UPSC MAINS – PHILOSOPHY – PAPER I

L 14 – Later Wittgenstein
1.0 Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein is often regarded as the greatest philosopher of the

20th century. In mid-20th-century analytic philosophy, he played a central,
albeit somewhat controversial, role. Across diverse topics such as logic and
language, ethics and religion, perception and intention, political thought,
and aesthetics and culture, he continues to influence current philosophical
thought. Furthermore, the multifarious nature of the project of interpreting
such topics is a central factor in investigating Wittgenstein’s works.
Therefore, certain difficulties in the ascertainment of his philosophical
substance and method are caused by this.

The early and the later stages were originally the two commonly recognized
stages of Wittgenstein’s thought. In their respective periods, both of these
were considered crucial. It is commonly acknowledged in this primitive two-
stage interpretation, that in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the early Wittgenstein is
epitomized. He provided new insights into the relations between the world, language, and thought by
showing the application of modern logic to metaphysics, via the medium of language, thereby,
extending the insight into the nature of philosophy.

The later Wittgenstein, is mostly recognized in the Philosophical Investigations. He took the more
revolutionary step by critiquing all of traditional philosophy and its climax including what appeared in
his own early work. Scholars heralded this nature of his new philosophy as anti-systematic. Yet, they
admit that it is still instrumental in a genuine philosophical understanding of traditional problems. This
division has been questioned though, in more recent scholarship. A certain unity between all stages of
his thought is claimed by some interpreters. While, a more nuanced division, is addressed by others
adding the middle Wittgenstein and the post-later Wittgenstein stages.

1.0 Critique of Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations

By 1930, Wittgenstein had unequivocally repudiated at least the truth-functional thesis of the three
main doctrines of the Tractatus - namely, the truth-functional thesis, the picture theory of
meaning, and the theory that all logical truths are tautologies. The desire to provide an
elaboration of the solidness of sense that was present in the seemingly vague sentences of ordinary
language motivated him. The truth-functional thesis proposed that, a sentence was analysable into
the basic propositions of which it was a logical product on any occasion when a sentence belonging to
ordinary language was meant and understood. A view of rules was implicit in it. When made explicit, it
can be viewed as the target of several of the themes about rules offered in the Philosophical
Investigations.

One of the most important insights of the Tractatus is the idea that philosophy should not be
approached dogmatically as is not a doctrine. Yet, his own early work is referred to as ‘dogmatic’
by Wittgenstein in his work, “On Dogmatism”. To designate any conception which permits a gap
between question and answer, in a way that there remains a possibility to find the answer to the
question at a later date, this term was used by Wittgenstein. On the assumption that discovering the
elementary propositions, whose form was not yet known, was the function of logical analysis formed
the complex edifice on which the Tractatus is built. The total rejection of dogmatism sums up the

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transition from early to later Wittgenstein. It is marked by the working out of all the consequences of
this rejection. This transition towards anti-dogmatism in its extreme is clearly visible in the shift from
the world of logic to that of the grammar of the ordinary language as the centre of the philosopher’s
attention, from systematic philosophical writing to an aphoristic style, and prominence given to
definition and analysis over ‘family resemblance’ and ‘language-games’. The working out of the
transitions comes to a culmination in the Philosophical Investigations.

Of the ways in which language is actually used by human beings, meaning and language altogether
are treated independently by the Tractatus. This dimension of language was believed to be of
paramount importance by Wittgenstein. He thought, the entire system of the Tractatus would collapse
without some account of it. Accordingly, he highlighted the connections between words and practical
human activities in his writings and teachings from 1930 on. He claimed that words are animated, or
given meanings, only by such activities.

1.1 Philosophical Investigations and its Critique

In 1953, Philosophical Investigations was published

posthumously. In its Preface, Wittgenstein states that one
would better understand his new thoughts by contrasting
them with and against the background of his old thoughts,
those mentioned in the Tractatus. And indeed,
questioning is primarily addressed in most of Part I of PI.
One can understand its new insights as essentially
exposing fallacies in the orthodox way of thinking about
language, intentionality, thought, truth, and philosophy. It
is conceived of as a therapeutic work, in this sense,
viewing philosophy itself as therapy. Focusing on
philosophical perception, psychology, and such was
different. In addressing specific philosophical issues, it
pointed to new perspectives, which are not disconnected
from the earlier critique. Therefore, it is more easily read
parallel to Wittgenstein’s other writings of the later period.

A quote from Augustine’s Confessions that says, “Give

us a particular picture of the essence of human
language,” marks the beginning of PI. It is based on the
idea that “objects are named by the words in language,”
and that “combinations of such names form sentences”.
As a basis for linguistic, epistemic or metaphysical
speculation, this picture of language cannot be relied
upon.

This reduction of language to representation cannot do justice to the whole of human language
despite its plausibility. And, even if one is to consider a picture of only the representative function of
human language, it is a poor picture. At the base of the whole of traditional philosophy lies this picture
of language. But, Wittgenstein recommends shunning it in favour of a new way of looking at both
philosophy and language. A new way of looking at language is offered by The Philosophical
Investigations. This new way will yield the view of philosophy as therapy.

2.0 Meaning as Use

For a large class, though not all, of the cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’ can be
explained in this way – “its use in the language denotes the meaning of a word”. The change of
perspective most typical of the later phase of Wittgenstein’s thought is underscored by this
fundamental statement. The heart of the investigation lies in the transition from a conception of
meaning as representation to a view which it looks to use. In the history of philosophy, traditional
theories of meaning were intent on pointing to something exterior to the proposition which provides it
sense. This ‘something’ could generally be located either inside the mind as a mental representation

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or in an objective space. Wittgenstein
challenged these conceptions. He claims
that “we should have to say that the life
of the sign was its use if we had to
name anything which it is”. However,
he does not give confirmation of the use
of a word or a proposition to any sort of
constructive theory building, as given in
the Tractatus. Rather, he proposes that
the philosopher, when investigating
meaning, must consider the variety of
uses to which the word is put. Light is
shed on the nature of words by using an
analogy with tools. When one thinks of
tools in a toolbox, one also sees their
variety. Similarly, the functions of words
are as varied as the functions of these
tools. One is misled by the uniform appearance of these words when it comes to theorizing upon
meaning.

Wittgenstein further explains that such consideration of the usage of words should be done on
a case to case basis, and not by generalizations. Any explanatory generalization should be
replaced by a description of use in the process of giving the meaning of a word. The traditional idea
that a proposition has a restricted number of Fregean forces (such as question, command, and
assertion) and that it has some content leads to a focus on the diversity of uses. Wittgenstein
introduces the key concept of ‘language-game’ in order to address their un-fixedness, the countless
multiplicity of uses, and their being part of an activity. He never explicitly defines it since this new
concept is made to function for a more diversified, more fluid, and more activity-oriented perspective
on language as opposed to the earlier ‘picture’. Hence, an old dogma, which misses the playful and
active character of language, is harkened by the requirement to define.

The general shift in the 20th century philosophy from logical positivism to pragmatism and
behaviourism is charted by Wittgenstein’s shift in thinking between the Tractatus and the
Investigations. It is a shift to seeing language as a fluid structure that is deeply connected to our
everyday practices and forms of life from seeing it as a fixed structure imposed upon the world.
Creating meaningful statements is not at all a simple matter of charting just the logical form of the
world for later Wittgenstein. It is a matter of the use of traditionally-defined terms in ‘language games’
that one participates in the course of everyday life. Wittgenstein claimed that in most cases, the use of
a word defines its meaning. In perhaps the most renowned passage in the Investigations, he states
that words are how one uses them.

For anyone who seeks to communicate clearly and effectively, Wittgenstein’s view of language as a
social practice is instructive. Communicators and writers are often advised to put the audience that
they are speaking to into consideration and thus craft their communiques accordingly. This point of
view is extended beyond linguistics into ethnography by Wittgenstein’s philosophy. One must listen to
how a social tribe plays with language in order to communicate effectively with it. Therefore, slang,
banter, and jokes are not to be considered poorly structured or ‘secondary’ forms of communication in
many cases. Rather, these should be acknowledged as a coded means of creating acute exchanges
within a community. A well-timed joke can thus, express an entire world-view.

Thus, there is practical value to Wittgenstein’s teaching. According to him, the conventional social
discourse within which it is employed is what gives a word meaning. One can hence avoid misusing
words and trying to make them mean things that they aren’t made to mean by attending to the
ordinary language contexts that give words their meaning. The more words are returned to their roots,
seeing them in terms of the contexts of the ordinary language that they work within, the easier it
becomes to simplify a language and comprehend what is really being said.

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3.0 Language Games and Family resemblance

To clarify his lines of thought

concerning language, Wittgenstein
consistently returns to the concept of
language-games throughout the
Philosophical Investigations. He
scrutinises primitive language-games
for the sake of insights they afford on
various characteristics of language.
The builders’ language-game, in
which precisely four terms - block,
pillar, slab, and beam – are used by
a builder and his assistant can be
taken as an example to illustrate the
correct part of the Augustinian picture
of language but which is strictly
limited since, in establishing meaning,
it ignores the essential role of action.
Usual language-games which include,
speculating about an event, forming
and testing a hypothesis, reporting an event, making up a story, reading it, singing catches, play-
acting, making a joke, guessing riddles, asking, translating, thanking, and so on, bring forth the
openness of possibilities in using and describing a language.

In Wittgenstein’s later linguistic philosophy, the concept of ‘family resemblance’ plays an important
element. It is introduced in order to clarify how one thinks about the meaning and sense of certain
words. The comparison to the concept of ‘family resemblance’ is used by Wittgenstein to show how a
word functions and is comprehended.

Firstly, language-games denote a part of a broader context termed by Wittgenstein as ‘a form of life’.
Secondly, the rule-governed character of language is pointed at by the concept of language-games. A
strict and definite system of rules for each and every language-game is not entailed by this, but the
conventional nature of this sort of human activity is rather pointed to. Still, one cannot find “what
makes all these activities into language or parts of language and what is common to them” just as one
cannot give an essential, final definition of ‘game’.

Wittgenstein’s rejection of definitions and general explanations which are based on sufficient and
necessary conditions in logic is best pronounced here. Instead of the philosopher’s craving for
generality and its symptoms, he subscribes to ‘family resemblance’ as the more fitting analogy for the
means of forming a network between particular uses of the same word. According to him, the
traditional and dogmatic outlook is unnecessary. He reasons that the essential core in which the
meaning of a word is located is a commonality for all uses of that word. Thus, one should instead
traverse with the word’s uses via “a complex network of overlapping and crisscrossing
similarities”. Family resemblance also exhibits the distance from exactness and the lack of
boundaries that distinguish different uses of the same concept. Such exactness and boundaries are
the decisive attributes of form—be it Aristotelian form, Platonic form, or the general form of a
hypothesis sketched in the Tractatus. Applications of concepts can be deduced, therefore, from such
forms. But, Wittgenstein, in his later works, forswears precisely this in favour of an appeal to the
similarity of a kind with family resemblance.

Consider this analogy offered by Wittgenstein - it is easy to see numerous similarities shared by the
members of a family. These members are not identical yet they share many common features. One
can agree that usually, there are many similarities between a father and son. Sometimes, the boy
may be somewhat similar to his sister in appearance and at the same time, may also have some of
his mother’s features. Words are allowed freedom from sharp boundaries in a similar fashion by
Wittgenstein’s analogy of family resemblances. According to him, the meaning of words must be at
least somewhat mobile since they are used in many ways. Thus, a word like ‘good’ is malleable to a

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degree and has many applications. A number of
slightly different meanings may be implied in it,
yet it will still clearly retain its essence at its core.
Therefore, just like the strength of a rope does
not lie in any one fibre but in the overlapping of
the many, the meaning or ‘essence’ of a word
lies in the overlapping of its similarities.
A possibility also exists that no feature is shared
by each individual within the family. Yet, the
existence of a visible family resemblance is still
not prevented. Similar to this concept,

Wittgenstein states that the various

resemblances between members of a family like
features, temperament, build, gait, colour of
eyes, etc. overlap and crisscross. This also
shows that games form a family. One can thus
evaluate that games such as chess, solitaire,
soccer, and skip rope are all very different yet
have certain similarities. In the context of The
Olympic Games, Wittgenstein argues that one
may not see a commonality to them all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of parallels
can still be drawn.

Wittgenstein thus stands that language is constantly at play. To the functioning of a language,
language games are intrinsic.

4.0 Rule-following and Private Language

The issue of rule-following is one of the most associated ones with the later Wittgenstein. It arises
from the considerations given above and becomes another central point of discussion in the factors
applicable to all the uses of a word. The notion that a rule is an abstract entity—transcending all of its
particular applications is held in the same dogmatic stance as before. The knowledge of the rule
involves grasping that abstract entity and thereby knowing how to use it.

Wittgenstein initiates his exposition by giving an example – consider a pupil who is asked to continue
a series (say ‘+ 2’) beyond 1000—and he/she writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. Although, what is to be
done and meant when the student, upon being corrected, insists that he did go on in the same way?
The cluster of attendant questions is further dismantled by Wittgenstein - How are rules learned? How
are they followed? Where are the standards, which decide if a rule is followed correctly, formulated?
Along with a mental representation of the rule, do they exist in the mind? Is intuition appealed to in
their application? Are they taught and enforced socially and publicly? Adhering to typical
Wittgensteinian fashion, the answers are not pursued positively. Rather, he puts to test the very
formulation of the questions as legitimate questions with coherent content. He reasons that it is both
the mentalistic and Platonistic pictures that necessitate asking questions of this type. Therefore, he is
also intent on freeing us from these assumptions. The removal of the need to postulate any sort of
internal or external authority beyond the actual applications of the rule is involved in such liberation.
These considerations are often taken as the culmination of the issue - “This is the paradox that
exists - no rule can determine a course of action, because every course of action can be made
according to the rule. The answer to this paradox is presented as - if everything can be made
according to the rule, then it can also be constructed in a way that it conflicts. Thus, neither
accord nor conflict can exist here.”

A wealth of interpretation and debate arise from Wittgenstein’s formulation of the problem, now at the
point of being a “paradox,” since this is the heart of the general issue of understanding and using a
language, and of meaning. Interpretation has been one of the influential readings of the problem of
following a rule (introduced by Fogelin 1976 and Kripke 1982). According to this interpretation,
Wittgenstein states a sceptical paradox and offers a sceptical solution. That is to say, there are no

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real grounds for saying that someone is indeed following a rule, no facts that determine what counts
as following a rule. By suggesting other conditions that might warrant our asserting that someone is
following a rule, Wittgenstein accepts this sceptical challenge. Though, several interpretations, such
as McGinn1984, Baker and Hacker 1984, and Cavell 1990 challenge this reading. Similarly, there are
others like Diamond, “Rules: Looking in the Right Place” in Phillips and Winch 1989, and several in
Miller and Wright 2002 who provide fresh, additional perspectives.

A direct analysis of the rule-following sections in PI leads to an easy upshot of the discussion. These
sections are called “the private-language argument” by interpreters. These sections point out that an
utterance must be possible in principle in order to subject it to public standards and criteria of
correctness for it to be meaningful. This is regardless of whether it is a veritable argument or not.
Therefore, a private-language, which relies on the principle that words are only supposed to refer to
the speaker’s knowledge and understanding of his immediate private sensations, is not a genuine,
rule-governed, meaningful, language. Thus, when there is a possibility of judging the correctness of
their use, only then the signs in language can function. So, the use of a word necessitates a
justification that is understandable to everyone.

4.1 Criticism of Private Language

What later commentators have dubbed ‘the private language argument’ has been laid out by Ludwig
Wittgenstein. A rough imagination of a case presented by Wittgenstein is as follows - Suppose a
person stranded on a deserted island has managed to bring along a diary. In order to keep himself
sane, one day he decides that whenever he experiences a certain sensation he shall begin recording
a symbol, ‘X’ for example, in his diary. He focuses his attention upon the sensation, and in doing so,
he tries to mentally pinpoint it, and marks ‘X’, whenever the sensation occurs. Wittgenstein concludes
that using a term to refer to a private mental state in this way is not possible. Thus, the concept of
private language cannot exist.

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An attempt to unseat the notion of private experience is made by the most-celebrated passages in
Philosophical Investigations. The basic idea that objects of thought cannot include elements that are
purely “private” to a single individual remains intact even if their interpretation is endlessly
controversial. This is because sensations are supposed to just “be”. For, there could be no distinction,
in what one says about one’s own thoughts, between being right and merely seeming to be right if
there were private objects of thought. Therefore, objects of thought must be essentially checkable,
public items about which, in principle, one can converse with others.

4.2 Grounds for Criticism of Private Language

I. Criteria for Correctness

Briefly stated, Wittgenstein’s primary concern is that “The speaker has no criterion of correctness
in the present case. Whatever is going to seem right to him/her is right. And that blurs the
definitions of what is ‘right’.” In other words, there would be no criteria for determining when ‘X’ is
used correctly, and when it is not in our desert island case. Two questions are now presented.
1. Why must there be some ‘criterion for correctness’ in order for a sign to be meaningful?
2. Why think that there are no such criteria in our desert island scenario?

The first claim seems very plausible since it is concerned with the notion that one must be able to
apply a word correctly or incorrectly for it to be meaningful. It would seem that the word had no
meaning if it were the case that, no matter how one used a word, one could never use it incorrectly.
For, suppose one is asked one’s meaning of a word, any answer that is given would be arbitrary. One
could just as easily and correctly choose some answer that suits one’s ‘private’ context. So, it is
understood that there must be some criteria of correctness for a word to be assumed as meaningful.
How can then the content of one’s words and their correctness conditions be determined? Several
possibilities exist.

A natural starting place, which is also thoroughly investigated by Wittgenstein, is the concept of a rule.
Suppose that learning a rule which governs the use of a word is required for learning that word. The
rule might demand to ‘use ‘X’ in only some specific situations, or to use ‘X’ to apply to only some
specific objects’. So, the rules that one learns when learning the various expressions in a language
are perhaps what provides the conditions of correctness for one’s words.

There still exists some trouble with this approach. The question is pushed back a step. As noted by
Scott Soames, the problem is that there are already words or symbols which must be understood if
the rules are to be of any use as they make up such rules. It is obvious that this kind of explanation
cannot go on forever. One needs to know what the rule means in order to know how to follow a rule.
The meaning of a rule is not carried on its face; it needs interpretation. But more and more rules are
needed to be invoked in order to do this. On account of the pain of infinite regress, it would then seem
that internalized rules cannot play the role of criteria of correctness.

Another query arises as to why not say that the man in the parable can appeal to his belief? In order
to determine that he is using ‘X’ correctly, he can claim that he is presently experiencing the same
sensation that he had when he originally marked ‘X’ in his diary. Why can the intentions or beliefs of a
speaker not determine when he/she is using an expression correctly and when he/she is not? The
trouble is that, just like rules, intentions, beliefs, and other contextual mental states must get their
content from somewhere. So, one runs into the same old problem of regression that tormented
appealing to internalized rules.

II. Wittgenstein’s Externalism

The fact that explanations of intentional phenomena need to bottom out in something non-intentional
seems to be the upshot. Rules, beliefs, or intentions can’t be used in order to explain meaning as per
the content/correctness conditions unless one is willing to explain the meaning of one’s rules, beliefs,
or intentions in terms of yet further rules. Wittgenstein recognises this fact and thus turns to factors
external to the speaker’s head in order to ground content. More specifically, he proposes that one
needs to appeal to the customs and practices of one’s linguistic community. In other words, the

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pattern of a word’s use in a speaker’s linguistic community determines the meaning of a given word
for a speaker of that language. This also determines that when a speaker’s use of a word is in
deviation with this pattern, he/she has used the word incorrectly.

Wittgenstein thus thinks that there can be no meaningful private language. What would be the criteria
governing whether one used a term correctly or not if one wanted to use the term to refer to some
private mental state? Since the state is private, there would be no public criteria, yet all internal
criteria are already ruled out. So, it would be impossible to determine when one used a term correctly
and when one did not. Therefore, the term would prove to be meaningless.

III. A Worry

Thus, Wittgenstein’s “community” view is incompatible with private language as it locates the
determinants of content in the patterns of agreement in one’s linguistic community. There still
lies a worry for this view. Suppose that everyone agrees to name a certain shiny yellow metal as gold.
Yet, they could be proven wrong. It could actually be “fool’s gold”. Thus, when the word ‘gold’ is used
to refer to this metal, a mistake has been inadvertently made. The term is not applicable in this case,
despite everyone thinking that it is. That there is something inherently problematic with the community
view is now seemingly apparent. This consideration might open the door to private-language after all.