Professional Documents
Culture Documents
37
Paull K.C. and Scott Cairns for the defendant bank. The
judge appears to have been unduly influenced by the fact
that the shipment was in fact Coromandel groundnuts. That
fact is immaterial, because what the banker has to pay against
is the documents specified by the letter of credit. In the
1 K. B. KING S BENCH DIVISION. 39
words of Bowen L.J. in Sanders v. Maclean (i), the bill of lading c. A.
" is a key which in the hands of a rightful owner is intended to I942
"unlock the door of the warehouse, floating or fixed, in which
"the goods may chance to be." The bank knows nothing RAYNER
officially of the transaction between consignor and consignee-: & Co-
see per Warrington L. J., in Stein v. Hambro's Bank of Northern HAMBRO'S
Commerce (2). There is nothing in the present case to show BANK, LD.
that the bank had knowledge of the particular trade. There
was a clear discrepancy between the invoice and the bill of
lading and the bank was entitled to refuse payment. [They
also relied on Hansson v. Hamel & Horley, Ld. (3); Guaranty
Trust of New York v. Van denBerghs, Ld. (4); and distinguished
Sociiti Metallurgique v. British Bank for Foreign Trade (5).]
Sir Robert Aske K.C. and Valentine Holmes for the plaintiffs.
If documents are presented in the form customary in the ship-
ping trade, namely, between the buyer and seller and the
ship, and containing material customary in the trade, they are
good and sufficient tender under a letter of credit. After all,
the bill of lading is the contract of the shipowner for the
carriage of the goods, and in it the shipowner accepts no
responsibility for any of the detailed characteristics of the
goods. If it be the practice of the trade on shipment of
goods to describe those goods as so many bags of merchandise,
that would be a perfectly good description, so far as the bill
of lading is concerned, for tender under a letter of credit. If,
for instance, the terms of a letter of credit called for the
presentation of invoice and bill of lading covering a shipment
of so many bags of Demerara sugar, and if it were the custom
of the trade to ship sugar under the designation of so many
bags of merchandise, then, if there is tendered an invoice for
so many tons of Demerara sugar at a contract price, and bills
of lading for so many bags of merchandise, that would be a
good tender under the letter of credit. Otherwise it would
be exceedingly difficult to deal with banker's credits. All
that is required is documents in the customary form, and in the
present case these documents did in fact cover 1400 tons of
Coromandel groundnuts. If the bank wants a particular
description it must stipulate for it.
C. A. set aside, and judgment entered for the defendants with costs,
1942 here and below.
j
RAYNER
GODDARD L.J. I agree. It seems to me that Atkinson J.
&Co. has based his judgment on the consideration that the bank was
V.
HAMBRO'S affected in some way by this custom of the trade, and, secondly,
BANK, LD. that he has considered whether what the bank required was
reasonable or unreasonable. I protest against the view that
a bank is to be deemed affected by knowledge of the trade of
its various customers, but, quite apart from that, even if
the bank did know of this trade practice by which " Coromandel
"groundnuts " can be described as "machine-shelled groundnut
"kernels," I do not think that would be conclusive of the case.
There are three parties concerned in a banker's credit—
the person who requests the bank to establish the credit, the
bank which establishes it, and the beneficiary who can draw
on it. The person who requests the bank to establish the
credit can impose what terms he likes. If he says to the
bank : " I want a bill of lading in a particular form," he is
entitled to it. If the bank accepts the mandate which its
customer gives it, it must do so on the terms which he
imposes. The bank, as between itself and the beneficiary can
impose extra terms if it likes. For instance, in this case,
the bank imposes a term: "All drafts drawn hereagainst
"must contain the clause: 'Drawn under confirmed credit
" ' No. 14597.' " The bank can say to the beneficiary : "These
" are the terms on which the bank will pay," and if it has only
been authorized by its customer to pay on certain terms it
must see that those terms are included in the notification
which it gives to the beneficiary, and it must not pay on any
other terms. If it does pay on any other terms, it runs the
risk of its customer refusing to reimburse it. It does not matter
whether the terms imposed by the person who requires the
bank to open the credit seem reasonable or unreasonable.
The bank is not concerned with that. If it accepts the mandate
to open the credit, it must do exactly what its customer requires
it to do. If the customer says : " I require a bill of lading
"for Coromandel groundnuts," the bank is not justified, in
my judgment, in paying against a bill of lading for anything
except Coromandel groundnuts, and it is no answer to say:
"You know perfectly well that 'machine-shelled groundnut
" ' kernels are the same as Coromandel groundnuts.' " For all
the bank knows, its customer may have a particular reason for
1 K. B. KING S BENCH DIVISION. 43
has not carried out the duty which I imposed on him. It Goddard L.J.
would be no answer for him to say: "Well, I got a receipt
"which in fact gives you all reasonable protection." My
answer to that would be : "You are not concerned with the
"protection which you have given me. You are concerned to
"carry out the orders which I gave you, and you have not
"done it."
In my opinion, in this case, whether the bank knew or
did not know that there was this trade practice to treat
"Coromandel groundnuts" and "machine-shelled groundnut
"kernels" as interchangeable terms, is nothing to the point.
They were told to establish a credit, and to pay against a bill
of lading describing particular goods, and the beneficiary
under that credit presented a bill of lading which was not
what they had promised to pay against. Therefore, it seems
to me, whether it is reasonable or unreasonable for their
principals to say that they want a bill of lading for " Coromandel
"groundnuts," or whether the bank had or had not knowledge
of some of the trade practices which are referred to, is not the
question. The question is "What was the promise which the
"bank made to the beneficiary under the credit, and did the
"beneficiary avail himself of that promise ? " In my opinion,
in the present case, he did not, and, therefore, I think that
the bank was justified in refusing to pay. The other matters
are, in my opinion, quite irrelevant, though the judge seems
to have paid particular attention to them. I agree that this
appeal should be allowed.
Appeal allowed.