Case Note: Session 4

1. Startup v. McDonald (1843) 6 Mann & G 593

FACTS: Startup (S) contracted with McDonald (M) to supply a specified quantity of
linseed oil within the last fourteen days of March. S tendered on the last of the fourteen
days at 9’o clock at night. M refused to accept owing to the lateness of the hour.
ISSUES:
1) Whether S supplying the goods at such period of time amounted to valid tender?
2) Whether M by denying to take delivery breached the contract?
HELD:
1) The promisee must have a reasonable opportunity of ascertaining that the thing offered
by the promisor is the thing which the latter is bound to deliver. If the parties to a
contract for the sale of goods do not specify the location and time for the performance
of the contract, then the law states that the party receiving the goods must appear in
person and wait until a reasonable time to receive the goods that the other party is
required to deliver. Since M was present at the warehouse and in a position to
reasonably determine the quality and quantity of the product delivered in this instance,
there was a valid tender even when it was submitted after the agreed-upon deadline,
giving rise to a literal possibility of performance under the terms of the agreement.
2. Swarnam Ramchandram v. Aravacode Chakungal Jayapalan (2004) 8 SCC 689
FACTS: The parties entered into a sale deed for a property in Belgaum. A certain sum was
also paid in advance by the defendant and the agreement was to be concluded within six
months. As the defendants did not execute the sale deed within the stipulated time, a suit
was filed by the plaintiff after giving notice dated 10.5.1983 for enforcement of the
agreement to sell.
ISSUES: Whether time was the essence for payment of Rs.75,000/- on or before 30.9.1981
and whether the said term was breached.
HELD: The parties may declare that time is of the essence either openly or in ways that are
clear that they intended to do so. As an alternative, the nature of the contract, the property,
or the surrounding circumstances may be used to infer that time is the essence of the
agreement.
3. Gomathinayagam Pillai And Ors vs Pallaniswami Nadar, 1967 AIR 868
FACTS: On March 5, 1959, while P, another son of G, was on trial for murder and G
desperately needed money for his defense, they orally agreed to sell the respondent a plot
of the property but set no deadline for its completion. The two appellants executed writing
stipulating that the sale deed would be executed on or before April 15, 1959. The sale
deed was however not executed by that date for different reasons, given by each of the
parties. A default clause was incorporated in the deed imposing a penalty upon the party
failing to complete the sale by the agreed date. On April 15, another agreement was
executed whereby it was agreed to complete the sale by 30th April 1959 on the same terms
and conditions, but it was not completed by that date either. The agreement was canceled
when appellants 1 and 2 of appellants 1 and 2 wrote to the respondent saying that time
was of the essence of the agreement.
ISSUES: 1. whether the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance of the sale of the
suit properties in his favor.
2. Whether the condition of time is of the essence, implied, or expressed formally?
HELD: Even if time is not the essence of immovable property contracts, it may be inferred
that performance should be within a reasonable period depending upon the contractual
terms, nature of the property, and circumstances. The court can, thus, after having
examined the relevant facts and factors even hold that time is of the essence in that
particular contract. Two principles to test the principle of ‘time is of the essence
a. “Intention to make the time of the essence, if expressed in writing, must be in an
unmistakable language: it may also be inferred from the nature of the property agreed
to be sold, the conduct of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances at or before
the contract.
b. Intention to make the time of the essence of the contract may be evidenced by either
express stipulations or by circumstances that are sufficiently strong to displace the
ordinary presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulations as to time are not
of the essence.”
4. Narayan Gangadhar Deshpande v. Rango Krishna Dixit, AIR 1960 Kant 175.
FACTS: The applicants were granted a decree for specified performance. The plaintiffs
were obligated to deposit the remaining amount within the time frame specified in the
 decision, by its conditions. However, they did not deposit the relevant sum. After the
deadline specified in the decree, the respondent applied with the court under section 35(c)
of the Specific Relief Act, asking that the decision be set aside since the plaintiffs had not
made the required deposit.
HELD: The court found that this provision has the intended effect of granting the court that
issued the decree for specific performance the right to revoke the agreement and vacate the
earlier judgment if the successful plaintiff fails to comply with its terms by paying the
purchase price or other amounts that the court has ordered him to pay. Therefore, when a
case has been decided, the court has the power to dismiss it.
5. Prem Singh & Ors vs Birbal & Ors., 2 May 2006
FACTS: Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and partition of the land claiming himself
to be a co-sharer with the defendant. The Appellant herein pleaded that the suit was
barred by limitation.
HELD: The Honorable Court believed that where a document was either void or voidable,
one might rely on its cancellation. The Honorable court ruled that to have a document
declared void, a person who feels wronged may not necessarily need to file a complaint
under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. However, to have a voidable document
or instrument canceled when a comparable objection is raised, a lawsuit must be filed by
Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963.
6. Ram Karan v. Bhagwan Das 17 December, 2012
FACTS: The plaintiffs filed a suit declaration, mandatory injunction and, partition against
the defendant who had misappropriated funds given as loan for personal gain. The
defendant had also agreed to sell the ancestral property while taking the loan to defendant
no. 2.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the defendants prove that the suit as framed is not maintainable?
2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
HELD: The Honorable Justice regarded making false statements in a specific document
or instrument in order to acquire certain benefits as an action that renders the performance
of the document's, instrument's, or contract's responsibilities voidable and not void. In this
case, the court ruled that the contract's responsibilities were voidable. The defendants in
the case should have filed a claim under the Specific Relief Act of 1963's provisions
regarding the cancellation of an instrument, and such a claim must be made before the
statute of limitations for such claims expires.