Information, Communication & Society

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A voice for the voiceless: online social activism in

Uyghur language blogs and state control of the
Internet in China

Rebecca A. Clothey, Emmanuel F. Koku, Erfan Erkin & Husenjan Emat

To cite this article: Rebecca A. Clothey, Emmanuel F. Koku, Erfan Erkin & Husenjan Emat
(2016) A voice for the voiceless: online social activism in Uyghur language blogs and state
control of the Internet in China, Information, Communication & Society, 19:6, 858-874, DOI:
10.1080/1369118X.2015.1061577

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Information, Communication & Society, 2016
Vol. 19, No. 6, 858–874, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1061577

A voice for the voiceless: online social activism in Uyghur language blogs and
state control of the Internet in China
Rebecca A. Clotheya*, Emmanuel F. Kokub, Erfan Erkina and Husenjan Emata
a
School of Education, Drexel University, One Drexel Plaza, Ste. 148, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA;
b
Department of Sociology, Drexel University, PSA Building 47-Room 309, 3228 – 50 Powelton Avenue,
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
(Received 15 August 2014; accepted 8 June 2015)

Much has been written in recent years about Chinese online activism. Although in China Internet
use is officially regulated and censored, China nevertheless has the world’s largest number of
Internet users, with blogs being the largest communication platform. However, most of the
research on Chinese use of social media to date has focused specifically on Chinese language
Internet sources, with little attention paid to online activity among any of China’s 55 officially
recognized ethnic minority groups, such as the Uyghurs. Uyghurs are an ethnic group native
to China’s northwest Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. They speak Uyghur language
natively, a Turkic language that utilizes an Arabic script, and most are Moslems. As the largest
ethnic group within a region of China noted as among China’s most politically sensitive, the
Uyghurs provide a rich source for study of the use of the Internet by a potentially contentious
group. This research thus seeks to fill a gap in the literature by addressing the question: In
what ways do Uyghurs utilize social media as a form of online activism? The findings show
that in Uyghur blogs, comments are often posted using veiled language such as metaphors,
sarcasm, and humor, or references to traditional Uyghur sayings and culture practices as a
means of expressing subversive political communication, in an indirect way.
Keywords: China; social media; online social activism; Uyghur; Xinjiang

Introduction
Increasingly, social media is emerging as an important tool for promoting social and political
change, in particular social and online activism (Bonfadelli, 2002; Boulianne, 2009; Diani,
2000; Nip, 2004). Online activism, a form of ‘contentious activities associated with the use of
the Internet and other new communications technologies’ (Yang, 2009, p. 2), is attracting interest
from pundits and scholars. Recent events such as the Arab Spring, and its precursor, the Moldova
uprising in 2009, have raised questions and debates about the extent to which social media can be
a catalyst for political change, especially under authoritarian regimes. While some scholars argue
that the Internet and social media are potentially disruptive (Aday et al., 2010; Howard, 2010),
others posit that these new media may even support authoritarian regimes (Morozov, 2011). A
gap in these assessments is how minority groups appropriate and use social media as a means
for social solidarity and resistance to authoritarian structures.

*Corresponding author. Email: Rebecca.a.clothey@drexel.edu

This article was originally published with errors. This version has been corrected. Please see Corrigendum
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1088214).

© 2015 Taylor & Francis

 Information, Communication & Society 859

This paper focuses on the experiences of one such ethnic minority group, the Uyghur, who
mostly reside in China’s northwest Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and number about
ten million people there. Most Uyghurs are Moslems and speak a Turkic language that utilizes
a modified Arabic script. Some Uyghurs perceive their cultural autonomy as being infringed
upon by majority Han Chinese domination and Chinese Communist Party policies, and in
recent years, such contentious issues have emerged in the form of riots, street protests, and
occasionally violence. Some of these have reportedly resulted in deaths and arrests (cf Buckley,
2013; Jing, 2014).
Much has been written in recent years about Chinese online activism. Although in China
Internet use is officially regulated and censored, China nevertheless has the world’s largest
number of Internet users. Furthermore, the most subversive ideas in China can arguably be
found in Chinese cyberspace, where the Internet is frequently used for contentious purposes.
This is because of its potential for promoting ideas that are an alternative to the official state pro-
paganda (Yang, 2009). However, while much has been written in recent years about Chinese
online activism, most of the research on Chinese use of social media to date has focused specifi-
cally on Chinese language Internet sources (see for example, Bamman, O’Connor, & Smith,
2012; Liebold, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; Yang, 2009). Little attention has been paid to online
activity among any of China’s 55 officially recognized ethnic minority groups, such as the
Uyghurs. As the largest ethnic group within a region of China noted as among China’s most pol-
itically sensitive, the Uyghurs provide a rich source for study of the use of the Internet by a poten-
tially contentious group. This research thus seeks to fill a gap in the literature by addressing the
question: In what ways do Uyghurs utilize social media as a form of online activism? In addition,
because blogs are the largest online communication platform in China (Liebold, 2011), they are
also most appropriate for the analysis of online activism in China. For these reasons, for this study,
we analyzed four Uyghur language blogs, utilized by Uyghurs and hosted in Xinjiang, over a
period of eight months.

Background and literature review

Xinjiang and Uyghurs
Uyghurs are the largest ethnic group native to China’s northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Auton-
omous Region. Xinjiang borders eight countries, including Russia, India, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh-
stan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. As such, Xinjiang is a culturally diverse
area with 13 different ethnic groups officially recognized by the Chinese government, many of
these speaking languages other than Mandarin Chinese natively. Though Uyghurs comprise a
majority within Xinjiang, they are recognized as an ethnic minority group within the larger popu-
lation of China, where the Han population is the majority. Xinjiang’s capital city Urumqi is
located more than 3100 km west of Beijing and though Xinjiang is rich in natural resources
such as oil, the standard of living in Xinjiang is lower than that in China’s more prosperous
eastern coastal regions (Dillon, 2009).
Although Xinjiang is not well known by many outside of Asia, in recent years ethnic unrest
there has been more widely publicized in western media. Welch and Yang (2011, 67) assert that
Xinjiang is ‘among China’s most politically sensitive regions’. Bovingdon (2010, p. 3) contends
that although Xinjiang is culturally distinct and geographically remote from China proper, Beijing
claims Xinjiang as ‘an integral part of China since ancient times’. Many Uyghurs, however,
believe the area to be a distinct and rightful homeland of the Uyghur people, and some hope
to turn Xinjiang into a sovereign state (Bovingdon, 2010). Uyghurs have also made claims
about ethnic discrimination, oppressive religious controls, cultural infringement, and continued
860 R.A. Clothey et al.

poverty and unemployment under Chinese Communist Party rule (Smith Finley, 2013). Some
Uyghurs also perceive their cultural autonomy as being infringed upon by majority Han
Chinese domination and Chinese Communist party policies. In recent years, such contentious
issues have emerged in the form of riots, street protests, and increasing violence. In the past
year, there has been a reported escalation of violent events within China that have been
blamed on ‘Uyghur separatists’, defined as Uyghurs who want to separate Xinjiang from the
rest of China and establish their own country within that territory. Reports of increased restrictions
in the region as a result have also emerged (Buckley, 2013).

Censorship and the Internet in China

China has had full Internet connectivity since 1994. As of 30 June 2012, Internet World Stats
reports 538,000,000 Internet users in China and 40.1% Internet penetration (Internet World
Stats [IWS], 2014). However, online expression is censored in China in at least three ways.
The first is through ‘The Great Firewall of China’, which blocks thousands of websites from
view on the Chinese Internet. A second censorship approach is an automated filtering system
that detects prohibited material based on keywords, as directed by China’s State Council and
Information Office (Mackinnon, 2012). Such automated ‘keyword blocking’ prevents a user
from posting text that contains banned words or phrases. A recent list included over 1041
words related to current affairs that are filtered online in China. Finally, a third and very important
mode of online censorship is through Internet police censorship. The Chinese Communist Party’s
propaganda department employs approximately two million people to police public opinion
online by using keyword searches (Hunt & Xu, 2013). Individuals may also be paid to post patrio-
tic commentary in blogs or chat rooms as a means of shaping public opinion.
The consequences for posting items that are considered inappropriate can be high. Chinese
Internet companies are required to self-monitor content posted on their websites and remove
any unacceptable material or risk warnings, fines, temporary shut downs, or revocation of the com-
pany’s business license (MacKinnon, 2012). Individuals may also face jail time in certain cases.
In Xinjiang, Internet surveillance is taken especially seriously. After riots in Urumqi in 2009,
Xinjiang’s Internet was shut down entirely for 10 months, and dozens of Uyghur website foun-
ders, editors, and writers were given lengthy prison terms for such crimes as ‘splittism, leaking
state secrets, and organizing an illegal demonstration’ or ‘endangering state security’ (Olesen,
2014, para. 10). Research also shows that Xinjiang has a more ardently watched social media
environment than in some other parts of China. One study found that more than 25% of comments
posted in social media from Xinjiang are deleted, whereas only about 10% of those posted from
Beijing and Shanghai are erased (Bamman et al., 2012). Using a proxy server from Xinjiang to log
onto websites that are blocked by the Firewall also poses risks. According to Olesen (2014), use of
proxy servers in Xinjiang is associated with terrorists, who are perceived as using virtual private
networks to access extremist videos blocked by China’s Firewall. In July 2014, Xinjiang courts
sentenced 32 people to prison for terror charges related to downloading and spreading violent
Internet content, which authorities have blamed for fueling violent terrorist attacks. Three
received life sentences, demonstrating that using the Internet in Xinjiang in a way deemed inap-
propriate can be extremely risky (China Jails, 2014).
Despite these risks, the Internet penetration rate in Xinjiang is relatively high, with Xinjiang
ranked as the 11th most connected region of China, of 31 regions ranked. Forty-three percent of
Xinjiang’s population is online, with an annual penetration growth rate of 9.1% (Olesen, 2014).
At the same time, there are relatively few registered websites and IP addresses in Xinjiang. Xin-
jiang had only about 6000 websites in 2012, compared with almost 400,000 in the capital,
Beijing, in the same year. This may suggest that while people in Xinjiang want to be connected,
 Information, Communication & Society 861

they are uneasy about setting up their own sites. Currently there are an estimated 2000 Uyghur
language websites in China. Yang (2009) proposes that despite Internet restrictions in China,
online communities, blogs, and bulletin board systems provide the potential for a contrast to
the official narratives of Chinese newspapers and television stations, and they therefore also
provide a space for China’s most subversive ideas. Thus, even with increasing political control
of the Internet, the online culture is thriving within China.
Yet according to Foreign Policy, Xinjiang’s tight Internet controls have resulted in ‘a highly
filtered and homogenized’ Uyghur web, where Uyghur users avoid discussing controversial
issues such as discrimination, bilingual education, religion, and unemployment, and instead
use blogs for music videos, shopping, parenting advice, fashion, and dating (Olesen, 2014).
Therefore, although China has the world’s largest number of Internet users, the potential for
group mobilization in China via the Internet is complicated by the fact of Chinese censorship.
It is within this context that we undertook to examine more closely in what ways Uyghurs appro-
priate and use social media for social solidarity and resistance to authoritarian structures.

Internet activism
Increasingly the use of the Internet as a medium of political activity and mobilization has been
debated. On the one hand, the Internet is often viewed as an information hub, a space for political
expression, and a medium for widespread exchange of ideas and debate. In this vein, the Internet
increasingly fosters knowledge about public policy issues and collective problems, and promotes
civic participation and public deliberation (Zhou, 2009). Internet advocates point to the unique
features of online communication (affordability, anonymity, customizability, time- and dis-
tance-defying communication, interactivity, and decentralization) that help promote political
dialog, attract marginal voices, and enhance participation in political affairs (Mitra, 2002;
Zhou, 2009). The use of social media to promote a series of events such as the Arab Spring in
the Arab World and Occupy Wall Street in the USA also points to the potential of the Internet
for political mobilization and collective action (Howard, 2010; MacKinnon, 2012).
On the other hand, critiques point out that concerns about the development of a global surveil-
lance society, corporate ‘colonization’ of cyberspace, and digital divides limit the potential of the
Internet for political activism (Lyon, 2007; McChesney, 2002; Zhou, 2009). Other studies on
online politics have also raised issues about the fragmented and often confrontational nature of
online political discussions (Johnson & Kaye, 2014; Karlsson & Åström, 2014). Despite these
concerns, scholars generally agree that in some contexts such as China, the Internet has
created more political freedom than before, and has become a viable tool for building a new
forum for participatory democracy, with real and potential impacts on politics (He, 2006;
MacKinnon, 2012; Yang, 2009). As such, online activism is no longer the unique provenance
of isolated, politically motivated hackers. It is instead deeply integrated with contemporary
social movement strategy and accessible to computer and mobile phone users with only basic
skills: it is a distinguishing feature of modern political communication and a means of creating
the elan that marks social change. Put differently, the Internet globalizes local struggles.
A number of studies (Chen, 2012; Chen, 2013; Harlow & Harp, 2012; Racherla & Wattal,
2010; Yang, 2009) have also demonstrated how online communication media and forums can
be used to mobilize social movement efforts for both general awareness and collective action.
Mercea (2012) examined the way computer-mediated communication (CMC) media is used to
increase participation in offline social movement events. He found that participation in protest
events is dependent on the risk associated with each event, and that activists were more likely
to attend low-risk events (such as a benefit concert or marathon) if they had not developed inter-
personal social links or were unaffiliated with an activist organization outside the online contexts.
862 R.A. Clothey et al.

On the other hand, if they had developed interpersonal social links or were affiliated with an acti-
vist organization beyond their involvement with such individuals on the Internet, they were more
likely to attend high-risk events (such as a sit-in, or more violent protest). Some researchers have
even argued that to the extent that the communication and linkages between activists do not trans-
late offline, organized movement may stagnate (Diani, 2000; Rucht, 2004).
Nevertheless, Earl and Kimport (2011) posit that action can still be considered as ‘collective’
even without a coinciding physical face-to-face presence (‘co-presence’), and that the conse-
quences of collaboration, for social movements and for participants, can also be identified
without co-presence. However, Earl and Kimport (2011) also speculate that such collective
action will look different than offline social activism and that forging a collective identity may
be less important for prompting online collective action than it is for offline collective action.
This study will examine that supposition by looking in more depth at the online activism of
one particular ethnic group whose identity is shared.

Theoretical framework
This paper builds upon Scott’s (1990) concepts of public and hidden transcripts. Scott (1990)
describes the ‘public transcript’ as people’s speech, behavior, and actions in public settings,
similar to Erving Goffman’s conception of the front stage and back stage (Goffman, 1956). As
Scott notes, it is frequently in the interest of oppressed people to behave publicly in a manner
expected of them. However, it should not be assumed that the behavior of marginalized popu-
lations as part of the public transcript is an indication of their compliance with the status quo.
On the contrary, oftentimes in the most oppressive states, the penalty for collective action
against the state may be too risky (Bovingdon, 2010). Thus, as Scott suggests, many ordinary
people may publicly defer to authority while mocking it privately. This private discourse is
what he refers to as the hidden transcript. The hidden transcript is what occurs when people
believe they are beyond the surveillance of those holding power. Hidden transcripts include
speech, behavior, or practices that contradict what appears in the public transcript, and which
occur outside public view. The hidden transcript is produced for a different audience than the
public transcript; it is usually specific to a given social site and created for a particular set of indi-
viduals, while excluding certain specified others (Scott, 1990, p. 5). Therefore, hidden transcripts
allow for relatively free expression, beyond the surveillance of those in power. As such, the
hidden transcript is a repository for contentious ideas, the open expression of which would be
dangerous. The hidden transcript serves as a substitute for direct subversive acts against power
authorities. As Scott (1990) puts it, the hidden transcript is the privileged site for non-hegemonic
dissident subversive discourse (p. 25).
Scott describes two conditions under which a hidden transcript will be most likely to thrive.
The first is that it emerges within a social site that is insulated from control and surveillance from
above, and the second is that the social site comprises solely individuals who share similar experi-
ences of domination. Moreover, the hidden transcript can exist within the public sphere if it
deploys linguistic codes, dialects, or gestures that are not transparent to those in power. Examples
might include the folktales, jokes, songs, codes, and euphemisms of oppressed groups of people.
Indeed, if the hidden transcript is to evolve as the social sphere of a select group, it must reflect
their cultural meanings (Scott, 1990).
Yang (2009) describes four means of ‘digital hidden transcripts’ as ways of resisting power
through digital media. These include using proxy servers to circumvent government filtering,
opening new websites with similar content if one is shut down, and organizational creativity,
such as establishing online petitions. A fourth form of digital hidden transcript described by
Yang, and the focus of this paper, is linguistic.
 Information, Communication & Society 863

Yang explains that Chinese social media users substitute Chinese homophones for officially
censored words in order to continue to post about potentially controversial issues. He also
describes posting images, substituting signs or symbols for Chinese characters, or separating
words with spaces in order to get around automatic filters. These methods are useful for
Chinese language users avoiding automated Chinese language filters; however, Uyghur language
is alphabetic and, therefore, such avoidance tactics cannot as easily be employed as a means to
trick Chinese automated censoring methods. Instead, Uyghur bloggers employ their language,
its idioms and proverbs, as a means of resistance. To the Uyghurs, language is central to their
ethnic identity, mobilization, and activism (Reny, 2009), because it speaks to multiple dimensions
of a given culture: ‘ritual and routine activity, conversation, emotion, and artistic expression’
(Dwyer, 2005, p. 59), especially in opposition to the language and identity of the [majority]
Han Chinese (Schluessel, 2007, p. 260).
For purposes of this study, online activism is defined as ‘any form of Internet based collective
action that promotes, contests, or resists change’ (Yang, 2009, 3). We assume that activism does
not necessarily mean contentious political activities, but instead can take cultural and social forms
that may also be contentious (Mansbridge, 2001; Yang, 2009). One of these forms can be discur-
sive activism, defined as speech or texts that challenge opposing discourses by exposing power
relations within these discourses. Discursive activism thus deconstructs what appears natural
(Fine, 1992, p. 221) and demonstrates flawed assumptions of mainstream social discourse.
According to Katzenstein (1995, 35), discursive politics involves ‘the politics of meaning-
making’, in that it ‘seeks to … rewrite the norms and practices of society’. As an essential strategy
of political resistance, activist discourses break social silences, and in so doing they fracture the
political discourses that justify inequality (Fine, 1992, p. 221).
The impetus for this kind of discursive activism, as Mouffe (2005) contends, is by definition
‘political’, a struggle against hegemonic structures, a struggle between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Using the
concept of the ‘constitutive outside’, Mouffe (2005) shows how political positions are relative in
terms of their opposition to other political positions: that is, the political order of one structure is
based on some form of exclusion, fueling and informing the oppositional struggles (Shaw, 2012, p. 42).
Uyghur sociopolitical history, particularly as exhibited through online blog discussions, pro-
vides good examples of discursive political activism, manifested through consciousness-raising
postings, critical media analysis, or interventions in the use of language (Young, 1997, 13).
Language then becomes a tool, a component of the ‘hidden transcript’ employed by Uyghurs
(the ‘us’ in Mouffe’s framework) in their resistance against hegemonic Chinese structures (the
‘them’ or the ‘constitutive outside’) (Mouffe, 2005).
In view of the above, one cannot but agree with Yang’s observation that online activism in
China is ambiguous: sometimes it borders on dissent, but not always evidently so. In fact, inter-
active blogs provide the social and public spaces for hidden transcripts to thrive, and in so doing
facilitate dissent and channel resistance. Furthermore, as Scott asserts, the strongest evidence for
the importance of autonomous social sites in generating a hidden transcript is the efforts made by
dominant groups to control them (Scott, 1990, p. 124). This paper, therefore, deals with the mech-
anisms through which the hidden transcripts manifest as acts of resistance among the Uyghurs.

Methods
For this research, we examined Internet blogs, hosted in Xinjiang and created and utilized by
Uyghurs, in Uyghur language. While personal web pages present original content in fairly
static formats, blogs usually contain regularly updated content and online commentary that
appear in reverse chronological order, with hyperlinks to other sources, and they usually allow
for external readers to post their own comments in response to posts (Liebold, 2011; Selwyn,
864 R.A. Clothey et al.

2007; Wei, 2009). Given their ephemerality, blogs can cover a range of topics, including personal
life and politics. Studies have shown that blogs create communities (where community refers to a
sense of cohesiveness, commonality, and propinquity among members of online groups) and that
its specific features such as bloggers’ identity, blogs’ content, and blogger communities synergis-
tically drive the blogosphere (Aday et al., 2010; Lee & Webb, 2012; Webb & Lee, 2011).
With funding from Drexel University’s Social Science Research Initiative, we hired two
native Uyghur speakers as research assistants (RAs), to monitor Uyghur language blogs over a
period of approximately eight months in 2014. With the assistance of the RAs, we studied four
Uyghur language blogs, hosted in Xinjiang, that were available, accessible, and active (in
terms of membership and variety of topics being discussed) at the time of the study. These
were specifically selected due to their relative popularity and repute within the Uyghur blogging
community and their accessibility at the time of the study. Drexel University’s Human Subjects
Protection (IRB) Office approved this study.
The blogs were:
Misranim (http://misranim.com/). Misranim was officially registered as a music downloading
website in 2007, but its blog section opened on 27 May 2010. Currently, it covers various local/
Xinjiang and international news in Uyghur language, in addition to featured sections on topics
such as economics, education, social affairs, medicine, entertainment (music, lyrics, and online
games), and literature (stories, jokes, poets, audio books, and online translations of text). The
Chinese government has never shut down Misranim.
Bagdax (http://bagdax.cn/). The Bagdax Electronic Education and Technology Company
registered the blog/website in 2008. Unlike Misranim, Bagdax has few sections – covering
local/Xinjiang and international news, and articles on social welfare, economics, and technology
and sports. Bagdax was shut down between May and September 2013 by the Chinese govern-
ment, indicating that it may include some politically sensitive material.
Xahtur/Bozqir (http://www.bozqir.biz/). Registered as a website on August 1 2013, the
blog covers a variety of issues including education, poetry, family, photography, news, litera-
ture, medicine, language learning, movies, travel, and computers. Unlike the other two blogs,
the Xahtur/Bozqir blog is much more focused on covering the political undertones and impli-
cations of the various topics it covers. Consequently, many anti-government posts and topics
get deleted by the site administrators (through self-censoring), unless they ostensibly ‘favor’
the Chinese government. Even so, the site was shut down between September and November
2014.
Ana Tuprak (bbs.anatuprak.com). This is a relatively old website which includes news,
movies, music, and literature. After riots in Urumqi in 2009, the website was ordered to revise
and since then has become extra sensitive about political topics. Therefore, the site is usually
not overtly political.
The two RAs monitored the four blogs on a daily basis, and captured (through screen shots)
sections of the blogs that addressed broad themes of online social activism. With the assistance of
the authors, one RA translated the blogs from Uyghur into English, and one RA checked the trans-
lations for consistency and reliability. The sample (sum total of all blog posts captured and trans-
lated during the study period) was 1683 blog distinct posts, each of which is about 100 words on
average. Weekly meetings between the RAs and the authors ensured review and discussion of
emerging blogs, themes, and contents.
In addition to the blog reviews, we also conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with
two individuals involved in the creation of Uyghur blogs and active in posting items online. These
individuals are located outside Xinjiang, and because they have been involved in the blog culture
for many years, they are well known within the Uyghur blogging community. The in-depth inter-
views explored their use of social media, what they read online, and what, when, and why they
 Information, Communication & Society 865

post; their level (if any) of involvement in political activism; and (if relevant) what they do to cir-
cumvent censorship. Each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes. They were conducted in
either English or Uyghur language as per their own preference. The RAs served as interpreters
when necessary. All interviews were conducted and recorded over Skype, and then transcribed
for further analysis.
To address our research questions, we employed a variety of methods (Jones, Millermaier,
Goya-Martinez, & Schuler, 2008), specifically content analysis of the interactive blogs created
by Uyghurs, in Uyghur language, as potential social sites for the hidden transcript. We began
our analysis with a chronological and periodic review of all the transcribed data in order to gen-
erate a potential set of themes and initial coding framework, guided by our research questions,
theoretical/conceptual frameworks, and insights from extant literature (Bernard & Ryan, 1998).
Following a grounded theory approach, we used ‘open coding’ strategies to generate themes
and analytical categories from the narratives themselves rather than through predetermined
topics and premises (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss &
Corbin, 1998). After identifying a set of themes and grouping the textual data accordingly, we
conducted ‘focused coding’ (Emerson et al., 2011) to help develop and refine sub-codes within
the broader themes identified earlier, culminating in the emergence of theories and conceptual cat-
egories (such as ‘sarcasm’, ‘metaphors’, and ‘cultural references’) embedded in and supported by
the textual data (Creswell, 2013). This allowed an exploration of discourses about how Uyghur
politics and social life are reflected in and shaped by online activism.

Findings
What we found in looking at the Uyghur blogs is a robust culture of resistance. Contrary to
assumptions about Uyghur blogs such as those described by Foreign Policy and noted above,
Uyghur bloggers posted frequently about controversial topics such as nationalism, religion,
Uyghur language, bilingual education, and ethnic identity. The way they often did this,
however, was through what we call the language of protest.
Smith Finley (2013) describes the use among Uyghur intellectuals of a ‘poetry of resistance’
whereby political ideas were orally disseminated and Uyghur nationhood was encouraged as early
as the 1920s. In the 1990s, Uyghur popular music reflected social and political concerns in Xin-
jiang and constructed and reproduced an alternative social, political, and national consciousness,
through the use of lyrical metaphors (Smith Finley, 2013, p. 189). The possibility for multiple
interpretations of the lyric’s metaphors meant that new folk singers could often avoid detection
by the government censors. As one Chinese official put it: ‘they always write indirectly, so
that if you confront them, they can deny that they meant what you think they did’ (Smith
Finley, 2013, p. 186).
In Uyghur blogs, we also found that in many cases, comments were posted using veiled
language such as metaphors, sarcasm, and humor, or references to traditional Uyghur sayings
and folk heroes in order to make a direct point, in an indirect way. In this manner, it is often dif-
ficult for someone not very well versed in the Uyghur language and culture to ascertain the
specific meaning. Even then, sometimes it may be difficult to know without question what the
interpretation should be. Some examples of these will be discussed below.

Sarcasm
Light (2007) describes joking among Uyghurs as a form of ‘opportunistic resistance to many
kinds of social organization’ (p. 52). We also often saw joking as resistance within the blogs
in the form of sarcasm.
866 R.A. Clothey et al.

A topic that came up in one of the blogs referred to the high unemployment rate among
Uyghurs in Xinjiang. One Uyghur blogger described high unemployment among members of
the Uyghur community and received the following sarcastic response in return:

… [But] they now offer a lot of jobs including public security, taxi driver, maid, labor work, cashier at
a highway check point, etc … and minority high officials in these essential positions account for more
than 90%. (Posted 3/04/2014)

The implication of this statement is that the only positions available, even for educated Uyghurs,
are blue-collar jobs that do not require a college education. Smith Finley (2013) describes Han set-
tlers into Xinjiang as dominating white-collar, government, and high-tech jobs in the areas of Xin-
jiang that are targeted for development. Ma (2009) suggests this is because Uyghurs’ proficiency
in Chinese is not as good as Han people’s, who speak Chinese natively; however, many Uyghurs
perceive this situation as being due to discriminatory policies (Grose, 2010). Grose claims the
unemployment of urban Uyghurs in Xinjiang to be 8%, as compared with 3% among Han.
Another topic that generated a lot of sarcastic responses was related to a government-spon-
sored dance program in Xinjiang, called ‘Apple Dance’. Since late 2014, the Chinese government
has launched a mobilization campaign to encourage mass ‘dance-ins’, possibly in response to a
speech by a Xinjiang representative of the National People’s Congress who stated that religious
extremists forbid dancing. According to Brophy (2015), the official campaign to promote public
dancing through the state-sponsored ‘Apple Dance’ in Xinjiang is a way to get people to publicly
disavow religious extremism. The result is the emergence of online videos showing large groups
of imams, state employees, factory workers, and even entire villages doing the ‘Apple Dance’ to a
Chinese pop tune.
In one blog, someone posted links to one of these videos and mentioned the increasing popu-
larity of the Apple Dance in Xinjiang. This prompted a series of comments from bloggers, who
mostly mocked the trend, while some others also expressed frustration, disbelief, and outrage.
Some sarcastic remarks included:

I just can’t understand what the heck this song has to do with an apple? Probably Ìm too stupid to
understand. (Posted 11/09/2014)

Why don’t we gather all the scientists and scholars from all over the world and leave a memorial dance
for a page of history? We can tell our kids in the future about this grand idea. (Posted 11/09/2014)

[This] dance is the product of 5000 years of great Chinese culture and intelligence; they should just
apply for the UN cultural heritage. (Posted 11/09/2014)

The use of humorous banter and sarcasm, while common, was not always universally understood,
as the following series of posts on a different topic, from four different individuals, each respond-
ing to the first person’s post, reflect.
12/14/2013 post: What does people’s support mean? It is the government that is in charge of
everything, everywhere. People should pay tax to the government, help the government with
everything they got, protect government with their lives, send their children to the front line,
pay fines to the government if they have extra kids, and be appreciative about all this. People
should stay away from the government’s business.

12/27/2013 comment 1: You are the best candidate for governor

12/31/2013 comment 2: You will definitely be able to focus and centralize power
1/27/2014 comment 3: Are you being sarcastic or ?
 Information, Communication & Society 867

The first two of these comments are sarcastic, but that was not entirely clear to the last person.
In another thread, a poster translated information from an article written in Chinese in the
newspaper ‘Global Times’ (Huangqiu Shibao) about Frederick Starr’s 2004 edited volume
called Xinjiang: China’s Moslem Borderland into Uyghur and posted it. The book was not
well received by Chinese officials and most of the western authors of chapters in that book
have been denied visas from the Chinese government since the book’s publication. In the post,
the blogger writes that the book claims there is a human rights issue because of Chinese domina-
tion in Xinjiang, and this provides a theoretical basis for Xinjiang separatism. In response to this
post, someone remarked:

11/16/2013 comment: Honestly, Xinjiang people do not want to separate because their lives are
getting better.

This comment was followed by the annoyed comment below, which alluded to a misunderstanding:

Comment 11/16/2013: No matter who you are, you certainly did not understand the meaning of this
topic, the reason the author translated this article in the first place and his intention, as well as what the
people from where you live think about this.

The fact that the hidden transcript can be misunderstood even by those for whom it is created
reflects the fact that someone could easily deny a subversive intention if called to question. Never-
theless, other bloggers within the cyberspace will call members of their own community out if
they believe the intended message is not getting across.

Metaphors
Another common form of the language of protest was through the use of metaphors. As an
example, in one blog, someone posted a copy of a speech given by Dilnar Abdulla. Dilnar
Abdulla is a well-known Uyghur dancer who was appointed as a Uyghur deputy to the National
People’s Congress of China. Although she was popular as a dancer, the decision to make her a
representative of the Uyghur people by appointing her to a government position is not popular
among Uyghurs. Because of that, the webmaster deactivated the comments option so no one
could post a response about the speech, after only two comments were posted related to it. The
following comment, which is one of the two that was posted in response to her speech before
the comments function was turned off, reflects the use of metaphor to make a veiled point.

Comment 3/05/14: A cat is attached to a cart while a bed asks where is the cat?

This seemingly nonsense statement is in fact a critique of Dilnar Abdulla as a government repre-
sentative. Just as it makes no sense to have a cat pulling a cart instead of lying on a bed, the impli-
cation is it also makes little sense to have a dancer making decisions in the government as a
representative of the Uyghur people. The other comment was sarcastic:

Comment 3/05/14: A driver usually talks about how his tires blow up, how his breaks are broken, etc.
Did this dancer talk about how to dance in the meeting?

In a different post, a blogger described the ideas of another Uyghur representative to the govern-
ment, named Anwar Imin, about how to deal with unemployment issues. One person referred to
their Uyghur representatives as no different than parrots, suggesting they simply repeat what each
other says (blog post, 3/4/2013), while another person responded:
868 R.A. Clothey et al.

Comment 3/04/2014: The source of the water is coming from dirt, what can you say?

From this metaphor we infer that because the ideas (the water) are coming from dirt (the repre-
sentatives), the output is not good.
Bilingual education was another topic that entered the cybersphere. Since 2004 there has been
a gradual change from schools that offer a Uyghur language curriculum to schools that have some
Uyghur teachers but who teach mostly in Chinese, and which offer Uyghur only as one subject
among others. These Chinese language curriculum programs for Uyghurs with Uyghur as a
subject are referred to as ‘bilingual’. In contrast, Uyghurs can also choose to attend a Chinese
medium school, in which they are not taught any Uyghur formally but instead learn English as
a foreign language (Dwyer, 2005). The trend has been that such Uyghurs tend to speak more
Chinese than Uyghur, and sometimes cannot read or write Uyghur at all as they are not taught
to do so (Smith Finley, 2013).
One person related a story in a blog about when he had attended a Uyghur wedding and sat at a
table where the guests, all Uyghurs, spoke entirely in Chinese with each other throughout the
event. Of this situation he asked:

Is it true that a person who cleaned a toilet for a year can’t tell the difference between the smell of crap
and perfume? (Posted 2/23/2014)

This metaphor implies that Uyghur language is perfume, while Chinese language is crap, but
those who spend too much time in a Chinese language school (instead of being educated in
Uyghur language) apparently cannot tell the difference.
Bloggers are not naïve about the risks of posting items with political undertones. In fact, three
out of four of the blogs that we monitored were shut down for a period of time during our research.
One of them was shut down for three weeks. Bloggers thus also posted frequent reminders to each
other to be careful about what they write. To one person’s warning to fellow bloggers to be careful
of what they write, another person followed up with the post:

Comment 12/28/2013: Goats can be open, but sheep can’t.

Smith Finley (2013) writes of frequent metaphorical references to sheep in Uyghur song lyrics as
an allusion to Uyghur people. As she notes, sheep are docile and prone to follow others. In the
metaphor above, Han people are portrayed as the goats. This metaphorical statement is an
acknowledgement (whether perceived or actual) of the more serious threat facing Uyghurs, as
compared with Han people, for saying anything that could be seen as subversive. Indeed, the
threat of censorship and consequences for subversive talk are frequently discussed within the
blogs, both subtly and explicitly. For example, in response to one thread topic about a Chinese
Communist party policy that a blogger found to be upsetting, he posted: ‘The enter key on the
keyboard is just enough’ (Posted 11/09/2014). There are two interpretations possible for this
comment. One is that he has no words to express his feelings. Another interpretation is that
there is nothing he can say about it that will not be removed by the censors. Another person in
the same thread put it more bluntly: ‘What is the point of telling it? If one sentence causes 10
years of dark suspension, who would be responsible then?’ (Posted 11/09/2014).
This assumption of more serious consequences for Uyghurs expressing discontent was con-
firmed in interviews. As one blogger put it:

… A problem that was posted on a Chinese blog would only be a problem of the Communist party
and the government. But, when the same problem comes to Uyghur people, it will also be a problem
 Information, Communication & Society 869

of separatism. Hence, the same problem in the Uyghur region will have a worse criminal conse-
quence. … Therefore, the government believes that it is ok for Chinese people to talk about such
problems while it would be dangerous for Uyghur people to engage in such talk. (Interview, 6/
27/2014)

Traditional Uyghur sayings and cultural references

Traditional Uyghur sayings and cultural references also appeared in the blogs as a means to
convey rich meanings. During the period of time that we monitored the blogs, there was a
mass stabbing incident at a train station in Kunming, in which 29 were killed and 130 people
were wounded. The incident was recognized as terrorist violence and was blamed on Uyghur
separatists (BBC, 1 March 2014). News about this event was translated into Uyghur from the
Chinese news and posted into one of the blogs. Some of the comments in response to this
news referred to Uyghur traditional sayings to make their point, as shown below.

Comment 1: 03/02/2014: If they were not out of their mind, they would not have thrown eggs on
rocks.
Comment 2: 03/02/2014: ‘Why throw eggs on rock? Because the eggs have suffered enough from the
rock.’ Traditional Uyghur Saying

Both of these comments are employing the same traditional Uyghur saying. The first commenter
uses some poetic license in incorporating the saying into his remark, while the second one quotes
the saying directly, and makes specific reference to the fact that he is doing so. The implication of
this saying is that people do things even when it is hopeless, because they feel they have to or
they have no other choice. Here it is being used to explain the seemingly crazy behavior that
resulted in a stabbing spree in Kunming. The eggs represent the stabbers, and the rock(s) is
the Chinese government, thus suggesting that people in Xinjiang are resorting to violent acts
because they feel they have no other means to express their dissatisfaction with the Chinese
government.
In a different thread, bloggers commented on news posted about yet another violent incident
blamed on Uyghur separatists. In this one, three people who were apparently Uyghurs drove into a
crowd in Tiananmen Square, injuring 40 and killing 2 people.
One response to this news stated:

The government should create education opportunities to help people to foresee their future.
Especially in Xinjiang, there are a lot of youths who need education. There is nothing more to
say about this. ‘A naked foot is not scared of water,’ a man with confidence won’t do stupid
things.

In this comment, the blogger is using a traditional Uyghur saying, ‘a naked foot is not scared of
water’, to emphasize his point that if people are better educated, they will be less likely to commit
terrorist acts.
In addition to traditional Uyghur sayings, other types of Uyghur cultural references also
emerged in the blogs. For example, one blog post entitled ‘Convenient Card or Trouble Card’
described a new policy in Xinjiang that requires everyone to have ‘convenience cards’. These
are ID cards that all Xinjiang residents must obtain in order to buy a house or do business. Accord-
ing to the blogger who started the thread, the use of these cards was implemented in order to
‘prevent terrorism’ and ‘keep social order in Xinjiang’ (blog post 7/26/2014). There was some
discussion about the inconvenience of having to obtain the ‘convenience’ card.
In response to this thread, one person wrote the following:
870 R.A. Clothey et al.

Ah it was a time
I had freedom everywhere
Fall has come and turned into a yellow leaf
Spring has left us forever. (Posted 7/26/2014)

These are lyrics from a Uyghur folk song about the absorption of the short-lived East Turkestan
Republic into the People’s Republic of China in 1949, which is today part of China’s Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region. The blogger is implying through these lyrics that there is no
freedom since the Chinese Communist Party came to the region. However, one would have to
know the history of the region and the lyrics to understand the relevance.
Another example refers to the ‘Apple Dance’ described above, where one blogger related his
remarks about the dance to a facet of Uyghur culture:

Dance can transfer one culture to the other. If they keep shaking their hands like this, our kids will
shake their hands after they wash their hands, and culture is going to be dissolved in us like this
(11/09/2014).

In this statement, the blogger is referring to the fact that in Uyghur culture, drying out one’s hands
by shaking them is considered to be a very disrespectful action. Thus, the statement implies that
the dance (in which the dancers shake their hands) is disrespectful of their culture, and also (more
explicitly) that doing this Chinese dance might endanger Uyghur culture. Such a reference to
shaking water off hands would likely not be familiar to one not well acquainted with the
Uyghur culture.
While some of the political undertones described here are subtle, bloggers whom we inter-
viewed acknowledged that they veil their language so as to avoid being detected. As one
blogger stated:

… As we speak about the way of writing, there is a difference between the government, the web
master, and us, writers; the government wants to restrict everything, the web master prefers to
publish topics that are very popular among the people, and we want to write whatever we like to
write. So we always try to give the web master topics that are, although restricted by the government,
publishable, without getting in to trouble. That is the way I write, and that is what the web masters
wish from us, write something that is hard to detect. (Interview, 6/27/14)

Discussion and conclusion

This paper explored the use of online interactive blogs by Uyghurs as a site for political activism.
Using Scott (1990)’s notion of the ‘hidden transcript’, the paper examined the role of linguistic
adaptions such as sarcasm, metaphors, and traditional proverbs/sayings employed by Uyghurs
as a means of subversive political communication.
As described in this paper, Scott notes two conditions under which a hidden transcript will
be most likely to thrive. The first is that it is insulated from surveillance from above, and the
second is that it comprises solely individuals who share similar experiences of domination. Our
findings not only support but also contribute to the utility of the ‘hidden transcript’ construct in
explaining online social activism. Despite the prevalence of Chinese government censorship of
the Internet through a variety of methods, Uyghurs are still actively discussing issues that are
important to them, in Uyghur, within Uyghur language blogs, and hence are not necessarily
insulated from surveillance. However, as we have also shown, oftentimes their social commen-
tary and critique are veiled through the use of metaphors, sarcasm, and references to traditional
Uyghur sayings and cultural aspects that only an insider or someone very familiar with the
 Information, Communication & Society 871

Uyghur culture and community would recognize. This suggests that a collective identity of
Uyghur ethnicity is a necessary component in order for this type of online activism to
emerge through these blogs. Uyghur bloggers publicly express their ideas within a public
sphere by deploying linguistic codes not transparent to others outside their community. Follow-
ing Mercea’s (2012) idea that interpersonal ties will facilitate offline activism, further research
is needed to ascertain in what ways sharing a common ethnicity in online blogs might also
translate into offline activism.
As described, on occasion the linguistic codes expressed by Uyghurs in the blogs are so subtle
that insiders also misunderstand. Nevertheless, our interviews and blog posts confirm that there is
an intentional effort made by bloggers to disguise subversive meanings, and post them just the
same. This shows that the hidden transcript operates even within a public sphere. Furthermore,
when intended meanings of the hidden transcript are misunderstood within the blogs, this is
made explicit, even if the original meaning is not.
Scott (1990) also notes that the hidden transcript is a substitute for direct subversion against
authorities, which can be valuable particularly when direct subversion is too dangerous. In the
Uyghur case, state surveillance offline in Xinjiang may serve to preclude open defiance of the
Chinese state; however, these blogs provide a continuing means for expressing frustration or
discontent that may be more difficult to state openly and offline. Such blog posts interpreted
through the lens of Scott’s hidden transcript thus also suggest that a lack of open (offline) defi-
ance does not necessarily reflect contentment with the status quo (Bovingdon, 2010). Online
collective action in the form of a hidden transcript may occur when no channels for an
offline equivalent are available. In short, this form of online activism has specifically
emerged within the blogs as a result of online censorship and the limitations for other modes
of offline activism.
Furthermore, as described by Earl and Kimport (2011), collective action found online may
look different from collective action offline. In the Uyghur language blogs, Uyghurs are not
openly defying ‘the system’, nor during the period of time that we monitored the blogs were
they organizing physical acts of public dissent through the blogs; instead, Uyghurs are expressing
their controversial opinions about controversial topics, which may be in opposition to the govern-
ment’s official stance. In this way, the aim is not ‘social activism’ as a means to overthrow auth-
ority, but instead, Uyghur bloggers are creating consciousness within their community about the
issues that are relevant to them. The blogs are thus a potential means to provide a voice for the
voiceless. More research is needed to ascertain to what extent and under what circumstances
this online action may be able to translate into other offline collective action by Uyghurs, or
other ethnic minority groups, and to what extent the government may respond to grievances
expressed online by minority populations.
In addition, more research on the collective use of the Internet by ethnic minority groups in
other country contexts is also needed to better understand the ways in which CMC may be utilized
as a form of collective action, particularly in regions where marginalized communities have
openly expressed discontent. Such studies can help illuminate the perspectives of communities
which may have been marginalized by dominant cultures. An understanding of such may poten-
tially prevent further discontent. In sum, while acts of what are referred to as ‘everyday resistance’
(such as posting comments in a blog) will not likely impact the balance of power, they may serve
to provide a voice to the voiceless, preserve the dignity of marginalized communities, encourage
their empowerment, and strengthen their collective identity.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
872 R.A. Clothey et al.

Notes on contributors
Rebecca A. Clothey is an assistant professor of Education at Drexel University, Philadelphia. Her research
interests include issues of ethnicity, equity and access, public policy and community activism, online social
activism, and international higher education policy. Prior to moving to Philadelphia, Dr Clothey lived in
China for five years where she was based at various higher education institutions throughout the country.
She speaks Mandarin and has a working knowledge of Uyghur, a Turkic language spoken in China’s north-
west region of Xinjiang where her most recent research has been focused. [email: rac52@drexel.edu]
Emmanuel F. Koku is Associate Professor of Sociology at Drexel University, Philadelphia. He holds a B.A.
(Hons) in Sociology from University of Ghana, Legon; an M.A. in Sociology from Queen’s University,
Canada, and a Ph.D in Sociology from the University of Toronto, Canada. Dr Koku’s research interests
are in the social networks, sexual health behaviors, new media use, and knowledge/learning networks.
His current research examines socio-demographic determinants of HIV risk in Africa, the lived experiences
of persons living with HIV in Africa and USA, as well as professional and informal networks of academic
researchers and policy-makers. His publications have appeared in a number of peer-reviewed journals
including American Behavioral Scientist, The Global South, Sociological Research Online, Journal of Com-
munity Health, and Sexual Health. [email: emmanuelkoku@drexel.edu]
Erfan Erkin is from Kashgar; he is a native Uyghur. He is working as a research assistant at Drexel Univer-
sity. [email: ea333@drexel.edu]
Husenjan Emat is from Atush; he is a native Uyghur. He goes to school at Temple University and works as a
research assistant at Drexel University. [email: husanjan424@gmail.com]

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