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extend access to Perspectives on Politics
Liberal international order - both its ideas and real-world political formations - is not embodied in a fixed set of p
practices. Open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, coll
lem solving, the rule of law - these are aspects of the liberal vision that have made appearances in various combinations a
ways over the last century. I argue that it is possible to identify three versions or models of liberal international order -
2.0, and 3.0. The first is associated with the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, the second is the Cold War liberal internati
post- 1945 decades, and the third version is a sort of post-hegemonic liberal internationalism that has only partially
whose full shape and logic is still uncertain. I develop a set of dimensions that allow for identifying different logics of l
national order and identify variables that will shape the movement from liberal internationalism 2.0 to 3.0.
the past century, the liberal internationalunfolding over the last two- centuries has been what might
be called the "liberal ascendency." This has involved the
"project" has evolved and periodically reinvented
extraordinary rise of the liberal democratic states from
itself. The liberal international ideas championed
by Woodrow Wilson were extended and reworked weaknessbyand obscurity in the late eighteenth century into
the inter-
Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Todays liberal world's most powerful and wealthy states, propelling
theorders
nationalist agenda is evolving yet again. The actual West and the liberal capitalist system of economics
themselves, built after the two world wars and in and
the after-
politics to world preeminence. All of this occurred in
math of the Cold War, have also differed in theirfits and
logic starts in the twentieth century amidst world war
and
character. Liberal international order - both itsand
ideas and
economic upheaval. At historical junctures along the
real-world political formations - is not embodied way, liberal states have pursued various efforts to establish
in a fixed
rules and institutions of international governance. Adap-
set of principles or practices. Open markets, international
tation and innovation, necessity and choice, success and
institutions, cooperative security, democratic community,
failure
progressive change, collective problem solving, shared - all of these are aspects of liberal internationalisms
sov-
movement
ereignty, the rule of law - these are aspects of the liberal along its twentieth century pathway.
vision that have made appearances in various combina-
It is possible to identify three major versions or models
tions and changing ways over the decades. of liberal international order - call these versions 1.0, 2.0,
and 3.0.
In grand historical perspective, this makes sense. TheThe first is associated with the ideas that Wood-
most important macro-transformation in world row Wilson and Anglo-American liberals brought to the
politics
post- World War I international settlement; the second is
the Cold War liberal internationalism of the post- 1945
G John Ikenberry is the Albert G Milbank Professordecades;
of and the third version is a sort of post-hegemonic
liberal internationalism that has only partially appeared
Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University
and whose full shape and logic is still uncertain. In its
in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Politics Department
early twentieth century form, liberal order was defined in
(gji3@Princeton.EDU). He is also a Global Eminence
Scholar at Kyung Hee University, Korea. He is theterms
authorof state independence and the building of an inter-
national
of After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and legal order that reinforced norms of state sover-
eignty and non-intervention. In the early twenty-first
the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton
century, liberal order is increasingly defined in terms of
University Press 2001). He would like to acknowledge
the reverse.
comments and suggestions by Michael Doyle, Andrew Hur- It is an evolving order marked by increasingly
rell, Miles Kahler, Jeff Legro, Andrew Moravcsik,far-reaching
Daniel and complex forms of international cooper-
ation that erode state sovereignty and reallocate on a global
Nexon, Alan Alexandroff, and members of the Princeton
scale the sites and sources of political authority.
University workshop on rising states and global governance.
Dimensions of Liberal
The United States was the major champion and spon-
Internationalism
sor of the liberal international project in the twentieth
century. But at each turn, the role and function of the The liberal imagination is vast, and the ideas and designs
United States in the liberal international order has dif- for liberal international order are also extraordinarily wide
fered. Indeed, the ways in which Americas preeminent ranging.1 At its most basic, liberal internationalism offers
geopolitical position has simultaneously facilitated and a vision of an open, rule-based system in which states
impeded the operation of an open, rule-based liberal order trade and cooperate to achieve mutual gains.2 Liberals
is a critical aspect shaping the character and logic of assume that peoples and governments have deep common
liberal order itself. In the post- 1945 period, the United interests in the establishment of a cooperative world order
States gradually became the hegemonic organizer and man- organized around principles of restraint, reciprocity, and
ager of Western liberal order. The American political sovereign equality. There is an optimist assumption lurk-
system - and its alliances, technology, currency, and ing in liberal internationalism that states can overcome
markets - became fused to the wider liberal order. The constraints and cooperate to solve security dilemmas, pur-
United States supported the rules and institutions of sue collective action, and create an open, stable system.
liberal internationalism but it was also given special There is also an optimistic assumption that powerful states
privileges. In the shadow of the Cold War, the United will act with restraint in the exercise of their power and
States became the "owner and operator" of the liberal find ways to credibly convey commitments to other states.
capitalist political system. The question today is how will Across the decades, liberal internationalists have shared
the system evolve - and how will the United States the view that trade and exchange have a modernizing and
respond - to a successor liberal order in which the United civilizing effect on states, undercutting illiberal tendencies
States plays a less dominating role? How necessary is the and strengthening the fabric of international community.
United States as a liberal hegemonic leader to the stabil- Liberal internationalists also share the view that democra-
ity and functioning of liberal internationalism? And will cies are - in contrast to autocratic and authoritarian states -
the United States remain a supporter of liberal order in particularly able and willing to operate within a open,
an era when it has fewer special privileges? For half a rule-based international system and to cooperate for mutual
century, the United States essentially had liberal order gain. Likewise, liberal internationalists have shared the
built to its specifications. What happens when this spe- view that institutions and rules established between states
cial status ends? facilitate and reinforce cooperation and collective prob-
This article has two goals. One is to map the various lem solving.3
models of liberal international order - both in ideal- Beyond these general, shared liberal convictions, there
typical terms and in their historical setting. This entailsis a great deal of variation in the ordering ideas of liberal
specifying the dimensions along which liberal inter-internationalism. In particular, liberal internationalist ideas
national order can vary and identifying the logic and func-and real-world orders have differed in regard to how sov-
tions of these ideal-typical orders. A second goal is to ereignty, rules, institutions, and authority are to be arrayed
probe the alternative and changing ways in which the within the international system. How liberal order is to be
United States has interacted with international order. In governed - that is, the location of rules and authority - is
particular, I delineate the alternative liberal pathways thatthe great unresolved, contested, and evolving issue of lib-
might exist as they lead away from the post- 1945 U.S.- eral internationalism.
centered order - that is, the movement from liberal inter- Looking back at the various visions of liberal order in
nationalism 2.0 to 3.0. the twentieth century, it is possible to identify five key
I begin by looking at the major dimensions arounddimensions of variation: participatory scope, sovereign
which liberal order can vary. After this, I survey the independence, sovereign equality, rule of law, and policy
major historical eras of liberal international order, includ-breadth and depth. These dimensions are summarized in
ing the transitional contemporary era. I argue that the figure 1.
"third era" of liberal international order hinges in impor- Scope refers to the size of liberal order; whether it is a
tant ways on whether and how the United Statesselective grouping or global in scope. This is a distinction
can accommodate itself to diminished authority andbetween order that is built around an exclusive grouping
sovereignty. The question for American policy makers of states (defined by regional or other shared characteris-
is whether bargains and other arrangements can be made -tics) or open in access and membership to all states (defined
particularly in security cooperation - that provide by universal principles). Liberal order can be constructed
ways for the United States to remain at the center of between Western democracies or within the wider global
liberal international order. New forms of governance - system. In one case it is situated within an exclusive group-
networks and informal steering groups - will become more ing of like-minded states - the West, the "free world," the
important in a post-American-centered liberal inter-Atlantic community - and in the other it is open to the
national order. entire world.
72 Perspectives on Politics
Sovereign independence refers to the degree to which advantages of states shape interaction. Hierarchical order -
liberal order entails legal-political restrictions on state sov- which confers unequal privileges and authority to the most
ereignty. Sovereignty in this sense refers to the state s exclu- powerful state or states - can also be more or less rule
sive claims to authority within its territory, manifest in the based.
internationally recognized domestic formal-legal right to Finally, liberal order can vary in terms of the breadth
issue commands and enforce obligations. States can pos- and depth of its policy domains. The international order
sess full Westphalian legal sovereignty and interaction with can be organized to deal with only a narrow policy domain.
other states on this basis, or agreements and institutions It could be essentially focused only on traditional inter-
can be constructed that involve the sharing and abridge- state security challenges. Or it can be organized to deal
ment of state sovereignty. On the one hand, states can with a more expansive set of social, economic, and human
cede sovereign authority to supranational institutions or rights challenges. The more expansive the policy domains
reduce the autonomy of their decision making by making of liberal order, the more that the international commu-
agreed upon commitments to other states. On the other nity is expected to be organized to intervene, control, reg-
hand, states can retain their legal and political rights within ulate, and protect aspects of politics and society within
wider frameworks of inter-state cooperation.4 and across states.
Sovereign equality refers to the degree of hierarchy within These dimensions of liberal order help us identify and
the liberal order. Hierarchy refers to the degree of differ- contrast the various historical manifestations of liberal inter-
entiation of rights and authority within the international national order. Refer to figure 2 for a summary of these
system. Liberal order can be organized around the sover- differences.
eign equality of states - a very horizontal ordering based As the following sections demonstrate, the logics of lib-
on principles of equal access, rights, and participation. Or eral international order have evolved - and at specific his-
liberal order can be more hierarchical in which one or torical moments they have been transformed. I do not
several states possess special rights and authority. In an offer a causal theory of why liberal order has evolved over
order marked by sovereign equality there is very little dif- the last century. Such explanatory efforts have been
ferentiation of roles and responsibilities. States enter into attempted elsewhere.7 The efforts here are typological -
agreements and cooperate as more or less equal parties. In that is, to identify the changing ways that liberal inter-
a hierarchical order, the roles and responsibilities will be national order has been envisaged and constructed.
more differentiated - and states are organized, formally or
informally, around superordinate and subordinate author-
ity relationships.5
Liberal International Order 1 .0
Rule of law refers to the degree to which agreed-upon The first efforts to construct a liberal international order
rules infuse the operation of the order. The "ruliness" of came in the aftermath of World War I with ideas famously
liberal order can vary. The interaction of states may be advanced by Woodrow Wilson. The Wilsonian vision was
informed by highly articulated sets of rules and institu- of an international order organized around a global col-
tions that prescribe and proscribe actions. Or the inter- lective security body in which sovereign states would act
action of states can be informed by more ad hoc and together to uphold a system of territorial peace. Open
bargained relations.6 Even ad hoc and bargained relations trade, national self-determination, and a belief in progres-
are informed by some minimal sense of rules - if only by sive global change also undergirded the Wilsonian world
the notion of reciprocity. Nonetheless, variations exist in view. It was a "one world" vision of nation-states that
the degree to which generalized rules and principles of trade and interact in a multilateral system of laws creating
order prevail or whether specific powers and bargaining an orderly international community. "What we seek,"
74 Perspectives on Politics
collective action were not thick enough. As a result, the The Roosevelt vision did anticipate more compromises in
inter-war era did not see the full implementation of lib- sovereign equality than Wilson - that is, the system would
eral international order 1.0. Instead, the United States be more hierarchical. There was also a substantially more
pulled back from active involvement in peace and secu- developed notion of how international institutions might
rity. The internationalism of the 1920s and 1930s was a be deployed to manage economic and political interdepen-
sort of internationalism 0.5. That is, it was essentially a dence. Roosevelt's wartime proclamation of the Four Free-
private internationalism of banks and commercial firms doms and the Atlantic Charter advocacy of a postwar order
that struggled during these decades to cooperate to man- that would support full employment and economic growth
age the impacts of a contracting world economy. There gave liberal internationalism a more expansive agenda. The
was also a revival of legal internationalism manifest in great powers and governance institutions would have more
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which sought to return to the authority than Wilson proposed, but it would remain a
early nineteenth-century uses of arbitration treaties to unified system in which Roosevelt's "family circle" of states
settle international disputes.16 This multilateral treaty, would manage openness and stability.
which gave governments an opportunity to renounce war But the order that actually took shape in the decades
against other treaty members - except in self-defense or after the war came to have a more far-reaching and com-
other circumstances - was even less of a formal security plex logic. It was more Western-centered, multilayered,
pact than the League of Nations. And it shared with and deeply institutionalized than originally anticipated -
Wilsons liberal internationalism 1.0 the conviction that and it brought the United States into direct political and
public opinion and moral suasion were the mechanisms economic management of the system. The weakness of
that would activate cooperation and collective security. Europe, the looming Soviet threat, and the practical require-
ments of establishing institutions and making them work
drove the process forward - and in new directions. In the
Liberal International Order 2.0 decades that followed. The United States found itself not
When the United States found itself in a position
just theto
sponsor and leading participant in a new liberal
relaunch the liberal international project in the international
1940s, it order - it was also owner and operator of it.
The
initially did not seek to transform its basic logic. vision of liberal order turned into liberal hegemonic
Roose-
velt wanted to inject a bit more realism into its order.
operation
by building a more formal role for the great powers. In both security and economic realms, the United States
Like
Wilsons version, it would be a "one world" system
found itselfin
steadily taking on new commitments and func-
which the major powers would cooperate to enforce the
tional roles. Its own economic and political system became,
peace. The United States would take the lead inincreating
effect, a central component of the larger liberal heg-
emonic
the order, but the order would be collectively run. Inorder.
this America's domestic market, the U.S. dollar,
sense, FDR's wartime vision of postwar order was and liberal
the Cold War alliances emerged as crucial mecha-
internationalism 1.5. But the unexpected and evolving
nisms and institutions through which postwar order was
founded and managed. America and the Western liberal
challenges of forging a viable postwar order - rebuilding
Europe, integrating Germany and Japan, makingorder became fused into one system. The United States
commit-
ments, opening markets, providing security, containing
had more direct power in running the postwar order but it
Soviet communism - forced the United States along alsoafound
path- itself more tightly bound to the other states
way that led to a transformation in the foundations
within thatof order. The United States became a provider of
liberal international order. In the shadow of the public
Cold(or War
at least club) goods - upholding a set of rules
a new logic of liberal internationalism emerged.and
It institutions
was a that circumscribed how American power
logic of American-led liberal hegemonic order was- that
exercised
is, and providing mechanisms for reciprocal
liberal internationalism 2.0. political influence. In the late- 1940s, security cooperation
From the moment it began to plan for peace,moved from the UN Security Council to NATO and other
the Roo-
sevelt administration wanted to build a postwar U.S. -led alliances.
system of The global system of great-power-
open trade and great power cooperation. "The United
managed collective security became a Western-oriented
States did not enter the war to reshape the world,"
security the
community organized around cooperative secu-
historian Warren Kimball argues, "but once in rity.theLikewise,
war, the management of the world economy
that conception of world reform was the assumptionmoved fromthat the Bretton Woods vision to an American
guided Roosevelt's actions." 17 It would be a reformed
dollar and"one
market system. In effect, the world "contracted
world" global order. In the background, the great
out" powers
to the United States to provide global governance.
A critical
would operate together to provide collective security within characteristic of liberal internationalism 2.0 is
a new global organization. The Atlantic Charter its Western foundation. The United States found it possi-
provided
the vision. Wartime conferences at Bretton Woods,
ble toDumb-
make binding security commitments as it shifted
arton Oaks, and elsewhere provided the architectural
fromplans.
Wilsonian collective security to alliance security built
76 Perspectives on Politics
American officials saw that its interests - national eco- not really exist. The term most frequently used was national
nomic, political, and security - could only be advanced "defense," and this had a more restricted meaning to pro-
with the building of a stable, articulated, and institution- tection of the homeland against traditional military attacks.
alized international environment. That is, the American Sometime during World War II the new term emerged and
commitment to rule-based order was not simply a conces- it captured the new vision of an activist and permanently
sion to other states, driven by Cold War alliance impera- mobilized state seeking security across economic, political,
tives. It was an incentive that the United States would and military realms. National security required the United
have had even without the Soviet threat. As the 1950s, States to be actively attempting to shape its external
NSC-68 strategic planning document that launched con- environment - coordinating agencies, generating resources,
tainment argued, the United States had a need "to build a building alliances, and laying the ground work.
healthy international community," which "we would prob- What the New Deal and national security liberalism
ably do even if there were no international threat." The brought to postwar American internationalism was a wider
felt need was to build a "world environment in which the constituency for liberal order building than in earlier eras.
American system can survive and flourish."24 The desirable international order had more features and
There are several distinctive features to 1940s-era rule- moving parts. It was more elaborate and complexly orga-
based order. One involved an innovation in the uses of nized. In several senses, the stakes had grown since the
institutions. Not only would intergovernmental institu- end of World War I - more had to be accomplished, more
tions provide functional tools to manage interdepen- was at risk if the right sort of postwar order was not con-
dence, they would also be created to bind states together. structed, and more of American society had a stake in a
This was most important in the reintegration of Germany successful American liberal internationalist project.
into the West, in which European and Atlantic-wide insti- Throughout the Cold War era, this American-led lib-
tutions provided frameworks to bind, commit, and reas- eral international order was the dominant reality in world
sure.25 Beyond this, the American approach to multilateral, politics. Along the way, the United States itself - its econ-
rule-based order was to insist on flexibility and privileges. omy, military, political institutions - became tightly tied
The United States would champion a rule-based approach to the wider order. Some aspects of American-led liberal
to international order, but there would need to be accom- order did change and evolve. In the 1970s, the dollar-gold
modations, exceptions, weighted voting, and opt-out standard collapsed and monetary and financial relations
clauses.26 These were the compromises that allowed lib- became less tightly tied to Washington. The expansion of
eral internationalism 2.0 to both reflect commitment to the world economy in the decades before and after the
the rule of law and accommodate the realities of hierar- end of the Cold War also reduced the centrality of Atlan-
chy. Finally, rule-based order was also supplemented by tic relations within the wider global liberal order. During
bilateral ties and agreements. States were not primarily or the Cold War, the liberal international order existed "inside"
simply asked to abide by treaty-based rules and norms. the global bipolar system. With the end of the Cold War,
Crucially, states agreed to operate in a rule-based system this inside order became the "outside" order. The global
which primarily created ongoing political processes. That system was now largely tied together through the markets,
is, rule-based order did not, strictly speaking, create "laws" relations, and institutions of the postwar American-led
that states were to obey, rather it created mechanisms and system. At the same time, amidst these sweeping changes,
processes in which states would bargain, communicate, the underling logic of liberal internationalism 2.0 seemed
and adjust - all within agreed-upon normative and insti- to be increasingly problematic. So why is this order in
tutional parameters. trouble - and what would liberal internationalism 3.0 look
As the foregoing suggests, 1940s-era liberal internation- like?
alism expanded the policy domain of liberal order. A denser
and more complex sort of international environment was
necessary to allow governments to fulfill their roles and obli-
The Crisis of Liberal
gations domestically. The domestic liberal agenda had
Internationalism 2.0
expanded as well - and it required liberal states to be more Liberal internationalism 1.0 ended in a crisis of failure.
internationally active and committed. Indeed, the shift from Liberal internationalism 2.0 is in crisis today, but it is a
liberal internationalism 1 .0 to 2.0 involved a shift in what crisis of success. The Wilsonian vision of liberal order was
constituted "national security." The depression and New coherent - it simply did not fit the realities of the time. It
Deal brought into existence the notion of "social security" - was built on assumptions that did not hold. In contrast,
but the violence and destruction of world war brought into the liberal internationalism of the post- 1945 period was
existence the notion of "national security." It was more than highly adapted to existing realities. Ironically, its coher-
just a new term of art - it was a new and more expansive ence was less obvious, at least at first. Indeed, unlike its
internationalist notion of security.27 In earlier decades, and Wilsonian predecessor, liberal internationalism 2.0 was
during World War I, the notion of "national security" did never really articulated in a single statement. It was cobbled
78 Perspectives on Politics
that provide the most worrisome dangers to the inter- liberal international order. Liberal internationalism 2.0 is
national system. experiencing a crisis of authority - a crisis of rule and
Fifth, the growth of the world economy and the incor- governance as it has been provisioned over the postwar
poration of new countries into it has created new "stake- decades within a liberal hegemonic framework.
holders" and raised questions about participation and
decision making in global governance. In the early decades,
the American liberal hegemonic order existed "inside" the
Liberal International Order 3.0
larger bipolar global system. When the Cold War ended, Liberal internationalism 2.0 is in crisis, which means that
the "inside" order became the "outside" order, that is, its there are growing pressures and incentives for reform and
logic was extended to the larger global system. This is a reorganization. As in the past, the liberal international
great transformation in which globalization of the world project is evolving. The old American-led liberal heg-
economy and the rise of developing states have dramati- emonic order is giving way to something new. But what
cally expanded the geography and reach of the liberal inter- sort of new order? What will be the character of liberal
national order. For the first time in the modern era, internationalism 3.0? It is easier to identify the pressures
economic growth is bringing non-Western countries such and incentives for change than to specify the organiza-
as China and India into the top ranks of the world system. tional logic of a post-hegemonic liberal international order.
These fast-growing developing countries are already becom- But three sets of issues are particularly important in shap-
ing an international economic force. According to The ing what comes next.
Economist, developing countries now produce half of the One set of issues concerns scope and hierarchy. A
global GNP. They hold most of the world s financial reserves reformed liberal international order will need to become
and are placing huge new demands on energy and raw more universal and less hierarchical - that is, the United
materials. As Fareed Zakaria notes, "for the first time ever, States will need to cede authority and control to a wider
we are witnessing genuinely global growth. This is creat- set of states and give up some of its hegemonic rights and
ing an international system in which countries in all parts privileges. But a "flatter" international order will also be
of the world are no longer objects or observers but players one in which the United States plays a less central role in
in their own right."36 These are remarkable developments providing functional services - generating public goods,
with potentially far-reaching implications for power and stabilizing markets, and promoting cooperation. So the
governance in world politics.37 questions are several. What is the logic of a post-hegemonic
The foundation upon which liberal internationalism liberal order - and is it viable? Can these functional ser-
2.0 was built has shifted. It is no longer a system built on vices be provided collectively? Will the United States agree
equilibrium or balance among the great powers. The uni- to relinquish the special rights and privileges built into
polar distribution of power and the rise of new powers liberal internationalism 2.0. Of course, it is possible for
and participants in the global system have made the old more incremental shifts away from liberal hegemony. The
bargains and institutions less tenable. The building of a United States could continue to provide functional ser-
liberal international order was more successful - and dur- vices for liberal order but do so in wider concert with
ing the Cold War largely unnoticed - than anyone in the other major states? Liberal order can be endangered if
1940s really imaged was possible. But the erosion of the there is too much hierarchy - indeed hierarchy in its
old norms of sovereignty, the spread of international norms extreme form is empire. But it might also be endangered if
of human rights, and the rise of new sorts of threats of there is too little hierarchy, as the Wilsonian-era experi-
collective violence have generated problems with the func- ment in liberal order revealed.
tioning of that liberal international order. A second issue concerns legitimate authority and post-
In a fundamental sense there is an authority crisis in Westphalian sovereignty. A reformed liberal international
todays liberal order. The international community is the order will need to find ways to reconcile more intrusive
repository for new human rights and national security rules and institutions with legitimate international author-
norms - but who can legitimately act on its behalf? Amer- ity. The human rights revolution makes the international
ican leadership of the liberal international order was made community increasingly concerned with the internal work-
acceptable to other states during the Cold War because it ings of states. So too does the new international-threat
was providing security protection - and, over the hori- environment - a situation where growing "security inter-
zon, there were threats from Soviet communism. Ameri- dependence" is making each country's security increas-
can authority is now less securely established - and the ingly dependent on what goes on elsewhere, including
American-centered, hierarchical character of the postwar elsewhere inside of states. The international community is
international order is more problematic. How to estab- going to need capacities and legitimate authority to inter-
lish legitimate authority for concerted international action vene in weak and troubled states.38 It is going to need
on behalf of the global community - and do so when the monitoring, surveillance, and inspection capacities to ensure
old norms of order are eroding - is the great challenge to that increasingly lethal technologies of violence do not get
80 Perspectives on Politics
will grow for norms of Westphalian sovereignty to con- it would be a governance system that did a great deal of
tinue to incrementally give way to intrusive international work. The policy domains in which states would cooper-
security regimes.43 ate would be expansive - indeed even more so than liberal
The hierarchical character of liberal internationalism internationalism 2.0. The breadth and depth of the rules
3.0 will change. It will, generally speaking, be "flatter" and institutions of liberal order would continue to grow.
- but hierarchy will remain, it simply will not be American- But as a non-hegemonic order, the actual functioning of
dominated hierarchy. The hierarchy of a post-hegemonic the system would look a lot like Wilsonian-style liberal
liberal order will be found in the expanded grouping of internationalism. It would be a universal order that is less
leading states that will occupy positions in the UN Secu- tied to the United States or the West. But also like the
rity Council, the Bretton Woods institutions, and other Wilsonian version, it would be an order in which cooper-
less formal international bodies. It is this group of states ation depended upon shared norms that fostered collec-
that will collectively provide the various functional ser- tive action. It remains a question whether the norms - or
vices previously provided by the United States - providing ideology of liberal order - are sufficiently coherent and
security, uphold open markets, and so forth. In some ways, widely-enough embraced to make this post-hegemonic
the character of hierarchy will look similar to the Roosevel- order function effectively over the long haul.
tian vision in liberal internationalism 1.5. A grouping of A second pathway is also possible in which liberal inter-
leading states will claim authority and institutional posi- nationalism 2.0 is less fully transformed - this would be
tions to oversee the stability and peace of the global sys- liberal internationalism 2.5. In this adaptation, the United
tem. But in liberal internationalism 3.0 their leadership States would renegotiate the bargains and institutions of
responsibilities will multiply to include a wider array of the past decades but retain its position as hegemonic leader.
security, economic, and political governance duties. In some sense, this is what is already happening today.
The character of the rule of law will also evolve. In In this reformed liberal hegemonic order, the United States
some areas, such as trade and investment, the rule-based would continue to provide functional services for the wider
character of the order will continue. Indeed, the World system - and in return, other countries would acquiesce
Trade Organization is already a liberal internationalism in the hierarchical rules and institutions presided over by
3.0 type of global system of rules. The United States does Washington. The order would remain hierarchical but the
not have special rights or privileges under international terms of hierarchy - the bargains and rules - would be
trade law. The leading trade states do exercise power in altered in ways that are mutually acceptable to states within
various ways - owing to their market size and overall stand- the order.
ing in the international order. But the norms of trade law In this 2.5 order, the United States would give up some
are fundamentally based on notions of equality and reci- of its hegemonic rights and privileges but retain others. In
procity. All contracting parties have access to opt out and economic and political realms, it would yield authority
escape clause rights. Mechanisms exist for dispute resolu- and accommodate rising states. The United States would
tion.44 In areas where economic interdependence gener- share authority within the reformed Bretton Woods insti-
ates incentives for states to coordinate and harmonize their tutions. In security realms, however, the United States
policies, rule-based order should increase. But in other would retain its hegemonic position. It would offer secu-
areas where states resist legal-institutional forms of coop- rity to other states in a world-wide system of alliances.
eration, less formal networks of cooperation will likely The American economy would remain a leading source of
grow.45 Such network-style cooperation allows states to markets and growth - even if its relative size declined. The
circumvent politically difficult or costly formal, treaty- United States would remain positioned to support and
based commitments. Network cooperation will appear par- uphold the renegotiated rules and institutions of the lib-
ticularly attractive to the United States as it loses its power eral order.
advantages and rights and privileges under liberal interna- In some respects, the Bush administration sought to
tionalism 2.0. The United States will find itself forced to save the American hegemonic order by renegotiating its
give up its hegemonic ability to foster cooperation on its bargains. Its envisioned the United States as the unipolar
own terms. It was able to dominate rules and institutions provider of global security, upholding an international order
and through weighted voting and opt out agreements, it of free and democratic states.47 In this version, the United
was able to reduce its exposure to sovereignty-reducing States would provide functional services to the world -
commitments. In a post-hegemonic position, the United but in return the United States would ask for new rights
States will find informal and network-oriented agree- and privileges. It would remain aloof from various realms
ments as a tolerable substitute that allows it to gain the of rule-based order. It would not join the International
benefits of cooperation without offering up formal-legal Criminal Court and other sovereignty-restraining treaties
restrictions on its sovereign independence. and international agreements. It was a new hegemonic
Liberal internationalism 3.0 would draw on the logics bargain. The United States would provide security and
of both its predecessors. Like the post- 1945 liberal order, stable order, but it would receive special dispensation to
82 Perspectives on Politics
maintenance of an open and rule-based liberal order. The national institutions, see Keohane 1984; and
liberal project itself has partly brought us to this impasse - Krasner 1981. On the fragmented and complex
its success has helped strip away the old foundations of nature of power and interdependence, see Keohane
the order. and Nye 1977. On domestic preferences and foreign
What comes after liberal internationalism 2.0? In the policy, see Moravcsik 1997. On transgovernmental-
absence of war or economic calamity, the old liberal order ism and networks, see Slaughter 2004. On the mod-
is not likely to completely breakdown or disappear. As in ernization theory underpinnings of the liberal
the past, liberal international order will evolve. The char- tradition, see Morse 1976 and Rosenau 1991.
acter of governance will shift with changes in the way 4 On the dimensions of sovereignty, see Krasner 1999.
states share and exercise power and authority. Precisely 5 For discussions of hierarchy in international rela-
because the crisis of liberal order is a crisis of success, tions as defined in terms of rights and authority
leading and rising states in the system are not seeking to relationships, see Lake 2003; and Hobson and Shar-
overturn the basic logic of liberal internationalism as a man 2005.
system of open and rule-based order. Rather, the pressures 6 See Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, and Slaughter 2001.
and incentives are for change in the way roles and respon- 7 For arguments about why and how powerful states
sibilities are allocated in the system. build international order, liberal or otherwise, see
The way in which liberal order evolves will hinge in Gilpin, 1981; Organski, 1958; Ikenberry 2001; and
important respects on the United States - and its willing- Legro 2007.
ness and ability to make new commitments to rules and 8 Wilson, War Message to Congress, April 2, 1917.
institutions while simultaneously reducing its rights and 9 I thank Thomas Knock for discussions that clarified
privileges within the order. The United States is deeply these points.
ambivalent about making institutional commitments and 10 Wilson, Speech to the League to Enforce Peace, May
binding itself to other states - ambivalence and hesitation 27, 1916.
that has been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, 11 Ambrosius 2002,130.
American unipolarity, and new security threats. But the 12 Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Senate, January
United States still possesses profound incentives to build 22, 1917.
and operate within a liberal rule-based order. Just as impor- 13 Knock 1992, 8.
tantly, that order is now not simply an extension of Amer- 14 See Keynes 1920.
ican power and interests - it has taken on a life of its own. 15 Quoted in Ambrosius 2002, 52.
American power may rise or fall and its foreign policy 16 See Ninkovich 1999, ch. 3.
ideology may wax and wane between multilateral and impe- 17 Kimball 1994, 17. See also Divine 1971, and Dallek
rial impulses- - but the wider and deeper liberal global order 1979.
is now a reality that America itself must accommodate to. 18 This shift was from a logic of collective security to a
logic of cooperative security. For the classic discus-
sion of collective security, see Claude 1962, ch. 2.
Notes 19 Viner 1942, 168.
20 This is the argument I make about the Bretton
1 International order refers to the settled arrangements
between states that define the terms of their inter- Woods agreements. See Ikenberry, in Goldstein and
action. Liberal international order refers to inter- Keohane 1993. A similar logic holds for the human
national order that is open and rule-based. As noted,
rights regimes in postwar Europe, in which countries
the more specific features of liberal international employed international commitments to consolidate
order - in particular the character and location of democracy - "locking in" the domestic political
sovereignty and political authority - can vary widely
status quo against their nondemocratic opponents.
within liberal orders. See Moravcsik 2000.
21 See Press-Barnathan 2003.
2 For surveys of liberal international theory, see Doyle
22 See Ikenberry 2001.
1997; Russett and Oneal 2001; Deudney and Iken-
berry 1999; and Keohane, in John Dunn 1990. 23 For an important study of these evolving views, see
3 No single modern theorist captures the whole of Murphy 1994.
24 NSC-68 as published in May 1993, 40.
liberal international theory, but a variety of theorists
provide aspects. On the democratic peace, see Doyle
25 See Ikenberry 2001, ch. 6.
1983. On security communities, see Adler and 26 John Ruggie surveys these "exemptionalist" tenden-
Barnett 1998; and Deutsch, Burrell, and Kann cies in American foreign policy in "American Excep-
1957. On the interrelationship of domestic and tionalism, Exemptionalism, and Global
international politics, see Rosenau 1969. On func- Governance," in Ruggie 2004. For a sympathetic
tional integration theory, see Haas 1964. On inter- portrayal, see Kagan 2002.
84 Perspectives on Politics
1998, Hurrell 2007, Bernstein and Pauly 2007. 48 For critiques of the Bush doctrine, see Daald
29 See Ikenberry in Leffler and Westad forthcoming, Lindsay 2003; and Shapiro 2008.
vol.3. 49 The fragmented order might have characteri
30 On the character and consequences of unipolarity, similar to the American airlines industry in w
see Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009. the major power centers (airline) have their o
31 Ikenberry 2006. distinct and competing hub and spoke system
32 For a survey of the shifting norms of state sovereignty, Aaltola 2005.
see Haass 2003. The emerging doctrine of the "respon- 50 See Leonard 2008; and Khanna 2008.
sibility of protect" is the most systematic notion 511 make this argument in Ikenberry 2008.
that captures the changing terms of sovereignty and
interventionism. See The Responsibility to Protect, a report
of the International Commission on Intervention References
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33 Stephen Krasner argues that Westphalian norms hub-and-spoke pedagogy of the American empire.
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36 Zakaria 2008, 3. Press.
37 Ikenberrv and Wright 2007. Borgwardt, Elizabeth. 2005. A New Deal for the World:
38 For discussions of post- Westphalian forms of inter- Americas Vision for Human Rights. Cambridge, MA:
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40 On the evolving norms of deviance in inter-
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of legitimacy and the use of force. For the classic Daalder, Ivo, and James Lindsay. 2003. Ame
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42 Several proposals for a new grouping of democracies ington, DC: The Brookings Institution Pre
have been advanced. See Ikenberry and Slaughter,
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43 For discussions of the evolving technical and legal 137-39.
frameworks for arms control monitoring and en- Dallek, Robert. 1979. Franklin Roosevelt and American
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44 On the rule-based character of the World Trade Deudney, Daniel, and G. John Ikenberry. 1999. The
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86 Perspectives on Politics
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