Slovenia’s Fragmented Past

Abstract

This article examines the weaponization of historical revisionism for political manipulation in
Slovenia. The historical period in question is the Second World War, the subsequent national
liberation movement that led to a communist revolution and the formation of the Socialist
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Specifically, the debate revolves around those Slovenian units
that opposed the communist-led national liberation movement and to this end, collaborated with
the Nazi and Fascist occupiers. In the aftermath of Yugoslavia’s breakup and Slovenia’s
independence, as well as its successful integration into the European Union, historical revisionists
change the meaning of certain decisions, acts, or events to justify them in an attempt to create a
new Slovenian national identity. For that reason, despite numerous attempts at national
reconciliation, the ongoing disagreement in collective historical memory and value systems
associated with such memory is used by politicians to push their political agenda and expand their
constituencies.

Keywords: historical revisionism, national reconciliation, Slovenia, politics of memory, national

identity

Introduction

There are events of such consequence that they completely alter the course of a country's political,
social, and economic existence. Wars, invasions, revolutions, uprisings, totalitarian regimes,
crimes against humanity, or genocides are events that leave their mark on the future, and those
who carry the future. Together, these individual fragments create the foundation of a state and this
foundation influences many aspects of the state’s development. Because of the importance these
happenings hold, who remembers and interprets them has great influence as well as responsibility.
For Slovenia, one of these monumental moments was the Second World War, when after being
occupied by Axis forces the question of its national survival was posed. Despite various repression
policies, the Slovenian nation survived the war, albeit with great civilian losses and infrastructure
damages.1 However, what continues to stir the discussion in the Slovenian society even today is

1
M. Jogan and Ž. Broder, 'Samostojna Slovenija in kolektivni zgodovinski spomin', Teorija in Praksa, 53 (2016),
92.
the extrajudicial killings of certain Slovenian defense units that opposed the communist-led
national liberation movement and to this end, collaborated with the Nazi and Fascist occupiers.2
Broadly understood, it is a discussion of whether, during the Second World War, an inner or civil
conflict occurred within Slovenia itself. The discussion on historical interpretation reared its head
after the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) disintegrated and Slovenia declared
independence. Painfully obvious in the remaining republics as they descended into brutal ethnic
wars, the state structure of Yugoslavia was instrumental in fortifying and reproducing the common
Yugoslav identity, that transcended ethnic and other divisions. Additionally, this identity has its
foundation in a common Second World War narrative, with the Partisan liberation struggle against
the Axis forces a focal point in it. After gaining independence, that narrative, without its
accompanying identity, became an obstacle for creating an independent modern Slovenian identity
that correlates to the wider European space more appropriately.3 The remaining void was filled
with factual distortion and an alternative narrative of war events, under the premise of national
reconciliation. If we understand historical revisionism as a reinterpretation of past events in a way
that radically alters their meaning or significance, this type of historical revisionism as a way of
identity reconfiguration is not a novel practice in contemporary politics. Reinterpreting history in
a politically motivated way has become an essential part of everyday politics in Europe, due to the
rise of exclusivist national identities. However, such politics of memory have a significant place
in Central and Eastern Europe, explaining why a significant amount of research has been done on
the topic.4 The fall of the Berlin War in 1989 and the subsequent dismantling of socialist regimes
in the region has caused a wave of economic, social, and political changes in a hurried attempt to
adapt to the new neoliberal economic ideology of the West. For that reason, radical attempts to
reconcile local, national, and transnational identities while reinterpreting the past have been used
to reinforce novel national agendas in the post-communist era. What makes Slovenia’s case
unique, is both its geographical and ideological position. Communism in Yugoslavia differed
greatly from the regimes in the Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern Bloc, exemplified by the
Tito-Yugoslav split in 1948. While communist parties in the Eastern European states adapted the

2
J. Hösler, 'Sloweniens historische Bürde', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 46 (2006).
3
M. Pušnik, ‘Media memorial discourses and memory struggles in Slovenia: Transforming memories of the Second
World War and Yugoslavia. Memory Studies, 12 (2019), 433–450.
4
M. Kopeček (ed.) Past in the Making: Historical Revisionism in Central Europe After 1989. (Budapest: Central
European University Press, 2008).
myths of the Comintern while celebrating the heroism of the Soviet liberation from Nazi rule in
the Second World War, the communists of Yugoslavia had a distinct experience.5 With little help
from the Soviet Union, the partisans of Yugoslavia organized under the leadership of Josip Broz
Tito and successfully resisted the Axis powers independently. Their socialist identity, in contrast
to the rest of the Eastern bloc, was not imposed but formed nationally with a vast majority of
people joining the movement voluntarily, making it harder to dissolve such an identity and replace
it after gaining independence. On the other hand, in comparison to the rest of the Yugoslav
republics, Slovenia left the federation quickly and quietly. Its rapid integration into the European
Union demanded a shift into a more appropriate identity, that would differentiate it from the bloody
Balkans, triggering a series of changes in public discourse and allowing the creation of an
alternative narration of the past.

This article explores the formation of an alternative narrative of war events and in what way its
existence influences Slovenian society today, both socially and politically. To understand how two
parallel narratives are possible, this article first takes an important historical overview of the events
in question by analyzing and comparing secondary sources. The comparative-historical analysis
helps in establishing an objective historical record. However, the historical overview in this article
is unavoidably incomplete due to limitations in focus and length of the article. Secondly, I turn to
study the alternative narrative through discussions and policies on national reconciliation in the
context of Slovenian independence. Without state independence, the discrediting of the socialist
state structure, and the attempt at a formation of a separate Slovenian identity after Yugoslavia,
the second narrative was less likely to gain legitimacy. Lastly, to determine the lasting influence
of the debate, a discourse analysis of contemporary news articles, political statements, and
historical monuments follows. The article concludes that the contemporary historical revisionism
of the 21st century in Slovenia is a part of a larger process of adaptation to new geostrategic
circumstances in Europe and that it follows a similar pattern in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the
weaponization of history is used by parties on both sides of the political spectrum as a tool of
political manipulation.

Historical background

5
A. Mrozik and S. Holubec (ed.), Historical Memory of Central and East European Communism. (Routledge,
2018).
Prior to the actual invasion of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the leading political party, the
Slovenian People's Party (SLS6) had attempted to negotiate a common solution with the intruder.
Their proposal, which was subsequently rejected by the invader, was for Slovenia to continue
existing as a part of a German protectorate being convinced the Axis powers will conquer Europe
and with that, Hitler's New Order shall prevail.7 The Axis powers formally started military
operations against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on the 6th of April 1941. Only eleven days later, the
country conceded defeat marking the beginning of a Fascist and Nazi occupation in Slovenia which
was to include elements of civil war and harsh repressive measures with the aim of destroying the
Slovenian national identity.8 After capitulating, Slovenian leaders appealed to the aggressors for
all of Slovenia to belong to one occupational zone, to somewhat preserve its territorial and national
unity. Despite their pleads, the country was divided between Germany, Hungary, and Italy into
three provincial administrative units. Germany occupied Styria, the north-western portion of
Prekmurje, the northern part of Upper Carniola, the Mežica Valley, and the Dravograd area. In the
meantime, the Italians controlled Ljubljana with Inner and Lower Carniola while Hungary gained
a significant part of Prekmurje.9 All the occupiers had unique assimilation and civilian repression
policies ranging from mass destruction, deportation, and in German-occupied areas mass
settlement of Germans. Therefore, the conditions during the war differed from region to region
meaning the extent of resistance and/or collaboration varied throughout the country.

The common goal of all three occupiers was to destroy the Slovenian ethnic identity and forcefully
subjugate them to the occupier's identity. Immediately after the invasion, four political groups
formed the Liberation Front (OF 10) among them most notably, the Communist Party of Slovenia
(KPS), the Christian Socialists, the National Democrats (known as Sokoli), and the Slovenian
progressive cultural workers.11 OF became an umbrella organization for all those in favor of an
independent, free, and unified Slovenian nation. In the beginning, the OF mainly distributed flyers
as well as the newsletter Slovenski poročevalec intending to educate the masses and unite those
wanting to resist the occupation. At the first plenary session on the 15th of June, they adopted a

6
Slovenian: Slovenska Ljudska Stranka (transl.note)
7
B. Repe, S puško in knjigo. Narodnososvobodilni boj slovenskega naroda, 1941-1945. (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva
založba, 2015), p.15.
8
J. Prnuk, Slovenski narodni vzpon 1768-1992. (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, 1992). p.296
9
O. Luthar (ed.) The Land Between: A History of Slovenia. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 419.
10
Slovenian: Osvobodilna Fronta (transl.note)
11
Luthar, The Land Between, p.424.
seven fundamental points, which were a mix between a national and a revolutionary program and
put forward that:

1. “The right of the Slovenian nation to self-determination, including the right to secession and
unification with other nations;
2. The liberation and unification of a divided Slovenian nation, including Carinthian and Primorska
Slovenes;
3. Concord and unity of the enslaved peoples of Yugoslavia and the Balkans in their struggle for
liberation;
4. The Soviet Union is a leading force and the mainstay in the liberation struggle of the Slovene nation
and all oppressed nations, it is a model of equal coexistence between nations;
5. Liberation is only possible on the ruins of imperialism;
6. Without a struggle against its treacherous capitalist elites, an oppressed nation cannot be liberated
7. Brotherhood and peace between nations must be a result of an anti-imperialist struggle that will
destroy imperialism."12

However, actors in the political sphere of wartime Slovenia disagreed on the appropriate level of
force when resisting. For example, after Germany attacked the Soviet Union on the 22 nd of June
1941, the KPS started to organize its first fighting formations signaling the start of armed resistance
in Slovenia.13 The party had twenty years of experience working as an illegal party which meant
it was highly organized, and disciplined, attracting both the young and Catholic population to the
OF, its public anti-occupation front.14 Nevertheless, their revolutionary character meaning the
decision to simultaneously resist the occupation and conduct a social revolution contributed to the
polarization of Slovenian society. It left the traditional bourgeoisie feeling threatened by certain
moves. For example, the KPS independently formed a secret intelligence agency (VOS15) to deal
with their political counterparts which included those collaborating in any way with the new
authorities. On the contrary, other political factions argued for a more lenient position towards the
imposters. The traditional SLS was weak, especially since the highest governmental
representatives had fled to London and unsuccessfully attempted to lead the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia from exile. Eventually, the rest of the political parties were discredited among the

12
Repe, S puško in knjigo, p. 63.
13
Luthar, The Land Between, p. 424.
14
J. Možina, Slovenski razkol – Okupacija, revolucija in začetki protirevolucionarnega upora. (Ljubljana: Medijske
raziskovalne storitve, J. Možina, 2019).
15
Slovenian: Varnostno-obveščevalna služba (transl.note)
people for their passiveness and collaborationist actions, failing to frame it as waiting for the
Allies. On the other hand, there were military initiatives from the anti-revolutionary camp, such as
the Slovenian legion created by the SLS politicians or the Sokol legion from the liberals, which
later cooperated with Draža Mihailović's Chetnik organization and were known as the Blue
Guard.16 Nonetheless, they opted for a waiting strategy as instructed by the London government-
in-exile and following the more traditional political camp. Consequently, although strongly
influenced by the revolutionary KPS, the OF was the only option for patriotic individuals
preferring to resist the occupation publicly and from its onset. The conflict between the two sides,
the OF under KPS leadership and the rest went beyond the question of wartime resistance but
became a political and military struggle on who was to decide the future political arrangements of
Slovenia.

Tensions grew as radicals on both sides condoned violence and sporadic conflicts between groups
occurred. On the 16 th of September 1941, the OF adopted a resolution claiming to be the only
legitimate representative of the national liberation struggle and labeled any organization operating
outside of the OF as harmful during occupational times.17 In Ljubljana, armed resistance led to
retaliation by the Fascists directed at the civilian population such as deportations to concentration
camps or mass shootings. Meanwhile, village guards were established by the locals, in response to
communist liquidations and the consequences of its armed resistance. Originally, the goal was to
protect individual villages from communist guerrilla takeovers and, with that, protect themselves
from Italian repression. The traditional political elites supported them in their fight against the
communists and organized themselves into the Slovenian Alliance of illegal political parties and
organizations. The Slovenian Alliance was formally financed and supported by the government in
exile, and by extension collaborated with Draža Mihailović Chetnik forces.18 With time, the village
guards started to collaborate militarily with the Italian invader and formed the Anti-Communist
Voluntary Militia (MVAC 19). It is important to note, that there were instances of Fascist authorities
forcing locals to enter MVAC units, however, most were volunteers. They were nicknamed the
White Guard by the partisans, a reference to the enemies of the Red Army in the Russian Civil
War. To this end, some scholars claim that communists saw the conflict with the traditional camp

16
B. Mlakar, Slovensko domobranstvo 1943-1945. (Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 2003), p. 17
17
Prnuk, Slovenski narodni vzpon, p.509
18
Mlakar, Slovensko domobranstvo, p. 28
19
Italian: Milizia volontaria anticommunista (transl. note).
as a necessary stage of the revolution, the class struggle. 20 The occupiers, expectedly, continued
to respond harshly to any armed resistance of the OF, both towards partisan units and the civilians.

The course of the conflict, in both aspects, was significantly changed with the capitulation of Italy
in September 1943 and the German arrival in previously Italian administrated zones. The anti-
communist forces were uncoordinated and divided in their opinion on how to deal with the new
occupier once again. In the meantime, the OF called upon their compatriots to put down their
weapons with the promise of amnesty and defeated many forces as early as September.
Nonetheless, the remaining anti-communist forces joined the new occupier and formed six new
German battalions, with their legal status formally known as assistant police units under the
German command and that of General Leon Rupnik.21 The battalion with the greatest military
significance was the Home Guard, known as Domobranci, which was stationed in the Province of
Ljubljana. A symbolic moment of renowned tensions was the October partisan denouncement of
the White Guard and General Rupnik at the Kočevje Assembly in October 1943 after concluding
elections in the liberated territories. This marked the post-war fate of most of their opponents.

As the war approached its end in Slovenia, the main part of the German retreating forces and the
Home Guard managed to escape to Austrian Carinthia. Unexpectedly, they were handed over to
the partisans by the British Army, leading to mass killings at Kočevski Rog, Vetrinje, parts of
Pohorje, and other regions in the summer of 1945. 22 The number of killed Home Guard members
is estimated to be around 10,000, however, historians in Slovenia continue to disagree on the exact
number of casualties and on who ordered the extra-judicial killings. At the same sites, members of
other collaborationist units such as the Croatian Ustaše and Serbian Chetniks were executed as
well. After the war, the SFRY was formed with Slovenia as one of its six socialist republics. The
one-party system of socialist Slovenia restricted the mentioning of the postwar killings as well as
the armed struggle that occurred between national groups.23 It is important to understand, that the
national liberation movement was instrumental in defeating the Axis powers in Slovenia, suffered
by far the most victims, and was recognized by the Western Allies as a legitimate successor of
government. It liberated the country independently, with limited help from the Red Army.

20
J. Možina, Slovenski razkol – Okupacija, revolucija in začetki protirevolucionarnega upora. (Ljubljana: Medijske
raziskovalne storitve, J. Možina, 2019).
21
Luthar, The Land Between,p. 432.
22
Ibid, p. 433.
23
S. Cmrečnjak, 'Slovenska sprava: zgodovinski pregled', Zgodovinski časopis, 3-4 (2016), 390.
Furthermore, the combination of strong propaganda and overall enthusiasm of being free from the
aggressor contributed to a strong communist narrative of the Second World War forming, and one
which was shared amongst all Yugoslav republics. The partisans were celebrated as heroes,
collaborators labeled as national traitors forming a defining element of post-war Slovenian
society.24

National Reconciliation

National reconciliation in Slovenia is defined as "the process of overcoming divisions that have
occurred in the country as a consequence of crimes and injustices committed during and after the
Second World War. The goal of it is for the past to stop being a source of division and disagreement
in the political space and that unity and solidarity would prevail in society." 25 The concept of
national reconciliation, or rather the need for it, developed within the Slovenian émigré
community, many of which were previous Home Guard members. After developing a separate
narrative of war events, they held various discussions abroad, and published works such as
personal testimonies or essays. However, the first mentions of national reconciliation inside
Slovenia appeared 25 years after the war. In an interview in 1975, Edvard Kocbeck, a prominent
Slovenian poet and partisan veteran called for admittance and redress for the crimes committed in
the past.26 The interview was the first public mention of the post-war crimes and broke the
government-issued media silence on the topic. A noteworthy moment was the publishing of
Spomenka Hribar’s essay, illustratively titled Guilt and Sin, in which she describes the killings not
as a conflict between two groups, but rather as a national trauma. She defines national
reconciliation as the cohesion of all national forces, where there is no place for absolute truth.27
Despite these individual incentives and calls for actions, the concept firmly established itself in
the Slovenian public discourse only after the country started decisively moving towards
independence in 1990. At this point, national reconciliation was understood as a precondition for
state consolidation, a proper transition to democracy and independence. 28 Under those
circumstances, among the last acts of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia was a

24
I. Todosić Lučić 'Heroism in Characters of People's Heroes: Spent Symbolic Capital of Yugoslav Nations?', Issues
in Ethnology and Anthropology, 4 (2020), 1221–1246.
25
Cmrečnjak, 'Slovenska sprava', 385.
26
B. Pahor and A. Rebula, Edvard Kocbek:pričevalec našega časa. (Trst: Zaliv, 1975).
27
Cmrečnjak, 'Slovenska sprava', 394
28
Ibid, 395.
declaration concerning national and civic appeasement, that placed national reconciliation in the
political sphere as an issue concerning state institutions. The purpose was to “contribute to the
establishment of such a situation in the political and public life of Slovenia where the past no
longer represents a burden for interpersonal relations of today and tomorrow." 29 The culmination
of events in 1990 can be seen in the Kočevski Rog commemoration, near the Jama graveyard
which was attended by 30,000 people as well as by President Milan Kučan and representatives of
the Catholic Church.30 In the crucial years following its independence, Slovenia adopted a series
of laws, regulations, declarations, and acts aimed at reconciliation. Among them were
parliamentary commissions for researching after-war killings; establishing the number of victims;
regulating the status of victims and compensation. The victim status came to include civilians
exposed to violence from the national liberation army and partisan units with one critical
distinction. The law dictated that a victim status belongs to a person only if he/she had not
voluntarily or professionally collaborated with the aggressor. 31 Succeeding these decisions, was
the establishment of the Study Centre for National Reconciliation by the right-wing government
in 2008. The task of the Study Centre is to 'research recent Slovenian history with an emphasis on
all three totalitarianisms that were present in the Slovenian territory: fascism, Nazism and
communism.'32 However, the Centre usually focuses only on the violence of communism during
and after the war. 33 Furthermore, an essential part of national reconciliation struggles was the
discovery of mass graves, properly taking care of the burial process, and rehabilitating victims
with reparations and/or memorials. Likewise, in 2009, the War Cemeteries Act was amended in
order to change the scriptures on post-war cemeteries to pay respects to “victims of war and
revolutionary violence”.34

In regards to war crimes, whether committed by anti-partisans or partisans, their investigation and
persecution were quite unsuccessful in Slovenia. Lack of concrete evidence and the death of many
possible suspects and witnesses impeded the judicial process and there weren’t any convictions

29
'Narodna umiritev kot pogoj za mirno sožitje', Delo, 5 March 1990.
30
'Spravna slovesnost pred 30 leti: "Da ne bi zamenjali ene krivice z drugo"', RTV SLO, 8 July 2020.
31
Cmrečnjak, 'Slovenska sprava', 421.
32
Study Centre for National Reconciliation. (2020). Available at https://www.scnr.si/en/about-the-centre.html
(accessed 25 September 2020).
33
N. Troha, 'Slovenia. Occupation, Repression, Partisan Movement, Collaboration, and Civil War in Historical
Research, Südosteuropa, 2, 346. (accessed 25 September 2020)
34
Cmrečnjak, 'Slovenska sprava', 425
related to war-time crimes in Slovenia. A mention-worthy judicial development was the retrial of
Bishop Rožman’s 1946 judgment and his subsequent rehabilitation. At a trial in absentia, Bishop
Rožman35 was sentenced to 18 years of strict imprisonment, 10 years of loss of civil rights, and
confiscation of all property for collaborating with the occupier. Trialed by a military court, his
judgment included a statement claiming he incited cooperation with the occupier, treason, and
crimes against the nation. Following the requests of the Archdiocese of Ljubljana, the judgment
was overruled in 2007 on grounds of significant violations of criminal procedure provisions.36 In
the opinion of the Catholic Church, this was a crucial step towards reconciliation.

A Fragmented Past

The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the discrediting of the socialist regime opened up space for
much-needed criticism of the existent historical interpretation. Until that moment, the historical
narrative was controlled by state institutions and used as a means of legitimizing the rule of the
communist party. To completely transition from the socialist regime, it was necessary to discuss
the past because it was previously unpermitted to do so. However, Luthar explains how the
expected democratization in historical interpretation has been halted by two processes, specifically
“the nationalization of history, and the struggles for new political monopolization of a particular
version of historical interpretation”.37 The tendency to adapt and interpret history to fit one’s vision
of a nation’s future has been thoroughly abused in Slovenia. It has been used as a tool to adapt to
the ideologies of Western liberal democracies, at the same time legitimizing collaboration as the
only viable option in resisting communism at the time, which in light of recent events, seemed to
be the right course of actions. Especially considering the wider historical context of the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, collaboration in Slovenia is being interpreted as
recognizing the danger of communism ahead of its time whilst collaborators are renamed into
victims of communist violence.38 The alternative narrative justifies passiveness and collaboration

35
Bishop Gregorij Rožman served as bishop of the Diocese of Ljubljana between the years 1930 and 1959. He
opposed the national liberation movement because it was led by the communists and established relations with the
occupiers and formally supported the occupying authorities. He remains a controversial figure. More in J. Pleterski
et al, Škof Rožman v zgodovini, (Ljubljana: Društvo piscev zgodovine NOB Slovenije, 2008) and M. Čipić Rehar et
al, Med sodbo sodišča in sodbo vesti, (Ljubljana: Družina, 2010).
36
'Soba proti Rožmanu razveljavljena', RTV SLO, 11 October, 2007.
37
O. Luthar, Of Red Dragons and Evil Spirits: Post-Communist Historiography between Democratization and New
Politics of History. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2017).
38
Jogan and Broder, 'Kolektivni zgodovinski spomin', 93.
in two ways. Adherents claim it was the only way to spare the nation of unnecessary sacrifices
whilst respecting the occupation authorities on the basis of international law. Relativizing
collaboration is supported by the claim, that no social, economic or religious issues could be settled
without collaboration and that the remaining political elites would feel endangered if they hadn’t
agreed to it.39 With that said, the reinterpretation was partly induced by changed geostrategic
circumstances in the world and Europe, especially after a large number of Eastern European states
joined the European Union and brought their own national traumas, including rehabilitating
collaborators and equating Nazism with communis, the Holocaust, and other Nazi crimes with
crimes of Stalin. By transferring the role from perpetrators to victims, the group avoids the need
for remorse as well as true responsibility for the crimes committed. 40 Common to states in
transition is when governments have fallen or regimes have been dismantled, the regime’s truths
become fallacies and new truths are needed to replace them. A similar tendency is seen in
Slovenian history textbooks that renamed liberation into occupation or collaboration into anti-
communism, completely shifting the previous narrative from occupation to civil war. 41 Moreover,
the new narrative implicitly denies resistance to occupation and fascism by painting the national
liberation struggle and subsequent regime change as illegal revolution. What follows is that any
resistance towards the socialist revolution was allowed by law. The main proponents of the second
narrative are usually descendants of the Home Guard, affiliates of the Catholic Church, and right-
wing politicians.42 For instance, an attempt at historical revisionism would be the organization
called the New Slovenian Alliance, a successor to the wartime Slovenian Alliance. In 1993, the
group advanced that the only way for Slovenia to transition to a democratic country is for the
government to acknowledge that a civil war occurred and to recognize the 'national liberation
movement as a totalitarian project of collaboration with a foreign and hostile ideological force'. 43
To this day, their newsletter Zaveza strongly focuses on questions related to the alleged civil war
and calls partisans terrorists, while celebrating the collaborators as true war heroes because they
opposed their communist compatriots. Equally important is the Church's stance towards

39
Repe, S puško in knjigo, p. 289.
40
O. Luthar, 'Post-Communist Memory Culture and the Historiography of the Second World War and the Post-War
Execution of Slovenian Collaborationists', Croatian Political Science Review, 55 (2018), 39.
41
O. Luthar, 'FORGETTING DOES (NOT) HURT. Historical Revisionism in Post-Socialist Slovenia, Nationalities
Papers, 41 (2013), 885.
42
G. Kranjc, 'Talking Past Each Other: Language in Post-World War II Killings in Slovenia', Journal of Genocide
Research, 20 (2018), 567.
43
Cmrečnjak, 'Slovenska sprava', 404
reconciliation, which can be found in their declarations. Most of the time, they emphasize truth as
the basis and foundation of reconciliation.44

What contributes to the reinterpretation of history is the way memorials for wartime victims are
built, situated in town landscapes, and how they are treated by government officials. Monuments
to the Home Guard occupy the central part of cemeteries whilst using Christian symbolism to
convey unity between Christianity and anti-communism, initiating an emotional response from the
viewer.45 During his research and categorization of the symbolism and rhetoric these monuments
carry, historian Godeša understands them not "as simply expressions of mourning and preservation
of memory, but as artifacts that create new meanings in new interpretations".46 In a similar
perspective on remembrance and memory, Norris researched a series of communist museums in
Eastern Europe, their commemorative practices, and their role in victimization. He demonstrates
how these museums, and by extension, this interpretation of history can be problematic because
"many museums of communism narrate the recent past through the prism of victimhood". 47 What
makes this approach dangerous, is that it leaves no room for self-reflection and allows for avoiding
guilt and atonement. As the author explains it, the simple logic behind the portrayal of suffering is
that “heroes cannot be villains, victims cannot be victimizers.” 48 Hribar, amongst the loudest
proponents of national reconciliation, distances herself from this turn of events, warning that the
working of such groups is an attempt at establishing another ultimate Truth, the main instigator of
divisions in their society.49

When examining policies aimed at facilitating national reconciliation, a favorable image of

transitional justice appears. The work of the Study Center and mass graves excavation has been
well funded by the state, and memorials condemning actions of revolutionary violence keep
appearing. However, the competing war narratives have increased tensions in Slovenia’s political
debates since different political parties may have different opinions on the topic, when
governments change, the state’s stance on the issue changes as well. The approach to historical

44
B. Godeša, 'Reconciliation instead of History', Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino, 3 (2016), 110.
45
Luthar, 'FORGETTING', 887.
46
Ibid, 886.
47
S. M. Norris (ed.), Museums of Communism: New Memory Sites in Central and Eastern Europe. (Indiana
University Press, 2020).
48
Ibid, p. 9.
49
Cmrečnjak, 'Slovenska sprava'.
interpretation by public officials and/or leading politicians at commemorations is highly reported
on by the media each year and can be highly controversial. Historical truth becomes the way
historical facts, or the lack of them, are interpreted by the current government. Consequently, the
issue became highly politicized and contributes to the entrenched right-left political dispute. Left-
leaning leaders are more ambiguous in their speeches as they tend to refer to the general cruelty of
violence and remind the listeners of the importance of the national liberation struggle. In contrast,
right-wing politicians are stricter and prone to stronger denotations of the post-war killings, even
referring to it as genocide.50 An epitome of this approach would be Janez Janša, a right-wing
politician and current prime minister of Slovenia, whose father was a member of the Home Guard.
For example, at the commemoration near Kočevski Rog, in June 2020, he claimed that that
"resistance towards any form of evil is legitimate" and "the only way to completely get rid of evil
is not with revenge, or forgetting, but only with the rule of law." 51 It is important to emphasize,
that politicians from all sides use the issue for their personal gains. What follows from this,
politicians pursue their political agenda by playing on the emotions and divisions within the nation.
In public discourses, the national liberation movement became identifiable with the socialist
economic model, which is inherently anti-capitalist while neoliberal capitalism represents the main
pillar of prosperity in modern, independent, European Union member Slovenia. Although Slovenia
undertook an economic transformation from the socialist model, the values associated with such
an arrangement (e.g., social welfare) are still demanded and expected in society. 52 In this way, left
and right political parties become partially identified with different narratives, and their
governmental policies are interpreted by the opposition and media as such. With such an
oversimplification of the actors of the past, everyday economic policies turn into historical debates
and play the so-called blame game. For example, are the modern economic problems of Slovenia
the legacy of the long-term present socialist model or a result of inadequate policies of its current
government?

What we are left with is a nation without a collective historical memory, an essential part of
creating a national identity and acknowledging values associated with such an identity. This is

50
Kranjc, 'Talking Past Each Other', 578.
51
I. Mekina, 'Janša na dveh slovesnostih, a z enim samim, zgrešenim prepričanjem: da si domobranci zaslužijo
„naše spoštovanje", Insajder, 6 June, 2020.
52
L. Prijon, 'Slovenian Communist Legacy: After 25 Years of Independence of Slovenian Nation', Slovak Journal of
Political Sciences, 17.2 (2017), 141–165.
what Hannah Ardent labeled, a fragmented past, "a past which has lost its certainty of
evaluation."53 Multiple identities within one nation are not uncommon or entirely problematic. In
the words of Hribar "reconciliation is not the eradication of differences, but rather quite the
opposite – an a priori assent to these differences. Therefore, it presupposes diversity (…) the only
presupposition of all these dissimilarities is that people – those who subscribe to and declare all
these legitimate and humanly justifiable differences – wish to and want to live in harmony." 54
However, the problem occurs when the lack of a unified history becomes a source of political
contestation and hinders future development. A way forward would be to complete the criticism
of the national liberation movement and the communist regime with criticism and knowledge of
the anti-revolutionary camp. By collaborating amongst each other, historians from both sides can
help in avoiding unnecessary political conflict and further distancing between the two sides. The
fixation on the inter-Slovenian conflict during the Second World War neglects that by far the
largest source of violence at the time was the occupiers. And in that crucial historical moment,
most of the Slovenian nation decided to oppose the repressive policies of the forced regime and
fought for their freedom and their right to self-determination.

Conclusion

Carl L. Becker noted that “we build our conceptions of history partly out of our present needs and
purposes.”55 The process occurring in Slovenia is neither unique nor seldom in Eastern Europe.
Identity politics have replaced previous methods of political contestation and have become a
primary tool for gaining votes and concentrating power. The heroics of the Partisan liberation
narrative clashed with the mechanisms of nation-building in Slovenia and its European democratic
orientation. This ensued in a public effort to “influence collective memory and to translate the
previous dominant narrative into a revisionist narrative of a repressive and totalitarian communist
state.”56 The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 marks the beginning of the slow dismantling of socialist
regimes in Eastern Europe. The countries entered a transitional period where they attempted to
reconcile their newfound independence, liberal democracy, and most significantly capitalism with
their turbulent pasts. The Second World War in Slovenia came to be remembered as a mixture of

53
H. Ardent, The Life of the Mind, (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), p. 212.
54
S. Hribar, "Sprava ni konsez o preteklosti, temveč o prihodnosti"(Kaj se je zgodilo s slovensko zgodovino?)
Razgledi, 13 May 1994.
55
C. L. Becker, ‘What are Historical Facts?’, The Western Political Quarterly, 8 (1955), 327–340.
56
Pušnik, ‘Media memorial discourses’, p.435.
brutal occupation, repression, resistance, revolutionary enthusiasm, collaboration, and fear. Today,
in the light of Slovenia’s independence and integration into the European Union, historical
revisionists attempt to change the meaning of certain decisions, acts, or events to justify them. The
Partizani vs. Domobranci debate is still the most controversial issue in Slovenia's modern history.
It became the story in the background of governmental policies, political speeches, and the favorite
dinner table debate. The practice of historical revisionism has changed the meaning of national
reconciliation and reignited the debate on the significance of transitional policies. It demands more
research to be done on the topic, both by exploring politics of memory and the weaponization of
history in the manner it is done today.

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