Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Building Engineering

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jobe

Progressive collapse of Murrah Federal Building: Revisited

J.X. Lu a, H. Wu a, *, Q. Fang b
a
College of Civil Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai, 200092, China
b
PLA Army Engineering University, Nanjing, 210007, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: As a typical incident of progressive collapse of RC structures caused by the terroristic vehicular
Murrah federal building bomb attack, the large-scale collapse of Murrah Federal Building (MFB) in 1995 has been
Blast loadings attracting extensive attentions. The alternate path method and the direct simulation method are
Progressive collapse commonly adopted to evaluate the progressive collapse resistance of buildings. However, the
Numerical simulation simultaneous damage of the structural members adjacent to the removed column and the
Seismic design
instantaneous interactions between the blast wave and the structures are neglected. This paper
aims to revisit the progressive collapse of MFB through the high-fidelity numerical simulations.
Firstly, the hybrid finite element model of MFB was established including both the near-range
refined model and far-range simplified model. Secondly, based on the explicit dynamic finite
element program LS-DYNA, the Arbitrary Lagrangian-Eulerian (ALE) method and Fluid-Structure
Interaction (FSI) algorithms were adopted to simulate the ignition of explosive, propagation of air
blast wave and its interactions with the building structures, which was validated based on an
external explosion test on RC frame structure. Furthermore, the collapse of MFB was predicted
and compared with the on-site photographs in terms of the collapse scopes of entire building and
the damage of local structural members. Finally, three seismic resistant design schemes of MFB
were proposed, and the corresponding progressive collapse resistance of which was further
evaluated. It derives that, (i) the numerical simulation combining the hybrid modelling and ALE
approaches can well reproduce the collapse process of MFB; (ii) the progressive collapse of MFB is
mainly caused by the insufficiency of flexural bearing capacity of the transfer girder due to the
failure of three supporting ground columns, rather than the rotation of the transfer girder; (iii) the
three improved schemes can partially prevent the shear failure of the ground columns and
mitigate the collapse scopes of MFB by 25%–50%, while the progressive collapse still occurs due
to the shear failure of transfer girder; (iv) transfer girder is not recommended for blast-resistant
buildings due to its low redundancy.

1. Background
Due to the spread and intensification of global terrorist activities, bomb attacks against iconic and public buildings have increased
and caused a large number of casualties. From 2008 to 2019, there are more than 300 terrorist bombings against buildings every year
around the world [1]. Since the majority of building structures are not blast-resistant designed, they are vulnerable to the bomb at­
tacks, which may cause the collapse or even progressive collapse followed by catastrophic consequences. For example, on April 19,
1995, a vehicle bomb attack caused the progressive collapse of Murrah Federal Building (MFB), resulting in 168 deaths [2]. On June

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: wuhaocivil@tongji.edu.cn (H. Wu).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobe.2022.104939
Received 2 April 2022; Received in revised form 24 June 2022; Accepted 8 July 2022
Available online 14 July 2022
2352-7102/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

25, 1996, a huge truck-bomb was detonated adjacent to Building #131 in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, causing the partial collapse of the
building, 19 deaths and nearly 500 injuries [3]. Compared with the highly intensive blast waves induced by bomb explosions, more
humans are injured or died attributed to the collapse of the buildings. Therefore, the blast-induced collapse especially the progressive
collapse of buildings, as well as the blast-resistant design and retrofitting measures need in-depth studied.
Progressive collapse is a situation where the spread of an initial local failure from element to element eventually results in the
collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part of it [4]. There are many factors that can trigger the progressive
collapse, e.g., explosion, fire, vehicle impact, construction errors, earthquake, etc. This paper mainly focuses on the blast-induced
progressive collapse of RC building structures. Before the 1990s, there were a few design methods against progressive collapse, e.
g., tie forces method, proposed after the Ronan Point collapse incident in 1968. However, the collapse of MFB and the attack on the
World Trade Center in 2001 triggered the revision and introduction of design methods to evaluate the progressive collapse resistance of
building structures. Several codes, e.g., Design of buildings to resist progressive collapse (UFC 4-023-03) [5] promulgated by Department
of Defense (DoD), Alternate path analysis and design guidelines for progressive collapse resistance [6] issued by General Services Admin­
istration (GSA), and Standard for anti-collapse design of building structures (T/CECS 392–2021) [7] specified by China Association for
Engineering Construction Standardization (CECS), have proposed similar design methods, mainly including the tie forces method,
alternate path method (APM) and enhanced local resistance method. Among them, the widely used method is APM [8], in which a
structure is designed to bridge over its locally damaged portions. By instantaneously removing a single column at critical locations, e.
g., side, corner and inner, APM is applied to analyze the force transition and deformation of the remaining structural members, and
judge whether the progressive collapse will occur. Whereas, for the progressive collapse caused by explosion, APM does not consider
the damage of the structural members adjacent to the removed column under the intensive blast wave, and thus overestimates the
capacity of structure to resist the progressive collapse. To make up the deficiency of APM, two another design methods against the
explosive threats, i.e., the improved APM and the direct simulation method, are recommended in T/CECS 392–2021 [7] and Standard
for blast protection design of civil buildings, (T/CECS 736–2020) [9]. Different from APM, the improved APM imposes non-zero initial
condition, i.e., velocity and displacement, and initial damage to adjacent columns through single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) approach
and Pressure-Impulse (P–I) diagram, i.e., iso-damage curves for structural members related to the instantaneous reflected overpressure
and impulse. Therefore, the improved APM can provides more reliable predictions for blast-induced progressive collapse. However,
this method cannot consider the initial condition and damage of other adjacent members, i.e., walls, beams and slabs, and the accuracy
of which is limited for complex building structures under close-in explosions, e.g., the vehicle bomb attack on MFB. Additionally, the
direct simulation method assesses the risk of progressive collapse by applying blast loading histories on the finite element model of
buildings, the accuracy of which is highly depending on the determinations of the magnitudes and distributions of blast loadings.
Generally, the blast loading parameters, i.e., reflected overpressure- and impulse-time histories, generated by empirical formula are
widely utilized due to the convenience, while it cannot reflect the instantaneous interactions between blast wave and structures with
the complex geometries and arrangement.
Comparably, the Arbitrary Lagrangian-Eulerian (ALE) method and Fluid-Structure Interaction (FSI) algorithm can be adopted to
realize the propagation of blast wave in the air and its interaction with the structures. However, as for the large-scale structures, the
main drawbacks of above method lie in the relatively low computing efficiency attributed to amounts of elements and the complex
contact algorithm, etc. In this paper, to address the above limitations, based on the existing design parameters and on-site survey of
MFB [2], the hybrid modelling approach and ALE method are combined to examine the cause of progressive collapse of MFB. Firstly,
the details of the collapse incident of MFB and the corresponding studies are reviewed to get a complete picture. Subsequently, based
on the explicit dynamic finite element program LS-DYNA [10], the finite element analysis (FEA) approach, i.e., the hybrid modelling

Fig. 1. North view of MFB (a) pre- and (b) post-collapse [2,12].

2
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

approach, element types and size, material model and parameters, and numerical algorithms, is proposed. A classic external explosion
test [11] on typical RC frame structure is selected to verify the validities of both the hybrid modelling and ALE approaches.
Furthermore, the collapse process of MFB is numerically predicted and compared with the on-site survey photographs, and the un­
derlying causes of the progressive collapse of MFB are examined. Finally, concerning the MFB is not seismic designed, the influences of
three improved seismic design schemes on the progressive collapse resistance of MFB are further assessed. The present work and
conclusions can provide an efficient FEA approach for the collapse resistant evaluation and design of large-scale buildings.

2. Introduction of collapse incident of MFB

As illustrated above, the consequence of the blast-induced progressive collapse of MFB is catastrophic, and the relatively complete
information of the bombing attack is available, which motivates the revisiting of this collapse incident in this paper. Concerning the
details of the collapse of MFB, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), i.e., 1800 kg of equivalent TNT charge, was
detonated at the north side of MFB, 4.75 m away from the nearest side ground column G20 [2,12]. As a result, the failure of ground
columns and transfer girder in this bomb attack leaded to the disproportional and progressive collapse of MFB. Photographs of MFB
pre- and post-collapse are shown in Fig. 1.
MFB was a United States federal government complex, constructed from 1974 to 1976 in Oklahoma City, USA [13,14]. The total
height of MFB was 36 m with nine floors, and the overall plan dimension was 61 m in the east-west direction and 21 m in the
north-south direction, respectively [2]. In terms of structural design, MFB adopted a frame-core tube structure system in line with ACI
318–71 [15] for non-seismic design. In order to satisfy the requirements of architectural design, a transfer girder was arranged at the
third floor of column line G, supporting the upper columns to increase the available space of the lower floors. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 present
the ground floor plan and north elevation view of MFB, including the location of the explosion and the layout of main structural
elements, e.g., columns G16, G20 and G24.
As a critical structural member of MFB, the transfer girder was 914 mm in width and 1524 mm in depth. Fig. 4(a) presents the
detailed size and reinforcements of the transfer girder. Note that the bottom bars at the beam-column joints are discontinuous [2].
There were six support columns connected to the transfer girder arranged at an interval of 12.2 m. The design information of the four
middle columns (G12, G16, G20 and G24) has been given in Ref. [2], i.e., the cross-sectional dimension was 508 mm × 914 mm, and
the reinforcement consisted of 20#11 vertical bars (20 steel bars and the diameter is 11 × 1/8 inch), with #4 (4 × 1/8 inch) hori­
zontally tied at the center with a spacing of 406 mm, as shown in Fig. 4(b). Additionally, the cross-sectional dimension of the upper
columns supported by the transfer girder was 406 mm × 610 mm, and the reinforcement consists of 4#9 vertical bars, with #3
horizontally tied at the center with a spacing of 406 mm. The north-south beam of MFB was designed as a wide-shallow beam with
1219 mm in width and 508 mm in depth. Additionally, the slab system was arranged as one-way slabs with a thickness of 152 mm. The
detailed sizes and reinforcements of the north-south beam and one-way slabs are presented in Fig. 4(c). The design information of other
structural members can be found in Ref. [2].

3. Literature reviews
After the collapse incident of MFB, many scholars utilized various methods to analyze the causes of the progressive collapse of MFB.
According to the debris from MFB, Hinman and Hammond [12] and Osteraas [16] found that the transfer girder was rotated by 90◦ and
lay inboard of column line G (Fig. 2), and inferred that the transfer girder suffered torsional failure under the lateral pull of slab, which
leaded to the collapse of MFB. However, the theoretical basis of the above conclusion is insufficient to some extent. Through the
multi-degree-of-freedom (MDOF) model and the McVay chart [17] on the damage modes of RC slab under explosion, Byfield and

Fig. 2. Ground floor plan of MFB [2] (unit: mm).

3
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 3. North elevation of MFB [2] (unit: m).

Fig. 4. Dimensions and reinforcements of (a) transfer girder (b) support columns (c) north-south beam and one-way slabs [2] (unit: mm).

Paramasivam [18] accurately predicted the brisance failure of column G20 as well as the shear failure of columns G16 and G24.
Furthermore, the transfer girder was replaced by a conventional beam-column arrangement, of which the collapse scopes are still
similar to that of the original MFB. Thus, it was concluded that the use of a transfer girder may not be responsible for the progressive
collapse. However, the above analyses only consider the damage of columns, and neglect the internal forces and deformations of the
remaining structural members after the failure of columns, which may lead to the unreliable conclusion about the safety of using the
transfer girder. Based on the principle of virtual work, FEMA/ASCE [2] carried out a static analysis on the plane frame of column line G
(Fig. 2) after removing the column G20, and argued that the failure of column G20 could trigger the progressive collapse of MFB. This
method has obvious defects, i.e., the Vierendeel frame action of the entire structure is not considered, and only column G20 was
removed without considering the damage of adjacent ground columns. Furthermore, Kazemi-Moghaddam and Sasani [19] established
a finite element model of MFB with the open-source computer program OpenSees, and employed APM to analyze the redistributions of
the internal force after the sudden removal of column G20. Contrary to the conclusion of FEMA/ASCE [2], it showed that the removal
of only column G20 would not trigger the progressive collapse of MFB attributed to the Vierendeel frame action. Although the FEA
approach considering the Vierendeel frame action is more appropriate, the damage of adjacent columns is still ignored, which may
yield the unconvincing predictions especially for the collapse of buildings triggered by explosions.
On the other hand, with the rapid development of the computer software and hardware, the numerical simulation of the MFB
collapse process has become more feasible and reliable. Tagel-Din and Rahman [20] employed the applied element method (AEM) to
reproduce the collapse process of MFB, and obtained a similar collapse scope with the incident. Additionally, an improved design of
MFB was proposed in which the rebars are continuous and the reinforcement area is double the existing value of the transfer girder.
The decreased damage scope was derived, i.e., only column G20 and partial slabs were severely damaged, indicating that the increase
of reinforcement ratio and the continuity of rebars can effectively prevent the progressive collapse. Since the connectivity, deformation
and even separation of elements can be achieved by a set of normal and shear springs between each element, AEM is considered as a
more accurate method to simulate the fracture of members and the collapse of entire structure. However, the applicability of which in
blast-resistance analyses is doubted since the adoption of free-field pressure wave model neglects the interaction between blast wave
and the building structures. Comparably, Kim and Wee [21] established a refined model of MFB by AEM, obtained the collapse scopes
closer to the incident, and put forward two improved design schemes: (i) replacing the transfer girder by a conventional beam-column
arrangement; (ii) using the roof spandrel beam with identical size and properties to the transfer girder. The numerical simulations
indicate that the progressive collapse could be resisted by above two schemes with the damage scopes restrained to 9% and 12%,
respectively. Regrettably, similar to Tagel-Din and Rahman [20], the blast loadings in above simulation work also fails to incorporate
the interactions between the blast wave and building structure.

4
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Generally, the existing studies about the collapse incident of MFB still have the following limitations: (i) the blast-induced damage
extent of structural members adjacent to column G20 is not considered, e.g., studies based on APM; (ii) in the existing numerical
simulation, the loading-time history approach was commonly adopted, i.e., the blast loadings are applied to the structure surface based
on the empirical formula. The simulation results are not reliable since the instantaneous interactions between the blast wave and
building structures are neglected and the deviations exist in the determination of blast loadings; (iii) without adopting the damage
plastic material models, most of the existing studies fail to reveal the instantaneous damage degrees and failure modes of structural
members under both of the explosion and collapse process.

4. Validations of FEA approach

In this section, an external explosion test on typical RC frame structure conducted by Woodson and Baylot [11] is selected to
validate the proposed FEA approach, i.e., the hybrid modelling approach, element types and size, material model and parameters, and
numerical algorithms, which will be further adopted to numerically reproduce the progressive collapse of MFB in Section 5.

4.1. Material models

(1) Concrete in the refined region

The dynamic behavior of concrete in the refined region is described by the *MAT_CONCRETE_ DAMAGE_REL3 model, i.e., the K&C
(Karagozian & Case) model [10], which is widely applied to simulate dynamic response of concrete under blast and impact loadings.
By using three pressure-sensitive, independent strength surfaces, K&C model can capture the variations in hardening and softening
behaviors exhibited by concrete. Moreover, it can reflect the strain rate effect of the concrete material strength by introducing the
dynamic increase factor (DIF), where DIF refers to the ratio of dynamic strength to static strength of the material at a certain strain rate
[22]. In this model, the tensile and compressive DIFs are expressed as [23]:
/ {
0.26(logε̇d ) + 2.06, ε̇d ≤ 1s− 1
TDIF = ftd fts = (1)
2(logε̇d ) + 2.06, 1s− 1 < ε̇d ≤ 2s− 1
/ {
0.04(logε̇d ) + 1.22, ε̇d ≤ 30s− 1
CDIF = fcd fcs = (2)
0.90(logε̇d )2 − 2.83(logε̇d ) + 3.49, ε̇d > 30s− 1

where TDIF and CDIF are the tensile and compressive DIF, ftd and fcd are the dynamic tensile and compressive strength at strain rate ε̇d ,
fts and fcs are the static tensile and compressive strength, respectively.
During the explosion and collapse stages, concrete experiences excessive crushing and spalling damage. Aiming to accurately
describe the damage degree and failure modes of concrete, and avoid the calculation termination caused by excessively distorted
elements, the maximum principal strain-based failure criterion is adopted to remove the highly distorted element through the keyword
*MAT_ADD_EROSION.
(2) Rebar in the refined region

The *MAT_PLASTIC_KINEMATIC model is adopted to capture the material behaviors of rebars in the refined region, which is
capable of describing elastic-plastic behaviors with kinematic and isotropic hardening [10]. In addition, the model takes effective
plastic strain as the failure criterion, and the elements will be deleted when the strain exceeds the preset threshold, i.e., 0.14 at present.
In order to account the strain rate effect, the Cowper-Symonds model is used to scale the yield stress by the dynamic increase factor
(DIFS) as [10]:
( ε̇ )P1
DIFS = 1 + (3)
C

where ε̇ is the strain rate, C and P are the strain rate parameters.

(3) RC members in the simplified region

The *MAT_PLASTICITY_COMPRESSION_TENSION model is adopted for RC beams and columns in the simplified region, which can
describe the elastic-plastic behavior of RC members by defining the compressive and tensile yield stress versus plastic strain curves. In
addition, the model includes a failure criterion based on the plastic strain. By inputting the material parameters and failure strains of
concrete and rebars, the responses and failure of RC beams and columns can be realized. In this study, the constitutive model of the
rebars is described by bilinear stress-strain curve, similar with rebars in the refined region. The uniaxial stress-strain curve of concrete
based on Chinese Code for design of concrete structures, (GB 50010–2010) [24] is adopted to describe the unconfined concrete as
⎧ ρc n /
⎪
⎪ 1− ( / )n ​ , εc εc,r ≤ 1
⎨ n − 1 + εc εc,r
σc = (1 − dc )Ec εc ​ , ​ dc = ρc / (4)
⎪
⎪
⎩1 − ( / )2 / ​ , εc εc,r > 1
αc εc εc,r − 1 + εc εc,r

5
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

⎛ ⎞ ⎧ ( ( / )) /
5
⎨ 1 − ρt 1.2 − 0.2 εt εt,r
⎪ ​ , εt εt,r ≤ 1
σt = ⎜ ⎟
⎝1 − dt ⎠Ec εt ​ , ​ dt = ρt / (5)
⎪
⎩1 − ( / )1.7 / ​ , εt εt,r > 1
αt εt εt,r − 1 + εt εt,r

where σc and σt are the compressive and tensile stress, εc and εt are the compressive and tensile strain, Ec is the elastic modulus, dc and
dt are the damage evolution parameters under uniaxial compression and tension, αc and αt are the reference values in the descending
stage of uniaxial compressive and tensile stress-strain curves, ρc = fc,r /(Ec εc,r ), ρt = ft,r /(Ec εt,r ), n = Ec εc,r /(Ec εc,r − fc,r ), fc,r and ft,r are
uniaxial compressive and tensile strength, εc,r and εt,r are the corresponding strain.
Additionally, the Mander confined concrete model [25] is adopted to describe the stirrup-confined concrete, and the corresponding
compressive strength fcc can be described as:
′

( √̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ )
′ ′
7.94f l fl
(6)
′ ′
fcc = fco − 1.254 + 2.254 1 + ′ − 2 ′
f co fco

where fco is the unconfined concrete compressive strength, fl is the effective lateral confining stress.
′ ′

The *MAT_CONCRETE_EC2 model is used for RC slabs in the simplified region. By changing the value of the fraction of rein­
forcement (FRACR), the model can represent plain concrete only (FRACR = 0), reinforcing steel only (FRACR = 1), or a smeared
combination of concrete and reinforcement (0<FRACR<1) [10]. Moreover, FRACR can be defined in mutually perpendicular di­
rections by FRACRX (x-axis) and FRACRY (y-axis), which is suitable for describing the slabs with two-way reinforcement mesh.
Combined with the keyword *PART_COMPOSITE, the concrete and rebars in the slabs can be arranged in different layers and described
separately. Similarly, in order to reproduce the fracture of RC slabs after the failure of concrete and rebars, the keyword *MAT_A­
DD_EROSION is adopted, and the maximum principal strain is taken as the failure criterion, i.e., 0.0033 and 0.14 for concrete and
rebars, respectively.
(4) TNT
The explosive detonation process of TNT is described by Chapman-Jouguet (CJ) model, which ignores the chemical reaction
process and only considers the final reaction heat. In LS-DYNA [10], CJ model employs the *MAT_HIGH_EXOLOSIVE_BURN material
model and *EOS_JWL equation of state to describe the detonation pressure P as [10]:
( ) ( )
ω ω ωE
P=A 1− e− R1 V + B 1 − e− R2 V + (7)
R1 V R2 V V

where V is the relative volume, E is the initial unit volume energy, and the coefficients A, B, R1 , R2 , ω are determined experimentally.
(5) Air
The air is described as a non-viscous ideal gas by the *MAT_NULL material model and the *EOS_LINEAR_POLYNOMIAL equation of
state as [10]:
( )
P = C0 + C1 μ + C2 μ2 + C3 μ3 + C4 + C5 μ + C6 μ2 E (8a)

1
μ= − 1 (8b)
V

Table 1
Material model parameters of the hybrid finite element model.

Refined region

Rebar (*MAT_PLASTIC_KINEMATIC) Concrete (*MAT_CONCRETE_DAMAGE_REL3 &

*MAT_ADD_EROSION)

Density Elastic Poison Yield stress Strain rate Strain rate Failure Density Uniaxial Maximum
modulus ratio parameter C parameter P strain compressive failure principal
strength strain
1
7800 206 GPa 0.3 400–450 MPa 40 s− 5 0.14 2400 38.5 MPa (27.6 0.5 (0.2)
kg/ (196.5 (413.7/275.8 kg/m3 MPa)
m3 GPa) MPa)

Simplified region

RC column and beam (*MAT_PLASTICITY_COMPRESSION_TENSION) RC slab (*MAT_CONCRETE_EC2)

Concrete Poison ratio Elastic Modulus Failure strain Concrete Uniaxial compressive strength Uniaxial tensile strength
0.2 30 GPa 0.003 38.5 MPa (27.6 MPa) 2.85 MPa (2.4 MPa)
Rebar Poison ratio Elastic Modulus Failure strain Rebar Poison ratio Ultimate strength
0.3 206 GPa (196.5 GPa) 0.14 0.3 609.5 MPa (737.7 MPa)

6
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

where P is the pressure, C0~C6 are the constants of equation of state, E is the initial specific internal energy, μ is the density change rate,
and V is the relative volume.
The values of main material model parameters of the hybrid finite element model are listed in Table 1. Considering the differences
of material parameters between the benchmark test in Section 4.2 and MFB in Section 5.1, the values for MFB are listed in parenthesis.
It should be noted that the failure strain of the concrete model in the refined region is determined by comparisons of the tested and
simulated displacement-time histories in the benchmark test. For the other material models, the failure strain is determined by the
commonly-used material properties. Additionally, the parameters of air and TNT are given in Table 2.

4.2. Validations
In LS-DYNA [10], there are three widely-adopted methods to simulate the instantaneous blast loadings: Load Blast method, impulse
method and ALE method. Based on the ConWep algorithms, Load Blast method applies the reflected overpressure-time histories on the
surface of structure by the keywords *LOAD_BLAST _SEGMENT and *LOAD_BLAST. Impulse method applies the impulse induced
velocities of detonation wave directly on the surface nodes of structures to simulate blast loadings through the keywords *SET_­
NODE_LIST and *INITIAL_VELOCITY. Although these two methods are convenient to use, it is unable to reflect the FSI and the
spatio-temporal propagation of blast wave in the complex building structures. Comparably, the ALE method combines the advantages
of both Lagrange and Euler methods to effectively describe the propagation of blast wave, and the interactions between blast wave and
structure can be realized by combining the FSI algorithms. Therefore, ALE method is adopted at present to simulate the blast loadings.
Aiming to reproduce the collapse process of MFB, the external explosion test on RC frame structure conducted by Woodson and
Baylot [11] is selected to validate the adopted FEA approach, i.e., the hybrid modelling approach, element types and size, material
model and parameters, and numerical algorithms. As shown in Fig. 5(a and b), the tested frame is a 1/4-scaled two-story RC structure
with two bays in the long direction and one bays in the short direction. The thickness of the slab is 41 mm, and the dimension of the
middle column is 89 mm × 89 mm. The compressive strength of concrete is 38.5 MPa, and the yield strength of rebars are 400–450
MPa. During the explosion test, a heavy block is set at the top of the two middle columns to represent the gravity load of the su­
perstructure. The reaction buttresses are set at the back of the frame to play a role of supporting the rest of the structure. A hemi­
spherical C-4 explosive charge of 7.1 kg (8.9 kg of equivalent TNT) is used in the test, which is 230 mm from the ground. In addition, a
total of seven reflected overpressure sensors are arranged in the test, of which three (F1, F2 and F3) are located in the front of the
middle target column, two (B1 and B2) are located in the back of the middle column, and two (R1 and R2) are arranged at the
symmetrical position of measuring point F1 with respect to the explosive as the reference measuring point. An acceleration sensor (A1)
is located in the back of the lower-story middle target column. In this paper, two scenarios of the test are selected for the FEA approach
validations, and the corresponding standoff distances, i.e., distances from the charge center to the middle target column, are 1.52 m
(Scenario 1) and 1.05 m (Scenario 2), respectively.
The refined finite element model of the above-mentioned test is established, as shown in Fig. 5(c). In terms of element types and
mesh sizes, the concrete and rebars with the mesh size of 10 mm are discretized by constant stress solid elements with one integration
point and Hughes-Liu beam elements with 2 × 2 Gauss integration, respectively. The air and TNT with the mesh size of 50 mm are
modeled by ALE multi-material solid elements with one integration point. The materials models introduced in Section 4.1, i.e., K&C
model, *MAT_PLASTIC_KINEMATIC model, etc., are adopted. In terms of contact algorithms, the contact between TNT, air and RC
structures is FSI realized through the keyword *CONSTRAINED_LAGRANGE_IN_SOLID. FSI is also utilized between the rebars and
concrete. For the loads and boundary conditions, the gravity load is applied to the entire model by the keyword *LOAD_BODY_Z. The
additional loadings attribute to the heavy block are applied to the top of the two middle columns by the keyword *LOAD_SEG­
MENT_SET. Moreover, the keyword *BOUNDARY_SPC_SET is used to constrain all the freedoms of the foot of test frames. As shown in
Fig. 5(c), the entire model is covered by the air domain, the boundary of which is set as a non-reflective boundary by the keyword
*BOUNDARY_NON_REFLECTING. The ground is assumed to be infinite and rigid, which is realized by the keyword
*RIGIDWALL_PLANAR_FINITE.
Fig. 6 presents the comparisons of the reflected overpressure-time histories between the test and simulations in Scenario 1 and
Scenario 2, respectively. It can be seen that the reflected overpressure in Scenario 2 is larger than that in Scenario 1 due to the decrease
of the standoff distance. Considering the influence of complex field environment on the measured reflected overpressures, it can be
regarded that the simulated results of these measuring points agree well with the test data in terms of the reflected overpressure-time
histories. Furthermore, Fig. 7 presents the comparisons of the experimental and numerically simulated blast impulse distributions
along the height of the middle column in two scenarios. The simulated impulses in Scenario 1 near the ground are greater than those in
the test, the reason lies in that the rigid ground is assumed in the finite element model, resulting in relatively greater reflected blast
impulse. Comparably, the simulated impulse values at other measuring points are close to the experimental values. Finally, the lateral

Table 2
Material model parameters of air and TNT.

Air (*MAT_NULL & *EOS_LINEAR_POLYNOMIAL)

Initial density Initial energy E0 Pressure cutoff Dynamic viscosity coefficient C0, C1, C2, C3, C6 C4 , C5
1.29 kg/m3 2.5 × 105 J/m3 0 0 0 0.4

TNT (*MAT_HIGH_EXPLOSIVE_BURN & *EOS_JWL)

Initial density Detonation velocity D Burst pressure PCJ A B R1 R2 ω E0
1630 kg/m3 6930 m/s 21 GPa 373.8 GPa 3.747 GPa 4.15 0.9 0.35 6 × 109 J/m3

7
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 5. Test setup and layout of measuring points (a) photograph [11] (b) schematic diagram (c) refined finite element model (unit: mm).

Fig. 6. Comparisons of the reflected overpressure-time histories at (a) F1 (b) B1 (c) B2 in Scenario 1 (d) F2 in Scenario 2.

displacement-time histories of lower-story middle column (point A1) are presented in Fig. 8 by integrating the recorded accelerations.
In two scenarios, the deviations of the simulated maximum displacements compared with the test data are both less than 20%.
Therefore, it can be drawn that the refined FEA approach is reliable, and the corresponding element types, material model and pa­
rameters, as well as the numerical algorithms can be further utilized for examining the collapse incident of MFB.
Aiming to further improve the computing efficiency by using the ALE algorithm, especially for the large-scale building structures, e.
g., MFB concerned at present, the hybrid modelling approach is adopted. That is to say, the close-range regions of building structures
near the explosion location are discretized with refined solid elements, while the remaining regions are simplified into beam (column,
beam) or shell (floor and roof slab) elements. At follows, the feasibility of the hybrid modelling approach is examined through the
above Woodson and Baylot [11] test. As shown in Fig. 9, the hybrid model of the test Scenario 2 is established, and three measuring
points (P1, P2 and P3) are set at the middle and corner columns reflecting the dynamic responses of the frame. Different from the
refined finite element model, the structural members of the 2nd floor are treated as the simplified region, thus the corresponding RC

8
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 7. Comparisons of the impulse distributions along the height of the middle column in (a) Scenario 1 (b) Scenario 2.

Fig. 8. Comparisons of the displacement-time histories of at A1 in (a) Scenario 1 (b) Scenario 2.

Fig. 9. Hybrid finite element model of Scenario 2 (unit: mm).

beams and columns are discretized by Hughes-Liu beam elements with integration rules defined by *INTEGRATION_BEAM, and the RC
slabs are meshed by Belytschko-Tsay shell elements with integration rules defined by *PART_COMPOSITE. The corresponding material
models in the simplified region are introduced in Section 4.1. In addition, the rigid connection between the refined region and
simplified region is adopted through the keyword *CONSTRAINED_NODAL_RIGID _BODY, realizing the transfer of force and
displacement between these two regions. The shared node method is used to constrain the interconnected RC members in the
simplified region. It should be noted that, in this case, the air domain only needs to cover the 1st floor of the frame, thus the element

9
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

number can be reduced so as to improve the numerical computing efficiency.

Fig. 10 compares the lateral displacement-time histories of the measuring point P1, as well as the vertical displacement-time
histories of the measuring points P2 and P3 between the refined and the hybrid models. It can be concluded that the predicted
displacement-time histories of three measuring points in the hybrid model agree well with those in the refined model. Furthermore, it
can be seen that the damage contours of two models are almost identical for the 1st floor, as shown in Fig. 11. Therefore, the feasi­
bilities of the hybrid modelling approach applied in the blast-resistant analyses of building structures are also verified.

5. Numerical simulations
In this section, the FEA approach, i.e., the hybrid modelling approach, element types and size, material model and parameters, and
numerical algorithms, validated in Section 4 are applied to numerically reproduce the progressive collapse of MFB and reasonably
examine the cause of the progressive collapse incident.

5.1. Hybrid finite element model

According to post-blast on-site survey [2], the failure of columns, beams and slabs in the range of column lines F-G at 1st-3rd floors
of MFB is highly involved into the progressive collapse, thus these structural members are modeled with the refined solid elements to
analyze the dynamic responses and damage modes. Meanwhile, the remaining structural members are simplified into beam or shell
elements. The established hybrid finite element model of MFB is shown in Fig. 12.
The element types are consistent with the verified hybrid model in Section 4.2. To improve the calculation efficiency, columns G16,
G20, G24, part of transfer girder within the range of G16-G24, and their surrounding slabs close to the bomb crater, are considered to
be the initial failure members, with a denser mesh size of 50 mm. The coarser mesh size is utilized for the other structural members, i.e.,
100 mm. The air and TNT are discretized with the mesh size of 200 mm. The total number of elements for the overall model of MFB is
3,604,252, including 1,664,671 constant stress solid elements, 1,161,775 shell elements, 323,814 Hughes-Liu beam elements and
453,992 ALE elements. The corresponding material models and parameters are introduced in Section 4.1. The boundary conditions
and contact algorithms are consistent with those in Section 4.2, except that the keyword *CONTACT_ERODING_SINGLE_SURFACE is
employed for all structural members to characterize the collisions between the inner structural members during the collapse process. In
addition, due to the limited available information of design load distribution of MFB, the live load of the structure, considered
equivalent to the uniformly distributed load, is taken as 2.4 kPa referring to the design load of the office area of MFB [2], which is
realized by the keyword *LOAD_SEGMENT_SET. Before the detonation, the keyword *CONTROL_DYNAMIC_RELAXATION is
employed to make the entire structure reach the equilibrium state under dead and live loadings. Considering both the hardware and
software capacity limitations, the air domain covers the refined structural members with a denser mesh, as shown in Fig. 12.
The entire simulation process is divided into three stages, i.e., gravity stabilization stage, explosion stage (0–0.04 s) and collapse
stage (0.04–1.44 s). The full restart algorithm is adopted to initialize the collapse stage with the stress-strain state at the end of the
explosion stage through the keyword *STRESS_INITIALIZATION, and the ALE elements are removed at the collapse stage to improve
the computing efficiency.

5.2. Collapse of entire structure

Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 present the damage contours of whole MFB at the explosion and building collapse stages, respectively. In Fig. 13
(a), attributed to the dead and live loads, before the detonation, there are slight plastic strains in the concrete at the bottom of the mid
span, and the top of the transfer girder end attributed to the developed tensile stress, which is common occurred for long-span beams.
In Fig. 13(b), at the beginning of the explosion, the blast wave firstly reaches the column G20 at about 2 ms, resulting in that the foot of
the column G20 enter into plastic state (effective plastic strain = 2). With the propagation of the blast wave, the structural damage
develops gradually. At the time instant of 6 ms, as shown in Fig. 13(c), the blast wave enters the structure and impinging on the

Fig. 10. Comparisons of the displacement-time histories at (a) P1 (b) P2 (c) P3

10
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 11. Damage contours of (a) refined model (b) hybrid model.

Fig. 12. Hybrid finite element model of MFB (unit: mm).

structural members, i.e., the 2nd and 3rd floor slabs, beams and columns, which cannot be realized by the direct simulation method. In
Fig. 13(d), the concrete at the foot of columns G24 and G16 enters plasticity. In Fig. 13(e) and (f), the 3rd floor slabs are engulfed by the
blast wave and subjected to upward flexural deformation. At the end of the explosion stage, in Fig. 13(g) and (h), the blast wave
transmits through the boundary of the air domain and no longer interacts with the building structure.
Fig. 14 presents the instantaneous damage contours of the entire structure at collapse stage of MFB. After the explosion, the gravity
becomes the dominant force at the collapse stage. In Fig. 14(a), each floor begun to deflect slightly, and the slabs on the 3rd floor is
reversely arched under the upward blast loadings. Afterwards, at 0.4 s, the obvious deflection of each floor occurs as presented in
Fig. 14(b). At the time instant of 0.6 s, as shown in Fig. 14(c), the large deflection of each floor occurs along with the obvious flexure of
the transfer girder. Then, in Fig. 14(d), each floor is fractured along the column lines 12 and 28. Subsequently, in Fig. 14(e), the
detachment of all the spandrel beams can be seen at column lines 12 and 28, and the fracture of each floor extends along the column
line F. Then, the superstructure is rapidly collapsing and the transfer girder hits the ground, as shown in Fig. 14(f). Finally, in Fig. 14(g
and h), most of the fractured transfer girder lies on the ground, and meanwhile the collapsed superstructure is stacked on the ground
floor. It should be noted that the termination computing time of the numerical simulation in this paper is 1.44 s. The reason lies in that,
(i) due to the impacting and stacking of the inner structural members during the later periods of collapse process, the meshes are

11
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 13. Damage contours of MFB during explosion stage at (a) 0 ms (b) 2 ms (c) 6 ms (d) 8 ms (e) 10 ms (f) 16 ms (g) 24 ms (h) 40 ms

seriously distorted, resulting in a sharp increase of the calculation time cost; (ii) a large number of members has been separated from
the main structure before 1.44 s, which can already reflect the progressive collapse scopes of entire building. Accordingly, the whole
numerical simulation is allowed to run for approximately 3 days with 32 CPU cores (clock speed = 2.70 GHz) on the platform of Linux
Xeon64 System.
Fig. 15 presents the comparisons between the terminal simulation results and the post-blast on-site photographs of the north
elevation of MFB. It shows that the progressive collapse of MFB occurs at all floors within the scope of column lines F-G (south-north)
and column lines 12–28 (west-east), while the structural members located on column lines 28 and 8–12 exhibits no signs of collapse,
which are consistent with the actual collapse scopes of MFB.

5.3. Behaviors of local structural members

In Refs. [2,12,16], photographs of some ground columns, transfer girder and the surrounding slabs after the collapse incident are
given, and it is believed that the failure of these members triggers the progressive collapse. Therefore, the simulation results of local
structural members are compared with post-blast on-site photographs to reasonably analyze the damage degree and dynamic responses
of these members in detail.
In Fig. 16, the local damage around columns G12 and G28 is compared with the photographs. The failure and fracture of the
transfer girder and spandrel beams occur at the west side of column G12, and the slabs are separated from the main structure along
column line 12, as shown in Fig. 16(a, b, c). In Fig. 16(d), only a segment in the middle of column G24 remains, and the transfer girder
falls to the inboard of the structure after detached at the joint of column G28, while column G28 remains stable without affected by the
failure of surrounding members.
Fig. 17 presents the damage contours of columns G16, G20 and G24, respectively. Under the intensive near-ground blast loadings,
the foots of columns G16 and G24 endure the shear failure, and column G16 suffer more serious damage attributed to the smaller
standoff distance of explosive. Column G20, as the closest ground column from the vehicle bomb, is subjected to the most significant
damage with serious crush and total breach of concrete, as well as the exposure of rebars at column foot. Meanwhile, due to the robust
support of the lateral bracing at the middle of the column, the upper half of the column G20 undergoes slight deformation, while the
lower half of the column is seriously bent to the inboard of MFB. As the superstructure drops downward under the gravity, the lateral
deformation of each column is aggravated with the crushing of concrete. Fig. 18 presents the comparisons between the actual residual
segment of column G24 and the simulation results. The damage modes of them are basically identical, i.e., being crushed by upper load
after shear failure occurs at top and bottom ends.
As an essential support of the superstructure, the failure of transfer girder will directly lead to the progressive collapse. Fig. 19

12
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 14. Damage contours of MFB during collapse stage at (a) 0.2 s (b) 0.4 s (c) 0.6 s (d) 0.8 s (e) 1.0 s (f) 1.2 s (g) 1.4 s (h) 1.44 s.

presents the damage contours of the transfer girder at the time instant of 1.4 s, i.e., after the failure of columns G16, G20 and G24. Due
to the failure of the ground columns, on one hand, the negative moment of the transfer girder above these columns reverses to the
positive, and the corresponding compressive rebars at the bottom reverse to endure the tensile forces; on the other hand, the negative
moment at column lines 12 and 28 increases, and the corresponding rebars at the top endure more tensile forces. Unfortunately, these
discontinuous rebars at the bottom and overlapped rebars at the top cannot provide the necessary tensile bearing capacity, thus the
failure in the vertical plane of the transfer girder occurs. In addition, attributed to the intensive inward blast loadings and the lateral
pull of the surrounding slabs, the transfer girder is deformed in the horizontal plane and rotated by 90◦ to the inboard of MFB in both
the numerical simulations and on-site survey.
As a result of explosion, the blast overpressure leads to the slabs of the 3rd floor being arched upward with flexural failure at the
time instant of 0.1 s, as shown in Fig. 20. On one hand, this phenomenon is attributed to the intensive upward blast loadings; on the
other hand, only the downward dead and live loadings are considered in the design of the slabs, so that the original slabs are only
reinforced in the bottom of mid span and top of the support as shown in Fig. 4(c), which leads to the inefficient flexural bearing

13
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 15. Comparisons of collapse scopes between the incident and simulation results from (a) northwest view and (b) northeast view (photos from Refs. [2,26]).

Fig. 16. Comparisons of local structural damage (a) northeast view (b) north view (c) northwest view around column G12, and (d) north view around column G28
(photos from Refs. [2,12]).

capacity of slabs under the upward loads.

Based on the above comparisons between the simulation results and post-blast on-site photographs, the numerical simulations of
the progressive collapse incident MFB is regarded as a satisfying reproduction, in which the collapse scopes of the entire building and

14
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 17. Damage contours of ground column (a) G24 (b) G20 (c) G16 (photos from Ref. [2]).

Fig. 18. Comparisons of the residual segment of column G24 (photos from Ref. [2]).

Fig. 19. Damage contours of transfer girder (photos from Ref. [16]).

the damage modes of the local structural members are both well predicted.

5.4. Cause of MFB collapse incident

Based on the above discussions, in this section, the possible causes of the collapse of MFB can be examined based on the numerical
simulation results. In Refs. [2,16], based on survey of the post-blast site, there are two main views on the causes of MFB collapse: (i) the
flexural bearing capacity of the transfer girder is insufficient to support the superstructure after the failure of the supporting ground
columns; (ii) the transfer girder is rotated under the lateral pull of the surrounding slabs. The main difference of these two views is the
failure mode of the transfer girder. Therefore, it is necessary to determine which failure mode occurs earlier and dominate the initial
collapse. Fig. 21 presents the vertical displacement-time histories of the 3rd floor slab, the transfer girder and the roof above G20. It
indicates that, at the beginning of collapse stage, both of the transfer girder and roof drop rapidly under gravity, while the slab moves

15
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 20. Damage contours of slabs of 3rd floor (a) north view (b) northeast view.

Fig. 21. Displacement-time histories of structural members.

upward due to the upward loading effect of blast loadings. At 0.65 s, the transfer girder suffered flexure failure at the column lines 24
and 16. Meanwhile, the downward displacements of the transfer girder and roof are close to 1600 mm, indicating the trend of pro­
gressive collapse. However, the lateral pull force is too small to rotate the transfer girder at the instant of 0.65 s, i.e., the time instant
that the slab falls back to the original height. In addition, Fig. 22 further presents the instantaneous position of the cross-section of
transfer girder near the column G20. At 0.8 s, the transfer girder dropped vertically with the height of approximately 2.3 m, i.e., half
height of a floor, attributed to its flexure failure. Subsequently, the rotating trend occurs and eventually causes the transfer girder
rotated by 90◦ . Thus, we can draw that the flexure failure of the transfer girder occurs earlier than its rotation. Based on the above
analyses, it is considered that the insufficient flexural bearing capacity of the transfer girder after the failure of three supporting ground
columns is the main reason for the progressive collapse of MFB, while the rotation of the transfer girder occurs during the succeeding
collapse process.

6. Further discussions
Till the 1970s, the codes for structural seismic design had not been well-developed, and thus MFB was non-seismic designed. By
referring the specifications of Chinese code GB 50010–2010 [24] and the Technical specification for concrete structures of tall building
(JGJ 3–2010) [27], it can be found that the seismic designs of columns G16, G20, G24 and the transfer girder have obvious defects.

16
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 22. Instantaneous position of the cross-section of transfer girder.

(i) The stirrup spacing is 406.4 mm for columns G16, G20 and G24. However, according to the code GB 50010–2010 [24], the
stirrups spacing of columns in ordinary frame structure should not be larger than 400 mm, and the stirrups spacing at the ends of
the frame column should not exceed 150 mm. Strictly speaking, the stirrup spacing along the overall height of the supporting
column, i.e., the column beneath the transfer girder, should not be larger than 100 mm. It is obvious that the stirrup spacing of
the columns of MFB does not meet the requirements, which results in insufficient shear capacity and ductility.
(ii) As for the transfer girder, the longitudinal rebars at the top of the girder are overlapped in the mid span, while the longitudinal
rebars at the bottom are discontinuous at the beam-column joints. In the code GB 50010–2010 [24], although the detailing
requirements of transfer girders are not explicitly put forward, the ordinary frame beams are required to be reinforced with two
continuous longitudinal rebars with the sectional area larger than 1/4 of the total area of longitudinal rebars at both the top and
bottom reinforcement layers. The transfer girder of MFB does not even satisfy the seismic requirement of ordinary frame beams,
not to mention the transfer girder. Therefore, the development of the catenary mechanism, i.e., invoking the tensile forces in the
transfer girder to resist the upper loads, was constrained, and results in the limited ultimate bearing capacity of the transfer
girder.
Based on the above analyses, three improved schemes following the seismic design are proposed as follows: design scheme I: three
and four continuous longitudinal rebars are configured at the top and bottom of the transfer girder, the stirrup spacing of the columns

Fig. 23. Dimensions and reinforcements of (a) scheme I (b) scheme II (c) scheme III (unit: mm).

17
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

at the column line G is identically set as 400 mm, with densified spacing of 150 mm arranged in potential plastic hinge areas (i.e., 2250
mm high at both ends of the columns), as shown in Fig. 23(a); design scheme II: differently from scheme I, the stirrup spacing along the
overall height of columns is set as 100 mm, as shown in Fig. 23(b); design scheme III: nine and ten continuous longitudinal rebars are
configured at the top and bottom of the transfer girder, and the stirrup spacing at the end of the transfer girder and the overall height of
the columns is identically set as 100 mm, as shown in Fig. 23(c).
By adopting the above validated FEA approach, the collapse scopes of the three design schemes are presented in Fig. 24. In scheme
I, compared with the original design scheme, column G16 survives and the collapse occurs within the column lines F-G (south-north)
and lines 16–28 (west-east), the collapse scope of MFB is reduced by about 25%. Comparably, in scheme II, the survival of columns G16
and G24 reduces the collapse scopes by 50%, i.e., the collapse is limited within the column lines F-G (south-north) and lines 16–24
(west-east). Therefore, it can be found that reducing the stirrup spacing based on the seismic design specifications can effectively
improve the shear bearing capacity of columns under blast loadings, and the collapse scopes of MFB can be significantly reduced. For
scheme III, even though the increased reinforcement of the transfer girder is adopted, the corresponding simulated collapse scope is
still close to that of scheme I, and larger than that of scheme II. The possible reason lies in that the increased rebars fail to prevent the
shear failure of concrete at column G16, but eventually transfer the axial forces to column G24, resulting in the crushing of the column
and a larger scope of progressive collapse.
The collapse scopes of above three schemes are further shown in Fig. 25. It can be concluded that the seismic design, especially for
columns, can mitigate the influential scopes of the progressive collapse. On the contrary, the strict seismic design for transfer girder
cannot further mitigate the collapse scopes. Overall, these three schemes all fail to prevent the occurrence of the progressive collapse. It
indicates that the structure configurated with the transfer girder exhibit too weak redundancy, i.e., alternate load paths, to restore
gravity stability, indicating that even a single critical member directly destroyed in a terrorist attack will cause the progressive collapse
of the building. Therefore, the transfer girder is not recommended for blast-resistant buildings.

7. Conclusion
Based on the combination of ALE method for blast loadings and hybrid modelling approach for building structures, this paper aims
to get a deep insight into the cause of the progressive collapse of MFB through the refined FEA approach. The main conclusions are
summarized as follows:
(i) Based on the external explosion test on the 1/4 scaled RC frame structure, the validities of the FEA approach are verified,
indicating that the combination of ALE method and hybrid modelling approach is accurate and efficient for predicting the blast-
induced progressive collapse of structure.
(ii) By adopting the validated FEA approach, the progressive collapse of MFB can be numerically reproduced by comparisons with
the post-blast on-site photographs in terms of the entire structure and local structural members. The cause of the progressive
collapse of MFB is reasonably clarified, i.e., the insufficient flexural bearing capacity of the transfer girder after the failure of
three ground columns, rather than the rotation of the transfer girder which occurs during the collapse process.
(iii) For the three improved design schemes, the seismic design details of columns lead to the survival of columns G16 and G24, and
reduce the collapse scopes of MFB by 25%–50%, indicating that the seismic design can prevent the shear failure of ground
columns and mitigate the progressive collapse scopes of buildings under blast loadings.
(iv) According to the simulation results of three schemes, the progressive collapse of MFB is inevitable due to the failure of the
transfer girder, even though the transfer girder satisfies the seismic requirements. Qualitatively, the inherent low redundancy of
transfer structure leads to the inadequacy of alternate load paths to support the superstructure after the loss of supporting
columns under blast loadings, thus the transfer structure is not recommended for blast-resistant buildings.

Fig. 24. Numerical simulation results of (a) scheme I (b) scheme II (c) scheme III.

18
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

Fig. 25. Collapse scopes of (a) scheme I (b) scheme II (c) scheme III.

Author statement
Chen T L: Methodology, Visualization, Writing-original draft. Wu H: Supervision, Funding acquisition, Validation, Writing-review
and editing. Fang Q: Supervision, Writing-review and editing.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

No data was used for the research described in the article.

Acknowledgements
The project was supported by the National Natural Science Foundations of China (52078379).

References
[1] Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[2] Federal Emergency Management Agency Fema, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Improving Building Performance through Multi-Hazard Mitigation, Building
Performance Assessment Team, Washington, DC, 1996. FEMA-277.
[3] Fandom Khobar, Towers Bombing, 2014. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Khobar_Towers_bombing.
[4] American Society of Civil Engineers Asce, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE/SEI 7-10, Structural Engineering Institute of the
ASCE, 2010.
[5] Department of Defense DoD, Design of Buildings to Resist Progressive Collapse, UFC 4-023-03, Unified Facilities Criteria, Washington, DC, 2009.

19
J.X. Lu et al. Journal of Building Engineering 57 (2022) 104939

[6] General Services Administration GSA, Alternate Path Analysis and Design Guidelines for Progressive Collapse Resistance, Office of Chief Architects, Washington,
DC, 2013.
[7] China Association for Engineering Construction Standardization (CECS), Standard for Anti-collapse Design of Building Structures, T/CECS 392-2021, China
Planning Press, Beijing, 2021.
[8] M.J. Gombeda, C.J. Naito, S.E. Quiel, et al., Blast-induced damage mapping framework for use in threat-dependent progressive collapse assessment of building
frames, J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 31 (2) (2017), 04016089, https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000949.
[9] China Association for Engineering Construction Standardization (CECS), Standard for Blast Protection Design of Civil Buildings, T/CECS 736-2020, China
Architecture & Building Press, Beijing, 2020.
[10] Lstc, LS-DYNA Keyword User’s Manual, Livermore Software Technology Corporation (LSTC), 2018.
[11] S.C. Woodson, J.T. Baylot, Structural Collapse: Quarter-Scale Model Experiments, US Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research and Development Centre,
1999. Technical Report SL-99-8.
[12] E.E. Hinman, D.J. Hammond, Lessons from the oklahoma City Bombing: Defensive Design Techniques, American Society of Civil Engineers, New York, NY,
1997.
[13] Alfred P. WikiMili, Murrah Federal Building. https://wikimili.com/en/Alfred_P._Murrah_Federal_ Building#cite_note-2, 2021.
[14] W.G. Corley, P. Sr, M.A. Sozen, et al., The Oklahoma City bombing: summary and recommendations for multihazard mitigation, J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 12 (3)
(1998) 100–112, https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(1998)12:3(100).
[15] ACI 318, Building Code Requirement for Structural Concrete, MI: American Concrete Institute, 1971.
[16] J.D. Osteraas, Murrah building bombing revisited: a qualitative assessment of blast damage and collapse patterns, J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 20 (4) (2006)
330–335, https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0887-3828(2006)20:4(330).
[17] Mark K. McVay, Spall Damage of Concrete Structures, US Army Corps of Engineers, Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Miss., USA, 1988. Technical
Report SL-88-22.
[18] M. Byfield, S. Paramasivam, Murrah building collapse: reassessment of the transfer girder, J. Perform. Constr. Facil. 26 (4) (2012) 371–376, https://doi.org/
10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000227.
[19] A. Kazemi-Moghaddam, M. Sasani, Progressive collapse evaluation of Murrah Federal Building following sudden loss of column G20, Eng. Struct. 89 (2015)
162–171, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engstruct.2015.02.003.
[20] H. Tagel-Din, N.A. Rahman, Simulation of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building collapse due to blast loads, in: Architectural Engineering Conference, 2006.
[21] H.S. Kim, H.H. Wee, Separation strain for progressive collapse analysis of reinforced concrete building using applied element method, Adv. Struct. Eng. 19 (3)
(2016) 437–448, https://doi.org/10.1177/1369433216630051.
[22] L.L. Ma, H. Wu, Q. Fang, Damage mode and dynamic response of RC girder bridge under explosions, Eng. Struct. 243 (2021), 112676, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.engstruct.2021.112676.
[23] Y. Hao, H. Hao, Influence of the concrete DIF model on the numerical predictions of RC wall responses to blast loadings, Eng. Struct. 73 (2014) 24–38, https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.engstruct.2014.04.042.
[24] Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of the People’s Republic of China, General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine
of the People’s Republic of China. Code for Design of Concrete Structures, GB 50010-2010, China Architecture & Building Press, Beijing, 2015.
[25] J.B. Mander, M.J.N. Priestley, R. Park, Theoretical stress-strain model for confined concrete, J. Struct. Eng. 114 (8) (1988) 1804–1826, https://doi.org/
10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9445(1988)114:8(1804).
[26] Crime Scene Database, Oklahoma City Bombing, 2016. http://crimescenedb.com/oklahoma-city-bombing.
[27] Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of the People’s Republic of China, Technical Specification for Concrete Structures of Tall Building, JGJ 3-
2010, China Architecture & Building Press, Beijing, 2011.

20