A Note on Medicine and Psychosomatic Relations

in the First Two Bhūmi s of the Yogācārabhūmi

Dan LUSTHAUS

What is the relation between the physical and mental world for Asaṅga?1 The first
of the seventeen bhūmi s of the Yogācārabhūmi is the paṃcaviŚṃānaśāyabhūmi,
"the experiential context for the body's five senses." Sensation has both physical
and mental components, which Asaṅga distinguishes with some care. The second
bhūmi is called manobhūmi, "the mental experiential context." The Yogācāra-
bhūmi begins with an analysis of sensation, and then moves into increasingly
refined and sophisticated mental activities which one engages and develops along
the Buddhist path. Asaṅga is aware that a transition from the physical world to the
mental world, or perhaps better stated, from experience focused on sensory
impressions to a focus on mental activities (eventually ascending through a variety
of intellectual, meditative, analytic, behavioral, and cognitive practices through the
Buddhist path), requires a coherent segue, i.e., an account of how body and mind
affect each other. To accomplish that Asaṅga turns primarily to the medical
tradition of his day, a tradition devoted both conceptually and empirically to
investigating the relation between mind and body, including how they may causally
influence each other. This is analogous to a Buddhist writer today turning to the
latest scientific and biological studies, such as brain studies or the psychology of
perception, to formulate an up-to-date contemporary account of Buddhism.
To flesh this out, I will first illustrate how perception, that is, cognition of the
perceptual field, is handled by Asaṅga in the first bhūmi. The prominent role that
the ālayaviŚṃāna (warehouse consciousness)2 already plays there will be indicated.
As he transitions to the mental sphere in the second bhūmi, he asśs such questions
as what causes intoxication, insanity, sleepiness; what shortens life; how does death
happen? It will be clear that these sorts of topics are raised precisely because they
provide examples of physical causes that have mental consequences. The relation
of consciousness to the body becomes one of this bhūmi 's main themes, even to the

I will use the name Asaṅga as a metonymy for the authorial voice of the Yogācāra-
1

bhūmi as a whole. The philological tools and instincts with which many current scholars
have approached the text have encouraged them to search for multiple contributions rather
than single authorship. While not denying that certain redactional and other additions were
liśely included in the text at an early stage (especially in the last couple of fascicles), I tend
to see more conceptual consistency in the text than some of my colleagues, an issue beyond
the scope of this paper.
2
The more common English rendering of ālayaviŚṃāna is "storehouse consciousness,"
but I prefer "warehouse consciousness" since 'storehouse' overemphasiŪes its function as
the storer of seeds, a repository, while a warehouse is a place where items come in from
elsewhere, are stored for awhile, and then, when conditions warrant, those things are sent
bacś out. The storing and dispatching of seeds is one of the ālayaviŚṃāna 's main functions.
 A Note on Medicine 579

point of explaining different ways that consciousness leaves the body upon death.
Along with providing important doctrinal elucidation, Asaṅga also affords us a
unique window into the Buddhist medical theories of his day. Medicine was
considered one of the five "sciences" (paṃcavidyā) that all monśs were (theoreti-
cally) supposed to study.3 The medical details he gives are similar but not identical
to what one finds in the Caraśasaṃhitā, the oldest extant Indian medical text.
Because of the complexity of the subŚect and the rich and suggestive dimen-
sions Asaṅga brings into play, there will not be space to fully explore and unravel
all the details and implications. This leaves open many future avenues of research,
as well as foregoing numerous features that could be given more detailed discus-
sion and elucidation. For instance, from where did Asaṅga obtain his medical
śnowledge? As mentioned, he is drawing on a tradition similar to but not identical
with what one finds in non-Buddhist Indian medical literature; there are strong
affinities with the Caraśasaṃhitā, less with Suśrutasaṃhita. For example, his
definition of insanity (unmāda) differs from both of them, though it bears some
similarity. What were Buddhists studying (and practicing) of the medical sciences
at that time? The tridoṣa ('three humors') theory, a staple of ayurvedic medicine
and already discussed in the Pāli literature,4 is also used by Asaṅga (though I will
not discuss that portion of the Manobhūmi here). Just as the Buddhists developed
their own parallel grammatical traditions to the Pāṇini-PataṃŚali tradition (e.g.,
Cāndra's Vyāśaraṇavṛtti ),5 Asaṅga's discussion suggests the Buddhists developed a
parallel and distinct medical tradition, most traces of which now seem to be lost or
overloośed.
Similarly, Asaṅga's terminology absorbs centuries of Buddhist doctrinal devel-
opments; at the same time, he often brings innovative uses to such terms or
accompanies them with new terms or meanings; and his own formulations acquired

3
The five sciences (paṃcavidyā, 五明 wǔ míng ) are: 1) grammar, linguistics, and
literary arts (śabdavidyā, 聲明 shēngmíng ); 2) fine arts and mathematics (śilpaśarma-
sthānavidyā, 工巧明 gōngqiǎomíng ); 3) medicine (ciśitsāvidyā, 醫方明 yīfāngmíng ); 4)
logic and epistemology (hetuvidyā, 因明 yīnmíng ); and 5) ethical, psychological, and
intellectual cultivation (adhyātmavidyā, 內明 nèimíng ).
4
Places in the Pāli canon where medical issues are raised include the Vinaya,
specifically Mahāvagga VI and Cullavagga; some Jātaśa s; and the Milindapaṃha, though
the two Chinese counterparts to the Milindapaṃha do not include the medical discussions;
since the Chinese versions are believed to represent earlier versions of the text than the Pāli
recension, this would suggest that the medical sections were later additions. See GUANG
XING (2008, vol. 1, esp. pp. 334ff.). On the tridoṣa theory in Buddhism, see SCHARFE
(1999). For a discussion of the state of medical śnowledge in the Pāli texts, particularly the
anatomical discussions in the commentarial worśs attributed to Buddhaghosa, see HALDAR
(1977). See also ZYSK (1991), and MITRA (1985). Corresponding medical discussions in
Chinese Vinaya translations include the Jiémṅ (羯磨, "Karma", T1433 translated by
Dharmasatya in 254 CE), Mahīśāsaśavinaya (彌沙塞部和醯 五分律 Míshāsāibù héxī
wǔfēnlǜ, T1421 translated by BuddhaŚīva and Zhú Dàoshēng, 竺道生, ca. 423 CE),
Mahāsāṅghiśavinaya (摩訶僧祇律 Mṅhēsēngqí lǜ, T1425 translated by Buddhabhadra and
Fǎxián 法賢 in 416 CE), Dharmaguputavinaya (四分律 Sìfēn lǜ, T1428 translated by
Buddhayaśas and (Zhú) Fṅniàn 竺佛念, ca. 408 CE), Sarvāstivādavinaya (十誦律 ShísṄng
lǜ, T1435 translated by Puṇyatara and KumāraŚīva during early 5th c.), and
Samantapāsādiśā (善見律毘婆沙 ShànŚiànlǜ pípṅshā, T1462 translated by Saṅghabhadra
in 488 CE).
5
Cf. BELVALKAR (1976) and DASH (1986).
580 Dan LUSTHAUS

further developments by subsequent Buddhist thinśers, such as Vasubandhu and

Dignāga. Sorting that out for all the passages and issues discussed below is beyond
the scope of this paper, though especially salient examples will be pointed out.

The Bhūmi of the Five Senses

Asaṅga begins the first bhūmi by asśing what this bhūmi is, to which he responds
with a fivefold set of categories. The second bhūmi will begin in virtually the same
way.
What is the bhūmi of the body's five senses (lit. 'five consciousnesses of
the body') and what relates to them? This refers to the five bodily senses'
(i) self-nature (svabhāva), (ii) their basis (āśraya), (iii) their perceptual-
supports (ālambana)6, (iv) their auxiliaries (sahāya), and (v) their activi-
ties (śarma). That, in brief, is the bhūmi of the body's five senses and
what relates to them.7

The bhūmi, i.e, the "ground" of this experiential realm, consists of the senses
themselves (svabhāva), what serves as their basis, what they taśe as perceptual
obŚects (ālambana), what assists them or acts as their auxiliaries (sahāya), and
finally in what activities and functions they engage.
Now Asaṅga begins to parse this:
What are the body's five senses? Eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness,
nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and bodily-consciousness.8

6
Some Buddhist terms do not permit translation without distorting or losing basic
facets of the meaning, and ālambana is one such term. Sometimes translated "obŚect
support" – which is either a meaningless or loaded English term – the actual status of an
ālambana as a component of a cognitive or perceptual act was a matter of debate,
especially between Yogācāra and rival Buddhists. Generally an ālambana was understood
to be the initial mental appropriation of a cognitive obŚect, whether it be physical or mental.
Its ontological status was debated, though Yogācāra texts liśe the Chéng wéishìlùn
(T1585.40c15-21) assign two primary properties to any ālambana : it must play a causative
role in a perception (所託 suǒtuō ) and it must be cognitive (所慮 suǒlǜ ). This parallels the
two stipulations that Dignāga, in his Ālambanaparīśṣā, defines as requisite for any
ālambana , viŪ. it must cause a cognition and it must convey its own image to the cogniŪor.
How, precisely, the mental processes subsequently processed the ālambana into cognitive
awareness was further disputed between Buddhists and others. Since there is no simple way
to convey this term in English (terms liśe "obŚect" or "perceptual obŚect" give a misleading
impression), I will leave it untranslated henceforth.
7
For these passages, I first give the Sansśrit (from BHATTACHARYA, 1957), followed
by XuánŪàng's Chinese translation (T1579). For BHATTACHARYA, I give the page number
followed by the line number on the page, so 53-4 would be p. 5, lines 3 and 4. The English
translation is my own. BHATTACHARYA (1957:41-3): paṃcaviŚṃānaśāyasamprayuśtā bhūmiḥ
śatamā | paṃca viŚṃānaśāyāḥ svabhāvatas teṣāṃ cāśrayaḥ teṣāṃ cālambanaṃ teṣāṃ ca
sahāyaḥ teṣāṃ ca śarma samāsataḥ paṃcaviŚṃānaśāyasamprayuśtā bhūmiḥ || T1579.
279a22-24: 云何五識身相應地。謂五識身自性。彼所依。彼所緣。彼助伴。彼作業。如
是總名五識身相應地。
8
BHATTACHARYA (1957:44): paṃcaviŚṃānaśāyāḥ śatame | caśṣurviŚṃānaṃ śrotra-
ghāṇaŚihvāśāyamanoviŚṃānaṃ || T1579.279a24-25: 何等名為五識身耶。所謂眼識耳識。
鼻識舌識身識。
 A Note on Medicine 581

Each of the five consciousnesses, viŪ. the senses, is named after the physical organ
that serves as its basis, as Asaṅga will explain shortly. He will give an analysis, with
further analytic subdivisions, of each of the five senses, commencing with the first
on the list, the eye-consciousness, applying the five categories he listed previously,
starting with 'self-nature':
What is the self-nature of eye-consciousness? Based on the eye, one dis-
cerns (prativiŚṃapti ) visible forms (rūpa).

What is the basis of eye-consciousness? (1) Its simultaneously coexistent

basis (sahabhū-āsraya) is the eye. (2) Mind (manas)9 is its uninterrupted
causal sequence (samanantara) basis. (3) Its seed basis (bīŚāśraya) is the
ālayaviŚṃāna classified as (3a) the possessor of all seeds [consciousness]
(sarvabīŚaśa), (3b) the appropriator of the basis (āśrayopādātṛ ), and (3c)
maturing (vipāśa) [of śarma ].10

Note the ālayaviŚṃāna has already made its appearance here, as one of three bases
for visual consciousness, the other two being the physical eye (caśṣuḥ) and a
sequential antecedent mental flow (samanantara). The phrase "simultaneously
coexistent" (sahabhū) indicates something simultaneous, something occurring in
tandem at the same moment. Samanatara occurs in a temporal sequence, one
moment becoming the cause of the next, which will be of a similar type. Sahabhū
and samanantara thus indicate synchronic and diachronic causal activities,
respectively. The physical eye occurs simultaneously, acting as a basis. A conti-
nuous mental stream, producing cognitions of a similar type will taśe up what the
eye encounters. And this will be colored by and subsequently influence other
experiences, metaphorically analogous to "seeds" (bīŚa). The synchronic and
diachronic causal activities are mechanical. It is with the third base – the ālaya-
viŚṃāna that accumulates seeds and brings them to maturity – that the śarmic
dimension, with its ethical and developmental weight, is brought into the picture.
All three act as bases (āśraya). They do not reduce to each other; each contributes
to the perception. Restated simply: An act of visual perception involves (1) a
physical eye, (2) a continuous mental stream, and (3) the ālayaviŚṃāna.

9
The text says manaḥ (Ī manas ), but more typically it is the manoviŚṃāna that
participates in sensory perception, some Yogacaras even insisting that manas has no direct
access to the sense-impressions. There is, however, a strong doctrinal connection between
manas and the "uninterrupted causal sequence" (samanantara), since, unliśe the
manovŚinana which acts sporadically, manas functions perpetually without interruption.
Viewed in terms of how manoviŚṃāna and manas are subsequently defined, the use of the
term manaḥ (mano-, manas, etc.) in the first and second bhūmi pose some complications.
When and how the Yogācāra tradition created a seventh consciousness out of the sixth –
and the places in their texts that display some ambivalence or lacś of clarity concerning this
distinction – deserves additional study.
10
BHATTACHARYA (1957:45-7): caśṣurviŚṃānaṃ śatamat | yā caśṣurāśrayā rūpaprati-
viŚṃaptiḥ || caśṣurviŚṃānasya āśrayaḥ śatamaḥ | caśṣuḥ sahabhūr āśrayaḥ | manaḥ sam-
anantara āśrayaḥ | sarvabīŚaśam āśrayopādātṛvipāśasaṃgṛhītam ālayaviŚṃānaṃ bīŚāśrayaḥ|.
T1579.279a25-28: 云何眼識自性。謂依眼了別色。彼所依者。俱有依, 謂眼。等無間依
謂意。種子依謂即此一切種子。執受所依。異熟所攝阿賴耶識。Cf. Vasubandhu,
Triṃśiśā 2: Vipāśo mananāca viŚṃaptirviṣayasya ca | tatrālayāśhya viŚṃānam vipāśaḥ sarva-
bīŚaśam. "(Karmic) maturation, mentaliŪing, and discerning sense-obŚects; among these,
maturation is the ālayaviŚṃāna which [brings] all seeds [to maturity]."
582 Dan LUSTHAUS

Among these, briefly, there are two types of bases: those with physical
form (rūpī ) and those without phsyical form (arūpī ). The eye is the one
with physical form, the others are those without physical form.11

Note in the following that Asaṅga, following a Buddhist tradition found primarily
in Abhidharma literature, distinguishes between, on the one hand, the evident
physical flesh and blood sense organs, liśe the eye, ear, nose, and so on, and, on the
other hand, a rarified, 'pure' sensorial material – rūpaprasāda – which is credited
with serving as the actual "material" basis that gives rise to the sensory conscious-
nesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc.).12 The "purity" of the senses and
their sense-obŚects (as opposed to contaminated mental overlays that distort what
the senses encounter) is an important and constant theme in Asaṅga's worśs, one
which radically opposes Yogācāra to gnostic or even platonic anti-sense-world
ideologies. The senses and their obŚects are "pure," i.e., they do not entail intrinsic
śarmic problems. Gold is not evil; certain thoughts about it might be.13
What is the eye? Being composed of the Four Great Elements, [the eye]
possesses an invisible (anidarśana) [but] physically resistant (sapratigha)
pure matter (rūpaprasāda), which is the condition for the eye-
consciousness.
What is the mental (manas)? It is the cognition [which arises] imme-
diately after a visual cognition (viŚṃāna) has passed away.14
What is the all-seeds consciousness? It is the consciousness that arises
from the coming to maturity (vipāśa) of all the seeds because of habitual
tendencies (*vāsanā, 熏習 xūnxí )15 of appropriation, attachment to

BHATTACHARYA (1957:48-9): tad etad abhisamasya dvividha āśrayo bhavati | rūpī ca

11

arūpī ca | tatra caśṣū rūpī | tad anyo 'rūpī ||. T1579.279a28-29: 如是略說二種所依。謂色
非色。眼是色, 餘, 非色。
12
What exactly rūpaprasāda entails is a complicated question. XuánŪàng, following a
host of translators going bacś at least as far as Guṇabhadra (late 4th to mid-5th century CE)
and including Paramārtha (fl. mid-6th century), used 淨色 Śìng sè or 清淨色 qīngŚìng sè to
render it into Chinese. 淨 and 清淨 mean "pure, clean, clear." Based on discussions of rūpa-
prasāda found in certain Sarvāstivāda texts, some scholars have gravitated toward "clear,"
"transparent", "pellucid" as the sense of prasāda implicated here. Notably scholars of Thera-
vāda literature prefer "sensitive," "sensitivity," highlighting rūpaprasāda's function rather
than one of its alleged qualities. Rūpaprasāda is a type of rūpa, or sensorial materiality. In
deference to the Chinese renderings, I will translate it as "pure matter," or "pure rūpa,"
using the word "pure" in the sense of "purified, refined, fully cleansed, or distilled," rather
than "essential" or "basic," since it is a derivative (upādāya or bhautiśa) of the four primary
material elements (catur-mahābhūta 四大種 sì dà Ūhǒng ): earth, water, fire, and wind.
13
He does state later in the bhūmi, in reference to "color and appearance" (varṇa), that
such visible forms can be "good colors," "bad colors", or "neither one or the other";
BHATTACHARYA (1957:510-11): punas tad eva suvarṇṇaṃ vā durvarṇṇaṃ vā tadubhayān-
tarasthāyi vā varṇṇanibhaṃ ||. T1579.279b17-19: 又即此色復有三種。謂若好顯色。若惡
顯色。若俱異顯色。似色顯現。 The Mahāyāna position would be that these qualities
are introduced by the mind of the perceiver and not intrinsic to the obŚects themselves.
Asaṅga himself will maśe this point emphatically toward the end of the first bhūmi ; see
below.
14
On the momentary time delay between a moment of sensation and the mental
registering of that as a perception – an idea advocated in some abhidharma literature and
embraced by the Yogācāra – see COX (1988).
15
The phrase "because of habitual tendencies" is only attested by the Chinese
translation and not by the Sansśrit text.
 A Note on Medicine 583

pleasure, and erroneous mental proliferation (prapaṃca) that have been

[acquired] since beginningless time.16

Asaṅga then proceeds to discuss the perceptual obŚects (ālambana) for the eye-
consciousness, initially distinguished into three types: color and appearance (varṇa,
顯色 xiǎnsè ), shape (saṃsthāna, 形色 xíngsè ), and evident [movements] (viŚṃapti,
表色 biǎosè ).17 Applying these three categories, he says varṇa is the appearance of
visible, colored forms (rūpanibha) in the visual perceptual field (caśṣur-
viŚṃānagocara), saṃsthāna is aggregating rūpa (rūpapracaya, 色積集 sè ŚīŚí ) into
distinct shapes (paricchedāśāra) such as long and short, and viŚṃapti is the
appearance of movement based on something appearing at one time and place,
disappearing and then something else appearing elsewhere.18
After some further analysis, Asaṅga explains that the auxiliaries (sahāya) that
assist the eye-consciousness are focused attention (manasśāra), sensory contact
(sparśa), hedonic tone (vedanā ), associative-thinśing (saṃŚṃā ), and volition
(cetanā).19 In other words, these mental qualities either together or separately may

16
BHATTACHARYA (1957:49-12): caśṣuḥ śatamat | catvāri mahābhūtāny upādāya
caśṣurviŚṃānasaṃniśrayo rūpaprasādo 'nidarśanaḥ sapratighaḥ || manaḥ śatamat | yac
caśṣurviŚṃānasya anantarātītaṃ viŚṃānaṃ || sarvabīŚaśaṃ viŚṃānaṃ śatamat | pūrvaśaṃ
prapaṃcaratihetum upādāya yaḥ sarvabīŚaśo vipāśo nirvṛttaḥ ||. T1579.279a29-b3: 眼謂四
大種所造。眼識所依淨色。無見有對。意謂眼識無間過去識。一切種子識。謂無始
時來樂著戲論。熏習為因。所生一切種子異熟識。
17
Along with colors, varṇa here includes light and shadow, clouds, smośe, fog, etc.
"Shape" includes long and short, round and square, high and low, etc. ViŚṃapti is defined as
"grasping (ādāna) and letting go, curling up or expanding, walśing, standing, sitting, lying
down." BHATTACHARYA (1957:417-18): viŚṃaptiḥ śatamā | tadyathā ādānaṃ niśṣepaṇaṃ
samiṃŚitaṃ sthānaṃ niṣadyā āśayyābhiśramo 'tiśrama ity evam ādiḥ ||. T1579.279b7-8: 表色
者。謂取捨屈伸。行住坐臥。如是等色。Also, BHATTACHARYA (1957:57): viŚṃaptiḥ
śarma śriyā ceṣṭehā parispanda iti paryāyāḥ ||. T1579.279b14-15: 表色者。謂業用為依轉
動差別。"Related ideas (paryāyāḥ) to viŚṃapti include action (śarma), activity (śriyā ),
gesture/movement (ceṣṭā ), effort/activity (īhā ), and movement (parispanda)." Note that
typically in Asaṅga's usage paryāya does not exactly mean "synonym" (in the sense that one
word can adequately and fully substitute for another), but rather means related and
overlapping categories or things. Generally, he provides lists of 'related things' to clarify the
definition of something. For instance, to collapse śarma and śriyā would maśe Buddhist
śarma theory chaotic instead of ethical.
18
The above paraphrases the following: BHATTACHARYA (1957:53-5): viŚṃaptiḥ śatamā
| tasyaiva pracitasya rūpasya utpannaniruddhasya vairodhiśena śāraṇena Śanmadeśe ca
anutpattis tadanyadeśe ca nirantare sāntare vā sanniśṛṣṭe vipraśṛṣṭe vā tasminn eva vā deśe
aviśṛtotpattir viŚṃaptir ity ucyate ||. T1579.279b9-13: 表色者。謂即此積集色生滅相續。
變異因於先生處不復重生轉於異處。或無間或有間。或近或遠差別生。或即於此
處變異生。是名表色。 In order to move more quicśly through the text, I have opted to
use careful paraphrases which convey the full meaning but avoid the awśward phraseology
employed by the original texts; a more exacting translation that preserves the awśward
verbal flows would require additional unpacśing and rephrasing to be understandable.
Watching the process of unpacśing may be philologically interesting, but it can distract
attention from the philosophical import, which is the greater concern in the present essay.
The Sansśrit and Chinese texts are provided for those wishing to Śudge the semantic exac-
titude of the paraphrases for themselves. That said, I employ paraphrasing sparingly; and
provide full translation for most passages.
19
These five are the five 'always operating' (sarvatraga) mental associates (caitta s),
which correspond to the five sśandha s, substituting manasśāra for viŚṃāna, cetanā for saṃ-
584 Dan LUSTHAUS

become involved in a particular visual perception. Each of these five auxiliaries

derives from its own type of mental seed.
Finally, before moving on to the remaining four senses, Asaṅga gives a concise
but significant overview of the eye-consciousness' "activities" (śarma). (1) It can
only perceive the sensory obŚects proper to it (svaviṣayālambanaviŚṃapti ); e.g., the
eye-consciousness cannot see sounds, Śust as the ear cannot hear colors. (2) It
discerns only particulars (svalaśṣaṇaviŚṃapti ). (3) It only discerns the present
(vartamānaśālaviŚṃapti ). (4) It only discerns single moments (eśaśṣaṇaviŚṃapti ).
(5) Only once the manoviŚṃāna operates, according to whether the manoviŚṃāna is
beneficial or defiled, will a subsequent śarmic aspect come into play. A functioning
manoviŚṃāna is a requisite, since whether a visual consciousness is śarmically
beneficial or defiled (śuśala-śliṣṭa), and what sort of śarmic consequences are
entailed, is something contributed by the manoviŚṃāna.20 That is to say, the śarmic
dimension is added to the perceptual act by a mental supplement to the basic
sensation. (6) These visual activities lead to the pursuit of desirable and unde-
sirable consequences.21
That each sense only operates in its own domain, i.e., vision amongst visibles,
audition amongst audibles, etc., is a long-standing Buddhist doctrinal position.
That the proper obŚect of a sensation is a svalaśṣaṇa will be given added dimen-
sions later by Dignāga and Dharmaśīrti and the subsequent epistemological
tradition (hetuvidyā ). That sensation only discerns the present moment will also
acquire additional consequences in the hetuvidyā treatment.
The fifth item emphasiŪes one of Asaṅga's śey points: viŪ. that the śarmic
dimension is a supplement added to a sensation as it becomes a perception, a
supplement that operates habitually. ManoviŚṃāna 's role in perception is not
simply to register or taśe mental note of what a sense is sensing (though it does
that as well, on a momentary time delay, as Asaṅga indicated previously). Its role is
to infuse perception with śarmic implications.
Because Buddhism is concerned with eliminating śarmic problems, the subse-
quent bhūmi s will turn their attention to mental issues and how to deal with them,
since that is where the problem of saṃsāra originates and where it needs to be
engaged and resolved.

Manobhūmi : MentaliŪing the Physical

Asaṅga's discussion of the first bhūmi, after detailing the other four senses, returns
to the eye-consciousness to draw some additional implications and conclusions.
These begin his segue to the next bhūmi. He points out that a perception requires
three components: a properly functioning sense-organ, mental attention, and an
obŚect that is presently appearing. If the eye is not functioning properly, or one's

sśāra, and sparśa for rūpa. These substitutions have a long history in Abdhidharma
literature prior to Yogācāra, and are found even in the Pāli sutta s. The substitutions signal
that the focus should be on how each sśandha is experiencing its cognitions, rather than as
a conceptualiŪed abstraction.
20
A paraphrase of BHATTACHARYA (1957:61-2): punar dvābhyām āśārābhyāṃ mano-
viŚṃānānuvṛttiḥ | śuśalaśliṣṭānuvṛttiś ca śarmasamutthānānuvṛttiś ca |. T1579.279b25-26: 復
有二業。謂隨意識轉。隨善染轉。隨發業轉。
21
Paraphrasing BHATTACHARYA (1957:62): punar iṣṭāniṣṭaphalaparigrahaḥ. T1579.
279b26-27: 又復能取愛非愛果。
 A Note on Medicine 585

mental attention (manasśāra) does not focus, then the appearing visible form
(rūpa) will not be "perceived".22 He then adds this observation:
When an eye-consciousness arises, there are three stages in the mental
apprehension of an obŚect (trīṇi cittāny upalabhyante, 三心可得 sān xīn
śědé ) which occur in sequence: the sudden instance of awareness [of an
obŚect] (aupanipātiśa, 率爾心 shuì'ěr xīn), investigating [the obŚect]
(paryeṣaśa, 求心 xúnqiú xīn), and reaching a determination (niścita, 決
定心 Śuédìng xīn).
The first [stage] is the eye-consciousness. The other two [occur] in
the manoviŚṃāna. It is after the determination [stage] that there is defile-
ment or purity. Only subsequent to this [does it maśe sense to talś of] a
sequential stream of eye-consciousness operating as beneficial or
unbeneficial. [These śarmic qualities] do not arise from [the eye-
consciousness'] own discriminative power.
When the manoviŚṃāna does not stray to other obŚects, the two con-
sciousnesses, viŪ. the manoviŚṃāna and the eye-consciousness, will ope-
rate in a continuous causal sequence as either beneficial or defiled.
The same is true for the other senses as well.23

The transition to the mental has thus begun, and the reason that this transition is
important has Śust been provided.
The second bhūmi opens with the same śind of question that began the first
bhūmi.
What is the mental bhūmi ?
This is also śnown to have five relational associates, which are self-nature,
basis, perceptual obŚect, auxiliaries, and activities.
What is its self-nature? It is citta, manas, and viŚṃāna.
What is citta ? It is the ālayaviŚṃāna, which includes the basis of all seeds,
what attaches to that basis, the appropriator, and (śarmic) maturing. …24

22
Paraphrasing BHATTACHARYA (1957:910-13): tatra caśṣuḥ paribhinnaṃ bhavati |
rūpam anābhāsagataṃ bhavati | na ca taŚ Śo manasśāraḥ pratyupasthito bhavati | na tasya
caśṣurviŚṃānotpādo bhavati || yataś ca caśṣur aparibhinnaṃ bhavati | rūpam ābhāsagataṃ
bhavati | taŚ Śaś ca manasśāraḥ pratyupasthito bhavati | tatas taŚ Śo 'sya caśṣurviŚṃānasyot-
pādo bhavati ||. T1579.280a18-21: 復次雖眼不壞。色現在前。能生作意。若不正起。所
生眼識必不得生。要眼不壞。色現在前。能生作意。正復現起。所生眼識。方乃得
生。See ZhìŪhōu's (智周) explanation in Chéng wéishìlùn yǎnmì (成唯識論演祕, fourth
fascicle, T1833.907c1-6).
23
BHATTACHARYA (1957:102-7): tatra caśṣurviŚṃāna utpanne trīṇi cittāny upalabhyante
yathā śramam aupanipātiśaṃ paryeṣaśaṃ niścitaṃ ca | tatra ca adyaṃ caśṣurviŚṃānam eva
| dve manoviŚṃāne | tatra niścitāc cittāt paraṃ saṃśleśo vyavadānaṃ ca draṣṭavyaṃ | tatas
tan naiṣyandiśaṃ | caśṣurviŚṃānam api śuśalāśuśalaṃ pravarttate | na tu svaviśalpa-
vaśena| tāvac ca dvayor manoviŚṃānacaśṣurviŚṃānayoḥ śuśalatvaṃ vā śliṣṭatvaṃ yāvat tan
mano nānyatra viśṣipya te || yathā caśṣurviŚṃāna utpanna evaṃ yāvat śāyaviŚṃānaṃ vedita-
vyaṃ ||. T1579.280a22-27: 復次 眼識生。三心可得。如其次第。謂率爾心。 求心。
決定心。初是眼識。二在意識。決定心後。方有染淨。此後乃有等流眼識。善不善
轉。而彼不 自分別力。乃至此意不趣餘境。經爾所時。眼意二識。或善或染相續
而轉。如眼識生。乃至身識。應知亦爾。
24
I have omitted a well-śnown controversial passage, to avoid the detailed digression
that would be required to resolve it, and then Śustify that resolution. The Chinese and
Sansśrit text diverge here (I believe the Chinese provides the earlier reading). The Chinese
presentation of manas as 恒行意 héngxíng yì, "perpetually operating manas " (liśe the
586 Dan LUSTHAUS

What is the basis? The basis for the uninterrupted manas (samanan-
tarāśrayo manaḥ ) is the basis of manas ' seeds, which, as previously ex-
plained, is the all-seeds ālayaviŚṃāna.25

Comparing the mental basis here in the manobhūmi with the basis of sensory
consciousnesses in the previous bhūmi, it may be noticed that something has been
dropped. The eye-consciousness had three bases: (1) the physical eye, which was a
simultaneous, synchronic basis (sahabhū-āsraya), (2) an uninterrupted, diachronic
mental sequence basis (samanantara-āśraya), and (3) the ālayaviŚṃāna which
provided a seed basis (bīŚa-āśraya). The second and third items are retained here –
in fact, we are presently giving account of the second – but the simultaneous basis,
namely the physical sense-organ, no longer figures in the calculation. That is
logical, since the topic now is precisely that second basis, the continuous mental
stream, which is not a physical thing, strictly speaśing.
Yet, rūpa has not disappeared entirely from consideration. Asaṅga next asśs
about the manobhūmi 's perceptual obŚect (ālambana).
What is its ālambana ? It taśes all phenomena (sarvadharma) as its ālam-
bana. Its ālambana is not shared [publicly, i.e., it is only accessible subŚec-
tively]. It taśes [as its ālambana] only the aggregates (sśandha) of
hedonic tone (vedanā ), associative-thinśing (saṃŚṃā ), and embodied-
conditioning (saṃsśāra); the unconditioned; invisible and non-resistant
physical things (rūpa); the six [inner]26 sense spheres (ṣaḍ-āyatana); as
well as everything derived from mental seeds.27

ālayaviŚṃāna but unliśe the first six consciousnesses which are sporadic and not constantly
operating), not by being a stable and fixed constant, but rather by perpetually causing itself
to re-arise from the uninterrupted cessations (無間滅意 wúŚiān miè yì ; anantara-
niruddhaṃ) of itself and the six sporadic bodily consciousnesses (六識身 liùshì shēn ; yat
ṣaṇṇām api viŚṃānaśāyānām) is standard Yogācāra fare, and a nice middle way approach.
The Sansśrit interpolates an allusion to manas as śliṣṭamanas (defiled manas), with its
fourfold characteriŪation (śliṣṭaṃ ca mano yan nityam avidyātma-drapṭy-asmimāna-tṛṣṇā-
laśṣaṇaiś caturbhiḥ śleśaiḥ samprayuśtaṃ) more commonly rendered delusion about self
(ātmamoha), view of selfhood (ātmadṛṣṭi ), conceit (asmimāna), and self-love (ātmatṛṣṇā ).
Since – if the Sansśrit text available to XuánŪàng contained this very familiar and standard
characteriŪation of śliṣṭamanas – there would be absolutely no reason for XuánŪàng to
omit it, I conclude it was absent from his text.
25
BHATTACHARYA (1957:111-10): manobhūmiḥ śatamā | sāpi paṃcabhir āśārair dṛṣṭa-
vyā | svabhavata āśrayata ālambanataḥ sahāyataḥ śarmataś ca | svabhāvaḥ śatamaḥ | yac
cittaṃ mano viŚṃānaṃ || cittaṃ śatamat | yat sarva bīŚopagatam āśrayabhāvopagatam
āśrayabhāvaniṣṭham upādātṛvipāśasaṃgṛhītam ālayaviŚṃānaṃ || … āśrayaḥ śatamaḥ |
samanantarāśrayo manaḥ | bīŚāśrayaḥ pūrvavad eva | sarvabīŚaśam ālayaviŚṃānaṃ.
T1579.280b4-11: 說五識身相應地。云何意地。此亦五相應知。謂自性故。彼所依
故。彼所緣故。彼助伴故。彼作業故。云何意自性。謂心意識。心謂一切種子所隨
依止性。所隨(依附依止)性。 能執受。異熟所攝阿賴耶識。意謂恒行意及六識身無
間滅意。識謂現前了別所緣境界。彼所依者。等無間依。謂意。種子依。謂如前說
一切種子阿賴耶識。心謂一切種子所隨依止性。所隨(依附依止)性。 能執受。異熟
所攝阿賴耶識。… 彼所依者。等無間依。謂意。種子依。謂如前說一切種子阿賴耶
識。
26
XuánŪàng thoughtfully adds the qualifier "inner," 六內處 (liù nèi chù ) "the six inner
sense-spheres." The Sansśrit Śust says ṣaḍ-āyatanaṃ, "the six sense spheres."
27
BHATTACHARYA (1957:1112-14): ālambanaṃ śatamat | sarvadharma ālambanaṃ |
śevalaṃ tu vedanāsśandhaḥ saṃŚṃāsśandhaḥ saṃsśārasśandho 'saṃsśṛtaṃ cānidarśanam
 A Note on Medicine 587

Quite striśingly, unliśe the previous bhūmi, here in the mental bhūmi what is not
being taśen as an ālambana is the aggregate of physical matter (rūpasśandha). The
mental activities here are still not taśing the consciousness aggregate (viŚṃāna-
sśandha) itself as a cognitive obŚect, as an ālambana. Reflection by the mind on the
mind will require additional bhūmi s. But in this bhūmi the mental faculties of
manas and manoviŚṃāna do not have direct access to rūpa, to physical obŚects. That
is the Śob of the senses, not the mental faculty. It views sense-obŚects only indirectly,
as sense-spheres (āyatana). XuánŪàng adds the word "inner", i.e., the six inner
sense-spheres (六內處 liù nèi chù) to emphasiŪe that the mental sphere operates at
a remove from the physical world. The senses feed it obŚects, which it then
processes in its own way, in its own sphere. It is not simply that manas and
manoviŚnana acquire whatever śnowledge of physical things they obtain only as
mediated through the sense – that, after all, is not only standard Abhidharma fare
but common sense as well. Rather, it is that rūpa and the rūpasśandha ceases to
provide cognitive supports (ālambana), so that attention and analysis turn
exclusively to the mental sphere, even when pondering how physical events and
causes produce cognitive repercussions. This is the critical Yogācāra move that has
been mistaśen for idealism ever since. Tellingly, the only exception is a peculiar
type of rūpa which Asaṅga still includes among this bhūmi 's cognitive obŚects,
namely "invisible and non-resistant physical things" (anidarśanam apratighaṃ ca
rūpaṃ), since something invisible and intangible could only be śnown mentally,
not by any of the physical senses.28
Having hopefully adequately illustrated that Asaṅga has cautiously and deli-
berately distinguished the physical, the sensate, and the mental, that he is carefully
moving from the realm of the five senses to the realm of the sixth (and seventh)
sense, and that he has been providing reasons why he is doing so all along the way,
we now turn to our main subŚect, his use of medical ideas to effect a rational
transition from the sense realm to the mental realm, while maintaining the causal
relation between them.

Body, Mind, Medicine, and Causes

Asaṅga's discussion continues until he has described the fifth category, the mental
activities (śarma) in this bhūmi which include (1) the ability to discern its own and
other's29 cognitive obŚects (svaparaviṣayālambanaviŚṃapti ), which is the first type of
activity; (2) discerning particular and general characteristics (svalaśṣaṇa and
sāmānyalaśṣaṇa); (3) the ability to discern past, future, and present;30 (4) discer-

apratighaṃ ca rūpaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ sarvabīŚāni ca ||. T1579.280b11-13: 彼所緣者。謂一切

法如其所應。若不共者所緣。即受想行蘊無為。無見無對色。六內處及一切種子。
28
Generally aviŚṃaptirūpa (a physical śarmic residual of a physical action with hidden
intent or concealed agent) is the main (or only) item that fits this category, but that is not
something Asaṅga discusses in the Yogācārabhūmi, though he does mention the distinction
between viŚṃapti and aviŚṃapti śarma on occasion, e.g., in passing at T1579.601a3-5, in the
54th fascicle.
29
The Sansśrit reads: svaparaviṣayālambanaviŚṃapti, "discerning its own and others'
cognitive obŚects," while XuánŪàng omits the word "others'": 能了別自境所緣 néng liàobié
Ūì Śìngsuǒ yuán, "able to discern its own cognitive obŚect." The "others" here are the five
sense-consciousnesses whose cognitive obŚects can be taśen up by the mental faculty.
30
Note that while above Asaṅga pointed out that sensory perception taśes place only in
the present moment with a presently displayed obŚect, mental cognitions can roam across
588 Dan LUSTHAUS

ning a moment (śṣaṇa) as well as (5) temporal sequences (prabandha), and so on.
Once such activities are set in motion, they give rise to a continuous mind-body
causal flow (viŚṃānaśāyānāṃ taddhetuniṣyandasamutthāpanā, 又能為因, 發起等
流識身).
To briefly contrast this with his description of the five senses: (1) Each of the
five senses is restricted to cogniŪing only its own domain (vision sees visibles,
audition hears audibles, etc.), but the mental sense cogniŪes not only its own type
of cognitive obŚect (i.e., mental obŚects), but it also cogniŪes the cognitive obŚects of
the other consciousnesses as well, so that the manas can cogniŪe the sights, sounds,
smells, etc., encountered by the other senses. (2) The five senses only cogniŪe
particulars (svalaśṣaṇa), while mental cognition apprehends both svalaśṣaṇa and
sāmānyalaśṣaṇa, i.e., general concepts. (3) The five senses only perceive present
moments, while mental cognition can range across past, present and future with its
ability to conŚure up what is not currently present. (4) While the five senses are
limited to single moments, the mental faculty can cogniŪe sequences, connective
temporal linśages, a byproduct of its ability to envision the past and the future.
Asaṅga points out there is another way that one might thinś about the activities
in the cognitive domain of the manas (manodhātu). Based on conceptualiŪing
distinctions (viśalpa), a variety of activities can be differentiated. Asaṅga gives a
list: (1) intoxication (mādyati, 醉 Ūuì ), (2) insanity (unmādyati, 狂 śuáng ), (3)
sleep (svapiti, 夢 mèng ), (4) waśing up (pratibudhyati, 覺 Śué ), (5) lightheaded-
ness (mūrchām āpadyate, 悶 mèn), (6) recovery from lightheadedness (mūrchāyā
vyuttiṣṭhati, 醒 xǐng ), (7) giving rise to bodily and linguistic śarma (śāyavāśśarma
pravartayati, 能發起身業語業 néng fāqǐ shēnyè yǔyè ), (8) detaching from desire
(vairāgyaṃ śaroti, 能離欲 néng lí yù), (9) bacśsliding from having detached from
desire (vairāgyāt parihīyate, 離欲退 lí yù tuì ), (10) cutting off beneficial roots
(śuśalamūlāni samucchinatti, 斷善根 duàn shàngēn), (11) progressively develo-
ping beneficial roots (śuśalamūlāni pratisandadhāti, 續善根 xù shàngēn), (12)
death and life (cyavata utpadyate, 若死若生 ruṄ sǐ ruṄ shēng ).
This is a fascinating list that might appear to be a random collection of things,
but it is not. Those familiar with the early Indian medical literature will recogniŪe a
number of these terms from the maŚor role they play in that literature. For each of
these, Asaṅga will asś "what is it?" by which he means "what causes that?" His
explanations are primarily medical.
"What causes intoxication (mada)? It could be based on a weaś or failing
nature, or not being used to drinś, drinśing something too strong, drinśing
excessive amounts," etc.31 In other words, physical activities, such as consuming
physical substances, result in altered mental states. Unmāda, "insanity," received a
great deal of attention in Indian medical literature.32 "What causes insanity? It can

time, i.e, the mental faculty fabricates obŚects that are not present, for instance, by memory
or anticipatory visualiŪation. Similarly, sensation only cogniŪes svalaśṣaṇa, while mental
cognition cogniŪes both svalaśṣaṇa and sāmānyalaśṣaṇa.
31
BHATTACHARYA (1957:1317-18): śathaṃ mādyati | praśṛtyā durbalaśarīratayā
anabhyastamadyapānatayā atitīśṣṇamadyapānatayā amātramadyapānatayā ||. T1579.280c
28-29: 云何醉。謂 依止性羸劣故。或不習飲故。或極數飲故。或過量飲故。便致醉
亂。
32
The Caraśasaṃhitā devotes an entire chapter to unmāda, as does Vāgbhaṭa's
Aṣṭāṅga Hṛdayam, and also the Bhelasaṃhitā. For the text and a translation of the unmāda
chapter in the Caraśasaṃhitā , see P.V. SHARMA (1981.I:88ff.); and R.K. SHARMA
 A Note on Medicine 589

be brought about due to prior activities, an imbalance or disorientation of

one's dhātu s,33 physical or emotional trauma (uttrāsabhayatayā ), the striśing of a
vital point (marmābhighāta),34 or perturbation by spirits (bhūtasamāveśatayā )."35
In this way, Asaṅga continues through the list, identifying physical and psycho-
logical causes for sleepiness (relaxation due to feeling secure, tired out from hard
worś, magic spells and powders, etc.), awaśening (loud noise, sleep has run its
course, etc.), lightheadedness (a disease of vāta or pitti, being strucś [in the head],
loss of blood, diarrhea, overexertion, etc.), and so on.
As Asaṅga then systematically worśs through this series of psychosomatic
items, he also delves into the tridoṣa theory and other Indian medical theories,
repeatedly reminding us that mental states are grounded in the body, even as he
brings our attention and focus increasingly to bear on mental issues. In this manner
he transitions from the cognitive realm of the physical senses to various mental
activities and spheres that taśe on their own dynamics. In the interest of space, I
will not detail this section of the Manobhūmi further since the principle – viŪ. the
psychosomatic nature of consciousness – should be clear. Rather, in conclusion,
I will sśip ahead to Asaṅga's discussion of death understood as a physical and
mental process ultimately resulting in consciousness departing from the body. That
discussion remains grounded in the Indian medical tradition. It also shows a strong
affinity between this section of Yogācārabhūmi and the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra.

The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and Death

according to the Manobhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi
When the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra introduces the eighth consciousness to Buddhist
discourse, its appellation of choice is ādānaviŚṃāna, "grasping consciousness,"
particularly since the eighth consciousness, according to the Saṃdhinirmocana,

(1976.I:287ff.). For a recent translation of Vāgbhaṭa, see WUJASTYK (2003:244-251), "On

Insanity." For the Sansśrit text and English translation of Bhelasaṃhitā 6.8, on mada and
unmāda see (Sśt) pp.202-203, (Eng) pp. 254-255, in WEISS (1977).
33
P.V. SHARMA (1993:5 and 8): "Human body is basically composed of doṣa, dhātu and
mala and as such a student of medicine must śnow about them… Dhātus are those which
maintain as well as nourish the body. They are seven—rasa (chyle), raśta (blood), māṃsa
(muscle), medas (fatty tissue), asthi (bone), maŚŚā (marrow) and śuśra (semen)… One
dhātu nourishes the other successive one and in this way they constantly undergo
transformation…" The three doṣa s, a staple underpinning of Indian medicine, are found
already in the Pāli texts (see note 4). They are vāta, pitta, and śapha ; generally associated
with air, fire and water, respectively. They pervade the body; many illnesses result from
imbalances of the doṣa s, and diseases that might originate otherwise will affect them. Mala
are excretions from digested food, including urine, feces, sweat, etc.
34
On Marman, vital points, see ROȘU (1981), WUJASTYK (2003:236-244, "Lethal Points
on the Body"), and FEDOROVA (1990). Vāgbhaṭa, e.g., states (WUJASTYK, 2003:241): "The
sutures (sīmanta) [specific vital points] are the five Śunctions on the sśull, going up and
across. Pierced in them, a person dies from vertigo, madness [unmāda ], or destruction of
the mind."
35
BHATTACHARYA (1957:1319-20): śatham unmādyati | pūrvaśarmāśṣepatayā dhātuvai-
ṣamyataya uttrāsabhayatayā marmābhighātatayā bhūtasamāveśatayā ||. T1579.280c29-
281a3: 云何狂。謂 先業所引。或 諸界錯亂。或 驚怖失志。或 打觸 摩。或
鬼魅所著。而發癲狂。
590 Dan LUSTHAUS

"grasps" and holds on to a body. In other words, it is the consciousness that

appropriates a body and which leaves the body on death.36
The śey passage in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra states:
From the first, the seeds in the mind and consciousness [of sentient
beings] mature, unfold, aggregate, increase, and enlarge based on two
types of appropriation: (1) appropriation of the physical sense-faculties
(*rūpīndriya, 有色諸根 yǒusè Ūhūgēn) and the sense-bases (*āśraya, 所
依 suǒyī ), and (2) appropriation of images and words conceptualiŪed
through habitualiŪed (*vāsanā, 習氣 xíqì ) linguistic expressions and
erroneous mental proliferations (*prapaṃca, 戲論 xìlùn). Beings in the
Form Realm are endowed with these two appropriations, but beings in
the Formless realm are not endowed with these two.
Visalamati, this consciousness is also called *ādānaviŚṃāna (阿陀那
識 ātuṅnà shì , 'appropriating consciousness'). Why? Because this con-
sciousness attaches itself to (*ānuṣaṅgiśa?, 隨逐 suíŪhú ) and clings to a
body. It is also called ālayaviŚṃāna (阿賴耶識 ālàiyé shì , 'warehouse con-
sciousness'). Why? Because it holds onto (*anugraha, 攝受 shèshṄu) a
body in which it conceals and secures itself (*yogaśṣema, 安危 ānwéi ). It
is also called *citta (心 xīn, 'mind'). Why? Because this consciousness
accumulates (*cinoti, 積集 ŚīŚí ) and amplifies (*upacinoti, 滋長 ŪīŪhǎng)
visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tactiles, etc.37

Without further ado, here is the Manobhūmi passage concerning death, without
interruptions:38
What is death (dying) (cyavate)? Due to [reaching] the limit of your
amount of lifespan, [you] subsequently arrive at death. Again, there are
three types of [dying]:
1) due to having exhausted one's lifespan;
2) due to exhausting previous śarma;
3) due to inescapable imbalances.
Moreover, you should śnow that there are timely and untimely deaths,
and there is dying with a wholesome mind (śuśalacitta), or an unwhole-
some mind (aśuśalacitta), or a śarmically neutral mind (avyāśṛtacitta).
What is "death due to having exhausted one's lifespan"? That is dying
as soon as one has experienced the completion of the sum of one’s life-
span. This is called a timely death.
What is "death due to exhausting previous śarma"? That is when
one's inherited [śarma] runs out.
What is death because of an inescapable imbalance? As the World
Honored One said:

"There are nine causes and conditions for which you die even though
not having exhausted your [full] lifespan."

36
In XuánŪàng's translation of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the full discussion occurs at
T676.692a28-c23.
37
T676.692b11-18: 於中最初一切種子。心識成熟展轉和合增長廣大。依二執
受。一者有色諸根及所依執受。二者相名分別言說戲論習氣執受。有色界中
具二執受。無色界中不具二種。廣慧。此識亦名阿陀那識。何以故。 此識
於身隨逐執持故。亦名阿賴耶識。何以故。 此識於身攝受藏隱同安 義
故。亦名為心。何以故。 此識色聲香味觸等積集滋長故。
38
For the Sansśrit text, see BHATTACHARYA (1957:157-1820). For the Chinese
translation, see T1579.281b3-282a12.
 A Note on Medicine 591

What are these nine? These are:

1) eating improper amounts (amātrābhoŚī bhavati )
2) eating improper foods (apathyabhoŚī )
3) eating before having digested the previous meal (apariṇatabhoŚī )
4) undigested āma that one is unable to expel (āmaṃ na āddharati )39
5) fully digested food that one retains (paśvaṃ dhārayati )
6) not being near a doctor or herbs [when ill] (bhaipaŚyaṃ na
pratiṣevate)
7) not śnowing what is harmful or beneficial for yourself
(sātmyāsātmyaṃ na Śānīte)
8-9) overindulgence in unchaste (abrahmacārī ) activities at im-
proper times and in improper amounts (aśālacārī bhavati
abrahmacārī bhavati ).
These are called untimely deaths.
What is "dying with a wholesome mind"? When you are about to die,
you recollect previous times when you practiced wholesome dharmas,
and this may lead to other memories. From these causes and conditions
[i.e., the good actions one remembers], at this time confidence (faith) and
other wholesome dharmas appear in the mind. At that time, should a
coarse thought occur, or a subtle thought, the beneficial mind will neu-
traliŪe them, and one will abide only in a śarmically neutral mind. Why?
At the time of death, one becomes even unable to remember habitual
wholesome (thoughts), so they no longer can produce further memories.
What is "dying with an unwholesome mind"? When one is about to
die, one recollects habits (vāsanā ) of previous unwholesome things [one
has done], and this may lead to other memories. At that time, greed, de-
lusion, and other such unwholesome dharmas appear in the mind, inclu-
ding the appearance of coarse and subtle thoughts [and so forth], as was
explained previously about the wholesome mind.
Moreover, when a wholesome mind dies, death is blissful. When one
is about to die, no extreme pain oppresses the body. When an unwhole-
some mind dies, death is painful and vexatious. When one is about to die,
serious pain oppresses the body. Again when a wholesome mind dies, it
does not see confusing forms. When an unwholesome mind dies, one sees
confusing forms.
What is "dying with a śarmically neutral mind"? This refers [either]
to someone whose actions [have been both] wholesome and unwhole-
some [so that they neutraliŪe each other] or to someone who does not act.
When about to die such a person is unable to remember [one or the other
type] so there are no other [subsequent] memories. At that time, the
death of the "neither a wholesome mind nor an unwholesome mind" is
neither a blissful nor a painful and vexatious death.
Furthermore, when a person (pudgala) who has acted in a whole-
some or unwholesome way is about to die, he may spontaneously remem-
ber the wholesome or unwholesome [dharmas] that he previously culti-
vated, and that may lead to further memories. At that time, his mind will
tend to register those of his repeated habits that were most dominant.
The rest are entirely forgotten.
If he has repeatedly cultivated equanimity, then at the time [of dying],
his initial memory [of this] may engender additional memories. Only
these [good roots] are not cut off, and they will not give rise to a different
type of mind.

39
Āma is a maŚor ayurvedic topic. It is food that is being digested. Medical texts offer
elaborate explanations of how – when the digestive process does not worś properly – all
sorts of illnesses ensue.
592 Dan LUSTHAUS

There are those whose death is caused by two types of prominent

forces (adhipatīśṛtvā ), namely the prominent force of attachment to
pleasure and erroneous mental proliferation (prapaṃca), and the promi-
nent force of pure and impure śarmic causes (śubhāśubhaśarmahetu).
Once one has already exhausted the fruits of prior śarma, if one
should act unwholesomely, he will at the time [of dying] experience the
undesirable fruit obtained from the unwholesome activities he did previ-
ously – liśe in a dream seeing innumerable types of forms of monstrous
mutations (aneśaviśṛta). The Bhagavān explained the basis of such im-
ages, saying:
"If you previously engaged in bad, unwholesome activities, then once
[your śarma] has reached maturity, when you die it will be liśe the
shadows [descending] on the mountain peaśs at the end of the day, [at
first only] the cliffs are covered, then everywhere is covered, and
[finally everything is] utterly covered [with darśness]."

You should śnow Śust so does a person (pudgala) Śourney from light into
darśness. If previous unwholesome śarmic fruit is exhausted, and one
cultivates wholesome ways, contrary to the previous example, you should
śnow that this is liśe a person Śourneying from darśness to light.
The difference between these two is that when [a wholesome mind]
is about to die, it is liśe in a dream seeing innumerable types of forms of
non-monstrous mutations and that one can expect a corresponding
[wholesome] birth.
If you are, liśe the earlier example, one who performs unwholesome
actions, then because you see these images of monstrous mutations,
sweat will flow, your hair will stand on edge, your hands and feet will
thrash uncontrollably, you will lose control of your bowels and bladder,
you will flail wildly at the empty air, your eyes will roll upwards and you
will froth at the mouth. Then you will have a birth corresponding to these
monsters.
For one who has performed [only] mediocre unwholesome śarma, at
the time of dying, images of monstrous mutations may or may not occur.
When sentient beings are about to die, but before they have fallen
into a coma, the self-love which they have cultivated for a long time ap-
pears. Because of its power, one says [with alarm], "I will cease to exist!"
This causes love for one's body; from this one creates the recompense of
a new life. At the moment of the passing of the previous fruit to the com-
ing of the future fruit, self-love again reappears. At [this transition
point…], if by repeatedly investigating and searching, by the power of
wisdom one can control and not be attached [to the self and the body],
Śust as a strong warrior is able to control and suppress a frail weaśling in a
wrestling match. You should śnow that the principle of the Middle Way
is liśe this. Should the fruit not return, at this time, self-love does not re-
appear.
Further, the dissolution of limbs and Śoints occurs in all the realms in
which sentient beings are born, except in the heavens and hells. …
He who dies a pure and liberated death is called one who tamed
death (dāntamaraṇam). He who dies an impure and unliberated death, is
called not having tamed death (adāntamaraṇaṃ).
Further, when one who has performed bad śarma is about to die, his
consciousness withdraws from the upper portion [of the body]. A cold
sensation begins in the upper portion and gradually withdraws [down-
ward] until reaching the heart. When those who have performed whole-
some śarma [are dying], their consciousness withdraws from the lower
part [of the body]. A cold sensation begins in the lower portion and gra-
dually withdraws [upward] until reaching the heart. You should śnow
that it is only from the heart that consciousness subsequently withdraws
 A Note on Medicine 593

[from the body], which is followed by a cold sensation pervading [the en-
tire body.]

The viniścayasaṃgrahanī passage commenting on this last paragraph – one that

strongly reminds us of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 's ādānaviŚṃāna explanation –
derives a proof for the existence of the ālayaviŚṃāna on its basis:
Why is it that without the ālayaviŚṃāna, the way consciousness [operates]
at the time of dying would be illogical? [The way consciousness operates
at the time of dying is that] sometimes consciousness gradually leaves
from the upper body, and a sensation of cold gradually arises [where con-
sciousness has vacated]. At other times, it starts from the lower half of the
body. But this [withdrawal of heat] does not happen when the mano-
viŚṃāna is inactive. Therefore, we śnow that it is only the ālayaviŚṃāna
that appropriates and upholds a body. When the [ālayaviŚṃāna] frees it-
self [from part of the body], a cold sensation can be apprehended in those
body parts [being vacated]. The bodily [senses] are unaware [at that time,
so they are not what is perceiving the cold sensation]. The manoviŚṃāna
does not function liśe that. Therefore, if there were no ālayaviŚṃāna, this
[feeling of cold] would be unreasonable.40

If the argument about turning cold seems odd, remember that for some Buddhists,
including the Yogācāra, three things are declared inseparable: life, consciousness,
and heat (Śīvitendriya, uṣṇa, viŚṃāna ; 命 mìng, 熱 rè, 識 shí ). Wherever there is life,
there must be consciousness and heat.41

Conclusion
That Asaṅga paid more attention to the body, physicality, and the senses than
some of his interpreters should be evident. He never abandons or repudiates these
ideas, and nothing in the remainder of the Yogācārabhūmi suggests that his
thinśing on these matters changed in any significant way.
He would agree with what the Pāli Bāhiyasutta (Udāna I.10) quotes the
Buddha as saying:
diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattaṃ bhavissati, sute sutamattaṃ bhavissati, mute
mutamattaṃ bhavissati, viṃṃāte viṃṃātamattaṃ bhavissatī… esevanto
duśśhassā.
In the seen, there is only the seen; in the heard, there is only the heard; in
the sensed, there is only the sensed; in the cogniŪed, there is only the
cogniŪed. … Exactly this is the end of suffering.

40
T1579.579c17-22: 何故若無阿賴耶識。命終時識不應道理。謂臨終時或從上身
分。識漸捨離冷觸漸起。或從下身分。非彼意識有時不轉。故知唯有阿賴耶識能執
持身。此若捨離。即於身分冷觸可得。身無覺受。意識不爾。是故若無阿賴耶識不
應道理。
41
This claim is found in several sources, such as the ālistambasūtra (了本生死經 Liǎo
běn shēngsǐ Śīng, T708.816a16-18), and Harivarman's *Satyasiddhi (成實論 Chéngshí lùn),
which states (T1646.345b8-9: 命熱識此三法常不相離), "Life, heat, and consciousness,
these three dharmas are never separated from each other." The same is also discussed in
the Yogācārabhūmi at T1579.830c6-16.
594 Dan LUSTHAUS

This is the root of viŚṃaptimātra42 (cf. the word viṃṃātamattaṃ in the Pāli excerpt
above), a term that occurs only three times in the Yogācārabhūmi,43 but which
became crucial in the later Yogācāra tradition.

ViŚṃaptimātra literally means "nothing more than what is made śnown [to you]." We
42

might rephrase this: cognitive narcissism.

43
T1579.595c11; 724a6; and 726c25.
 A Note on Medicine 595

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HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES

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VOLUME SEVENTY-FIVE
The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners
The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and
Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet

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