Journal of International Economic Law (2001) 67–78  Oxford University Press

  ‘’  

:
 ‘’ 
John H. Jackson*


This article invites the reader to take a step back and look at the big picture
of the world trading system. After putting the WTO into its historic perspect-
ive, seven catch phrases that sound reassuring, but are almost never thought
through, the so-called seven ‘Mantras’, are questioned. Observations from
Seattle lead to reflections on internal decision-making, before the focus is
broadened to external relations of the WTO, a discussion of transparency and
the participation of non-state actors. In its conclusion, this article suggests
that systemic or ‘constitutional’ issues deserve deeper discussion and analysis
for a healthy evolution of the system as a whole.

1
Since its beginning more than fifty years ago, the post-war world trading
system has gone through numerous stages of development. This article
explores this world trading system, in brief historical context and in light of
recent developments, with emphasis on the institutional developments and
reforms needed in light of the constitutional questions that have arisen
recently.
Section I surveys the landscape of the world trading system, and in particu-
lar it undertakes to understand the perspective of the statesmen who signed
the various treaties on world trade at the end of the second world war. It then
looks at both the historical and current policy objectives of the world trading
system. Section II examines the internal questions of the institution of the
World Trade Organization, such as the procedures concerning decision-

* University Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Director, Institute of Interna-
tional Economic Law at GULC. Email: jacksojh@law.georgetown.edu
1
This manuscript is derived from a lecture and discussion delivered 15 March 2000 in Geneva to a
group of WTO Ambassadors, officials, and scholars as part of the Program for the Study of Interna-
tional Organizations at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. The author has also
developed some of these themes in a recent article. See John H. Jackson, ‘International Economic
Law in Times That Are Interesting.’ 3 J Int’l Econ L (2000): 3–14, and John H. Jackson, ‘Dispute
Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems.’ 1 J Int’l Econ L (1998): 329–51.
68 John H. Jackson

making. Section III examines the external relations of the world trading
system, focusing on transparency and participation. The issue of participation
encompasses non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society. The
final section of this article concludes by offering some suggestions for future
development.

.   

A. Policy objectives
In analyzing the successes and failures of the current world trading system, it
is useful to begin by recalling the assumptions of the policymakers, which
form the foundation for this system.2 There were two main objectives sought
at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 and at the subsequent conferences
that led to the negotiations of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) and an ITO (International Trade Organization). The first objective,
and the more important one at that time, sometimes overlooked, was the
prevention of another war. The idea was to build institutions, which would
avoid the problems that occurred in the inter-war period and that were
blamed for leading to the second world war. Arguably, this post-World War
II vision of the statesmen to establish a world trading system has proven
successful, in that the world has since avoided a global war.
The second objective was the economic betterment of the whole world.
This is based on general policies about economics and the market structure
of economies. The basic idea is that increasing the amount of resources for
each individual (or family) is the best way to allow that individual to follow
his or her choices, lifestyle, and goals in life. This objective is based on the
economics of comparative advantage and the economics of competition. The
economists themselves have articulated certain challenges to the concepts of
comparative advantage. However, even those who reject some or all of the
concepts of comparative advantage may accept the advantages of competition,
namely, a higher degree of efficiency and productivity, which contribute to
world economic betterment. We should note that competition occurs between
producers or service providers within single countries or across borders.
Today, the world trading system is motivated by a third objective, namely,
managing economic interdependence, or what some people call ‘globaliz-
ation’. Natural barriers to cross-border economic activities have declined dra-
matically due to the events of the last several decades. Half a century ago,

2
See also John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Rela-
tions, 2d edn, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997). A bibliography of principal publications of this
author may be found at the Georgetown University Law Center Web site. See also a compilation of
a number of relevant articles by this author in John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of the GATT and
the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press
2000).
 The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms 69

countries were motivated to reduce border barriers and other barriers to

trade. However, border barriers may not have been as vital or significant at
that time, since there were other, more natural barriers to trade. During these
last decades, those natural trade barriers have declined in significance. First,
transportation costs and time have been significantly reduced. As a result,
farmers can ship fresh produce to locations halfway around the world.
Second, communication has improved, thereby reducing what might have
been a natural trade barrier. Third, transaction costs and time have been
significantly reduced, in conjunction with reduced transportation costs and
time and improved communication, in the last five to ten years.
These changes challenge us, and we can reevaluate the advantages that we
hope to gain from comparative advantage and competition. The reduction of
natural trade barriers should enhance these advantages. Nevertheless we
know, and the economists instruct us, that there are both winners and losers
in this process. The basic concept of decades ago was that the advantages
create a rising tide that lifts all boats. We now realize that not all boats are
lifted, for one reason or another. This results in a situation in which people
experience fear and anxiety about whether they will be able to retain their
living standard and lifestyle. This has been felt in some cases even by people
who have profited handsomely by these new economic developments. Poign-
ant is the person about 55 or 60 years of age who loses a job and is in a
position where it is very difficult to find another job within a reasonable period
of time, and yet is not then able to retire. These are some of the facets that
contribute to the creation of so-called globaphobia, which has been written
about, and which was manifested in Seattle in late 1999.

B. Implications
Looking at the landscape of the world trading system, what are the implica-
tions of these circumstances? As the countries of the world become increas-
ingly interdependent, nation-state governments cannot regulate effectively on
many subjects. As a result, national governments cannot meet the expecta-
tions of their constituents and cannot deliver upon their promises to their
constituents. This imposes a considerable amount of tension on governments,
and makes governing much more difficult. Within this context, there is a
worry that there will be a ‘race to the bottom’ and that there will be a tend-
ency for governments to redress their inability by using barriers of one type
or another. For example, it leads to what some economists analyze as the
prisoners’ dilemma: when one country raises barriers, another is likely to do
so, and soon all countries will be hurt. What is the solution?
The solution is cooperative mechanisms at the international level. These
mechanisms should be based on rule orientation, as opposed to power orienta-
tion. These rules should be well formulated and effective. In other words, they
should cause certain kinds of behavior and inhibit other kinds of behavior.
70 John H. Jackson

This raises the issue of sovereignty. We are seeing that the rule-oriented
measures that emerged from the Uruguay Round and earlier rounds of multi-
lateral trade negotiations, deeply affect national regulation internally, not
merely at the border. As a result, some people in the United States have
argued that we should reverse course and take the WTO back to the time
when it was only responsible for border measures, thereby limiting its ability
to affect national regulation internally. This is folly, because such time never
existed. It was always recognized that there were measures in the GATT that
would have effects behind the border. In particular, Article III, paragraph 4,
of the GATT, which deals with internal regulations and national treatment,
has always had enormous implications on sovereignty and sovereign decisions
relating to internal regulations.

C. Markets and institutions

Another part of this policy landscape is the relationship of institutions to
markets. This article is based in part on the underlying assumption of market
economics, an assumption which can be challenged. But following the logic
of market economic thinking, we realize that during the last several decades,
economists have become much more interested in the institutions that under-
pin the markets and make the markets work. These institutions are vital.
The markets themselves will not work without an appropriate institutional
framework, as implied by the writings of Nobel Prize winners Douglass North
and Ronald Coase.3
Perhaps what we saw in Seattle last December was in essence a challenge
to the existing institutional structure. Many commentators have discussed the
causes of the failure of Seattle at great length, and have come up with a list
of a dozen such causes.4 However, my focus is on the institutional side, on
what I call the ‘constitution’ of the world trading system.5 I am using the term
‘constitution’ in the sense of a broad view similar to that used in the United
Kingdom, that is, to represent this institutional structure as a whole, which

3
See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press 1990); Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press 1988). See also Jan Tumlir, Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic
Societies (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1985).
4
See, e.g., Reactions to Seattle, 3 J Int’l Econ L 167 (2000) (discussing factors that contributed to the
failure to launch a new round at Seattle); Joseph Kahn, ‘Swiss Forum Has Its Focus on Memories
from Seattle’, N.Y. Times (29 January 2000), at C1 (stating that ‘government officials have stressed
that the failure of trade talks owes more to negotiating positions taken by World Trade Organization
members than to the influence of demonstrators’); Michael Littlejohns, ‘Embattled WTO Looks for
Allies at the UN World Trade Body: Moore Says Public Confidence Must Be Rebuilt to Stem
Threat to Economic Globalization’, Fin. Times (20 January 2000), at 10 (quoting WTO Director-
General Mike Moore as stating that the NGOs and anti-trade groups at Seattle contributed but were
not the ultimate causes of the failure).
5
See, e.g., John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs 1998).
 The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms 71

is the world trading system as it actually operates, including informal mechan-

isms and ‘practice’.
People have asked, was Seattle a real crisis? After all, the GATT and the
WTO have been through various times like this, such as the 1982 ministerial,
the Montreal mid-term ministerial in the Uruguay Round in 1988, and the
Brussels impasse in 1990. Thus, it may be business as usual. In my view,
however, Seattle was at least a mini-crisis, which may serve as a wake-up call
for some of the problems that we can see embedded in the institutional struc-
ture.
What would the crisis or mini-crisis mean? I do not think that it will lead
to a collapse of the WTO. In other words, the WTO will not disappear in a
puff of smoke. However, if the WTO fails to keep abreast of the changes in
the world and to evolve as an institution, some of the major users of the
institution, and particularly some of the large trading powers, may begin to
turn elsewhere to solve their problems. This could mean that these countries
would turn to other multilateral institutions, such as the OECD, or to
regional organizations, bilateral measures, or even unilateral measures. If the
major users become disillusioned, the WTO could gradually atrophy, which
would then be disappointing to some of the other users of the system.

.      

A. Mantras
My second subject is the internal constitution. Some of the ideas expressed
here can be attributed to ambassadors, governments, or academics. I have
not tried to identify authorship for each piece of this puzzle, because usually
there have been a number of parallel suggestions. In this part, I will first
introduce a series of what I call ‘mantras’. These are phrases that are used
commonly, particularly in Geneva and among those who are well experienced
as well as some of those who are less experienced. Quite often, these phrases
are used in a context in which they do not easily suggest that the content of
the phrase should be examined in depth. In other words, the phrases are used
to avoid thinking certain issues through. Here, I provide a brief overview of
seven of these mantras.
(1) The first mantra is that ‘consensus is great or even sacred’. It is said
that we must maintain the consensus system of decision-making. Often, this
is in the context of thinking that there are only two approaches to decision-
making, that this is a binary choice – one choice is consensus, and the other
is voting – and you have to choose between them. However, we do not have
to choose between those two. There are a lot of things in between, and there
are some real pitfalls about the consensus rule that at least should make us
think more about where in between we might focus attention.
(2) Another mantra is that the WTO is an organization that is ‘govern-
72 John H. Jackson

ment to government’. This implies that non-governmental entities have no

role here. Once again, we should think this through.
(3) The third mantra is: we must be sure to preserve national or nation-
state sovereignty. This mantra is used not only in Geneva, but also in Wash-
ington and other capitals. This ‘mantra’ overlooks a good many things. Again,
it is not a binary question; it is not a question of all or nothing. The word
‘sovereignty’ has overtones that are totally out of date, but nevertheless the
concept of sovereignty probably has some policy merit that we should think
about. The policy question really involved in the sovereignty question is: How
do you want to allocate power?6 What decisions do you want made in Geneva,
Washington, Sacramento, California, or a neighborhood in Berkeley? By
viewing it as a decision about how to allocate power, we can disaggregate the
question of sovereignty and make people think about how to correctly design
that allocation. Some of the policies discussed in Section I suggest directions
in this regard. In other words, some of the reasons for going to a higher level
of decision-making are to solve such questions as the prisoner’s dilemma or
the race to the bottom.
(4) Another mantra often used is that the organization is ‘member
driven’. Member driven means that the members want to keep the WTO
Secretariat out of their hair. They do not want to give the Secretariat or the
officials or the Director-General any power whatsoever. A totally member-
driven organization is, in many cases, counterproductive, and most certainly
inefficient.
Furthermore, if this mantra is used to question the independence of the
dispute settlement organs, it undermines the integrity of the adjudicative pro-
cess of the system.
There are three additional points, which I will call mantras just to put
them in sequence, although they are more targeted to current negotiating
atmospheres and ideas of structure. Yet, like the other mantras mentioned,
these may not have been fully understood or examined.
(5) One is the notion of ‘single undertaking’, a single package idea. I have
great concerns and doubts about the single undertaking concept, although I
can see its advantages. (Indeed, I can discern the advantages of all these
mantras. I do not mean to suggest that they are totally useless.) But I can
also perceive certain circumstances where it might be wise to experiment with
an approach that would not be part of a single package. There might be
different subjects that would require a different time line or a different com-
position of participants.
(6) Similarly, another concept is ‘MFN’ or the most-favored-nation-clause.
MFN has enormous strength and advantages in the system, but we should

6
See John H. Jackson, ‘The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Imple-
mentation of the Uruguay Round Results’ in The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on
Treaty Law and Economic Relations 367, above, n 2.
 The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms 73

not view it as sacrosanct in its purity, because it has major problems, such as
the free-rider problem and the tendency towards the lowest common denom-
inator.
(7) Finally, there has been talk about the need for so-called
‘deliverables’. At the outset of discussions regarding a new trade negotiating
round, diplomats have worried about the length of time a round often takes
(ten years or more) and have spoken of the need to conclude some parts of
the round early and have those implemented so that the benefits are
‘delivered’ early.
Indeed, deliverables have advantages, as do these other items. On the other
hand, deliverables tend to push policymakers towards sacrificing longer-term
institutional strengths for short-term political advantages.
I have raised each of these mantras, and my suggestion is that they should
not be off limits from more careful examination.

B. The implications of Seattle

One of the things that the failure of the Seattle ministerial meeting seems to
show us is that even the world that existed as recently as 1980 or 1990 is no
longer the landscape that we have to deal with today. Part of this change is
due to the very fast-moving technology that is influencing trade and every-
thing else. There are two dimensions of this for the internal constitution of
the WTO, and there are similar dimensions for external relations of the
WTO, which will be discussed in Section III. These two dimensions are: (1)
the dispute settlement process and (2) the rest of the decision-making or
negotiating process, in other words, the non-dispute settlement process. To
some extent, we could think of these dimensions as analogous to political
structures at the national level, namely, the relationship of the judiciary to the
legislature. One of the questions is: Do we have an effectively working legislat-
ure? Do we have an effectively working decision-making or rule-making pro-
cess? These issues are of considerable importance. Why? Currently, we have
a very effective judicial process, certainly more effective than before. It has
received lots of credit, and although it is not without some problems, it is
well worthwhile. It is a big improvement over the GATT system, and it helps
underpin some of the policies mentioned in Section I above. For instance,
the rule orientation of the institutions is enhanced by the predictability and
stability that the dispute settlement system adds to the implementation of the
rules.
However, if the decision-making and rule-making processes fail to produce
results, there is a tendency to throw their issues at the dispute settlement
process. Therefore, there could be a tendency to ask the dispute settlement
process to take on issues that it ought not to. For instance, there could be
temptations to put in the hands of the dispute settlement process, issues that
are really ‘rule making’ instead of ‘rule applying’.
74 John H. Jackson

There are real concerns about the current decision-making structure. This
structure developed in the Uruguay Round negotiations, when negotiations
focused on a WTO, a World Trade Organization, particularly in the fall of
1993 when major players worked hard to alter some of the previous drafts.
While alterations were appropriate in many ways, one of the things that the
negotiators did was to constrain and put checks and balances on the decision-
making process. They did this by requiring decision by consensus and by
super-majorities and through certain other kinds of procedures. Today we
realize that those constraints can lead to a lack of effectiveness of the decision-
making process. This is one of the issues (and one of the dilemmas) that we
have before us and that requires more examination.

C. Decision-making
There are advantages and disadvantages to a consensus-based decision-
making process. One downside of requiring full consensus is that it may be a
recipe for impasse, stalemate, and paralysis. In other words, the result may
be that things do not get done. We have seen some very interesting examples
of that in the last year. There are also examples that often are not easily
visible.
For example, there are situations where the participants in this constitution
would like to see some evolution and change. These changes may be rather
detailed and technical, such as modifying elements of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. Yet, proponents of change may abandon such an effort even
before trying, because of their perception that the consensus process makes
it impossible to do what they want to do.
What are some alternate methods for decisions? One possibility is to figure
out a way to distinguish the more detailed procedural aspects from things
that have real substance. There is already a distinction in the amending clause
of the WTO between the non-substantive and the more substantive issues.
There might be ways to develop a similar distinction in the consensus process.
Of course, one of the problems with the consensus process is that in order to
change it you must have consensus. Therefore, any country can block a pro-
posed change. This leads us to a search for alternative ways to make changes
without amending either the DSU or the WTO as a whole. Often this is a
delicate question, and I am not sure the alternatives are workable. If they are
not workable, and the parties are without recourse to make changes, we are
likely to be in very great trouble.
There are, however, some other possibilities. One possibility is a so-called
‘critical mass’ idea, which has been experimented with. The basic idea is to
develop a practice where countries refrain from blocking consensus when a
critical mass of countries support a proposed change. This critical mass of
countries could be expressed as an overwhelming majority of countries and
an overwhelming amount of the trade weight in the world, such as 90 percent
 The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms 75

of both of these factors. In addition, there could be other factors. Of course,

the proposed change would need to be consistent with the existing treaty
obligations, including MFN. One could try to develop a practice, maybe
through something called ‘peer pressure’, by encouraging states to refrain
from blocking a consensus in certain kinds of decision-making, if these other
attributes existed.7 One parallel or analog to this approach is roughly (but
not precisely) the so-called Luxembourg Compromise in the history of the
European Communities development.
Another possibility is to use expert or smaller groups attached to a particu-
lar committee, such as the Dispute Settlement Body. Such a group would
meet with diplomats and perhaps outside experts to draft a proposal that
coincided with criteria, such as those mentioned above. Then, when a pro-
posed change is put forward to the final decision-makers, the parties could
argue that governments should refrain from blocking the consensus in that
particular circumstance because of the critical mass argument, the percentage
of trade, and so forth.
A third approach is to use a ‘tariff scheduling’ approach. This approach was
used in the telecommunications agreement and, to some extent, the financial
services agreement. Under this approach, commitments resulting from further
negotiations were put in the schedules, which are annexed to the services
agreement of those governments that were willing to go along with the meas-
ure. Of course, these commitments are usually subject to MFN, depending
on some of the aspects of the services agreement. This approach addresses
both the difficulties with the consensus rule and the single package. It is ana-
logous to something that was built into the WTO, namely, the Annex 4 Pluril-
ateral Trade Agreements, which are optional.
Unfortunately, it takes a full consensus to add an agreement to Annex 4,
so there could well be blocking against that approach. But if there were not
blocking, this might also be an approach where certain innovation could occur
with smaller groupings rather than the whole.
Another problem is whether there needs to be some kind of a ‘steering
group’, some kind of a small group in the organization, which can help the
Director-General and others. Without going into detail, something like this
is going to be required. There has been a fair amount of writing, both aca-
demic and diplomatic, about how to constitute such a group. There are a
number of different proposals, and I would hope that perhaps some of them
might work. In each of these cases, it is possible to try them for a limited
period of time, such as two years. At the end of the two-year period, the
provisions could expire. This approach allows the parties to renew negoti-
ations and reach agreement, based on their view of how the provisions played

7
See Jackson, above, n 2.
76 John H. Jackson

out. If these provisions appear to have been effective, the parties could renew
them for an additional period of time.

.      

A. The role of non-governmental organizations
About Seattle, many of us talked about the ‘inside problem’ and the ‘outside
problem’. The ‘inside problem’ is what was really going on in the negotiations
and the various half a dozen or more factors that prevented success there.
The ‘outside problem’ includes the demonstrations, the tensions involved
with that, and the organization of NGO and public participation. These are
analogous to the structure of this article, with attention to internal problems
compared to external. You can look at these problems under both dispute
settlement and decision-making dimensions. There are really two parts under
each of those, and it may be helpful to view it as a two-by-two matrix. One
is the subject of ‘transparency’ and the other is the subject of ‘participation’.
Please note that I separate these terms rather dramatically because quite often
the word transparency is used in an ambiguous way to cover both. Transpar-
ency, as I and others see it, really means information for the public, but it
can also mean internal flow of information. Ways of making information avail-
able to the public include available documentation, open hearings, and open
meetings (at least for the press). Participation, on the other hand, is somewhat
more of a problem and is a more delicate issue. Participation by civil society
or non-governmental entities means that they have an opportunity to be heard
and present their views.
The basic question, and the one most vital here, is the role of NGOs.
There are arguments both for and against NGO participation. We should
thus recognize both the advantages and disadvantages of NGO participation.
The governments are the authorized legitimate representative in the WTO
structure. The NGOs sometimes forget that, as we see in some of their argu-
ments and how they go about their business. In some cases, an NGO may
have no legitimate role and no true constituency. Sometimes it is said that
some NGOs are part of the so-called ‘uncivil’ society. They are abusive and
destructive and can cause various problems, including safety problems. Gen-
erally NGOs, even the good ones, can create resource problems. For example,
it will involve some resources to open hearings and provide additional docu-
mentation, space, and time. On the other hand, there are advantages to NGO
participation. First, they can be quite useful. Sometimes they have resources
for study and analysis that governments lack. They can bring to the table
information that can be very useful in the proceedings. They can also transmit
information to concerned and important constituencies in the various coun-
tries. They can come to an understanding and then explain the issues to a
broader constituency that has not had the time or the information to try to
grasp them. In addition, they have real power, as demonstrated by the MAI
 The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms 77

(Multilateral Agreement on Investment) exercise and the impact of the Inter-

net, and in Seattle, to some extent.
What to do? It is surprising how far behind the WTO is, compared to most
of the international organizations in Geneva and other cities, with respect to
how it handles NGOs. Other organizations have very elaborate methodologies
of accreditation of NGOs based on a variety of criteria, which vary from
organization to organization. For example, the United Nations has been
doing this for forty or fifty years.8 In addition, the International Labor Organ-
ization (ILO) has fairly elaborate measures, as does the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO). WIPO integrates key NGOs that have expert-
ise in some of the technical aspects, such as its ‘domain name’ exercise.
UNCTAD also has measures. Why not the WTO? At a minimum, there
should be a study, which could be done by a committee reporting to the
General Council chairman or one under the supervision of the Director-
General.

B. Transparency and participation

With respect to transparency, there is a problem of documents. To some
extent, the very ingenious program of computer documentation in the WTO
is quite advanced and can be a real help as part of the outreach, not only to
the delegates themselves, but also to civil society and NGOs. There is also a
question of whether meetings should be open. I was surprised recently at how
willing some experienced diplomats were to see such things as WTO commit-
tee meetings made open for public attendance. Even if one is not willing to
go that far, because of the negotiating function of at least some of those
committee meetings, maybe the Council meetings could be open, or maybe
there could be a press gallery for the various Councils, not just the General
Council.
Likewise, in the dispute settlement system, some of the same questions
arise. For example, there is a problem of the documentation, particularly the
panel reports and the delay that is caused in part by translation resource
problems, which surely can be overcome.
‘Participation’ is a different and more difficult question in the context of
decision-making. There may be grounds to call upon some of the NGOs for
assistance as experts, and there certainly is authority to do so. Indeed, the
WTO Charter, Article IX, paragraph 2, suggests certain relationships for
NGOs. In the dispute settlement system, we have already seen the ‘amicus
curiae’ brief as one way to transmit information to the panels. That can be
constructive, but it needs to be thought through so as not to cause certain
kinds of problems.

8
United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service, The NGLS Handbook of UN Agencies, Programmes
and Funds Working for Economic and Social Development (2d ed, 1997).
78 John H. Jackson


This article examines the world trading system in its historical context and in
light of recent developments. Looking ahead, it is useful to consider how to
move forward. By providing leadership, the trade superpowers – the United
States, the European Union, and Japan – can play a major role. There are
other groups of countries that could get together and try to thrash out ideas
and discuss the pros and cons of some of these measures, and then see if
there is some in-between measure that tends to maximize the advantages and
minimize the disadvantages. Such measures could then be introduced for lim-
ited periods of time.
Already suggested by the European Community and the Director-General
and others, is an idea of forming a group of parliamentarians to meet at the
WTO on a regular basis to exchange information, ideas, and attitudes. Other
ideas that have been set forth include the formation of a steering group9 and
an NGO consultative group. There may be a parallel here in the European
Community, which has something like an economic and cultural consultation
committee that works with it on various subjects. Suggestions for increasing
transparency include public sessions and increased access to reports and other
documents. Short of amending the agreements, there are many steps that can
be taken to strengthen the institution and its agreements. It is worthwhile to
focus our efforts on these steps. Clearly, this brief article only touches the
surface, so let us hope much further analysis and discussion on these and
other WTO ‘constitutional issues’ will occur in the near future.

9
See Jeffrey J. Schott and Jayashree Watal, Decision-making in the WTO (Institute of International
Economics Policy Brief No. 00–2, March 2000) http://www.iie.com/NEWSLETR/news00–2.htm
(suggesting that ‘the WTO needs to establish a small, informal steering committee (20 or so in
number) that can be delegated responsibility for developing consensus on trade issues among the
member countries’).