Semester: 3rd Course: Legal Aspects of Business | MBA-C301 Programme: MBA Submitted to: Dr Waseem Jahangir
Bakshi Hardatt v. The State of J&K, 1977
Advocates 1. T.S. Thakur 2. S.P. Gupta 3. A.D. Singh Judges 1. A.S. Anand 2. I.K. Kotwal Facts Respondent No. 1 filed a lawsuit on April 5, 1968, in the High Court on its original side, seeking to recover Rs. 35,120.11 from the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 and 3. On January 2, 1971, the appellant made a motion before the learned Single Judge who was hearing the case that the firm Kathua Motor Union, a partnership, was a necessary party to the suit and could, therefore, be impleaded as a defendant in the action because of the transactions that had occurred between the firm and respondent No. 1. In his ruling of September 7, 1971, the learned Single Judge, J. N. Bhat J., who served as His Lordship at the time, dismissed the aforementioned application. The order is the subject of this appeal. Respondent No. 1 has raised a preliminary objection, arguing that because the contested decision was not appealable under order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure or a "judgement" as defined by claim 12 of the Letters Patent, the appeal could not be maintained. Argument by learned council The knowledgeable attorney has then claimed that because the appellant is only one of several partners in the firm Messrs. Kathua Motor Union, the impugned ruling has harmed his ability to collect contributions from other partners. No additional lawsuit against the remaining partners would be admissible at the appellant's request, according to the experienced counsel, unless the firm itself was a party to the current lawsuit. The experienced counsel's argument also lacks any substance. Point of law A judgement within the sense of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent cannot be defined as an order that denies a request to amend a lawsuit by adding a party or for any other reason. This is an absolute legal principle that cannot be established. Every case must be decided based on its own unique facts. Judgement The judgement on behalf of the court simply indicated that a refusal that denied someone the chance to later argue their claim had resolved their rights and obligations and was, thus, a judgement. This court has ruled in favour of it that there is no way that the appellant's right to demand contributions from the other partners in the firm is not fully guaranteed by Section 43 of the Contract Act. The contested order has no bearing on the case's merits because it does not deprive the appellant of any such rights. This clearly demonstrates that the contested order is harmless and has no bearing on the rights and obligations of the parties in controversy in the suit if the allegations in the plaint are proven. This is true even if the firm Messrs Kathua Motor Union, in which the appellant is a partner, is added as a defendant. For the aforementioned grounds, it is obvious that the assailed order does not qualify as a judgement under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The appeal is rejected because it fails, and the preliminary objection still stands. Costs must follow the outcome.