Sustainable Water Resources Management (2023) 9:30

https://doi.org/10.1007/s40899-022-00796-w

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Institutional arrangements of the aflaj systems’ maintenance

in Sultanate of Oman: operation of the different aflaj type case study
Ahmed S. Al‑Marshoudi1   · Jasni Sulong1

Received: 5 April 2021 / Accepted: 6 December 2022

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022

Abstract
The aflaj (singular falaj) may be viewed from Omani institutional term to distribute water using time to those hold water
rights or viewed as an irrigation system by which transport aquifer water table/underground galleries naturally through grav-
ity to the irrigated areas/villages. Such transportation process/the original water extraction takes three main forms, locally
known as three aflaj types: daudi, ghaili and ayni. Since the main water source for the daudi found several kilometers from
villages, it requires long closed tunnel extending deep into the aquifer (but must be constructed at a level of the upper part
of the aquifer to allow natural flowing by gravity). Whereas the ayni main water sources (natural spring) come up to the
surface and transported through short open channel. The ghaili extracts water from surface of an oasis and uses open short
channel. Empirical information with respect to these three forms of the physical-extraction variation has been investigated
and examined through a detailed case study. The primary objective is to evaluate and document the historical methodology
undertaken to develop different maintenance institutional arrangements. Hence, an attemptis made to answer the following
research question ‘To what extent did the development of the aflaj institutional arrangements reflect upon the original physical
variation collection/extraction process?’ Although there exist three water-extraction processes in Oman, the finding clearly
classified the three aflaj types with respect to institution for maintenance into two main categories. Our survey provided
evidence which place daudi and ghaili within one category and ayni in another. This finding can be explained as follows:
(1) since the ayni aflaj usually found in mountainous areas (which are not prone to flooding), limited financial support is
required for their regular maintenance. In addition, their channel layout prevents extensive water damage; (2) although the
main water source for ghaili aflaj appears simple and does not require complex construction, they tend to capture tremen-
dous amounts of sand that remains after flash floods. This is attributed to the fact that its mother-well was constructed as an
open, and hence, any flow of the wadi/oasis would bring large amounts of silty sand and clay, which may completely block
the main water supply.

Keywords  Institutional arrangements · Scarcity · Water allocation · Water rights

Introduction Omezzine 1996), historically such community-owned falaj

The ancient aflaj system (singular falaj) in Oman is not only
a system to convey groundwater from aquifer to irrigated
areas,1 but contributed widely toward the matter of water
rights and associated legal context since millennium. While
several regions in the northern part of the country rely heav-
ily upon a single community-owned falaj for irrigating their
date gardens and other annual crops (Abdel Rahmnn and
* Ahmed S. Al‑Marshoudi
almarshoudi4@gmail.com
1 1
Islamic Department, School of Humanities, University Sain
Malaysia, 11800 Pulau Penang, Malaysia
characterized by a legal boundary. Wilkinson (Wilkinson
1977) used a term locally known as sawadir al-bilad (liter-
ally means the village boundary) as he included things like
walls, channels, bridges, building and gardens. Zekri and
Al-Marshudi (Zekri and Al-Marshudi 2008a) referred it as
falaj protected zone and sited (Caponera 1978) to define such
zone, stated: “customary laws were commonly used as a
legislative tool to declare a protected area extending over a
25 m radius around the falaj infrastructure where well dig-
ging is not allowed because it affects the falaj flow” (P. 355).
Another aspect is how the community developed tools to
  The system represents 38% of the entire country’s irrigated area of
(26,498 acres) [Zekri et al. (2014)].

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generate income for maintenance. Since frequencies of the
drought period can damage the whole systems, continuous
cooperation by all members of the community is required
(Al-Marshudi 2007; Birks 1978). In the past Sutton, Sut-
ton (1984) linked this knowledge in generating income for
system survival; stated “…by tradition the falaj institution
owns property from which the income necessary for its con-
tinued survival comes” (P. 9). Whereas Remmington (Rem-
mington 2018) discussed the aflaj traditional knowledge with
the adaptation toward the country agricultural moderniza-
tion; She wrote “… after the modernization of agriculture
resulted in competing interests over water, mean that tradi-
tional knowledge systems need to adapt to this challenge”
Page. 135.
This paper provides further investigation of the manage-
ment and development of the aflaj institutional arrange-
ments. The primary objective of this study is to further
investigate this institution within the context of physical
water-extraction variation. To do this, it is important to
include a sample comprised the three existing aflaj types.
The fieldwork was conducted over a period of 4 years; 2014
to 2018 in several governing region at the Northern part of
Oman. It is important to note that the finding on this paper
is partial of the overall revealed result of the comprehensive
study. Furthermore, other partial finding in the form a case
study can be further viewed elsewhere (Al-Marshoudi 2018;
Marshoudi 2017), but I will not tough upon here.
Theoretical consideration
There is agreement among researchers that to solve the ever-
growing water demand (water scarcity) globally, it requires
to introduce regulatory measures. There have been several
of these measures. However, the most discussed and ana-
lyzed the following: the tradable water rights. This have been
introduced/proposed within the efficiency concept and the
related water-market approach (Zekri et al. 2006). The argu-
ments have been viewed from two different angles: water can
be treated as an economic good/commodity which can be
evaluated within the efficiency criteria (Araral 2009; Hansen
et al. 2015), or the price of water will reflect its true scar-
city and its opportunity cost (Perry 2001; Randall 1981).
Another evaluating criterion used in examining water is the
concepts of equitably. This is very much concerned with the
social aspects with respect in distributing water equitably, so
that disputes among beneficiaries are minimized. Although
extensive coverage of the efficiency concept and the market-
oriented strategy (Zekri et al. 2006; Araral 2009), difficulty
in adjusting between social (equitably) and the private ben-
efit (efficiency) have been observed. For instance, while sev-
eral researchers have been calling for a well-defined prop-
erty rights and establishment of a water market within the
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Sustainable Water Resources Management (2023) 9:30
efficiency water pricing approach (Rosegrant et al. 1995;
Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994), other are against the idea
of establishment of a water market, because, as they think on
one hand, water is a social commodity (Larson and Bromley
1990) and, on the other hand, may be prone to a market fail-
ure due to physical characteristic of a watercourse (Randall
1983; Milliman 1959; Young 1986).
With this in context, many researchers and water profi-
ciencies studied several of the ancient small community-
managed irrigation systems worldwide. For example, the
Nepal farmer-managed irrigation system (Ostrom and Gard-
ner 1993), the communal tenure in Swiss villages (Netting
1976), canal irrigation system in India (Meinzen-Dick et al.
2002), and indigenous water distribution system in Andean
village, Peru (Trawick 2001). Although these provided
much discussion with respect to the indigenous knowledge
of water distribution, limited insight provided concerning
the well-defined water rights and institutional arrangements.
Probably, the ancient aflaj system (singular falaj) in
Oman has been studied over a wider contribution matter
with regard to the water rights and associated legal context
since millennium (Zekri and Al-Marshudi 2008b). Although
studies such as Abdel Rahmnn and Omezzine (1996) and
Zekri and Al-Marshudi (2008b) placed the system within a
competitive market and tradable water rights frameworks,
provided limited insight into institutional arrangements. It
is acceptable to place the system within the context of com-
petitive tradable water rights, but these institutional arrange-
ments must be evaluated within the three aflaj type’s physi-
cal variation (see below).
Practical consideration
As earlier mentioned, water researchers and economists in
the past and present theoretically attempted to discuss solu-
tions and to introduce many regulatory measures to manage
the ever-increasing water demand worldwide. We think that
these measures have been placed under two main analyti-
cal frameworks; first under the framework of institutional
setting in formulating rules and water rights structural set-
ting (sometime called well-defined property rights). Second,
under the framework of the concept of private benefit and
efficiency in the primary aim to introduce a water-market
transaction approach. In general, establishing a water market
can provide several positive economical as well as social
benefits. For example, Bitran et al. (2014) indicated the
fact that water market increases and improves economic
efficiency through: (1) expansion of more efficient new
water users, (2) the adoption of water conserving technolo-
gies, and (3) the elimination of unnecessary or non-cost-
effective uses. This is normally achieved by the allocation
of resources to their highest valued use through voluntary
Sustainable Water Resources Management (2023) 9:30 Page 3 of 12  30
exchange and the generation of information about relative
scarcity and demand (Bitran et al. 2014). Despite all these
economic benefits and improvements, many commentators
think to establish a water market require a careful conceptual
analytical framework. This is attribute to the fact that on one
hand, we are dealing with a complex social commodity and,
on the other hand, require to have a deep understanding of
the physical characteristic of the water flow.
As far as the former is concerned, it must be analyzed
within inter-disciplinary sphere; economics and law (Cole
and Grossman 2002; Dales 1968) to solve the social prob-
lem, while the physical feature of the water must be assumed
to be represented by the natural flowing of the stream/rivers.
This is considered among a major restricting contributing
factors by which prevented in establishing a well-defined
water rights to a watercourse (Perry 2001; Randall 1981).
Here, two elements have been discussed in the literatures:
the size of the resources and how to measure its quantity
using a measuring unit. This is required during the process
of transacting the resource within a private market system.
For example, there is agreement among researchers that it is
difficult to establish a clear property rights to water, because
water is a fleeting resource which exists partly as a store
and partly as a flow (Young 1986; Milliman 1965). Others
relate with this fluctuating factor is the fact that difficulty
of measuring the level of use via a measurable unit. For
instance, Dales (1968) applied implicit and explicit water
prices and how they are reflected by the fact that water is
mobile and naturally water being so large to the extent dif-
ficult to use a measurable unit for pricing system like land
of being immobile.
Overview of the Aflaj system
water‑extraction process
Given the high variability of the Omani arid climatic pat-
terns, which experiences extremely hot summer tempera-
tures and low rainfall, aflaj have been descripted as resil-
ience to the harsh arid environment over this region. For
example, Remmington (2018) has argued that the survival
with the Omani aflaj-shared community has been adapted
over the harsh climate. She then pointed out the fact that
there is currently a deficit in the groundwater balance, as
attributed to two main reasons: (1) changing of participating
rate and (2) slow of recharge of the major renewable ground-
water sources. In other occasion, she placed the system with
a common management collective action framework from
two supportive claims; (1) the first aspect is concerned with
the fact that the main water original source (in this case is
the aquifer) can be considered as forming a collective action
for the whole community. In this study, the relationship that
exists between the two main components of the aflaj system:
the physical part and the social organizational setting will be
evaluated and examined. While slightly different terminol-
ogy is being used to describe different types of falaj systems
based over how water is extracted, the literature largely sup-
ports the idea that there are three types of aflaj in Oman:
daudi, ghaili and ayni. For example, Megdiche-Kharrat et al.
(2017) classified aflaj into three different types and cited
Costa (1983) definition for each: daudi drain water from
aquifers, ghaili aflaj channeling surface from wadis (oasis),
and ayni ones are connected to springs.
Although, daudi and ayni type originate/extract their
water from aquifer/underground, differ in extraction method.
This clearly can be viewed over the daudi and ayni cross sec-
tion of the extraction process (Figs. 1, 2) as they originate
water from same source (groundwater level). However, since
the water source (aquifer) of the daudi type constructed
away from the irrigated areas (villages), require long tun-
nel (approximately between 5 to 10 km distances). This
was clearly seen from the cross section of a daudi type (see
Fig. 1). In this cross section, an underground tunnel extend-
ing deep into the aquifer (but was constructed at a level of
the upper part of the aquifer to allow natural flowing by
gravity over the tunnel) with serial of vertical shifts (for
ventilation and maintenance) was built. Whereas the ayni
water sources naturally (mainly in limestone rocks) come up
to the surface, as can be seen, with a short open channel con-
structed to convey water to the irrigated areas. In contrast,
the situation for the ghaili type is completely different as
follows: (1) it extracts water from surface of an oasis (wadis)
and (2) uses open short channel in transporting water to the
irrigated areas (see Fig. 3).
It is apparent from the illustrated water-extraction process
(extracted from either deep of the aquifer or shallow using
the surface of the oasis), two different implications: (1) yield
high volume of water capable of supplying a large, irrigated
area and (2) yield less amount of water capable in irrigated
smaller irrigated area. These then offers a useful requirement
to evaluate the aflaj institutional arrangements. We argued
that since the daudi type extracts water from deep of the
aquifer/away from irrigated areas, a more complex institu-
tional arrangements with high community involvement is
expected. In contrast, since the ayni and ghaili type extract
water from short distance of the irrigated areas with open
simple channel, less complex institutional arrangement is
expected.
Method and study site
To investigate the aflaj traditional knowledge/institutional
arrangements) for its maintenance, the physical-extraction
variation among the three types (as illustrated above) must
be included. First, we need to evaluate how aflaj institutional
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Fig. 1  A typical cross section of a daudi (close-tunnel) falaj type [adapted from Megdiche-Kharrat et al. (2017)]
Fig. 2  A typical ayni (natural spring) falaj cross section
arrangements embedded its physical-extraction variation.
To do this, require providing thorough understanding of
the three water-extraction processes for the three aflaj, as
illustrated above. Second, based on survey finding to what
extent these three methods can be further classified. The
study used primary as well as secondary sources of infor-
mation. These sources were structured over the preparatory
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Sustainable Water Resources Management (2023) 9:30
data collection framework. First, information is related to the
primary sources which is based on in-depth interview in the
various villages, with repeated visits and time spent inter-
acting with people in these communities. Second, to iden-
tify the main stakeholder’s bodies which have close contact
with the system. These can be divided into two main catego-
ries: the private stakeholders including private community
Sustainable Water Resources Management (2023) 9:30 Page 5 of 12  30
Fig. 3  A typical ghaili (oasis) cross section.
members, such as the aflaj committee members (wakeels,
areefs, auctioneers, recorders and aflaj historical expertise)
and individual farmers, and the public official bodies, such
as the most relevant Omani official Ministries. The most
contacted Ministries is Ministry of Regional Municipality
and Water Resources and Ministry of Awqaf and Religious
Affairs. Note the Arabic used terms like wakeel can be trans-
lated like administrative agent and areef well-knower. Also,
note that the term awqaf (singular waqf) means religiose
type of endowment.
Using a case study approach, nine aflaj among the three
types were selected. These aflaj located in four main areas:
Nizwa, Smail, rustaq and Tawwi, all of which situated in the
northern part of the country.2 In addition, these areas belong
to three main regions: Dakhiliya (the interior) hold the area
of Nizwa and Smail, Southern Al-Batinah hold the area of
Rustaq and Al-Sharqyah hold the area of Tawwi (Fig. 4). The
main selective criteria are the popularity of each falaj within
their category. For example, falaj daris in Nizwa, by which
considered as the largest in the region, selected to represent
the daudi type. Similarly, falaj al-samdi in Samail represent
an example of the oasis falaj type.
Although the selected sample appears to represent a lim-
ited number of all aflaj system3 in Oman, they are repre-
sentative of the aflaj population with respect to irrigated
2
  Along the main sample of the five aflaj (which were included on
the UNESCO heritage list in the year 2006 (MRMWM 2008)).
3
  The last aflaj census reported a total of 3017 active aflaj.
area. This can be explained as follows: the last aflaj census
reported that aflaj irrigate area of 26,498 acres (Aflaj Dept
2009) represents approximately 38% of the total country irri-
gated area. Hence, based on census data, we divide the sam-
ple irrigated areas (619.37 ha shown in Table 1 converted to
acres 1530.50) by the census figure to obtain approximately
6%. It can be concluded that the sample constitutes 6% of
the aflaj irrigated area. Another related aspect is to see the
distribution within each type. Zekri and Al-Marshudi (Zekri
and Al-Marshudi 2008a) pointed out that daudi irrigates
20% of the aflaj irrigated areas, ghaili 8% and ayni 10%;
they wrote ‘…despite the fact that ghaili constitute nearly
half in number of the total falaj systems, they only irrigate
8% of the total cropped area’. They went on to say ‘…daudi
and ayni irrigate 20% and 10% of the area, respectively’ (P.
352). Therefore, looking at the distribution in Table 1, the
ayni almost holds similar proportion, but daudi and ghaili
are slightly higher.
Result
The aflaj water collection process
The study identified, in general, that there are three dif-
ferent water-extraction processes exist in northern Oman.
The first source is characterized by perennial water-flow by
which water extracted from the upper part of the aquifer in
the mountains, by which it is achieved through the use of
a long underground tunnel. Hence, the local use the term
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Fig. 4  Location of the studied aflaj over the Northern part of Oman

Table 1  Selected sample with Falaj name/inventory number Location/walayat Total cultivated area Annual
respect to irrigated areas and ­(m2) water supply
annual water supply ­(m3)

daudi aflaj
 daris (F0500) Nizwa 1,715,502 4,682,410
 al-mayasser (F1446) Rustaq (al Khabib) 1,133,698 2,752,647
 al-malki (F0606) Izki 815,522 2,220,380
 al-khatmeen (F3071) Birkat al-mawz 703,148 1,971,689
 Sub-total 4,367,870 11,627,126
 % 71 75
ghayli aflaj
 as-samdi (F1714) Samail 779,021 2,147,408
 al-farsakhi (al-alayah) Samail 217,505 598,833
 balfaee (al-sifalah) Samail 230,136 658,355
 Sub-total 1,226,662 3,404,596
 % 20 22
ayni aflaj
 ayn al-kasfah (F2750) Rustaq 589,315 352,150
 al-jaylah Sur 10,034 26,215
 Sub-total 599,349 378,365
 % 9 3
 Grand total 6,193,881 15,410,087
 % 100 100

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Sustainable Water Resources Management (2023) 9:30 Page 7 of 12  30
Fig. 5  Field survey constructed daudi identified components. The
picture (left side) indicates a man-waking tunnel for falaj al-khatmeen
in the district of burkat al-mouz (approximately 2450 m long with a
2-m width and 1-m height), as indicated above. The second picture
(right site) shows author viewing, along with falaj al-malki wakeel
daudi to refer to this traditional construction-engineer of a
long tunnel. For example, as can be seen in Fig. 5, a closed
man-walking tunnel (approximately 2450 m long with a 2-m
width and 1-m height4 extending deep into the aquifers) has
been constructed for the falaj al-khatmeen in the village of
burkat al-mouz. In addition, the local revealed that once the
tunnel converted from the traditional channel-lining pro-
cesses, ventilation required and hence a serial of smaller
wells/shafts (with a 10-m interval) have been built. The main
function of these is to allow air inside the tunnel and also as
a means to get rid of the dirt from the tunnel construction,
and later used as access for maintenance. The right side of
Fig. 5 is the author particular visit during the survey viewing
these along the wakeel (administrative agent) of the falaj.
The second source normally extracts water from the sur-
face of wadi (oasis). This is considered as seasonal fluctu-
ated flow. Hence, the word ghail has been employed by the
local referring to all ghaili aflaj system which uses the flow
of the permanent oasis flow. During the survey, particular
visits were conducted to view this water source in Oman
represented by viewing falaj as-samdi in Samail (see below).
The third source is known as perennial natural-spring flow
by which extract water from a spring that naturally comes
to the surface, mainly in limestone rocks. Hence, ayn is a
word very often employed by the local referring to a natural
occurring phenomenon of perennial flow since millennium.
4
  Source: unpublished booklet by the current falaj wakil ‘Mr. khamis
b. Masoud Al-Dhashi’.
(administrative agent), a ventilation shaft which deeply attached with
the tunnel forming a horizontal tunnel attached with serial of these
shafts. During the survey, we observed that these shafts never closed
and not influenced by the climatic circumstances, because they were
constructed over hill of the mountainous areas (as can be seen)
Again, a particular visit during the survey field to view the
most ancient ayni falaj (ayn al-khasfah). This falaj located
on the Southern al-Batanah governing region in the north-
west of the town of Rustaq in Oman (see below).
Maintenance institutional arrangements
Based on the above three illustrated water-extraction/collec-
tion processes, a very important element was apparent, that
is how institutional arrangements with respect to the system
maintenance have been developed in Oman. First, there has
been found that a particular pattern was developed histori-
cally based on physical characteristic of the system. While
the aflaj system in Oman has been placed over three main
physical water-extraction process, slightly different classi-
fication with respect maintenance institutional arrangement
was observed. First, the three aflaj collection process can be
combined into two major constructive physical networks. It
is worth noting the primary purpose of such constructive
network is to convey/transport water to the villages/irri-
gated areas. The first process/method is found more com-
plex and holds a number of sophisticated components. This
is normally implying for the daudi type with long tunnel, as
discussed above. The reason of such sophisticated compo-
nents is because these types characterized by holding a high
(powerful discharge rate) and a constant water flow (high
reliability). The second constructed process has been found
as less complex with short open channels. This is normally
applied for the ghaili and ayni aflaj types. Figure 6 simpli-
fied three identified water-extraction process along the two
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Fig. 6  The three extraction-methods and maintenance institutional
arrangements
Fig. 7  Water extraction process of the ayn al-kasafah (ayni) source.
The first picture (left) shows how the water is coming from the vol-
canic limestone rocks and is highly protected (by the government)
due primary to its high temperature from the local and tourists to
enter as can be seen there is strong metal fence along with warning
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Sustainable Water Resources Management (2023) 9:30
apparent constructive method with respect to maintenance
institutional arrangements.
Combination of the physical network construction pat-
tern and the requirement for maintenance provides thorough
understanding of how each category developed its own insti-
tutional arrangements. The survey provided evidence which
places daudi and ghaili within one category and ayni system
in another. These are shown in Figs. 7 and 8.
From the view of the ayn al-kasafah (Fig. 7) and as-
samdi (Fig.  8), reveals several noteworthy institutional
arrangements. First, since the ayni-type aflaj are usually
found in mountainous areas that are not prone to flooding,
limited financial support is required for their regular main-
tenance. In addition, their channel layout prevents extensive
water damage, as will be discussed in more detail below.
Second, although the main water source (mother-well) in
as-samdi appears simple and does not require complex con-
struction, they tend to capture tremendous amounts of sand
that remains after flash floods. Since the mother-well of this
falaj and the main supply channel are open (see Fig. 8), any
flow of the wadi would bring large amounts of silty sand
and clay, which may completely block the main water sup-
ply. As a result, sand removing machines need to be used
on a daily basis, which can be costly. This system also
requires monthly flow monitoring, including main channel
signs, so any visitor only can view it from above. The second picture
(middle) is an old hole was constructed at the top edge of the main
spring to convey flow through an open channel (left side) constructed
strong cement dam) in aim to convey water continuously day and
night to the irrigation area
Sustainable Water Resources Management (2023) 9:30 Page 9 of 12  30

Fig. 8  Water extraction process of the wadis (oasis) surface source;
falaj as-samdi. The first picture (left) shows how the water is col-
lected from the main source in the middle of the oasis (wadi). Since
it is difficult to be protected from the heavy rain (flood), result in con-
tinues monitoring and maintenance. The second picture (middle) is an
open water-flow conveying channel was constructed at the top edge of
the main water source to convey flow through an open channel (left
side) with strong cement dam in aim to convey water continuously
day and night to the irrigation area

Table 2  The identified tradition Falaj name/inventory number Location/wilayat Water market

water market within the studied
sample Weekly Annually
muzyadah murboutah

daudi aflaj
 daris (F0500) Nizwa Exist/explicit 24 h 19.5 2.5
 al-mayasser (F1446) Rustaq None 96 None
 al-malki (F0606) Izki Exist/explicit 24 h 51.5 None
 al-khatmeen (F3071) Burkat-al-mouz None None 96
 al hamra (F0201) AL HAMRA Exist/explicit 24 h 96 None
 abu Tha'alab (F1406) AR RUSTAQ None 48 None
ghaili aflaj
 as-samdi (F1714) Samail Exist/implicit 24 h None
 al-farsakhi (al-alayah) Samail Exist/implicit 24 h None
 balfaee (asifalah) Samail Exist/implicit 24 h None
ayni aflaj
 ayn al-kasfah (F2750) Rustaq None None
 al-jaylah Sur None None

cleaning and repairing any damage to the channel bridges floods have forced the locals to develop a traditional water
and junctions. market as a part of which 24-h circulation is sold or rented
to generate income, known as a common (renting) right.
Since falaj water flows continuously, the rented/sold quantity
Traditional water‑market arrangements

The institutional arrangements currently in place for aflaj

maintenance and damage prevention as a result of heavy

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Table 3  Annual revenue (muzyadah and murboutah) for two aflaj: al-khatmeen and al-mayasser
al-khatmeen al-mayasser
Lower stream (lower khaz) Upper stream (Upper khaz) Lower stream (lower khaz) Upper stream (Upper khaz)
Murboutah Murboutah
(48 athar) (48 athar) (48 athar) (48 athar)
Total revenue US$ Total revenue US$ Total revenue US$ Total revenue US$

2008 2902.85 2917.20

2009 2902.85 2917.20 2700.67 2236.42
2010 2902.85 2917.20 4467.84 4243.20
2011 2902.85 2917.20 9310.08 8711.04
2012 2902.85 2917.20 3706.56 3432.00
2013 2902.85 2917.20 4617.60 4430.40
2014 2902.85 2917.20 3494.40 3359.62
2015 2902.85 2917.20 3868.80 3684.10
2016 2902.85 2917.20 4298.11 4038.53

Al-Khatmeen annual revenue were obtained from the two wakils/administrative agents; Mr. khamis b. Masoud Al-Dhashi’ who administrate the
upper-stream (upper khaz) and Mr. ‘Mohammed b. Abdullah Al-Saqri’ who is responsible for the downstream channel (the lower khaz). They
provided precisely two baddah (48 athar) each; an overall of four (96 athar), while Al-Mayasser annual auctioned revenue collected from the
two wakils Mr. Saiyd b. Saif Al-Mazrouyi and Mr. Zahir b. Mohammed Al-Harasi. They also provided 48 athar for each khaz

is expressed as a time-share rather than volume. However,
since the ghaili is characterized by low flow, one full day
per week is implicitly set aside for renting. On the other
hand, the high daudi aflaj discharge rate necessitates that
an explicit common (renting) right is set aside, determined
in locally adopted measuring units, known as athar.5 Sec-
ond, since such right belongs to the falaj itself to generate
income, rental agreements can only be made through falaj
wakeel (administrative agent organization) to prevent indi-
viduals from renting their share to others. This arrangement
also ensures that all generated revenue can be used for sys-
tem maintenance. However, since not all aflaj types require
extensive maintenance, the rules governing such water mar-
kets vary. As can be seen in Table 2, water markets have
been traditionally established with the daudi and ghaili aflaj,
and are rarely formed for the ayni type that, as noted above,
requires minimal maintenance. In addition, more complex
market transactions are usually associated with the daudi
type relative to ghaili aflaj.
The primary operational mechanism of this market is to
sell/rent a whole day (24 h) circulation; known as a com-
mon (renting) right. This is operated as follows: since falaj
water flows continuously day and night, the overall flow
distributed/rotation expressed on time-share not volume.
A whole day (24 h) set aside a renting common share to
generate income. This is differing among the two aflaj
5
  This Arabic term locally used to reflect an amount of water meas-
ured using sunshade equivalent to approximately 30 min.
type. For example, since the ghaili type characterized by
low flow, the common (renting) day is implicitly set aside
from the seventh simple-days circulation. Whereas, because
the daudi aflaj characterized by holding a high discharge
rate, an explicit common (renting) right is set aside with
locally innovated measuring units; known as athar. Second,
since such right is belonging (owned) by the falaj itself to
generate income, must be rented only through falaj wakeel
(administrative agent organization) not individual. This is
crucially important to prevent the free-riding problem if the
individual were allowed to rent their share. Hence, all indi-
vidual whom seeking extra what usually rent from the falaj
common right and the generating revenue normally used for
whole system maintenance. However, since not all aflaj type
require maintenance, co-existence of such water market var-
ies. According to Table 2 in general, traditional water market
has been found mainly with the daudi and ghaili aflaj and not
exists with ayni type. This prove the finding above that not
much financial support is required for the ayni type, because
they were constructed away from flooded area with simple
channel layout. However, more emphasis and development
of market transaction were identified with daudi type than
ghaili.
Data shown in column 3 of Table 2 are the identified
weekly water market. This is usually operated for ghaili and
daudi aflaj. However, the difference is that the daudi market
normally operated with explicit common (renting) right, that
is a complete day (24 h) set aside for income generation.
Whereas ghaili market usually operated with implicit com-
mon (renting) right with same complete day set aside. Data

13
Sustainable Water Resources Management (2023) 9:30 Page 11 of 12  30
in column 4 and 5 of Table 2 show the annual water market.
This can be interpreted from two different angles: (1) these
types characterized by holding high discharge rate (high reli-
ability) by which provide more water rights including the
common (renting) right; (2) characterized by more complex
and sophisticated physical-network components. The survey
identified two annual water rights; muzyadah (mean the bit
left over) and murboutah6 (mean tightened water rights to
its leases) as follows: three aflaj attached with muzyadah.
These are falaj daris (19.5 athar), falaj al-mayasser (96
athar) and falaj al-malki (51.5 athar). Whereas only two
aflaj linked with murboutah annual market; these are falaj
daris (2.5 athar) and falaj al-khatmeen (96 athar). How are
these markets operated?
Table 3 shows the collected annual revenue (US$) of the
muzyadah and murboutah common (renting) right for the
two aflaj: al-katmeen in burkat al-mouz and al-mayasser
in Rustaq. Although these two aflaj were constructed with
two split primary channels (upper stream and lower), they
follow slightly different annual water-market operation.
First, in case of the al-khatmeen revenue follow the mur-
boutah principle; that is, the common (renting) right, which
is expressed on time-share (48 athar), normally contractual
over an agreed prices for probably several years; hence, they
say murboutah (fixed on hand of renters). The data in col-
umn 2 and 3 of Table 3 shows the revenue calculated/col-
lected for the 48 athar for the lower khaz and upper khaz.
Our interpretation of the finding as follows: Since such com-
mon (renting) rights selling/renting should not be based on
supply and demand principles, almost constant rented price
per athar was obtained. In other words, the entry and exist
of the water renters should not be conducted through the
biding auction process but only once the existing renters
clearly declare to release the holding, number of athar, then
it is the responsibility of the administrative agent to search
for new renters and so on. This explains the almost constant
price per athar in column 2 and 3 of Table 3.
By contrast, falaj al-mayasser common (renting) right
follows the principle of annual auction. They say muzya-
dah which is a close meaning as the bit left over. Every
year, usually on month of muharam (the first month of
the Islamic calendar AD), all potential extra water seekers
gather in well-known place, normally near the city/village
central market. An auctioneer usually starts up the bidding
by drawing the attention of the potential buyers/renter to
obtain an initial biding price. Here, the auctioning item
is the 24-h irrigated interval expressed on time-share, as
earlier indicated. The main function of the auctioneer, in
this regard, is to obtain an increase increment over these
time-share items from all presented buyers. Once reach
6
 These two Arabic terms normally used to reflect auctioning item
types; muzyadah to bit left over and murboutah simply no bit or fixed.
to a stage that only two competing buyers remain, one of
whom must buy the item. Finally, once a farmer/irrigator
accepts the bid, it is the responsibility of the auctioneer to
ensure that buyers provide cash delivery to the wakil. The
collected revenue shown in column 4 and 5 of Table 3 is
almost identical for the two khaz. However, large variation
over different years can be observed. This can be explained
with relation to flow rate shown in column 6 as follows:
Oman, as an arid region, experiences periods of drought
with extremely hot summer temperatures, and in other
years, a period rainfall normally provides some sort of
abundant water supply. For example, Kwarteng (Kwarteng
et al. 2009) indicated that a period of high rainfall years;
1995–1998, which were far above the yearly average.
These year’s period then followed by 4 consecutive years
of drought, which were 20% below the average; these years
were from 1999 to 2003 (Kwarteng et al. 2009).
Such natural phenomena greatly influence the original
water aquifer which supplying these aflaj. Hence, looking
at flow in column 6 and revenue of say upper khaz, there
is almost an inverse relationship. For example, the highest
flow of al-mayasser was recorded in the year 2009, while
revenue collected in this year was lowest.
Conclusion
An investigation of the aflaj maintenance institutional
arrangements is, in many respects, an assessment of the
overall aflaj-shared community threating risk/uncertainty
within an arid harnessed environment. However, our field
survey found that careful institutional arrangements con-
cerning the whole system maintenance have been devel-
oped in accordance with the physical-extraction variation
among the three aflaj types in Oman. First, although cer-
tain of these types (ghaili) were constructed with a simple
short physical-network layout, received a well-developed
institutional arrangements for maintenance. This is attrib-
uted to the fact that they are prone to drought and greatly
influenced by the occasional heavy rainfall flood. In con-
trast, aflaj constructed over mountainous areas away from
heavy flooded areas, were found with less arrangement
for maintenance. Second, the development/co-exist of a
traditional water market within certain aflaj type is not
merely to meet the efficiency criteria of water usage, but
whether the original of the water-extraction variation has
been represented by the law of water supply. This is sig-
nificantly important in the process of prices determina-
tion. The picture drawn from this investigation indicates
that while there co-exist two several methods in deter-
mining prices (weekly auction, murboutah and muzaya-
dah), prices determined freely within a competitive water
13
 30   Page 12 of 12
market. For example, in a situation where the flow is regu-
lar and water supply fairly stable, community developed
what known as annual contractual over an agreed prices
not allowing an auctioning process in determining prices.
This is significantly crucial in avoiding a market failure,
because prices, as discussed in case of falaj al-mayasser,
hold an inverse relationship; that is as flow rate high price
dramatically reduced, and as a result, revenue was dramati-
cally influenced.
Declarations  4(2):135–146
Conflict of interest  My main interest lay within the subject of agricul-
ture economics. However, recently, I worked over the analysis of the
ancient aflaj water system in Oman, in particular the water rights clas-
sification and associated institutional arrangements.
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