Group Dynamics: Theory.

Research, and Practice © 2013 American Rsychological Association

2013. Vol. 17. No. 2. 124-136 t089-269W13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0O31346

A New Perspective on Coalitions: What Motivates Membership?

Christopher J. Meyer
Baylor University

The author seeks to advance coalition theories by integrating the idea of prevention-
and promotion-focused motivation from psychology and the activation of a gain or loss
frame by the group. This frame is then applied to explain the effects on four classic
outcomes: size of the coalition, membership of the coalition, distribution of the
outcomes within the coalition, and stability or duration of the coalition.

Keywords: coalitions, regulatory focus theory, decision making

It has long been asserted that organizational
goals are determined through the behavior and
decisions of coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963;
Thompson, 1967). Coalitions have always ex-
isted within organizations (Gamson, 196Í), but
the shift away from the hierarchical, militaristic
organization to a fiat, egalitarian, knowledge-
based stmcture (Cappelli, 1999) has thmst co-
alitions into prominence as an important deter-
minant of organizational outcomes. Although
the coalition is an important means of making
decisions and directing the organization (Ko-
morita & Parks, 1995; Thompson, 1967), the
idea of coalitions has been studied very little,
and what little has been done have been labo-
ratory experiments that have been very limited
in scope (Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1985)
and have focused on the economic value of
particular coalitions. Stevenson and colleagues
(1985) point out that the previous research on
coalitions has limited generalizability to orga-
nizations because organizational actors have
both a history and a future together, which is not
taken into account by the myriad previous the-
ories of coalitions. In addition, empirical work
in the area of coalitions generally focuses on a
single interaction, economic rationality, and
perfect information (Lopes, Santos, & Teles,
2009; Mumighan & Brass, 1991; Shellshear &
Sudholter, 2009). Building on these two short-
falls in the literature, I propose a theory of
This article was published Online First February 11, 2013.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Christopher J. Meyer, Department of Manage-
ment, Baylor University, One Bear Place #98006, Waco,
TX 76798-8006. E-mail: christopher_meyer@bayior.edu
124
coalition formation that allows for multiple in-
teractions over time, nonrational behavior, and
information asymmetry. This view adds to the
previous game theoretic views of coalitions and
will inform scholars about the operation of co-
alitions outside of a purely economic context.
My goal in this article is to extend and inte-
grate the previous application of coalitions from
varied fields to the field of organizational be-
havior. I draw from sociology, social psychol-
ogy, psychology, and organizational behavior to
build a theory of coalitions that is more broad
and explanatory of the impact of the motivation
for coalitions on the process. I begin by defining
the term coalition. Lack of a consistent defini-
tion has led to some disparity and difficulty in
the study of coalitions, and this definition is
meant to contribute stability to the meaning of
coalition. Second, I introduce motivation to
form a coalition and how this may impact the
coalition. Finally, I introduce several important
outcomes of the coalitional process and make
predictions about the impact of the differences
based on the motivation of the coalition.
Definition of Coalition and Review of
Literature
Definition
Some confusion stems from the similarity
between coalitions and small groups, informal
groups and work teams. Coalitions are similar
to these more familiar entities. Small groups, a
term that is used to describe these various other
groups, are an important means of directing
organizations (Levine & Moreland, 1998).
Small groups have been studied extensively
 A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON COALITIONS
from the standpoint of work teams, formal
groups, and informal groups, both in the labo-
ratory and in the field. However, small groups
differ from coalitions in several ways, most
significantly in visibility (Mumighan & Brass,
1991). Small groups operate with the sanction
of management, and are generally put in place
hy management, either directly or through the
norms of the organization. Most coalitions are
not sanctioned; other organizational members
may not even know that coalitions exist because
they take place outside of the view of manage-
ment (and organizational researchers) and are
therefore difficult if not impossible to observe
(Mumighan, 1978). Coalitions, by nature, oper-
ate outside the organizational structure, with
coalition members building support and negoti-
ating distribution of outcomes independent of
the organizational hierarchy. Many coalitions
may never meet as an identifiable unit, but
rather meetings take place hetween dyads or
triads (Mumighan & Brass, 1991). Because of
the hidden nature of coalitions and the lack of
an easily identifiable membership, many of the
previous studies of coalitions have been labora-
tory based, game theoretic, and short term in
nature.
The new outlook on coalitions proposed here
builds on several definitions of coalitions de-
scribed in the literature. The first defitiition that I
consider was proposed hy Thibaut and KeUey
(1959). This definition describes a coalition as
"two or more persons (or groups) acting jointly to
affect the outcomes of one or more persons"(Thi-
haut & Kelley, 1959, p. 205). This definition im-
plies that two (or more) of the parties to the
coalition are engaged in a collusive arrangement
to the benefit of one (or more) party(s) and to the
detriment of the remaining parties. The use of this
definition has led to many of the economic
models of coalition behavior (Gamson, 1961;
Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973). This definition
relies on a "zero-sum" perspective; that is, one
party will gain at the expense of another party.
This would lead the individual members of a
coalition to different ideas about who they will
include in a coalition, how many members, who
gets what if the coalition is successful, and how
long to endure in the coalition. If the individuals
presume that there is a fixed amount of re-
sources, there will he a definite effect on the
formation and duration of a coalition, assuming
that each individual will attempt to maximize
125
gain. Tbis is the definition that is generally used
in the literature to define coalitional behavior.
Levine and Moreland (1998) define a coali-
tion as "subsets of members [that] agree to
cooperate in order to secure mutually desired
outcomes" (p. 432). This definition differs in
that it assumes that the benefit will imbue to
multiple parties, rather than a single party, to the
coalition. Levine and Moreland remove the idea
that if one (or more) party(s) benefit, the other
parties will be negatively impacted. Rather,
they propose in their definition that the outcome
is desired by multiple parties and can be shared
by multiple parties. By working together in a
coalition, the benefits increase. This is a differ-
ence from the "zero-sum" perspective of Thi-
baut and Kelley (1959). Where the Thibaut and
Kelley perspective put a negative connotation
on the idea of coalition, the Levine and More-
land perspective is a more neutral perspective.
A third perspective is proposed by Stevenson
et al. (1985), who define coalitions as
an interacting group of individuals, deliberately con-
structed, independent of the formal structure, lacking
its own internal formal stracture, consisting of a mu-
tually perceived membership, issue oriented, focused
on a goal or goals external to the coalition, and requir-
ing concerted member action, (p. 261)
This is a much more comprehensive defini-
tion. This view of coalitions differs from the
previous two views. Stevenson et al. provide us
with the view that coalitions are calculated and
highly developed forms of organization tbat de-
velop with an intention and purpose.
Building on these previous definitions for
coalitions, I propose the following definition: A
coalition is an interacting group of individu-
als—the totality of which is not known to those
outside of the coalition (and may not be known
to those inside the coalition)—deliberately con-
structed, independent of the formal organiza-
tional structure, focused on a goal or goals
extemal to the coalition, and requiring con-
certed member action with the intent of bene-
fiting certain members of the coalition.
An interacting group of individuals—the
totality of which is not known to those out-
side of the coalition (and may not be known
to those inside the coalition). First, a coali-
tion must be made up of individuals who inter-
act. This does not mean that the individuals will
meet as a whole. In fact, coalitions will rarely
126 MEYER
meet, relying on meetings between dyads and
triads to decide on direction and build consen-
sus (Mumighan & Brass, 1991). This allows the
coalition to operate outside the formal structure
of the organization. If the coalition were out in
the open, the organization could take steps to
influence the coalition or impact the member-
ship. Given the clandestine nature of the coali-
tion, the entire membership is rarely known to
the organization and just as rarely known to the
members of the coalition. There are even argu-
ments that revealing all of the connections
would cause great harm to the organization as a
whole (Gallicano, 2009). Even the individual
who set out to form the coalition may not know
the membership if other members recruited in-
dividuals into the coalition without his or her
knowledge (Mumighan & Brass, 1991). This is
one very important difference between a coali-
tion and a small group. In most small groups,
the membership is known and the group meets
in its entirety on numerous occasions to achieve
goals or complete tasks.
Deliberately constructed. A coalition
must be created by its membership (Stevenson
et al., 1985). If the group is mandated or formed
through the typical organizational structuring
process, then it is a small group (or work team),
not a coalition. The coalition is self-forming.
Independent of the formal organizational
structure. The coalition operates outside the
formal organizational structure (Murnighan,
1978; Stevenson et al., 1985). Any group man-
dated by the organization will also be required
to follow the organizational goals and work
toward organizational outcomes. As I argue in
the next section, the coalition will be focused on
its own goals rather than the goals of the orga-
nization. The coalition also needs the freedom
to form. As noted above, the coalition is created
by its membership, not by the formal structure
of the organization. Entities created by the for-
mal structure would be small groups, work
teams, or departments (Levine & Moreland,
1998; Stevenson et al, 1985).
Focused on a goal or goals external to the
coalition. A coalition will not form except to
pursue a goal. This goal or issue is the impetus
for the coalition. Past scholars have agreed that
the coalition must have a reason to exist and to
go through the process of forming and acting
(Bacharach & Law 1er, 1980; Murnighan &
Brass, 1991; Stevenson et al., 1985; Thibaut &
Kelley, 1959). This shared interest is an impor-
tant distinction between a coalition and a group
that is formed by organizational mandate. The
groups that are formed by the organization may
have a shared goal through the mandate, but not
necessarily through the shared interest of the
members of the group. The coalition, by defi-
nition, will share this goal, not because there is
some external body or superior requiring this
goal focus, but rather because the coalition
members believe it is important and worth pur-
suing the goal.
Requiring concerted member action.
Within the coalition, the members must contrib-
ute some action or activity to the coalition (Ste-
venson et al., 1985). This activity could be an
individual activity that supports the agenda of
the coalition or some coordinated group effort
(Bottom, 2001). This action could also include
bypassing or refraining from some action in
which the coalition member would otherwise
have participated.
With the intent of benefiting certain mem-
bers of the coalition in the process. The goal
of a coalition is to increase the influence beyond
what could be accomplished by an individual
(Lopes et al., 2009; Stevenson et al., 1985). The
intent of the coalition is to affect outcomes and
provide an advantage or positive effect to the
coalition or a member of the coalition (Mur-
nighan, 1978). This definition does not preclude
the opportunity for the benefit to flow to all
members of the coalition, to the organization, or
to individuals (or parties) excluded from the
coalition. Rather, the coalition has every oppor-
tunity to benefit others that are outside of the
coalition. The important factor is that the coali-
tion would not form without the opportunity to
benefit at least one member of the coalition.
Earlier Theories of Coalitions
Much of the previous work on coalitions has
been limited in scope; for example, Bacharach
and Lawler (1980) and many others focused
only on the triad. In the realm of organizational
behavior, coalitions have been studied in the
context of negotiations (Bottom, Holloway,
McClurg, & Miller, 2000; Polzer, Mannix, &
Neale, 1998), as well as a more psychological
outlook (Pearce & DeNisi, 1983) that applied
attribution theory to the formation of coalitions.
Other work has applied a game theoretic or
 A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON COALITIONS
economic viewpoint to coalition formation in an
organizational context (Bottom, 2001; Bottom,
Eavey, & Miller, 1996; Murnighan & Brass,
1991). Theories have generally focused on the
players and the coalition that would form, with
limited work concerning the distribution of
outcomes.
Past scholars focused on the potential size of
the coalition (Gamson, 1961; Riker, 1962).
Gamson's (1961) minimum resource theory
predicts not only the coalition that may form,
but also the payoff to each member, based on
economic rationality. Gamson predicts that the
coalition that forms will control the least
amount of resources necessary to form a major-
ity and that the members will determine the
outcomes using an equity-like principle. That is,
the distribution is based on the relative percent-
age of resources contributed to the coalition.
Similarly, Riker's (1962) size principle states
that the minimum winning coalition will form.
Riker focuses on the individuals in the coalition,
such that if one member were removed from the
coalition, they would no longer control the
amount of resources necessary to win (Mur-
nighan, 1978). Riker did acknowledge that the
coalition members may not have the informa-
tion that would allow them to determine the
minimum winning size and, therefore, coali-
tions that were larger than the minimum win-
ning size were not only possible, but also heav-
ily dependent on the amount and the quality of
information available to coalition members.
Bargaining theory introduced a negotiated
group (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973) as the ba-
sis for coalition formation. Komorita and Chert-
koff (1973) predicted that individuals would use
alternative coalitions as threats during the bar-
gaining process. They also predicted a distribu-
tion of outcomes that tended toward equality.
Individuals that formed a coalition under bar-
gaining theory were thought to be maximizers
of individual outcome, but would also form a
coalition only if the outcome was somewhere
between equity (based on what each member
contributes to the coalition) and equality.
Although these views of coalition formation
give a baseline for the phenomena, they are not
realistic in an organizational sense because of
the bounded rationality of the individuals in-
volved in the coalition as well as other factors
that may impact the coalition. The earlier views
of coalitions do not agree with the definition
127
proposed above. For example, for the distribu-
tion of outcomes to conform to an equity prin-
ciple, all coalition members would need to
know not only who else is involved in the
coalition, but also the amount of resources that
each person contributed. Anything less would
amount to an inequitable distribution because of
the lack of referent others to determine whether
equity was being enforced (Adams, 1965),
These views also ignore many other aspects of
the definition of coalitions, such as the lack of
visibility, concerted member action, and the
presence of a collective goal.
More Recent Views of Coalitions
Bottom and colleagues (Bottom, 2001; Bot-
tom et al., 1996; Bottom et al., 2000) have
focused on the economic aspects of coalition
formation such as the formation of the core
coalition needed to win, the influence of norms
on the coalition, and quota shaving, which is
how individuals negotiate the payoff and join a
coalition based on the economic outcome. Al-
though this view is greatly improved over the
prior iterations of economic or game theoretic
views of coalitions, it is still more limited in
scope. Bottom has focused on the rational or
mathematical view of coalitions while greatly
improving theory by incorporating such ad-
vances as coalitional history, social constraints
(Bottom et al., 1996), risk preferences (Bottom
et al., 2000), and cognitive illusions (Bottom,
2001). These studies add an important element
into the previous theories of coalition forma-
tion. Bottom's work includes some of the non-
economic factors that are important to coali-
tions, but are absent from the previous theories.
Past theories of coalition formation assume
that coalitions will form for either short-term or
one-shot processes such that individuals will
coalesce, act, and disband (Murnighan & Brass,
1991). Individuals will join, maximize value,
and not worry about others or repercussions—
because there is no tomorrow.
Motivations for Coaiitions
In this article, I propose that individuals or
groups will form coalitions for two different
motivations—for preservation or promotion.
Higgins (1997) builds on the hedonic principle
and theorizes that individuals will be motivated
128 MEYER
in different situations by either a prevention
focus or a promotion focus. This view is built
on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). A preven-
tion focus is characterized by a concern for
safety and protection. A promotion focus is
characterized by a concern for advancement and
growth. These foci can be applied to long-term
activations of motivation or to momentary situ-
ations (Higgins, 1997). Keltner, Gruenfeld, and
Anderson (2003) link the prevention motivation
with a loss frame and the promotion motivation
with a gain frame. That is, those with a preven-
tion focus will adopt a loss frame, and those
with a promotion focus will adopt a gain frame.
The frame placed on a situation is known to
cause differential reaction, even if the economic
value is the same, independent of the frame
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) ex-
tends the hedonic principle by taking the plea-
sure-seeking and pain-avoiding viewpoint a bit
further. Not only do individuals approach plea-
sure and avoid pain, but the ways in which they
do this are substantially different from one an-
other. Individuals can take on either a promo-
tion focus or a prevention focus. The promotion
focus is characterized by sensitivity to positive
outcomes, approach strategies, and taking risks
to ensure hits rather than commit errors of omis-
sion. A promotion focus is characterized by a
concem for advancement and growth. Con-
versely, the prevention focus is one that pre-
scribes that negative outcomes will be salient,
avoidance strategies will dominate, and there
will be more risk aversion to ensure against
errors of commission. A prevention focus is
characterized by a concern for safety and pro-
tection. An individual can have a chronic, or
trait-like, focus in either promotion or preven-
tion, but also be placed into a temporary state of
promotion or prevention based on the situation
or context.
I focus on how this differential motivation
can cause different outcomes in the coalition
through the activation of a gain or loss frame. In
this initial work, I assume a homogeneous
group in regard to motivation, that is, I focus on
the extremes. I assume that a group will share a
collective motivation, that the average or aggre-
gate motivation of the group will be either a
prevention or promotion focus. Although this is
unlikely to happen in organizations, it is useful
to develop the theory at a simple level and
expand it in future empirical studies that could
allow the motivation of the group to vary natu-
rally. However, these extreme cases may not be
entirely fictitious. A coalition generally has a
single founder, coupled with more joiners (Mur-
nighan & Brass, 1991). The founder of the
coalition could very easily, and very likely
would, control the motivation as members join
the coalition. The coalition builds incremen-
tally, adding a single member at a time (Mur-
nighan & Brass, 1991); therefore, the frame can
be controlled by the founder.
As each new member joins the coalition,
the founder would apply the motivation by
saying, "Something important to us is at risk"
to activate the prevention motivation and the
loss frame, or "We have something to gain
with this action" to activate a promotion mo-
tivation and gain frame. This possibility is left
to be empirically tested at a later time and for
the purposes of this article, I assume a group-
level motivation.
As indicated above, this focus, whether pre-
vention or promotion, could be something that
is a persistent trait-like chronic outlook. That is,
every time an individual is involved in an in-
teraction that leads to a coalition, s/he takes on
the same focus—whether prevention or promo-
tion. Alternatively, this focus can be more situ-
ationally induced. An individual could take on a
specific focus based on the desired outcome of
the interaction. Those potential outcomes are
the subject of this article.
Preservation motives for forming coalitions
have been well reported in earlier work (Mur-
nighan, 1978). Much of this earlier work builds
on a self-preservation outlook based on the
work of Simmel (1955), which contends that
individuals will form a coalition to defend
against a threat or to gain some resources that
they may be in jeopardy of losing. I posit that
individuals will also form coalitions for promo-
tion reasons—that is, to make a preemptive
strike on the resources that they need or want or
to quash a threat before it arises. This is not a
completely foreign idea in the literature of co-
operation and group action. Others have pro-
posed a proactive motivation when it serves
self-interest (Lopes et al., 2009).
Differential motivation in forming coalitions
is only interesting if this causes differences in
outcomes. In this article, I focus on the differ-
 A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON COALITIONS
enees that can be produced in four areas based
on motivation (see Table 1). These four out-
comes have been the subject of theory and dis-
cussion in many previous papers. The first im-
portant outcome from the formation stage is the
number of members in the coalition, or the size.
Size has been predicted to vary based on the
minimum needed to win (Gamson, 1961 ; Riker,
1962) or the minimum impact on the projected
payout (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973). The size
of the coalition is important to managers who
are trying to manage a situation that is being
driven by a powerful coalition. How many in-
dividuals are attempting to influence an out-
come? What would be the impact of opposing
the coalition? How many people are attempting
to affect the organization? The size is also im-
portant to the members of the coalition. The
larger the coalition, the smaller each person's
share of the outcome will be of the outcome. As
the coalition increases in size, the distribution
of the outcome will flow to more individuals
and the size of each member's portion will
decrease.
An important attribute of the coalition that
follows from the size and has been discussed
in much of the previous literature (Gamson,
1961; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; Mur-
nighan, 1978) is the membership of the coali-
tion. Different motivations will affect the
membership differently.
Another important factor in the study of co-
alitions is the distribution of the resources or
outcomes that will be affected by the motivation
of the coalition. Distribution has been explicitly
predicted (Gamson, 1961; Riker, 1962) in past
theories that have been based on the economic
function of the coalition. Past predictions have
been limited by a game theoretic viewpoint. I
consider how the motivation for the coalition—
either prevention or promotion—will activate a
gain frame or a loss frame in the coalition and
Table 1
Four Outcome Areas Based on Motivation in Coalition Formation
Motivation Size Membership
Prevention Larger than the Similarity: demography,
minimum skills, knowledge
Promotion Minimum Complementary:
winning size demography, skills,
knowledge
129
how this frame will affect the distribution of the
outcome.
Finally, the stability or endurance of the co-
alition will also be affected by the different
motivations. Mumighan and Brass (1991) argue
for the importance of duration when consider-
ing coalitions in organizations. Individuals
within organizations have not only a past with
coalitional partners, but also a future to take into
account when operating in coalitions. I propose
that the motivation, which activates the framing
for the coalition, will affect the stability or the
duration of the coalition differently in each case
(see Figure 1).
Prevention-Versus Promotion-Motivated
Coalitions
Scholars have argued for a differential moti-
vational scheme of prevention and promotion
focus extending the pleasure-seeking and pain-
avoidance motivation (Anderson & Berdahl,
2002; Higgins, 1997; Higgins, Shah, & Fried-
man, 1997; Keltner et al., 2003). This difference
in motivation applies in situations that can be
classified as momentary or temporary, as well
as a more stable trait-like attribute (Higgins,
1997). Individuals can react to a situation in one
of two ways. One possible activation is a pre-
vention focus. The prevention focus will be
activated by a threat; this threat will lead to
security needs or the need to protect an individ-
ual or some resource. This focus becomes im-
portant in a loss-nonloss situation. That is,
when some resource is threatened and the op-
portunity is present to lose the resource or to
retain the use of the resource, a prevention focus
will be activated (Higgins, 1997). Keltner and
colleagues (2003) theorize that this prevention
focus will then activate a loss frame. The loss
frame of the situation will cause losses to loom
larger (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), a sensi-
Distribution Duration
Based on an equity principle Until the objective is reached
Based on bargained Will endure past the
outcomes tending toward accomplishment of the
equality objective
130
Figure 1. Proposed relationships between motivation, frame, and coalition outcomes.
tivity to negative outcomes, and avoidant be-
havior (Keltner et al, 2003). This prevention
focus, when applied to coalitions, will have an
effect on the outcomes of size, membership,
distribution of outcomes, and stability or dura-
tion of the coalition.
In contrast, a promotion focus is activated
by an opportunity; this opportunity will lead
to the need for growth or advancement. The
promotion focus is salient in situations that
are presented as gain-nongain. That is, when
the opportunity to better oneself is present
and there is the possibility to gain some re-
source or not, a promotion focus will he ac-
tivated (Higgins, 1997). Keltner and col-
leagues (2003) theorize that this promotion
focus will then activate a gain frame. The gain
frame of the situation will cause a greater
sensitivity to positive outcomes and approach
behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). This promo-
tion focus, when applied to coalitions, will
have an effect on the outcomes of size, mem-
bership, distribution of the outcome, and sta-
bility or duration of the coalition.
Proposition 1: (a) The stronger the preven-
tion motivation, the stronger the loss fram-
ing, (b) The stronger the promotion moti-
vation, the stronger the gain framing.
MEYER
Size of the Coalition
The bargaining theory of coalition formation
(Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973) as well as Rik-
er's (1962) size principle and Gamson's (1961)
minimum resource theory make predictions for
one-shot or short-term coalitions. These theo-
ries have in common the ability of members to
join and exit as needed, but do not consider
history or future interactions. Bargaining theory
(Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973) states that indi-
viduals will be added to the coalition as needed
to win and that the individuals will be offered
enough that the coalition is attractive, but not so
much that the existing members of the coalition
will lose any economic value hy adding the
member. Riker's size principle states that the
minimum number of individuals needed to
win will come together, and no more. Gam-
son's minimum resource theory looks at the
resources needed to win rather than the num-
ber of players. Minimum resource theory
states that the individuals who control the
minimum amount of resources necessary to
win will form the coalition.
As the coalition is built in response to a
threat, with the prevention motivation, the loss
frame will be activated. The loss will loom
largely for the coalition and an avoidance he-
havior and sensitivity to negative outcomes
 A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON COALITIONS
(Keltner et al., 2003) will cause the coalition to
attempt to protect the resources that are being
threatened. This protection mechanism will im-
pact the size of the coalition. The prevention
motivation is activated by uncertainty (Keltner
et al., 2003), and as Riker (1962) tells us, due to
the uncertainty of the outcome, the size of a
coalition will continue to increase past the min-
imum size originally predicted, van Beest, van
Dijk, De Drue, and Wilke (2005) studied the
size issue in a different way. They found that
when there was an actual loss in a coalition
decision-making exercise, the coalition grew to
a larger size to share the loss with more indi-
viduals. Because losses loom larger than gains
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), the coalition,
which operates in a condition of uncertainty,
will then expand to reduce the uncertainty and
hedge for the prevention of the loss. As the size
increases, the uncertainty will decrease, until
the outcome is known, at which point there will
no longer be any uncertainty and the coalition
will cease to expand.
Proposition 2: The stronger the loss framing,
the larger the coalition.
In a coalition that is formed based on the
promotion motivation, the gain ñ-ame will be
activated. Because losses loom larger than
gains, there will be less motivation to try to
expand the coalition. The gain frame is acti-
vated by opportunity (Keltner et al., 2003). The
coalition will face less uncertainty and will
build to confront this uncertainty, but because
this is a gain-framed situation, there will not be
the same urgency as a loss-framed situation,
causing the coalition to be smaller. There will
also be less uncertainty in a coalition that is
motivated in a promotion focus, van Beest et al.
(2005) examined this phenomenon in the con-
text of the payoff valence in multiparty negoti-
ation. They found that individuals who were
concerned with the perspective of others were
not willing to "do harm" to them. That is, those
who were concerned with others shared out-
comes with more individuals, thus growing the
coalition. The research was conducted with
small outcomes available; therefore, self-
interest was less important to the individuals
than was fairness. In a similar study, Harinck,
van Dijk, van Beest, and Mersmann (2007)
found that when the amount of money available
in the final outcome was small, individuals re-
versed their loss aversion. Participants in the
131
study were more likely to reverse their loss
aversion when small amounts of money were
concerned. They reported more satisfaction in
receiving a small amount of money than they
did in losing a small amount of money. Taken
together, this would indicate that in the case of
small amounts of money—and broadened to
small outcomes—individuals are more likely to
be motivated to share this with a larger group.
However, there is no evidence that when faced
with distribution of a large outcome, individuals
will put self-interest behind them and grow the
coalition to a larger size.
In a coalition, the person who forms the co-
alition or asks individuals to join the coalition is
in a position of weakness—due to the apparent
dependence on the other party (Mumighan &
Brass, 1991). For that reason in a gain-framed
coalition, it will be less likely that the coalition
will surpass the minimum winning size. Rather,
the coalition will follow Riker's (1962) mini-
mum winning size principle.
Proposition 3: The stronger the gain framing,
the smaller the coalition.
Membership of the Coalition
Again, the prevention motivation of the co-
alition will cause a loss frame, which will lead
to more concern with safety and preservation
(Keltner et al., 2003). Individuals will also be
more likely to coalesce with individuals who
have a similar interest (Polzer et al., 1998).
Simmel (1955) reported that individuals will
coalesce if they share a common mood, such as
the solidarity of workers trying to improve
working conditions. In a second line of thought
proposed by Simmel, individuals of similar ed-
ucation or background will join in aversion to
other individuals or groups that may offend
them, van Beest, van Dijk, and Wilke (2004b)
examined the formation issue in coalitions as a
function of resources and altematives. They
found that individuals with more altematives
for coalition formation were more likely to de-
mand a premium to join a coalition. However,
this self-serving did not hold for those individ-
uals who maintained control over more re-
sources than others. Having more altematives
leads individuals to demand a premium, making
them more difficult to bring into the coalition.
Having more alternative coalitions that one
can join is indicative of a person who has
!32 MEYER
membership in wide and varied groups.
Therefore, these persons are likely more di-
verse. In a loss-framed coalition, these indi-
viduals are less likely to be approached to join
the coalition because they will demand a pre-
mium. Similarly, those individuals who are
able to facilitate an equitable outcome are
more likely to be brought into the coalition
(van Beest, van Dijk, & Wilke, 2004a).
Therefore, those with similar concerns for
equity are likely to join in a coalition.
In addition, the loss frame is connected with
more risk-seeking behavior. Building a coali-
tion that is homogeneous in demography, skills,
and abilities could be interpreted as risk seek-
ing, as there is no diversity to minimize risk.
When these conditions are taken in conjunction
with the general risk-seeking nature connected
with a loss frame (Neale & Bazerman, 1991),
this will lead the coalition to contain members
who are similar.
Proposition 4: The stronger the loss framing,
the more homogeneous the coalition.
Keltner and colleagues (2003) tell us that
those with a promotion motivation view others
in terms of how they satisfy their own goals and
needs. These individuals will be risk averse and
will therefore diversify (Neale & Bazerman,
1991) to add knowledge, skills, and abilities to
the coalition. Diversity was found to be a sig-
nificant predictor of high-performing work
teams (Neuman, Wagner, & Christiansen,
1999). This study, which was based on the
personality diversity in the work team, found
that the complementary model was the best
determinant of a high-performing team. Teams
that had diversity, with each member contribut-
ing unique attributes to the cause, were more
successful. Phillips (2001) found a positive link
between success of the team and continued
viability. 7,,;
Extrapolating from the work done by van
Beest and colleagues (2005), we know that in-
dividuals in a gain frame formed more small
coalitions in an experimental setting than did
those in a loss frame. That would lead to the
conclusion that in the gain frame negotiators
saw more possible partners, were more open to
people who were dissimilar to themselves, and
were more likely to coalesce with others. Thus,
Proposition 5: The stronger the gain framing,
the more heterogeneous the coalition.
Distribution of the Outcomes
Distribution of outcomes is an area that has
been focused on in a number of theoretical and
empirical papers. Because we are concerned
with what we get out of an interaction, the
distribution of outcomes moves to the forefront
of many decisions about whether or not to form
coalitions. Certainly, the motivation and fram-
ing of the situation play a roll in the way the
outcomes are distributed. The bargaining theory
of coalition formation (Komorita & Chertkoff,
1973) as well as Riker's (1962) size principle
and Gamson's (1961) minimum resource theory
make predictions for distribution of outcomes in
one-shot or short-term coalitions. Bargaining
theory (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973) states that
individuals will be added to the coalition as
needed to win and that the individuals will be
offered enough that the coalition is attractive,
but not so much that the existing members of
the coalition will lose any economic value by
adding the member.
In a coalition that has a prevention focus and
a loss frame, the coalition members will tend
toward a distribution of outcomes that is equal
across members of the coalition, van Beest and
colleagues (2005) found that in a loss situation,
coalition members were more likely to share the
loss equally, regardless of what would be con-
sidered equitable in that situation. Similarly, it
has been shown that in a negatively valenced
situation, individuals are more likely to split a
negotiated outcome in an equal division rather
than based on decision rules or equity (Leliveld,
van Beest, van Dijk, & Tenbrussel, 2009). It has
been shown in the negotiation literature that
parties that are bargaining from the loss frame
are less willing to give concessions and will be
more risk seeking, that is, they will be less
likely to take the initial offer that is put on the
table (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). This behavior
when attempting to distribute the outcomes of
the coalition will lead to members of the coali-
tion standing strong against any distribution
other than an equal distribution.
On the other hand, in a promotion motivation
and a gain frame, individuals will be more con-
cessionary (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). This
concessionary behavior will lead to a higher
likelihood that the distribution will be differen-
tiated based on contribution. Individuals will be
more likely to come to a bargained agreement
 A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON COALITIONS
on the distribution. In promotion-focused coali-
tions, the concem over an equitable distribution
facilitates an agreement (van Beest et al.,
2004a). Those negotiators who are in a posi-
tively valenced situation are less likely to make
offers that are based on equality (Leliveld et al.,
2009). Much of what motivates individuals in a
gain-framed situation is the ability to provide
equitable payouts. Thus,
Proposition 6: The stronger the loss framing,
the more the outcomes of the coalition will be
determined based on equality.
Proposition 7: The stronger the gain framing,
the more the outcomes of the coaUtion will be
determined based on equity.
Stability or Duration of the Coalition
Most coalitions form, act, and disband (Mur-
nighan & Brass, 1991). One explanation for this
finding is because the focus of research is on
prevention-motivated coalitions, "they do not
usually coordinate long term political planning
except in times of severe threat" (Mumighan &
Brass, 1991, p. 301). Riker's (1962) size prin-
ciple states that the minimum number of indi-
viduals needed to win will come together, and
no more. Gamson's (1961) minimum resource
theory looks at the resources needed to win
rather than the number of players. Minimum
resource theory states that the individuals who
control the minimum amount of resources nec-
essary to win will form the coalition. These
theories describe a defensive coalition and pre-
dict that individuals will join, achieve a goal,
and disband. After the threat has been dissi-
pated, there is no reason for the coalition. Thus,
Proposition 8: The stronger the loss framing,
the shorter the duration of the coalition.
The coalition must be fluid, constantly
forming and disbanding, to maintain any lon-
gevity (Mumighan & Brass, 1991). As I noted
above, the promotion focus will generate a
diverse team that is more likely to attain some
type of success (Neuman et al., 1999) and
teams that are successful maintain longer
(Phillips, 2001). Because there is a promotion
focus with a gain frame that is focused on
achievement, the coalition will remain to-
gether past the current opportunity to address
subsequent opportunities.
Proposition 9: The stronger the gain framing,
the longer the duration of the coalition.
133
Discussion
This is the initial work on a theory of coali-
tions that takes the motivation for the coalition
into consideration. It would seem that to truly
understand this phenomenon and its importance
to the organization, scholars would have to un-
derstand the "why" of coalitions. Previous work
in the area of coalitions has looked at the for-
mation from a very mathematical standpoint
(Mumighan, 1978). This is a very useful out-
look to have, but it is also very limited. Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979) found that humans do
not always focus on the mathematical value of
an outcome when making a decision. This new
outlook takes the motivation of the coalition
into account and the subsequent framing that
this motivation will activate.
This article contributes to our understanding
of coalitions in three distinct ways. First, a
comprehensive definition of the term coalition
is given. The concept of coalition has been
defined on numerous occasions: Some have at-
tempted very comprehensive definitions (Ste-
venson et al., 1985), whereas others have at-
tempted to get by with very shallow definitions
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Thompson, 1967).
The definition that I suggest is both comprehen-
sive and deep. The pieces of the definition are
necessary and sufficient for a coalition to exist.
Second, a frame for the motivation of coali-
tions based on the prevention-promotion focus
casts a new light on the ideas and predictions
about coalitions. Coalitions have previously
been predicted from an economic or mathemat-
ical standpoint. Although some prior work has
considered how individual differences may im-
pact coalitions (Bottom, 2001; Bottom et al.,
2000; Polzer et al., 1998), the human compo-
nents of the coalition are only recently being
considered. Rather, most work has assumed that
the coalition will operate in a rational or logical
sense, absent of human irrationality. The theory
proposed here takes the motivation of the coali-
tion into account. Although this is a constrained
viewpoint, which aggregates the motivation of
many individuals into a "coalitional motiva-
tion," it is still an important step to understand-
ing how coalitions function. Future work should
consider how the different levels of individual
motivation operate within the coalition. That is,
future empirical and theoretical work could con-
sider the impact of different levels of promotion
134 MEYER
and prevention focus within the coalition and
how that affects the predictions made here. This
is discussed in greater detail below.
Finally, I consider the effects of the motiva-
tion of the coalition on the four most studied
and most important outcomes. These four out-
comes—size of the coalition, membership of
the coalition, distribution of the outcomes, and
duration of the coalition—have been consid-
ered since the earliest work on coalitions (Ca-
plow, 1956; Gamson, 1961; Riker, 1962). Much
of the previous work has made predictions that
are very limited in scope and are constrained by
the game theoretic viewpoint and the triadic
methods that have been employed (Mumighan,
1978). These theories give us a good starting
point from which to build, but there is more at
work than merely a mathematical function. I
have attempted to broaden that viewpoint in this
article. By adding in the differential effects of
the coalition's motivation, predictions can bet-
ter account for some of the deviations from a
purely mathematical model. The application of
prospect theory to the coalition gives us a better
f'ramework to make predictions and allows us to
make better predictions by taking the reaction to
the frame into account.
Future Research
An obvious shortcoming of the previous in-
camations of coalition theory has been the lack
of a good test. Previous theories have been
easily tested in the laboratory, but these tests
lack generalizability because of the specific na-
ture of the tests. Game theory and economic
viewpoints are important to the underlying
framework of our understanding of coalitions,
but are not the totality of the unit. Theories that
generalize well to organizational application
may be difficult to test because of the embedded
nature of coalitions. The coalition can have dif-
ferent motivations, goals, and attributes. For
this reason, I have proposed the promotion-
prevention focus in this article. Future research
could test these propositions first in a laboratory
setting and subsequently in field studies.
Laboratory studies could build on the work
of Higgins et al. (1997) who have manipu-
lated the differential motivations of promo-
tion focus and prevention focus by manipu-
lating the goal. Kahneman and Tversky have
also manipulated the frame of their subjects in
the laboratory (1979; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). The manipulation of the motivation
and frame could easily be accomplished by
following the framework laid out by previous
research. Once the frame has been manipu-
lated, researchers could allow the subjects to
coalesce as they pleased and test the propo-
sitions laid out in this article. Although the
situation is still a bit contrived, it would pro-
vide incremental knowledge to a field that
generally relies on game theoretic models to
inform it. This would be a good first step to
test whether this is how coalitions work in
organizations.
Building on this step, further research
could manipulate the frame in a classroom
setting. The end goal could be more salient in
the classroom than the laboratory, such as a
final project or some other outcome that could
impact the subjects' grade. This would pro-
vide a more realistic setting for coalition
building and would allow for a unique oppor-
tunity to test the propositions put forth in this
article.
Final steps to test these propositions would
allow the motivations of the subject to be
free. These motivations could be measured
initially, and again at the time of coalescing,
to determine whether each subject has a pre-
vention or promotion focus and the intensity
of the focus. Once these foci are determined
for each subject, the effects of differential
focus could be seen by testing each of these
propositions. This final laboratory test would
need to include some developmental work on
the proper method for aggregating team mo-
tivation, the discussion of which is outside
of the scope of this article. After development
of this method for aggregating (or determin-
ing) group-level motivation, regression could
be used to examine the effects of different
levels of prevention and promotion motiva-
tion on the four outcomes, as proposed in this
article.
Implications
The idea of coalitions has been with us for
quite some time. The effects have been talked
about in anecdotes and popular press stories, but
little scientific research has undertaken to un-
derstand the inner workings of the coalition.
This article attempts to integrate past and près-
 A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON COALITIONS 135

ent theoretical and empirical work with a novel
viewpoint from the field of motivation. Many
people have examined the "how" of coalitions
and the "who" of coalitions, but very littie work
has been done on the "why."
My hope is that this integration of preven-
tion-promotion focus and coalitions will spur
future work in the area of coalitions. By open-
ing the field to scholars who may not be math-
ematicians or game theorists, I hope to integrate
these viewpoints with the viewpoints of sociol-
ogists and psychologists. This will allow for a
much richer understanding of coalitions.
As I stated in the introduction, the coalition is
an important means of direct organizations and
making decisions in organizations. A richer un-
derstanding of coalitions and the outcomes pro-
posed in this article will help both scholars and
mangers understand coalitions.
References
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental so- Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C.
cial psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267-299). New York,
NY: Academic Press.
Anderson, C , & Berdahl, J. L. (2002). The experi-
ence of power: Examining the effects of power on Komorita, S. S., & Chertkoff, J. M. (1973). A bar-
approach and inhibition tendencies. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1362-
1377.
Bacharach, S. B., & Lawler, E. J. (1980). Power and
politics in organizations. San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass.
Bottom, W. P. (2001, June). Cognitive illusion as the Leliveld, M. C , van Beest, I., van Dijk, E., & Ten-
impetus for concession making and coalition for-
mation. Paper presented at the Intemationai Asso-
ciation for Conflict Management, ESSEC Business
School, Cergy, France.
Bottom, W. P., Eavey, C. L., & Miller, G. J. (1996).
Getting to the core: Coalition integrity as a con- Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. L. (1998). Small
straint on the power of agenda setters. Journal of
Confiict Resolution, 40, 298-319. doi:10.1177/
0022002796040002004
Bottom, W. P., Holloway, J., McClurg, S., & Miller, Lopes, H., Santos, A. C , & Teles, N. (2009). The
G. J. (2000). Negotiating a coalition: Risk, quota
shaving, and learning to bargain. Journal of Con-
fiict Resolution, 44, 147-169. doi:10.1177/
0022002700044002001
Caplow, T. (1956). A theory of coalitions in the triad.
American Sociological Review, 21, 489-493. doi:
10.2307/2088718
Cappelli, P. (1999). The new deal at work: Managing Mumighan, J. K., & Brass, D. J. (1991). Intraorga-
the market-driven workforce. Boston, MA: Har-
vard Business School Press.
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral
theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall.
Gallicano, T. D. (2009). Personal relationship strat-
egies and outcomes in a membership organization.
Journal of Communication Management, 13, 310-
328. doi: 10.1108/13632540911004597
Gamson, W. A. (1961). A theory of coalition forma-
tion. American Sociological Review, 26, 565-573.
doi: 10.2307/2090664
Harinck, F., van Dijk, E., van Beest, I., & Mers-
mann, P. (2007). When gains loom larger than
losses. Reversed loss aversion for small amounts
of money. Psychological Science, 18, 1099-1105.
doi:10.1111/j.l467-9280.2007.02031.x
Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain.
American Psychologist, 52, 1280-1300. doi:
10.1037/0003-066X.52.12.1280
Higgins, E. T., Shah, J., & Friedman, R. (1997).
Emotional responses to goal attainment: Strength
of regulatory focus as moderator. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 72, 515-525. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.72.3.515
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect the-
ory: An analysis of decision under risk. Economet-
rica, 47, 263-291. doi: 10.2307/1914185
(2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. Psycho-
logical Review, 110, 265-284. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X. 110.2.265
gaining theory of coalition formation. Psycholog-
ical Review, 80, 149-162. doi:10.1037/h0034341
Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1995). Interpersonal
relations: Mixed-motive interaction. Annual Re-
view of Psychology, 46, 183-207. doi:10.1146/
annurev.ps.46.020195.001151
brussel, A. E. (2009). Understanding the influence
of outcome valence in bargaining: A study on
fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior. Jour-
nal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 505-
514. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.02.006
groups. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Linzey
(Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed..
Vol. 2, pp. 415-469). Boston, MA: McGraw Hill.
motives for cooperation in work organizations.
Journal of Institutional Economics, 5, 315-338.
doi:10.1017/S1744137409990038
Mumighan, J. K. (1978). Models of coalition behav-
ior: Game theoretic, social psychological, and po-
litical perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 85,
1130-1153. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.85.5.1130
nizational coalitions. In M. H. Bazerman, R. J.
Lewicki, & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), Research on
136 MEYER
negotiation in organizations (Vol. 3, pp. 283-306).
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1991). Cognition
and rationality in negotiation. New York, NY:
Free Press.
Neuman, G. A., Wagner, S. H., & Christiansen, N. D.
(1999). The relationship between work-team per-
sonality composition and the job performance of
teams. Group & Organization Management, 24,
28-45. doi:10.1177/1059601199241003
Pearce, J. A., II, & DeNisi, A. S. (1983). Attribution
theory and strategic decision making: An applica-
tion to coalition formation. Academy of Manage-
ment Joumal, 26, 119-128. doi: 10.2307/256138
Phillips, J. M. (2001). The role of decision influence
and team performance in member self-efficacy,
withdrawal, satisfaction with the leader, and will-
ingness to return. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 84, 122-147. doi:
10.1006/obhd.2000.2922
Polzer, J. T., Mannix, E. A., & Neale, M. A. (1998).
Interest alignment and coalitions in multiparty ne-
gotiation. The Academy of Management Journal,
41, 42-54. doi: 10.2307/256896
Riker, W. H. (1962). The theory of political coali-
tions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Shellshear, E., & Sudholter, P. (2009). On core sta-
bility, vital coalitions, and extendability. Games
and Economic Behavior, 67, 633-644. doi:
10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.005
Simmel, G. (1955). Confiict and the web of group
affiliations. New York, NY: Free Press.
Stevenson, W. B., Pearce, J. L., & Porter, L. W.
(1985). The concept of coalition in organization
theory and research. Academy of Management Re-
view, 10, 256-267.
Thibaut, J., & Kelley, H. (1959). The social psychol-
ogy of groups. New York, NY: Wiley.
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in
prospect theory: Cumulative representation of un-
certainty. Joumal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-
323. doi:10.1007/BF00122574
van Beest, I., van Dijk, E., De Drue, C. K. W., &
Wilke, H. A. M. (2005). Do-no-harm in coalition
formation: Why losses inhibit exclusion and pro-
mote fairness cognitions. Joumal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 41, 609-617. doi:10.1016/j
.jesp.2005.01.002
van Beest, I., van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (2004a). The
interplay of self-interest and equity in coalition
formation. European Joumal of Social Psychol-
ogy, 34, 547-565. doi:10.1002/ejsp.216
van Beest, I., van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (2004b).
Resources and altematives in coalition formation:
The effects on payoff, self-serving behaviour, and
bargaining length. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 34, 713-728. doi:10.1002/ejsp.226
Received January 14, 2010
Revision received November 9, 2012
Accepted November 21, 2012 •
Copyright of Group Dynamics is the property of American Psychological Association and its
content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email
articles for individual use.