EMERGING AFRICA Elena Berelowitsch 1818946

EUROPE, AFRICA, MIGRATION

Can we do better?

Is there really a migration crisis? Which is the relation between nationalism and policies related to
migration? Can we do better, as Europe, to improve this situation? How is it possible that human
rights keep on being violated, even if our aim in theory is to protect them?

I am aware that all those questions are complex and that there are no simple answers, my aim in
this paper is to enlighten some sides of this complex situation.

Europe’s segmented attitude

Migration issue is always a much debated one and it is permanently a top priority in EU’s agenda.

In order to deal with the phenomena of migration, we should go at its roots, that is asking
ourselves why people are leaving the countries that they inhabit and what is possible to do in
order to improve their living conditions. Taking a look at European strategies and declarations,
that’s exactly what we are doing, but if we look at the applications of such purposes the situation
seems quite different.

EU devolved and is devolving many resources to try to keep people in Africa and the a problem is,
as many underline, that its primary goal is to stop people from coming in. In many cases, no
matter how. Short term solutions are often privileged, in fact lasting solutions come in response to
long term commitment- it’s much easier for politicians to promote “instant resolution” and to push
people back. Moreover, many leaders use this issue to reinforce their discourses and thus their
political agendas end up influencing policies and agreements. We have a great example of politics
defining responses to migration if we look at the different reactions -both among and within
countries- in the regards of the so-called 2015 crisis.

Angela Merkel’s Germany initially adopted an open-door approach, accepting nearly one million
migrants, but less than one year later this policy was reversed due to the increasing power of
right-wing party Alternative for Germany. Other countries, such as Poland, Hungary and Czech
Republic rejected the EU proposal of accepting a proportional share of asylum seekers.

Throughout Europe, centrist politicians pushed for a fast and effective response, and the EU-
Turkey agreement can be regarded as the result. The agreement focused principally on the
following issues: returning to Turkey any migrant entering Greece from Turkey illegally; and
resettling, for every migrant readmitted by Turkey, another Syrian from Turkey. EU promised 6
billions and a more liberal visa if Turkey successfully restricted the flow of people into Greece.
Those migrants come mainly from Siria and Afganistan but also from the Horn of Africa.

This agreement was deeply criticized for many reasons, one of the most important is that Turkey
is not considered a safe country. In fact, many NGOs reported there is the risk that Syrians may
be returned to Syria from Turkey, furthermore the International Amnesty Annual Report on Turkey
2015/2016 referred to the pressure on refugees to agree to a “voluntary” return to Syria. Some
point out also the terrible conditions of the camps both in Turkey and in Greece, and obviously
with the Covid-19 pandemic the
problem of overcrowding is even more
relevant. This complex situation is
constantly evolving, with Turkey’s
prime minister using migrants as a
political instrument to put pressure on
Europe.

Another phenomena that I found

necessary to mention is that of the
widespread multiplication of European
illegal push-backs on its external
borders which goes hand in hand with
an increase in overcrowded refugee
camps. Those pushbacks amounted to
around 10,000 only in 2020 from
Croatia to the Balkans Route, from
Cyprus and Greece to Turkey, with a
possible chain refoulement to Syria;
and 60,000 from Malta and Italy to FIRE IN MOIRA CAMP, LESBO, 2020
ANGELOS TZORTZINIS
Libya since 2015.

With this brief and limited overview I just wanted to note the lack of a unified response both among
and within countries in Europe, and how this worsens the situation. Moreover, this leads to human
rights’ violations and whenever they occur or not shouldn’t depend on political situations and
agendas. The top priority, both in theory and in practice, should be to end any of those violations
as soon as possible.

The controversial EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

But there are not only the different countries’ policies and behaviours, in fact, EU is also sending
funds to Africa. It may be interesting to take in analysis the “EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability
and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa”, a trust fund
established in November 2015 and signed by European Commission, 25 member countries as
well as Norway and Switzerland. The trust was established during the 2015 Valletta summit in
which the Join Valletta Action Plan was adopted. In the dialogue, we may find two different
currents: the African group pushed to expand regular pathways for migration while EU focused
primarily on addressing irregular migration flows, mainly through securisation and development
support.

On EU’s website, the trust is described as it follows “The EUTF for Africa provides a new impetus
for EU cooperation on migration by creating a platform to reinforce political engagement and
dialogue with partner countries in Africa, pooling together EU and other donors’ resources, and
enlarging the EU evidence base to better understand the drivers and dynamics of migration. The
EUTF for Africa also undertakes to build a comprehensive approach to support all aspects of
stability, security and resilience, aiming at addressing the conditions that could be conducive to
violence and destabilisation, and supporting governments in their efforts to improve security.”

Those are great objectives, but as Oxfam reports and many other studies and articles underline,
the effective results seem to be quite distant from the purpose. In some cases the results
seemingly led to the contrary -that is enhancing violence and destabilization- as we will see in the
cases of Libia and Niger.

Of course, many projects funded with this tool are effective and are having very positive
outcomes, this is not to say that this system is entirely wrong and inefficient. In some cases,
Oxfam’s report underlines, projects are designed to promote the rights and resilience of refugees,
people affected by conflict, or people at risk of being displaced from their home. In any case, the
report also advices all the involved NGO’s to be prudent about the political environment in which
those projects are designed.

It is important to note that EUTF for Africa operates under flexible conditions, “there are no
specific countries or thematic allocations in order to allow programs to respond to the evolving
migratory or conflict dynamics in each region”, as EU’s website reports. Indeed, this is one of the
more criticized points, in fact this flexibility is often used by donors as a tool to promote their own
priorities. This objection was raised in the the paper “An Emergency for Whom? The EU
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa” published by Oxfam in 2017. A successive Oxfam’s report,
published in 2019, affirms that even if the concerns raised in the report resonated with the
findings of others, including the European Court of Auditors, the fundamental character of the
EUTF for Africa as a flexible instrument has not changed.

As retrieved in the 2019 report “(…) spending of Official Development Assistance (ODA) is
increasingly being tied to the EU’s desire to stop irregular migration and reach agreements with
African countries on the return of their nationals. The notes from the EUTF for Africa’s Strategic
Board meetings record multiple discussions about the need to allocate budgets to specific
regions and countries in Africa in accordance with the nationalities of people arriving in the EU
after crossing the Mediterranean”.

Donors conditionality was and is a key issue regarding the developmental possibilities of
emerging countries. As the events and programs relied to the debt crisis have shown, the role of
donors and the conditions that they posit in order to support those countries deeply affect the
effectiveness of the aid. We need to be very aware of whether the aid is used primarly to meet
donors’ needs and remember the enormous damage that funding dangerous dictators provoked
at the time. I think that the debate on the relation with donors and the usefulness of the aid is still
very actual and important also in the respects of migration.

Funds should not be allocated on the basis of the nationalities of people arriving in EU or to
countries that are more strategic and collaborative apropos of migration, but rather on the basis
on each country’s needs. In fact the countries in which help is most needed are not always those
which can be more “useful” in relation to migration.

It is also interesting to take a look at the share of money allocated for different purposes. In the
last years, the share of spending in development-focused projects diminished. In 2017 two thirds
of the budget were allocated to that but since then the share of projects focusing on
developmental cooperation reduced to the 48%.

Furthermore, less than 1.5% of the total worth of the EUTF for Africa is allocated to fund regular
migration schemes.

The top recipient countries in the EUTF for Africa are Somalia (€307.5m), Libya (€282.2m),
Ethiopia (€270.2m), Niger (€253m) and Mali (€214.6m).

In Somalia different projects are running. €103m were allocated as budget support for the
provision of basic services and improving financial management and this has been very helpful for
Somalia’s debt relief efforts. €83m were allocated for the Inclusive Local Economic Development
program, which provides much-needed support for stabilisation, governance, economic
opportunities and basic services. Finally, €40m were allocated in order to strengthen the security
sector governance and the judicial system. This is the most debated part, because it entails some
risks and it increases not only government’s accountability but also EU’s involvement in Somali
affairs.

Libia receives many founds and a significant amount of them are dedicated to stop migration,
even if there are conflicts in the country and the humanitarian situation is quite terrible. Many
funds arrive to the Libyan authorities, even if the involvement of Libyan coastguard in trafficking
people and their violations of human rights are well documented. Other concerns regard the funds
allocated to improve the inhuman conditions of detention in Libyan prisons.

Concerning Etiopia, the report underlined that there is an evident relation between the progress in
the negotiations of readmission procedures and the periods in which the fund approved projects
for Ethiopia.

Also in Niger the allocation of funds for development seems deeply related to migration
management, in fact it is an important transit country. Furthermore “concerns have been raised
around the EU’s interventions in Niger, where EU pressure to change laws and policies led to a
reduction in the community’s access to livelihoods and its trust in local government.”, Oxfam’s
report underlines

Indeed Nigerian government, in order to reduce illegal migration, passed a law which forbids
anyone to facilitate the movement of migrants but other sorts of economic activities haven’t been
encouraged enough: programs for those who were previously in the “migration business” seem
inadequate.

Furthermore, both in Niger and in Mali, civil society organizations are against the criminalization of
mobility and they accuse their governments of being more accountable to Europe than to their
own population.

Moreover, researchers noted that in Niger and in other countries security forces not only harassed
migrants but were also used to repress civil society and political opposition. This raises concerns
about EU strengthening the security of governments that don’t seem to take human rights in
consideration. Some state leaders, in fact, may seek this aid to build their state’s internal security
capacity and thus the aid will end up serving their interests.

On the other side, some leaders refused to cooperate because doing so would make them
unpopular at home.

Search and Rescue Programs

The last topic that I’d like to mention is the issue of Search and Rescue Programs (SAR). EU
declares that those programs are considered a priority but once again in practice the things don’t
work this well. While the seize of migration flows across the mediterranean decreased, death rate
is higher. This increase is related to many factors, such us cutting funds for NGO’s and new
policies on the arrivals.

Italy is particularly involved in this problem, in fact it is a transit country. In 2014, EU refused to
pay the Italian Mare Nostrum organization that was replaced by Operation Triton- renamed
operation Themis in 2018. This operation has fewer assets and fundings than its predecessor and
in conformity with the new Italian policies rescued migrants have no automatic authorization to
disembark. Critically, this new policies are deeply related to Italian right wing party gaining more
power and consensus.

Furthermore, a very high number of vessels have been blocked in the past years, due to ongoing
criminal and administrative proceedings, vessel seizures and other measures, which means that
they can’t carry SAR operations.

 EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Conclusions: narratives of migrations and human rights

In conclusion, I’d like to briefly address the theme of the different perceptions of migration.

I was born and I always lived in Europe, thus I’m exposed to the European narrative of migration,
which always often involves terms such as “crisis” and “emergency”. In Africa, many say, there is
a different conception of migration. It was mostly seen as a way to contribute to development,
and actually it is- not only for African countries, that need remittances, which are often even more
consistent than the aid- but it is also for EU, that needs labour and that is facing demographic
challenges especially in small cities and rural areas. There is a need, as some point out, to
communicate in a transparent way the possible benefits of migration to Europeans. Changing this
narration can be crucial in order to establish a win-win cooperation between EU and Africa.

To sum up, I think that we need to do better, and that we can do it. This is important, first, from a
humanitarian point of view- it would be at best hypocritical to maintain that Europe is a protector
of human rights if we allow all of this to happen. But it can be also important from a
developmental point of view, in fact migrants are necessary for European economy and perhaps
maybe we should try to focus more on this side of the coin rather than on the “crisis” narrative. It
is possible that changing point of view will also help in decreasing racism- which is increasing
throughout Europe.

Furthermore, maybe, toning down this exclusive focus on migration may improve European
relations with Africa, and this can be extremely beneficial for both. In fact if the question of
stopping migration is always the first European condition and concern in every encounter, finding
efficient and sustainable agreements becomes more difficult.

But if things will not change I am very afraid that the situation won’t get better and that people will
keep on dying in the sea and living in inhuman conditions everyday.

Migration won’t stop with measures of border control and securisation. Even without considering
those who are escaping from violence and war, if there will continue to be such a difference in
lifestyles and possibilities between EU and Africa people will continue to migrate, searching for a
brighter future. This is both understandable and legitimate. We should always remember that
freedom of movement is a human right.

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