3u1 1 4 Industrial Faciliti The epicentral area is home to about 40% of Turkey’s heavy industry. There are several concentrated areas of industry surrounding the Sea of Marmara and Izmit Bay, extending to Adapazari, Substantial damage to industrial facilities was observed over a large geographic area More than 25 companies from various industries in the Izmit and Adapazari areas were surveyed in the days immediately following the earthquake, The performance of these industrial facilities is relevant to other areas of the world because Turkey has many modern, engineered facilities, in many cases owned by multinational companies. The industrial facilities visited generally were constructed with much higher quality control than observed in the residential structures. This chapter summarizes observations relevant to the seismic performance of industrial facilities. Structural engineering aspects of industrial building performance are discussed in chapter 11 PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY There is a heavy concentration of petrochemical plants near Korfez, on the northern side of Izmit Bay within about 10 km of the epicenter. This is the first time in about 35 years that large refineries and chemical plants have been so close to the epicenter of a major earthquake, and this, may be the largest concentration ever of petrochemical facilities to experience such a shake. Most of these plants experienced peak accelerations on the order of 0.32g, based on an instrument located at the Petkim petrochemical plant. The response spectra for that instrument indicate a large high-period response. The duration of strong shaking was about 45 seconds Hiack Sen os Figure 14.1, Map showing location of industrial facilities relevant to epicenter. Petrochemical312 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES TOPRAS REFINERY The most widely publicized and spectacular damage to any industrial facility occurred at the massive refinery near Korfezrun by the state-owned oil company, Tiipras. The 220,000-barrel-per- day facility produces about one third of Turkey’s oil, primarily for domestic consumption. This refinery is a major supplier to industries throughout the area, Prior to the earthquake Tiipras had been slated for privatization in early 2000 and was considered to be the linchpin of Turkey’s privatization program. It is unknown whether its status will be affected by the earthquake damage. ‘The plant was designed and built in the early 1960s by an American company and turned over to Tiipras. Major expansions were added in 1971 and 1982. ‘Tank Farm Fires and Cooling Tower Damage The refinery received international media attention because of the tank farm fires that burned out of control for several days. The first fire was initiated in a floating-roof naphtha tank, Naphtha is a highly volatile material with a low flash point and is therefore easily ignited. The common speculation is that the sloshing of naphtha in the tank caused the floating roof to breach its seal, allowing naphtha to spill. The naphtha was likely ignited by sparks from the friction between the steel roof and the tank wall. ‘The refinery receives its entire water supply through a dedicated pipeline from Lake Sapanca, some 45 km to the east. Due to multiple breaks in the pipeline, the refinery quickly lost all water and all fire-fighting capabilities. As the fire spread to additional tanks, aircraft attempted to douse the fires by dropping foam. After a few days, along with the aerial foam attack, the refinery used diesel pumps to draw water directly from Izmit Bay to fight the fire. The fires were finally declared under control on Sunday, some five days after the earthquake. While the fire was burning out of control, an area within two to three miles of the refinery was evacuated, including some areas where search and rescue operations were taking place in collapsed buildings. Train service was disrupted in the area because of the fire. Strangely, personnel in neighboring facilities report that they were not allowed to leave their facilities during the evacuation period, because nobody was allowed in or out of the area. The fire and heat eventually consumed numerous tanks in the tank farm. It was reported that at least 17 tanks were considered to be total losses. These tanks were generally crumpled by the intense heat, with one tank expanding as if ready to explode. In addition to the tanks directly damaged by fire and heat, several appeared to be damaged by sloshing of fluid, A few had ruptured walls near their tops and clear evidence of loss of material down the tank wall. A large number of tanks (on the order of 50) were reported to have had floating roofs “sink.” The sloshing of fluid in the tanks apparently caused damage to seals and allowed fluid on top of the floating roofs. The extra weight then caused the roofs to sink into the tanks. Each of these tanks must be drained and the roofs decontaminated and often repaired or replaced. Sloshing is a long period response, and the amount of damage was likely amplified by the long duration of shaking. No evidence of piping rupture was observed. This is primarily attributed to the typical configuration: piping running in a flexible manner down central pipe runs between the tanks. Some piping leakage was reported in the area of the burned tanks. One tank that burned was observed to have a classic “elephant’s foot” bulge on one side. The other side appears to have damage that led to draining of the tank and spreading of the fire to this, tank and an adjacent one. We understand that these two tanks were the last to burn, after the fire spread over or through a berm, skipping over a few tanks in the process. The main process units are located just beyond another berm from the tank farm. Four cooling towers, one concrete and three wood, are located at the berm. One of the wooden cooling towersIndustrial Fa: 313 was burned completely by the radiant heat of the fire. A second cooling tower, some 50 meters away, was shaken down completely. while the adjacent tower remained standing. A concrete tower on the other side of the burned tower appeared to be undamaged Piping runs into the units between the bumed and collapsed cooling towers. It is not difficult to believe that the fire came close to burning down the entire facility. an estimated $3.5 billion investment Figure 14.2. Collapsed tank due to fire at Figure 14,3. Collapsed tanks due to fire at Tiipras refinery (Gayle Johnson). Tiipras refinery (Gayle Johnson) Figure 14.4. “Expanded” tank due to fire at Figure 14.5. Failure at top of tank due to Tiipras refinery (Gayle Johnson). sloshing of fluid at Téipras refinery (Gavle Johnson)STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES Figure 14.6. Pipes between tanks in Tipras Figure 14.7. Elephant’s foot buckling at tank tank farm typically run above ground (Gayle that collapsed due to fire at Tupras refinery Johnson). (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.8. Bumed-out cooling tower just over Figure 14.9. Collapsed cooling tower next to berm from Tiipras tank farm (Gayle Johnson). Tiipras tank farm (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.10, Location of burned-out and Figure 14.11, Piping between Tupras tank farm collapsed cooling towers next to Tiipras tank and process units runs between cooling towers farm (Gayle Johnson). (Gayle Johnson).Facilities 315 Crude Unit and Stack Collapse The other area of severe and spectacular damage in the refinery occurred in one of the three crude units when a 115-meter-high reinforced concrete heater stack, designed in 1978, collapsed. The break appeared to occur at about the height of the large-diameter heater duct. The cause of the failure was not immediately obvious from sifting through the rubble of the stack The top of the stack fell into the unit, destroying the heater, while the bottom portion fell into apipeway running around the perimeter of the unit, The destroyed pipeway was heavily congested with piping from all over the refinery. It is liable to take several months to identify. isolate, and repair damaged piping in this area One of the pipes broken by the stack collapse was a naphtha line from the original burning naphtha tank in the tank farm. A fire started when the collapse occurred. and although it was extinguished relatively quickly, it flared up several times because of new fuel from the broken pipe. The supply could not be stopped, because the two block valves were at the tank. inaccessible because of the fire, and downstream from the crude unit Figure 14.13. Collapsed stack in Figure (4.12. View from a distane: meter-high stack collapse in Tupras crude unit background was attached to furnace in (Gayle Johnson). foreground by a large duet (Garle Johnson). Figure 14.14, Top of stack collapsed in unit, Figure 14.15. Bottom portion of stack fell severely damaging heater unit; top of stack is in backward into pipeway/Gayle Johnson). foreground of photo (Gayle Johnson)STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES 316 Figure 14.16. View showing congestion of piping in destroyed pipeway (Gayle Johnson). Port Damage and Oil Spill ‘The Tiipras refinery has its own private port facility. Water depth is approximately 15 meters. The wharf structure reportedly had several sheared piles at the waterline. This was attributed to a combination of earthquake loads and existing heavy corrosion. ‘There was evidence of ground failure at the approach to the wharf. A steel frame pipeway on the wharf structure extending out from the shore partially collapsed, with broken frame connee- tions and severely bent members. Damage was reported to supply and return lines due to this support damage. The loading jetty is a separate structure oriented parallel to the shore. It separated from the wharf structure, as evidenced by dropping of connecting grating into the water below. Other nonstructural damage at the wharf included a fallen light standard An oil spill occurred at the port. When the earthquake began during transfer operations, the vessel pilot reportedly panicked and moved his vessel away from the dock, ripping the transfer hose before the manual valve could be shut down. The damaged piping on the wharf also contributed tothe oil spill, as well as overflow of the drainage system forthe tank farm, made worse by emulsion from the fire-fighting efforts Office Building Parts of the main Tiipras office building at the refinery were evacuated following the earthquake because of apparent structural damage. Inspection of the damage revealed it to be primarily cracking of masonry infill walls and relative displacement at building separations. There was some settlement of one wing of the building. The damage appeared to be repairable and is not expected to prevent reoccupancy of the building for safety reasons.Industrial Facilities 317 Figure 14.17. Pipeways collapsed and leaning Figure 14.18. Pipe supports bent and broke at on warf approach to shore (Gavle Johnson). welded connections (Gayle Johnson) Figure 14.20. Hoses used for transfer port (Gayle Johnson). operations at port (Gale Johnson). Figure 14.21. Hose reportedly broke when vessel pilot pulled away during earthquake without disconnecting; caused oil spill at Tapras port (Gayle Johnson)318 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES Figure 14.23, Damage to office building at building separation (Gayle Johnson).Industrial Facil 319 Other Areas Because of the fire-fighting efforts and the evacuation, detailed inspections of the bulk of the facility had not been performed at the time of our visit. Only the areas of severe damage had been identified. We expect other damage to be uncovered during more detailed inspections. Summary of Tipras Observation Very few oil refineries have experienced strong shaking in the last 30 years, and no large refineries have been so close to the epicenter of such a large earthquake. This earthquake demonstrated several concerns related not only to structural failures, but also to emergency response issues, human response, fire following earthquakes, and oil spills. The events during this earthquake may be indicative of what might be expected in such an earthquake in refineries in seismically active areas of the United States, such as the Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and Salt Lake City regions. This facility is expected to be completely out of business for several months. Turkey is losing an important asset just at the time when recovering industries will be challenged to obtain necessary resources, IGSAS FERTILIZER PLANT The Igsas fertilizer plant is immediately adjacent to the Tlipras refinery. The plant was built in 1977 and makes ammonia from natural gas. ‘A major concern at Igsas was spreading of the Tupras refinery fire to the two 10,000-tonne ammonia tanks that sit near the shore. No damage was reported to these tanks, although there was some ground failure and spreading near the shore directly adjacent to the tanks as well as damage to the port, also located near the ammonia tanks. Steel pipeways on the wharf experienced buckling of braces. Cranes on the wharf jumped off their rails. It was unknown whether the wharf sustained structural damage to its piles. One precast concrete frame warehouse building had a partial roof collapse. The urea warehouse had damage to a walkway near the roof. This building also had some separation of structural elements in the exterior building frames. Igsas had severe damage to one four-story office building: a collapse of the entire first story. According to facility staff, the building was identical to an adjacent building that appeared to be undamaged. They indicated that the building did not contain carports, large openings, or other features that would suggest a soft story or weak story collapse mechanism. Because of the Tiipras fires, Igsas staff had not had the opportunity to perform any detailed inspections at the time of our visit on Sunday, five days after the earthquake. They planned to begin inspections the following day on the main reactor structure. It was noted that the elevated reactor vessel had broken lateral supports near the top of the vessel, with the damaged and disconnected braces left hanging from the reactor and support frame. The concrete support frame itself was reported to be severely damaged.320 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES Figure 14.24. Two 10,000-tonne ammonia tanks at the Iysas fertilizer pla support (Gayle Johnson). t, bent braces on pipe ure 14.28, Severely di concrete reactor support structure at gs Braces near top of reactor are hanging disconnected after earthquake (Gayle Johnson), Gayle Johnson) Figure 14.27. Failed first floor in Igsas office building (Gavle Johnson).Industrial Facil 321 PETKIM PETROCHEMICAL PLANT The Petkim petrochemical facility at Korfez is one of the largest state-owned facilities in the country and, like Tiipras, supplies many other companies, especially in the tire manufacturing industry. Petkim hada few areas of severe damage and is expected to be out of operation for at least two months. They report that they maintain a three-month stockpile of product. This facility was constructed between 1967 and 1975, and the main plant became fully operational in 1969. Petkim employs approximately 2,500 workers, down from 4,000 a few years ago. The facility is located on a relatively stiff soil. The soil near the port and wharf structures was filled and compacted. One of the storage tanks located on compacted soil had no apparent damage. Horizontal accelerations of 0.32g were recorded on a soil-founded instrument (referred to as YPT) located at this site. This YPT instrument was the closest recording to the petrochemical plants and many of the other industrial facilities in the Izmit area. ‘One of the problems Petkim faces is disruption of the water supply. Like the Tiipras refinery, this facility has a dedicated pipeline from Lake Sapanca, over 40 kmto the east. At least three breaks in their pipeline have been identified. One of the biggest problems at Petkim was the collapse of cooling towers. One three-cell wood cooling tower completely collapsed. The adjacent four-cell cooling tower is newer and apparently survived without damage. Another concrete cooling tower was severely damaged. This structure was designed with “short columns”: the perimeter columns sit on top of a partial-height shear wall and are half the height of the interior columns. These perimeter columns attract more load because of their additional stiffness relative to the interior columns. On this cooling tower, every perimeter column hinged at the base, while interior columns were undamaged. The concrete and wood cooling towers were approximately 400 and 200 meters away from the YPT recording station, respectively. ‘The port was severely damaged. There was evidence of ground failure in the process area next to the port. Pipeways on the wharf structure extending perpendicular to the shoreline partially collapsed. About 100 meters of fire protection piping spilled onto the wharf deck due to failure of support frame welds. The piping itself was not damaged. On the loading platform, at least 10 battered piles were severely damaged such that one can see through the rebar cage just below the pile cap. Underwater inspections had not been performed at the time of our visit. Two dolphins were also severely damaged, as every pile hinged at the top. All these piles were battered. Petkim imports essential chemicals through its port facility. Even without other damage to the plant, Petkim would not be fully operational due to insufficient raw materials such as polyethanol and ethanol. The PVC factory is a concrete frame structure with masonry infill. It had some structural damage at connections as well as cracking of infill walls and shear failures in some relatively stocky columns. Petkim reported that they were aware of other damage at the time of our inspection, forexample, the internals of a feeder polymerization reactor.STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES Figure 14.29. View of Petkim petrochemical plant (Gayle Johnson) Figure 14.30, Collapsed cooling tower at Figure 14.31. Severely damaged conerete Petkim (Gayle Johnson), cooling tower at Petkim (Garle Johnson). Figure 14.32. All columns on perimeter are Figure 14.33. Fallen fire protection line at “short” columns and hinged. Interior columns Petkim port. Piping was not damaged are longer and were undamaged (Gayle (Gayle Johnson). Johnson).Industrial Facilities 323 Figure 14.34. Pipe support failure that led to falling of fire protection pipeline at Petkim port (Garie Johnson) Figure 14.35. Damaged battered piles at Petkim port (Hali Sezeny. Figure 14.36. All piles severely damaged on dolphins at Petkim Port (Halil324 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES BRITISH PETROLEUM. Two British Petroleum gas terminals were visited in this area, The BP Gaz Tanker Filling Station is a small facility located a few kilometers from the Tiipras refinery, The station reported minor effects, such as shifting of the horizontal “bullet” tanks on their supports. Two of these unanchored vessels, oriented perpendicular to cach other, slid during the earthquake. The vessel oriented north-south slid over an inch, while the other vessel slid less than half that amount. The tank filling station also reported that transformers “leaned back” a little but had been repaired prior to our site visit. The BP gas terminal is located immediately adjacent to the Tiipras refinery, The facility had only minor damage, such as minor buckling of tank roofs from sloshing of fluids. Those tanks were reported to be about 70% full, with about 3 meters of freeboard The al also had some damage to walkways connecting tank roofs, and there were indications of minor settlement at a few locations on the property as tern gure 14.37. Bullet tanks at BP Tanker Filling Station are oriented perpendicular~ and shifted different amounts (Gayle Johnson) Figure 14.39. BP Gas Termina located immediately adjacent to Tiipras, had minor damage, such as buckling of tank roofs and sloshing (Gavle Johnson). Figure 14.38. Evidence of shifting of over 1 in. on bullet tanks (Gayle Johnson)Industrial Facilities 325 OTHER LPG PLANTS At least 15 other gas firms are located in the immediate vicinity, with numerous spherical LPG. storage tanks in the surrounding area. These spheres are typically supported by either reinforced concrete or fireproofed ste! support columns with X-bracing between legs. No obvious structural damage to spheres or their supports was observed in any of these plants. Minor effects such as falling of canisters were common. In one location a light standard fell onto a small tank. Although no major structural damage was observed at these plants, two truck drivers were killed in a fire ignited by driving through a gas leak from one of the facilities. Security monitors at one facility captured the drivers leaving the facility across the street, beginning to run down the road on foot, changing their minds and returning to their trucks, and driving away. The remains of their burned-out trucks and a burned-out building in the facility could be found less than a mile down the road, Figure 14.40. Sign indicates over 15 Figure 14.41. Power pole toppled onto small LPG gas plants in immediate vicinity. tank. Stacked containers tipped over in background are typical of LPG plants (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.42. Burned-out trucks drove through Figure 14.43. Fire from trucks burned down gas cloud leaking from facility (Gayle Johnson). building at facility (at right) and killed drivers, (Gayle Johnson).326 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY Automobile and tire manufacturing facilities are abundant in this area. Several multinational industrial companies, such as Pirelli Tires, Goodyear, and Hyundai, are located within a few miles of one another in the Kasekiy region, just to the east of Izmit, The Sabanei company has joint-venture facilities with several companies in the area, The partnership with Bridgestone of Japan that manufac- tures rubber goodsand tiresis called BriSA. Inthe same complex are several other companies that supply this industry. The company also owns 50% of the Toyota car manufacturing plant in Adapazari HYUNDAI CAR FACTORY The Hyundai car factory, just east of Izmit, opened in late 1997. The assembly building structure is a heavy steel moment-resisting frame with a steel space frame roof covered with galvanized panels. It is supported on 60-cm (24 in.) piles. The building engineer reported that several column-to-roof-truss bolted connections had sheared high-tension bolts, with as many as six bolts fractured in some connections, Hyundai is replacing all connection bolts in the plant. They also reported that some columns bent We were allowed to visit a portion of the plant, including utility penthouse some 9 to 10 meters, above ground level. This portion of the building exhibited severe nonstructural damage, including large separations of ducts from the air handlers, loss of support for large ducts, and unzipped and fallen cable tray systems. The cable tray systems appeared to have fallen because of a poorly configured rod hanger attachment to overhead clamps. It was reported that there was no observable damage to robots and other major equipment. TOYOTA CAR FACTORY ‘The Toyota factory is located approximately 40 km east of Izmit in Adapazari. This 123,000- meter’ plant was constructed in 1994 and currently is used to produce Corollas. Toyota has an annual capacity of approximately 100,000 vehicles. Construction of their buildings utilizes massive steel frames, with flange thicknesses of nearly 4 in. common and some flanges up to 5 in, thick. Buildings are supported on 400 by 400 mm (16 by 16 in.) piles driven 12 meters deep, where rock is encountered in the soil profile. The plant has approximately 3,800 piles. Fault ruptures were observed on the grounds within about 100 meters of the main plant buildings. The fault rupture caused damage to the waste treatment plant. Figure 14.44. Faulting at Toyota plant in Adapazari, within about 100 meters of buildings (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.45, Collapsed store Toyota plant (Halil Sezen).Industrial Facilities 327 Although no structural damage to the buildings was reported, significant nonstructural damage occurred, including the following: + Skylights popped out in places. + Storage racks used for steel plates collapsed. + Stacked and stored material moved. + Expansion joints opened. + Light fixtures fell. + One substation transformer jumped to the side, requiring repair. It was reported by the manager that the plastic roof covering of a 10-meter-deep sludge paint plant, which is used to store and process some chemicals and paints, popped out during the earthquake; however, no leakage was reported. It was also reported that there was no damage to several deep, waterproofed, high-strength concrete pits. These pits have walls one meter thick and a foundation depth of 1.5 to 2 meters. The plant was shut down at the time of the earthquake, so only a few cars were on the line. Several of them jumped off the tracks, moving several feet and impacting nearby items. Because of the shutdown, no sensitive robotics had obvious damage. Technicians from Japan were scheduled to arrive the following day to test and calibrate equipment. FORD CAR FACTORY The body shop building of the new Ford plant under construction in Gélctik was damaged due toa fault rupture that crossed immediately adjacent to the comer of the building and some zone of faulting under the building. The fault rupture left the building with leaning walls and columns, as, well as cracked floor slabs and column joints and failed bolts at roof-truss-to-column connections. The structure isa grid of about 6-meter-high square reinforced concrete columns with arigid base and hinges connecting toa steel space frame at the top. The roofs covered by light steel panels above the steel roof frame. Similar light stee! panels were used for walls around the perimeter. These steel wall panels popped out or deformed quite easily as a result of excessive deformation demands caused by the fault rupture. The floor slab was cracked and opened about 5 in. at construction joints. Plastic hinges were formed at the bottom of many columns, causing permanent drift in the structure, PIRELLI TIRES The Pirelli tire plant, just east of Izmit, consists of about 20 interconnected buildings with an area of 218,000 meters*, dating back to the 1960s with subsequent additions. One of the oldest portions of the building, of reinforced concrete moment frame construction, experienced a complete collapse, killing one worker and injuring 20. Adjacent building sections were severely damaged and had been temporarily shored up at the time of our site visit. Several columns had hinged at the base. These building sections also had severe nonstructural damage, such as fallen light fixtures and cable trays. Because of the condition of those adjacent sections, they cannot be used for production. One major business interruption concem for Pirelli is that critical equipment, such as the Banbury extrusion machines that handle all the raw materials for the entire plant, are located in this section of the building. Although the extruders themselves are undamaged, they cannot be used because of the building damage, and these large machines are not easily relocated within the facility. Other buildings at the site had damage of less severity. The facility also includes a steel cord factory with 200 employees and 60,000-meter? enclosed area, Some damage was observed in short columns in this factory, which was built in 1987.328 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES Figure 14.46, Collapsed building at Pirelli tire plant (Gayle Johnson). igure 14.47. Severe damage to building adjacent to collapsed building at Pirelli This building houses critical equipment and cannot be used because of the building damage (Gayle Jolinson). Figure 14.48. Other buildings at Pirelli did not collapse but bad significant damage (Gavle Johnson)Industrial Facilities 329 GOODYEAR TIRE PLANT Goodyear has a 500-person Izmit factory in the same industrial area as Pirelli and the other factories discussed. The plant is of steel construction, built in 1963. They reported only minor damage that did not significantly affect production lines, such as fallen light fixtures and wall cracks and areas of the fire protection system that broke and triggered sprinklers. They reported that 90% of their fire protection system remained operational, and that they hoped to restart the next day, slightly more than a week after the earthquake. Major suppliers for Goodyear, including KordSA (located across the street) and Petkim, suffered substantial damage. It was reported that Goodyear and other tire plants in the region could face some serious shortages of raw materials if these suppliers cannot start operation within few weeks. BRISA TIRE PLANT BriSA, a joint venture of the Bridgestone and Sabanci companies, manufactures rubber goods and tires. The Sabanci company started tire production in 1974. BriSA, the major tire manufacturer in Turkey and the sixth-largest in Europe, had total sales of $275 million in 1998. BriSA operates ina 8,512-meters? facility. The BriSA plant had severe structural damage to buildings, with the north and south walls fallen. Part of the walls had fallen on transformers. The control room was reported to be damaged. Most of the damage was reported to be in the older part of the plant, which was built 25 years ago. ‘The newer part, built 10 years ago, suffered less damage. A few days after the earthquake, one investigation team reported that 65% of the BriSA plant had insignificant or no damage. KORDSA KordSA is one of the largest producers of tire cord fabric and industrial fabric in the world, with about a 13% share of the global market. In 1998, KordSA had sales of $150 million, including exports to more than 52 countries. It was reported that the plant was 50% operational one week after the earthquake. The main plant, constructed in 1973, consists of interior steel moment-resisting frames and perimeter reinforced-concrete frames. A storage area was added next to the main plant later. There was significant damage in this product storage structure due to roof collapse resulting from failure of some of the corbels supporting the steel space truss. Almost all the columns in the frame between the main plantand this storage area failed due to short column effects. A similar reinforced concrete structure on the other side had no apparent structural damage but suffered some nonstructural damage. Most of the parapets on that structure, large concrete panels covered with blue metal sheets, failed due to excessive displacements and corbel failures. DUSA DuSA, established in 1987, is a joint venture between the Sabanci company and DuPont. The company, with sales of $78 million in 1998, produces and exports tire cord fabric and nylon yard, which is the main component in the production of automotive tires and industrial fabrics. The main plant, a reinforced concrete frame on a one-meter mat foundation, is reported to have been damaged heavily. At least one secondary structure in the complex collapsed. Itis estimated that the facility will be shut down for six months to a year. It was reported that the continuous hot process unit had extensive damage, with process equipment moving, pipes sheared, pipes “blocked,” and instrument cables cut. It was also reported that some critical equipment tipped over. The plant was shut down, and maintenance planned for next year was accelerated. The steel moment-resisting frame structure under construction did not appear to have structural damage. A tall, wide brick infill wall had some cracks in it and bulged out of plane.330 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES Figure 14.49, KordSA tire cord fabric plant. just east of Izmit (Halil Sezens. Figure 14.50 Collapsed roof in storage structure at KordSA (Halil Sezen) portion of main plant at DuSA (Halil Sezen).Industrial Fai ENERJISA EnerjiSA started production in 1997 to supply electri companie: ity and processed steam for Sabanci ich as BriSA, KordSA, DuSA, and BekSA. The company began with a power plant with asingle unit having 40-MW capacity. In orderto meethigherdemand, EnerjiSA hasa program under way to install a system with a capacity of 130-MW power and 160-ton/h, steam generation. At the time of the earthquake, some equipment was being installed and several structures were under construction. The heat recovery steam boiler under construction moved to the side. The base of the steel columns in the steam generation system under construction and in the old unit sheared and crushed the side of the conerete base Bushings on two transformers failed and were replaced after the earthquake. A new trans- former, which was in the process of being installed, rolled several feet and tipped over on its end Other transformers moved 5 to 10 cm during the earthquake The older 40-MW unit was operational after the earthquake. Figure 14. Base of heat recovery steam boiler crushed and members buckled (Halil Sezen). Figure 14.52. Heat recovery steam boiler under construction at EnerjiSA power plant (Halil Sezen). Figure 14.54, Transformers at EnerjiSA; Figure 14.55. Transformer at EnerjiSA rolled end transformer rolled and tipped (Halit several feet and tipped on its end (Halil Seze Sezen).332 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES KSA BekSA, established in 1987 as a joint venture between the Sabanci company and Bekaert of Belgium, is the largest independent steel wire manufacturer in the world. The company. with sales of $40 million in 1998, covers an area of 57,000 meters’. Their product, steel cord. is essential for other facilities in the region and an integral component in the manufacture of tires, bead wire, hose wire, and spring wire, ‘The facility consists of reinforced concrete plants and office buildings and was partly operational ten days after the earthquake. One of the office buildings, with a glass facade, completely collapsed, and the main office building was barely standing. with many columns sheared in the first story. The columns, with poor shear reinforcement and poor details, were restrained at the top and bottom and attracted large shear forces, creating a short column effect ‘The main plant suffered some nonstructural damage. Itwas estimated that 90% of the windows between the walls and roof truss were broken, Some cracks were observed in infill walls OTHER HEAVY INDUSTRY NUH CEMENT PLANT NUH operates a large cement plant near Dilovasi, west of Izmit. The plant includes two kilns, three cement mills, coal mills, and raw mills. ‘The plant was operating at the time of the earthquake and shut down when power was lost. The plant maintains two 1.3-MW generators for safely shutting down rotating kilns, a process that takes about eight hours, The generators are not automatic and were started approximately 20 to 25 minutes after the earthquake, at about 3:30 a.m, The plant requires about 40 MW for complete operation. This plant was the only plant visited that was in operation at the time of our site visit, five days after the earthquake. Two of the three mills were in operation; the third was expected back in a few days. The kilns were not running due to repairs of refractory lining. These repairs were not due to earthquake damage but were maintenance originally scheduled for November and moved up a few months to take advantage of the unscheduled downtime and other repair work caused by the earthquake. The kilns were expected to be in full operation in seven to ten days. Damage to the plant was minor and includes the following: + Cracking of walls and broken glass in the control building + Falling of hanging monitors in the central control room + Falling of free-standing PC monitors in the central control room + Several inches of settlement to the “older” section of the pile-supported port facilities + Damage to pipe supports from differential movement of structures in the plant Figure 14.56. View of NUH Cemento cement plant near Dilovasi (Gayle Johnson)Figure 14.57. Damage to pipe supports from differential displacement of structures in NUH cement plant (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.58. Area of minor settlement at Figure 14.59, Old section of NUH port settled NUH port (Gayle Johnson). several inches relative to newer portion (Gavle Johnson).334 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES MANNESMANN BORU STEEL PIPE FACTORY ‘The Mannesmann Boru steel pipe factory isa joint venture ofa German and a Turkish firm. The facility is located in Izmit, a few miles east of the petrochemical plants. The facility is of 195 vintage and is generally broken into the “small pipe” and “large pipe” manufacturing areas. Each area consists of production buildings, warehouses, and stores, There is also an administration building and storage yards. Damage was observed at several buildings, often associated with reinforced concrete frame structures with partial height masonry infill. “Short column” damage was especially noticeable on two buildings, a production building and a warehouse, where adjacent building sections had very different window opening heights. The shorter columns experienced much more severe dam: than the adjacent taller columns One steel frame production building at the large pipe area uses steel moment-resisting frame. Anchorbolts on these columns stretched and fractured. It was noted that some torsional effects may have added to the column response in the longitudinal direction due to inclusion of diagonal braces on only one truss face, This 100 -meter-wide by 600-meter-long main plant had two steel moment frames in the longer direction and several shorter frames in the other direction. Because shorter frames were not placed symmetrically, they also apparently caused some damage due to torsional effects ‘The administration building experienced some building separation and infill damage. Similar effects were observed at another warehouse building. An elevated skylight along the length of one warehouse building collapsed. Contents of one production building and one warehouse were observed to have shifted and fallen, In the yard at the large pipe area, two cranes experienced identical failures. The legon one crane completely collapsed due to buckling of the box section. The crane was not loaded at the time of the earthquake. A second crane experienced identical buckling of the box section. Its fall was broken by the adjacent cable support structure. The collapsed cranes were built in the early 1970s and were constructed of box sections using approximately 3/8-in. plate, Goods are generally shipped from the port of the adjacent SEKA paper mill, because Mannesmann Boru does not have its own port facility. Severe damage to that port will make it unavailable for an extended time. Figure 14.60. Short columns failed in bays next to longer columns at Mannesmann Boru steel pipe factory (Gayle Johnson)335 Figure 14.61. Toppled pallets at Mannesmann Boru storage building Gayle Johns Figure 14,63. Sheared bolts at base of column at Mannesmann Boru large pipe factory (Gayle Johnson) Figure 14,62. Steel braced frame building at Mannesmann Boru large pipe factory. E load paths led to shearing of bolts (Gayle Johnson).336 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES Figure 14.64, Collapsed crane at Mannesmann Boru large pipe factory yard (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.65. Box section of crane leg buckled at Mannesmann Boru. A second crane experienced an identicat leg failure but did not fall (Gayle Johnson)Industrial Fa: 337 SEKA PAPER MILL SEKA isa state-owned paper mill next door to the Mannesmann Boru plant where paper and, cardboard are produced and processed. The port facility, owned by SEKA but also provided to Mannesmann Boru, experienced a complete collapse of the port approach bridge. The structure, designed around 1960, was supported on single reinforced concrete columns. Axial failure of the columns under the port bridge suggests that the columns were not strong enough to carry lateral earthquake loads under heavy vertical load. Also, the concentration of damage in the upper-level shorter columns closer to shore indicates that the lateral demand on these columns was h compared with that on more flexible columns away from the shore. A second wharf structure was also severely damaged, with one section dropping vertically a foot or more relative to the adjacent section. For safety reasons we were unable to get closer to the damage to determine the exact cause, but from the configuration it appears to be damage to the concrete supports above one of the pile groups The facility has five paper mills, each with two paper machines. Like the other state-owned cilities, Tiipras and Petkim, SEKA gets its water through a dedicated pipeline from Lake Sapanca, 40 km to the east, The cast-iron pipeline, constructed in 1938, was broken in several locations, and a repair time had not been determined at the time of our visit. As a contingency. the factory had plans to divert water that runs from a dam 20 km away to Istanbul Several buildings at the SEKA facility had structural damage. primarily to the roofing system. Reinforced concrete planks had fallen in several locations, A wall panel collapsed in the upper floor of one building One of the reinforced concrete cellulose silos completely collapsed. Two of the newer silos appeared to be undamaged. Plant 4, constructed in the late 1950s, was without power because of damage to its transformer. Mills and paper machines did not have any apparent damage after external inspection however, they had not been operated at the time of our visit Plant personnel estimated that the entire plant would be shut down fora minimum oftwo weeks. and longer where there was severe structural damage. Plant 4 was expected to be shut down for up to two months because of the damaged transformer. The port is expected to be out of operation for a lengthy period due to the severity of the damage, SEKA plans to bring in materials by truck Figure 14.66. The approach to the port at the SEKA paper mill is completely unusable (Gavle Johnson).338 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES ass SS SS sa Figure 14.67. SEKA port support structure has collapsed single reinforced concrete columns (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.6 structure at .. One section dropped a foot or more relative to other sections on the second wharf EKA (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.69. Pipelines did not appear to be igure 14,70. View of buildings at SEKA damaged, but second port structure at SEKA is paper mill, Wall panels have fallen on upper also unusable (Gayle Johnson). floors of building at left (Gayle Johnson),339 Industrial Facilities Figure 14.71. Top left Precast concrete roof planks fell in several SEKA buildings (Gave Johnson). Figure 14.72. Top right Collapsed cellulose silo at SEKA paper mill (Gavle Johnson). Figure 14.73. Left Newer, undamaged cellulose silo at SEKA paper mill (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.74, Above Damaged transformer at SEKA plant 4 will cause the plant to be shut down for two months (Gavle Johnson).340 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES PAKMAYA FOOD PROCESSING PLANT Pakmaya is one of the largest food processing plants in Turkey, with a major facility located just east of Izmit, between the Pirelli and Goodyear plants. The facility employs about 300 people and usually operates 24 hours a day. The Izmit planthad both power and water but was expected to be out of operation for six to eight weeks because of damage to buildings, equipment, and vessels, The plant receives power from the grid and from a cogeneration plant. Themain plant consists of several steel moment-resisting frames. Steel frames on the perimeter were infilled with lightweight brick blocks. Damage to this failty included the following: Damage to five insulators in the switchyard. Repairs had been made at the time of our visit, as they maintain a supply of spare parts, + Damage to piping from shifting of 150-tonne bioreactors. + Damaged skids under reactors, including buckled skid beams and shifted supports, leading to 1 to 2 in. of permanent lateral displacements to the equipment. * Damage to instrumentation and critical equipment due to permanent movement as a result of strong ground shaking. Because the tanks used for fermentation vibrate 10 to 15 hours per day when the plant is in operation, some of the frames, slabs, and supports for the equipment are expected to meet some special design requirements to resist forces induced by vibration. + Damage to the internal steel frame of the reactor building, including buckled and fractured braces. + Collapsed infill walls on several buildings. + Fallen monitors in the control room. Ofspecial note at this facility was the total collapse of asteel penthouse built on top of aconcrete frame building. This two-story penthouse structure was a steel frame with infill walls on all four sides at the upper level and on three sides at the lower level. The steel wide-flange columns hinged at the top and bottom from inertial loads, causing several feet of interstory drift. The structure had been deemed a complete collapse and was scheduled for demolition shortly after our visit. It was reported that the largest Pakmaya plant, located in Diizce, had no serious damage and was operational after the August 17, 1999, earthquake. Diizcewas hit by another strong earthquake (M7.2) on November 12, 1999. PHILIPS INCANDESCENT BULB FACTORY The Philips factory just east of Izmit makes incandescent lightbulbs. The plant was expected to be operational in two weeks. They reported minor damage, including the following: Some minor structural damage to buildings, such as a cracked chimney and cracks between the infill walls and beam-columns in the office building + Cracking at the base of the water tower + Some equipment alignment problems, which were fixed by their own staff in one weekend + Falling of several gas cylinders + Falling of boxes and palletsIndustrial Facilities Figure 14.76. Control room monitors fell at Pakmaya (Gayle Johnson). 341 Figure 14.75. Skid beams buckled and shifted due to displacement of large bioreactors at Pakmaya food processing plant (Gayle Johnson) Figure 14.77. Original placement of fallen monitors in Pakmaya control room (Gayle Johason). Figure 14.78. Fallen wall panels at Pakmaya food processing plant (Gayle Johnson).STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES Figure 14.79. Top Fallen walls and damaged steel penthouse building at Pakmaya food processing plant (Gavie Johnson). Figure 14.80, Left View of large displacements on steel penthouse at Pakmaya (Halil Sezen) Figure 14.81. Above Columns on steel structure at Pakmaya hinged top and bottom, causing several feet of interstory drift (Halil Sezen).343 BASTAS FLUORESCENT BULB FACTORY Bastas is a joint-venture company with Philips that manufactures fluorescent lightbulbs. The facility is located next door to Philips and shares a main gate. Bastas was operating during the earthquake. The factory received power from its emerg generators immediately after the earthquake. There was no structural damage to the facility: however, it was shut down because of damage to equipment, The main problem encountered at Bastas was with the glass furnace. The furnace is supported onan unanchored steel frame, and it moved about | to2 cm. A fan tipped but continued to operate. Compressed air was lost to the furnace when a valve was damaged on a temperature control rack. Because of the change in the fuel-air mixture, the furnace was unable to maintain its normal operating temperature of 1,500°C. The molten glass froze in the lines and brickwork was damaged. ney Figure 14.82. View of Philips incandescent lightbulty factory Gayle Johnson. Figure 14.83. Above Several gas cylinders {eil at Philips lightbulb factory (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.84. Lefi Water tower had cracks at base (Gayle Johnson)344 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES A special “tube” in the glass furnace was deformed and required replacement, This tube had to be ordered from Holland and was expected to arrive in six to eight weeks. Because of the critical nature of this item, the entire plant had to be shut down until it could be replaced. HABAS LIQUEFIED GAS PLANT The Habas plant in Izmit provides liquefied gases to commercial plants and medical facilities. The major damage observed at Habas was the collapse of two large storage tanks Three identical 48-ft.-diameter tanks built in 1995 consisted of stainless steel shells wi interior diameter of 42 ft. The tanks were each supported on a 42-in.-deep reinforced concrete platform, with 16 reinforced concrete columns, 20 in, in diameter and 100 in. tall. Two of the three tanks were filled with liquid oxygen at the time of the earthquake, Their column supports were not strong enough to resist lateral loads induced by the earthquake under high axial load, leading to collapse of the entire support frame in a brittle manner. an Figure 14.85. View of Bastas fluorescent bulb factory (Gavle Johnson). Figure 14.86 Unanchored fan at Bastas tipped, but continued to operate (Gayle Johnson).Industrial Facilities 345 The identical third tank immediately adjacent to the collapsed tanks was reportedly one quarter full of liquid nitrogen and had no apparent damage. c T MANUFACTURING PLANT Citi has a small manufacturing plant in Izmit that produces glass containers for the pha tical industry. The plant was shut down because of structural damage to the building. Equipment appeared to be undamaged, although supplies and products were toppled in several areas of the plant. Some infill walls were cracked and fell down in the part of the plant where offices were located maceu- Figure 14.87. Three identical tanks at Habas. Tanks at left were full of liquid oxygen, Third tank to right was apparently 1/4 full of liquid nitrogen and did not collapse (Gayle Johnson). Figure 14.88, Tanks at Habas collapsed due to failure of reinforced concrete columns and support base, Support structure was built in 1995 (Gavle Johnson).346 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES TOPRAK ILIC PHARMACEUTICAL PLANT The Toprak Hic pharmaceutical plant is located in Adapazari, near the Toyota plant. in a group of buildings connected by enclosed walkways. Overhead piping in the walkways reportedly was damaged. The most severe damage observed was a collapse of several high storage racks in the warehouse At least two racks completely collapsed, one falling into and severing a diagonal steel brace Facility staff also reported that chemicals in wall cabinets had fallen to the floor in the laboratory and mixed together, causing “minor” toxic release problems. The plant was expected to take about two months to return to full operation: it was reported that some units were ready for operation already. However, cight days after the earthquake they did not have a water supply with good enough quality for production. Figure 14.89, Collapse of storage racks at Toprak Llie pharmaceutical plant in Adapazari (Gayle Johnson).Industrial Facilities 347 TOPRAK SAGLIK PAPER PRODUCTS PLANT The Toprak Saglik paper products plant is located in Adapazari immediately adjacent to the pharmaceutical plant, This plant employs about 170 people and operates 24 hours per day. with three shifts. The plant is only about five or six years old, the warehouse about two years old. Damage at this facility included the following + Falling of unanchored electrical cabinets + Movement of machinery + Cracks in the 2.5-meter buried reinforced concrete water tank and spilling of water + Falling of stacked rolls of product in several storage buildings + Falling of a small unanchored vessel on legs in the pump room + Damage and separation of interior walls + Damaged exterior wall panels and glazing + Damage to one of the columns that is part of the lateral load carrying system on the north side of the facility CAMLICA SOFT DRINK The Camlica soft drink company is located in a recently constructed plant next to a major highway east of Adapazari. The plant is composed of several three-bay prefabricated frames. Due to pounding of different frames in the longitudinal direction and excessive deformations in the shorter direction, some of the roof panels distorted, fell down, or popped out, Roof panels were composed ofa polyurethane layer (a foamlike material) sandwiched between two light steel plates Part of the roof and wall fell down and caused some damage in the comer of the structure where soft drinks were stored. Figure 14,90. Unanchored electrical cabinets Figure 14.91. Stacked rolls of product toppled fell at Toprak Sagliks paper products plant in throughout the storage area at Toprak Sagliks Adapazari (Gayle Johnson) paper products plant (Gayle Johnson).348 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES CAP TILE The Cap textile facility is located 3 km west of Akyazi. to the east of Adapazari. The facility was composed of two similar three-bay prefabricated concrete structures with 16 columns, typically 6 meters high with the stronger axis perpendicular to the longitudinal direction. One of the plants collapsed during the carthquake, apparently a progressive collapse starting with failure of a few frames at one end, Almost all the columns in the other plant had plastic hinges at the base, causing a substantial amount of damage, including large permanent drift. collapsed walls on the sides, and fallen roof panels. The site is located on soft alluvium with rivers on both sides of the facility about 500 meters apart, Liquefaction and lateral spreading observed between the facility and the river suggests that soil conditions underneath the facility significantly contributed to the destruction of this plant. Figure 14.92. One of two identica buildings at Cap textile plant (Halil Sezeny. Figure 14.93. One building at Cap textile plant completely collapsed (Halil Sezen) Figure 14.94. plant had hinging of columns, large permanent drift, collapsed walls and fallen roof panels (HalilIndustrial Facilities 349 NUH BETON The NUH Beton conerete batch plantis located in the Késekdy industrial area near many ofthe other industrial facilities visited. The facility had been in operation for about two years before the earthquake One ofthe 150-tonne cement tanks lost its contents due toa break in the piping atthe base. A second tank was damaged but still funetional, allowing the business fo continue operating. NUH has decided to rebuild both tanks, with reconstruction of the first tank under way at the time of the site visit Figure 14,95. One of two 150-tonne cement tanks at the NUH Beton conet Késekdy (Mark Aschheim) re 14,96, Support frame for cement tanks, batch plant in Braces are bent (Mark Aschheim). Figure 14.97. Damaged base of 150-tonne cement tank (Mark Aschheim) Figure 14.98. One 150-tonne cement tank being rebuilt at NUH Beton (Mark Aschheim).350 STRUCTURES AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES SUMMARY The epicentral area contains a high percentage of Turkey’s industry. As might be expected, the industrial facilities in the region generally had higher levels of engineering and much better construction quality control than the residential and commercial construction. However, damage was much more severe and extensive than seen in earthquakes with similar peak ground acceleration levels, with numerous examples of extended business interruption. Based on the type of structures damaged and the nature of the damage, itis likely that the long period motion and duration of the earthquake were major contributors to the extent of damage. This earthquake has pointed out many situations that might be encountered and hazards that might be faced during earthquakes of this magnitude, such as emergency response, human response, fires, oil spills, and toxic releases in addition to fundamental issues of structural and nonstructural damage. As additional information is gathered and studied from these facilities, lessons learned will be directly applicable to industrial facilities in other seismic regions of the world, including the United States. CHAPTER CONTRIBUTORS Gayle S. Johnson EQE International Mark Aschheim University of Minois Halil Sezen University of California, Berkeley