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Tortfeasor and Joint Tortfeasors Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. Worcester v Ocampo Facts: The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippine Islands, and Secretary of the Interior of Insular Government. The defendants are twelve persons designated by name in the complaint and alleged therein to be the owners, directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores), and administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which defendants, as well as the plaintiff, are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands. It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants were the owners, directors, writers, editors, and administrators of said daily newspaper, and that said newspaper, during all the time mentioned in the complaint, was published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands. It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last, on said date, with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff who then was still is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the integrity and reviled the reputation of the plaintiff, not only as a private citizen, but also as an official of the Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed, and published in said newspaper in its ordinary number of the said 30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and false libel, form of an editorial entitled Birds of Prey which was injurious to the plaintiff. It is alleged, among other things, in paragraph four of the complaint, that the plaintiff was on the date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to the public generally, personally as well as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as a Secretary of the Interior; and the defamation and libel, and the words, terms, and language used in said defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and that they should be understood, as in fact they were understood, by the public officials of the Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in general, as referring to the plaintiff. (Here follow the reasons for saying the editorial referred to plaintiff and why the public understood it as referring to him.) The said defendants charged plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal welfare; and with the violation of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal combination of the purpose of robbing the people, with the object of gain for himself and for others; and lastly, with being a bird of prey, and that said defamation should

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be understood, as in effect it was understood by the public officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatever. That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a heading in large and showy type, and every effort was made by said defendant to see that said defamation and libel should attract the attention of the public and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same. In paragraph five of the complaint it is further alleged that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino to believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason to oppose of his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior. In fact, said defendants, by means of said libel and other false statements in said mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the plaintiff, and to in incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which said plaintiff has met with a great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his labors as a public official in every one of the Departments. And the allegations end with paragraph six, in which the plaintiff states that for all these reasons has been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional work to which he has been put by said defendants in compliance with his duties, both in the past and in the future, as well as for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the sum, of P50,000, and that besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand pesos in the way of punitive damages, as a warning to the defendants. The trial court ruled in favor of Worcester. Issue: (1) WON the accused are guilty of libel; (2) Who are liable are tortfeasors? Held/Ratio: During the trial of the cause the plaintiff called several witnesses for the purpose of showing that the statements made in said alleged libelous editorial were intended to apply to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior. The defendants duly objected to these questions and excepted to the ruling of the court admitting them. In the case of Russell vs. Kelley (44 Cal., 641, 642) the same question was raised and the court, in its decision, said: The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on Slander (p. 51) is that the application of the slanderous words to the plaintiff and the extrinsic matters alleged in the declaration may be shown by the testimony of witnesses who knew the parties and circumstances and who can state their judgment and opinion upon the application and meaning of the terms used by the defendant. It is said that where the words are ambiguous on the face of the libel, to whom it was intended to be applied, the judgment and opinion of witnesses,

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who from their knowledge of the parties and circumstances are able to form a conclusion as to the defendant's intention and application of the libel is evidence for the information of the jury. Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p. 567), says: The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others acquainted with the circumstances, to state that, in reading the libel, they at once concluded it was aimed at the plaintiff. It is not necessary that all the world should understand the libel. It is sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant. (See also Falkard's Stockey on Libel and Slander, 4th English edition, 589.) The correctness of this rule is not only established by the weight of authority but is supported by every consideration of justice and sound policy. The lower court committed no error in admitting the opinion of witnesses offered during the trial of the cause. One's reputation is the sum or composite of the impressions spontaneously made by him from time to time, and in one way or another, upon his neighbors and acquaintances. The effect of a libelous publication upon the understanding of such persons, involving necessarily the identity of the person libeled is of the very essence of the wrong. The issue in a libel case concerns not only the sense of the publication, but, in a measure its effect upon a reader acquainted with the person referred to. The correctness of the opinion of the witnesses as to the identity of the person meant in the libelous publication may always be tested by cross-examination. (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston, 72 Fed. Rep., 443; 2nd Greenleaf on Evidence, 417; Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52 Ill., 236; Smith vs. Miles, 15 Vt., 245; Miller vs. Butler, 6 Cushing (Mass.), 71.) It is true that some of the courts have established a different rule. We think, however, that a large preponderance of the decisions of the supreme courts of the different States is in favor of the doctrine which we have announced here. We are of the opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may fairly be considered together, the question being whether or not the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower court shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the said editorial was libelous in its character. Here again we find that this question has been passed upon by this court in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1), and we deem it unnecessary to discuss this question again, for the reason that the evidence adduced in the present cause was practically the same, or at least to the same effect, as the evidence adduced in the cause of U.S. vs. Ocampo et al. It is sufficient here to say that the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause shows, by a large preponderance of the evidence, that said editorial was one of the most pernicious and malicious libels upon a just, upright and honorable official, which the courts have ever been called upon to consider. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the entire record, notwithstanding the fact that the defendants from time to time attempted to make a show of proving the truthfulness of the statements made in said editorial, which in any way reflects upon the character and high ideals of Mr. Dean C. Worcester, in the administration of his department of the Government. With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the court erred in holding that the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco, were the proprietors of "El Renacimiento," the lower court said:

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Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the twelve defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them had originally contributed their money as a patriotic donation to the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and property of the paper as trustee for this people, and that the paper was being devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends but had not done so. "This proposition," said the lower court, "in the light of the evidence, is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if any, serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and common sense. That those seven defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901, for their own personal benefit and profit, is fully and unmistakably established. It is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but that he has been and is still the administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and that the other six persons named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof and were such on the said 30th of October, 1908." Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower court, we find, sometime before the commencement of the present action and before any question was raised with reference to who were the owners of the said newspaper, that the defendant, Arcadio Arellano, in the case of United States vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338), testified upon that question as follows: Q. A. Q. A. Q. A. Who are the proprietors of "El Renacimiento"? I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barretto, and Galo Lichauco. Who else? No one else. And Rafael Palma is not so? No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma.

During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified that his declarations in other cause were true. It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that in the month of November, 1907, long before the commencement of the present action, "El Renacimiento," in reply to an article which was published in "El Comercio," published the following statement: They (it) say (s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the publication of "El Renacimiento") "is sustained by Federal money; that we are inspired by Federal personages. We declare that this, besides being false, is calumnious. The shareholders of this company are persons well known by the public, and never at any moment of their lives have they acted with masks on--those masks for which "El Comercio" seems to have so great an affection. They are, as the public knows: Seores Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit.

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Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of the present cause that he contributed P750 to the establishment of "El Renacimiento;" that Martin Ocampo contributed the sum of P500; that Mariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel Jose contributed the sum of P250 or P500 each; that Galo Lichauco contributed the sum of P1,000 and that Manuel Palma contributed P3,000. During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin Ocampo, and Angel Jose testified as witnesses, relating to the ownership of the newspaper called "El Renacimiento." They testified that whatever money they gave for the purpose of establishing said newspaper, was given as a donation, and that they were neither the owners nor coowners of said periodical. The defendants, Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, did not testify as witnesses during the trial of the cause in the lower court. No reason is given for their failure to appear and give testimony in their own behalf. The record does not disclose whether or not the declarations of Arcadio Arellano, in the case of U. S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) at the time they were made, were called to the attention of Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, as well as the reply to "El Comercio," above noted. Proof of said declarations and publication was adduced during the trial of the cause in the present case, and the attorney of these particular defendants well knew the purpose and effect of such evidence, if not disputed; but, notwithstanding the fact that said declarations and publication were presented in evidence, and notwithstanding the fact that the attorney for the defendants knew of the purpose of such proof, the defendants, Palma, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit, were not called as witnesses for the purpose of rebutting the same. It is a well settled rule of evidence, that when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion. (Railway Company vs. Ellis, C. C. A. Reports, vol. 4, p. 454; Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 295; People vs. McWhorter 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.) Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs. Archer (Cowper, 63, 65) said: It is certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other side to have contradicted. Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence (vol. 1, p. 64), lays down the rule that: The conduct of a party in omitting to produce evidence in elucidation of the subject matter in dispute, which is within his power and which rests peculiarly within his own knowledge, frequently offers occasion for presumptions against him, since it raises the strong suspicion that such evidence, if adduced, would operate to his prejudice. (Pacific Coast et al. Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C. C. A. Reports, 136, 153.) At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the case of Sedano and at the time of the said publication in reply to "El Comercio," there was no reason for stating anything except the truth: neither does there seem to have been any reason for publishing the fact that the defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" unless it was true. At the time there seemed to be no reason to have it appear that they were donors and public benefactors only. They seemed to be proud of the fact that they were the owners. The editors,

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publishers, and managers of "El Renacimiento," at the time the reply to "El Comercio" was published, seemed to be anxious to announce to the public who its owners were. It ("El Renacimiento") had not then realized that it belonged to no one; that it had been born into the community without percentage; that it had been created a terrible machine for the purpose of destroying the good character and reputation of men without having any one to respond for its malicious damage occasioned to honorable men; that it was a cast-off, without a past or the hope of a future; that it was liable to be kicked and buffetted about the persecuted and destroyed without any one to protect it; that its former friends and creators had scattered hither and thither and had disappeared like feathers before a cyclone, declaring, under oath, that they did not know their offspring and were not willing to recognize it in public. It seems to have been a Moses found in the bulrushes, destined by its creators to be a great good among the Filipino people, in teaching them to respect the rights of persons and property; but, unlike its Biblical prototype, it became, by reason of its lack of parentage, an engine of destruction let loose in the State, to enter the private abode of lawabiding citizens and to take from them their honor and reputation, which neither it nor the State could restore. To rob a man of his wealth is to rob him of trash, but to take from him his good name and reputation is to rob him of that which does not make the robber richer and leaves the person robbed poor indeed. The appellants tried to make it appear that the money which they gave for the establishment of "El Renacimiento" was a pure donation. They claim that it was a donation to the Filipino people. They do not state, however, or attempt to show what particular persons were to manage, control, and direct the enterprise for which the donation was made. A donation must be made to definite persons or associations. A donation to an indefinite person or association is an anomaly in law, and we do not believe, in view of all of the facts, that it was in fact made. A donation must be made to some definite person or association and the donee must be some ascertained or ascertainable person or association. A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it must be made, in the very nature of things, to some definite person or association. A donation made to no person or association could not be regarded as a donation in law. It could not be more than an abandonment of property. Of course where a donation is in fact made, without reservation to a particular person or association, the donor is no longer the owner of the thing donated nor responsible, in any way, for its use, provided that the object, for which the donation was made, was legal. A person does not become an owner or part owner of a church, for example, to the construction of which he has made a donation; neither is he responsible for the use to which said edifice may be applied. No one disputes the fact that donations may be made for the public use, but they must be made to definite persons or associations, to be administered in accordance with the purpose of the gift. We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the defendants and appellants, at the time they presented the defense that they were donors simply and not owners, had a reasonable hope that their declarations as to said donation, given in the manner alleged, would be believed by the court. After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this court and taking into consideration the failure of the other defendants to testify, we are of the opinion that a preponderance of such evidence shows that the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the coowners of the newspaper known as "El Renacimiento," at the time of the publication of the said alleged libel.

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The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of error together, and claim that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants and in allowing an execution against the individual property of said owners, and cite provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in support of their contention. The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have been sued jointly and severally, as they were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common Law Reports), 558.) If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chiddey, Common Law Pleadings, 86.) It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for, to give an example, in a case of assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common law all are principals. So also is the person who counsels, aids or assists in any way he commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or assisted or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.) It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 Ill., 313 (63 Am. Dec., 312 and note); Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb. (N. Y.), 612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.) Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (English Reports), 343; Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Booth vs. Hodgson, 6 Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505; Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449; Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9 Johnson (N. Y.), 294.) Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount. (Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417; Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.) A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might exist against the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement, generally operates to discharge all. (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N.Y.), 290; Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387; Turner vs. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)

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Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort feasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson (N. Y.), 382; Drake vs. Barrymore, 14 Johnson, 166; Owens vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.) This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine Commission. Section 6 provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part . . . or number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same. In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants and allowing an execution against their individual property. The provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes cited by the defendants and appellants have no application whatever to the question presented in the present case. Possessors of Animals Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Vestil v Intermediate Appellate Court Facts: On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3 Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4 The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. 5 It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

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Issue: WON Purita Vestil should be sustained in her argument that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property and hence, not liable for the act of the dog Held/Ratio: No. In Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to anyone, including himself. Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him ("one way or the other") and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which, however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. 8 She at least implied that they did not pay any rent, presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to know them very well. There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders (or more of boarders than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a dog. 10 Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although Purita denied paying the water bills for the house, the private respondents submitted documentary evidence of her application for water connection with the Cebu Water District, which strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question. 12 While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the

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child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. Owner of Motor Vehicles Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. Chapman v Underwood Facts: At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this action, there was a singletrack street-car line running along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other. One of these switches was located at the scene of the accident. Chapman, the plaintiff, had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of Creveling, in front of whose house the accident happened. He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed from the gate into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear flatform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reached it without extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's automobile. The defendant, Underwood, entered Calle Herran at Calle Peafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the switch that is, went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon the defendant no longer followed that the street car nor went to the left, but either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the one the plaintiff attempted to board, was almost in front of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff, as above described. The judgment of the trial court was for defendant. Issue: WON Underwood should be liable for the act of his driver during the accident

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Held: No. A careful examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in common out to board the car, was not obliged, for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts and circumstances of this case. Although in Johnson vs. David the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own. In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. Caedo v Yu Khe Thai FACTS: Caedo and family were traveling Highway 54 on the way to the airport. Private respondents were traveling on the opposite direction. Bernardo was the personal river of Yu. Both vehicles were running at moderate speeds when a carritela was traveling the same direction as Bernardos. The latter overtook the caritella and took the lane Caedos were traveling and caused multiple injuries and damage to the Caedos. Bernardo was held liable. ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the vehicle who was riding with the driver at the time of the accident be held solidarily liable. RULING: The court ruled that if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the existence of due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence

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of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. Provinces, Cities, Municipalities Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. Guilatco v Dagupan FACTS: Guilatco, (Court Interpreter) was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk when at Perez Blvd when she accidentally fell into a manhole causing her right leg to be fractured. Perez Blvd is a National Road under the control and supervision of City of Dagupan. Such manhole is partially covered by a flowerpot leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long and 1 feet wide. She was hospitalized, operated on and confined. She had been deprived of income. She sued for damages. The lower court ruled in her favor; hence, this petition. The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan. ISSUE: WON Control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists which makes City liable under Art 2189 HELD: Yes. RATIO: Art 2189 says : Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries, suffered by, any person by reason of the defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works, under their control and supervision. Thus, it is not even necessary that such defective road or street belongs to the City. In the case at bar, the control and supervision of the national road exists and is provided for in the charter of Dagupan. It provided that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Such control and supervision is exercised through the City Engineer Tangco, who aside from his official capacity as City Engineer, was also Ex Officio Highway Engineer, Ex Officio City Engineer of Bureau of Public Works, and Building Official and received compensation for these functions. The function of supervision over streets, public buildings and public works, pertaining through the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these two officials are employees of the Natl Govt, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer. Hence the City is liable. Quezon City v Dacara Facts: Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of '87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic), while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik

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St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. Indemnification was sought from the city government, which however, yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara Complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon. Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a moun[d] of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident on February 28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M. In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latter's negligence and failure to exercise due care." After trial on the merits, the RTC found that the evidence proffered by the complainant (herein respondent) was found to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners. The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. Noting the failure of petitioners to present evidence to support their contention that precautionary measures had indeed been observed, it ruled thus: "x x x. Sadly, the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failed to show that they placed sufficient and adequate precautionary signs at Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent the dangers to life and limb under the circumstances. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the [petitioners], namely Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, Ernesto Landrito and Eduardo Castillo, that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress and prove the sufficiency and adequacy of said contention."10 Further upholding the trial court's finding of negligence on the part of herein petitioners, the CA gave this opinion: "x x x. As observed by the trial court, the negligence of [petitioners] was clear based on the investigation report of Pfc. William P. Villafranca stating to the effect 'that the subject vehicle rammed into a pile of earth from a deep excavation thereat without any warning devi[c]e whatsoever and as a consequence thereof, Dacara, Jr. lost control of his driven car and finally turned-turtle causing substantial damage to the same.' As a defense against liability on the basis of quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family which [petitioners] failed to establish in the instant case."11 Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been no death or physical injury, the CA ruled in the affirmative: "x x x. More importantly, we find it illogical to limit the liability to death or personal injury only as argued by appellants in the case at bar applying the foregoing provisions. For, injury is an act that damages, harms or hurts and mean in common as the act or result of inflicting on a person or thing something that causes loss, pain, distress, or impairment. Injury is the most comprehensive, applying to an act or result involving an impairment or destruction of right, health, freedom, soundness, or loss of something of value."12 Issue: WON Quezon City must be held liable on the ground of negligence

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Held/Ratio: Yes. That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower court's finding, which we quote: Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. "Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident. xxxxxxxxx "Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed. xxxxxxxxx "The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable."20 (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on "city streets with light traffic, when not designated 'through streets,'" as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 218521 of the Civil Code.22 These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136 in their Motion for Reconsideration23 of the CA Decision dated February 21, 2001. It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. It is well-settled that points of law, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal.24 To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. Proprietors of Buildings

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Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. Engineer/Architect of Collapsed Building Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. Head of a Family for Things Thrown/Falling Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. Dingcong v Kanaan Facts: Dingcong brothers are co-lessees in the upper floor of the house owned by Saenz Brothers established the central hotel in the building where they were the managers A guest, Echivarria, occupied room 10 of the hotel for P30 per month Kanaans occupied the lower floor of the hotel where they established a bazaar Echivarria let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were undergoing repairs A bucket was placed underneath the leaking faucet to catch the dripping water the bucket overflowed

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Water seeped through the floor the merchandise in the bazaar below got wet and damaged worth around P1T Kanaans brought an action for damages against the managers (brothers Dingcong) and Echivarria (person who let the faucet leak) CFI absolved the deceased Dingcong brother only but held Echivarria liable CA reversed holding Dingcong liable for the damages Issue: WON the manager can be held liable Held: YES Ratio: Dingcong, as a co-lessee and manager of the hotel has to answer for the damage caused by things that thrown or falling from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil) Echivarria was a guest of the hotel and was the direct cause of the damage But Dingcong did NOT exercise the diligence of a good father of the family He knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair, presumed that the guest Echivarria would use the faucet, but only provided a bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks Judgment Affirmed. Owners of Enterprises/Other Employers Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced. Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker. Afable v Singer Sewing Machine Facts: Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. His compensation was a commission of eight per cent of all collections made by him. On the afternoon of Sunday, November 16, 1930, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso Street in Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the

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practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning. On November 21, 1930, Vitaliano Sumoay, the driver of the truck within caused the death of Leopoldo Madlangbayan, was convicted for the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day, and to indemnify the heirs of Leopoldo Madlangbayan in the sum of P1,000. On February 19, 1931, the widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought the present action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses. Issue: WON Singer is liable for expenses incurred by Afable Held/Ratio: No. The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant. The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. Although some courts have held otherwise, we think the better rule is as we have stated it. We do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while of his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment. In the case at bar, if the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover. In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance. An employee quit work, mounted his motorcycle and started for home. When riding down the street he collided with an automobile driven by another employee. He sustained injuries which resulted in his death. In holding that the accident did not arise out of in the course of

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the employment, the court said: "To come within the term "injury received in the course of employment " it must be shown that the injury originated in the work, and, further, that it was received the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs of the employer. If it be conceded that the injury originated in the work, it would still be necessary, in our opinion, to show that the employee was engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business." Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. Alarcon v Alarcon Facts: On June 3, 1955 the defendant hired Urzino Azaa and his brother to dig a well on his land in Caramoan, Camarines Sur. After the day's work the two had dug a hole about five feet meters deep without striking water. On the next day Urzino resumed his work with one Generoso Zulueta as co-worker. Generoso was also hired by the defendant in place of Urzino's brother who did not return to work. Urzino and Generoso started their work early in the morning. Urzino was lowered into the hole with a rope to dig deeper. On reaching the bottom he quickly remarked that he was not feeling well. Generoso told him to get ready to be pulled up, but a moment later Urzino fainted and slumped helplessly into a sitting position. Generoso quickly called for help. A policeman and other persons immediately responded. After their arrival Generoso lowered a ladder and proceeded to descend into the hole. After having gone down about two meters, he felt a current of hot air with an obnoxious odor around him. He soon realized that he was not feeling well. Accordingly, he desisted from descending farther and instead he climbed up out of the hole. One of the men then volunteered to go down in his place, but he too could not reach the bottom for the same reason. Realizing that it was not safe to go into the hole, Generoso and others thought of another method to get Urzino out. With a rope tied into a loop on one end, they caught one of his legs and pulled up his body. They next put him on bed while someone summoned a doctor. In less than five minutes the municipal health officer arrived. He quickly attempted to revive Urzino but his efforts proved unavailing because he was already dead. He certified that Urzino died of asphyxia. On the day of his death Urzino was single, 20 years old, and living with his mother who is the plaintiff. She filed this action to recover compensation for her son's death under the provisions of Art. 1711 of the Civil Code. Issue: whether the defendant falls under the provisions of said Article 1711

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Held/Ratio: No. Art. 1171 provides that owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced. Defendant herein does not own any enterprise. He is merely a school teacher who needed a well. Neither does he fall under the category of "other employers" mentioned in said Article 1711. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, said "other employers" must be construed to refer to persons who belong to a class analogous to "owners of enterprises", such as those operating a business or engaged in a particular industry or trade, requiring its managers to contract the services of laborers, workers and/or employees. As His Honor, the trial Judge had correctly observed the terms "capital", "management", "industrialist", "manager" and "owners of enterprises", used to describe the employers alluded to in said section 2, indicate that they contemplate those engaged more or less in business or industry. In fact, the aforementioned Article 1711 merely states the philosophy underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) and must be interpreted in relation thereto, for Article 2196 of the same Code provides that "compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws". Pursuant to section 39(b) of Act No. 3428, as amended: Laborer' is used as a synonym of 'Employee' and means every person who has entered the employment of, or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for an employer. It does not include a person whose employment is purely casual and is not for the purposes of the occupation or business of the employer. . . Inasmuch as the employment of Urzino Azaa by defendant herein was "purely casual" and was not "for the purposes of the occupation or business" of said defendant, it is clear to us that Urzino Azaa is not covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Neither may plaintiff herein avail of the benefits of the Employer's Liability Act (Act No. 1874), which she does not invoke, for it is not claimed that Urzino's death was due to "a defect in the condition of the ways, works or machinery connected with or used in the business of the employer," or to "the negligence of a person in the service of the employer." Hence, there is no means by which defendant herein may be held liable for Azaa's death, due to an accidental cause or fortuitous event. Manufacturers/Producers Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.

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Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. RA 7394The Consumer Act of the Philippines ARTICLE 97. Liability for the Defective Products - Liability for the Defective Products. Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting from design, manufacturer, construction, assembly and erection formulas and handling and making up, presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof. A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: a) presentation of product; b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it; c) the time it was put into circulation. A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been placed in the market. The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable when its evidences: a) that it did not place the product on the market; b) that although it did place the product on the market such product has no defect ; c) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault. ARTICLE 99. Liability Defective Services - The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof. The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: a) manner in which it is provided. b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it; c) the time when it was provided. A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of new techniques. The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven: a) that there is no defect in the service rendered; b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault ARTICLE 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation - The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as provided for in this and in preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than one

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person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redress established in the pertinent provisions of this Act. However, if the damage is caused by a component or part incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable. RA 9803The Food Donation Act AN ACT TO ENCOURAGE THE DONATION OF FOOD FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Food Donation Act of 2009", SEC, 2. Declaration of Policy, - It is the policy of the State to alleviate national poverty and reduce food wastage. As such, the State shall implement measures to encourage the donation of apparently wholesome food for charitable purposes. SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows: a) "Apparently Wholesome Food" refers to food that meets all quality and labeling standards imposed by pertinent laws and administrative regulations even though the food may not be readily marketable due to appearance. age. freshness, grade, size, surplus, or other conditions. It does not include milk products as defined and covered under Executive Order No. 51, the "National Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, Breastmilk Supplements and Other Related Products", (b) "Donate" is to dispose of an apparently wholesome food in favor of another. It includes giving by one person to another person of an apparently wholesome food for distribution, notwithstanding that the former has charged a nominal fee from the latter, if the ultimate beneficiary is not required to give anything of monetary value. (c) "Food" refers to any raw, cooked, processed, or prepared edible substance, ice, beverage, or ingredient used or intended for use in whole or in part for human consumption. (d) "Gross Negligence" refers to voluntary and conscious conduct, including a failure to act, by a person who, at the time of the conduct, knew that the conduct was likely to be harmful to the health or well-being of another person. (e) "Intentional Misconduct" refers to conduct by a person with knowledge at the time of the conduct that the conduct is harmful to the health 01' well-being of another person. (f) "Charitable Purposes" refers to philanthrophic, humanitarian and non-profit objectives, including the benefit of the needy, poor, sick, prisoners, orphans, etc. SEC. 4. Coordinating Mechanism. - To ensure effective and sustained inter-agency and multisectoral coordination, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) shall serve as the main coordinating agency together with the Philippine National Red Cross as auxiliary for the implementation of this Act.

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SEC. 5. Liability for Damages from Donated Food. A person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability arising from the nature, age, packaging, or condition of apparently wholesome food that a person donates in good faith for charitable purposes. This shall not apply, however, to an injury or death of an ultimate beneficiary of the donated food that results from an act or omission of a person constituting gross negligence or intentional misconduct. SEC. 6. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DSWD, in coordination with the Department of Health (DOH) and its attached agencies, the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and the National Nutrition Council (NNC); the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC); the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP); other relevant government agencies, nongovernment organizations including the Philippine National Red Cross and private entities shall formulate and issue the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act within ninety (90) days after the effectivity of this Act. SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, rule or regulation inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SEC. 8. Separability Clause. - If any portion 0" provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act or any provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and effect. SEC. 9. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation.