G.R. No.

179641

DOLORITA C. BEATINGO, Petitioner,
vs.
LILIA BU GASIS, Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Dolorita Beatingo filed a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Sale,
Reconveyance, Delivery of Title and Damages 4 against respondent Lilia Bu Gasis before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City.
Petitioner alleged that she bought the subject property on May 19, 1998 from Flora G. Gasis.
The sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. However, she failed to obtain registration
as she could not produce the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. She, thus, filed a petition for the
issuance of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title but was opposed by respondent Lilia, claiming that
she was in possession of the Original Certificate of Title as she purchased the subject property from
Flora on January 27, 1999, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale and declared that, upon payment of the
purchase price, she immediately occupied the subject property and enjoyed its produce.

The RTC dismissed the complaint and decided in favor of respondent. The RTC considered the
controversy as one of double sale and it applied the rules laid down in Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial and Reconsideration on the ground that she was in
possession of the subject property actually and constructively. However, the motion was denied by the
RTC.

Undaunted, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Notice of Appeal. The CA required
petitioner to file an Appellant’s Brief within forty-five days from receipt of the notice. However, due to
pressures of work in equally important cases with other clients, counsel for petitioner requested for an
extension of ninety (90) days within which to file the brief which was granted. Instead of filing the
Appellant’s Brief within the extended period, petitioner twice moved for extension of time to file the
brief, covering an additional period of sixty (60) days for the same reasons as those raised in the first
motion for extension. In a Resolution, the CA denied the motions for extension to file brief. Thus, for
failure to file the Appellant’s Brief, the appellate court dismissed the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent appeal should not have been dismissed.

RULING:

No. The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal when no appellant’s brief is
filed within the reglementary period prescribed by the rules.

Evidently, petitioner’s counsel was negligent in failing to file the required brief not only within
45 days from receipt of the notice but also within the extended period of ninety (90) days granted by the
appellate court. He, however, explains that he could not comply with the court’s directive because he
had to attend to other cases that he considered more important and urgent than the instant case.
Regrettably, such excuse is unacceptable. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best
of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence,
more so if the delay results in the dismissal of the appeal.

In this case, we find no reason to disturb the appellate court’s exercise of sound discretion in
dismissing the appeal. We must emphasize that the right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory
privilege, and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
 G.R. No. 165575

ADELIA C. MENDOZA and as Attorney-in-Fact of ALICE MALLETA, Petitioners,

vs.
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the Appellants’ Brief filed by petitioners for failure to comply with the requirements
under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner Adelia Mendoza, attorney-in-fact of petitioner Alice Malleta, filed a Complaint for

annulment of titles, foreclosure proceedings and certificate of sale. In their Complaint, herein petitioners
stated that they entered into a Real Estate Mortgage Contract with respondent UCPB in the amount of
₱4,925,000.00. The properties were sold at public auction in the total amount of ₱31,300,00.00 to UCPB.
Petitioners contended that the foreclosure proceedings violated due process and the legal requirements
under Act No. 3135, as amended.

In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent UCPB denied that petitioners entered
into a Real Estate Mortgage Contract with it, the truth being that petitioner Adelia Mendoza executed
several promissory notes in the total principal amount of ₱27,500,000.00, and to secure these
obligations she executed, together with petitioner Alice Malleta, several real estate mortgages over
several parcels of land in favor of UCPB. Respondent denied that the foreclosure proceedings were
legally defective, as the said proceedings were done in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135,
as amended.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute. Respondent contended that
petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of its Answer on August 26, 2002, as shown by the
photocopy of the registry return receipt. It stated that under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioners have the positive duty to promptly set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading
had been filed. It stated that the Answer was the last pleading, since petitioners failed to file a Reply
thereon within the reglementary period.

Petitioners, through counsel Atty. Jose P. Malabanan, filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss and Motion to Set the Case for Pre-trial, 20 and stated therein that their counsel on record is Atty.
Monchito C. Rosales, who died on December 22, 2002; that Atty. Jose P. Malabanan forgot the case
because of the death of Atty. Rosales (who is his law partner), and that he was setting the case for pre-
trial. Petitioners prayed that the Opposition and motion to set the case for pre-trial be granted.

The RTC of Lipa City issued an Order dismissing the case. The court found the Motion to Dismiss
(for failure to prosecute) to be in accordance with the rules. It stated that the records of the case showed
that since August 20, 2002, the issues in this case had already been joined, and that Atty. Monchito C.
Rosales was still alive then, yet he did not take any step to have the case set for pre-trial. It found the
claim of Atty. Jose P. Malabanan, that he forgot about the case because of the death of Atty. Rosales, as
unpardonable, flimsy and an invalid excuse. The Motion for Reconsideration of the Order was denied for
lack of merit by the trial court

Thereafter, petitioners appealed the trial court’s Orders to the Court of Appeals, and filed an
Appellant’s Brief. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that the Appellant’s Brief
failed to comply with the requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondent contended that the Appellant’s Brief contained only the following topics: (1) Prefaratory
Statement; (2) Statement of Facts and Antecedent Proceedings; (3) Parties; (4) Statement of the Case;
(5) Issues; (6) Arguments/Discussion; and (7) Prayer. The Appellants’ Brief did not have the following
items: (1) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references,
and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages
where they are cited; (2) an assignment of errors; (3) on the authorities cited, references to the page of
the report at which the case begins and page of the report on which the citation is found; (4) page
references to the record in the Statement of Facts and Statement of the Case.
 The Court of Appeal dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the ground that their
Appellants’ Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the
said brief did not have a subject index, an assignment of errors, and page references to the record in the
Statement of Facts.

RULING:

No. In regard to ordinary appealed cases to the Court of Appeals, such as this case, Section 13,
Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the contents of an Appellant’s Brief, thus:

Sec. 13. Contents of appellant’s brief.—The appellant’s brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated,
the following:

(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a
table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where
they are cited;

(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which errors shall be separately, distinctly and
concisely stated without repetition and numbered consecutively;

(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action,
a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the nature of the judgment
and any other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the controversy, with page
references to the record;

(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of the facts
admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of the proof relating
thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;

(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its
judgment;

(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant’s arguments on each assignment of error with page
references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the report at which the
case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;

(g) Under the heading "Relief," a specification of the order or judgment which the appellant seeks; and

(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant’s brief shall contain, as an appendix, a
copy of the judgment or final order appealed from.

In this case, the Appellants’ Brief of petitioners did not have a subject index. The importance of a
subject index should not be underestimated. De Liano v. Court of Appeals declared that the subject index
functions like a table of contents, facilitating the review of appeals by providing ready reference.
Moreover, the Appellants’ Brief had no assignment of errors. Further, the Court of Appeals found that
the Statement of Facts was not supported by page references to the record. The assignment of errors
and page references to the record in the statement of facts are important in an Appellant’s Brief as the
absence thereof is a basis for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (f), Rule 50, of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

In fine, the Court upholds the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of
petitioners on the ground that their Appellants’ Brief does not comply with the requirements provided
in Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the dismissal is supported by Section 1 (f),
Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and jurisprudence.
 G.R. No. 171038

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LOPEZ, namely: MONSERRAT LOPEZ-MARCHAN, LYDIA LOPEZ-DAMASCO,
THELMA LOPEZ-GERONA, ELSA FELY LOPEZ-REBUSTILLO, JOSE LOPEZ, and HERMINIO
LOPEZ, Respondents

FACTS:

The respondent heirs of the deceased Juan Lopez owned a parcel of coconut land.
Monserrat L. Marchan, together and in behalf of her co-respondents,voluntarily offered to sell the
parcel of land to the Department of Agrarian Reform under the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988." After conducting a field investigation only 21.6101 out of the 23.1301 hectares was
found subject for acquisition. The LBP’s offer was reduced to ₱298,101.21

The respondents rejected the LBP’s offer and elevated the matter to the DAR Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. Provincial Adjudicator Manuel M. Capellan fixed the just compensation
9 

for the respondents’ 21.6101-hectare property at ₱928,330.17, which was ₱630,228.96 more than
the amount offered by the LBP. The huge difference from the LBP’s estimate arose from the
PARAD’s use of the average selling price of ₱16.00 per kg. of copra instead of the average selling
price of ₱5.86 per kg. of copra used by the LBP. The motion for reconsideration was denied.

The LBP filed before the Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court a petition
for the judicial determination of just compensation. The LBP contended that the PARAD gravely
abused his discretion in valuing the respondents’ property at ₱928,330.17. The RTC-SAC affirmed
the PARAD’s decision.

The CA affirmed the RTC-SAC’s ruling. As for the LBP’s valuation, the CA found it to be
unrealistic and far from being the "just" compensation envisioned by the Constitution

ISSUE:

Whether the present petition for review on certiorari, that the LBP insisting that the PCA-
supplied average selling price data of ₱5.86 per kg. of copra should have been used in computing
the just compensation for the respondents’ property is reviewable by Rule 45.

RULING:

No. We find the present issue to be a question of fact that is not reviewable by this Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  1avvphi1

Section 1 thereof provides that "[t]he petition x x x shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth." To differentiate, a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts while a question of law exists if the doubt centers on what the law is on a
certain set of facts; there is a question of fact if the issue requires a review of the evidence presented
or requires the re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, and there is a question of law if the issue
raised is capable of being resolved without the need of reviewing the probative value of the
evidence.

The issue of the correctness of the average selling price data used in this case is clearly a question
of fact that can only be determined by a review of the evidence presented by the parties.
In the absence of proof to show that the RTC-SAC acted arbitrarily in the appreciation and weighing
of the evidence, we respect the RTC-SAC’s findings. Factual findings and determinations made by
the RTC, or in this case the RTC-SAC, are generally binding on the Court, particularly when affirmed
by the CA.

G.R. No. 160932

SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTO P.

CERICOS, Petitioner,
vs.
NESTOR M. CANDA, BIENVENIDO LIPA YON, JULIAN D. AMADOR, BOHOL PROVINCIAL
CHIEF, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, AND NATIONAL DIRECTOR, RESPECTIVELY,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ALL SUED IN BOTH THEIR OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE
CAPACITIES, Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.

Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project,
respondent Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings in a letter as
follows:1) The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental Examination is
required. 2) The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social acceptability
should be established. Proper indorsement from the Protected Area Management Bureau or PAMB
should be secured. The petitioner appealed Canda’s findings to respondent EMB Director
Bienvenido L. Lipayon, claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because the project was no
different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the Department of Public Works and Highways.

RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial Environmental Examination document was
required for the project due to its significant impact in the area and required the petitioner to submit
the documents to enable the EMB to determine whether the project was within an environmentally
critical area or not. The petitioner submitted eight certifications, including the certification issued by
the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS). Given the tenor of the
certification from PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayon’s letter declared that the project was within an
environmentally critical area, and that the petitioner was not entitled to the CNC.

the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the Regional Trial Court in Loay,
Bohol, alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied with the
certification requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar
waterworks project in the same area. The RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus. Hence, this
appeal brought directly to the Court via petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the appeal directly to this Court from the RTC was proper.

RULING:

No. Petitioner’s appeal is improper under Rule 45, Rules of Court. This appeal by certiorari is
being taken under Rule 45, Rules of Court, whose Section 1 expressly requires that the petition shall
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Yet, the petitioner hereby raises a
question of fact whose resolution is decisive in this appeal. That issue of fact concerns whether or
not the petitioner established that its project was not located in an environmentally critical area.

The Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case. The Court relies on the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals or of the trial court, and accepts such findings as conclusive
and binding unless any of the following exceptions obtains, namely: (a) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals or the trial court went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when
the findings are contrary to the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k)
when the Court of Appeals or the trial court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. However, none of
the aforementioned exceptions applies herein.
 G.R. No. 185112

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) and NATIONAL MARITIME

POLYTECHNIC (NMP), Petitioners,
vs.
RUBEN Y. MACEDA Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Ruben Y. Maceda rose to the permanent positions of Assistant Professor I and
later Associate Professor I. In 1998, the NMP again promoted respondent Maceda to the rank of
Professor I but this time under a mere temporary appointment. In 2002 the NMP completed the
revision of the Qualification Standard (QS) for its staff. Maceda claimed, however, that nothing has
since been heard of that revised QS after the NMP submitted the same to the CSC for approval. The
Human Resources Management Section of NMP wrote respondent Maceda, advising him that the
school would be putting him under contractual employment from January 7 to June 30, 2003 or until
such time as the CSC shall have already approved the NMP Maritime Training Revised Qualification
Standard.

On March 20, 2003 the NMP Executive Director, Noriel Devanadera, wrote respondent
Maceda, informing him that his temporary appointment as Professor I was being renewed effective
on April 1, 2003 and that the succeeding renewal of his appointment would be subject to his meeting
the requirements of the position. On December 23, 2003, the NMP OIC wrote respondent Maceda,
informing him that his appointment as Professor I would be renewed on contractual status effective
from January 5 to June 30, 2004. Maceda agreed and signed a contract of employment. On the
same date, however, Maceda filed a complaint with the CSC regarding his demotion in employment
status. The Administrative Officer of the CSC regional office convinced him, however, that the
renewal of the appointments of temporary employees is a prerogative of the head of the agency.

On June 30, 2004 the NMP OIC informed respondent Maceda that, on instructions from
Devanadera, he was not to report for work anymore on the following day. On June 2, 2004
respondent Maceda wrote to the members of the Board of Trustees of NMP about his illegal
termination as professor and Devanadera’s mismanagement of the school’s affairs. Further, Maceda
charged Devanadera and NMP before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of
oppression leading to his illegal termination. On October 21, 2004, the DOLE Secretary dismissed
his complaint.

On November 2, 2004 respondent Maceda appealed his case to the CSC but the latter
dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction, pointing out that, since Devanadera was a presidential
appointee, the power to discipline him belonged to the President. This prompted Maceda to seek
recourse by special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals. 2008 the CA rendered a
decision, granting the petition, ordering the NMP to reinstate Maceda to his previous position as
Professor I.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA correctly gave due course to Maceda’s special civil action of certiorari for
the correction of the alleged errors in the rulings of the CSC.

RULING:

No. In determining whether the proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari or a
petition for review, it is not so much the nature of the question or questions that would be raised that
matters. With very rare exceptions, what is decisive is whether or not the challenged order is a final
order that disposes of the merit of the case.
 The Court held in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Jancom Environmental
Corp. that the remedy for seeking the reversal or modification of a judgment rendered on the merits
of the case is appeal. This is true even if the error imputed to the officer, body, or tribunal constitutes
alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or grave abuse of discretion in making
its or his findings of fact or of law. The Court cannot countenance the blurring of the distinction
between a special civil action for certiorari and a petition for review.

Besides, it cannot be said that the CSC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
respondent Maceda’s complaint. Grave abuse of discretion exists where the public respondent acts
in a manner so patent and gross that it amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
do what the law enjoins on him. It is not sufficient that the CA disagreed with the findings of the CSC
or considered them in error; it had to determine that the CSC’s findings had run berserk, prompted
by passion and personal hostility rather than by reason. The CA did not make this determination.
 G.R. No. 161122

DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, HON. AUGUSTINE VESTIL, as Presiding Judge of RTC-
CEBU, Br. 56, MANDAUE CITY, SPS. FELIX NG AND NENITA NG, and SPS. MARTIN T. NG
AND AZUCENA S. NG AND AGRIPINA R. GOC-ONG, Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner acquired a parcel of land through a deed of absolute sale executed between
the petitioner, as vendee, and Agripina R. Goc-ong (a respondent herein), Porferio Goc-ong,
Diosdado Goc-ong, Crisostomo Goc-ong, Tranquilino Goc-ong, Naciancena Goc-ong and Avelino
Goc-ong (collectively, the Goc-ongs), as vendors. The petitioner later on discovered the joint affidavit
executed on June 19, 1990 by the Goc-ongs, whereby the Goc-ongs declared that they were the
owners of the property, and that they were mortgaging the property to Felix Ng, married to Nenita N.
Ng, and Martin T. Ng) to secure their obligation amounting to ₱ 648,000.00, subject to the condition
that should they not pay the stipulated 36-monthly installments, the Ngs would automatically become
the owners of the property. With the Goc-ongs apparently failing to pay their obligation to the Ngs as
stipulated, the latter brought on January 16, 1997 a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money,
or, in the alternative, for the foreclosure of mortgage in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, in
Mandaue City (RTC) only against respondent Agripina R. Goc-ong. With Agripina R. Goc-ong being
declared in default for failing to file her answer.

The petitioner commenced in the Court of Appeals an action for the annulment of decision of
the RTC. However, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, considering that nowhere therein is there an allegation
on why "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The petitioner moved for the
reconsideration but the CA denied its motion for reconsideration on the basis that petitioner did not
show why it had not availed itself of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies as provided in Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 was a proper recourse for the
petitioner to set aside the decision rendered in Civil Case No. MAN-2838.

RULING:

No. It is elementary that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the
parties and those who are their successors in interest by title after the commencement of the action
in court. We said there that the effect of a judgment could not be extended to non-parties by simply
issuing an alias writ of execution against them, for no man should be prejudiced by any proceeding
to which he was a stranger.

Accordingly, Section 1 of Rule 47 extends the remedy of annulment only to a party in whose
favor the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, and petition for relief from judgment are no
longer available through no fault of said party.

As such, the petitioner, being a non-party in Civil Case No. MAN-2838, could not bring the
action for annulment of judgment due to unavailability to it of the remedies of new trial,
reconsideration, appeal, or setting the judgment aside through a petition for relief.

We agree with the CA’s suggestion that the petitioner’s proper recourse was either an action
for quieting of title or an action for reconveyance of the property. It is timely for the Court to remind
that the petitioner will be better off if it should go to the courts to obtain relief through the proper
recourse; otherwise, it would waste its own time and effort, aside from thereby unduly burdening the
dockets of the courts.