Extended Essay in Philosophy

Title: A look into the utility of the progressive schools of thought on gender
and gender identity

Research Question: Which progressive theory on gender is the best at

providing a definition for “what is gender”?

Subject: Philosophy

Word Count: 3344

Citation Style: APA6

Table of Contents

1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 3

2 THE THREE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ................................................................................ 5

3 THE TWO TESTS............................................................................................................. 7

3.1 Why these tests? ................................................................................................................ 7

3.2 The first test ....................................................................................................................... 7

3.3 The second test ................................................................................................................ 12

4 CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................15

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1 INTRODUCTION
Societies are built on principles. These principles necessarily have tensions within

them, working out for only the powerful while oppressing the weak. When these tensions

become too great, a revolution occurs, providing new principles. This would be a quote from

Hegel if he wrote like a human being.

The traditional principles of gender have come to the point of needing to be

revolutionized; throughout the past century, that fact has become apparent with the fight

for women’s rights, equal pay, sexual liberation, and most recently, an influx of people

identifying outside of the gender binary. Gender is not working out for us. The question is,

once the gender revolution starts, which new principles should we adapt? Through a

Marxist interpretation, it is crucial that the new principles be adapted based on good

theory, lest they drown by the ideology the powerful will inevitably push.

Three decades ago, Judith Butler published her book “Gender Trouble” in which she

suggests that gender is a matter of performativity; a self-perpetuating cycle of

acknowledging things as gendered only to use them as costumes for roles people wish to

fulfill. Butler’s new take gave way for gender non-conformity and transgenderism to be

treated not as a mis-performance or something less that gender than conformity, but as an

expression of the theory in practice. This theory holds its strengths in both accuracy and

inclusivity.

Yet, till this day, not one mainstream activist has employed this theory into their

demands or even their rhetoric. Instead, many radical feminists prefer the existentialist

approach towards the topic, devaluing trans identities. In response, the mainstream trans

community has chosen the path of claiming gender is an innate part of who one is; a

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seeming contradiction to the notion of gender as a social construct. The theory of

performativity is nowhere in sight.

In this essay, I will explain the philosophical background behind each of the three

interpretations of gender (the existentialist, the essentialist, and performativity-based) and

put them through a self-devised test showing which of the three most accurately describes

gender. Then, I will bring into perspective what each of the three schools of thought have to

say about the fight for the liberation from gender. This altogether will show direction the

gender revolution should be headed towards.

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 2 THE THREE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
Judith Butler claims gender is a matter of a combination of what Lacan would

describe as a symbolic identification with a social role1, our need to fulfill that role, markers

that we were socialized to see as gendered, and being recognized as the social role. The

theory is labeled as “performativity”2.

It is important to distinguish it from the theory of performance which states that

gender is purely a matter of being recognized as something. Performativity is more nuanced

in a sense that it encompasses the wide array of processes. To be able to best visualize it, I’d

recommend using an example of a job as an allegory to gender; I, someone that was trained

in pottery, see myself as a potter. I present myself as a potter to people and I make pots as

this is expected of a potter. This means that people recognize me as a potter. I don’t mind

making pots. I am a role model for new potters. I am a potter. Performance would not

necessitate for me to see myself as a potter or to make pots; people would simply have to

believe I was a potter. But it would also not need me to be a role model for new potters,

and this is where the nuance comes to play. Crucially, performativity is able to not only

explain why someone conforms to a gendered structure and how people see them as a

representative of a gender structure, but how this gendered structure perpetuates itself

through time. If every potter just made pots without them setting any standards for future

potters, we wouldn’t have future potters.

In short, performativity says I believe to be a gender, I am told what that entails, I do

those things, I am seen as that gender, and I set new standards for people who believe the

same.

1: Lacan, J. (1977). Ecrits. In Ecrits (pp. 23-24). London: Tavistock Publications.

2: Butler, J. (2006). Gender trouble. In Gender Trouble (pp. 84-85). Taylor and Francis.
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 The existentialist view on gender is best encompassed in the quote “One is not born

a woman; one becomes a woman”3. The idea here is that it is the gendered oppression one

experiences that makes her a woman. The theory goes further from the individual gender

identity and acknowledges that gender is also a social class built on the patriarchal

structures. De Beauvoir reduces the categorical gender to a means of oppression, providing

the reasoning that the only purpose of gender is to other women. Following this logic, we

can infer both that gender according to de Beauvoir is based in history and its influence on

the modern contemporary society, and that it should be abolished.

The essentialist theory states that there is something that makes us feel as a gender

and identifies that as gender. This theory was popularized by transgender activists. It is

essentialist in nature as it presents a narrative of “born in the wrong body”, presuming

there is a core (either brain or soul) that is “the real person” with which the body was

mismatched.

I would say one of the best versions of these theories is presented by Slavoj Žižek

who accepts that there is something that makes a trans person want to transition. He takes

a step further and claims that this has to be a radical feeling, since switching genders is a

radical action. Thus, the choice a trans person makes to transition is a necessity, reminiscent

to the German idealist Shelling; it is a necessary free choice as this is the only way not to

betray yourself. According to him, this feeling of necessity is caused by one’s gender 4.

3: Beauvoir, S. D. (2015). The second sex. In The second sex (pp. 46-48). London: Vintage Classic.
4: Žižek, S. (2016, August 01). The sexual is political. Retrieved February 18, 2021, from http://thephilosophicalsalon.com/the- 6
sexual-is-political/
 3 THE TWO TESTS

3.1 Why these tests?

There is no way to absolutely determine what gender is. Firstly, because it is a vague

term used to describe a vague set of things we experience; gendered things stem from

colors to behavior to body shapes, all subjective to social context we are in. But it also

makes it impossible to pin down because the term itself is socially constructed, which makes

it impossible to discover “the truth” about gender through science and reasoning. It’s not

like there is some sort of a natural taxonomy that tells us that some genitals mean “woman”

and others mean “man”. We made that taxonomy up5. It is only a way to describe things,

there is no such thing as gender outside of the social construct. Because of that we can

never determine the core of what gender is. However, we can see what believing in one of

the theories gives us and to which conclusions it can lead us to. Based on that, if we know

some conclusions are better than others, we can determine which of the theories is best.

What I will be doing in the following sections of the essay is provide reasonable

conclusions to which a theory on gender should lead to as a means to provide a standard to

judge the three theories. Next, I will determine which of the three theories gives us the

logical tools to come to these conclusions.

3.2 The first test

The first thing any theory on gender should do is to be useful to the people talking

about gender. Both for other people and describing one’s own gender. Since there are a lot

of people with different experiences with their gender, the theory should be flexible. It is

not enough for a theory to encompass the historically binary genders (male and female), but

also the non-binary ones6.

5: Growing up transgender, /. (2018, December 15). Biological sex is a social construct. Retrieved February 19, 2021, from
https://growinguptransgender.com/2018/11/01/biological-sex-is-a-social-construct/ 7
6: Richards, C., Bouman, W. P., & Barker, M. (2017). Genderqueer and non-binary genders. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
 The reason why we should care about the theory providing language for non-binary

people is that there is no reason for it not to; if gender is socially constructed, all gender

identities should be respected since they are all socially constructed. Social constructs can

be reconstructed.

Now, which of the theories is able to provide the best language for all people to

describe their gender identity?

Examining Simone de Beauvoir, it is clear that her theory does not. This is because it

describes the root of gender in an oppressive social class, making it contingent on there

being some social roles already in place for the gender to exist. This is impossible for an

entirely new gender to experience, as there is no oppression that defines it. A similar point

could be made when it comes to the notion of becoming a gender, also encompassed in this

theory. You cannot fill the shoes of a demi-girl-flux, as there is no clear set of shoes to be

filled. Sure, there is some power in the claim that there are some far-fetched shoes to be

filled; a variation of the existing ones since any gender identity associates with the binary

two, as demi-girl-flux does. But when a gender does not relate to the two binary identities,

like say star-gender, this is impossible. Then, there is no social class that a person can be a

part of.

Following these two concerns, within de Beauvoir’s analysis, these people would

assume the social class they pass as; a star-gender person who looks like the social

expectation of a man would be treated as a man, while unable to use the theory to describe

nova gender identity. That is to say, if we accept that gender is a social class, nov is not

stargender, but a man. This disables nova from accurately describing novself’s gendered

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experience and thus proves the existentialist approach is not inclusive to different gender

identities.

It is important to note that although the interpretation of the stargender individual

through the existentialist feminist approach would be possible in a world where we created

a social class of star-gender, this misses the point; there should not be a requirement for a

gendered structure to exist in order to prove all gender identities existing; the language

should be accessible and consistent within the theory to all, irrespective of the social role

different genders hold within a society.

When it comes to Slavoj Žižek and his modern essentialist interpretation of gender, I

wouldn’t even have to explain how his use of language is not inclusive, since he admits he

doesn’t’ believe in the validity of some genders, especially fluid genders. His case being that

since gender in his eyes is a radical unconscious decision, the only genders that are valuable

are the ones with this radical free choice. “You choose yourself,” as the alternative would

eat you up from the inside. Therefore, people that consciously weigh their options, or

change their gender from day to day, are not that gender.

This might seem a quite convincing case for his theory to not be inclusive, but I

would disagree. Following the logic that the gender one is is not a conscious choice, then

any radical choice regarding gender that feels like a necessity to the individual is an

expression of gender. Žižek makes the point of genderfluid people not feeling this necessity,

but this isn’t necessarily true. Realizing even the act of identifying as genderfluid is

stigmatized, one would presume the people that do identify as genderfluid do so out of

necessity to be true to themselves. Therefore, there potentially is an essentialist component

to the fluidity of gender. Either way however, Žižek is not inclusive towards the people that

9
aren’t as passionate about their gender identity, which still, means they don’t receive the

language they need to describe their own gender experience. This implies to the people that

don’t necessarily feel they would be betraying themselves if they wouldn’t transition but

just prefer living as the gender they are transitioning to. I don’t necessarily have to hate all

other flavors of ice cream in order to choose chocolate, especially not to the degree of

feeling a sense of betrayal if I ate vanilla. Yet I still always choose chocolate. Some people

experience gender in such a less radical way.

It gets even worse if other analyses of gender essentialism come to play as many try

to explain why the radical choice of changing one’s gender is made in the first place. Those

ideas are not only flawed in nature as they try to explain gender on a non-societal basis, but

also in execution as they necessarily exclude genders that don’t come from the past;

provided that there are gendered brains, it is biologically impossible to have a gender that

doesn’t exist on the spectrum of the male-female. Not only that, any day-to-day fluidity is

close to impossible when the brain doesn’t change, not to mention, the soul is the same,

thus fluidity is utterly improbable. This completely disables neo-genders and genderfluid

individuals from using it as language to describe their experiences.

Lastly, why and how is the theory of performativity inclusive to all of those

individuals? At its core, the main idea of performativity is that someone’s symbolic

identification with an identity can be expressed and that the expression slowly redefines

gender.

This is inclusive to anyone with a stable symbolic identification; be it woman,

boyflux, or stargender. As long as I believe I am an identity, I will perform said identity, and

set new standards for this identity. This is also true for neogenders; if I believe I am

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stargender, irrespective of the fact that there is no class standard for it, I can define the

identity myself, or identify with anyone that already holds this identity. Then, I will slowly

set new standards for this identity with my actions. The same goes for genderfluid

individuals. If the identity is seen as a stable marker, I can symbolically identify with it and

perform to those standards, and if I see it as multiple identities intertwining, I symbolically

identify with a different one every day or so and perform that. For both, I set new

standards. Finally, I do not have to have a strong need to be a gender. As long as I believe to

be something, I do not need a sense of fear of betrayal of myself to be that thing.

There is valid concern within this theory of not being recognized as the gender you

identify with and thus not being said gender. However, I would argue this isn’t true. For one

thing, the theory presumes that gender is situational, this clear as being a man today is

different than it was 500 years ago. Similarly, different cultures and even social groups see

gender through different lenses. This means that provided gender is legitimized by your

surroundings, some surroundings will accept you and you will be that gender. Once we

agree upon that, we can limit your surroundings to only yourself. At that point, if you

believe you are a gender, you are that gender to yourself.

And this actually makes more sense; if someone does not see you as a particular

gender, you are not that gender to them, and you will not set new standards for said gender

either. But this is also true for anything that does not understand the concept of gender;

you cannot make a platypus see you as a woman no matter how much you try. This does

not mean that you are not a woman to yourself.

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 3.3 The second test

The standard I will be employing for the best language provided by a theory for the

feminist movement is which of the three makes it clearest as to what people should do

when we say “abolish gender”. This is because abolishing gender should be an essential part

of the feminist movement7. Gender is a social structure created by the powerful and rooted

in the patriarchy. Like all structures created by the powerful, we should question it (Karl

Marx). But that doesn’t only mean its social roles; even with absolute social, economic, and

political equality between genders, when we gender something, we create a divide and with

it a form of marginalization. This means it is specifically the categorical differentiations, the

boxes of gender, that should be abolished, and not just the kinds of oppression that come

with it. The categorizing in itself is oppressive. And once we get people on board with

abolishing it, they should know what to abolish. Meaning, if we proclaim something as

“gender”, we should be able to abolish it, and once we do, leave nothing gendered behind.

This might seem as a contradictory stance, when on one hand I claim inclusivity,

while on the other I strive to abolish all gender. It isn’t; everyone is oppressed by gender

since it brings them either societal or personal pain. To combat societal pain, people join the

feminist movement, to combat personal pain, people transition or break gender norms.

With less influence of gender in our society, both types of pain would decrease. And even

the most non-social pain; the discomfort within one’s body, would be normalized. However,

before we abolish gender, we shouldn’t let the people oppressed by it suffer.

Again, starting off with the existentialist view on gender, identifying it as a social

class, I believe it is clear that once we take the entirety of the social class away, including

7: Firestone, S. (2015). Dialectic of sex: The case for feminist revolution. In Dialectic of sex: The case for feminist revolution (pp. 12
5-12). London: Verso.
gendered language and social roles people have to fulfill that there would be nothing

gendered left. Perhaps the problem within this theory is a lack of clarity of what exactly the

ambiguous phrase “we abolish the social class that makes a person become a woman

through oppression” means; sure, we stop dividing people into categories, but how exactly

do we do that? Do we not wear anything gendered, all becoming ambiguous blobs? Do we

create a community only using neutral language and treat everyone equally? The answer

probably is somewhere along the lines of dismantling the mental idea of gender in our

minds and using the language appropriate to a genderless world, but that is not clearly

communicated within the narrative provided by the theory. Nonetheless, this can of course

be improved through additional elaboration, so my concerns are minimal.

However, looking through the essentialist point of view, I am not sure if gender

could even be abolished. Regardless of what exactly one would claim gender within this

theory is (the soul, the mind, or just something), the language describing it presumes it to

be a part of someone. Not only that, but an essential part of someone; something that

makes identifying with one of the boxes a necessity. When something so important is

gender, we cannot abolish it.

But even if gender as a strong identification could be abolished, this would not mean

an end to oppression. The problem is, feeling no sense of necessity to be a gender doesn’t

mean you stop gendering others. At best, you are just indifferent to being categorized and

your options being limited. You’re still oppressed, even if you don’t care about the nature of

the oppression. Needless to say, the definition of gender based on what people feel does

not provide the language of the abolishment of categorizing oppression.

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 Finally, does the theory of performativity hold up to this standard? Provided that we

define gender as a process of symbolic identification and a gendering of things and people,

taking that away would mean nobody gendering anyone. It is clear that this would abolish

gender quite efficiently.

However, performativity also holds a strength in clarity; it is clear that the way to

tackle gender is through our own perception of it. If we actively stop gendering things,

gender will be abolished.

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4 CONCLUSION

Gender is an artificial way of categorization. It limits an individual’s ability to present

themselves and be treated without preconceptions. The way we should define and

understand it should be based on the minimum amount of oppression that comes with out

understanding. This means we should simultaneously aim to abolish it and allow people to

individually liberate themselves from its shackles while it still exists. The best way to achieve

that is to adapt Judith Butler’s theory on performativity, as it clearly identifies how gender

should be abolished (through consciously not gendering things), while leaving room for the

creation of non-binary genders. In contrast, both the determinist and the existentialist

understanding of gender don’t achieve those goals.

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SOURCES

- Beauvoir, S. D. (2015). The second sex. In The second sex. London: Vintage Classic.
- Butler, J. (2006). Gender trouble. In Gender Trouble (pp. 84-85). Taylor and Francis.
- Firestone, S. (2015). Dialectic of sex: The case for feminist revolution. In Dialectic of sex:
The case for feminist revolution. London: Verso.
- Growing up transgender, /. (2018, December 15). Biological sex is a social construct.
Retrieved February 19, 2021, from
https://growinguptransgender.com/2018/11/01/biological-sex-is-a-social-construct/
- Lacan, J. (1977). Ecrits. In Ecrits. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Richards, C., Bouman, W. P., & Barker, M. (2017). Genderqueer and non-binary genders.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Žižek, S. (2016, August 01). The sexual is political. Retrieved February 18, 2021, from
http://thephilosophicalsalon.com/the-sexual-is-political/

16