See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/333775668

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance and

Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange The
Relationship Between Ownership Types and Cor...

Article · June 2019

CITATIONS READS

10 4,978

1 author:

Dr. Pankaj M. Madhani

Management Consultant
250 PUBLICATIONS   1,341 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Dr. Pankaj M. Madhani on 14 June 2019.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 The Relationship Between Ownership Types
and Corporate Governance and Disclosure
Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange

Pankaj M Madhani*

Corporate governance is an institutional arrangement that not only addresses the

agency problem between shareholders and managers of the firm, but also provides
the context for the decisions taken by the top management of the firm. In this
context, the main question is whether ownership types influence corporate governance
practices of firms. This research empirically studies corporate governance and disclosure
practices of firms segregated according to types of ownership, i.e., foreign firms,
private sector firms and public sector firms. Such firms are diverse entities with
different management philosophy, responsibility and structure. This research focuses
on firms across various sectors listed on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and seeks to
identify whether corporate governance and disclosure practices of foreign firms,
private sector and public sector firms are significantly different. The research also
emphasizes the salient features of firms according to ownership types. The findings
shed light on the governance and disclosure practices of firms segregated according
to ownership types in the legal and institutional environment of India.

Introduction
Corporate governance is the system by which firms are directed and controlled. The corporate
governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different
stakeholders in the system, such as the board, managers, shareholders and spells out the rules
and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. Thus, corporate governance
provides an ethical process as well as well-defined structure through which the objectives of
the firm, the means of attaining such objectives, and systems of monitoring performance are
also set.
As such corporate governance is an institutional arrangement that not only addresses the
agency problem between shareholders and managers of the firm, but also provides the context
for the decisions taken by the top management of the firm. In this context, the fundamental
objective of a corporate governance framework is to identify a basis for strategic cooperation

* Professor, ICFAI Business School (IBS), IBS House, Opp. AUDA Lake, Near Science City, Off. S G Road, Ahmedabad
380060, Gujarat, India. E-mail: pmadhani@iit.edu

The2016
© Relationship Between
IUP. All Rights Ownership Types and Corporate Governance
Reserved. 7
and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
between shareholders and managers of the firm such that the agency problem is reduced and
a basis for decisions that promote the competitiveness of the firm is provided.
The corporate governance covers a wide range of measures. Researchers classify these
measures into internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate governance
mechanisms can be considered as key factors explaining the level of disclosure by various firms.
With internal corporate governance mechanisms, the types of ownership and structure of the
firm, the board characteristics such as size and composition, the auditor and the major
committees of the board acquire special significance. Within external corporate governance
mechanisms, the external market and market competition play a significant role in improving
corporate governance. The internal and external corporate governance mechanisms in turn are
shaped by the overall legal and institutional environments of the country. This research
emphasizes on study of corporate governance and disclosure practices of firms segregated
according to types of ownership (private as well as public sector and foreign firms). Private
sector and public sector firms are constituents of domestic firms, while foreign firms are
subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations (MNCs).
Private sector, public sector and foreign firms are diverse entities with different management
philosophy, responsibility and structure. In relation to corporate governance and disclosure
practices, despite the differences, there are corporate governance principles, such as
accountability, transparency, and ethical business conduct, that are equally applicable for these
diverse entities. This research works in this direction and focuses on private sector, public sector
and foreign firms across various sectors listed on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), to study their
corporate governance and disclosure practices.

Literature Review
Corporate governance is the act of protecting shareholders from expropriation by managers.
It benefits shareholders through increased disclosure of information, which results in lower
asymmetric information (Mitton, 2002). Given the relevance that corporate governance
information has for capital markets, it is evident that firms should adopt such corporate
governance codes and reveal this information to contribute to the improvement of their
transparency. As such corporate transparency refers to the disclosure of firm-specific
information to outside constituents of the firm and is an integral part of corporate governance
practices. Disclosure may be considered the foundation of any system of corporate governance
(Cadbury, 1999).
Increased public interest in corporate transparency is also reflected in recent corporate
governance regulations that have been introduced by stock exchanges and regulators
worldwide. Firms, across the globe, recognize that there are economic benefits to be gained
from a well-managed disclosure policy. This shows that firms in need of a good deal of external
financing, such as rapidly growing firms, have an incentive to improve their disclosure and
corporate governance. A detailed and structured system of disclosure enables investors to
understand and obtain accurate and reliable information of companies in order to make better
investment decisions (Ho et al., 2008).

8 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

 Corporate governance is not just about the process but it is also about the way firms are
held accountable mainly via ‘financial reporting’. The effective financial reporting may play a
key role in improving the soundness of the corporate governance system. One of the key
functions of the financial reporting system is to limit top management’s discretion, and hence
constraining top management to act in the shareholders’ interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
and Watts and Zimmerman, 1978), or, broadly speaking in a wider perspective, in the interest
of all the strategic corporate stakeholders. However, it should also be noted that the quality of
information produced by the financial reporting system is fundamental for a corporate
governance system to be effective. On the one hand, financial reporting constitutes an
important element of the corporate governance system. In fact, some failures of corporate
governance may be reduced by an adequate financial reporting system. On the other hand,
some problems of the financial reporting system find their origin in deficiencies of the system
of corporate governance (Whittington, 1993).
Communication of corporate disclosure via annual reports is a very important aspect of
corporate governance in the sense that meaningful and adequate disclosure enhances good
corporate governance (Bhasin and Reddy, 2010). Annual reports are published by firms as a
medium for communicating both quantitative and qualitative corporate information to
shareholders, potential shareholders (investors) and other stakeholders. Although such
publication of an annual report is a statutory requirement, firms normally voluntarily disclose
information in excess of the mandatory requirements. Hence, annual reports are important
documents for assessing and analyzing the company performance in regard to corporate
governance and disclosure standard/standards as well as compliance.
Disclosure is one of the fundamental goals of the financial reporting system. Transparency
is the timely and adequate disclosure of the performance of the company and its corporate
governance practices related to its ownership, board, management structure, and processes.
A system of corporate governance needs a good level of disclosure and adequate information
to eliminate (or at least reduce) information asymmetries between all parties, making corporate
insiders accountable for their actions. According to Baek et al. (2009), “all the relevant
information should be made available to the users in a cost-effective and timely way.”
Disclosure is an important component of corporate governance since it allows all
stakeholders of firms to monitor the performance of the firm. It is the quality of financial reports
that determines the quality of corporate governance. Financial disclosure plays a twin role:
firstly by allowing investors and other outsiders to monitor firm performance through
information presented in the financial reports; and secondly, an efficient disclosure system also
brings clarity to the boards regarding the strategy and risk appetite of the firm (Bushman and
Smith, 2001). Corporate governance stands for responsible business management geared
towards long-term value creation. The opacity in disclosure practices can contribute to
suspicious and unethical behavior leading to poor valuation of the firm (Madhani, 2007a). Good
corporate governance is a key driver of sustainable corporate growth and long-term
competitive advantage (Madhani, 2007b).

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 9

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
 According to Mallin (2002), information to shareholders is one of the most important aspects
of corporate governance as it reflects the accountability of the firms towards their shareholders.
Good practices in corporate governance disclosure, a guidance issued by OECD (2006), also
states that all material issues related to the corporate governance of a firm should be disclosed
in a timely manner. Hence, disclosures have to be clear, concise and precise and governed by
substance over form principle. Disclosures indicate the quality of the firm’s business model, its
growth strategy, and the risks it is facing (Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008). Disclosure thus plays
a decisive role in helping the shareholder assess firm’s performance. According to the Global
Investor Opinion Survey (McKinsey & Company, 2002), corporate governance is a significant
investment criterion for most investors. Ho et al. (2008) found that exhaustive disclosure by
firms enabled investors to make better investment decisions.
Prior research has shown specific benefits that encourage voluntary disclosure of
information through better corporate governance. These benefits translate into a reduction of
the information asymmetry problems as a result of the separation of ownership and control of
firms (Lev, 1992). Also, firms that opt to disclose information beyond the standard requirements
reap benefits such as reductions in capital and debt costs, greater analysts’ cover or an increase
in the liquidity of company securities (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Corporate transparency
plays a crucial role in reducing the information asymmetry between firms and their stakeholders
(Durnev et al., 2009). It also allows stakeholders to monitor performance and contractual
commitment of firms (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Hence, market regulators enact numerous
rules and codes to ensure timely and accurate disclosure of information by listed firms.
Bushman et al. (2004) studied corporate transparency across 45 countries and found substantial
differences in corporate disclosure practices that arose from a country’s legal as well as judicial
regime. There is an expanding literature that examines whether a country’s legal and judicial
institutions affect disclosures practices across countries (Jaggi and Low, 2000). Researchers such
as Hope (2003) and Francis et al. (2005) also found that country-level institutional factors matter
in explaining disclosure levels.
Good practices of corporate governance are now documented in most country codes.
These codes commonly stress the need for transparency in financial and nonfinancial
disclosures, due board processes and information systems, compliance with legal and
regulatory requirements, accountability to various stakeholders, among others. Several
studies examine Indian corporate governance generally. Khanna (2008) reviewed the
development of corporate governance norms in India beginning from independence era.
Bhattacharyya and Rao (2004) examined whether adoption of Clause 49 (an important set of
governance reforms in India) predicts lower volatility and returns for large Indian firms. Black
and Khanna (2007) conducted an event study of the adoption of Clause 49 and report positive
returns to a treatment group of large firms (who were required to comply quickly) relative
to small firms (for whom compliance was delayed).
Prior to the adoption of Clause 49, India was considered a laggard in corporate governance
practices. In May 1999, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) announced the
formation of the Kumar Mangalam Birla committee, which was tasked with proposing corporate

10 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

governance reforms. These reforms became ‘Clause 49’, so named because they were
implemented through a new Clause 49, which was added to stock exchange listing
requirements. SEBI revised Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement pertaining to corporate
governance vide circular dated October 29, 2004, which supersedes all other earlier circulars
issued by SEBI on this subject, and came into effect in the year 2006 (January 1, 2006).
It is now mandatory for the Indian listed companies to file with SEBI the corporate
governance compliance report along with the financial statements. Clause 49 has both
mandatory as well as voluntary provisions. Mandatory provisions relate to board composition,
the composition and functioning of the audit committee, board procedures, management
discussion and analysis in the annual reports, governance and disclosures regarding subsidiary
companies, CEO/CFO certification of financial statements and corporate governance reporting
as part of the Annual Report. The adoption of Clause 49 may be viewed as a turning point in
Indian corporate governance. Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) reported that small Indian firms
which are subject to Clause 49 react positively to plans by SEBI to enforce the Clause 49, relative
to similar firms not subject to Clause 49.
Recent studies on Indian corporate governance and disclosure practices have focused on
cross-listing of firms (Madhani, 2014a), industry types (Madhani, 2014b), nature of firms such
as tangible assets versus intangible assets-dominated firms (Madhani, 2015a), origin of firms,
i.e., MNC subsidiaries vs. domestic firms (Madhani, 2015b), board characteristics, i.e., board size
and composition (Madhani, 2015c), and board committees (Madhani, 2015d). In the Indian
context, fewer studies seek to identify specific characteristics determining the variation of
corporate governance and disclosure practices across firms. This study aims to contribute to
the understanding of this issue by analyzing the specific firm characteristics such as ownership
of the firm. This research focuses on ownership types such as private sector, public sector and
foreign firms listed in BSE to study their corporate governance and disclosure practices and
accordingly the research identifies and tests the empirical evidence for such relationship for
listed firms.

Corporate Governance: MNC Subsidiaries Versus Domestic Firms

MNCs are seen as amongst the world’s most powerful types of organizations as they account
for a large share of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), are big employers and contribute to the
economic development of the foreign country where they operate (Williams, 2009). Firms
having multinational presence such as subsidiaries of MNCs that have their parent firms in other
country have operations in more than one country and may also be listed in the host country.
An MNC subsidiary is defined as a local affiliate of an MNC located in a foreign country, of which
the parent company holds majority ownership in promoters’ holding (Bouquet and Birkinshaw,
2008).
Such subsidiaries of MNCs are influenced by the parent firm in home country to a great
extent. It is possible that subsidiaries of MNCs internalize some aspects of disclosure practices
of their parent firm and hence exhibit better governance and disclosure practices as compared
to domestic firms (Madhani, 2015e). Hence, these subsidiaries of MNCs are expected to have

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 11

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
higher standard of corporate governance and disclose more information and observe better
reporting practices for the various reasons explained below:
• As they have to comply with the regulations of not only their host country but also
those of the parent country or home country, where accounting practices and
standards of reporting are substantially higher.
• Usually, these firms are equipped with more advanced accounting software tools
and packages, efficient audit staff, competent and efficient accounting and support
staff, and better management practices. The variety of information collected by the
parent firms i.e., MNCs, along with their better reporting systems, can result in the
increase of voluntary disclosures. Hence, they have the potential to disclose more
information without any incremental processing costs on disclosures (Choi and
Mueller, 1996).
• These firms are under closer scrutiny of various political and pressure groups within
the host country, as they view them as sources of economic exploitation and agents
of imperialist power (Kamran and Nicholls, 1994). Hence, such firms have an incentive
to disclose more information in order to avert any pressure for excessive control for
exploitation (Srinivasan, 2008).
• International agencies like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and others frequently monitor and evaluate the MNCs because
of their importance in the global trade. Subsidiaries of MNCs have been frequently
accused of tax evasion and other practices like transfer pricing which may end up
paying high political costs.
• MNCs have two related levels of corporate governance structures—one at
headquarters and other at subsidiary levels. In the case of MNCs with subsidiaries
listed on local stock exchanges in different host countries, those subsidiaries need
to simultaneously conform to the host country’s legal requirements as well as
governance practices of the MNC in home country (Kiel et al., 2006). Therefore, MNC
subsidiaries face dual pressures, from the demand of the host country environment
where they are operated and also from corporate headquarters of parent MNC in
home country (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991).
MNCs as a parent firm pressurize their subsidiaries internally to adopt their organizational
practices which are transferred to them from their parent firm in home country. Externally, the
host country’s institutional environment pressurizes MNC subsidiaries to adopt local
organizational practices. Hence, the MNC subsidiary has to decide which institutional pressures
are more important: internal pressures that would enable it to become legitimate within the
working environment of MNCs or the external pressures that would enable it to gain external
legitimacy within the legal environment of the host country.
MNC subsidiaries operate across different countries with different corporate governance
regimes, which will often deviate from corporate governance practices in the MNC home

12 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

country. MNCs have to thus manage multiple economic, legal, political and cultural
environments externally as well as complex networks of knowledge and resource flows
internally (Volkmar, 2003). MNC subsidiaries face additional complexities and challenges in
corporate governance and disclosure practices due to the diversity of corporate governance
rules, regulations and stakeholder expectations in the various host countries in which they
operate (Luo, 2005).
The global presence of MNC and its subsidiaries creates a demand for voluntary disclosure
by such firms because MNC subsidiaries are likely to have greater information asymmetry as
a result of their greater scope and complexity. Such effect will be larger for firms based in
countries with weak legal environments than for firms based in countries with strong legal
institutional environments. Hence, it is expected that the subsidiaries of MNCs will provide more
disclosures as a result of weak legal environment at host country. Accordingly, MNC subsidiaries
are expected to have higher corporate governance and disclosure level as compared to
domestic firms in India. Pattnaik and Gray (2012) found evidence for such hypothesis in Indian
environment and empirically proved that subsidiaries of MNCs were more transparent and
disclose more information than domestic listed Indian firms. Their time frame of the study was
before implementation of Clause 49. However, after implementation of Clause 49, no concurrent
study was conducted in India regarding corporate governance and disclosure practices of MNC
subsidiaries (foreign firms), private sector as well as public sector firms.

Corporate Governance: Private Sector Firms Versus Public Sector Firms

Usually, the focus of corporate governance research is associated more with private sector
entity. While the study of private sector corporate governance practices is a common research
theme, we also need to pay attention to corporate governance practices in public sector.
Although there is no example of spectacular governance failures in public sector firms, the
importance of governance in public sector is still very vital. Majumdar (1998) analyzed the
performance of state-owned, privately-owned, and mixed ownership firms in India over the
period 1973-1989 and found that privately owned firms exhibit greater efficiency than state-
owned or mixed-ownership firms and that mixed-ownership firms exhibit greater efficiency than
state-owned firms.
There has been increasing worldwide attention to corporate governance studies in the
public sector (Ryan and Ng, 2000). India, UK and Australia, for example, issued a framework
of corporate governance in the public sector units and guideline of how to apply principles
and practice of corporate governance in the public sector units (Madhani, 2014c). Public sector
reforms have improved corporate governance and disclosure practices of public sector units.
Guidelines on Corporate Governance for State-Owned Enterprises (CG Guidelines) were issued
by the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) (Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public
Enterprises, Government of India) in 2007. The main focus of the CG Guidelines is on the Board
of Directors and audit committees but they also touch on disclosure and subsidiary companies.
While the CG Guidelines are voluntary, public sector units are expected to note their compliance
and explain areas of noncompliance (comply or explain).

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 13

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
 According to ICAI Research Committee Report (1985), public sector firms disclosed more
information than private sector firms. Sanan (2011) studied private and public sector firms for
the financial year 2008-09 and found that private sector firms adhere to higher standards of
corporate governance disclosure practices than public sector firms. However, Madhani (2014c)
found that there is no statistical significant difference for corporate governance and disclosure
practices between private and public sector firms as public sector firms adhere to higher
standards of corporate governance disclosure practices comparable to private sector firms.

Private Sector vs. Public Sector: Major Differences

Prior literature on corporate governance highlights that corporate governance framework must
be tailored to each organization based on their types, as there is a difference in needs between
the organizations. The differences between private sector and public sector firms are given in
Table 1.

Table 1: Private Sector vs. Public Sector Firms: Major Differences

S. No. Variable Private Sector Public Sector

1. Governance Directors and managers Agency heads, ministers, Parliament –
tensions between loci of authority
2. Mandate Profit maximization, considering Welfare maximization, considering
corporate interests only community interests, involving tradeoffs
3. Ownership Partially-owned entities Relation to assets remains complex
4. Other Employees, creditors, suppliers, Same set of stakeholders, but weighting of
Stakeholders communities communities much heavier
5. Goal Generally clear Often vague to satisfy different stakeholders
6. Product Choice Decided by corporation Mandated by government
7. Revenue From sales Also from some natural monopolies
8. Prices Generally constrained by market Dependent on policy
9. Costs Firm’s own costs used for Community costs, including externalities,
decision making deadweight losses

10. Efficiency Technical efficiency basic Economic efficiency is often at the cost of
requirement technical efficiency

11. Financial Cash flow crucial to survival Cash not an operating constraint, as
Controls government has a macro monetary role

Source: Madhani (2014c)

Objectives and Development of Hypothesis

The review of extant literature suggests that there is no comprehensive study of corporate
governance and disclosure practices of firms in the Indian context, simultaneously looking into
corporate governance reporting practices of private sector firms, public sector firms and
foreign firms. Hence, to fill this gap, the present study focuses on BSE-listed private and public

14 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

sector firms (domestic firms) as well as foreign firms (MNC subsidiaries) representing various
industries and compares their governance and disclosure practices by calculating Corporate
Governance and Disclosure (CGD) score of such firms and using them as a proxy for good
governance.
There has been a greater interest in applying institutional theory to the study of MNCs
(Westney, 2005), especially to identify and study the factors influencing MNC subsidiary
practices in different host country’s institutional environments (Kostova and Roth, 2002; and
Tempel et al., 2006). Prior empirical research found that institutional pressures created by legal
environment develop an institutional context within which firms make decisions regarding what
to disclose and how (Crawford and Williams, 2010). Institutional theory can also be linked to
legitimacy theory, as their combined view could provide a better explanation of disclosure
practices of MNC subsidiaries. In contrast, domestic firms need to conform only to the demands
of their domestic rules, regulations and stakeholder expectations (Alpay et al., 2005).
As MNCs conduct their global business in multiple institutional environments that require
different disclosure rules, they may maintain higher disclosure standards and disclose more
information than domestic firms. Similarly within domestic firms, public sector firms may have
lower standard of corporate governance and disclosure compared to private sector firms due
to differences in their governing variables (see Table 1).
This research study seeks to examine how ownership types influence corporate governance
and disclosure practices of foreign firms, private and public sector firms. Hence, this research
intends to investigate empirically whether there is a significant difference in corporate
governance and disclosure policies of foreign firms, private sector firms and public sector firms
listed on Indian stock exchange. In short, the paper intends to:
• Measure the extent of corporate governance and disclosure practices of sample firms
with the help of an appropriate instrument as an evaluation tool; and
• Study the overall corporate governance and disclosure practices in the sample of
private public sector firms and foreign firms.
Thus, based on these arguments, the following null hypothesis is proposed:
H0: There is no significant difference in corporate governance and disclosure practices
among firms of different ownerships types, i.e., foreign firms, private sector firms
and public sector firms.

Data and Methodology

Sampling and Data Collection
This study employs a method of content analysis of published annual reports of firms. Content
analysis can be a great source of information as it involves codifying both qualitative and
quantitative information into predefined categories in order to track patterns in the
presentation and reporting of information (Guthrie et al., 2006). Content analysis is widely used
in accounting research to reveal useful insights into accounting practice (Steenkamp and

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 15

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
Northcott, 2007). Annual reports are important documents for assessing and analyzing the
company performance in regard to corporate governance standards and compliance. The
annual reports of 54 firms for the financial year 2011-12, i.e., for the period ending March 2012
or December 2012 (based on the sample firms’ financial year), were downloaded from the CMIE
Prowess database (4.14 version). Stratified sampling was used for obtaining data of firms listed
in BSE and constituent of S&P BSE sectoral indices.
Sectoral indices at BSE aim to represent a minimum of 90% of the free-float market
capitalization for sectoral firms from the universe of S&P BSE 500 index (Table 2). This sector
index consists of the firms classified in that particular sector of the BSE 500 index. The sample
firms represent different sectors, viz., metal, oil and gas, power, FMCG, healthcare, IT, auto,
consumer durables and capital goods. In each of these sectors, the top six firms as per market
capitalization are selected for sample. In most of the earlier studies on disclosure, firms were
taken as the top largest firms listed on their respective stock exchanges which have been
selected on the basis of their market capitalization. Such studies also employed content analysis
of published annual reports (Joshi et al., 2012). As shown in Table 2, these 54 firms selected
from nine different sectors represent more than 91% of the overall sectoral index weight. Hence,
the sample of 54 firms truly represent the selected nine sectors.

Table 2: Weight of Sample Firms in Their Respective Sectoral Indices

S.
S&P BSE Sectoral Indices No. of Firms Studied Weight in Index (%)
No.
1. S&P BSE Auto 6 89
2. S&P BSE Capital Goods 6 94
3. S&P BSE Consumer Durables 6 90
4. S&P BSE Healthcare 6 88
5. S&P BSE IT 6 95
6. S&P BSE Metal 6 82
7. S&P BSE Oil & Gas 6 94
8. S&P BSE Power 6 97
9. S&P BSE FMCG 6 91
Total Sample Size 54 91

Research Procedures for Testing Hypothesis

This research conducted an inferential statistical analysis for testing the hypothesis. In order
to test the significant differences in the corporate governance and disclosure practices across
various ownership types, one-way ANOVA and the Kruskal-Wallis test were used. One-way
ANOVA tests the difference in the dependent variable among two, three or more groups. It tests
whether groups formed by the categories of independent variables are similar. The Kruskal-
Wallis test is the nonparametric test used in place of ANOVA.

16 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

Research Instrument
In this study, corporate governance and disclosure practices of firms are measured by using
the index developed by Subramanian and Reddy (2012). They developed a new instrument to
measure corporate governance and disclosure levels of firms, considering only voluntary
disclosures in the Indian context. On the basis of the S&P instrument, corporate governance-
related disclosures are classified under two categories: ownership structure and investor
relations (ownership), and board and management structure and process (board).
The final instrument had 67 items: 19 questions in the ownership disclosure category and
48 in the board disclosure category. The annual reports of the selected 54 firms were carefully
examined for the financial year 2011-12. Hence, to arrive at the overall disclosure score for
each category, i.e., ownership and board, annual reports of each firm under study was
scrutinized for the presence of specific items under the above-mentioned categories. One point
is awarded when information on an item is disclosed and zero otherwise. All items in the
instrument were given equal weight, and the scores were thus arrived at (for each category),
with a higher score indicating greater disclosure. As shown in Table 3, final CGD score
(maximum: 67) for each firm was calculated by adding the overall score received in ownership
(maximum: 19) as well as and board category (maximum: 48).

Results and Discussion

As this research compares corporate governance and disclosure practices of BSE listed firms
according to ownership types, i.e., private sector firms, public sector firms, and foreign firms,
54 firms of the sample are divided into the 33 private sector firms, 9 public sector firms and
12 foreign firms (Figure 1). Figure 2 shows relationship of CGD scores of sample firms, along
with frequency distribution in terms of histogram.
Table 3 shows CGD score of sample firms divided according to sector and ownership types.
Table 4 shows key statistics of sector-wise breakup of CGD scores, while Table 5 shows key
statistics of CGD scores across various firms of this study, according to ownership types.

Figure 1: Sample Firms According to Ownership Types

Foreign Firms
(22%)

Private Sector
Firms (61%) Public Sector
Firms (17%)

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 17

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
 Figure 2: Histogram of Sample Firms

6
Frequency

0
10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00
CGD Score
Mean CG Score = 25.96; SD = 7.44; Sample Size = 54

Table 3: CGD Score of Sample Firms

S.
No. Sector Firm Ownership CGD Score

1. IT Infosys Private 37
2. Wipro Private 47
3. Oracle Financial Foreign 20
4. HCL Private 34
5. TCS Private 33
6. Mahindra Satyam Private 21
7. Auto Mahindra & Mahindra Private 31
8. Tata Motors Private 34
9. Cummins Foreign 13
10. Maruti Suzuki Foreign 19
11. Bajaj Auto Private 24
12. Hero MotoCorp Private 22
13. Capital Goods L&T Private 31
14. ABB Foreign 22
15. Siemens Foreign 28
16. Pipavav Defence Private 21
17. Crompton Greaves Foreign 23
18. BHEL Public 24

18 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

 Table 3 (Cont.)
S.
No. Sector Firm Ownership CGD Score

19. Oil and Gas IOC Public 28

20. Bharat Petroleum Public 24
21. Reliance Industries Private 34
22. Cairn India Foreign 30
23. ONGC Public 31
24. GAIL Public 20
25. Power Tata Power Private 29
26. Reliance Infrastructure Private 30
27. NTPC Public 28
28. Reliance Power Private 27
29. NHPC Public 29
30. Power Grid Public 25
31. Metal Sterlite Foreign 30
32. Tata Steel Private 32
33. Hindalco Industries Private 20
34. Coal India Public 24
35. Jindal Steel & Power Private 17
36. JSW Steel Private 35
37. FMCG Hindustan Unilever Foreign 33
38. Colgate-Palmolive Foreign 15
39. Nestle Foreign 16
40. Godrej Consumer Products Private 36
41. ITC Private 41
42. United Spirits Private 24
43. Consumer Durables Videocon Industries Private 18
44. Titan Industries Private 26
45. TTK Prestige Private 15
46. Gitanjali Gems Private 24
47. Rajesh Exports Private 15
48. Bluestar Private 20
49. Healthcare Glaxo Foreign 20
50. Cipla Private 14
51. Lupin Private 24
52. Ranbaxy Laboratories Foreign 22
53. Dr. Reddy’s Private 40
54. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Private 23

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 19

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
 Table 4: CGD Score Across Various Sectors – Key Statistics
95% Confidence
Min. Max. Mean
S. No. of Std. Std. Interval for Mean
Sectors CGD CGD CGD
No. Firms Deviation Error Lower Upper
Score Score Score
Bound Bound
1. Power 6 25 30 28 1.79 .73 26.12 29.87
2. Oil and Gas 6 20 34 27.83 5.08 2.07 22.50 33.16
3. Metal 6 17 35 26.33 7.12 2.90 18.86 33.80
4. IT 6 20 47 32 10.20 4.16 21.29 42.70
5. FMCG 6 15 41 27.50 10.82 4.41 16.14 38.85
6. Capital Goods 6 21 31 24.83 3.87 1.57 20.77 28.89
7. Healthcare 6 14 40 23.83 8.68 3.54 14.72 32.94
8. Auto 6 13 34 23.67 7.55 3.08 15.73 31.59
9. Consumer 6 15 26 19.67 4.59 1.87 14.84 24.48
Durables
Overall 54 13 47 25.96 7.44 1.01 23.93 27.99

Table 5: CGD Score According to Ownership Types – Key Statistics

95% Confidence
S. No. of CGD Score Mean Std. Interval
Ownership Std. for Mean
No. Firms CGD Deviation CV* Error
Types Lower Upper
Min. Max. Range Score
Bound Bound
1. Private 33 14 47 33 27.30 8.21 30.06 1.43 24.39 30.21
Sector
2. Public 9 20 31 11 25.89 3.37 13.02 1.12 23.30 28.48
Sector
3. Foreign 12 13 33 20 22.33 6.51 29.16 1.88 18.19 26.47
Firms
Overall 54 13 47 34 25.96 7.44 28.64 1.01 23.93 27.99
Note: * CV = Coefficient of Variation.

Values of minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation of CGD score for various
ownership types have been presented in Table 5. The results show that there is a difference
between the mean and standard deviation of CGD score for various ownership types.
The research also identifies the top firm in each ownership type with respect to CGD score
(Table 6).
Table 7 shows that private firms are present in all sectors and all firms in consumer durables
sector are private. It is also evident that consumer durables sector has lowest CGD score among
all sectors. Also, Reliance Industries is the only private sector firm in oil and gas sector.
Table 8 shows the key statistics of the CGD scores of private sector firms.

20 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

 Table 6: Firms with Highest CGD Score According to Ownership Types

S. No. Firm Sector Ownership Types CGD Score

1. Wipro IT Private 47
2. ONGC Oil and Gas Public 31
3. Hindustan Unilever FMCG Foreign 33

Table 7: CGD Score of Private Sector Firms Across Various Sectors

S. Mean CGD
Private Sector Firms Sector CGD Score
No. Score of Sector
1. L&T Capital Goods 31
25
2. Pipavav Defence Capital Goods 21

3. Crompton Greaves Capital Goods 23

4. Reliance Industries Oil and Gas 34 34

5. Tata Power Power 29

6. Reliance Infrastructure Power 30 28.67

7. Reliance Power Power 27

8. Tata Steel Metal 32

9. Hindalco Metal 20
26
10. Jindal Steel & Power Metal 17

11. JSW Steel Metal 35

12. Lupin Healthcare 24

13. Dr. Reddy’s Healthcare 40

25.25
14. Cipla Healthcare 14

15. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 23

16. Godrej Consumer Products FMCG 36

17. ITC FMCG 41 34

18. United Spirits FMCG 24

19. Mahindra & Mahindra Auto 30

20. Tata Motors Auto 34

27.50
21. Bajaj Auto Auto 24

22. Hero Moto Corp Auto 22

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 21

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
 Table 7 (Cont.)
S. Mean CGD
Private Sector Firms Sector CGD Score
No. Score of Sector
23. Videocon Industries Consumer Durables 18
24. Titan Industries Consumer Durables 26
25. TTK Prestige Consumer Durables 15
19.67
26. Gitanjali Gems Consumer Durables 24
27. Rajesh Exports Consumer Durables 15
28. Bluestar Consumer Durables 20
29. Infosys IT 37
30. Wipro IT 47
31. HCL IT 34 34
32. TCS IT 33
33. Mahindra Satyam IT 21
Overall 27.30

Table 8: Private Sector Firms – Key Statistics of CGD Score

No. of
Private CGD Score Mean
S. Std. CV*
Sectors Sector CGD
No. Deviation (%)
Firms Min. Max. Range Score

1. Capital Goods 3 21 31 10 25 5.29 21.16

2. Oil and Gas 1 31 31 0 31 – –
3. Power 3 27 30 3 28.67 1.52 5.32
4. Metal 4 17 35 18 26 8.83 33.96
5. Healthcare 4 14 40 26 29 9.54 32.89
6. FMCG 3 24 41 17 33.67 8.73 25.95
7. Auto 4 22 34 12 27.5 5.50 20.02
8. Consumer Durables 6 15 26 11 19.66 4.59 23.33
9. IT 5 21 47 26 34.4 9.31 27.08
Overall 33 14 47 33 27.30 8.21 30.06
Note: * CV = Coefficient of Variation.

Further, Table 9 shows the CGD scores of public sector firms. It shows that public sector
firms are related to oil and gas, power, metal and capital goods sectors. The power sector
comprising three firms is found to have the highest level of CGD score of 27.33 as compared
to other sectors in this category. The government holdings in public sector firms range from
54.93% (Bharat Petroleum) to 90% (Coal India) among the sample firms of this study as the

22 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

government has now disinvested in many of the companies. The aggregate government
holdings for sample firms were 72.10%. Table 10 shows key statistics of CGD scores of public
sector firms.

Table 9: CGD Score of Public Sector Firms Across Various Sectors

S. Mean CGD
Public Sector Firms Sector CGD Score
No. Score of Sector
1. BHEL Capital Goods 24 24
2. ONGC Oil and Gas 31
3. IOC Oil and Gas 28
25.75
4. GAIL Oil and Gas 20
5. Bharat Petroleum Oil and Gas 24
6. NTPC Power 28
7. NHPC Power 29 27.33
8. Power Grid Power 25
9. Coal India Metal 24 24
Overall 25.89

Table 10: Public Sector Firms – Key Statistics of CGD Score

No. of
CGD Score Mean
S. Public Std. CV*
Sector CGD
No. Sector Deviation (%)
Min. Max. Range Score
Firms
1. Capital Goods 1 24 24 0 24 – –
2. Oil and Gas 4 20 31 11 25.75 4.79 18.60
3. Power 3 25 29 4 27.33 2.08 7.61
4. Metal 1 24 24 0 24 – –
Overall 9 20 31 11 25.89 3.37 13.01
Note: * CV = Coefficient of Variation.

Table 11 shows the CGD scores of foreign firms (MNC subsidiaries). It shows that foreign
firms are not present in consumer durables and power sector. It is evident that auto sector has
the lowest CGD score among all the sectors in this category. Also, most foreign firms are in
FMCG sector. Table 12 shows the key statistics of CGD scores of foreign firms.
Table 13 shows key statistics of CGD score across various sectors in this study, grouped
according to various type of ownership, i.e., foreign firms, private and public sector firms.

Hypothesis Testing
The explanatory variable used in the present research is various types of firm ownerships. The
study aims to find out if CGD scores of firms with different types of ownerships are significantly

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 23

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
 Table 11: CGD Score of Foreign Firms Across Various Sectors
MNC Parent Mean CGD
S. CGD
Foreign Firms Sector (Home Score of
No. Score
Country) Sector
1. Oracle Financial IT US 20 20

2. ABB Capital Goods Switzerland 22

25
3. Siemens Capital Goods Germany 28

4. Sterlite Metal UK 30 30

5. Maruti Suzuki Auto Japan 19

16
6. Cummins India Auto US 13

7. Cairn India Oil and Gas UK 30 30

8. Hindustan Unilever FMCG UK 33

9. Colgate-Palmolive FMCG US 15 21.33

10. Nestle FMCG Switzerland 16

11. GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals Healthcare UK 20

21
12. Ranbaxy Healthcare Japan 22

Overall 22.33

Table 12: Foreign Firms – Key Statistics of CGD Score

No. of CGD Score Mean

S. Std. CV*
Sector Foreign CGD
No. Min. Max. Range Deviation (%)
Firms Score
1. Capital Goods 2 22 28 6 25 4.24 16.97
2. Auto 2 13 19 6 16 4.24 26.52
3. FMCG 3 15 33 18 21.33 10.12 47.42
4. Healthcare 2 20 22 2 21 1.41 6.73
5. Oil and Gas 1 30 30 0 30 – –
6. Metal 1 30 30 0 30 – –
7. IT 1 20 20 0 20 – –
Overall 12 13 33 20 22.33 6.51 29.16
Note: * CV = Coefficient of Variation.

different. The results presented in Table 14 show that the significance value is greater than 0.05.
Therefore, at 5% level of significance, the null hypothesis of equality of means fails to be
rejected. Thus, there exists no significant difference among the average CGD scores of firms
across various ownership types, i.e., foreign firms, private sector and public sector firms.

24 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

 Table 13: Firms According to Various Sectors and Ownership – Key Statistics
of CGD Scores
Private Public CGD Score Mean CV*
S. Sector Foreign SD#
Sector Sector CGD (%)
No. Firms Min. Max. Range
Firms Firms Score
1. Capital Goods 2 3 1 21 31 10 24.83 3.87 15.59
2. Oil and Gas 1 1 4 20 34 14 27.83 5.08 18.25
3. Power – 3 3 25 30 5 28 1.79 6.39
4. Metal 1 4 1 17 35 18 26.33 7.12 27.04
5. Healthcare 2 4 – 14 40 26 23.83 8.68 36.42
6. FMCG 3 3 – 16 41 25 27.50 10.82 39.35
7. Auto 2 4 – 13 34 21 23.67 7.55 31.90
8. Consumer Durables – 6 – 15 26 11 19.67 4.59 23.34
9. IT 1 5 – 20 47 27 32 10.20 31.88
Overall (54) 12 33 9 13 47 34 25.96 7.44 28.66
Note: #
SD = Standard Deviation; and * CV = Coefficient of Variation.

Table 14: Results of ANOVA and the Kruskal-Wallis Test for Difference
Among Various Ownership Types
Components of Hypothesis F-Value Sig. Chi-Square Sig.
CGD scores of firms are not significantly 2.044 0.140 4.010 0.135
different across various types of ownership

Conclusion
The empirical evidence from this study enhances the understanding of the relationship between
ownership types and corporate governance and disclosure of firms listed on Indian stock
exchange. In this research, the corporate governance and disclosure practices of foreign firms,
private sector and public sector firms listed on S&P BSE sectoral indices were studied. Revised
Clause 49 of listing agreement has lessened the differences between foreign firms and private
sector firms. Similarly, public sector reforms have lessened the differences between the private
sector firms and public sector firms. Hence, a clear picture emerges from this study that in the
Indian context, there is no statistically significant difference in the CGD scores of firms across
various ownership types, such as foreign firms, private sector firms and public sector firms.o

References
1. Alpay G, Bodur M, Ener H and Talug C (2005), “Comparing Board-Level Governance at
MNEs and Local Firms: Lessons from Turkey”, Journal of International Management, Vol. 11,
No. 1, pp. 67-86.
2. Baek H Y, Johnson D R and Kim J W (2009), “Managerial Ownership, Corporate Governance,
and Voluntary Disclosure”, Journal of Business and Economic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 44-61.

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 25

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
 3. Bhasin M L and Reddy M (2010), “Corporate Governance Disclosure Practices: The Portrait
of a Developing Country”, International Journal of Business & Management, Vol. 5, No. 4,
pp. 150-167.
4. Bhattacharyya A K and Rao S V (2004), “Economic Impact of ‘Regulation on Corporate
Governance’: Evidence from India”, Working Paper No. 486.
5. Black B S and Khanna V S (2007), “Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firm
Market Values?: Event Study Evidence from India”, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 4,
No. 4, pp. 749-796.
6. Bouquet C and Birkinshaw J (2008), “Managing Power in Multinational Corporation: How
Low Power Actors Gain Influence”, Journal of Management, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 477-508.
7. Bushman R M, Piotroski J D and Smith A J (2004), “What Determines Corporate
Transparency?”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 207-252.
8. Bushman R M and Smith A J (2001), “Financial Accounting Information and Corporate
Governance”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 32, Nos. 1/3, pp. 237-333.
9. Cadbury A (1999), “What are the Trends in Corporate Governance? How Will They Impact
Your Company?”, Long Range Planning, Vol. 32, No. 1. pp. 12-19.
10. Chahine S and Filatochev I (2008), “The Effects of Information Disclosure and Board
Independence on IPO Discounts”, The Journal of Small Business Management, Vol. 46, No. 2,
pp. 219-241.
11. Choi F D S and Mueller G G (1996), International Accounting, 2nd Edition, Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice-Hall, NJ.
12. Crawford E P and Williams C C (2010), “Should Corporate Social Reporting be Voluntary
or Mandatory? Evidence from the Banking Sector in France and the United States”,
Corporate Governance, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 512-526.
13. Dharmapala D and Khanna V (2013), “Corporate Governance, Enforcement and Firm Value:
Evidence from India”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 29, No. 5,
pp. 1056-1084.
14. Durnev A, Errunza V and Molchanov A (2009), “Property Rights Protection, Corporate
Transparency and Growth”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 40, No. 9,
pp. 1533-1562.
15. Francis J, Khurana I and Pereira R (2005), “Disclosure Incentives and Effects of Cost of
Capital Around the World”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 1125-1162.
16. Glosten L R and Milgrom P R (1985), “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market
with Heterogeneously Informed Traders”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1,
pp. 71-100.
17. Guthrie J, Petty R and Ricceri F (2006), “The Voluntary Reporting of Intellectual Capital –
Comparing Evidence from Hong Kong and Australia”, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 7,
No. 2, pp. 254-271.

26 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

18. Ho L P, Tower G and Barako D (2008), “Improving Governance Leads to Improved
Corporate Communication”, Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 26-33.
19. Hope O K (2003), “Firm-Level Disclosures and the Relative Roles of Culture and Legal
Origin”, Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 14, No. 3,
pp. 218-248.
20. ICAI Research Committee Report (1985), “Trends in Published Account”, The Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India, New Delhi.
21. Jaggi B and Low P Y (2000), “Impact of Culture, Market Forces, and Legal System on
Financial Disclosures”, International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 495-519.
22. Jensen M C and Meckling W H (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency
Cost and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 305-360.
23. Joshi M, Ubha D S and Sidhu J (2012), “Intellectual Capital Disclosures by Indian and
Australian Information Technology Companies: A Comparative Analysis”, Journal of
Intellectual Capital, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 582-598.
24. Kamran A and Nicholls D (1994), “The Impact of Non-Financial Company Characteristics
on Mandatory Disclosure in Developing Countries: The Case of Bangladesh”, International
Journal of Accounting Education and Research, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 62-77.
25. Khanna V S (2008), “The Anatomy of Corporate Governance Reform in an Emerging
Market: The Case of India”, Working Paper.
26. Kiel G C, Hendry K and Nicholson G V (2006), “Corporate Governance Options for the Local
Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises”, Corporate Governance: An International Review,
Vol. 14, No. 6, pp. 568-576.
27. Kostova T and Roth K (2002), “Adoption of an Organizational Practice by Subsidiaries of
Multinational Corporations: Institutional and Relational Effects”, Academy of Management
Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 215-233.

28. Lev B (1992), “Information Disclosure Strategy”, California Management Review, Vol. 34,
No. 4, pp. 9-32.

29. Luo Y (2005), “Corporate Governance and Accountability in Multinational Enterprises:

Concepts and Agenda”, Journal of International Management, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-18.

30. Madhani P M (2007a), “Role of Voluntary Disclosure and Transparency in Financial

Reporting”, The Accounting World, Vol. 7, No. 6, pp. 63-66.

31. Madhani P M (2007b), “Corporate Governance from Compliance to Competitive

Advantage”, The Accounting World, Vol. 7, No. 8, pp. 26-31.

32. Madhani P M (2014a), “Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices in India: Domestic
Firms versus Cross-listed Firms”, The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. 13, No. 4,
pp. 24-51.

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 27

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
33. Madhani P M (2014b), “Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices of Indian Firms: An
Industry Perspective”, The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 27-41.

34. Madhani P M (2014c), “Corporate Governance Disclosure: Public Sector vs. Private Sector”,
SCMS Journal of Indian Management, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 5-20.
35. Madhani P M (2015a), “A Study on the Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices of
Tangible Assets Dominated and Intangible Assets Dominated Firms and Their Relationship”,
The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 7-29.
36. Madhani P M (2015b), “MNC Subsidiaries vs. Domestic Firms”, SCMS Journal of Indian
Management, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 5-24.
37. Madhani P M (2015c), “The Impact of Board Characteristics on Corporate Governance and
Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed in Indian Stock Exchange”, The IUP Journal of Corporate
Governance, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 14-46.
38. Madhani P M (2015d), “Study of Relationship Between Board Committees and Corporate
Governance Practices of Indian Firms”, Global Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 pp. 1-19.
39. Madhani P M (2015e), “Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices of MNC Subsidiaries
and Cross-Listed Firms: An Institutional Environment Perspective”, The IUP Journal of
Corporate Governance, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 48-71.
40. Majumdar S K (1998), “Assessing Comparative Efficiency of the State-Owned Mixed and
Private Sectors in Indian Industry”, Public Choice, Vol. 96, Nos. 1/2, pp. 1-24.
41. Mallin C (2002), “The Relationship Between Corporate Governance, Transparency and
Financial Disclosure”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 10, No. 4,
pp. 253-255.
42. McKinsey & Company (2002), “Global Investor Opinion Survey: Key Findings”, July,
pp. 1-14, New York.
43. Mitton T (2002), “A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East
Asian Financial Crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp. 215-241.
44. OECD (2006), “Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosures”,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Publications.
45. Pattnaik C and Gray S (2012), “Differences in Corporate Transparency Between MNC and
Domestic Corporations: Empirical Evidence from India”, Transparency and Governance in a
Global World, Vol. 13, pp. 173-196.
46. Rosenzweig P M and Singh J V (1991), “Organizational Environments and the Multinational
Enterprise”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 340-361.
47. Ryan C M and Ng C (2000), “Public Sector Corporate Governance Disclosures: An
Examination of Annual Reporting Practices in Queensland”, Australian Journal of Public
Administration, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 11-23.

28 The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. XV, No. 1, 2016

48. Sanan N (2011), “Corporate Governance in Public and Private Sector Enterprises: Evidence
from India”, The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 37-59.

49. Srinivasan P (2008), “Analysis of Factors Influencing Corporate Voluntary Disclosure

Practices”, in P M Madhani (Ed.), Corporate Disclosure: Concepts and Practices, The ICFAI
University Press, Hyderabad.

50. Steenkamp N and Northcott D (2007), “Content Analysis in Accounting Research: The
Practical Challenges”, Australian Accounting Review, Vol. 17, No. 43, pp. 12-25.

51. Subramanian S and Reddy V N (2012), “Corporate Governance Disclosures and

International Competitiveness: A Study of Indian Firms”, Asian Business and Management,
Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 195-218.

52. Tempel A, Edwards T, Ferner A et al. (2006), “Subsidiary Responses to Institutional Duality:
Collective Representation Practices of US Multinationals in Britain and Germany”, Human
Relations, Vol. 59, No. 11, pp. 1543-1570.

53. Volkmar J A (2003), “Context and Control in Foreign Subsidiaries: Making a Case for the
Host Country National Manager”, Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, Vol. 10,
No. 1, pp. 93-105.

54. Watts R L and Zimmerman J L (1978), “Toward a Positive Theory of the Determination of
Accounting Standards”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 112-134.
55. Westney D E (2005), “Institutional Theory and the Multinational Corporation”, in S Ghoshal
and D E Westney (Eds.), Organization Theory and the Multinational Corporation, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York.
56. Whittington G (1993), “Corporate Governance and the Regulation of Financial Reporting”,
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 311-319.
57. Williams C (2009), “Subsidiary-Level Determinants of Global Initiatives in Multinational
Corporations”, Journal of International Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 92-104.

Reference # 04J-2016-01-01-01

The Relationship Between Ownership Types and Corporate Governance 29

and Disclosure Practices of Firms Listed on Indian Stock Exchange
 Copyright of IUP Journal of Corporate Governance is the property of IUP Publications and its
content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email
articles for individual use.

View publication stats