Republic of the Philippines

Department of the Interior and Local Government

Philippine Public Safety College
NATIONAL POLICE COLLEGE
Camp General Mariano N Castaňeda, Silang, Cavite

PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS ADVANCE COURSE

CLASS – 2022 – 04 SILANG CAMPUS

Student: PCPT JOHANAFLOR P MIRAFLOR

Subject: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Insurgency
Professor: P/MGEN FELIZARDO M SERAPIO, JR. (Ret)
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“Psychological Defense in Preventing and Countering

Extremism”

CONTEXT:

Radicalization is a process of developing extremist beliefs, emotions, and

behaviors. The extremist beliefs are profound convictions opposed to the fundamental
values of society, the laws of democracy and the universal human rights, advocating the
supremacy of a certain group (racial, religious, political, economic, social etc.). The
extremist emotions and behaviors may be expressed both in non-violent pressure and
coercion and in actions that deviate from the norm and show contempt for life, freedom,
and human rights.

Extremism refers both to political ideologies and to methods through which political
actors try to achieve their aims. Extremist political ideologies oppose the fundamental
values of society and the principles of democracy and universal human rights by
advocating racial, political, social, economic, and religious supremacy. Violent extremism
is a violent type of mobilization that aims to elevate the status of one group, while
excluding or dominating its ‘others’ based on markers, such as gender, religion, culture
and ethnicity. In doing so, violent extremist organizations destroy existing political and
cultural institutions, and supplant them with alternative governance structures that work
according to the principles of a totalitarian and intolerant ideology.

Perpetrators of terrorism undermine their own cause by engaging in such violent

acts that create stereotypes of the social, religious, or political group. Today, there are
not only immediate consequences of destruction during a terrorist attack, but broader
social, economic, and political ramifications associated with such acts. It is extraordinarily
strange behavior for someone to engage in, since it causes harm to ingroup members.
 To develop methods of lessening intergroup conflict, resentment and stereotyping,
it is first important to review the relevant psychological theories that pertain to violent and
possibly morally abnormal behavior. Insofar as these theories hold, their claims may
prove pertinent when considering the psychological processes that may, at least partially,
account for the seemingly outlandish and heinous acts of extremists. If their actions can
be partially attributed to psychological reasoning, then the understanding of that reason
may provide opportunity to combat the processes and deter such conflict.

No single theory can account for all terrorist acts. Thus, counter strategies may
differ on a case-by-case basis. However, it will be useful to create a framework for
analyzing the dynamics behind an act of terror to more easily determine an appropriate
response, as well as prevent future violence.

This concept paper aims to identify the drivers of radicalization and address
possible psychological explanations for the heinous acts in which terrorists engage. This
also identify, describe, and evaluate what contribution – if any – psychological theory or
research may have made to understanding terrorists and terrorism. To identify and
analyze the scientific and professional social science literature pertaining to the
psychological and/or behavioral dimensions of terrorist behavior. To examine whether
and how psychology and other behavioral sciences have sought to explain violent
behavior more generally.

PROPOSED AGENDA:

THEME 1 – Drivers of Radicalization

Drivers of radicalization consist primarily of socio-economic pressures and

propaganda and recruitment efforts. However, violent extremist scholars and practitioners
agree that the main drivers of radicalization are poverty and economic hardship, ethnic
and religious marginalization and disenfranchisement, and frustration with the
government.

a. Poverty and Economic Hardship

Some claimed they have been pushed toward extremist groups because they felt
that the state was not providing for them and, in some cases, was actively discriminating
against them in matters of jobs and housing. Some scholars have assessed that the
primary drivers of violence and radicalization are economic marginalization and
destitution, political domination, physical insecurity, threatened identity, a perception that
government is the culprit, and a perception of hopelessness under the present order of
things.

Also, lack of education, which often goes hand in hand with poverty, also
contributes to radicalization. Rural or suburban youth may be particularly susceptible to
radicalization, as they tend to be both impoverished and uneducated. Many rural youth
reportedly do not stay in school and work as day laborers on farms instead, leading to a
large population of out-of-school youth who might view extremist organizations as their
only prospect for success.

b. Social Marginalization

Social marginalization has drastic negative consequences for any society.

Marginalization of children has even more dire effects – both for the present and in the
future. Stereotypical presumptions about people, coupled with prejudiced views
concerning specific religions and their followers, are dangerous with respect to the impact
that these negative stereotypes can have on progress towards community cohesion and
social integration.

c. Frustration with the Government

If there is not even small support from the government for the fulfillment of
fundamental requirements (like food and shelter) of each citizen including vulnerable low-
income communities it may push citizens toward joining extremist groups. The
government has added up just a burden to the citizen implementing taxations and
provision of restriction on various regular activities of citizens. The government may be
lacking its responsibility in various sectors like health services, education sectors, and
many more.

d. Material Incentives

Some groups have sought to attract young people by offering financial incentives
or salaries. Impoverished youth join these organizations as a means of providing for
themselves and their families. In a recent study of the motivations of former members of
the Maute Group, 15 of the 25 interviewees had joined because they were offered “a
regular salary of between 20,000 and 50,000 pesos”; other material incentives, such as
drugs, were a factor. In addition, to entice potential recruits, Abu Sayaff Group offers
weapons and a monthly stipend to those willing to join the organization.

e. In-Person Networks

Both Communist and Islamist groups used to recruit heavily from schools and
universities, but they have increasingly shifted to targeting uneducated youth and school
dropouts, who might be more susceptible to radical ideologies. Indeed, some extremist
groups seek to draw uneducated young people in with the promise of providing them with
an Islamic education; those with no moderate Islamic education have no basis for
challenging radical teachings.

f. Other Factors

Other factors stem from circumstances at the individual level, such as mental
illness, psychological disorders (such as depression or posttraumatic stress disorder),
criminal behavior, or other personality traits that would make an individual more
susceptible to radicalization. Some studies have coded these factors as a category of
their own, but we believe they fall under the category of push factors, as they predispose
or otherwise steer an individual toward radicalization.

THEME 2 – Psychological Theories

In reviewing explanatory theories and empirical models, it is perhaps not surprising

to learn that the discipline of psychology has yet to develop or discover (much less agree
upon) any that substantially explain violent behavior, particularly across its many
contexts, motivations and actors. The problem is not that researchers, scholars and
practitioners have not tried to locate such an explanation, but the “holy grail” has proved
to be elusive. In fact, it is probably fair to say that psychological theoretical development
in explaining violence has been given less attention, and has made less progress than in
many behavioral realms of substantially lesser social importance or consequence.

What are some of the main psychological theories that have been applied to
understanding extremism?

1. Triple-Appeal Principle

The triple-appeal principle is a psychological model, based on the Freudian

divisions of personality: id, ego, and superego to explain different psychological reactions
to appeals espoused from varied deliberate persuasive efforts. Lasswell states, “the id
may be said to correspond with impulses, the superego with conscience, and the ego with
reason”. An appeal can be issued from three sources: a person, institution, or occasion.
Entities may attempt to appeal to their audience’s id, ego, superego, or some
combination. The division or divisions in which the target of appeal is, may be a deliberate.

For example, if a mother praises her child for making his or her bed in the morning
with a hug, then the child will feel emotionally good about making the bed. This is an
appeal to the id. If the mother gives the child five dollars for making the bed, then the child
will be motivated to repeat the act because of the money; this appeals to the ego. It could
be assumed that a mother would want her child to make his or her bed because that is
the responsible thing to do and feel good about it, rather than for mere monetary gain.
Thus, the appeal to the superego is more effective to achieve the goal of increasing
responsibility. If the goal was just for the task to be done, then the appeal to the ego may
be more effective.

2. Vicarious Retribution Theory

Lickel et al. provide a framework for understanding how blame is ascribed to the
outgroup; once an act occurs that has been personally offensive or has offended a fellow
ingroup member, then the attribution of traits of the perpetrator is generalized to the entire
outgroup, since the original perpetrator may be unavailable or the outgroup is perceived
to be coherent and alike. Existence of generalized blame is not new or uncommon. Thus,
even though the outgroup target may not be directly responsible for acts in which the
ingroup perpetrator is avenging, the outgroup individual is held accountable. However,
social inhibitions regarding what is morally acceptable prevent rampant intergroup
violence from occurring; yet, there are instances when the inhibited id acts out – this is
when a violent act may materialize. Individuals first attempt to make sense of the act that
was offensive to themselves or their group, and then rationalize who is to blame. In this
model, the blame lands on any one individual of the outgroup with whom the original
perpetrator is identified.

Group identification and perceived outgroup entitativity are the main factors that
influence the possibility of vicarious retribution. Group identification plays a role in the
likelihood of vicarious retribution; the stronger an individual identifies with a group, the
higher likelihood one is to act on behalf of the given group. Lickel et al. claim that
“identification increases a sense of anger and influences the motivation for vicarious
retribution because of its links to group pride and empathy for harmed ingroup members”
[italics in the original]. Thus, these are the two factors that influence an individual’s
strength of identification; however, social norms are a third way that may also promote a
heightened sense of identification, since they “not only define what is morally appropriate;
but may also represent an expected standard of behavior”.

3. Cognitive Dissonance

A decision to act out violently may be based on the rejection of beliefs that violence,
in the given context, is immoral, or that the intended victim is not culpable. When cognitive
dissonance takes place, the impulse fueling the violence is supported by the belief that it
is socially acceptable. Typically, violence is not socially accepted, and therefore
destructive id impulses are inhibited, as Lasswell addresses in discussing social
inhibitions. However, Festinger says the typical social denouncement of violence that is
inhibitory of acting upon raw impulse may be rejected. Instead, rigidified belief structures
may reinforce the rejection of the social norm, like the establishment of a caliphate, or a
“just war”. Thus, “changes in terms of information that produce or restore consistency are
referred to as dissonance-reducing changes”.

4. Social Identity Theory

Tajfel’s social identity theory has three components: categorization, identification,

and comparison. First, social categorization entails individuals placing others into groups.
Second, individuals categorize themselves as a member of one, or multiple, of those
groups that they perceive will maintain or improve their self-esteem. Finally, individuals
engage in social comparison, by comparing their identified group with other categories.

5. Relative Deprivation

Relative-deprivation theory “refers to the proposition that one’s sense of grievance

is not a monotonic function of one’s actual situation in an absolute sense” because
individuals compare their situations to one another, rather than evaluating it without
reference subjects. The concept, however, “is used to refer to the emotion one feels when
making negatively discrepant comparisons...the emotion of relative deprivation is one
type of anger [italics in original]”; anger is a raw impulse and, hence, an action of the id.
Thus, at the root of the theory is an acting out of the Freudian, id. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that relative-deprivation can, but does not always, lead to violence; it
can lead to no acts, moderate acts, and extreme acts. Lastly, in defining the theory, it is
important to understand that deprivation is not absolute, but relative; one must have a
subjective reference point to be comparing oneself to feel relatively deprived. Thus, the
more exposure one has to “others” and the world, – through education, media, and travel,
for example – the greater the likelihood for these feelings to arise, since the exposed
individual has more experiences to which to compare.

6. Defense Mechanism Theory

Defense mechanisms “protect the individual from experiencing excessive anxiety,

and to protect the self and self-esteem”. To pose the existence of defense mechanisms,
Cramer focuses on three: denial, projection, and identification. The first pillar directly
addresses the dispute as to whether defense mechanisms exist by stating that they
operate outside the conscious awareness of an individual, and yet they have behavioral
consequences. They are unconscious processes functioning outside conscious
awareness used to protect one’s self.

7. Reaction Formation

There are several types of defense mechanisms: reaction formation, projection,

displacement, undoing, isolation, sublimation, and denial. However, reaction formation is
one of the most supported mechanisms to have been tested and proven to
occur. According to Baumeister, Dale, and Sommer, “the concept of reaction formation
involves converting a socially unacceptable impulse into its opposite”, which may be
“exaggerated or extreme”. Reaction formation is a type of defense mechanism that occurs
when an individual feels his or her self-esteem is threatened. In fact, “Most researchers
in personality and social psychology today would readily acknowledge that people defend
their self-concepts against esteem threats.”

8. Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development

Kohlberg developed a six-stage theory of moral development. It claims that as

humans develop, so does their morality. However applicable Kohlberg’s work may be, it
is also important to bear in mind that his scale only leads up to his conception of morality.
Nevertheless, his stages are applicable to help explain a justification for the adherence
ISIS fighters have to their society, as do others to their respective societies. The stages
are as follows:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation.

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation.
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or “good boy-nice girl” orientation.
 Stage 4: The “law and order” orientation.
Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation (usually with utilitarian
overtones).
Stage 6: The universal ethical-principle orientation. (Kohlberg, 1971)

According to Kohlberg, most humans reach Stage 4 of his moral scale, with only
some reaching Stages 5 and 6. ISIS fighters, too, develop to Stage 4, which may seem
incongruous at first, but helps to explain why the group has grown so strong and continues
to expand. It may appear as though these fighters are unable to develop past the second
stage, which is self-interest, given that the maturation of defense mechanisms may halt
around that time. However, outside observers may have this perception because they do
not want to consider the possibility that beheading or raping another human being is at
the same level of maturity as their own.

THEME 3: Pathways to Radicalization

People follow a pathway into (and often through) radicalization, terrorism and
terrorist organizations. The pathway may be different for different people and can be
affected by a wide range of factors.

a. Frederick Hacker : Three stages of Progression

The first stage involved an awareness of oppression. The second stage marked
a recognition that the oppression was “social” and therefore not unavoidable. The third
stage was an impetus or realization that it was possible to act against the oppression.
Ultimately, at the end point of that phase, some conclude that working through advocates/
intermediaries (e.g., elected officials) or within the system to “reform” or improve it is not
going to work and that self-help by violence is the only effective means for change.

b. Eric Shaw : Developmental Pathway

The four stages in that process were as follows: (1) early socialization
processes; (2) narcissistic injuries (a critical life event that negatively affects self-image
or self-esteem); (3) escalatory events (often a confrontation with police offering a
perceived provocation); and (4) personal connections to terrorist group members (which
enhance opportunity, access, and incentives to enter a terrorist group).

c. Borum

He describes the development of extremist ideas and their justification of

violence in four simplistically labeled stages:

• It’s not right: The starting point is a grievance or sense of dissatisfaction,

usually pertaining to some perceived restriction or deprivation in a person’s
environment. The nature of the undesirable condition may vary (e.g.,
 economic, social, etc.), but those who experience it perceive it in some way
as aversive.
• It’s not fair: An undesirable condition is not necessarily an unjust one.
Perceptions of injustice usually arise when one comes to view the aversive
condition in a comparative context – relative to one’s own expectations or
relative to how that condition does or does not affect others. This is similar
to Ted Gurr’s concept of “relative deprivation,” which he defines as the
“actors' perception of discrepancy between the value expectations {the
goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably
entitled} and their environment’s apparent value capabilities.” This
discrepancy, perceived as unfair or unjust, prompts feelings of resentment.
• It’s your fault: We are socialized to believe that although “bad” things may
happen in life, injustices typically don’t occur without some cause. Lerner
talks about a phenomenon he refers to as the “just world hypothesis,” a
human condition in which "individuals have a need to believe that they live
in a world where people generally get what they deserve and deserve what
they get" . If they themselves are the victims of injustice, then it is assumed
someone else is at fault for that condition. By attributing blame, those who
have accumulated resentments now have a target or outlet for them.
• You’re evil: The stages reviewed so far describe a possible mechanism for
developing hateful attitudes toward a group or institution. But most people
who hate don’t kill. What facilitates violence is the erosion (sometimes
intentional) of the psychological and social barriers that inhibit aggressive
behavior even in the presence of aggressive impulse or intent. This may
involve creating justifications for one’s actions (such as perceived threat and
need for “self defense”) and/or dehumanizing the victims to some degree,
such as by casting them as “evil.”

METHODOLOGY:

As established, the matter in question is not whether acts of terrorism are heinous,
destructive, and terrifying. Rather, the question is how the psyches of individual
perpetrators allow them to engage in such acts that oppose a globally accepted belief
system that denounces extreme violence. This paper has explored various dynamics as
to what may be psychologically occurring that allows for this behavior.

An exploration between the interplay of psychological theories, such as the

divisions of personality, and those of social psychology, such as the social identity theory,
has shown that there may be psychological dynamics occurring to account for extremist
violence and intergroup conflict. Further, the inner dynamics of an individual’s
psychological development, identity, and environment may shape the reasoning behind
extremist behavior and perceived stereotypes.

No single theory has gained ascendance as an explanatory model for all types of
violence. Perhaps the diversity in behaviors regarded as violent poses an inherent barrier
to such a global theory. Terrorist violence most often is deliberate (not impulsive),
strategic, and instrumental; it is linked to and justified by ideological (e.g., political,
religious) objectives and almost always involves a group or multiple actors/supporters.
These issues all add complexity to the construction of terrorism as a form of violence and
challenge the emergence of a unifying explanatory theory.

REFERENCES:

Trip, S., Bora, C. H., Marian, M., Halmajan, A., & Drugas, M. I. (2019). Psychological
Mechanisms Involved in Radicalization and Extremism. A Rational Emotive Behavioral
Conceptualization. Frontiers in Psychology, 10.https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00437

Wiktorowicz Q. (2005). Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the West. Lanham, Md.:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc

Flynn, Sydney, "Applying Psychological Theories of Personality, Identity, and Intergroup

Conflict to Radical Violence: A Case Study of Extremist Behavior" (2018). CMC Senior
Theses. 1890. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1890

Thomas Koruth Samuel, Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of

Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Kuala Lumpur: Southeast Asia
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Rhoades, Ashley L. and Todd C. Helmus, Countering Violent Extremism in the

Philippines: A Snapshot of Current Challenges and Responses. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA233-2.html.
Also available in print form.

Hacker, Frederick J (1983). "Dialectical Interrelationships of Personal and Political

Factors in Terrorism." Pages 19-32 in Lawrence Zelic Freedman and Yonah Alexander,
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Shaw, Eric D (1986). "Political Terrorists: Dangers of Diagnosis and an Alternative to the
Psychopathology Model," International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 8, 359-68.

Borum, R. (July, 2003). Understanding the terrorist mindset. FBI Law Enforcement
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Mathias Bak, Kristoffer Nilaus Tarp, and Dr. Christina Schori Liang, “Defining the Concept
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