominance of unsecured debt,
there was a rapid upswing in personal loans within rural
and semi-urban population groups, among whom the share
of risky borrowers has grown since 2017. This is primarily
because both demonetisation and the consequent thriving
of NBFCs that followed created new opportunities both, for
below-prime consumers through easy access to liquidity and
purchasing power, which enabled consumption smoothing,
and for financial institutions in terms of diversified loan port-
folios and better profit margins that gradually exposed them
to systemic risks.
In the period following demonetisation, the drastic decline
in currency-in-circulation was reflected in the sudden increase
of low-cost deposits as demonetised banknotes were credited
in depositors’ accounts and the addition of 27 million new
Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana accounts. This generated
large surplus liquidity conditions that led banks to significantly
lower their medium-term deposit rate by 0.62%, as well as the
WALR on outstanding rupee loans by 0.5%, and fresh-rupee
loans by 1% during November 2016–August 2017. This facili-
tated the transmission of monetary policy to market interest
rates in this period through a marked reduction in deposit-
cum-lending rates (RBI 2017). In addition, most banks sharply
reduced their marginal cost of funds-based lending rate
(MCLR) by 0.75%–0.9% even when the policy rates remained
unchanged so as to pass on the benefits of cheaper loans to
new borrowers at a rapid pace. However, because of the fal-
tering demand conditions caused by the protracted state of
feeble investment growth and dwindling capacity utilisation
in the private corporate sector, acceptable borrowers were not
willing to borrow. This weakened corporate loan demand and
thereby further pushed banks to strengthen their retail loan
businesses. Moreover, with stagnating wages and poor job
prospects, households displayed an increased reliance on
short-term credit to smooth out consumption to finance their
everyday expenses that formed the basis not only for the up-
surge in demand for these products but also for their rising
exposure to uncollateralised debt in these times. Therefore,
as financial institutions ushered in credit supply shocks due to
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 7: Distribution of Outstanding Personal Loans
(a) Consumer Durables (b) Housing
4 1.4 48 70
Rural Semi-urban
3.5 1.2 46 60
3 1 50
44
2.5 Urban (right axis) Metropolitan (right axis)
Urban (right axis) Metropolitan (right axis) 0.8 42 40
2
0.6 40 30
1.5 Rural
Semi-urban 0.4 38 20
1
0.2 36 10
0.5

0 0 0
34
September 2015

September 2016

September 2017

September 2018

September 2019

September 2015

September 2016

September 2017

September 2018

September 2019
March 2014
December 2014
March 2015
June 2015

December 2015
March 2016
June 2016

December 2016
March 2017
June 2017

December 2017
March 2018
June 2018

December 2018
March 2019
June 2019

December 2019
March 2020
June 2020

March 2014
December 2014
March 2015
June 2015

December 2015
March 2016
June 2016

December 2016
March 2017
June 2017

December 2017
March 2018
June 2018

December 2018
March 2019
June 2019

December 2019
March 2020
June 2020
(c) Education (d) Vehicles
14 7 16 16
Rural Semi-urban
Urban (right axis)
12 6 14 14

12 12
10 5
Urban (right axis) 10 10
8 4
Metropolitan (right axis) 8 8
Semi-urban 3 Rural Metropolitan (right axis)
6
6 6
4 2
4 4
2 1 2 2

0 0 0 0
September 2015

September 2016

September 2017

September 2018

September 2019
March 2014
December 2014
March 2015
June 2015

December 2015
March 2016
June 2016

December 2016
March 2017
June 2017

December 2017
March 2018
June 2018

December 2018
March 2019
June 2019

December 2019
March 2020
June 2020
September 2015

September 2016

September 2017

September 2018

September 2019
March 2014
December 2014
March 2015
June 2015

December 2015
March 2016
June 2016

December 2016
March 2017
June 2017

December 2017
March 2018
June 2018

December 2018
March 2019
June 2019

December 2019
March 2020
June 2020

(e) Credit Cards (f) Other Personal Loans

2.5 9 45 35
Urban (right axis) Semi-urban
8 40
30
2 7 35
25
6 30
1.5 Rural 20
5 25
Metropolitan (right axis) Metropolitan (right axis)
4 20 15
1
Semi-urban 3 15
Urban (right axis) 10
2 10
0.5
5
Rural 1 5
0 0 0 0
September 2015

September 2016

September 2017

September 2018

September 2019

September 2015

September 2016

September 2017

September 2018

September 2019
March 2014
December 2014
March 2015
June 2015

December 2015
March 2016
June 2016

December 2016
March 2017
June 2017

December 2017
March 2018
June 2018

December 2018
March 2019
June 2019

December 2019
March 2020
June 2020

March 2014
December 2014
March 2015
June 2015

December 2015
March 2016
June 2016

December 2016
March 2017
June 2017

December 2017
March 2018
June 2018

December 2018
March 2019
June 2019

December 2019
March 2020
June 2020

Source: Computed from RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy (2019c).

unsecured loans and greatly expanded the scope of their opera-
tions, it initiated borrowing excesses among households, where
they were induced to spend future incomes using credit. This
not only drained excess liquidity from the system but also chan-
nelled financial excesses through the expansion of digital foot-
prints in the economy while piling up household debt in the
process. Thus, the confidence that the households’ future in-
comes would be sufficient to meet forthcoming payments not
only reinforced heightened lending but also fuelled increased
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
consumption, which was expected to feed into aggregate
demand and consequently revive economic growth; but as the
real growth rate of the economy declined, caused by marked
depressions in industrial growth and the subsequent drying
up of the informal sector leading to a sequential slowdown,
this resulted in high unemployment rates and a drop in labour
force participation rates. Consequently, the real incomes
and purchasing power of individuals were eroded. This high-
lights that when all the engines of economic growth failed to
vol lVii no 18 55
SPECIAL ARTICLE
recuperate, the only way to boost household spending, consider-
ing insufficient incomes, would have been through the accu-
mulation of debt, which was brought about by the accrual of
unsecured lending products. Thus, when the wage share was
suppressed and the domestic demand in the economy was
consistently dampened by rising inequalities and worsening
distribution of income, rising household debt was generated
to act as a substitute for higher wages through the easing of
liquidity constraints by financial institutions. This not only
maintained relative standards of consumption but also ena-
bled stagnant incomes to coexist with the much-needed high
levels of consumption and aggregate demand.
COVID-19 and Push towards Household Deleveraging
As the COVID-19 crisis brought economic activity to a grinding
halt, it dramatically plunged the Indian economy into break-
down mode by further dismantling the sluggish pace of its real
GDP growth, which was at its lowest in the quarterly series,
fundamentally driven by a steep loss of momentum leading to
a cliff effect. Despite some uptick in high-frequency indicators
in the latter half of 2020, there has been a broad-based con-
traction in credit growth across all sectors—personal loans and
their sub-components decelerated in March 2020—although
they had begun to show signs of slowdown even before the
pandemic (Table 1). This is particularly true for rural, semi-
urban, and urban groups, where most of the segments of
personal loans exhibit remarkable collapse in 2019–20 (Table 3).
This emphasises that so long as a credit-financed splurge in
consumption was used as a stimulus to resurrect output and
economic growth, the course had started to slow and saturate
as the debt overhang squeezed the demand for fresh credit
considering that the long-drawn-out investment-led econom-
ic slowdown continued to lower wages and raise unemploy-
ment in these years.
In addition, household financial savings improved in 2019–
20 because of the increase in bank deposits and sharp decline
in household borrowings, which condensed the growth of
their financial liabilities; this has further been aggravated by
the COVID-19 crisis through a diminished offtake of credit and
a spike in precautionary savings among households, which
also mirrors the subdued demand conditions in the economy.
This is substantiated by the increase in aggregate bank depos-
its by `6.8 lakh crore since March 2020 despite the fall in in-
terest rates, while credit growth continued to lag on account
of the weak loan demand and tight credit procedures on the
part of banks and NBFCs (owing to risk aversion), which led to
a widening resource gap of `8.2 lakh crore in the current year
(RBI 2020a, 2020b). This shows that the household delever-
aging that was already underway in India since 2019–20 has
steadily intensified during the current crisis as abrupt in-
come setbacks led households to exercise caution and con-
spicuously reduce their expectations of future incomes amid
the rising uncertainty.
As more households were brought under the indebtedness
process during the expansionary phase of retail lending in the
post-demonetisation years, this debt-fuelled artificial stimulus
56
to consumption became unsustainable, and with the COVID-19
shock, it has severely jeopardised households’ ability to ser-
vice debt as frequent job losses, shrinkage of real incomes, and
curtailments in purchasing power became rampant. According to
Bertrand et al (2020), 84% of Indian households reported a
decrease in income since the lockdown, which indicates the
sharp and broad negative impact on household incomes with a
limited ability to cope in the current economic climate. With
the marginal recovery in employment and subsequent salary
cuts, this has also significantly inflated the debt-to-income
ratio for households, which means that as interest on the exist-
ing debt accumulates when incomes are not rising fast enough,
it not only has serious repercussions for the debt-servicing
capability of indebted households but also leads them to low-
er their future consumption below their disposable income
depending on how large the debt-to-income ratio has already
become. This entails that as households are plunged into a
series of indebtedness, they react to the current economic dis-
turbance by drastically curtailing discretionary consumption
and adding to their savings so as to repay existing debts.
Since the fall in demand by indebted households cannot be
outweighed by higher demand from less-indebted households
due to differences in marginal propensities, this would create
an overall shortfall in aggregate demand, which would fur-
ther stall the business appetite for fresh investments, curb
employment growth, and stifle economic recovery even as
supply-side conditions in the economy make progress.
Another major risk lurking around the corner is the possibility
of higher delinquency rates on household debt that has been
delayed but not mitigated because of the provision of extended
loan moratoriums (RBI 2020d). As the macroeconomic envi-
ronment worsens and asset quality deteriorates, it could spill
the exacerbating stress over into the financial system through
severe escalations in NPAs. This would not only create a cas-
cading effect on financial institutions through another wave of
balance sheet crises and increases in potential fragility but
also ensure a severe tightening of credit supply for all house-
holds that would make the subsequent recession even more
protracted (Mian and Sufi 2018). As the growing stress on the
financial system could form a vulnerable link in dealing with
the current crisis, it might widen pre-existing cracks in India’s
financial system. This is because banks and non-banks are
still coming to grips with the piling NPA s that first resulted
from the over-exuberant lending to the infrastructure sector
during the investment boom of 2004–11 and later as a post-
demonetisation phenomenon through NBFCs and the real es-
tate sector. This could culminate in additional rounds of bad
loans among the personal loans extended to households as
the pandemic-induced crisis drags out. It might, therefore, be
onerous for financial institutions to issue fresh loans to inject
liquidity into the economy so as to avert additional losses,
which could result in a credit freeze and financial tightening.
Also, past experience shows that balance sheet stress takes a
long time to repair, which resulted in long periods of corpo-
rate deleveraging and the consequent collapse of bank credit
to industry. Correspondingly, household deleveraging would
april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

lead to a worsening of growth in personal loans that would
further suppress investment and depress aggregate demand,
thereby posing formidable downside risks threatening the
prospects of economic recovery. Thus, with the accumulating
stress on the key growth engines of consumption and invest-
ment along with the mounting pressure on the financial sys-
tem, there is a considerable onus on fiscal policy to drastically
upscale measures through deep-seated and wide-ranging
structural reforms, considering that the intensity and duration
of the pandemic-induced recessionary phase has put the Indian
economy on life support. Given the serious repercussions for real
and financial sectors, it is imperative to address the subdued
demand conditions in the economy by targeting the persistent
issues of rising unemployment and falling wages. This is crucial
to regain potential output losses, speed up economic recovery
during the post-pandemic phase, and thereby cope with the
ongoing economic catastrophe because this time it is essen-
tially a crisis of sentiment, confidence, and outlook.

REFERENCES PDFs/RBIBNOV17ABB2DE5EA76F428980F42 — (2020b): “Monetary Policy Report,” October, Re-

Azad, Rohit, Prasenjit Bose and Zico Dasgupta
(2017): “‘Riskless Capitalism’ in India: Bank
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Schofield (2020): “How Are Indian Households
Coping under the COVID-19 Lockdown? 8 Key
Findings,” Rustandy Center for Social Sector
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CEIC (2020): “India Household Debt: % of GDP,”
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tin/PDFs/BLOC091010_F.pdf.
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BE602988E90.PDF.
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dia, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulletin/
PDFs/0RBIJAN20182F85B40805824C57A81BA
D553117A379.PDF.
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India, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulle-
tin/PDFs/0RBIMARCH100318_F7618E7F52-
38E48CD9DC5BED9F0764B4B.PDF.
— (2018c): “Annual Report, 2017–18,” Reserve
Bank of India, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/
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45EC9A874DB38C991F580ED14242.PDF.
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serve Bank of India, https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/
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82A8286E6D65F81D.PDF.
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Credit Market: Second Quarter 2019,” Tran-
sUnion Industry Insights Report, TransUnion
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report-IIR-Q2-2019.pdf.
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Overview of Consumer Credit Trends (Q3 2018),”
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sunioncibil.com/resources/tucibil/doc/insights/
reports/report-IIR-Q3-2018.pdf.

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For subscription details, visit www.epwrf its.in or write to us at its@epwrf.in

EPWRF India Time Series is an e-ShodhSindhu consortium approved online database.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 57
 POSTSCRIPT
ARCHIVES

Archiving Visual History

Preliminary Approaches and Methods from the North East
Systematic archiving of visual media, which offers a visible feel of people and places, can help understand
and appreciate diverse communities.

Aparna Sharma, Ankuran Dutta, Raja Das

I
n the heart of Shillong’s famous Police Bazar is an inno- available online as open-access resources. The north-eastern
cuous photo studio, Karuz Photographers, owned and region—with limited or no institutional support and unfa-
operated by the octogenarian, Ahmad Hossain. These vourable humid natural conditions that pose risks of deple-
times of digital and mobile photography may well make photo tion and loss to historical materials—is particularly suited to
studios such as Karuz defunct, yet this studio hides in it the promotion of online and digital archives of visual media.
visual histories of North East India’s eight states, chronicled This is especially true for photographs, which, unlike films,
passionately by Hossain over a career spanning four decades. are widely produced and used in both public and private
Hailing from a well-to-do family, Hossain’s vast photographic settings. Private contexts such as personal collections within
collection—developed between the 1960s and the early families and in homes pose great risks to photographs such as
2000s—offers a rare and detailed insight into the social and devaluation, deterioration or loss due to negligence, limited
cultural lifeworlds as well as the historical changes that resources, decay, and accidents. Thus, organised documen-
communities of the North East have undergone since India’s tation, preservation, and dissemination are necessary for
independence. Though Hossain’s photography has been private collections such as Hossain’s. While digital reposito-
commissioned and displayed by a number of public There is a need ries and archives provide quality renditions of
agencies over the years, today, most of his nearly for a learned original materials that are readily accessible
15,000 photographs are stored privately, lacking understanding of across locations, their making involves more
an institutional home and the care befitting visual media as than the mere digitisation of materials. It neces-
endangered historical material. For us, a group of materials and texts sitates organised research and presentation, in-
visual media practitioner–researchers, document- cluding vital information pertaining to the con-
in their own right
ing, preserving, and making accessible Hossain’s tents of visual media and the contexts in which
that encode and
photographic collection is one way to advance his- they are produced and circulated—all communi-
offer meaning
torically sensitive understandings of the land- cated through metadata.
scapes and peoples of the North East, thus correcting the long- The development of a digital archive can be divided
standing under- and mis-representations of the region. into two stages of work. The first is a preliminary stage
Photographs and films bear documentary value for their when materials are surveyed and researched to understand
immediacy, the ability to depict an exact likeness of events their scope, contents, conditions, and suitability for digitisa-
and processes in a given place, at a given time. These visual tion. Based on preliminary work, a second stage is devised
media can be seen as constituents of cultural heritage that during which materials fit for digitisation are selected, ac-
can aid in writing recent and contemporary histories. Offer- tual digitisation conducted, and the digitised materials dis-
ing depictions—a visible feel—of places and peoples, visual seminated. In our work with Hossain’s photographs, the pre-
media are especially suited to promoting understandings liminary stage of work commenced with an orientation for
about communities removed from mainstream society, like Hossain and members of our research team. In this orienta-
the north-eastern states of India that are sparsely known in tion, the necessity and scope of work involved in surveying
any serious way to outsiders. An information and perception and devising an inventory were introduced to all. During
gap operates in relationship to this cradle of diverse ecolo- the orientation, Hossain and the members of the research
gies, histories, and cultures—a gap that we feel can be team also examined some online platforms with which
bridged through the promotion of systematically and rigor- a possible future archive of Hossain’s photographs may sit
ously researched materials, including visual media. Visual in conversation.
media can offer representations that can enable outsiders to Following the orientation, an open-ended session to inven-
learn about, relate with, and appreciate the varied and dis- tory a small album of Hossain’s photographs was undertaken.
tinct ways of living practiced by communities that call the The 1970s’ album from Mizoram included photographs of
North East their home. public events, natural landscapes, local bazaars, portraits of
Digital technologies offer vast scope for enhancing access locals, and some of the state’s material culture such as textiles.
to visual media. They can be used to develop archives made Studying this album, the team developed the first categories
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lViI no 18 71
 POSTSCRIPT
ARCHIVES

that an inventory would include, such as serial number, as insights into Hossain’s motivations and working methods,
item name, description, category, format, copyright and shared in his own words to give a sense of the contexts and
permissions status, and any special notes, for example, conditions in which he worked. This information is impor-
those indicating the condition of the photographs. The making tant to build an understanding of how visual media get pro-
of archives and associated documentation are based on duced and it can aid researchers in accessing these materials,
field-based research and, as such, the data generated includ- offering appropriate attribution and contextualisation, thereby
ing inventory categories must be ascertained in relation to ensuring that the labour and intentions of the media’s author
the materials, rather than using predetermined categories are respectfully recognised.
that may not necessarily accommodate all the information In regions such as the North East, visual media play a vital
related to a particular body of materials. role in promoting nuanced awareness and understanding of
After the orientation, the team conducted an in-depth lesser-known cultures and histories. As visual media, espe-
survey of Hossain’s photographs from each of the North cially photographs and films, becomes ever more accessible
East’s eight states. We organised the collection and gathered through digital and online platforms, they offer new meth-
data based on in-depth conversations with Hossain where odologies to complement research in the arts, humanities,
he recollected his memories, shared the contexts in which and social sciences. Against these potentialities is the need
he worked, and offered further information from diary for a learned understanding of visual media as materials
entries, notes that photographers keep on contact sheets of and texts in their own right that encode and offer meaning.
their prints, supplementary documents, and confirmed While visual media may be available for multiple uses, their
information from acquaintances. Such an exercise is neces- context and authorship merit recognition. For this, their
sary, for it establishes the contexts in which Hossain’s photo- preservation and dissemination must be backed by in-depth
graphs were produced and what their intended focus was. research that facilitates purposeful and ethical use that is fit
Highlighting and sharing this context and focus with future for intellectual inquiry—understood most broadly.
users contributes to promoting a culture of ethical and fair
[Images accompanying this article are available on the EPW website.]
use whereby materials are appropriately attributed and
both the media and the rights of those who produce them The researchers thank Ahmad Hossain and the Arcadia Trust-funded Modern
are preserved. The need for the responsible and fair use of Endangered Archives Program, University of California, Los Angeles.
historical media materials has never been more urgent than Aparna Sharma (a.sharma@arts.ucla.edu) teaches at the Department of World Art
in the present times when media proliferate in the digital and Cultures/Dance, University of California, Los Angeles, US. Ankuran Dutta
and online realms where they may not be appropriately (adutta@gauhati.ac.in) teaches at the Department of Communication and
attributed or their contents, dates and contexts clearly Journalism, Gauhati University, Guwahati, Assam. Raja Das (raj49gu@gmail.com)
is a research and programme associate at Dr Anamika Ray Memorial Trust,
understood. As our survey of Hossain’s photographs ex- Guwahati, Assam.
panded, we revised the inventory to include more specific
categories that would offer a deeper understanding of the
materials. Some of the new categories we included were:
keywords, such as the name of a tribe or a festival; themes
that is, broad fields that the photograph reflects such as
“culture,” “socio-economic activity,” etc; type of camera
used, the total number of photographs on a given topic; and
the date of data entry.
A key component of developing the inventory was devising
a master code for all photographs. During our survey, we
recognised that Hossain’s numbering may have been clear to
him but not to a person new to the material. To remedy this,
we developed a master code that was alpha-numeric, including
the project name and a photograph number. For example,
VH/219 refers to a photograph depicting rubber-tapping
with VH being an abbreviation of our project’s name, “Visual
Histories,” followed by a serial number of the photograph.
After all inventories were developed, they were shared with
Hossain to review. Following his approval of the data, short
summaries were developed for each state’s inventory that are
included in a guidebook for Hossain’s collection. The guide-
book offers to a lay reader an overview of Hossain’s collec-
tion, the work involved in surveying and organising it as well
72 april 30, 2022 vol lViI no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 POSTSCRIPT
CINEMA

Spring Thunder
Adivasi Resistance for
‘Jal, Jangal, Jameen’
Spring Thunder tells the story of the Adivasi
community’s resistance to upper-caste and
capitalist exploitation of the natural world.

Neeraj Bunkar

S
pring Thunder (2018), written and directed by Sriram
Dalton, starts with a note that says, “This movie
belongs to Mars” and immediately gives us a stunning
aerial view of forests and birds flying over tall, green trees.
The note shows the director’s anger at the people who,
despite gaining from it, do not care about the natural world
or do enough to protect it. Starring Amanda Bloom (as
Catherine), Ravi Sah (as Suresh Lakra), Akash Khurana
72 april 30, 2022 vol lViI no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

(as Chunnu Pandey), and Parikshit Tamuli (as Ghunghroo
Mahto), the film tells the story of a conflict between beauty
and destruction—the Adivasi community of the region is
fighting to protect their land, resisting the might of the
dominant upper castes who cross all limits and destroy na-
ture in order to make profits.
Catherine, a doctor from Australia, is in the region as a
healthcare worker to provide basic facilities to the Adivasis.
They live in miserable, neglected conditions even so many
decades after independence. According to development econo-
mist Arup Maharatna’s book, Demographic Per- Adivasis are
spectives on India’s Tribes (2005), 28.9% of India’s displaced because
tribal population has no access whatsoever to of the pressure
doctors and clinics; for Dalits, the percentage is and imperatives of
15.6%. Among tribal children, 42.2% have been
what passes as
immunised compared to 57.6% of Dalit children.
“development”
Again, 63.6% of Dalits have access to safe drink-
ing water against 43.3% of the Adivasi population. Both Dal-
its and Adivasis are at the margins of our society and have
been oppressed for generations.
Debates around the word “development” abound: What is
it and for whom is it? For Adivasis, development includes
protecting and preserving natural resources—jal (water),
jangal (forests), jameen (land)—that are meant not only for
their survival but which also carry great cultural significance
and symbolism in their lives. On the other hand, develop-
ment for others—who are not inhabitants of the forest, in-
cluding the government, businesspeople, mining compa-
nies, etc—is to exhaust and exploit mineral and natural
wealth and set up polluting factories on Adivasi land, which
makes life easier for other parts of the country while violat-
ing the rights of traditional forest dwellers. Adivasis are
displaced because of the pressure and imperatives of what
passes as “development.” These actions and policies of the
government to extract resources from forest areas actively
dispossess many Adivasis of their traditional means of life
and livelihood. This is illustrated in the scene where the pro-
tagonist Suresh says to Catherine: “Do you know madam,
there are other issues here, but the world sees only mines.
But, for us, this is life.”
Spring Thunder deals with the issue of displacement as
a consequence of this violent development, highlighting the
attack on the Adivasi way of life from different quarters—
the local dominant upper castes, from the government
(policymakers, the police, the army), and from corporate
interests. After discovering uranium deposits in the Adivasi
area and obtaining a tender from the government, the con-
tractor in the film conspires to force the Adivasi community
to migrate from their land, by mixing poison in the pond,
which is their main water source. Displaced from their land,
they are forced to work in the mines and under unsafe
conditions as “unskilled” labourers, while the others lead
secure and profitable lives that directly emerge from this
condition of extraction.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022 vol lViI no 18
POSTSCRIPT
CINEMA
It is not surprising that there is a radical left ideological
infl uence on the film. For instance, an assertive youth leader
is shown reciting a poem that is translated in the subtitles as
“we will hide that whole sky in our fist,
never cross our path, we are of this earth,
you have shoved us here in the mines,
your guns, your planes, your missiles
why do you point them at us?
we will lay down our lives but not forest.”
The protagonist, Suresh, too asserts the rights
of the Adivasis in the same manner, urging for
unity against those in power: “Awaj Do Hum Sab
Ek Hai” (Raise Your Voices, We Are All One),
“Inquilab Zindabad” (Long Live the Revolution).
By including Adivasi people from the region to act
in the film, the director, Dalton, ensures that such
critical scenes are not removed from reality and form a last-
ing impression on the audience. However, Spring Thunder
surprisingly conflates the identity of the ordinary Adivasi
with that of a Naxalite in many scenes, lending strength to
the dangerous belief in the mainstream that all Adivasis are
Naxalites, or insurgents. Such generalisation, where anyone
with a left-leaning and emancipatory ideology and resisting
the violence of the state is branded as a Naxalite, is danger-
ous and problematic.
In response to the state’s policies regarding mining, the
movie portrays the Adivasis fight against the system and the
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73
 POSTSCRIPT
CINEMA

local leaders but does not dwell on the systemic and struc-
tural changes that are needed, like increasing the represen-
tation and the inclusion of the Adivasi population in all
aspects of governance. Instead, it ventures into problematic
depictions of the population engaging in criminal acts, which
might make the conventional moviegoer unsympathetic to
their cause as it reproduces stereotypical narratives about
the Adivasis. It does not engage with the other side of the
Adivasis’ life struggle, and what the state can do to ensure
the improved conditions that they want and is their right—
access to quality education and healthcare, for example.
Given the immense reach and influence that cinema has,
it is always good news when film-makers create movies on
the issues and plight of the downtrodden in our society.
That said, for it to be a meaningful engagement, what is
important is who is making the film. From what perspective
is this narrative assertion of the marginalised community
being expressed? For example, Fandry (2013) and Pistulya
(2009) by Nagraj Manjule portrayed not only the lived reality
and the struggle of the Dalits and marginalised communities
but also honestly voiced the desires of the Dalit community
in the larger caste society.
This was because Manjule had experienced that very
struggle in his personal life and harboured the same desire to
move forward and challenge the hegemony of the upper castes
in the creative sphere with his own alternative cinematic
experiments. For many decades now, stories about Dalit and
Adivasi communities have been told on the screen, but a
majority of these are by upper-caste film-makers who often
appropriate the voice and ideology of Dalit and Adivasi com-
munities. The reality of the lives of the oppressed community
can be presented honestly and sensitively only by someone
who has first-hand experience of this reality.
In the case of Spring Thunder, while the director himself
is not an Adivasi, he has some first-hand experience of the
oppression and misery faced by the Adivasi community in
his region—Dalton Ganj, a town in the same Palamu district
in north-western Jharkhand where the story is set. Dalton’s
work and commitment to the Adivasi cause extend beyond
the screen to real life, through an initiative called “Jal Jungle
Zamin Humara Hain,” which spreads awareness regarding
land rights and the commercialisation of water and forest.
This work too informs his film-making. Even though Spring
Thunder does not speak entirely from the Adivasi perspec-
tive, it is praiseworthy for its efforts to create awareness
among other Indians about the daily struggle and issues of
the Adivasis, traditional forest dwellers and the protectors of
our forests. In the long wait for cinema to justly encourage and
welcome Dalit and Adivasi inclusion in the mainstream,
movies like Spring Thunder, which are sympathetic to the
struggles of the oppressed, offer some hope.
Neeraj Bunkar (neeraj2meg@gmail.com) is a PhD student at the Department of English,
Linguistics, and Philosophy at Nottingham Trent University, United Kingdom, with a
specific interest in caste, Dalit issues, and cinema.

74 april 30, 2022 vol lViI no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 POSTSCRIPT
POEM

Ask
Rohini Kejriwal

They told us to be curious

To not shy away from raising our hands.
They said there were no stupid questions,
Only stupid answers.
So we ask them about systemic racism and
intergenerational trauma,
About hate crimes and bloody politics
The normalisation of injustice.

We never get the answers,

Only excuses and lies,
A journalist is killed somewhere,
Elsewhere, a student is gagged.

How can we find the answers

In a system so deeply rigged?
We badger on incessantly—
Till there’s nothing left to lose.

Rohini Kejriwal (thealiporepost@gmail.com) is a writer, artist and photographer

living in Bengaluru. She runs The Alipore Post, a weekly newsletter and journal that
celebrates poetry, art, music, photography and creativity.

74 april 30, 2022 vol lViI no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for Rice Fortification: villages as the rice grown here cannot
comment on current affairs
and research in the social sciences.
A Reconsideration be used directly without fortification.
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949–1965), Now, rice processing will be in the hands
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
As editor for 35 years (1969–2004)
Krishna Raj
T he government has recently announ-
ced a fast schedule of spreading
rice fortification in India. According to
of those big companies, including multina-
tional companies, which control the forti-
fication technology. Other rice millers will
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. this schedule, the supply of fortified rice survive only after taking loans and adding
Editor to the Integrated Child Development the new expensive machinery and then
GOPAL GURU Services, midday meals, other nutrition too only as junior partners of those who
SENIOR Assistant editor and welfare schemes as well as to the control fortification technology, who can
INDU K
vast public distribution system is to be keep dictating to them to make improve-
Assistant editors
Nachiket kulkarni completed by 2024. ments in processing and machinery, thus
Rohan Dominic Mathews This rapid rollover of rice fortification is imposing added costs on them.
Sahba Fatima
likely to be harmful in various ways. It has been seen time and again that
editorIAL Assistant
Ankit Kawade Rice fortification should not be seen in staple food becomes more expensive once
Editorial Coordinator isolation, but together with programmes its processing passes into the hands of
Shilpa Sawant and proposals for fortification of several big business interests. To give an example,
copy editors other essential food like salt, milk, edible even at the time of the influx of cheap
jyoti shetty
Tulika Bhattacharya oils, and wheat, apart from the fact that corn in Mexico as a result of a free trade
production
fortification is also used in several other agreement with the United States, the
suneethi nair widely sold packaged food products. price of tortillas remained high because
CHIEF FINANCE OFFICER So, the first risk is that there can be the maize milling and flour industry was
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR
health problems arising from excess concentrated in a few big business units.
Circulation
KULDEEP NAWATHE
intake of some of the micronutrients in Thus, farmers (due to higher maize im-
fortified foods like iron and vitamins. ports) and consumers (due to higher
Advertisement Manager
Kamal G Fanibanda The fact that such excess can lead to sev- prices) both suffered. In fact, at the time of
General Manager & Publisher eral health problems is well established the farmers’ movement in 2021, the main
Gauraang Pradhan as is the fact that this is much more likely point precisely was that both the ordinary
editorial: edit@epw.in to arise from artificial fortification than farmers and consumers will be harmed
Circulation: circulation@epw.in from natural foods. The process of forti- with the increasing domination of big
Advertising: advertisement@epw.in fication involving the processing in heavy businesses. But it appears that the gov-
machines can also lead to some undesir- ernment has still not learned this lesson.
Economic & Political Weekly
320–322, A to Z Industrial Estate able residual products finding their way In the case of indigenous rice varieties,
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel to our food. it is often stated that the flavour improves
Mumbai 400 013
Phone: (022) 4063 8282
In the case of fortified rice, if the forti- with time. So, it has been usual to store
fied kernels do not blend optimally with and eat somewhat later. The shelf life of
EPW Research Foundation normal rice, the consumer can be con- the fortified rice kernels is stated to be
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts
research on fi nancial and macro-economic issues in India. fused regarding whether there are some only around 12 months or so. We need to
Director undesirable contaminants to be removed. remember that storage periods in the
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR The next step can be to promote only a few Food Corporation of India warehouses
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101
rice varieties, or to give a better price for can be quite long and then transportation
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41 only such varieties, or even to root for pat- across vast distances, ultimately to the fair
epwrf@epwrf.in ented or genetically modified varieties in price shops (FPSs), takes its own time too.
Sameeksha TrusT the name of varieties that blend well. An important need in India is highly
(Publishers of Economic & Political Weekly) While the need is to encourage smaller, decentralised procurement so that a signif-
Board of Trustees
Deepak Nayyar, Chairman village-level processing of rice and all icant part of the food procured in a village
Shyam Menon, Managing Trustee other food, thus generating local liveli- ends up in the same village’s FPSs and
André Béteille, D N Ghosh, hoods, this rice fortification will take us nutrition programmes, reducing food trans-
Deepak Parekh, Romila Thapar,
Rajeev Bhargava, Dipankar Gupta, in the opposite direction of further in- portation that is good both for the envi-
N Jayaram, SUDIPTO MUNDLE creasing the centralisation of rice produc- ronment and food security. Mandatory
Printed and published by Gauraang Pradhan, for and tion by a few big businesses. The idea of food fortification can shut the door on
on behalf of Sameeksha Trust and printed at
Modern Arts and Industries, 151, A–Z Industrial Estate, local village-level rice processing will be such ideas.
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013
and published at 320–322, A–Z Industrial Estate, dashed forever. It will become difficult Now let us see if we can achieve better
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013
to establish even a cottage industry based nutrition enhancement objectives in other
Editor: Gopal Guru (Editor responsible for
selection of news under the PRB Act) on rice produced in the nearby fields of ways. Even official reviews say that the
4 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

need for fortification arises because the
present-day milling removes essential
nutrients from rice significantly. Hence, the
most obvious way is to move away from
milling that indulges in excessive removal
and polishing to milling, which results in a
much lower removal and polishing, thus
reducing this as much as possible. Such
technology is certainly available, and so
the real solution is actually very simple
and inexpensive. However, the biggest
gains for nutrition will come from follow-
ing the social agroecology approach in
farming and food, which is based on im-
proving soil health and the overall natural
conditions of farming on the one hand and
reducing inequalities on the other. As soil
is nursed back to its health, its balance of
micronutrients will return, and the nutri-
tion of plants grown in this soil will im-
prove too. Reducing inequalities at all lev-
els and promoting creative, sustainable,
and ecologically protective livelihoods of
people remain the best means of chasing
away hunger and malnutrition, but well-
implemented nutrition programmes in
both villages and cities will also help.
Bharat Dogra
New Delhi
Fixing the Water and
Climate Change Nexus
P akistan is inherently a water-depend-
ent country. Its water and climate pol-
icy nexus is mired in deep, endemic, and
systemic challenges, most notably poor
governance. In practice, Pakistan has
historically relied upon structural, infra-
structural, and engineering solutions. On
the contrary, its climate change and wa-
ter security challenges have a much
larger domain than merely technical or
infrastructure issues.
Water governance involves a set of
political, administrative, and institu-
tional policies, processes, and practices
that enable decision-making and their
implementation after extensive consid-
eration of the stakeholders’ concerns and
holding the decision-makers accountable
for water management.
Governance holds the key to addressing
most of the climate–water issues, though
Pakistan has ignored the role of good gov-
ernance in addressing most of its natural
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
resource problems. The major governance
challenges are political disinterest in issues
like the climate change and water man-
agement, absence of robust policies, lack
of effective institutional frameworks, inef-
fective engagement of stakeholders, lack
of data, and poor service delivery.
Agricultural water governance can
significantly help in the sustainable use
of economically scarce water resources
to contribute to food and water security.
This is easier said than done as agriculture
uses around 88%–92% of the available
water resources. It contributes 19.5% to
the national gross domestic product,
employs over 42% of the labour force,
provides the raw material for about 30%
of its industry, and is the largest source
of foreign exchange earnings in Pakistan.
However, at the cost of providing fresh
water to agriculture, Pakistan’s rising
urban population faces acute issues of
meeting their water demands, sanitation
and hygiene services, domestic water
supply, and sanitation facilities. To ad-
dress this trade-off, Pakistan must lever-
age non-traditional water management
and governance pathways that involve
active engagement of stakeholders through
participatory development, including pub-
lic and private institutions for disaster
management and mitigation of extreme
weather losses. To improve water gov-
ernance in Pakistan, local water boards,
provincial and federal governments and
the private sector must work together.
The Government of Pakistan has ex-
pressed its strong commitment towards
adopting the global Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) as a national agenda,
both at the federal and provincial levels.
Within this framework, the achievement
of food security is emphasised as a top
priority for Pakistan, with the commit-
ment to pursue the goal of “ending hunger,
achieving food security, and improved
nutrition and promoting sustainable
agriculture” (SDG 2) and related targets.
Despite a strong agricultural base, the
country fares poorly concerning the in-
dicators of food security. Despite net
EPW Engage
The following article has been published in the past week in the EPW Engage section (www.epw.in/engage).
(1) ‘Fixing’ the River: Political Ecology of Changing Water Flows and Infrastructuring along the Godavari
Riverscape in Nashik — Shilpa Dahake
vol lVii no 18
LETTERS
food surpluses, Pakistan has been facing
a paradox of widespread food insecurity
and malnutrition.
Globally, it ranks among the top 15
extreme water-stressed countries in the
world. Climate change has exposed the
geographic, economic, social, and envi-
ronmental vulnerabilities of the water
sector in Pakistan. The Indus River Basin
System (IRBS)—a complex hydrologic sys-
tem—receives more than 70% of its water
from the melting of glaciers located in the
Hindu-Kush Karakoram Himalaya. Given
the significant vulnerability of the Indus
basin to climate change, integrated river
basin management by ensuring climate
resilience is the most significant govern-
ance area for sustainable management of
the IRBS in Pakistan.
Another key pathway is to understand
that water and climate do not respect ad-
ministrative or national boundaries. There-
fore, Pakistan and regional countries, and
particularly India, due to the Indus Basin
Treaty have to develop transboundary
water management and this is one of the
most challenging water governance areas.
Given the integrative and multifaceted
nature of climate–water issues, the role
of leadership has become ever more im-
perative globally to address the climate
policy and water governance problems.
Political leadership is pivotal to addressing
multiple governance problems confronting
integration, regulation, coordination, trust-
building, transboundary collaboration,
and stakeholder engagement for tackling
water–climate issues.
Primarily, the lack of high-level political
commitment and visionary leadership
has remained one of the significant rea-
sons for the poor performance of the
climate and water sectors in Pakistan.
Hence, here is a silver lining of working
with the political leadership through evi-
dence-based advocacy and active engage-
ment with all stakeholders. With the new
government in place, this should be a
priority area to be worked upon.
Abdur Rehman Cheema
Islamabad
5
LETTERS
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Send us your submissions on edit@epw.in.

6 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for Rice Fortification: villages as the rice grown here cannot
comment on current affairs
and research in the social sciences.
A Reconsideration be used directly without fortification.
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949–1965), Now, rice processing will be in the hands
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
As editor for 35 years (1969–2004)
Krishna Raj
T he government has recently announ-
ced a fast schedule of spreading
rice fortification in India. According to
of those big companies, including multina-
tional companies, which control the forti-
fication technology. Other rice millers will
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. this schedule, the supply of fortified rice survive only after taking loans and adding
Editor to the Integrated Child Development the new expensive machinery and then
GOPAL GURU Services, midday meals, other nutrition too only as junior partners of those who
SENIOR Assistant editor and welfare schemes as well as to the control fortification technology, who can
INDU K
vast public distribution system is to be keep dictating to them to make improve-
Assistant editors
Nachiket kulkarni completed by 2024. ments in processing and machinery, thus
Rohan Dominic Mathews This rapid rollover of rice fortification is imposing added costs on them.
Sahba Fatima
likely to be harmful in various ways. It has been seen time and again that
editorIAL Assistant
Ankit Kawade Rice fortification should not be seen in staple food becomes more expensive once
Editorial Coordinator isolation, but together with programmes its processing passes into the hands of
Shilpa Sawant and proposals for fortification of several big business interests. To give an example,
copy editors other essential food like salt, milk, edible even at the time of the influx of cheap
jyoti shetty
Tulika Bhattacharya oils, and wheat, apart from the fact that corn in Mexico as a result of a free trade
production
fortification is also used in several other agreement with the United States, the
suneethi nair widely sold packaged food products. price of tortillas remained high because
CHIEF FINANCE OFFICER So, the first risk is that there can be the maize milling and flour industry was
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR
health problems arising from excess concentrated in a few big business units.
Circulation
KULDEEP NAWATHE
intake of some of the micronutrients in Thus, farmers (due to higher maize im-
fortified foods like iron and vitamins. ports) and consumers (due to higher
Advertisement Manager
Kamal G Fanibanda The fact that such excess can lead to sev- prices) both suffered. In fact, at the time of
General Manager & Publisher eral health problems is well established the farmers’ movement in 2021, the main
Gauraang Pradhan as is the fact that this is much more likely point precisely was that both the ordinary
editorial: edit@epw.in to arise from artificial fortification than farmers and consumers will be harmed
Circulation: circulation@epw.in from natural foods. The process of forti- with the increasing domination of big
Advertising: advertisement@epw.in fication involving the processing in heavy businesses. But it appears that the gov-
machines can also lead to some undesir- ernment has still not learned this lesson.
Economic & Political Weekly
320–322, A to Z Industrial Estate able residual products finding their way In the case of indigenous rice varieties,
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel to our food. it is often stated that the flavour improves
Mumbai 400 013
Phone: (022) 4063 8282
In the case of fortified rice, if the forti- with time. So, it has been usual to store
fied kernels do not blend optimally with and eat somewhat later. The shelf life of
EPW Research Foundation normal rice, the consumer can be con- the fortified rice kernels is stated to be
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts
research on fi nancial and macro-economic issues in India. fused regarding whether there are some only around 12 months or so. We need to
Director undesirable contaminants to be removed. remember that storage periods in the
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR The next step can be to promote only a few Food Corporation of India warehouses
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101
rice varieties, or to give a better price for can be quite long and then transportation
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41 only such varieties, or even to root for pat- across vast distances, ultimately to the fair
epwrf@epwrf.in ented or genetically modified varieties in price shops (FPSs), takes its own time too.
Sameeksha TrusT the name of varieties that blend well. An important need in India is highly
(Publishers of Economic & Political Weekly) While the need is to encourage smaller, decentralised procurement so that a signif-
Board of Trustees
Deepak Nayyar, Chairman village-level processing of rice and all icant part of the food procured in a village
Shyam Menon, Managing Trustee other food, thus generating local liveli- ends up in the same village’s FPSs and
André Béteille, D N Ghosh, hoods, this rice fortification will take us nutrition programmes, reducing food trans-
Deepak Parekh, Romila Thapar,
Rajeev Bhargava, Dipankar Gupta, in the opposite direction of further in- portation that is good both for the envi-
N Jayaram, SUDIPTO MUNDLE creasing the centralisation of rice produc- ronment and food security. Mandatory
Printed and published by Gauraang Pradhan, for and tion by a few big businesses. The idea of food fortification can shut the door on
on behalf of Sameeksha Trust and printed at
Modern Arts and Industries, 151, A–Z Industrial Estate, local village-level rice processing will be such ideas.
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013
and published at 320–322, A–Z Industrial Estate, dashed forever. It will become difficult Now let us see if we can achieve better
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013
to establish even a cottage industry based nutrition enhancement objectives in other
Editor: Gopal Guru (Editor responsible for
selection of news under the PRB Act) on rice produced in the nearby fields of ways. Even official reviews say that the
4 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

need for fortification arises because the
present-day milling removes essential
nutrients from rice significantly. Hence, the
most obvious way is to move away from
milling that indulges in excessive removal
and polishing to milling, which results in a
much lower removal and polishing, thus
reducing this as much as possible. Such
technology is certainly available, and so
the real solution is actually very simple
and inexpensive. However, the biggest
gains for nutrition will come from follow-
ing the social agroecology approach in
farming and food, which is based on im-
proving soil health and the overall natural
conditions of farming on the one hand and
reducing inequalities on the other. As soil
is nursed back to its health, its balance of
micronutrients will return, and the nutri-
tion of plants grown in this soil will im-
prove too. Reducing inequalities at all lev-
els and promoting creative, sustainable,
and ecologically protective livelihoods of
people remain the best means of chasing
away hunger and malnutrition, but well-
implemented nutrition programmes in
both villages and cities will also help.
Bharat Dogra
New Delhi
Fixing the Water and
Climate Change Nexus
P akistan is inherently a water-depend-
ent country. Its water and climate pol-
icy nexus is mired in deep, endemic, and
systemic challenges, most notably poor
governance. In practice, Pakistan has
historically relied upon structural, infra-
structural, and engineering solutions. On
the contrary, its climate change and wa-
ter security challenges have a much
larger domain than merely technical or
infrastructure issues.
Water governance involves a set of
political, administrative, and institu-
tional policies, processes, and practices
that enable decision-making and their
implementation after extensive consid-
eration of the stakeholders’ concerns and
holding the decision-makers accountable
for water management.
Governance holds the key to addressing
most of the climate–water issues, though
Pakistan has ignored the role of good gov-
ernance in addressing most of its natural
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 30, 2022
resource problems. The major governance
challenges are political disinterest in issues
like the climate change and water man-
agement, absence of robust policies, lack
of effective institutional frameworks, inef-
fective engagement of stakeholders, lack
of data, and poor service delivery.
Agricultural water governance can
significantly help in the sustainable use
of economically scarce water resources
to contribute to food and water security.
This is easier said than done as agriculture
uses around 88%–92% of the available
water resources. It contributes 19.5% to
the national gross domestic product,
employs over 42% of the labour force,
provides the raw material for about 30%
of its industry, and is the largest source
of foreign exchange earnings in Pakistan.
However, at the cost of providing fresh
water to agriculture, Pakistan’s rising
urban population faces acute issues of
meeting their water demands, sanitation
and hygiene services, domestic water
supply, and sanitation facilities. To ad-
dress this trade-off, Pakistan must lever-
age non-traditional water management
and governance pathways that involve
active engagement of stakeholders through
participatory development, including pub-
lic and private institutions for disaster
management and mitigation of extreme
weather losses. To improve water gov-
ernance in Pakistan, local water boards,
provincial and federal governments and
the private sector must work together.
The Government of Pakistan has ex-
pressed its strong commitment towards
adopting the global Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) as a national agenda,
both at the federal and provincial levels.
Within this framework, the achievement
of food security is emphasised as a top
priority for Pakistan, with the commit-
ment to pursue the goal of “ending hunger,
achieving food security, and improved
nutrition and promoting sustainable
agriculture” (SDG 2) and related targets.
Despite a strong agricultural base, the
country fares poorly concerning the in-
dicators of food security. Despite net
EPW Engage
The following article has been published in the past week in the EPW Engage section (www.epw.in/engage).
(1) ‘Fixing’ the River: Political Ecology of Changing Water Flows and Infrastructuring along the Godavari
Riverscape in Nashik — Shilpa Dahake
vol lVii no 18
LETTERS
food surpluses, Pakistan has been facing
a paradox of widespread food insecurity
and malnutrition.
Globally, it ranks among the top 15
extreme water-stressed countries in the
world. Climate change has exposed the
geographic, economic, social, and envi-
ronmental vulnerabilities of the water
sector in Pakistan. The Indus River Basin
System (IRBS)—a complex hydrologic sys-
tem—receives more than 70% of its water
from the melting of glaciers located in the
Hindu-Kush Karakoram Himalaya. Given
the significant vulnerability of the Indus
basin to climate change, integrated river
basin management by ensuring climate
resilience is the most significant govern-
ance area for sustainable management of
the IRBS in Pakistan.
Another key pathway is to understand
that water and climate do not respect ad-
ministrative or national boundaries. There-
fore, Pakistan and regional countries, and
particularly India, due to the Indus Basin
Treaty have to develop transboundary
water management and this is one of the
most challenging water governance areas.
Given the integrative and multifaceted
nature of climate–water issues, the role
of leadership has become ever more im-
perative globally to address the climate
policy and water governance problems.
Political leadership is pivotal to addressing
multiple governance problems confronting
integration, regulation, coordination, trust-
building, transboundary collaboration,
and stakeholder engagement for tackling
water–climate issues.
Primarily, the lack of high-level political
commitment and visionary leadership
has remained one of the significant rea-
sons for the poor performance of the
climate and water sectors in Pakistan.
Hence, here is a silver lining of working
with the political leadership through evi-
dence-based advocacy and active engage-
ment with all stakeholders. With the new
government in place, this should be a
priority area to be worked upon.
Abdur Rehman Cheema
Islamabad
5
LETTERS
Subscription Rates
(Revised rates effective 01 April 2022)
Category Print Digital Archives Print + Digital Archives Concessional rates are restricted to students in India. To subscribe at
concessional rates, please submit a proof of eligibility from an institution.
Print Current Current Current Print Print Print
Edition Issues Issues + Issues + Edition + Edition + Edition + Print:
Current Subscribers will receive 50 issues of the print edition every year, which
Last Complete Current Current
include all special and review issues.
5 Years’ Archives Issues Issues + Issues +
Archives (since 1966) Last Complete Digital Archives:
5 Years’ Archives (i) Current Issues: Subscribers can access all issues published during the
Archives (since 1966) subscription period. For example, a 1-year subscription will provide
access for the period of 1 year to the latest issue at the time of
subscription and all subsequent issues for the period of 1 year.
India (in Rupees)
(ii) Current Issues + Last 5 Years’ Digital Archives: Subscribers can
Students – 1 Year 2,080 810 2,550 4,450 2,940 4,760 6,650 access all issues published during the subscription period, plus all
issues published in the last 5 years. For example, a 1-year subscription
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6 april 30, 2022 vol lVii no 18 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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‘Fixing’ the River: Political Ecology of Changing Water

Flows and Infrastructuring along the Godavari
Riverscape in Nashik
SHILPA DAHAKE

Shilpa Dahake (shilpabd26@gmail.com) is an Independent Researcher.

Vol. 57, Issue No. 18, 30 Apr, 2022

Technocratic managerialism has a long legacy of infrastructuring the Godavari river to

maintain the hydraulic order of Nashik city. The implementation of hard infrastructures in
the riverscape has been the dominant governmentality in the city.

Technocratic managerialism has a long legacy of infrastructuring the Godavari river to

maintain the hydraulic order of Nashik city. The implementation of hard infrastructures in
the riverscape has been the dominant governmentality in the city. As the city started
expanding and began to spatially fix itself with more permanent roads, housing complexes,
and other public infrastructures, the moments of overflow and no flow of water in the river
flood and drought became incongruous with Nashik’s emerging modern urban life. In other
words, they became disruptions giving rise to the need to fix the unruliness of the river.

Here, the word fix implies two ways of engaging with the river – to repair by managing and
manipulating its flows and to place or anchor, by presuming it to be a distinct line between
land and water. The fixing of the Godavari through infrastructures focused on the re-
engineering of the riverscape to manage the excesses of water during the monsoons and
water scarcity during the dry seasons. In contemporary times, the Godavari riverfront is
also rendered as “a place of commodified value” (Baviskar 2011) with aesthetic significance
that is (re)producing the riverscape as a desirable place for capital accumulation. Following
the Marxian political-economic logic, that suggests, in order for capital to grow and
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circulate it must be spatially fixed in the form of a built environment (Harvey 1982; Smith
1984). In this vein, the riverscapes have emerged as a site that serves the purpose of
periodical spatial fixation of capital flows through large-scale development projects.

Meandering through diverse cultural backdrops, in a journey of 1,456 kilometres (km)

(About Godavari Basin nd), Godavari witnesses several remarkable happenings throughout
its course. Proximate to its origin, in the Brahmagiri mountains of the Western Ghats, the
Godavari encounters a religiously significant and rapidly urbanising city of Nashik, in
Maharashtra, India. With a population of ~1.4 million, Nashik is the fourth largest city in
the state, after Mumbai, Pune, and Nagpur (Census India 2011). Nashik and Godavari are
coevolving and (re)shaping each other in myriad ways. Their relationship is manifold,
linking economy, religion, development, and waste and pollution.

Derived from ethnographic fieldwork spread across 2015-19 in Nashik, along the Godavari,
this photo essay narrates the frictions between the notions of flows and fixities emerging at
the land-water interface in the city. It not only investigates the various forms of fixities that
have emerged in relation to the Godavari, but also unravels new emerging ecological flows
of the river. In the process, the essay traces how the river itself reworks the land-water
distinctions by “acting back” (Helmreich 2011) on the infrastructures and the city that seek
to control it. Beginning with the Kumbh Mela of 2015, this photo essay engages with the
ecological imbalances surging after the festivities to unpack the entanglements between the
flows and fixities in Nashik.

Image 1:
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The religious-cultural cosmos of Nashik is concentrated around a ~2 km stretch of the river,

locally known as Goda Ghat or Godavari Ghat. These ghats experience a thorough
transformation in a cycle of 12 years, with every Kumbh Mela. The attempt of the Nashik
Municipal Corporation (NMC) to revive the Godavari Ghats for the Kumbh Melas, to
accommodate the influx of pilgrims, resulted in the channelisation of the natural course of
the river by concretisation. As illustrated by a local activist, “Concrete equals development.
This notion has been deeply engrained in our policymakers’ minds as well as in the public
conscience.”

Image 2:

The activist added, “In the name of development, the NMC has literally poured concrete in
the riverbed of the Godavari.” This was done by the administration in 2002, during the
preparations for the Kumbh Mela of 2003. Like in other host cities (Allahabad, Haridwar,
and Ujjain) of Kumbh Mela, even in Nashik, it has become a mega event. The preparation of
the mela attracts huge funding from the state as well as the central government. To
showcase the utilisation of these funds in a short period, in 2002, the NMC concretised the
banks of the river and riverbed in Godavari Ghats.
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Image 3:

By concretising the Godavari Ghats, the administration attempted to produce

a fixed riverscape with stable surfaces to ensure the easy movement and connectivity of the
pilgrims converging along the river. However, in doing so, the administration, as
highlighted by one of the activists, “destroyed the historic kunds [stepwells] and the natural
ecological make-up of the Godavari.” In this stretch, the river is no more a river. It has been
reduced to a controlled and restricted stream of water in concretised pools.
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Image 4:

The concretisation of the riverscape in Nashik did not stop in 2002-03; it continued in
2014-15 for the Kumbh Mela of 2015. This time, the NMC extended the concretisation done
in 2002-03 to the area downstream of the Godavari Ghats and built more ghats and
platforms along the river. By cutting the natural and porous riparian edges of the river, the
hard surfaces were created to cater the needs of religious commodification of the Godavari.

Image 5:
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The commodification of Godavari in Nashik is not only limited to the religious domain.
Under the guise of river conservation and bank protection, a 3 km long stretch of the
Godavari’s left bank upstream of the Godavari Ghats was developed as Goda Park. This
initial version of the project was formulated in 2005-06, under the Jawaharlal Nehru
National Urban Renewal Mission. However, the project did not succeed as it ignored the by-
laws of construction within the floodlines, resulting in seasonal destruction due to flooding
of the river.

Image 6:

Despite the initial failure, the project was revised in 2013 by the then ruling party, and
foregrounded the idea of building a “world-class” Godavari riverfront, a project as an
initiative towards conservation. This revised version was envisioned as a 13.5 km long
project with laser shows, musical fountains, multipurpose facilities, parks, etc, to be
developed upstream of the old Nashik city along both the banks of the river. Due to lack of
funding, in 2013, the NMC without any public consultation handed over the project to a
private corporation. However, till date, only ~500 m stretch of the project has been
constructed.
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Image 7:

Promoted and advertised as an infrastructural project to uplift the urban image of Nashik,
the riverfront development project was instead imposed on the city as the performance of
the aspirations of modernity and development. The underlying purpose of the project was to
commodify the riverfronts. This process was undertaken simultaneously by the government
and the private developers. The intention was to capitalise on the land along the river. As
the government acquired land along the river for the project, the private developers started
buying farmlands in the vicinity of the project sites.
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Image 8:

In the summer of 2016, before the culmination of the year-long festivities around the Kumbh
Mela, the local and national newspapers in Nashik were filled with headlines like “First time
in 139 years, Nashik’s sacred Ramkund dries up” (Sarkar 2016). As per official figures, on
15 June , 2016, there was a reserve of only 3% of waters in the 11 dams across Nashik
district (PTI 2016). The Gangapur Dam complex, which fulfils the water needs of Nashik
city, had only 12% of its water stock left. The course of the river traversing through Nashik
had turned into a trickle, with no water in the religious stretch for the pilgrims to take a
holy dip.

Image 9:

With the drying of the river, the view of the ghats was dominated by the greys of concrete.
Adding to this greyness, some workers were building a concrete weir-like structure in the
riverbed, close to the Ram Kund (a stepwell where all the rituals are carried out). As there
was no water in the river and due to water shortage, to meet the needs of thousands of
pilgrims visiting the Ram Kund to perform various rituals, this wall was being erected to
contain water within the Kund. Moreover, the municipal corporation (re)created the river by
filling the kund with borewell water to facilitate the celebrations of Gudi
Padwa (Maharashtrian New Year).
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Image 10:

As the locals were overcoming the shock of the drying of Godavari, during the monsoon of
2016 the river flooded twice. The first episode was a flash flood that occurred without any
discharge from the Gangapur Dam, whereas the consequent one resulted from heavy
rainfall, coupled with additional discharge from the dam.

Owing to these drastic fluctuations in a span of four months, a young resident highlighted
the changing perceptions and relations with the river by suggesting, “People of old Nashik
used to rejoice and welcome the flow of the Godavari in the monsoons. But things have
changed now … now, people fear the floods.” He further added, “This attitude shift is a
result of the changing behaviour of Godavari. And, the Godavari has changed because we
have kept nothing natural in the riverscape.”
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Image 11:

In Nashik, extreme fluctuations of the water flows in the river laid open the gaps in the
bureaucratic determination of infrastructuring river or, as anthropologist Tania Li (2007)
describes the constant “will to improve” the riverscape. People of Nashik started
highlighting these gaps in the technocratic interventions by asking “what they seek to
change” and “what is accomplished” (Li 2007: 1). These interventions often produce specific
unintended outcomes or feral enactments (like flooding), while sometimes aggravate the
very issues they intended to resolve.
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Image 12:

Attempts to harness and control the Godavari through different infrastructure projects for
various purposes – as a resource, a religious entity, a symbol of modernity, has been
(re)producing the river as an infrastructure. The riverscape, as an accretion of
infrastructures, has been serving as a location for the manifestation of aspirations,
provisions, and technical progress. The institutional management of the flows of water,
which includes the material infrastructures and technological devices and (dis)connections,
may seem to regularise the hydraulics of the city. However, they have impacted various
processes of, and within, the Godavari riverscape. As a result, the inherent materiality of
water to flow has no place to manifest itself in the riverscape.
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Image 13:

The occurrences of flooding and drying within the re-engineered riverscape induce ruptures
at a particular sociopolitical moment in a sociocultural context. These ruptures highlight the
limits of the visions of modernity and development, and become an opportunity for locals to
question the state and re-engage with the river. The extremities of 2016 led to the
emergence of civic movements demanding deconcretisation of the riverscape. After three
years of legal battle, now, the locals have finally succeeded in forcing the administration to
free the flow of riverscape from the shackles of concrete.
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Image 14:

Analysing the changing patterns of water flows through the riverscape is one way of
understanding the materialities of the anthropogenic Godavari riverscape. The river has
internalised the anthropogenic interventions, and the obduracy of infrastructures has
become an integral part of the flows of the river. With each infrastructural layer, the river
started modulating its ecological flows around the materiality of the infrastructures. Such
technocratic interventions repeatedly tried to fixate the boundaries of land and water,
restrict the river in a particular place, or fix the river.
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Image 15: (illustration done by author)

In conclusion, though, the economic logic of commodification is rendering value to the

Godavari. However, the inherent fluidities of the Godavari continue to defy fixities,
commodification, and highlights the limits of capital. Moreover, the river not only remains a
medium through which political power is expressed, rather, the river itself becomes political
when it starts (re)shaping the political subjectivities of the locals in Nashik.

References:

About Godavari Basin (nd): “Godavari River Management Board,” accessed from
http://grmb.gov.in/grmb/basin.

Baviskar, Amita (2011): What the eye does not see: The Yamuna in the imagination of Delhi,
Economic and Political Weekly, pp- 45-53.

Census India. (2011): Nashik City Population Census 2011-2020, Maharashtra. Retrieved
from https://www.census2011.co.in/census/city/361-nashik.html

Harvey David (1982): The Limits to Capital, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Helmreich, Stefan (2011): Nature/Culture/Seawater, American Anthropologist, Vol. 113, No.

1, pp-132-144.
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Li, Tania Murray (2007): The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the
Practice of Politics, Durham and London: Duke University Press.

PTI (2016): Rain and Floods Batter Nashik as the Godavari River Bursts its Banks, Mail
Online India. Retrieved from
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3720591/Heavy-rain-flooding-batter
-Nashik-district-Godavari-river-bursts-banks.html

Sarkar, Sumita (2016): First Time in 139 years, Nashik’s Sacred Ramkund Dries Up, The
Times of India, Retrieved from
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/First-time-in-139-years-Nashiks-sacred-Ramkund-d
ries-up/articleshow/51720282.cms

Smith, Neil (1984): Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space,
Oxford: Blackwell

Image-Credit/Misc:

Image Credits- Shilpa Dahake

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Marxist Ecology in the light of Contemporary

Ecological Thought: Reflections on the Ontological
Questions in Dark, Deep and Marxist Ecology
VARUN WIGHMAL

Varun Wighmal (varunwighhmal@gmail.com) is a PhD Scholar Centre for Political Studies,

JNU, New Delhi.
Vol. 57, Issue No. 18, 30 Apr, 2022

The paper strives to explore some fundamental debates concerning the question of ecology,
nature and culture in Marxian corpus. First, it attempts to explicate the differences and
commonalities between the philosophical conception of nature in Marxism and
contemporary and old ecological thoughts like Dark ecology of Timothy Morton and Deep
ecology of Arne Naess. Second, the paper is also an attempt to revisit some of the larger
philosophical and ontological questions pertaining to nature and ecology; especially the
questions related to ontological position of mind and matter in relation to nature and how
these fundamental questions have a bearing on the current and future trajectory of
ecological thought and movements globally in the Anthropocene epoch.

There has been an extensive debate within Marxism concerning the question of nature and
its concomitant questions about the interaction of nature and culture or nature and society.
This debate goes back to the writings of Karl Marx himself and got livelier after Friedrich
Engels’s magnum opus Dialectic of Nature. Marx’s own writing reflected a comprehensive
or totalised system of knowledge, which gave due emphasis to the question of ontology.
That is, it contends the fundamental question of what constitutes reality and being. This
ontological undercurrent in Marx can be seen in his doctoral dissertation, which was a
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comparative study of Epicurus and Democritus on the philosophy of nature. In his thesis,
Marx analysed the materialistic philosophy of ancient thinker Epicurus and also formulated
his initial understanding of the working of nature and its materialistic mechanism. This
early work of Marx has also been interpreted as an introduction to his dialectical conception
of nature, wherein nature is perceived to work in a dialectical materialistic fashion.
Although some recent writers like Thomas Nail have argued for a different understanding of
Marx’s thesis, wherein Marx formulated that unfolding of nature or change in nature does
not happen only dialectically, which is somewhat deterministic, rather it happens as
dialectic kinetic swerves (sudden or abrupt change in any process) (Nail 2020).

Whatever may be the case, it becomes quite clear that Marx right from the onset had
ontological concerns about nature and its materialistic or non-materialistic underpinning.
This negates the later interpretation of Marx and Marxism as an economic theory or
philosophical system that was indifferent to the fundamental question of ecology and nature.
It has been argued by contemporary political ecologists like John Bellamy Foster that this
anti-ecological interpretation of Marx’s oeuvre was a product of neo-Kantian and neo-
Hegelian interpretations of Marxism, especially by Frankfurt School and Western Marxism
theorists (Foster 2000). This neo-Kantian thinking with epistemology centric discourse
completely sidelined the foundational and ontological questions in Marxism.

This had a huge impact on the question of ecology or nature and society as it was assumed
that Marxism and its dialectical method is only applicable to society and its unfolding and
the domain of nature was virtually left untouched or ignored by this discourse. The
domination of Western Marxism and the new left in academia with its Kantian and Hegelian
leaning is partly responsible for the marginalisation of the discourse of nature and natural
science within Marxism. It can be argued, without an iota of doubt, that it was not the case
in original or early Marxism. In early Marxism which includes the writings of both Marx and
Engels, nature and society or nature and culture were not seen as independent domains,
rather they were perceived as a continuous relational or dialectical process. And, the
method of dialectics which entails both struggle and unity of opposites was thought of as a
basic scientific method by which all of reality, whether social or natural, unfolds. In other
words, the processes that bring changes in the social world were inextricably linked or
entwined with the processes of the natural world. This can be substantiated by some
common examples from Marx’s own writings and ideas, especially his conception of social
and natural metabolism and the metabolic rift that had accompanied the capitalist
transformation of agriculture.

Marx formulated that natural and social metabolism is interlinked and disruptions in one
bring changes in the other. The best example was the loss of soil fertility that resulted
because of the transformation in social relations with capitalist agriculture in enclosure
movements in England. The irreversible loss of nutrients from the soil and disruption in the
soil cycle embodies a metabolic rift between natural and social metabolism, which was
otherwise considered as one and intertwined. This shows the deep insights that Marx had
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on nature and its relation with society, which was not just an epistemological insight about
the question of how we do know or perceive natural and social reality, but what
fundamentally entails as nature and society and their enmeshed relationship, i.e. the
question of social and natural ontology. These ontological and scientific concerns in Marx
are thoroughly explored by philosophers like Helena Sheehan (1985) in her work Marxism
and the Philosophy of Science and also by a natural scientist like Richard Lewontin, Richard
Levins and Stephen Jay Gould; all of them have tried comprehending nature and its
processes and vicissitude through a dialectical prism and method.

Marxist Ecology in the light of Dark and Deep Ecology

After highlighting the basic ecological thinking in Marx and other early Marxist and the drift
that happened with Western Marxism, it becomes pivotal to explore Marxist ecological
thinking in relation to some other prominent and new ecological philosophies and thought.
Two prominent eco-philosophies that are worth reckoning in light of this debate are Dark
and Deep ecology. Dark ecology is relatively new and therefore has varied and ambiguous
interpretations. It is a sort of ecological thinking that strives to frame the question of
ecology without the conception of nature (Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking
Environmental Aesthetics 2007). This was formulated by philosopher Morton in his major
work named Ecology without Nature. Morton belongs to the avant-garde tradition of post-
continental philosophy named object-oriented ontology (OOO) and speculative realism. Both
these ideas and philosophies contend a position that fundamentally challenges both Kantian

correlationism1 and anthropocentrism2. Morton, who is inspired by philosophers like

Graham Harman and Bruno Latour, asserts that our formulation of nature is extremely
anthropocentric. This is because of the spectre of non-humans, which constitutes virtually
every entity in the universe, barring humans.

Morton propounds that Dark ecology is an aesthetic critique of the conception of nature that
privileges humans or sentient beings over objects and non-human stuff. This aesthetic of
ecological experience that Morton calls Dark ecology transcends all anthropocentric
binaries of nature versus culture and asserts solidarity with non-humans on a plane of

immanence. Fundamentally, Morton argues for a flat ontology3, wherein the human-centric
universe is demolished and a true post-human aesthetic experience is formulated that
subverts the violence of the Neolithic agricultural revolution, which severed the symbiosis of
human and non-human existence. The symbiotic real that Morton proposed in his work was
about the inseparable or entangled existence of humans with non-humans or objects and
was also a flat plane of immanence with no duality or transcendence or hierarchy in the
ecosphere and which got severed with the Neolithic revolution or agriculture. This severing,
according to Morton, is the root cause of our ecological crisis. Dark ecology is nothing but
an aesthetic experience or phenomenology that strives to undo this severing by making
humans conscious of the complex network that the ecosphere is and how each actor in the
network is enmeshed with the other. Morton calls for an eco-communism in his recent work,
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which is about the solidarity of humans with non-humans. Morton argues that a spectre is
haunting Marxism, which is basically the spectre of non-humans. He acknowledges the
anthropocentric undercurrents in Marxism and still contends that communism or Marxism
has more potential than capitalism because, according to Morton, anthropocentrism is a

bug, not a feature of Marxism (Morton 2019). He postulates a post-human economy4 in

which human thought is no longer the top access mode to the world.

His work of Dark ecology and ecology without nature is an avant-garde intervention in post-
continental philosophy and literary theory that blends together insights from Marxism,
Heidegger’s ontology, Lacaian and Derridean framework. Morton, unlike shallow ecologists
or liberal ecologists, wants to ontologise ecological thinking, and this resonates with Marx’s
own attempt in his doctoral thesis as well as Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
and Das Kapitalto bring out deep ontological and materialistic concerns about nature and
ecology. The difference between the ecological frame of Morton and Marx lies in their
vantage point concerning the ontology of object and matter, because Marx, unlike Morton,
did not argue for an active role or agency of non-human objects in social relations
independent of human labour, this makes Marxian analysis not completely post-human as is
the case with Morton.

After, explicating Dark ecology and its juxtaposition with the Marxian ecological framework.
It becomes crucial to delve into some of the vital questions raised by Deep ecology and its
adherents and how the Marxian frame fits in it. Deep ecology is an ecological thought as
well as a movement started by philosopher Arne Naess and espoused by Vandana Shiva and
others who contend that nature has intrinsic value. In other words, the formulation of use-
value or exchange value by Marx or any other political economist eludes the basic notion
that apart from values attributed to nature by humans and their economic processes, it is
the nature that has value-in-itself independent of human attribution.

In Deep ecological framework, nature is alive and should not be seen as dead, inert or brute
matter. This fundamental operative logic distinguishes deep ecology from shallow-liberal
ecology, which argues for the preservation of nature for human needs and survival. Deep
ecologists have also accused Marx of engaging in the same anthropocentric fallacy that
liberal political economists fall in that is of seeing nature and its products as a gift to man.
Deep ecologists’ accusation against Marx has also been accepted by many eco-socialist like
Joel Kovel and others who have accepted the idea that Marx lacked a true ecological lens,
due to his spatio-temporal position. This position against Marx has also been accepted by
Akeel Bilgrami, who has also alleged that Marx’s thinking lacks a deep ecological frame. But
Bilgrami does not blame Marx for this lack, because he contends that there was no
ecological Copernican revolution, when Marx was writing, which made him oblivious of
some of the catastrophic consequences of capitalism.

Deep ecologist argues that it is not just capitalism that promotes ecological destruction, but
it is a modern or modernist frame of perceiving nature in predatory terms that fuels this
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catastrophe. There lies the fundamental distinction between Marxian ecology and Deep
ecology because Marx despite his stringent condemnation of capitalism and capitalist
modernity did not oppose modernity as such. It was capitalism, not modern productive
forces that according to Marx wreaked havoc on the environment and nature. In his,
envision of future communism advancement of technology and productive forces are a
prerequisite for any communist society.

Deep ecology shares a lot with animistic epistemology and ontology. Animism, which is

nothing but panpsychism5 in action view nature and every entity of nature as alive and also
attributes rudimentary agency or subjectivity to matter. And, here we can draw a strong
parallel between Deep and Dark ecological frameworks. Both frameworks somehow
attribute agency to matter and objects or nature, which is non-human, the difference
emanates in their method. Dark ecology which is inspired by object oriented ontology of
Graham Harman that transcends Kantian correlationism that privileges human subjectivity
for any knowledge of the object and the Cartesian notion that the world is split into two
kinds of entities: human thinkers and dead physical matter. Object Oriented Ontology (OOO
upholds Kant’s basic conception of the thing-it-itself, but the primary difference between
OOO and Kant is the claim by OOO proponents like Harman and Morton that objects are
noumenal (that is exist in themselves), not just for us, but for each other as well. And, hence
the deep error of Kantian philosophy is the assumption that we cannot speak of any
relationship that does not include humans as one its elements. For example, we cannot talk
about thunder-in-itself, but only about how thunder manifests to humans under the
condition of time and space. In other words, OOO speaks of objects outside of any relations.
This ontological assumption is accepted by Dark Ecology of Morton and through this, he
formulates a non-anthropocentric model of ecology. Deep ecology is also non-
anthropocentric but does not accept the fundamentals of Dark ecology, which is based on
object oriented ontology and actor-network theory of Latour. Deep ecology in a way ascribes
human-like subjectivity to all of nature and objects; albeit some scholars have tried drawing
some link between Deep and Dark ecology through a common notion of panpsychism, but it
is quite contested as to how much of a link can be drawn between the two, as Dark ecology
is primarily lies in the domain of aesthetic experience and argues for a fundamental shift in
human consciousness and Deep ecology perceives all nature to be alive like humans.

Marxist ecological framework does not go into such conceptual philosophical questions
about the ontology of objects and can we speak of objects outside of our subjectivity like
thing-in-itself. Many Marxist thinkers have criticised both Dark ecology and Deep ecology
for ignoring concrete historical and social factors that shape any ecology and its framework.
Dark ecology is seen as an attempt by Marxists to obfuscate and absolve capitalist
exploitation of nature by bringing obscure complex ontological questions in their analysis of
nature and ecology. I believe this criticism is not very strong due to Marx’s own engagement
with ontological questions as shown in the earlier part of the paper. Deep ecology has also
been criticised by Marxist ecologists due to its cryptic and mystical language and it's
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complete sidelining of concrete social and economic factors in their ecological analysis.

Conclusions

The paper started with an endeavour to introduce Marxist ecological thought and to trace
its genealogy in the writings of early Marx. It contends that Marx and Marxism right from
inception had taken ontological questions seriously. It argued that Marx was a
comprehensive philosopher, who had conceptualised a totalised ontology of humans and
nature. He saw both nature and humans or society have always existed in a symbiotic
relationship that got disrupted by capitalist agriculture and mode of production. The paper
also looked at the attempts initiated by Western Marxism that tried to separate Marxism
from natural sciences and positioned the process and method of dialectics as belonging only
to the human and social sphere. This fallacy was disproved by delving into Marx's
ontological concerns about nature and matter as well by the involvement of Marxist natural
scientists in framing and perceiving nature dialectically.

It then explored the domain of Dark and Deep ecology and juxtaposed the non-
anthropocentrism of both these ecological frameworks with Marxist ecological thought and
argued that Marx was not completely anthropocentric, as he is usually accused of, but he
also did completely touch on some of the intriguing ontological questions about object,
matter and its ontology as framed by Dark ecologist and OOO theorists. Dark ecology
subscribes to a relational ontology, wherein everything is inextricably interconnected and
this common factor blends insights of all three ecological frameworks, whether Dark, Deep
or Marxist.

Deep ecological concern and their panpsychist orientation were also juxtaposed with
Marx’s analysis of the matter. It can be argued that the new interpretation of Marxism in
light of new materialism that perceives matter to be active, dynamic and in motion and
changing abruptly especially by Nail in his work Marx in Motion provides new space to
interpret Marx's ontology in a panpsychist lens. This could be interesting future work that
can bridge some of the gaps between Dark, Deep and Marxist ecology. Finally, the paper
was an attempt to explore new perspectives on the question of ecology and nature and to
envision a new ontological framework which is truly relational and transcends
anthropocentrism and hubris of human exceptionalism.
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End Notes:

[1] Correlationism is the idea propounded by speculative realists and is seen as inherent in
Kantian thought that we can ever have access to the correlation between thinking and
being, and never to either term considered apart from the other.

[2]Anthropocentrism can be defined as the idea that human subjectivity is unique and
human beings are the most significant entity in the world, due to its peculiar faculty of
having an inner subjective feeling called ‘qualia’. Non-anthropocentric approach to ecology
tries to decentre humans from the larger picture and assigns some sort of agency and
subjectivity to the larger nature.

[3] Flat ontology is a philosophical conception that emanates from the philosophies of
Spinoza, Deleuze and Levi Bryant and others. It argues for an ontology, which defies any
transcendence and hierarchy of existence. It is a non-dualistic ontology, which is about
democracy of objects; wherein every entity in the universe shares the same flat immanence
and hence exists equally.

[4] Post-human economy is a conceptualization of economy, wherein economic relations are

not just seen as contingent on human-human relation and production or between human and
object relation; objects as congealed human labor. But a certain level of agency and
autonomy is attributed to objects. This resonates well with Object Oriented Ontology and
Morton Hyperobjects like Global Warming and its potential to fundamentally shift human
frame and relation is an acknowledgement of post-human economy. Cyborg of Donno
Haraway, which is a confluence of human and machine is also an example of post-human
relation and economy.

[5] Panpsychism in its most elementary form is the view that consciousness animates or
pervades all of nature and hence cannot be either reduced to matter or eliminated. There
are many version of this idea, ranging from micropsychism to cosmopsychism. Panpsychist
ontology is non-dualistic, as it does not perceive mind and body, as two separate entities,
distinct from each other. But treats mind as an essential component of matter.
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References:

Bilgrami, Akeel (2020): Nature and Value, Columbia University Press.

Foster, John Bellamy (2000): Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature, NYU Press.

Latour, Bruno (2005): Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory,

Oxford University Press.

Marx, Karl (2012): The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Dover Publication.

Marx, Karl (2000): The Difference between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of
Nature( Doctoral thesis of Marx published 1841), marxist.org.

Morton, Timoth (2016): Dark Ecology: For a Logic of Future Coexistence, Columbia
University Press.

Morton, Timothy (2007): Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental aesthetics,

Harvard University Press.

Morton, Timothy (2019): Humankind: Solidarity with Non-human People, Verso Books.

Naess, Arne (2008): The Ecology of Wisdom: Writings by Arne Naess, Counterpoint Press.

Nail, Thomas (2020): Marx in Motion: A New Materialist Marxism, Oxford University Press.

Sheehan, Helena (1985): Marxism and the Philosophy of Science, New Jersey: Humanities
Press International.

Image-Credit/Misc:

Image Credit- Akankshya Padhi (Multimedia Editor, EPW-Engage)

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Revisiting the Debates on Man-Nature Relation in

Marxist Tradition
CHEPAL SHERPA

Chepal Sherpa (chepal10@gmail.com) is a research scholar at the Centre for Political

Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Vol. 57, Issue No. 18, 30 Apr, 2022

This paper tried to locate the debate on man-nature relation in the Marxist tradition. It looks
at Marx’s theory of alienation and dialectics and argues that his theory of alienation and
dialectics is not limited to a critique of capitalist modernity but shows man’s alienation from
nature.

Developing on this thesis, this paper looks at Engel’s position on the place of nature in
Marxism. We argue that Engels’s notion of ecological crisis in capitalism is a result of his
idea of nature as above society as he argued in Dialectics of Nature. In Lukacs and western
Marxism, Engel’s thesis of the dialectics of nature is criticised. We especially highlight how
Engels’s notion of nature suffers the reification of capitalism.

Nature occupies an important aspect of Karl Marx’s theory of capitalism but not in the way
thinkers and intellectuals prior to Marx conceived it. Classical political economy – Adam
Smith, and Ricardo – conceived nature as static, unchanging and infinite to be extracted for
wealth generation and profit-maximisation. Similarly, romanticism (Baudelaire) as an
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artistic movement stood against the trauma of great interventions of industrial capitalism
and the exploitation of nature that according to romanticists ideally should be left to itself.
They thought of increasing alienation of mankind from nature as a result of the spiritual
degradation of society that should be restored. On similar lines, Kantian formulation of
‘thing-in-itself’ is a theoretical boundary between nature (things or objects) and human
society. ‘Nature’ according to these grand narratives is outside of the society and domain of
thought that needs specialised scientific discourses – physical, chemical, biological, etc –
‘natural sciences’ that cater to developing knowledge about the complexes of nature. In all
these formulations, nature is thought of as an opaque and at many instances a mystical
entity that has its own autonomous domain which cannot be reached. With its own ‘“aws,”
nature is completely outside of human comprehension and outside of social processes and
social relations. But Marxism has a completely opposite view of nature.

In Marxist tradition, there are two dominant positions on the idea of ‘nature’ represented
by (i) Georg Lukacs (Frankfurt School), and (ii) Engels’ ‘dialectics of nature’ thesis. It is
argued by the former that ‘nature’ and the material world is integral to the social processes
– class struggle. And the latter locate some amount of flexibility and autonomy with its own
“laws of nature” vis-à-vis scientific laws of society. But before discussing the central points
of differences among these two approaches in Marxism, let us formulate certain basic
understanding widely shared by both of them.

Dialectics and Alienation

Marx’s doctoral dissertation on Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, dialectics

is the central question. In his later writings, dialectics as a method of ‘negation of negation’
formed his basic mode of judgment. Marx’s Capital is premised on dialectics borrowed from
Hegel by rejecting his idealist shell and replacing it with concrete social relations, mode of
production and division of labour under capitalism. Engels’ dialectics is centred on the
‘materialist interpretation of history’, as Marx and Engels developed in “the German
Ideology”. Marx’s Capital is a work that is reflective of the dialectical use of concepts like
‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’ of commodities under capitalism. The ‘commodity form’
peculiar under capitalism Marx showed is the dialectical processes of capital-labour
relations. Under capitalism, commodity forms the particular unit on which the universalising
nature of capitalism as a system of production is realised. Marx showed this dialectic
between commodity and production as the basis for other dialectical processes of surplus
value and money, land and rent, agriculture and industry and so on and so forth. Marx’s
systemic explanation of the workings and operations of capitalism is based on dialectics,
what many have referred to as “materialist dialectics” because it entails a materialist
explanation of contradictions of capitalist social relations as opposed to the abstract

metaphysical preoccupation of Hegelian dialectics1.

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Marx’s 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (EMP) section on ‘Estrangement of

Labour’ is on critique of political economy and ‘alienation’ under capitalism. Marx was also
concerned with the relationship of man with nature under capitalism. In capitalism – man
undergoes various forms of estrangement/alienation: First, alienation from the external
world, that is nature, secondly, from other individuals and society, and thirdly, alienation
from themself.

Regarding the alienation of man from nature, Marx stated that labour of workers and the
production of commodity are not possible without nature, i.e. the sensuous world (Marx
1844). Man creates the world around them through exercising their labour on ‘nature’.
Land, resources, energy and physical materials are the “inorganic body” of man under
capitalism which are transformed into products and commodities. The material production
of man’s labour and its outcomes are appropriated from them and become something
external to labour.

Therefore, nature gets transformed into commodities with exchange value in the capitalist
system, which is a result of labour. But as the processes of capitalist production become
more organised, man gets alienated from nature. Capitalism creates conditions of alienation
where nature becomes further distant from man. Nature ceases to remain immediate and
organically linked to man and society and gets more distanced from society and mediated
through the capitalist processes of production. As a result, nature becomes distant from
society and appears as an alien and external entity.

But the process of alienation of nature from man gets intensified in one condition, i.e. with
the increasing alienation of man in society. Both these processes of alienation- alienation of
humanity/man from nature and alienation of man with man happen parallel to each other
(Horkheimer, 2004), and the great divide between human society and nature deepens. For
Marx, therefore, it is the problem of alienation that creates the rift between nature and
man. This is the basic premise so far discussed on which both Engels and Lukacs develop
their ideas and conceptualisation of nature.

Dialectics of Nature

Engels was a lifelong friend of Marx and both developed many of their philosophical
methods together. Dialectics and alienation were very fundamental concepts that shaped
major contributions – Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Anti-
Dühring, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, etc, marked the development of materialist
dialectics.
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Engels’ Dialectics of Nature was published in 1883. John Bellamy Foster argues that Engels

should be understood as one of the “foundational ecological thinkers” in modern times 2.

Foster argues Engels extended Marx’s theory of ‘metabolic rift’ in historical materialist
notion of the ecological crisis. Engels contributed by providing a deep understanding and
study into nature’s “universal metabolism”. Others have observed that Engels’s book has
increased our awareness and conception about the many dimensions of ecological crisis.
Paul Blackledge among others suggests that Engels’s Dialectics of Nature has revealed how
contemporary ecological crises have roots in the “capitalist social relations”. Engels shows
the dialectic of society and nature that helps clarify the nature of ecological crisis in
contemporary times. Eleanor Leacock, a Marxist anthropologist observed that, Engels’s
Dialectics of Nature helped in the later efforts to develop the conceptual basis for
understanding “the complete interdependence of human social relations and human
relations to nature” (Leacock 1972).

In Anti-Dühring, written in the 1870s, Engels highlighted how the capitalist class under its
leadership was racing the society towards “ruin”. He projected how capital was unable to
control the “productive forces” that had gone beyond its control. Capital, argued Engels,
had developed into a destructive force that ruined environment and nature. Therefore,
according to Engels it was either “revolution or ruin” that would put an end to the society.
Later socialists like Rosa Luxemburg would echo Engels’s cautionary remark in her popular
slogan – Socialism or Barbarism! Following Engels, Walter Benjamin in his “On the Concept
History” would also make similar cautionary remarks about the modern capitalist society
with his analogy of a locomotive train that would eventually fall in the abyss if not taken
immediate action by pulling the brakes of the train, i.e. revolution.

Engels also observed that capitalism created destructive tendencies that ruined nature and
caused immeasurable epidemics, disease and deterioration of social health in general. The
impact of these epidemics and natural calamities would mostly affect the working class and
the poor. Engels in his the Condition of the Working Class in England published in 1844
argued that capitalism created inhospitable living conditions for the working classes with its
periodic health crises and unemployment. But added to these systemic crises are the
destructive environmental and epidemiological conditions in the large industrial cities like
Manchester. The starkest claim of Engels that has remained forceful in his the Condition of
the Working Class in England is the nature of crises capitalism creates in all its forms of the
epidemic and health hazardous conditions of working class for which Engels hold capitalism
as a system responsible for “social murder” inflicted on the whole of population.

Based on Engels’s studies of the destructive material conditions of capitalism, Marx

developed his study of environment and epidemics in Capital. Marx developed his theory of
“metabolic rift” in capitalism resulting from the “periodical epidemics” and the destruction
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of soil and land.

Engels developed his theory that man is a part of ‘nature’. This thesis Engels is referred to
as “proof of dialectics”. It is important to note Engels developed a naturalist and
evolutionary notion of ‘nature’. ThisFoster argues in today’s context, Engels’s “proof of

dialectics is to be understood as “ecology is the proof of dialectics."3 Engels was also critical
of the environmental destruction caused by colonialism.

Engels viewed nature as a whole on which humanity or society was located. His critique of
bourgeois sciences for the 18th and 19th centuries was that they thought of society outside
of nature. For instance, in Francis Bacon’s understanding, nature is presented as some kind
of entity that should be subjected and conquered by humans. Engels criticises this position
as this was an attempt to include nature and environment within the laws of capitalist
accumulation in the early phase of industrial capitalism. Engels cautions such notion of
“conquering nature” thesis of the erstwhile bourgeois theorists as symptomatic of
senselessness and meaninglessness and argues that such “victory” over nature would only
lead to “revenge of nature”:

“Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over
nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, in the
first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has
quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel out the first” (Marx, Engels).

Engels gives the examples of Mesopotamia, Greece and Asia Minor to substantiate his point
about the destruction caused by the people in those societies to nature through their
ecological devastation of natural resources like – forests, land, water, dairy industry, etc,
that would have negative effects for generations to come in these societies.

“Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror
over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood
and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in
the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws
and apply them correctly”. (Marx) (emphasis added)

It is alleged by Marxist ecological thinkers like Foster that ‘western Marxism’ completely
abandoned Engels’ dialectics of nature thesis. As a result, study of nature and natural
sciences have completely remained outside the framework of historical materialism. Nature
and natural sciences has gone at the other extreme of the realm of mechanical and positivist
sciences. This has happened especially in the post-World War II era, and ironically at the
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time when the ecological movement started advancing in the political landscape as a force.

Reification of Nature under capitalism and “Lukacs Problem”

Lukacs developed a very complex critique of mechanical understanding of society and

nature. In relation to Engels, he had a critique that Engels developed an “undialectical”
notion of nature where in society is thought to be a part of nature. Critiquing the inadequate
theorisation on the importance of dialectics, Lukacs shows how Engels’ Anti-Duhring, which
shaped much of what we know as “materialist dialectics”, was “inadequate” or “even
flawed” (Kadarkay, 1991) Because, Lukacs argues, Engels failed to show and mention the
“most vital interrelation”, i.e. the “dialectical relation between subject and object in the
historical process”. (Kadarkay, 1991) Further, Lukacs criticises Engels for his failure to
show the interaction (dialectical) between society and nature in historical process.

In other words, according to Lukacs, Engels’ notion of dialectics is limited to thought alone
and never “touches” object (reality) and practical action of masses and therefore remains
“contemplative” and fails to become practical. Lukacs provides some historical examples of
this problem from Marx’s times. Like Machists’ “obedience to laws”, as formulas not very

different than “bourgeois or contemplative materialism” of the 19th century. The 18 th

century classical economists and various tendencies of fatalism, dogmatism and voluntarism
and such movements were marked by their “undialectical” and “unhistorical” assessment of
the capitalist mode of production. According to classical political economists, economic
concepts like ‘law of value’, ‘socially necessary labour time’, ‘exchange value’ etc. are
eternal concepts applicable across universal history in all modes of production. But the
point Marx pointed out in his critique of political economy is that these concepts explain
only the particular phenomenon of capitalism because it emanates from the concrete social
and economic historical conditions of capitalism. Similarly, Lukacs develops his idea of
‘reification’ under capitalism as a process where commodities and objects appear as forms
autonomous and above the social relations. In capitalist reification commodities and
institutions appear to the individuals as independent and natural entities that hide the real
social relations and processes that produced such commodities, institutions and products in
general. Therefore, capitalism creates its own fetishism of “facts” and objectivity and their
definitions depending on the historical development of division of labour and its
contradiction with capital. For instance, under capitalism, the reification of human relations
is posited in the form of economic relations. Economic “facts” become the scientific basis
under capitalist society. Therefore, according to Lukacs, science itself is the outcome of a
particular economic relation defined by capitalism. Knowledge retains the reified effect of
the capitalist system. Facts and knowledge appear as truth under capitalism. In capitalism,
the most unscientific nature of knowledge of a seemingly scientific method lies in its “failure
to see and take account of the historical character of the facts on which it is based”
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(Kadarkay, 1991).

Western Marxism, Lukacs is often regarded as the founder, locates such reification under
capitalism as central in understanding nature. It is this approach to nature and ecology that
eco-Marxist Foster has referred to as the ‘Lukács problem’ since this argument is presented
with much force in the writings of Lukács. But Foster sees this not limited to Lukacs alone
but characteristic of the Frankfurt School. Foster in his Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and
Nature (2000) argues that Western Marxism had failed to come in terms with natural
sciences, due to its socio-historical notion of dialectics that cannot be applied to nature.
Therefore, Foster argues, western Marxism gave way to positivism in natural sciences.
Hence, it was idealist in its approach towards nature and left no space for understanding
the ecological devastation and crisis created by capitalism.

Lukacs criticises Engel’s notion of dialectics of nature. According to Lukacs, man’s

alienation from nature was rooted in the process of reification in which social relations
appeared in the form of “quasi-objectivity”. The result of the process of reification through
which “a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a
‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to
conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people”(Lukacs, 1971).

Lukacs called this process of reification and alienation of man from nature under capitalism
as “second nature”. Man in capitalism is increasingly alienated from the “first” nature that
is the previous historical modes of production where humanity lived close organic relation
with nature and environment. In the ‘first nature’, men lived and cohabited with nature. But
as the process of reification and alienation intensified under capitalism, so was the distance
of man and society from nature increased.

Lukacs’ critique of Engels is that the latter’s attempt to develop ‘dialectics of nature’ is
inapplicable to nature. Even the apparent “primitive” character of nature is mediated
through the modern capitalist processes of production and reification. On Engel’s major
argument about the place of society and humanity in nature, Lukacs’ point is the opposite.
He argues that what Engels argued about the society’s location in nature is the exact
opposite where nature is part and construction of the social relation under capitalism. In
political terms one can argue that Lukacs places nature as the outcome of the class struggle
in capitalism where there is a constant contradiction between capital and labour. Lukacs’
critique of Engels is that the latter places nature as a static entity over and above social
relations of capitalism, and the class struggle. Therefore, according to Lukacs, nature is not
above society as an overarching entity with an objective place of its own. Rather nature
should be placed in a particular historical phase of society, i.e. in capitalism. This
understanding, according to Lukacs, would provide a holistic idea about the relationship
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between society and nature and man’s position vis a vis environment.

Conclusions

In this paper, we discussed the major debate on the question of man-nature relationship. We
highlighted Marx’s concept of alienation. It was argued that alienation as a concept is not
only a critique of the capitalist economic system, but we showed how under capitalism there
exists alienation of man from nature. Engels’s concept of ‘dialectics of nature’ helped the
discourse on ecological Marxism. His accounts on the destructive forces of capitalism have
an immense impact on ecology and nature.

Western Marxism, on the other hand, criticised Engels’s notion of ‘dialectics of nature’. We
argued that “Lukacs problem” or Lukacs’s critique of ‘dialectics of nature’ thesis showed
how it suffered from ‘reification’, where nature is seen as an entity above the society and
not as a part of social relations in capitalism and the class struggle.

In contemporary times, ecological crisis has emerged as the immediate political question.
The climate changes, global warming and the effects of rising sea levels have not only
threatened capitalism, but also threatened the whole of human existence on earth.
Therefore, a Marxist ecology rooted in Engels’s diagnosis of capitalist destruction of the
planet based on the historicist approach of Lukacs is how we can go forward. The recent
theorisations in the left have posed even new questions of global inequality and ‘climate
action’ led by activists like Greta Thunberg are emerging with new possibilities for the
future.

End Notes:

[1] See Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, For Marx and Reading Capital.

[2] Foster, John Bellamy, “Engels’s Dialectics of Nature in the Anthropocene”, Monthly
Review Magazine, online source -
(https://monthlyreview.org/2020/11/01/engelss-dialectics-of-nature-in-the...)
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[3] Foster, John Bellamy, “The Return of Nature”

References:

Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx: Early

Writings, Penguin Books.

Horkheimer, Max (2004): The Eclipse of Reason, New York: Continuum

Publishers.

Adorno, Theoror (2005): Minima Moralia, New York: Verso Books.

Blackledge, Paul (2019): Friedrich Engels and Modern Social and Political
Theory, Albany: State University of New York Press. see (First Chapter).

Leacock, Eleanor (1972): Introduction to The Origin of the Family, Private

Property and the State, by Frederick Engels, New York: International
Publishers. (1972)

Foster, John Bellamy, The Return of Nature Marx and Engels, Collected
Works, vol. 25

Kadarkay, Arpad (1991): Georg Lukacs: Life, Thought and Politics, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.

J. B. Foster; B. Clark; R. York (2010): The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War

on the Earth, New York, Monthly Review Press.

Lukacs, Georg (1971): “Reification and the Consciousness of the

Proletariat”, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics,
(Trans.) Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Image-Credit/Misc:

Image Credit: Akankshya Padhi (Multimedia Editor-EPW Engage)

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Driven to Ecological Crisis: Motility and Disparity on

Urban Roads
AKSHAY BALAN AND ANISHA MAINI

Anisha Maini (anishamaini.dse@gmail.com) and Akshay Balan (akshayb45@gmail.com) are

students of MA Sociology at Delhi School of Economics.
Vol. 57, Issue No. 18, 30 Apr, 2022

Modern cities in India such as Delhi are a cesspool of inequalities and disparities that are
deeply tied to the class-caste nexus. These aspects manifest themselves starkly on its roads,
made apparent by identifying those who utilise its infrastructure, while dictating its design,
and those who are systematically left out. The automobile owning classes of Delhi have a
monopoly over the city’s land, water and air, extracting and exploiting for their needs and
comforts, while the poor are left to bear the brunt of the ecological degradation that comes
with it. The bourgeois class’s systematic collusion with the state is also visible in its
environmentalism, through which it controls the narrative of legitimacy. The social and
ecological consequences of these processes stand as evidence of the crisis that neoliberal
India is facing at present.

On the busy streets of Delhi, one does not see much of a tree line these days. In fact, there
are more cars than trees near the pavements, standing in rows as if they are waiting in
some kind of assembly line. The roads are filled with them too, queued one after another in
traffic, fumes exhuming into the air around. In the midst of this, helmeted people in two-
wheelers carry on as well, weaving through the gaps that the cars could not occupy. There
is a certain kind of anonymity and obscurity that being behind the wheel allows. Cars create
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an urban space that is faceless and devoid of human connection as if the people become
part of their machines (Walks 2014). They are so “every day” in the city that the rare
occasions when there is not any on the street almost feel strange. Amidst the chaos that has
was already in place, there have also been a few new entrants into the traffic, zigzagging
their way through the maze in t-shirts that declare the brand of app-based companies like
Zomato, Urban Company, Swiggy and Dunzo. Platform service and delivery workers provide
new visibility to people who are in the hustle and bustle of the traffic, whose workplace is
essentially the road.

Around 8% of the country’s total motor vehicles ply within Delhi (Badami 2005). Although
two-wheelers are a majority in Delhi, there is no arguing about whom the roads actually
cater to. As Alan Walks (2014) explained, automobility as a dominant culture dictates the
shape, use and accessibility of space in the city. Cars and their users have a chokehold on
urban infrastructure, transforming it in ways that increase the efficiency of automobile-
dependent lifestyles while excluding alternate and pre-existing ones (Walks 2014). Any
inconvenience to the car and its uninterrupted motion is a nuisance to the entire city—an
argument commonly brought against both the Shaheen Bagh protests and the Kisan
Movement in Delhi was the disruption of vehicular movement (Anand 2021; Indian Express
2020). As for platform workers, they are not on the roads of their own accord as their time
belongs to the company (Barik 2021). More often than not, these companies provide
services that are targeted at the middle and upper classes that own automobiles.

In this way, cities such as Delhi have increasingly become exclusive to the requirements of
the elite consumer classes, and this is most tangible in the impact it has had on the ecology
of the city. A major source of air pollution in Delhi is attributed to the exhaust fumes of
motor vehicles that contain carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxide (Badami
2005). Further, as Alan Walks puts it, cars and their movement are “entirely dependent on
goods and services provided by a multitude of others” (Walks 2014: 233). This includes the
systematic felling of trees in the name of road expansion and construction of flyovers,
parking lots and petrol stations, the encroachment of riverfronts for the sake of
development, and the massively polluting fossil fuel industry that benefits large oil
companies and nations (Baviskar 2020; Walks 2014).

Infrastructural Exclusion and Ecological Inequality

The ecological landscape of the city has had a huge shift over the decades. Green spaces
and groves have dwindled as the city moved with the demands of the neo-liberal market. A
primary demand in that sense was the automobilisation of the city. Developing countries like
India perceive automobility as vital to achieving modernity and economic prosperity. This
agenda gets reflected not only in policies that encourage the use and purchase of motor
vehicles but also in the aggressive ways in which the state tries to remove n-motorised
transport (NMT) from the roads (Buliung et al. 2014). One can simply point to the many
road signs in Indian cities that ban the movement of cycles and carts over certain roads and
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bridges.

As Madhu Kishwar (2001) observed, the Delhi government constructed over 40 flyovers in
anticipation of the 2010 Commonwealth Games, a majority of which are inaccessible for
NMTs. Moreover, the state apparatus has made active policy decisions that make it difficult
for non-motorised vehicles (NMVs) to ply. Take, for example, the case of the cycle rickshaw.
Once an intrinsic part of Delhi, it is now at odds with the administration and the larger elite,
as they declared the rickshaw to be an inconvenience to the free movement of automobiles
(Kishwar 2001). The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) has made owning and operating
a cycle rickshaw a bureaucratic nightmare with the threat of confiscation of vehicles in
case of failing to comply with arbitrary regulations. In contrast to this, the many financial
options available to purchase cars and the aspirational value of the vehicle only encourages
an increase in its numbers. The city’s idea of modernity and development are intertwined
with the idea of the “world-class,” which has no place for the vehicles of the poor (Baviskar
2020). The poor are not only removed from their streets, but also from their homes, in the
name of development and beautification. According to some estimates, at least 70,000
households have been evicted since the millennium began (Bhan 2016). Ron Buliung and co-
authors wrote, “rising cost of transport and outright exclusion of NMT through transport
policy, coupled with enforcement and harassment, contribute to maintaining and
reproducing the cycle of poverty” (2014: 206). Delhi’s infrastructural focus is thus on the
construction of mobility structures that increase the efficiency of movement for the elite,
with no regard for its social or ecological ramifications.

In India, the disparities that come with such ramifications are often rooted in the class-caste
nexus. Slum-dwellers in urban India mostly belong to Dalit or Muslim communities, who
face regular threats of evictions from infrastructural projects championed by the elite
classes. This is not simply circumstantial but rooted in the systematic exclusion and
dispossession of land for Dalits in the urban spaces (Ranganathan 2021; Bhan 2016;
Baviskar 2020). Cycle rickshaw wallahs in Delhi predominantly hail from a number of
artisanal caste communities who come to the city seasonally for work (Kishwar 2001).
Hence, the exclusion of NMTs like cycle rickshaws is in fact tied to caste hierarchy and
discrimination. Whereas the bourgeois elite who actively participate in such exclusions, who
benefit from these systemically embedded forms of casteism, are often educated Savarnas
and dominant caste Hindus (Ranganathan 2021). Among car owners in India, these groups
represent a significant majority (Kundu and Bhattacharya 2016). On the roads, this privilege
is claimed, visualised and celebrated, with many car owners displaying their caste names on
bumpers (Sherwani, 2019).

The unequal focus by the state on the needs and demands of the elite consumer can be
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understood also through the idea of purchasing power (Boyce 2007). In a neo-liberal
economy such as ours, policy decisions are often skewed towards those that have the ability
to affect the market. James Boyce wrote, “differences in purchasing power can affect not
only decisions made by private parties in response to market signals, but also public-policy
decisions made by governments” (Boyce 2007: 7). In the automobile-centric urban space,
one way that this purchasing power is translated and reflected is through ‘motility capital,’
that is, the value in the ability to be mobile within the city (Kaufmann 2002, Urry 2007, cited
in Mendez et al 2014: 203). In a city such as Delhi, this capital is unequally distributed, with
car-owning residents hogging the major share, as the urban space is primarily designed in
its favour. Naturally, those that are excluded from this space would have lesser motility
within the city. These groups primarily consist of the poor who have no automobiles but also
includes the old and the disabled (Walks 2014). A paradox here is that as the use of
automobile vehicles incrases, so does automobile infrastructure like one-way roads and
traffic systems, which in turn increases the distance between destinations. This way, an
increase in car ownership in a city leads to a greater distance from homes to the city’s
markets and services (Mendez et al 2014). This can even affect those classes that do not
own automobiles, as can be seen when slum dwellers are evicted from residences close to
their workplace to be relocated miles away, all in the name of development (Baviskar 2020;
Bhan 2016). Moreover, this motility comes at another cost as vehicle use is connected with
environmental and health risks that come with exposure to pollution and road-related
dangers (Walks 2014).

These factors impact the effective speed of people living in the city. Effective speed
calculates indirect costs that come with being mobile in the city and looks at how much
labour time is needed to make up for such costs (Walks andTranter 2014). In cities like
Delhi, where the effective speed is low (Gordon andTranter 2012), automobile owning
classes have found a workaround by relying on the gig workers of app-based platforms such
as Zomato or Dunzo to whiz through the city’s pollution infested roads. Using their
purchasing power, the car owner evades the ecological and health-related risks that
automobile infrastructure and the marginalisation of NMTs caused. In their stead, the gig
worker buys food, runs errands and delivers groceries. The gig worker sells their motility,
as they, like many others in the city, cannot afford to evade the ecological risks that come
with navigating its streets. The low effective speed in the city has created a requirement for
a class of exploited workers who deliver essential services at the doorstep of the affluent, in
spite of the health risks that come with it. As Karl Marx wrote, “Capital asks no questions
about the length of life of labour-power” (1976: 376).

The Rights over the Road and the Environment

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The marginalisation of NMTs is the result of a systematic attempt to remove the unwanted
aspects from the urban city which do not fit into the aesthetic imagined by the middle class
of their world-class urban centre. Amita Baviskar (2020) in her text on Delhi highlighted
how this attempt by the urban middle is not limited to cleansing the urban roads but also
extends to the removal of factories, limiting access to green areas and even in the planning
of cities. To understand this particular brand of environmentalism that is portrayed as
"public interest” but which benefits only a certain well-off section of society, Baviskar
coined the term ‘bourgeoisie environmentalism’ (2020: 120). According to Baviskar, this
group includes “padhe-likhe log (educated folk), a group instantly recognised by its dress,
deportment, and language. These are white-collar professionals and businessmen, usually
educated in private English-medium schools, usually upper-caste. Besides being owners of
cultural capital, they are likely to own their own homes and automobiles over the course of
their lives” (Baviskar 2020: 125). The bourgeoisie environmentalists are notconcerned
about the environment, as;

For them, environmentalism is a mode of expressing and addressing their anxieties

about themselves in relation to their habitat—physical surroundings, both proximate
and distant, and other species. Concerns about health and hazard, beauty and order,
pervade this mode and have precedence over issues of life and livelihood that are
central to ‘the environmentalism of the poor’ (Baviskar 2020: 121).

The superficial interests of this propertied class are depicted to the judiciary as
representing the larger public or the majority. The judiciary, unwilling to act against the
interest of the consumer class, actively delivered judgements that violate the rights of the
marginalised (Bhan 2016). The double standard in the treatment of different classes comes
across starkly in MCD’s laws concerning the ownership and rights of the rickshaw wallahs.
As mentioned earlier, these laws make the legal ownership of rickshaws almost impossible,
with unjust clauses restricting the movements of rickshaws, making their hire illegal and
inflicting heavy fines while cars see no such restrictions (Kishwar 2001). This disparity in
treatment and rights is due to the fact that the car-owning classes are seen as legitimate
citizens who have the right to occupy space on the urban roads while the users and owners
of NMTs are seen as encroachers and undesirable aspects on that very road (Bhan 2016).

The dichotomy of citizens versus encroachers, Gautam Bhan (2016) argued, is created due
to recognition of a particular section of society as legitimate, which prioritises their
concerns and interests over those of others. However, one must also understand that a
power nexus operates behind this creation of the “legitimate citizen”. The reason why no
one thinks of restricting the number of cars on roads to curb air pollution is not only due to
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the fear of backlash from the bourgeoisie environmentalist who cannot think beyond their
own comfort but also due to the fact that the state and capitalists would not back this
decision. Restricting the ownership of cars or even restricting the number of cars per
family, would be detrimental to the pockets of the owners of the automobile industries and
in turn the neoliberal economy.

Therefore, the interest of the bourgeoisie environmentalists, the capitalists and the state all
align to maintain the status quo, with no regard to the ecological effect of the same. Stuffing
their pockets with the profits from increasing sales and sitting in the comfort of their car
during the commute to work, the capitalists and the bourgeoisie environmentalists both
have the same complaint—the poor rickshaw wallah, or the cyclists, or the walker, creating
chaos on the road by simply occupying space. What needs to be seen instead, is that the
cost of the profits and the comfort that is being paid by those on the road—the rickshaw
wallahs toiling and evading the police in fear of harassment and seizure of their vehicle and
the delivery partners rushing from one place to the other while dealing with calls from
impatient customers.

Automentality and Ecological Crisis

It is the informal and precarious workers who are most affected by environmental pollution.
As a group, due to their oppressed class and caste background, they cannot afford powerful
lawyers to represent their demands as “public interest” in the courts and therefore, do not
exercise enough political clout to influence social and environmental decisions (Boyce
2007). Moreover, in the eyes of the capitalists, they are notideal consumers, instead, they
occupy the precious real estate of the street, which could instead be occupied by cars. The
urban city, due to this, by its very design, excludes certain sections of the population.

The highways, the flyovers, the wide roads, as discussed above, have been designed to allow
easy and unrestricted movement of cars, which are one of the major contributors to
environmental pollution. For capitalists, the profit is not only derived from the
underpayment of labour, but also from unrestricted exploitation of the natural environment
(Robbins et al. 2014). The economic gains come at the cost of an ecological crisis, the
effects of which harm the health of the workers. The profit-centred agenda of the capitalists
becomes even more evident when one sees the promotion of the new, aesthetically-pleasing,
Yulu bike services in Delhi which present themselves as the environment-friendly alternative
to commuting. The irony of this cannot be escaped. While on one hand, for the capitalist and
the bourgeoisie environmentalists, the traditional NMTs, like rickshaws, are a nuisance that
must be removed because they crowd the road and obstruct the traffic, they simply discard
the fact that these are the cheapest and the most environment-friendly way of commuting.
On the other hand, they laud initiatives like Yulu bikes, simply because their mission of
being environmental- friendly is presented in aesthetic, futuristic-looking blue coloured
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bikes. The reason behind the removal of the lower classes from the roads is thus not only
due to them being viewed as encroachers on public land, but also because there is no
systematic way of making a profit from thousands of informal workers spread all across the
city.

Therefore, when the capitalists talk of electric cars or Yulu bikes, which are environment-
friendly alternatives to commuting in cars, this is not due to some altruistic need to preserve
the ecology. Instead, it is born out of the fear of running out of fossil fuels, which have been
ruthlessly exploited for decades to support industrial expansion and the need to keep
making a profit from these alternatives. The middle-class population too, actively takes part
in the farce green-washing services, such as cab-sharing options provided by major
corporations like Uber and Ola instead of taking public transportation. This aversion
towards public transport is the result of what Alan Walks and Paul Tranter (2014) termed
‘automentality’, which is against state-supported public transport since the dominant
culture promotes the use of individualised automobiles as the socially accepted way to
commute.

Daniel Faber and Allison Grossman (2009) noted that the capitalists exploited nature not
only in the manner that would promote profit but in a politically viable manner. It is,
therefore, true that “the less political power a community possesses to offer resistance, the
more likely they are to experience arduous environmental and human health problems at
the hands of capital and the state” (Faber and Grossman 2009).Thus, in an urban
conglomerate like Delhi, caught in the web of exploitation and exclusion weaved by the
bourgeoisie environmentalists, capitalists and the state, are the poor, informal workers who
shoulder the burden of creation of this aesthetic urban city, while dealing with the ill-effects
of ecological crisis.

Conclusion

This analysis of mobility in urban areas and the space occupied by motorised and non-
motorised modes of transportation, provides a glimpse into the crisis of the environment,
state policies and capitalist ideology. It becomes evident that the very infrastructure of an
urban city like Delhi is supported by a capitalist motive to promote the use of cars and
increase profits. Automobility is presented as a symbol of individuality and freedom,
however, what underlies this is a product made due to exploitation of labour and nature
which further marginalises the underprivileged and destroys the environment. Preserving
the ecology of the city is a secondary concern for the capitalists. However, the effects of this
exploitation are felt differently by different sections of society. There is a clear class and
caste disparity arising out of this system—n which the poor, informal workers suffer low
effective speed, and are structurally excluded from the city based on their lack of
purchasing power and political clout, and face the worst of environmental degradation.
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Block Roads,” Hindustan Times,
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agitations-don-t-block-roads-101629738865739.html.

Badami, Madhav (2005): “Transport and Urban Air Pollution India,” Environmental
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Barik, Soumyarendra (2021): “When algorithms dictate your work: Life as a food delivery
‘partner’,” Entracker.
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Baviskar, Amita (2020): Uncivil City: Ecology, Equity and the Commons in Delhi, New Delhi:
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Bhan, Gautam (2016): In the Public's Interest: Evictions, Citizenship and Inequality in
Contemporary Delhi, Athens: University of Georgia Press.

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transport in the global South China, India, and the rickshaws of Dhaka,” In Alan Walks (ed.)
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Indian Express (2020): “Delhi HC Rejects Plea Seeking Removal of Police Barricades from
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Karl, Marx. (1976): Capital Volume 1, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books (& New Left Review).

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Understanding Metabolic Rift through Assemblage of

Land and Intersectional Inequalities in India
SURAVEE NAYAK AND MIJO LUKE

Suravee Nayak (suraveenayak@gmail.com) and Mijo Luke (mijoluke@gmail.com) are

doctoral scholars at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram,
Kerala.
Vol. 57, Issue No. 18, 30 Apr, 2022
Thanks are due to Mythri Prasad-Aleyamma for reading the earlier draft and providing
insightful comments. We are grateful to the reviewers for their critical comments and
suggestions.

Climate change has become one of the most burning concerns of our living times. Using the
Marxian concept of ‘metabolic rift’, we illuminate the complex nature-society relationship in
India. We do so by understanding the rift advanced by neo-liberal capitalism through the
assemblage of land and intersectional inequalities. We argue that the intersecting
inequalities based on social (power) relations are exacerbated during climate change; in
particular, the neo-liberal capitalist interventions have created disproportionate impacts of
climate change among rural communities shaped by the unequal land relations in India. In
the light of the IPCC AR6 report, we indicate few potential mechanisms of healing/repairing
the metabolic rift; however, we caution the ineffectiveness of healing efforts without
addressing the socio-spatial injustices. We highlight that the equitable redistributional
justice challenging the existing socio-spatial power relations remains a critical concern,
without which, even in the efforts of repairing the rift, the structural inequalities may still
be reproduced in the new landscapes.
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Climate change has become one of the most burning concerns of our living times. Recently
concluded COP26 points to the urgency of addressing the planetary climate crisis. However,
climate change activism has been largely geographically and socially biased, limiting the
framing of the climate crisis and its mitigation strategies (Sultana 2022). Existing research
also shows that technical approaches to climate change adaptation are shallow (Taylor
2014). Alternatively, the recent political ecology approaches to climate change consider
power relations and other inequalities at the core of providing new understandings
(Nightingale 2015; Nightingale et al 2020; Sultana 2021). Scholars have also called for the
decolonisation of climate change discourses (Sultana 2022). In this direction, the
peculiarities of climate change in India throw a different array of questions on the
relationship between nature and society, in the context of widespread socio-environmental
injustices. For instance, how do we understand the peculiarities of the climate crisis in the
context of a global south country like India? To what extent does land shape the narratives
on climate politics in the country? What is the relationship between land based inequalities
and climate change?

We argue that the Marxian concept of the metabolic rift is a useful lens to understand the
underlying socio-environmental injustices in the climate crisis in India. We understand the
metabolic rift in India through the assemblage of land and intersectional inequalities. The
analysis of the climate crisis remains limited or even flawed if land politics and land-based
social inequalities are not centre staged in the enquiries of the climate crisis (Franco and
Borras 2021). The current rift in the country can only be healed in its true sense if these
intersectional inequalities are addressed and ended.

Metabolic Rift and Climate Crisis

In Das Capital, volume 3, Marx wrote,

Large landed property reduces the agricultural population to an ever decreasing

minimum and confronts it with an ever growing industrial population crammed
together in large towns; in this way it produces conditions which cause an
irreparable rift in the interdependent process of the social metabolism, a
metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life itself. The result of this is a
squandering of the vitality of the soil, which is carried by trade far beyond the
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bounds of a single country. (Liebig) . . . Large- scale industry and industrially

pursued large-scale agriculture have the same effect. If they are originally
distinguished by the fact that the former lays waste and ruins the labour-power
and thus the natural power of man, whereas the latter does the same to the natural
power of the soil, they link up in the latter course of development, since the
industrial system applied to agriculture also enervates the workers there, while
industry and trade for their part provide agriculture with the means of exhausting
the soil. (Quoted in Foster 1999: 379)

There is increasing attention to Karl Marx's concept of the metabolic rift in political ecology
literature (Napoletano et.al. 2019). This is more so with the intersection of capitalist
development and climate change in different parts of the world (Moore 2011). We conceive
the view of capitalism as part of a perspective that is known as world-ecology. World-
ecology has emerged in recent years to think through human history in the web of life
(Moore 2017). Rather than begin with the separation of humans from the web of life, the
scholars ask questions about how humans — and human arrangements of power and
violence, work and inequality — fit within nature (Schindler and McMichael 2010).
Therefore, the idea of capitalocene puts capital as a system of power, profit, and
reproduction in a web of life of nature-society relations (Moore 2017). Further, capitalocene
suggests an analysis that shows how relations of power, production, and reproduction work
through the web of life (Moore 2017). Every phase of capitalist development is
accompanied by a rupture in socio-ecological relations (Moore 2011). Capitalism advances
epistemic rifts- a rift in our understanding of how humans are embedded in nature (Moore
2011:8).

The metabolic rift can be used as an ecological, social, and historical concept. As an
ecological concept it describes ruptures, or imbalances in natural cycles, as a social concept
describes social causes and consequences of different society-nature relations and as a
historical concept to describe the historical contingency of social and natural relations
(Schneider and McMichael 2010:466). There are differentiated moments of ‘metabolic rifts’
within the historical development of capitalism (Moore 2011). Engagement with the current
climate crisis demands an understanding of the metabolic rift advanced by neoliberal capital
in the country, which is different from past environmental exclusions. In India, scholarship
on the metabolic rift- a rupture in the nature-society relationship could be understood by
highlighting the assemblage of land and intersectional inequalities. As Li (2014)
conceptualises, the assemblage of land is an alignment of materialities, relations,
technologies and discourses around the land, which involves diverse actors, including
villagers, scientists, investors, legal experts and government officials. The analytic of
assemblage illuminates the various ways the multi-scalar state in the country makes land an
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investible resource where the land relations shaped by the intersecting inequalities are key
to the commodification of land and advancement of epistemic rifts.

Neoliberalism and Environmental Conflicts in India

Dispossession of agrarian and nature-based communities and destruction of ecology has

been rampant in colonial, post-colonial and neoliberal India. In particular, the colonial state
alienated adivasi communities from land and forest resources (Xaxa 2018). In the post-
colonial era, the Nehruvian developmentalist state dispossessed and displaced rural
communities and degraded the ecology for dams, mines, steel plants and other public sector
projects (Levien 2018). This led to enormous environmental conflicts and politics of
rehabilitation and resettlement in rural regions where marginalised communities, including
adivasis, dalits, women, and landless peasants, were most affected (Fernandes 2008;
Mathur 2013). Under the rubric of public purpose, these developments led to the mass
mobilisation of marginalised communities towards environmental justice movements.
Different regions of India have witnessed movements such as the Chipko Movement, the
Appiko movement, Narmada Bachao Andolan, and the Silent Valley protest (Roy and
Martinez-Alier 2019). However, the nature of land dispossession and environmental
conflicts took a dramatic shift with the liberalisation of the Indian economy to became
known as India’s land wars (Levien 2013). The neoliberal capital has hit the marginalised
communities hardest in these land wars (Agarwal and Levien 2020)

Since the 1990s, land and forest resources have been acquired for private speculative
purposes, including Special Economic Zones (SEZs), private factories and mines, public-
private partnership infrastructure projects, and real estate development (Andreas et al
2020). The neoliberal state turned out to be brokers for private capitalists (Levien 2018).
The land acquisitions for non-agricultural use have increased from 19.6 million hectares in
1980-81 to 26.32 million hectares in 2008-09 (Sud 2014 as cited in Chatterjee 2020). These
dispossessions and displacements create irrevocable environmental destruction and
threaten food and water security and entanglement of the marginalised communities with
precarious, hazardous, and exploitative forms of livelihood. For instance, in the case of land
acquisition for mining in central and eastern parts of India, it results in air pollution due to
mineral transportation, rising temperatures, diminishing forest cover, destruction of soil
fertility impacting the productivity of crops, and imbalance of groundwater (Lahiri-Dutt et al
2012). Particularly, land diverted for thermal power plants results in destroying the fertile
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[1]

wetlands and causing water, land and air pollution (Roy and Schaffartzik 2021). It has been
also argued that the expansion of Special Economic Zones led to the loss of cropland in
various regions (Bhattacharya, 2019). In the case of fisherfolks, they are caught between
the land and sea and face massive scale displacement due to coastline erosion and land
acquisition for coastline development in coastal regions such as Gujarat[2].

Currently, more than 700 ongoing natural resources disputes affect over 7.5 million people
in India, as reported by Land Conflicts Watch. Another database ‘EJAtlas’ reports 283
environmental conflicts in the year 2018 since the 1990s, out of which 85% of the conflicts
were either high or medium intensity conflicts as a response to water management, fossil
fuel, and climate change, industrial and utilities, and other mineral ores conflicts (Roy &
Martinez-Alier 2019: 80).In this era, the environmental justice movements include those
against corporate giants in Niyamgiri, Odisha, Thoothukudi, Tamil Nadu, Koyla Satyagraha
in Jharkhand, anti-bauxite mining in Kashipur, Nandigram conflict in West Bengal, SEZ
protests in Goa to name a few. Thoothukudi in Tamil Nadu is a protest by the fisherfolks
against air, soil and water contamination whereas Nandigram in the state of West Bengal is
a mobilisation by the farmers against corporate industrialisation. Although each movement
has its own specificities but common to all the environmental justice movements and the
struggle of marginalised communities has been the question of land (often tied with
livelihoods). The capitalist operations in neoliberal India have disproportionately affected
the marginalised communities in India over land and resource use, particularly dalits,
adivasis, women and lower-class peasants at the intersections of power relations who are
super-exploited and continue to be at the bottom under neoliberal growth (Lerche and Shah
2018).

The Assemblage of Land in India

Land in India has a multi-dimensional presence and holds multifaceted meanings in the lives
of rural populations (Sud 2020a). The multidimensionality of land as enlivened, territory,
authority, property, and access and exclusion together organises the social lives around it
(Sud 2020b). The assemblage of materialities, relations, technologies and discourses around
land makes land as a resource for investment (Li 2014). The materialities of land are often
changed from productive resources to speculative (Goldman 2020). This making of land
signifies the complex relationships and alignment of actors around land, primarily rural
communities, experts, investors, multi-scalar state and local institutions.
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In India, state coercion has been argued as the explicit feature of contemporary land grabs
(Levien 2013, 2018). The use of intersecting strategies such as law, coercion and consent
are the mechanisms deployed by the multi-scalar state in organising land markets across
the country. Laws such as the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, Coal Bearing Areas Acquisition
and Development Act of 1957, Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act 2005, Land Acquisition Act
2013 are used by the state to gain land rights over agricultural, homestead and forest land
as a first step towards the rift by separating the rural communities from productive
resources. Forcible land acquisition for capitalist development is seen in different parts of
the country (the most recent example is the struggle against the acquisition of paddy lands
[iii]

and betel vineyards in Odisha’s Dhinkia ). The most extreme examples of conflict are the
Nandigram conflict in West Bengal, where 12 villagers were killed and even the Kalinga
nagar massacre, where 13 adivasi lost their lives in police firing. At times, the state also
persuades the communities using local networks of brokers and generates consent, as was
the case in Mahindra World City, SEZ in Tamil Nadu (Subramanyam and Kudva 2021). The
collective action of communities is also fragmented by the state using welfare strategies
such as compensation, where the experience of dispossession is differentiated based on pre-
existing socio-spatial inequalities shaped by access to land and natural resources (Nayak
2020a,2020b).

Contests over land as access and exclusion are germane to politics as a struggle for power,
resources and place in a social order (Sud 2020b:56). The social relations around land
shaping the agrarian politics of the regions are at the core of the assemblage of land in
India. The unequal possession of land shaped by the intersections of gender, caste and
ethnic hierarchies is questionable (Jahnavi and Satpathy 2021). Evidently, caste, ethnicity
and gender are the major axes of social structure shaping the land relations in the country.
However, women in India have been tilling on the land and denied ownership or inheritance
of land (Agrawal 1988; Levien 2017; Rao 2017). Their husbands often mediate their access
to land. Dalits are exploited on the lands possessed by dominant caste groups as landless
agricultural labourers in varied regional contexts of the country. However, the recognition
of caste as an aspect of land relations in the country is long overdue and needs immediate
attention for understanding the agrarian and ecological realities in the country (Jodhka
2021). Similarly, land alienation among the forest and natural resource-dependent adivasis
has significantly increased over the years, explosively leading to their vulnerability in the
country (Kujur et.al 2020). On the one hand, these processes of exclusion of the
marginalised communities from the ownership of land, facilitate commodification of land for
capitalist growth and, on the other, make dalits, adivasis and women endangered with little
to no say in the decision making of the land commodification process. Consequently, these
intersectional inequalities further disadvantage them in earning dignified livelihoods in
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these dispossession processes (Levien 2017; Agarwal and Levien 2020; Nayak 2020a).

Intersectional Inequalities and Climate Change

We argue that these intersecting inequalities based on social structures are exacerbated
during climate change and an understanding of the differentiated precarity of the climate
crisis is central to any alternative narrative. Climate change has disproportionately
impacted rural communities and regions across the country (Agarwal and Narain 1991;
Nightingale et al. 2020). The latest International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sixth
assessment report identifies India as one of the most vulnerable countries getting severely
impacted by extreme climate events such as deadly heatwaves, rising sea levels, frequent
floods and droughts. The impacts of climate change could result in a loss of 2% of GDP in
South Asian countries by 2050. The IPCC report suggests that in the Indus and Ganges river
basins, “deadly” heat waves could cross the limits of human survivability, with some regions
already experiencing such conditions. Exposure to extreme heat is expected to become more
frequent, intense and long-lasting in South Asia, increasing the likelihood of droughts in arid
[iv]

areas . By the end of the century, South Asia will be one of the regions hardest hit by heat
stress, with outdoor workers seeing the number of “climatically stressful” work days
increasing to 250 a year. It will lead to water scarcity and food insecurity for already
vulnerable communities.

The existing pattern of an increased number of natural disasters in different parts of the
country has shown that the marginalised sections such as dalits and adivasis, including
women, have been burdened with risks of climate change (Raman 2020). We attempt to
show how this operates through intersectional inequality, drawing from different cases. The
exclusion of dalit communities from access to land resources has forced them to live in the
peripheries of the settlement or ecologically sensitive areas. This is further increased by the
growth of urban informal labour and slums (Coelho 2016). For instance, the case of
extreme weather events in the states of Assam, Karnataka and Kerala revealed that dalits
are more vulnerable to climate risks compared to privileged caste people due to their
marginalized social position, location, their vulnerable livelihoods (NCDHR 2013; CSSC
2019). The fisherfolk in the country are also facing multiple risks from climate change which
affects their livelihood. For instance, the continuous cyclones year after year are
threatening the lives and livelihoods of the coastal people across East Indian and South
Indian states[v]. The temporal power relations made them disproportionately burdened with
natural disasters such as cyclones, floods, sea-level rise, and land erosion. On the other
hand, the adivasi communities are facing the challenges of mining in the country's resource-
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rich central and eastern regions. The socio-environmental impacts of mining regions are
well explored in the Indian context (Lahiri-Dutt 2014; Oskarsson and Bedi 2018). Largely
adivasi and dalit communities are the bearers of coal pollution in eastern and central India
with hardly any adaptation and mitigation strategies. With growing reproductive and care
burdens, the intensity of the impact of climate change on women within dalit and adivasi
communities, landless or economically insecure groups, is more profound than in other
privileged women (Rao and Raju 2020). In the coming days, frequent droughts and
heatwaves will increase workloads and stress for women. Climate-induced food insecurity in
South Asia will result in a host of adverse birth outcomes for pregnant mothers – including
[vi]

undernutrition, stunting, and childhood mortality . The IPCC report finds that climate-
induced soil salinization is burdensome for women responsible for obtaining clean drinking
water in the Sundarbans. Also, the migrants endure intersecting forms of environmental
marginality in urban cities such as Bengaluru and Surat in the country (Chu and Michael
2019).

This intersectional inequality forming various environmental justice movements in India

should be at the core of policy innovations towards healing the rift that can provide
attention to the most burdened with the climate crisis. The IPCC report warns that without
adaptation measures, India’s GDP losses from sea-level rise will be second only to China by
2080. The report recommends a few adaptation strategies, including nature-based
protection of shorelines, insurance to farmers against weather related losses, and the public
distribution system (PDS) to relieve immediate survival pressures on climate change victims
and threats to cities.

Healing/Repairing the Rift

The neoliberal capitalist interventions have created disproportionate impacts of climate

change among rural communities in India. We need to create climate resilient development
pathways as an alternative imaginary in policy-making as warranted by the latest IPCC AR6
report in our efforts to heal the rift at the earliest. Equity and justice should be at the core
of climate resilient development pathways. The report identifies that indigenous knowledge
systems and local solutions are the key to addressing the present climate crisis. Unlike the
global discourses on climate change influenced by the ‘power matrices of control’ [global
north] (Sultana 2022), climate politics is very much shaped by unequal land relations in
India, which we explained through an assemblage of land reflecting intersectional
inequalities. This is true in the case of other global emergencies as well, such as recent
ongoing COVID-19 pandemics. Therefore, we need to think beyond depoliticised technical
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solutions (Sultana 2022) and quick fixes for climate change-related problems (Taylor 2014)
and we need to move towards locally curated solutions and indigenous knowledge systems
immediately.

For instance, the grassroot environmental movements of adivasi communities for ‘jal, jangal
and zameen’ (water, forest and land) in the country are fundamental collective actions
towards resisting and healing the metabolic rift. Many of the issues of ecological crisis and
metabolic rift can be potentially addressed by striving to incorporate them into
environmental decision-making. In this direction, decentralisation offers the potential to
ensure the participation of the communities in shaping mitigation and adaptation strategies
to offer local climate policies. As we know, the decentralization campaign in Kerala is
internationally acclaimed and has offered many successive local solutions to many pertinent
problems (Heller et.al. 2007). This can be developed in the light of the suggestion offered by
the IPCC AR6 report by formulating locally curated solutions and paying attention to who
benefits and who fails to benefit in mitigation and adaptation strategies. Besides, central
acts like PESA (Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas) 1996 and FRA (Forests Rights
Act) 2006 provide a window to healing the rift in adivasi-dominated areas of the country.
However, the PESA-FRA governance structure is made defunct for the capitalist growth
(Bhattacharya et.al 2017), which needs to be addressed immediately. Recent discussions on
energy transitions away from fossil fuel, particularly coal in the country, point to the right
direction of repairing the rift provided a bottom-up approach of community-centric policy
making and implementation is adopted.

The inclusion of land based intersecting inequalities in the framing of climate policy is the
preliminary step towards the larger agenda of transformative justice in the country.
Importantly, equitable redistributional justice challenging the existing socio-spatial power
relations remains a critical concern, without which, even in the efforts of repairing the rift,
the structural inequalities may still be reproduced in the new landscapes. Although the
IPCC sixth assessment report calls for immediate action and local solutions to the climate
crisis, it is largely silent on the role of neoliberal capitalism in this present climate
emergency (Borras et.al 2022,11). We argue that we cannot heal this metabolic rift and
achieve transformative actions without addressing and ending the land based socio-spatial
injustices exacerbated by neoliberal capitalist growth in the country.

End Notes:
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[1]

https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/air/coal-burning-responsible-for-hea...

[2] https://thewire.in/society/indias-fishermen-get-caught-devil-deep-blue-sea

[iii]

https://thewire.in/rights/after-successful-posco-stir-odishas-dhinkia-up...

[iv]

https://science.thewire.in/environment/what-the-new-ipcc-climate-report-...

[v]https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/environment/life-thrown-out-of-gear-in-coastal-odis
ha-as-bulbul-comes-closer-67689

[vi]

https://science.thewire.in/environment/what-the-new-ipcc-climate-report-...

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akankshya
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The Alienation and Commodification of Nature:

Fighting the Fallacious Fetishism of Contemporary
Frameworks through a Revolutionary Transition
TANYA AHUJA

Tanya Ahuja (tanyaahuja94@gmail.com) is pursuing M.A. (Hons.) Social Sciences from

ISSER, Panjab University, Chandigarh.
Vol. 57, Issue No. 18, 30 Apr, 2022

With the frantically incessant economic production activity that apparently projects no end,
the human-nature relationship seems to have come full circle. As man agonises being
manacled by natural constraints, in the form of planetary ecological crises, he stands to be
the alleged culprit. For analytical coherence, this paper is divided into four sections. The
first section elucidates, through a Marxist perspective of ecology, how the unheeded
capitalistic socio-economic course of human action has engendered the alienation of nature
itself, which in turn is posing fatal afflictions, conspicuous through compelling phenomena
like climate change. Following it is a discussion on the repercussions of commodification of
nature. The third section brings out the dichotomous reasoning evident in redundant
environmental policy frameworks and paradigms in India. Accentuating the dialectical
relationship between sociology and ecology, it explicates, in advocacy for the contemporary
“have-nots,” the need to constantly heed the multidimensionality of sustainability, also
discernible in the Sustainable Development Goals. On these lines, finally, the course of a
“revolutionary transition,” to reinstate a progressive human-nature nexus, is expounded. As
a way forward, the paper suggests eschewing the repudiation and outright denial of the
prevailing ‘problem of production’ and the need for a sagacious dialogue, in order to mount
radical action in response to the looming environmental threats.
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Modern man does not experience himself as a part of nature but as an outside force
destined to dominate and conquer it. He even talks of a battle with nature, forgetting that, if
he won the battle, he would find himself on the losing side. (Schumacher 2011: 10-11)

Introduction

Today, the Marxian maxim “History repeats itself. The first time as tragedy, the second time
as farce” (Marx and Paul 1978: 1) seems to have come true. In primitive communist
societies, as Karl Marx called it, people were more strongly bound by natural constraints,
rather than the social ones. Compared to other animals, human beings are poorly adapted
to the natural world, and the only way to adapt ourselves is by changing it and working
cooperatively to survive. This is labour. As we labour, we change the world around us and
gradually free ourselves from the natural restraints. Nevertheless, as we emancipate
ourselves from natural limitations, we entangle ourselves in social reins.

Schumacher (2011: 10), the proponent of Buddhist Economics, warned that the consensus
among academics and professionals on the notion that “the problem of production” has been
solved is a perilous one. The central question of freedom, in Marxism, is the question of
labour: how it is organised, who benefits and what changes occur over time. Materialist
conception of history by Marx is inevitably linked to the materialist conception of nature,
comprising not only the critical appraisal of political economy, but also the critique of the
natural-scientific revolutions of his times (Foster and Clark 2016: 1). The alienation of
labour and of nature, and the obsession with commodity fetishism call for revamping policy
frameworks, and also a collaboration towards a “Great Transition” (Foster 2015).

The Alienation of Nature: An “Impoverished” Thing?

The Marxian notions of alienation of labour and the alienation of nature, both, were
grounded in the understanding of the politico-economic thrust in a capitalist society (Foster
2000: 73–74). In order to comprehend how alienation leaves nature impoverished, a concise
explanation of the Marxian notion of alienation of labour is indispensable.

The experience of alienation, central to Marxian theory of class conflict, is the experience of
“loss of freedom” (Jha 2009: 218). The workers caught in the vicious cycle of exploitation,
devoid of escape, lose contentment in work, and thereafter, work becomes an enforced task,
rather than a creative and a satisfying activity (Rao 2012: 689). The responsibility and
interest of the worker get diminished because they own neither the tools with which they
work, nor the final product. They area mere cog in a machine. For Marx, alienated labour,
deviated from the essence of “species-being” (Marx and Engels 2009), encompasses four
aspects, namely the alienation from the product, the process, the self and others (Kain and
Neas 1993: 135-36) in the community. Thus, alienation is “that condition when man does not
experience himself as the active bearer of his own powers and richness, but as an
impoverished ‘thing’ dependent on powers outside of himself” (Fromm 1955: 59). This
predicament of alienation intensifies the mood of the worker for a conflict.
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According to Marx, the labour and the production process were defined as the metabolism
of nature and society. Hence, the rudimentary conceptual framework intrinsic in Marx’s
thought was a “non-alienated triadic relation of humanity, social metabolism and universal
metabolism of nature” (Foster and Clark 2016: 3). Today, it is evident through the alarming
figures that are talked through in global conferences, that the earth’s capacity to soak the
filthy by-products and negative externalities of “global capitalism’s voracious metabolism is
maxing out” (Klein 2014: 177-186). Nature too, when alienated, from its own natural
product, process, self and its web of species, owing to the ensuing entropy, prepares for
conflict.

Nature and society are irreducible. Foster (2016) explains that metabolic rift is based on a
non-dualistic, materialist dialectic open system. It refutes a widespread social monism in
post-humanist political ecology (Napoletano et al 2018: 92). Many scholars have suggested
refraining from sectarianism in metabolic-rift scholarship and engaging in the pursuit of
hybridisation of their concepts with dominant post-humanist paradigms (Napoletano et al
2018: 92; White et al 2017).

Modifying and Commodifying Nature

Commodity Fetishism, in Marxism implies that labour power itself becomes a commodity
influenced by the evolution of the capitalist economy, which metamorphoses the personal,
social and emotional nature of labour relations into an independent, external and objective
thing (Martineau and Lafontaine 2019: 489). They are endowed with a life of their own (Jha
2009: 222), and “this fetishism attaches itself to the products of labor as soon as they are
produced as commodities” (Marx 1990: 165).

In a capitalist society, according to Marx, even if a thing has a use value, it will not be
produced unless it has exchange value (Jha 2009: 221-22), which is determined by the
amount of human labour embodied in it. But as the world of commodities becomes
dominant, we begin to see the commodity as having value in itself, and we devalue the
contribution of those who made the commodity (Marx 2009).

The fetishism of commodities and value that typifies capitalism, for Marx, is evident in “its
abstraction from human needs” (Napoletano et al 2018: 94). David Harvey (2017) asserts
that the potential of capital to adjust its accumulation strategies and profit from
“sustainability fixes” often aggravates, rather than reconciling, the capital’s crises of human
development, which are not reducible to “the madness of economic reason.”

Fetishism of commodified nature not only demeans its essence but also makes it difficult for
ethical consumers to be effective both in their evaluation of objects available and in
influencing the world around them (Carrier 2010: 672). Nature is not presented as a
concrete and constantly singular entity, but as a commodified good or merchandise,
rendered the same everywhere (MacKenzie 2009: 440-55). Attributing such a form to nature
tends to shape people's consciences. It is this aspect that is substantiated by the concept of
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reification (Martineau and Lafontaine 2019: 489–90).

Reification is a process in which certain entities or social relations take on the character of
a thing by being illusorily considered and treated as mere quantifiable objects, concealing
the human origin of these entities or human relations (Lukács 1971: 83). The concept of
reification can help elucidate how the process of commodifying nature and transforming it
into a good, tradable or exchangeable, in the market, affects the inter-subjective meaning of
it to individuals, who are ushered to construe nature from a solely utilitarian angle, thereby
losing their affective and emotional relationship with nature (Martineau and Lafontaine
2019: 492).

Fetishism of Frameworks: Overcoming the Obsession with Obsoleteness in India

Napoletano et al (2018) identify the need for clarifying the “conceptual confusion” in the
“theoretical antagonism” regarding the metabolic rift and its material-dialectical approach
to human alienation, the socio-ecological contradictions, crises of capital accumulation and
human development. More formidable is the divide between the theoretical and
philosophical debates and environmental policy frameworks which reify nature and
denaturalise culture.

Albeit the political economy of the developing countries with welfare orientation does not
permit the neglect of the needs of the poor, and notwithstanding that the developed
countries are majorly the contributors for global environmental issues, the developing world
cannot afford to remain oblivious of its own environmental degradation (Vyas and Reddy
1998: 48). Along with China and the United States (US), India is a major emitter of
greenhouse gases (GHGs). This makes India among the most important nations in shaping
the course of global climate negotiations and in the exploration of sustainable practices
(Saryal 2018: 2). Kumar and Naik (2019) allege India of a “Janus-like dualism” towards
climate change, for the absence of comprehensive legislation, or an updated policy
document that effectively guides the country’s commitments under the Paris Agreement and
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Numerous large-scale development projects, ranging from infrastructure, energy and

mining projects (Das 2015) afflict livelihoods of the poorest, especially the women (Bisht
2009), and aggravate inequalities, by displacing a substantial number of inhabitants without
sufficient compensation. Lower-caste tribal communities located on these lands and forests
have suffered inordinately from “development-induced displacement and environmental
destruction in India” (Amnesty International 2016). Marx placed great emphasis on the fact
that natural resources are often treated as a “free gift of Nature to capital” (Marx and
Engels 2009), and this leads to the fatal blunder of believing that the “problem of
production” has been solved (Schumacher 2011: 10).

Mining projects and extractive industries aggravate inequalities in rural areas and have
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adverse impacts on the poor , namely no access to clean water, unemployment and
alcoholism (Bhanumathi 2002). Conflicts have become frequent between mining projects
and lower castes living in forest areas, who demand land titles and rights over forest
resources. According to Amnesty International, nearly 70% of coal is located in central and
eastern India (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha) where over 26 million people of lower-
caste communities, accounting for nearly 25% of the Adivasi population in India, live.
Greenpeace notes that the government has weakened environmental legislation, allowed
mining in protected forests, land acquisition and approved mine extensions without
adequate social or environmental impact assessment (Burton and Fernandes 2016).

There is also a gap between legislation and effective implementation. Consequently, the
third sector, non-governmental organisations, have expanded their environmental
awareness generating activities (Vyas and Reddy 1998: 48). Almost half-a-century-old
legislations like Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the Water (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1974, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, the Air (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 implemented through
several governmental departments and specialised regulatory institutions, require an
integrative and coordinated policy framework.

Nevertheless, India is taking steps to ensure that the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) are used as an opportunity to redefine the development paradigm for structuring an
egalitarian and environmentally sustainable society. Climate justice is useful in overcoming
the ambivalence in foundational values in policies. Primarily, climate justice views climate
change as being something beyond merely a scientific phenomenon or concept. It
accentuates the gaps in the equity dimensions of climate change (Adams and Luchsinger
2009) especially among communities of most susceptible castes and classes. It recognises
the socio-ecological inseparability and provides for a rights-based approach to
development.

Towards Sustainability: Radical Action for Revolutionary Transition

John Bellamy Foster (2015:1) argues that for a socio-ecological “Great Transition,” we must
organise struggles for “radical reforms” in the current times that question the devastation
of capital. To implement the long “revolutionary transition,” a broad movement, essential for
human existence and sustained development of humanity, is to be mounted.

The concepts of universal metabolism of nature, the social metabolism, and the metabolic
rift, contributing invaluably to systems ecology scholarship, proposed by Marx, have
provided constructive arguments for modelling the interrelation of capitalism vis-à-vis its
wider ecological system. Marx defined socialism in terms of a process of sustainable human
development: an imperative of preserving the environment for future generations, with the
greatest possible development of human freedom and potential. As a result, socialism
demanded that the associated producers intelligently regulate the metabolism of nature and
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society. This perspective is inextricably entwined with the critique that Marx voiced against
the capital class society (Foster 2015: 3).

Marx’s critique of capitalism was founded on contemporary ecological concerns (Napoletano

et al 2018: 93). An evident instance of metabolic rift is provided through his examination of
issues pertaining to soil fertility and urban contamination associated with capitalist
agriculture and urbanisation (Marx 1990). Through his materialist-dialectical approach,
Marx recognised these issues as being organically associated with the economic
impoverishment and exploitation of the working class (Foster 2000).

Through an “ecodemocratic” course, and denunciation of the logic of capital accumulation,

countries, especially the richer ones, need to shift to an economy persisting within solar
budgets and without net capital formation. Foster (2015: 9) suggests a carbon-fee-and-
dividend system, a ban on coal-fired plants and unconventional fossil fuels, a vast shift to
solar and wind power and other sustainable energy.

By definition, transformation entails reshaping development frameworks as a result of a

shifting global political economy controlled by neo-liberal capitalism and increasingly
authoritarian inclinations (Pelling 2011) including “radical shifts” and directional steps in
technical as well as normative dimensions of culture, development and risk management
(Pelling et al 2015). In this perspective, transformation delves into the deeper and veiled
roots of unsustainability, brimming in social, cultural, economic and political spheres
(Temper et al 2018).

Conclusions

The multidimensional forward and backward linkages and the negative externalities of the
problem of production and economic activity, in practicality, remain unheeded to a large
extent, while impact assessments exhibit little efficacy in curtailing substantial
environmental degradation. The Marxian canon of political ecology provides insights,
through concepts like alienation and commodification, which not only help analyse the
impact of capitalistic trends on nature but also nudge human beings to refine collective
conscience and to unite for cooperative action. Transformation to sustainability entails a
shift from scarcity discourses to a political discernment of resources and sustainability
(Scoones 2016). Therefore, if reform is to be realised in an empowering and pro-poor
manner, a truly political perspective that exposes, problematises, and combats the
perpetuation of negative power relations is indispensable (Gillard et al 2016). Moreover, a
call for a “red-green dialogue” is must for the development of a movement that seeks the
end of the exploitation of both labour and the earth (Gimenez 2000).
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Exploring Conflicts in Development: A Socio-Economic

Perspective to the Major Forms of Land Dispossession
in Post-Colonial India
TITAS DUTTA

Titas Dutta (duttatit@msu.edu) is a Graduate Student at Michigan State University.

Vol. 57, Issue No. 18, 30 Apr, 2022

This article introduces the problems caused by development projects (the major forms
include hydel power, extractive mining, industrial development, and, currently, the special
economic zones) in India. It seeks to explore the process of land appropriation,
dispossession, and displacement faced by the poor and marginalised groups (Dalits and
Adivasis) of the Indian society. This article is an effort to explore the historical cycles of
displacement caused by such projects since independence and the active role of the
government in addressing these scenarios. It further provides an overview of the various
scholarly literature actively involved in this subject and how these projects ultimately lead
to further marginalisation of the marginalised in the name of development.

In the 20th century, large river valley projects (hydel power and dams) were the
cornerstones of development efforts in India. They were the largest source of dispossession
not only in post-independence India but also throughout the developing world (World
Commission on Dams 2000). It has been highly researched and debated due to the political
conflicts over the involuntary displacement due to state-led development projects since the
1980s (Nielsen 2009). While these large dams delivered the benefits of irrigation and
electricity to the capitalist farmers of the plains and the urban consumers, it
disproportionately displaced the population of the Dalits and Adivasis, the most
marginalised groups of the Indian society (Levien 2013). The Indian government was
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reluctant in recognising the customary land rights and thousands of families were
displaced without compensation. Even for the families with formal land rights, the
compensation was kept extremely low and usually was not enough to buy alternative lands
(Levien 2011). The project-affected families’ demand for “land for land” compensation was
rarely forthcoming and there were no compensations for lost access to the common
property resources. The resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) policies were non-existent
for the lost common property resources, and studies have unanimously shown that the
dispossessed were excluded from the benefits of the project (Whitehead 2003; Kothari
1996). Situations worsened with increased aggregate poverty and health, with violence
often inflicted by the state on the villagers (Mishra 2011). The worst affected by the loss of
CPRs were women who were often primarily responsible for livestock rearing in rural
households. They had a greater chance of controlling the income from it and were
particularly hurt by the large-scale submergence and loss of grazing land for animals
(Agarwal 1989, 1995; Shiva 1988).

While large dams during the Nehruvian era led to ‘development-induced

displacement in India, the shift to a neo-liberal economic model over the past two decades
has led to an increasingly privatised form of dispossession. In the 2000s, the special
economic zones (SEZs) became the epicentre of the so-called “land wars,” and unlike the
river valley projects, they could be developed by private companies and not just
government agencies. Levien (2013) explains this as shifting “regimes of dispossession”
where land expropriation during postcolonial development was the land for production
having significant legitimacy among a broad Indian public. While SEZs represented a shift
to a regime of dispossession with the state being a mere land broker for any private use
that marked the regime of land for the market. Land was previously expropriated to
produce goods for the public, but with the onset of liberalisation, it is being increasingly
expropriated for its own market value. In between 2000 and 2005, a legal framework
evolved that opened ways for the private companies to create “hyper-liberalized export
enclaves” based on the Chinese model (Levien 2011). SEZs in India were started to be
spatially delimited experiments with extreme levels of liberalisation. But, because of
political constraints, it could not be applied to the whole country, and since 2005, the
Indian government has approved 581 zones across the country ranging from 10 to 5,000
hectares in size (Levien 2011).

Theoretical Background to Development in India

Karl Marx’s analysis of the problem of British enclosures in the 18th century was
defined as the Primitive Accumulation. It took place during the origin of capitalism in the
West and transitioned to capitalism in the Southern countries of the globe. Marx saw
primitive accumulation as having three aspects: the removal of peasants from the land by
enclosures and abolition of customary rights; creation of a pool of landless laborers who
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become wage laborers under capitalism and flocked to towns where they emerge as
industrial proletariat; concentration and centralisation of wealth as the means of
production monopolised by fewer and fewer individuals (Foster and Clark 2004).

David Harvey reframes the concept of primitive accumulation as “accumulation by

dispossession (ABD)” and tries to inculcate the diversity of dispossessions generated in
recent times by fully industrial and financial capitalism. ABD opens an avenue to
understand the escalations in the number of lands grabs in India in the name of
development projects—building dams, roads, SEZs, mining, and slum destruction. These
reflect the clear demands for land and natural resources by the developed capitalism
(Levien 2011).

Marx’s analysis of primitive accumulation includes “conquest, enslavement, robbery,

murder, in short, force, played the greatest part,” while Harvey’s ABD claims that the
means of accumulation is “primarily economic rather than extra-economic” and that it “is
most importantly exercised through credit system and financial power” (Harvey 2006: 159).
Though Harvey sets out a list of examples to define ABD, he fails to provide a clear
definition and only provides a few categories of processes (Levien 2011). What
accumulation by dispossession does is release a set of assets (including labour-power) at
very low (and in some instances zero) cost. Over-accumulated capital can seize hold of such
assets and immediately turn them to profitable use. (Harvey, 2003, 149)

Levien (2011), on the contrary, defines “accumulation by dispossession as the use of

extra-economic coercion to expropriate means of subsistence, production, or common
social wealth for capital accumulation.” He elaborates that it is the extra-economic
character of ABD that differentiates it from the primitive accumulation and tries to show
that in the case of rural India, ABD is a decision the political process through which the
state employs its coercive powers. This in turn makes land available for capital, making it a
“land broker state” whose chief responsibility remains the forcible transfer of agrarian land
to capital for industrial and commercial development. He goes on to define another class of
“capitalist rentiers,” also termed as corporate developers, who commodify land for
industrial and urban growth with the motive to capture the windfall profits from the cheap
land acquired by the state (Levien 2011).

The accumulation of land into the SEZ has an amplified effect on its rural
surroundings by land commodification that broadens the existing inequalities in the rural
class and caste structure. This agrarian transformation in the neo-liberal regime leads to
the expansion of pre-capitalist forms of production in which the labour power of the
dispossessed peasantry becomes irrelevant, thus giving rise to a marginalised pool of
unemployed labour. An SEZ developer is a capitalist rentier who commodifies the rural
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lands for urban uses and infrastructure and captures the huge margins of profit between
the artificially low prices of the dispossessed agricultural lands, captured with the help of
the state, and the commercial value of the lands minus the development costs. The ratio of
the cost of state-acquired land to its ultimate price is often termed as the “rate of
accumulation of dispossession” (Levien 2011). Since land remains more than just a
financial asset in rural India, this land acquisition faces increased resistance. The SEZ
producers imitate a role of a capitalist employing cheap labour from the neighbouring rural
states, lower land prices, and infrastructure for capitalist production with the help of the
“land broker” state (Levien 2011). Since liberalisation in India, the central government has
increasingly withdrawn in the role of setting the macroeconomic policy frameworks within
which capital operates and the state governments negotiate directly with capitalists to
compete against one another in order to attract their investment (Rudolph and Rudolph
2001).

In India, the land grab is facilitated by the toxic mixture of the colonial Land
Acquisition Act of 1894 (the now amended act of 1984); the deregulation of investments
and commerce through neo-liberal policies coupled with the rule of uncontrolled greed and
exploitation. It is facilitated by the creation of a police state and the use of colonial sedition
laws that define defence of the public and national interest as anti-national (Shiva 2011).
Since times before independence, the land has been considered the most important asset of
rural India. It is now increasingly demanded by the domestic and international capital
based on public–private partnership (PPP) looking for spaces to create factories, offices,
residential townships, and various infrastructure (Levien 2011). The World Bank has
worked for many years to commodify land and its structural adjustment program of 1991
reversed land reform, deregulated mining, roads, and ports. The problem seems to be much
bigger with the issues of land acquisition, dispossession, denial of rights, and livelihood
loss. These development projects pose a threat to the property rights distribution and
access to common property resources along the lines of class, caste, and gender. The
dispossession due to state-led development programmes does not provide an alternative
livelihood for the evicted marginalised nor provides appropriate rehabilitation packages.
This could be reformulated into more concrete forms that I would like to explore through
empirical evidence.

We will overview a few development projects that have taken place in India over the past
century. These are literary evidence of land acquisition and appropriation caused by the
development initiatives, both by the state and international capital. The case studies
represent the social movements that gained big momentum during different times to
protect the land rights of the rural and tribal communities. The three regimes of
dispossession, that is, river valley project, industries, and SEZs, created displacement,
dispossession, and livelihood loss across the Indian sub-continent (Levien 2013).
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Historical Cycles of Dispossession in India

There is much evidence of land acquisition for the different development initiatives
(of hydel power generation, mining, industries and SEZs) throughout India, which created a
series of social movements and resistances from across the country. This gained larger
momentum during the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) on the Narmada River during the
1980s, leading to worldwide support. These projects differed in terms of aim, state
engagement, the role of World Bank in providing funds or compensation, or the
involvement of foreign capital; but these programs showed similar outcomes in terms of
displacement of the rural communities, unsatisfactory or no compensations, and long
periods of distress (Levien 2006, 2013).

The protests around hydel power projects gained its biggest momentum during the
Narmada Valley Project, which constituted of 30 large-, 133 medium-, and 3,000 small-
sized dams along with 75,000 km of canal network to direct the waters of Narmada to
different states. Approximately 245 villages were planned to be ousted by the project
without any information on flood levels (Arvinda 2000). Over the 250 thousand people
displaced by the SSP funded by the World Bank, almost 70% belonged to Scheduled Tribes
whose primary livelihood was pastoralism, subsistence-oriented slash and burn agriculture,
along with hunting and gathering (Whitehead 2003). Thousands of villagers questioned the
holistic issue of livelihood, ecology, human rights, and the thousands of acres lost to
submergence and waterlogging. The cost of irrigation was up to 10 times the cost of local
watershed development. The SSP raised waves of resistance against the centralisation of
knowledge and other natural resources—a fight against globalisation. This led to the World
Bank devising a new institutional mechanism of Inspection Panel to examine the human
right violations for the bank funded projects. But they failed to include the environmental
(and social) impact assessment (EIA), restoration of common property resources (CPRs),
and ‘land for land’ compensations leading to an eventual withdrawal from the project (SSP
being the first case). There are attempts to incorporate these components in the World
Bank-funded projects, however, their executions are usually disappointing (Cullet, 2001).

The conflicts between the Dongria Kondh tribe and the British-mining company
Vedanta Resources (2011) lay in the humanistic geographical concepts of place and space.
The three important factors in this conflict were the relationship between inequality,
development, and economic growth. The concept of development and economic growth is
connected to an agenda that favours western liberal capitalism posing a threat to the use of
natural resources. The unanimous vote by 12-gram sabhas (village councils) of indigenous
Dongria Kondh communities in Odisha's Rayagada and Kalahandi districts rejected Vedanta
Aluminium and the Odisha Mining Corporation's plan to extract bauxite from the Niyamgiri
hills (Stenius, 2012). It is the historic and significant precedent that determined to some
extent the course of similar developments in other tribal areas in India. It brought forth the
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religious and cultural rights over their habitat and habitation, recognized by the Supreme
Court under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of
Forest Rights) Act – better known as the Forest Rights Act (FRA) of 2006. The Dongrias had
a do-or-die attitude towards vacating their home for mining. The mining operations would
affect some 8,000 Dongria, Kutia, and Jharania Kondh in 112 tribal and Dalit villages in
Kalahandi and Rayagada districts (Stenius, 2012; Mahapatra, 2013).

Bandyopadhyay and Shiva (1988) proposes that the “appropriate metaphor of

understanding development process is that of polarization” and not linear progression
within the materialist perspective of development. She elaborates that this polarisation
model leads to an unequal social structure and the “development plans,” which are created
by the dominant power structure, only enhance the material and financial returns to that
group while depriving most of the rural communities means to survival and subsistence.
The concepts of “economic development” and “economic growth” are class-based, and
when operated within a society, it leads to improved well-being for a minority and
simultaneously denies the majority access to basic resources, thus contributing to the
underdevelopment. She cites the case of Doon Valley of Himachal Pradesh to show the
effects of limestone quarrying as a major economic activity that led to the destruction of
water sources, livelihood loss, sharp declines of cattle population due to loss of grazing
lands, and the downfall of the tourist industry. This has created some discontent among the
villagers and residents that has been suppressed by the people in power, but the
inhabitants of the valley did not seem to accept the denial of their basic resources of
survival in the name of “progress” and national development (Bandyopadhyay and Shiva
1984).

Levien (2017) studies the displacement caused by the Mahindra World City (MWC),
one of the first largest private SEZs that was established in India in 2009. It was to be
established outside Jaipur, Rajasthan, dispossessing 2,000 acres of private farmlands and
1,000 acres of public grazing land from nine villages. He observes that these mixed-caste
villages had a Hindu majority highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture and livestock
rearing supplemented by wage labour in Jaipur and the neighbouring towns. Under
Rajasthan’s government compensation package, families were given small
commercial–residential plots adjacent to the SEZ, which were one-fourth the size of their
previous holdings. The compensation policy did not elicit consent but divided farmers by
absorbing them into a speculative land market on an individual basis. This resulted in the
Rajasthan government acquiring land for the MWC without a “land war.” Land
dispossession deprived the villagers of private farmlands and common grazing land,
destroying agricultural income and food security. The SEZ also failed to generate
significant employment for local people—providing jobs to only 18% of the dispossessed
families (to only one member). The jobs had low wages and provided temporary positions
like gardeners, janitors, and security guards. While the government promised piped water
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to the SEZ, the villagers lost their wells and were forced to purchase water from tankers
(Levien 2017).

Putting this in a broader context, John Bellamy Foster has provided historical
evidence of the ecological degradation at the universal level related to the divisions of the
world capitalist system. He focuses on the fact of a single world economy divided into
various nation states competing, also hierarchically into centre and periphery, and the
world system of dependency and dominance. He takes the classic case of Britain to explain
the concept of “metabolic rift” between human beings and the Earth, as Marx saw it
(Foster and Clark 2004). His concept of “metabolic rift” was about the loss of soil nutrients
like phosphorus and nitrogen through the export of food and fibre to the cities. The
essential nutrients that were being shipped a thousand miles away ended up as wastes in
the cities rather than returning to the soil as seen in the traditional agricultural production.
“The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder
flowed back to the mother country and were turned into capital there” (Marx 1976).

Conclusions

In the light of recent events, virtually the whole of Odisha, including Kashipur in
Rayagada, Lanjigarh in Kalahandi, Lower Suktel area in Balangir, Kotagarh in Phulbani, the
mining-industrial belt in Jharsuguda, Kalinganagar, and now Rourkela, has been a
battleground on the issue of development and displacement (Mishra 2011). With
liberalisation and the rise of SEZs, POSCO, a South Korean steel company, signed a
memorandum of understanding with the Odisha government in 2005 to set up a 12 million
tonne-capacity steel project in Jagatsinghpur district (Mahapatra 2020). The project faced
opposition due to the acquisition of fertile strips of land on the coast of the Bay of Bengal
near Paradip, which is famous for betel vines. The betel industry-supported 20 thousand
people, and about 3,000 acres of the 4,004 acres of the land for the steel plant were
forestlands and its landscape supported 5,000 betel vines. The farmers had to forgo an
average income of ₹20,000 per month. The project also fractured the village community
into pro- and anti- POSCO activists, and police cases were also lodged against the anti-
POSCO activists, including women who lost their livelihoods in attempts to avoid arrest.
However, in January 2015, an amendment of the Mine and Mineral (Development and
Regulation) Act put an end to POSCO’s plan. The act was created in the wake of the
allegations of mining scams across India and provided a mandate for the company to go
through the auction route to get its captive iron ore mine. Nonetheless, the ecology had
been damaged and livelihood lost where the betel farmers are now making a living as daily-
wage laborers in different vineyards. They also suffer from depleted forest covers, creating
a shortage of firewood (Mahapatra 2020).
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Historically, Odisha has been the most backward state of India in terms of economic
development, not only due to socio-political factors but also natural factors like famines in
the past centuries. As per the National Human Development, 2001, Odisha is ranked
amongst the lowest. Odisha’s record in poverty eradication has been one of the worst in the
country (National Human Development Report, 2002). The regions of northern and
southern Odisha have been the home of several tribal groups, which were gradually
brought under the direct and indirect political control of British colonialism. During the
colonial period, there were a series of tribal rebellions in these princely states, which
protested against encroachments by the state and outsiders upon what the tribal thought
as their traditional sources of livelihoods (Mishra, 2011).

Pre-independence, the construction of Hirakud Dam on the Mahanadi River in

Odisha came as a part of the post-war reorganization program (the second world war
ending in 1945) and an anti-flood measure for coastal districts. Even though the dam
construction employed local workers, the project caused a loss in terms of revenue of
submerged land, its output, forest products, grasslands (Baboo, 1991a). There was a clear
under-estimation of the recurring value of forest products with the overestimation of
benefits of the construction of the dam. There had been cost escalations for several years
since the 1948 displacement without proper information of rehabilitation and were
stigmatized as ‘budi anchalar loka’ (reservoir outsees) forever. Only, the rich, Brahmins,
and artisan class migrated to towns with the skills and resources to prosper (Baboo, 1991a,
b).

The forest lands are still targeted by the state forest department to promote
commercial tree plantation by supplanting forests nurtured by the tribal communities who
grow diverse food products and collect minor forest products for household consumption
and also to sell in the local haats (markets), which ensure their major source of income
(Mohanty 2020).

The development initiatives with the wave of liberalisation have worsened the
conditions of the tribal populations in India. They have resulted in an increasing amount of
involuntary migration and political turmoil in various parts of India. The Environmental
Justice Atlas lists almost 346 reported cases of conflicts in India—the largest number of
environmental justice movements in the world. More than 57% of the reported
environmental justice movements from India have Adivasi communities mobilizing (Roy
2019). The role of the government, both union and state, in helping the private companies
acquire lands in rural spaces have been influential. This is an active process but seldom
makes it to the headlines of the local news. In most cases, the local population lacks the
resources to organise against these projects and mostly lacks the support of organisations
that have the technical and legal knowledge to fight back against these systems. This
article tries to overview the various issues of acquisition, eviction, dispossession,
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displacement, and the role of the agents (the state, the funding agencies, and private
multinational companies) in further marginalising the marginalised.

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Project Masquerading as ‘Afforestation’”, The Wire, July,
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Image-Credit/Misc:

Image Credit: Gretchen Andrew- Wikimedia Commons

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Ecological Rift and Alienation: Field notes from Goa

and Sikkim
HINDOLEE DATTA

Hindolee Datta (hindolee@gmail.com) did her M.A. in Linguistics from Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi, and is currently an independent researcher.
Vol. 57, Issue No. 18, 30 Apr, 2022
The author is thankful to the anonymous reviewer for their valuable feedback.

Goa and Sikkim, two of the smallest states in India by area, are also places that have some
of the richest plant and animal biodiversity, with Goa nestled between the Western Ghats
and the Arabian Sea, and Sikkim being a part of the eastern Himalayas. Incidentally, their
natural beauty also makes them ideal tourist destinations. Currently, Goa is about to see a
resumption in mining activities, mining fields that were left abandoned for a decade will
open up soon, and places like Mollem (an ecological hotspot) will be dug up in the name of
“development projects” (Datta 2022). The mountains of Sikkim and North Bengal too are
being dug up for the Sivok-Rangpo railway project, with plans of extending it to Gangtok at
a second phase later on. In this paper, I explore the Marxist ecological tradition and the
metabolic rift through primary field evidence from Goa, and parts of North Bengal and
Sikkim. I present the observations from field visits to these places followed by an analysis of
observations from the Marxian ecologist perspective, foregrounding the idea of ecological
rift and alienation as discussed by John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark, Richard York and Fred
Magdoff.

In a village called Maina in South Goa, villagers who once had freshwater springs flowing
before their homes now store water in large blue drums all year round. Located near
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Sanvordem, the South Goa mining capital, the soil beneath Maina is rich in iron-ore, and
was the site of extreme mining activity from 2008-11, during what was the Age of Greed (de
Souza 2015). Hills were dug up and aquifers blasted to obtain mud and iron which then
made their way to China and Japan. With the local aquifers and springs gone, the hills now
echo when villagers cry out ujanu (no water) in the height of monsoons.

Nearly 150 since Karl Marx predicted the collapse of nature and Friedrich Engels warned
about nature’s revenge, their worst nightmares are on track to becoming reality. Aside from
the very palpable and tangible effects human activity has had on nature and the
environment, our relationship with each other has also seen a considerable shift since the
time Marx first commented on the Modern Age. The concept of Alienation, which was
central to their ecological critique, too has evolved with the times, to make space for newer
and newer technological and social “developments” which have created newer rifts
(Haydock 2017).

In this paper, I explore the Marxist ecological tradition and the metabolic rift through
primary field evidence[i] from Goa, and parts of North Bengal and Sikkim. Goa and Sikkim,
two of the smallest states in India by area, are also places that have some of the richest
plant and animal biodiversity, with Goa nestled between the Western Ghats and the Arabian
Sea, and Sikkim being a part of the eastern Himalayas. Incidentally, their natural beauty
also makes them ideal tourist destinations. Currently however, Goa is about to see a
resumption in mining activities[ii], mining fields that were left abandoned for a decade will
open up soon, and places like Mollem (an ecological hotspot) will be dug up in the name of
“development projects” (Datta 2022). The mountains of Sikkim and North Bengal too are
being dug up and burrowed through for a railway project that connects Sivok, a town near
Siliguri, West Bengal to Rangpo in Sikkim, with plans of extending it to Gangtok at a second
phase later on.

In the following sections, I present the observations from the field visits in Goa and Sikkim
followed by an analysis of these observations from the Marxian ecologist perspective,
foregrounding the idea of ecological rift and alienation as discussed by John Bellamy Foster,
Brett Clark, Richard York and Fred Magdoff.

Notes from Goa

Eat Dust: Mining and Greed in Goa (2016), born out of author Hartman de Souza’s personal
narrative, was centered around his sister Cheryl’s farm. Located in Maina, a village in South
Goa between Cavorem and Rivona, the farm is on land rich in iron-ore, which the local
mining bigwigs were desperate to acquire. Especially since that lucrative piece of forest
land was in between two separate mines, and getting that land would fulfil the dream of
having their own little mining corridor.
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In the years when illegal mining had raised its head in Goa, Cheryl, with her mother Dora,
daughter Aki and village resident Rita, were at the centre of protests, given that the mining
activities were underway in their very own backyard. Dora was the stuff of legends – in
October 2008, 85 years old and wheelchair bound, she chained herself to the entrance of
the mines to stop the trucks from doing their bid. Needless to say, all of them spent some
time in Aguada jail.

During the Age of Greed in Goa, Cheryl was the “mad woman” who kept crying about water
standing atop a hill (which was designated to be razed out for mining activities). Most of the
villagers paid her no mind, since there were springs all around; plus, they were given
enough allurement to keep their mouths shut. Having no water felt like the stuff from a
deranged woman’s dreams.

Now, years down the line, when the local communities come to her to discuss the water
problem, what can she do anymore? For when that hill was blasted, it released the aquifer
which was the village’s main water source. “The water came gushing through our homes,
and didn’t recede for 6 days”, Cheryl said.

The natural water that is left is contaminated with arsenic, mercury and other hazardous
compounds which were used for cleaning out the mud and iron, to be packed onto trucks
and sent offshore.[iii] “Almost all the topsoil, mud and iron-ore they took from the hills
behind us are now in China. It was low-grade iron ore, very high in demand there.”, said
Cheryl. She recalls how trucks would go past the farm, day and night, carrying mud,
followed by JCB carriers that were used to flatten the mud elsewhere.

It’s not just water, but food too. Where there are now mines, there used to be dense forests,
housing tigers, leopards, deer, wild bison and monkeys, as well as otters, monitor lizards,
various kinds of fish, among hundreds of species of plant and wildlife. Different species of
snakes and butterflies could also be found. Now with their habitat and food sources lost, the
surviving animals have had to move closer to human habitations. Cheryl herself has lost
multiple dogs to tiger and leopard attacks. With the food chains disrupted, wild bison and
monkeys finish off fruits and vegetables that the villagers grow — this has upturned the
local farming system, creating scarcity where there used to be none. This was also a major
reason why life became extremely difficult for all during the COVID-19 lockdowns in March-
August 2020: no one had any source of livelihood, farms didn’t reap a harvest, there was no
money or fuel to drive down to Quepem some 20km away and buy food (Datta 2022).

Near the Karnataka border in the south-eastern part of Goa, at the foothills of the
Sahyadris, lies Mollem, a protected area covering 240 sq km, comprising a reserved forest
and sanctuary. However, since last year, proposed “development” projects which include
the setting up of a double railway line, roadways, electrical line and coal mining requiring
almost 40,000 trees to be felled and 1.8 million tonnes of mud to be shifted from the area
threaten this ecological hotspot.
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Across Goa, extreme weather events have started to seem normal. In 2021, after an
exceptionally wet summer and a cyclone-filled monsoon, Goa saw monsoon-like rains for the
first time in November. These weather changes have already begun creating havoc on local
farming and growing patterns, destroying all seeds for the next harvest season. Even the
sea, Goans say, has been behaving differently. Judging by the water currents, they all agree
that another tsunami is coming.

North Bengal - Sikkim

The Sivok-Rangpo railway project commenced in 2019 after a 10year delay. Primary
observations reveal that this project, covering nearly 45 km with 28 bridges and 14 tunnels
comprising 38.5 km, is being undertaken by clearing a considerable portion of forest cover,
burrowing through significant chunks of the Himalayan mountains as well as mining of the
Rangit and Teesta rivers flowing adjacent to the railway route for sand and stones used in
the construction process.

Key trade and defense interests have expedited the project over the last few years; locals
believe that the railway route will make ferrying goods from China more convenient, as well
as help turn Sikkim into a more functioning “borderland” area. Local communities, by the
promises of employment opportunities and better connectivity, seem to be ignoring the very
real consequences they have been facing, namely a prolonged monsoon season well into
October, high temperatures in December, regular landslides even without rainfall, and
roads spontaneously caving in in the absence of trees to hold the soil anymore with
precautionary sign boards marking them as “sinking zones”.

Blasting these mountains to create tunnels has ended up removing forest cover and released
water from aquifers; trucks carry sand and crushed stone from the river banks to the
construction site the water bleeds out from the battered mountains till they run dry and the
trucks billow dust as they come and go, to the point of completely blocking visibility on the
roads. From Jalpaiguri in North Bengal, to Melli and Rangpo in South Sikkim all the way to
Gangtok in the east, surface water quality, air quality and soil quality have all been
adversely affected. The remaining vegetation along these routes is covered entirely by a
thick coating of dust. All of this stands in sharp contrast to how calm, clean and beautiful
everything was before this project commenced. Now, food stalls, engineering company
boards, mounds of sand, JCB carriers, cranes, stone crushers, cement mixers can be seen
lined up the entire way. Like in Goa, the removed forest cover has made monkeys homeless,
who now hang around by the roadsides.

Absurdity and alienation exist in how labourers fortify the battered mountain sides with
stones dug from the river bank, concrete and thick wire nets to prevent further landslides,
since there are no trees left along those paths to hold on to the soil anymore. The mountains
have turned fragile and turn to dust without further provocation.

Massive billboards advertising cement and iron companies are strewn along the mountain
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roads wherever permissible and adorn small and big shops with happy faces of famous
Bollywood actors and sportspersons promising a better future for people’s families, in a
messaging that clearly seeks to manufacture consent to justify the assault that the local
ecology and biophysical entities are being subjected to.

Rifts and Contradictions

For years, the loss of land and livelihood has been upheld as the sacrifice people would have
to make in order to get jobs and money later on. It does not seem to matter that any sort of
prosperity has failed to trickle down to the people till date, barring those few who get to
fatten their pockets.

Marx’s analysis of political economy starts off with talking about the theft of dead wood
from Germany’s forests by Prussians even though it was from common land and to meet
basic necessities (SWP TV 2011); similarly in these two states, there is a theft of a whole
horde of natural resources. In Goa, mud and iron have been extracted in unholy amounts, by
upturning and stealing the soil, all in the name of development. In North Bengal and Sikkim
now, the Rangit and Teesta riverbeds are being excavated for sand and stones, which are
subsequently crushed to make concrete that allows for the laying of railway lines.

The metabolic rift, as espoused by Marx, involves a break in natural processes wherein
nutrients from the soil, consumed by humans and plant and animal life, fail to find their way
back in the form of physical remains. Historically, industrial activities, beginning from the
production of fertilisers for agriculture to the livestock industry, resulted in
compartmentalised changes in the spatial relationship of humans, plants and animals
(Foster and Magdoff 1998). As a result, remains from the end of the production and
consumption cycle end up as waste (in the form of sewage, industrial run-off, sludge,
packaging materials, etc.). As Foster says, generating ecological rifts with nature is an
endemic tendency of capitalism, and waste is built into its system of production.

This alienation from nature and the ecological contradiction is further exacerbated by what
is known as the Lauderdale paradox, namely where the system promotes private riches
while destroying public wealth: the use value of resources (water, soil, minerals) is
destroyed by capitalist forces which promote the creation of scarcity in order to turn them
into commodities which can then be monopolised by private players (Clark and Foster
2010). In the case of Goa and Sikkim, the metabolic rift is not simply changing the nature or
quality of the soil, but the entire landscape itself. Mountains are being razed to dust as we
speak. Landslides have become commonplace since neither are there trees to hold the soil
in place, nor is there any water (either in aquifers or as groundwater) left in the soil which
could allow for afforestation. This in turn also increases propensity for disaster events which
will only make life exceedingly difficult in the future.

In Maina, there are other reasons as to why the local Velip and Dhangar communities,
among others, did not play a bigger role in opposing mining activities. They eventually
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became the agents of the mining industry, enabling the system either as private contractors
or truck drivers who ferried the loot from mine to railway/port. However, this is not to say
that these communities accumulated wealth off of mining’s back – one-time payments did
little to improve their socio-economic status or living standards. Money and the premise of
development feeds the social aspirations of people who buy into the myth of development
that justifies the environmental exploitation and degradation, as well as lends acceptance
among the people whose lands are being destroyed before their own eyes.

Foster’s discussion of the Dependence effect highlights these contradictions inherent in a

system where consumption patterns are determined at the level of production by those
controlling the means of production, and not by the vast number of workers. Politics and
power dictate the flow of money which creates commodities to satisfy irrational
consumption needs which generates more money that gets accumulated as wealth. A system
whose primary goal is to keep production moving, creates demands for commodities that
are simply non-essential and ensures profits for those in control. Alienation of labour,
environment and nature, and of communities from each other have allowed for these rifts to
take hold. The profit maximisation system relies on this flow, where wealth and capital get
concentrated in the hands of a few, and workers are left to survive with the lowest possible
compensation. In Goa, as one crosses Quepem, this fact bares itself in simple visuals – the
countryside in that part of town has small hamlets, with a few pakka houses built at a little
distance from the main settlements with at least one truck parked in front.

The labouring workforce for these projects, as in most Indian cities, predominantly arrives
from the states of Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. The migrant labourers receive bare
minimum wages to work in terrible working conditions, and struggle to make ends meet and
have two full meals a day. With systemic forces ensuring their alienation from each other
and their work, one cannot expect them to be conscious about the land they work in or
nature or the climate for that matter.

While some in the local communities gain petty profits from the exploitative system, any
form of dissent from these workers (be it regarding work conditions or the nature of their
work) threaten to oust them from the system, making their survival an uncertainty. Decent
work conditions for the workforce, adequate compensation and remuneration, food, health
insurance, in addition to schooling opportunities for their children – would all have been
gamechangers for the climate movement.

Engels puts this fact succinctly across in the eulogy he delivered at Marx’s funeral, saying:

“Just as Darwin discovered the law of development or organic nature, so Marx

discovered the law of development of human history: the simple fact, hitherto
concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink,
have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.;
that therefore the production of the immediate material means, and consequently
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the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given

epoch, form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions,
art, and even the ideas on religion, of the people concerned have been evolved…”

The evidence from Goa, North Bengal and Sikkim brings us back to the question of
production which is now undertaken not to satisfy basic human needs, but to capitalism’s
need to multiply on itself in order to sustain the system (SWP TV 2011). Capitalism is
antithetical to the human need for clean air, water, food and shelter and is uprooting all
systems that satisfy those needs in order to keep the wheels of production moving and
exchange value secure. Had it only been concerned about core human needs, mining
operations and irrational production in the name of “development” projects would cease;
aside from the fact that there are enough recyclable materials in circulation in the world for
us to not require further mining, and energy production which can be reliant on renewable
resources, human survival and non-human nature depends on cutting back on the irrational
cycle of production. All this points to a very grim prediction for the future, already in
motion, where only the uber rich, the monopolists and private players, will be able to afford
these basic human necessities anymore.

A point of critique in the existing Marxian framework of metabolic rift and the current
ecological crisis comes on the lines of what David Harvey cautioned about the risk of
“crying wolf” – keeping in mind Foster’s view that people tend to think mechanically rather
than dialectically, a lot of people dispute the arguments around the impending world
catastrophe, especially when things do not break down in the way or within the timeframe
that they are expected to (Haydock 2017). Shifting the narrative from the future that still
remains abstract and hard to comprehend, as Lejano and Nero (2020) point out, to the
struggles and changes in environment that are lived experiences in the present may help to
connect the general public to the dark fact that ecological changes which Marxists and
scientists predicted have been set in motion already.

End Notes:

[i] Field visits were conducted in Goa during November 2021 and in North Bengal and
Sikkim during December 2021. The quotes by Cheryl in the following sections are from
conversations during said field visit to Maina.

[ii] A Supreme Court order halted mining activities in September 2012, only because a
report by the Justice MB Shah Commission revealed that Rs 35,000 crores were siphoned
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offshore, by mining companies like Vedanta, Magnum, Minescape, Fomento, among others.

[iii] Vedanta’s official website states: “Vedanta is a major supplier to the domestic market
with the Goa iron ore mine also serving the Chinese and Japanese export markets” through
Sesa Goa Iron Ore, a Vedanta group company.

References:

Clark, Brett and John Bellamy Foster (2010): “Marx’s Ecology in the 21st Century,”
Worldview of Political Economy, accessed on 27 February 2022,
https://johnbellamyfoster.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/2010_Marxs-Ecology-in-the-2
1st-Century.pdf.

Datta, Hindolee. 2022. “Eating Dust in Paradise.” The Telegraph India, February 14,
2022. [Retrieved February 27, 2022, from
https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/eating-dust-in-paradise/cid/1851774.

De Souza, Hartman (2015): Eat Dust: Mining and Greed in Goa, Harper Collins.

Foster, John Bellamy, and Magdoff, Fred. (1998). Leibig, Marx, and Depletion of Soil
Fertility: Relevance for Today’s Agriculture. Monthly Review, 50(03), pp 43–60.

Frederick Engels’ Speech at the Grave of Karl Marx. (1993). [Retrieved March, 26,
2022, from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/death/burial.html.

Haydock, Karen (2017): “A Marxist Approach to Understanding Ecology,” Economic and

Political Weekly, Vol 52, No 37, pp 83-88.

John Bellamy Foster (2009): The Ecological Revolution: Making Peace with the Planet,
Kharagpur, Cornerstone Publications.

John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark, and Richard York (2010): The Ecological Rift:
Capitalism’s War on The Earth, Kharagpur, Cornerstone Publications.

Lejano, Raul P., and Nero, Shondel J. (2020): The Power of Narrative: Climate
Skepticism and the Deconstruction of Science. USA, Oxford University Press.

SWP TV. 2011, August 26. Marxism and Ecology - John Bellamy Foster - Marxism 2011.
[Retrieved February 27, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IwIb4Mb8xVo]

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akankshya