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    A Case for Dualism and Interaction Howard D. Roelofs Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 15, No. 4. (Jun., 1955), pp. 451-476. Stable URL http: flinksjstor-org/sici%sici= 131-8205% 28195506%291S%3A4%3C45 1%3AACEDAL®3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at bhupulwww.jstororg/about/terms.hunl. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of « journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial us. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at bhtpuwww jstor-org/journals/ips hum Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission, JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to ereating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org, bhupslvwwjstororg/ Sat Oct 14 17:50:28 2006 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH A Quarterly Journal Vouume XV, No. 4 Jone 1955 A CASE FOR DUALISM AND INTERACTION T have called this essay “a case” for Dualism and Interaction, rather ‘than “‘the case” because in two senses that is all it is. First, the evidence here given is not all that might be offered. Second, and this is the more important, I do not regard my presentation as conclusive. So far as I have been able to discover, a conclusive demonstration of dualism and interac- tion as the solution of the mind-body problem is not to be had; and in the final section of this essay I shall offer a criticism of the position which, on ‘the basis of our present knowledge, I nonetheless accept and maintain. How all this comes about will, trust, be made clear and convincing by the essay itself. 1: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS Dualism and Interaction name a theory, a theory with rivals. In modern philosophy these rivals are conventionally two, Naturalism and Idealism. ‘There is also the position which holds that the mind-body problem is not ‘a genuine but only a pseudo-problem, and this might be called another rival theory in addition to those I have named. In any case, however, I do not propose to state and then criticize these rivals, whether they be two, three, ‘or more, but I count upon the knowledge commonly available of all these theories to provide a setting for my exposition and substantiation of ‘Dualism and Interaction. The common subject for which these theories offer ‘their diverse interpretations is the unsolved puztle of ourselves, the essential nature of man. What in man evokes and sustains these rivals is that man displays a prima facie duality in a unity. Each of us is a body; each of us is ‘8 mind; and each of us in being body and mind is not two but one. This dualism in a unity is the primary datum which all of us, regardless of which theory about man we profess, recognize and accept. Since my own position is labelled Dualism, it might be suspected that I am trying to win an initial advantage by this description. Dualism is what we start with, I may seem to be saying, and if anything else is asserted, the burden of proof is on those who diverge from Duslism. But Imake nosuch claim. It is precisely because I do not wish to capitalize on this prima facie dualism, that I begin by call- ing attention to it. It is important that this initial dualism be recognized and accepted for what it is, no more, but also no less. I have sought dili- gently for a statement of that dualism which, as a statement, would bo at ‘once precise and yet without prejudice to any of the rival theories. “Mind 451 452 Pamosoray AND PHeNoMENOLOGICAL RESHARCH your head” is the result of that search. It is the conventional warning in English buses and trams. In its three words the duality and the unity of man are neatly and correctly indicated. To each of us comes this admonition: mind—your—head. The body of a man is definitely different, from his mind, his mind from his body, both are his, and he is not two, but just himself, one. He is to mind his head. Only as we recognize and accept, the genuine reality of the mind and the equally genuine but different reality of the body, do all the theories have a subject matter. Only as we recognize and accept the genuine unity of these different realities do these theories have a common problem. That goes for all three theories. I am prepared to consider diverse solutions, including my own, but they must be solutions, not dissolutions. A theory which dissolves the mind in the body so that T am body, but not really mind; a theory which dissolves the body in the mind so that Tam mind, but not really body; a theory which dissolves my ‘oneness s0 that I am body and mind, but not really one—any such theory, no matter how neat and nice, is simply not about me. Perhaps I am in- soluble. That remains to be seen. But itis better to be insoluble than to be dissolved. That is my first preliminary consideration My second preliminary consideration derives from the peculiar status of the rival theories. A persistent problem is the normal focus for a group of rival theories. But in this case the solutions in all their diversity seem to be as stable as the problem. It seems to be accepted that Naturalism, Idealism, and Dualism together exhaust the field of contenders for the answer to the problem of the unity in duality of man’s nature; and at present these three seem also to have exhausted each other. It is this situa- tion which makes some people think the affair is a bogus problem on which no further energy should be wasted. Others incline to the view that this stalemate is waiting for the discovery of new facts which, when obtained, ‘will of themselves establish a definite solution to our problem. I can find no evidence to support that hope. Some people, indeed, are excited by the discovery that when a man thinks, variations in electric current occur in his brain. But such discoveries are like the earlier one, that when a man thinks, even though he does not speak, there are muscular activities in or near his throat. These discoveries add nothing to our understanding of the mind-body problem, they merely illustrate it. In any ease, I, myself, have no new facts to report, facts discovered by recent, original research. I do have something significant to say. If I can say it properiy, it will be sufi- cient to restore to Dualism and Interaction the scientific respectability and philosophic integrity they merit. If I make no converts, I may in- vigorate the faint-hearted. Yet what I have to say will not be conclusive. Were I an Idealist or a Naturalist, I would be, mulatis mudandis, in the same case. Hence in arguing for Dualism, or for either of its rivals, there A Case ror Duauisa axp Interaction 453 should be no evasion of this specific question: How is it that these diverse ‘theories about « common problem continue to be significant yet inclusive? In particular, as an exponent of Dualism, I accept responsibility for indi- cating some of its deficiencies. Finally I have some remarks to make about language. A rose, we are told, by any other name would smell as sweet. I agree that s0 it would. ‘Yet when for some time roses have been called by that name, and noses by this other name, to say of my love that she is like a red, red nose, misleads people no matter how sweet she in fact is. It misleads even philosophers, for they, too, are swayed by the connotation of terms. This cannot be climinated; but a stiff warning given at the right time can reduce the evil consequences. A stiff warning is needed here. ‘The conventional name of each of the three rival theories carries a misleading connotation. ‘The connotation of Interaction is that two or more things of the same order ‘of being mutually operated on each other with the same mode of action. Hence to speak of the interaction of mind and body suggests that both have the same kind of being, and that they push and shove each other around. This is hardly the appropriate connotation for the theory which affirms mind and body to be substantially diverse, and the mode of their ‘mutual influence on each other to be proper to that diversity. The connota- tion is not appropriate, but it is in its way benevolent: Interaction as a name means well. But the connotations of Idealism and Naturalism are malignant. To conjoin by suggestion devotion to the good with disparage- ‘ment of the reality of the body, as often happens when the word “Idealism” is used, is an unwarranted insult to both. Worst of all is the name ‘Naturalism, Naturalism in our present context names one theory among. others about a common set of factual data. Yet as a name, Naturalism carries the connotation of being in accord with nature and holding fast to empirical data, sticking to the facts. Whatever is contrary to Naturalism. is by this connotation imputed to be contrary to nature, unempirical, at ‘odds with the facts, hostile to science, and addicted to the supernatural ‘The result is considerable confusion, and one and only one thing is clear. ‘Naturalism with that connotation is a question-begging epithet. We can not have a fruitful discussion of man’s essential nature unless right from the start we recognize and accept without qualification that Idealism, ‘Dualism, and Naturalism are equally theories and in the same sense. Each is an interpretation of data. “Empirical” means attending to and using what can be observed. “Nature” has a number of meanings, each proper in its own context, and none of these is invidious. “Nature” may properly mean the kind of being which members of a species have in common. Tt may also mean collectively the entire realm of worldly existence, with man either specifically excluded or included. This last may involve a difference 454 Pamosorny anp PamNomENotocicat, RESEARCH not merely of usage but of doctrine. But as regards the three theories here considered, no one has a monopoly of observation, or any pre-eminent claim to being natural or empirical. The intent of Idealism is surely to prosent ‘an account of man which will be true of his nature and of the facts of his activity. The intent of Naturalism is surely to achieve a rational inter- pretation of the data of human experience, What is said of each could be ‘said of the other, and also of Dualism. In terms of their intentional meaning ‘Naturalism, Idealism, and Dualism are established terms, each with a distinctive reference. Each has a connotation also which is proper and legitimate, But when innuendos are made along the line of being scientific, miraculous, empirical, supernatural, and so on, each of these theories can and should claim its rightful status as a theory—a sustained, deliberate endeavor to interpret adequately and significantly the data’ commonly available to all of them, and each should disdain the use of question-begging epithets and disparaging adjectives. ‘That is their status. Performance is another matter. That is what I am now to attempt—performance. ‘There judgment comes after the event and always has a specific reference. By this time we are all familiar with the word Semantics. Let us heed one thing it, bas to tell us—the warning against being beguiled by words. Having been warned, we should be ready and able to use words with a fair degree of precision and clarity. This is my third and final preliminary consideration. 1: DUALS ‘When one refers to the naive, the ordinary, the common-sense view of man, this may be done either in the way of disparagement or praise. The praise seems to spring from the curious notion that ideas are more likely to be correct when they are formed before much attention has been given to them; the disparagement seems to spring from the opposite but equally curious notion that knowledge obtained at first glance and without reflec- tion must be wrong. Depending on which alternative is taken, advocates of philosophic theories like to stress on behalf of their chosen theory either ite basic agreement with common-sense or its essential divergence. I shall do neither of these things on behalf of Duslism, For the virtue of common sense is neither its correctness nor its error, but that itis the source of data unbiased by interest in a theory. Common-sense may be mistaken or correct, it may have prejudices; but it is, as regards philosophic theories, disinter- cated. This is not because common-sense has no theories, in fact it uses ‘many, but because it is not aware of them. Hence each use, ench interpreta- tion of experience, is ad hoc, made or seized upon for the occasion. As a result of this, Dualism, Idealism, Naturalism can each go to common-sense for support and find it. Common-sense dualism is readily ilustrated. Why did Epicurus, the Hedonist, take such pains to prove that death ends all? A Case ror Duatisst ap Inreracrton 455 Because of the wide-spread notion that man is in this life a union of body and soul, that these realities are not only distinet but separable, and that therefore one, the soul, may continue to live after the death of the other, the body. Among what people was this notion prevalent? They were neither savages nor Christians. They were pagan Greeks, common-sense dualists. T do not offer this as evidence in support of Dualism. But if either Tealism or Naturalism ventures to deny that common-sense is on occasion dualistic, they must then reckon with those Greeks. For myself, I shall make no further reference to common-sense as regards argument, but I shall, as need arises, use it as a source of raw material. ‘The dualism of common-sense is opportunist and ad hoc. The Duslism I represent is a deliberately fashioned theory about the essential nature of ‘man. It asserts that man is best understood as a unity of at least two diverse natures, commonly denoted as matter and mind, body and soul, body and spirit. I say at least two, because the diversity which requires the rejection of ontological monism seoms at times to be inadequately interpreted by a simple dualism. That is one reason why, in stating Dualism, the name for ‘one component is more constant in meaning and less variable in word than is the case with the other. There is, of course, a variation in the terms ‘matter’ and ‘body,’ and it is possible that some Naturalists prefer the term ‘energy’ to name the basic reality from which, as they believe, man and all else have come to be. But these terms, although not synonyms, belong to a group expressive of one kind of being. The variation expressed in the terms mind, soul and spirit rests upon less definite distinctions and may involve basic differences of being.* For the purpose of this essay, however, T consider only a dualism, using the terms mind and soul indifferently to name one component, matter and body the other. I shall contend that the basis and the justification ‘of Dualism is the knowledge of nature and of man provided by science, philosophy, and ordinary experience. I do not resort to Dualism in order to defend a primitive animism or a traditional religion against the destructive implications of science. On the contrary itis in large measure what science tells us which requires a dualistic theory for adequate interpretation. Before I proceed further, however, @ prevalent disposition to misread evidence in this area needs to be noted, explained, and, if possible, eor- rected. There is in both common sense and science a notable imbalance in the quantitative distribution of our knowledge as regards the kinds of ob- jects known. We know far more bodies than we do minds, and we know far ‘more about these bodies than about the minds. Quantity all too frequently In an essay published some years ago, Louis T, Moore argued persuasively for ‘three distinet and irreducible forms of being: Three Realms of Knowledge, The Hibbert Journal, Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 27-20. 456 Purosoriy aND PHRNoMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH overwhelms us, and the sheer bulk of our knowledge of matter is at times too much for us. We then forget that we know anything at all of minds, or ‘we succumb to the suggestion that, because that knowledge is little, the thing known is unimportant, a mere appendage of bodies. ‘The corrective for such errors is just that firm, direct attention which sees that they are errors, for they arise not from formal mistakes in reasoning but from unchecked and unexamined promptings of many sorts and sources. Standard usage gives to the words matter and body a fairly constant, common reference, and at the same time differentiates them. ‘Matter’ names in a generic sense that of which all bodies are composed, and ‘body’ ‘names the particular forms in which matter is organized. Hence we rarely tuse the plural form of ‘matter,’ at least in a material sense, while we often ‘use the plural form ‘bodies.’ Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geology, and 120 on, Physiology and Zoology, unite in giving knowledge of matter and of bodies. These sciences are diverse, they also are in part the same. For what, ‘one science tells, another science accepts and uses to the extent that the subject matter of the one reappears in the subject matter of the other. ‘And what is present in all is matter and bodies. I am not a scientist, that is, ‘Tam not a physicist, nor a chemist. But I have listened attentively to what the sciences say. In what follows I aim to be an accurate reporter as well ‘a8 & competent theorist. If I fall into error, I shall weleome and readily ‘accept authentic correction. There is no suggestion of scepticism or suspicion in this; my position is that what science tells us about bodies and matter is true, Finally, what I have to report holds for matter and bodies whether matter is taken to be atoms or energy. ‘Our knowledge of matter and bodies includes on the positive side these essentials: (1) Being in space: The description of a body properly includes its posi tion. This is generally accepted, but in microscopic physics a limiting condi- tion is encountered. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells us that for certain particles, notably electrons, we cannot know both their position and ‘their motion. Any method used to determine the one, excludes learning the other. It is then argued by strict adherents of the operational theory of ‘meaning that those particles for the determination of whose position there is no available procedure, have in consequence no position at all. They are in fact nowhere. A dialectical reply is to ask for the operation which deter- mines that, ie., their being nowhere. It is also appropriate to repeat the tart comment of a physicist of a different persuasion, “God knows what Bridgman can’t discover.” In any case these niceties of theory do not ‘establish the sundering of any body from space. The alleged place-less particles have momentum, and that involves reference to space. The original statement stands: in the description of a body, reference to space is es- sentially relevant. A Case ror Duatisa aN IvreRaction 457 (2) Quantitative determination: Whether we are dealing with bodies, matter, or energy, quantity is an essential aspect of being and of activity. Units of measure may be arbitrary, but measurement is not, for it is the nature of matter to be “so much,” of energy to do “this much.” (3) Causal relations are quantitatively stated in equations. The use of the idea of causality may be objected to, but the crucial term is not ‘causal’ but ‘equation.’ Personally T am convinced that scientists use causality whatever they may say, but in any case, they describe activities in terms of quantities and relate them in equations. ‘The activity of bodies—or of energy—in a limited region is formulated in an equation. Within local systems changes, displacements, transformations are balanced out as losses here, gains there: the reduction of gasoline in the fuel tank is equated with motion of the ear, heat, and so on. When a rise of energy is noted in a local system as a whole, an outside source is sought; when a loss is noted, escape to the outside is traced. Tt is frequently difficult to establish the specific ‘equation for a particular situation, and there are doubts as to whether the law of the conservation of energy applies to the totality of local systems, if there is such a totality. But these practical difficulties and ultimate doubts do not concer us here. ‘The essential point. is that as regards ordinary, determinable interactions, for a gain here, there must be a loss there, for & loss, a gain. In the language of philosophy and common sense, causation cfficient and requires a transfer of energy; and the transfers balance out in losses and gains. (4) The unity of a body is the organization of parts in space. This type of unity leaves the parts external to each other. Hence the common type of change in a body is change in size. When additional matter is brought within the spatial organization of a body, that body gets bigger; when some part is removed from the spatial organization, the body gets smaller. It is this which enable us to cut a body, as we say, in two, and get fuxo bodies, each of which is as definitely a body as the original. Cutting in two a body which inalso an organism may destroy the organism. But there are still two bodies. Af there is an ultimate, literal atom, an uncutable one, itsunity eannot be the “organization of parts in space, for the hypothesis is that this literal atom hhas no parts, Are we to say, then, that itis a unit but has no unity? Atomic fission may yield a transformation of matter into energy and instead of an increase in the number of bodies, there is not even one. But after we have recognized and considered these peculiar cases, actual or imaginary, the original statement about the unity of bodies still holds for all others, and these are both the typical and the most numerous. It is more pertinent to point out that the structure or power which maintains the unity of ordinary material bodies is not fully understood. Even s0, the unity which is main- tained is correctly described as the organization of parts in space. (6) Identity is identity of sameness. As often as I have had the real op- 458 Pamosorny aNp PueNoMENoLogicat RESEARCH portunity, that is, as often as I have found a scientist who was at once eminent, able to understand my question, and willing to hear and to answer, Thave asked this question: If it were possible to identify a specific electron, found when it was relatively by itself, and then to identify it again, after it had entered into many and varied combinations and from these returned again to being relatively by itself, what would its condition be? Invariably ‘he answer is this: that electron would be precisely what it had been when first identified. To my question there is an objection of the type already encountered, because no operation can be specified for performing the hypothetical identification, the question is meaningless. But even from those who thus object, I readily obtain agreement that for any electron—or proton or neutron—it is irrelevant to speak of its having profited by the ‘experience’ of belonging to this organization or to that. If an electron, then just an electron, no more and no les. Tn addition to these five positive statements, there are some truths about matter and bodies which are properly presented in negative form. T shall indicate these by lettors. (8) Matter is indifferent to Time. Strictly, matter and bodies have no history; this present body may be a product of changes in the past, changes in bodies, but the past is not incorporated in the present body: the body is ‘composed of parts and the past is not a part, We use time to determine certain aspects of bodies, eg., velocity. But before and after have no dis- tinctive meaning for bodies; in fact, they are interchangeable, since all ‘equations can be read in both directions, and all changes are in principle reversible. (b) Matter is inert and so are bodies. Quick denials of this are usually withdrawn upon reflection. For to say that matter is inert is not to deny mo- tion or energy. It is to deny that any bit of matter, any body, ever of itself does anything different. “Every body continues in ite stato of rest or motion ina right line unless acted upon by an external force.” The key word in this classic formula is “external.” Modern physics offers, as near as I can dis- cover, only apparent, not genuine, exceptions. There is a change not made by external forees: bodies left to themselves can lose energy. But there is 8 limit even to this: there must be inequality of distribution, The grim picture of a universe dead because its energy is evently distributed is familiar to ‘usall. I think it is justified to call energy itself inert. (© Matter and bodies of themselves never act for the sake of an end. Final causation has no residence in matter. This has been said so often and with such emphasis by science that it should by now be understood and not, questioned. But today there are those who do not like the result. There is, for example, Professor Gotshalk. He first affirms what I have just said, that the findings of the natural sciences eliminate teleology. He then says A Case ror Duatisi ano Interaction 459 this is a pity, because it is so depressing. Finally, as a remedy for the de- pression he proposes that teleology be re-established in things. How is this to be done? By discovering that bodies actually do things on purpose? Certainty not, for they don’t. But specific bodies in motion have a “specific matter-of-fact directionality”—and this he proposes to “call their telic factor.”* ‘Bodies in motion now have a new name. Call their direction in motion their ‘telic’ factor if you please, but they still do not do things on purpose. To these eight truths about matter and bodies, others could be easily added, and some substitutions or subtractions could be made without serious loss. For I have aimed not at a complete account, not at a formally perfect definition, but at an account which is representative of our present knowledge of the essential nature of matter and of bodies. In this I think Thave succeeded. We now have before us a fair sample of the truth about ‘what matter and bodies essentially are. Matter and bodies, however, are not themselves before us; a part of the truth about them is. That is the point. Those statements are knowledge. For the moment let us not consider the source of this knowledge, but rather what can be said of it now that we have it. Can we say of knowledge what was said of matter? Matter has spatial position. Has knowledge? No; mnowledge has no spatial position. This is true not secundum quid but simpliciter. We do not fail in assigning a position in space to knowledge because of any breakdown or defect in our methods for locating it; we never fail to spot knowledge correctly in one place because it, has just left for another place. It is even misleading to say knowledge is nowhere. The only correct and proper thing to say in this context is that spatial position isnot relevant to knowledge. Knowledge exists, but not in space. Books, of course, do have spatial position. Books are bodies. But while in a figure of speech wo say books are full of knowledge, strictly books qua bodies neither are knowledge nor contain it. When a book drops from the table to the floor, knowledge does not suffer a bad fall; when some one gets knowledge from a book, he does not move the knowledge from one place to another; no one examining a book returned by a friend exclaims, ‘the rascal, he has taken away some of the knowledge from my book—I wonder where he has put it?” Knowledge is not in space. ‘That is a negative characterization. A positive characterization of ‘Knowledge is that itis true or false. Those who shy at saying of knowledge that itis false, can substitute the term misknowledge. Or I can use a cit- cumlocution and say, judgments taken distributively are true or false, and *Gotahalk: “A Suggestion for Naturalists,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLV No.1, Jan. 1948, pp. 5-12. 460 PuILosoPHy AND PHRNoMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH true judgments taken collectively constitute knowledge. In any ease, true ‘and false are in this context significant terms. But true and false are never properly applied to bodies. A body has position, energy and s0 on, but is neither true nor false. Nor is any attribute, activity, or relation of a body truo or false. True and false are as irrelevant to bodies as spatial position is to knowledge. The conclusion is really a pearl of the pellucid: Knowledge isnot body, not an attribute, nor an activity, nor a relation of body. Knowi- edge is, inter aia, of, that is, about bodies, but their modes of existence are disparate, ‘To establish this conclusion I have given an argument. It can be sum- ‘marized in two syllogisms, both in the second figure, Camestres. But some may distrust argument, preferring to put their confidence in experiments. Such persons ean be accommodated. Let a storeroom be stored with bodies, of any and every sort that ean be found. For completeness let there be a man in the store room reading book, and let there be a sign above him with this legend in gold, “Science is Knowledge.” Now let scientists be equipped with every instrument of investigation, the largest telescope, the most powerful microscope, the most potent cyclotron, the fastest centrifuge, and if there be any other instruments, let them be added. Thus equipped, the scientists are given these instructions: Describe every body in the store room in the terms proper to your science and in no others. Who then will discover there is knowledge in the room? And one or more should, if knowledge is a body or an attribute, relation, or activity of bodies. Who will describe as true, the legend in gold, “Science is Knowledge?” Will it be the Physicist? No. The Chemist? No. The Geologist? No. ‘Who, then, if anyone? This experiment has, in effect, been dono and the ‘outcome is conclusive. One scientist, knowing what it was all about, includ- ing the fact that in the room there was a man reading a book, a man in the very act of getting knowledge, went right to work on that man. This scientist was a Behaviorist Psychologist. What did he describe? A behavior pattern. And he claimed the prize, for there was a prize, for having de- scribed knowledge in bodily terms. But he did not got the prize. His de- scription was excellent, precise, quantitative, and 90 on. Tts defect. was that it was @ description of a body’s behavior. Of course it was. And he asserted the behavior was knowledge. But when he was asked for evidence, he could give none. He could only shout, ‘but I know it is knowledge,’ and when he shouted very loud, he was removed to have his behavior studied by another Psychologist of the same persuasion. He was judged to be suffering from an oceupational disease called relapsus introspectionis. But not even the Behaviorist read the sign. ‘The Physicist described its golden litter; the Chemist discovered that in this case, what glittered was gold; the botanist found traces of fossil plants in the gold leaf; but no scientist A Case ror Duauism ano Inreraction 461 read the legend, let alone described it as true. Each was exclusively intent, on deseribing bodies. ‘We now have an important question on our hands. If knowledge does not ‘exist in the realm of matter, what is its mode of being? Is it a natural object ‘with independent existence? I have no desire to seem coy, and the answer, of course, is that minds produce knowledge and possess it. There is no ‘question about that. But there is a question about minds. Are they bodies? r if not bodies, are they attributes, relations, results, activities of bodies? ‘As regards knowledge, minds both get it and communieate it. In both cases minds are active. What happens when a mind knows something, let it be a body? What most concems us is that when a mind knows a body, no al- ‘eration results in the body that is known. It was Woodbridge, if ‘my memory is correct, who stated this point with perfect precision. Empiti- cal investigation discloses that just as it is the nature of digestion to alter what it digests, so it is the nature of knowing to leave unaltered what it ‘knows. The facts are clear, and as stated. Personally, I ean find no excuse for the confusion which is offered as a denial of the plain facts. Certainly in order to enable me to know a body, I often manipulate the body, but the manipulation is not the knowing: I turn a coin over to learn its date; the turning over alters the spatial situation of the body; the learning the date ‘qua learning does not alter the date on the coin. A good thing, too, that it does not; for altering the date of a coin is a crime. Again, itis certainly the case that physical action, altering the body known, often occurs as the result of the knowing; but again it is not the knowing which alters the body, but the action of another sort, which is consequent to the knowing. I look ‘at aman and know him to be the man whose face I dislike; I then hit him and alter his face. But itis the blow of my fist which alters his face, not my knowing it. In fact, after it has been altered, a further cognition may occur; now like it even less, and I decide to leave a bad job alone. Knowing is an activity, it can be directed on bodies, yet it leaves them as they are. ‘The case of communication is equally distinctive. We who are teachers are expected to communicate knowledge to our students. They gain. What, happens to us? We get tired, for we lose energy in the process; teaching is work. But what happens to our knowledge? Do we lose knowledge in pro- portion to what we communicate? We certainly do not. We increase our own knowledge in the process of giving some of it to others. In the interaction of bodies, energy is, at most, conserved. In the interaction of minds, knowl- edge is increased. Matter and mind are essentially disparate in their modes, of being and of action. listed eight essential characteristics of matter, and with reference to the first and the third, I have presented evidence showing that what matter is, mind is not. I shall now more briefly indicate the results when bodies and 462 Pumosoray aNd PamvomzNotoaical, Reskancn minds are compared with reference to the remaining six characteristic: As I do this, I urge my readers not to attend merely to what I say, but ¢ allow it to lead them to examine what they already know, and to mak comparisons and to draw conclusions for themselves. Consider quantitative determination, We regularly measure bodier ‘What about minds? Do we know the length, breadth, depth of any mind Tits weight or mass? Its velocity? Those are standard quantitative deter minations of bodies. If the mind were also a body, at least one of thes. dimensions would pertain to it. But none does. The phrase ‘mental meas ‘urements’ is, as I well know, in common use, and a person's 1.Q. is statec in figures. But it is also regularly admitted by Paychologists that in nc ‘caso do these numbers represent: direct measurement of the mind or of in telligence. A man ean learn to count his ideas, and others can count the results of his mind’s activity, his wrong answers to their questions, fot example. The electric current in hie brain can be measured when he thinks. ‘But the mind iteelf is never counted or measured. It has no parts, it has ne extent or mass, The category of quantity is simply not appropriate to mind. ‘The unity of a body is organization of parts in space. A mind is not in ‘space, has no parts, and its unity is not organization of parts in space. Does any one really doubt that? Let him try cutting a mind in two. Or let him try to take one part from one mind, another from another, another from another and then try to compose a new mind by putting these parts into spatial adjacency to each other. If the parts fail to stick, can heat be ap- plied until the parts become sufficiently fluid to low together? Is that sort of process the basis for saying of a man that he has a fluid mind? Finally, the identity of the individual mind is not identity of sameness, but identity persisting through constant change. Every experience changes the mind ‘which has it, yet the mind continues to be identically one and itself. ‘Thus far, starting with positive characteristies of bodies, emphasis has been on what minds are not. The complementary contrast is obtained when ‘we start with what bodies are not. They are indifferent to time. But minds live in time, incorporating the past in the present, apprehending the future on the basis of past and present, and this living in time is never reversible, ‘Aman can walk through a house, retrace his steps, and go out by the door he came in, but for his mind the going back is not simply the original ex- perience in reverse, it is the re-experience of the earlier, first experience. And as we s0 easily and so truly say, seeing things « second time makes ‘such a difference. Matter in motion or at rest is itself inert. Minds are essentially active. ‘They initiate action of themselves. Past experience is the chief resource of ‘ mind initiating new activity, and the range of what a mind can do is both limited and indicated by the resources at its disposal. But whereas in A Case vor Duatisa anp IvreRacrion 463 the case of bodies, antecedent conditions determine subsequent action, in the ease of minds antecedent conditions provide the range and resources for choice. Matter is the realm of necessity, mind is the realm of freedom. This contrast leads us to the next, that between efficient and final causation. It is now accepted that matter has no purposes of its own and that in their interactions with each other bodies display efficient causation only. The ‘Prima facie presence of purpose in the activity of minds is also beyond ques- tion. But there is disagreement over whether minds really and truly aet for the sake of an end, or only seem to do so. It is contended by some that both the action done, and that it seems to be done on purpose, for it must not be forgotten that the “seeming” is certainly there and must be ac- ‘counted for, are in fact the effects of purely efficient, nonpurposive causes. ‘Now it is one thing that man may be mistaken as to his actual purpose and as to the actual causes operative in a particular undertaking, it is quite another that in every ease his sense of purpose is completely illusory. Further, the truth of the first is not evidence for the truth of the second. And if purpose is illusory, how does precisely that illusion come into being? Beyond these observations T shall say nothing to persuade anyone that on ‘ceasion men genuinely act on purpose. Let them regard themselves and their fellow mon. If what they ean observe does not establish the fact, then argument is not likely to be effective, not even the argument that they themselves are arguing deliberately and for an end. But there is another aspect of this general situation to which I wish to direct attention. Tt is the conjunetion in one world of active, purposeful minds, and energetic yet inert, purposcless matter. ‘That matter has no purposes ofits own does not mean it cannot be used in purposive activity. Quite the contrary. The effectiveness of man’s purposive activity in the physical world is crucially conditioned by the absence of purpose in matter. Abundant energy, acting in regular accord to laws of efficient causation, is ideally adapted to pur- pposive direction by minds. If matter in motion started having ends of its ‘own and acting to achieve them, our present subjection of the physical environment to our purposes would certainly be upset. The steady flow of lectrcity through wires to give me light as I work on this essay, is at once ‘a witness to mechanical law in matter, purpose in man, and the availability of purposeless matter to purposeful mind. I submit that the more precisely we attend to what we know of bodies and of minds, both to the knowledge provided by science, and that pro- vided by our own ordinary experience, the clearer it becomes that we are confronted by © dualism of substances. When I attend firmly to what I know of a stone and what I know of me, each taken in its concrete par- ticularity, then that they are different in kind is the inescapable conclusion. Teommend that procedure to others. It is when I relax, allow myself the 464 Pumosoray AND PieNoMENovocicst, RRSHARCH lasy luxury of vagueness, and beguile myself with such phrases as ‘elec- tricity is potentially life,” and ‘ideas are very complex organizations of pathways of nervous impulse in the cortex,’ it is then that a materialistic monism acquires momentary plausibility. Idealism, too, ean be made plausible by prolonged stress on what things mean, and evasion of the ‘question of what they are. Neither of these monisms ean endure the testing of direct observation, pertinent experiment, and precise knowledge. Dualism can. At the same time, as was noted above, one feature of our knowledge makes it easy to succumb to a defeatist attitude as to the reality of minds. ‘We know of bodies which are just bodies. There are many such bodies, and the extent of our knowledge of such bodies is enormous. We know of minds only in conjunetion with bodies. Relatively speaking, the bodies conjoined to minds are few, and our knowledge of them this situation. We know a great deal about bodi bout most of the known bodies, what we know is the essential truth. Tt then tempting to try to make out that tho distinctive features of living bodies are somehow merely complications of what is characteristic of just bodies. Of the living bodies, a few, relatively, are conjoined with minds. Tt is again tempting to make out that these minds are just complications of the complication already alleged to be all that life is. After all, minds are ‘0 few; it is large numbers which impress us. It is tempting, both reductions are tempting, and succumbing to the one makes it easier to yield to the other. But the affirmation of error does not change the facts. Tt often pro- vvokes from others the assertion of a counter error. ‘Thus Idealism evokes ‘Materialism and Naturalism, and vice versa. The distinctive merit of ‘Dualism in this situation is not its elegance as a theory—it lacks that grace—, but its refusal to deny, suppress, or pervert facts in order to simplify and sustain a theory. It accepts the facts and then as best it ean develops a theory to interpret them. Matter and Mind are declared to be cach real in existence, each irreducible to the other, each with distinctive nature, because a careful examination and comparison of what we know of them both, discloses that such they are, ‘That is my case for Dualism. MK: INTERACTION Before taking up the specific topic of this section, it may be well to consider certain objections which have probably been building up in the minds of philosophically experienced readers. One objection is almost ccr- tainly directed against my use of ‘substance.’ In modern times such wither- ing assaultshave been madeon thiseategory thatit may seem an inexcusable ignorance or a worse folly to go on using the term as if it were in good stand- ing. If 1 insist on substance, why have I not supported the use with ex- planation and argument? Another objection may have been provoked by A Case ror Duatisw ano Interaction 465 my failure even to mention recent discussions by other philosophers of the general subject of this essay. Why have I not noted and welcomed such support as may be found in the writings of Professor Ducasse? Why have I not replied to the arguments against Dualism which are presented by Professor Ryle? Tam aware that thus far T have done none of these things. I do not intend to do them now. But I shall try in a fow sentences to justify my procedure by explaining it. ‘The criticisms of ‘substance’ are of the category itself, ‘and «sound defense must in like manner be of the generic notion, But in this essay I am not concernod with that general problem, but with Matter ‘and Mind, their essential differences, their relations to each other, and 50 on. It is true that, as regards the general problem of substance, I am con~ vvinced that the eategory is well grounded and that the arguments against, it have clarified rather than invalidated its meaning and use. Hence in presenting my case for Dualism I have assumed the category and offered ‘evidence that, given the category, Mind and Matter are different substances. No doubt the attempt to do that, s0 far as itis successful, is also evidence that substance itself is a valid notion. Yet the difference remains between ‘the two problems. The discussion of substance falls outside the proper scope of this essay and I shall leave it there. ‘A reply to objections of the second sort can be made along similar lines. ‘The statement, examination, and criticism of the views of such distinguished thinkers as those I have mentioned, are major undertakings in each ease, and merit and require independent essays. But I wish to state in addition ‘a different and, I think, more important explanation of my procedure. ‘Attacks on Dualism are in these days more frequent than defenses of it. But if Dualism can be sustained, that must be possible by exhibiting Dualism directly, together with the evidence which supports it. Arguments against the arguments against Dualism are on occasion needed. There is, ‘also the need, as great if not greater, for the simple presentation of a case for Dualism, without the complications and diversions of replies to the rguments of its opponents. Dualism, I think, finds its best defense in itself, and that is the procedure followed in this essay. We now return to our main theme and take up the particular doctrine called Interaction of Body and Mind. The primary reference of this doctrine is to a familiar, readily observed pattern of human life, the constant re- sponse of mind to body, body to mind. As a theory, Interaction is at first little more than the assertion that what we take to be the mutual interac- tion of mind and body is justthat. All theimmediately relevant facts confirm the theory; I know of none which is at variance with it. Even those who, because of their adherence to other theories, deny that the facts are what they commonly are taken to be, rely on interaction in practice. The Idealist 466 PHILosopHy AND PueNouenovoaicat, Reswanct takes thought for his body; the Naturalist drinks a cocktail to put his mind at case; and the special Semanticist who identifies meaning with bodily response, expects to be understood. Were I reading this essay aloud to a to-a group of listeners, what would I and they be doing? I would be com- ing ideas to them. How? By direct thought transference? No. I ‘would make noises, specific sequences of particular sounds, enunciating them as clearly and distinctly as possible. It is those sounds which would reach the ears of my listeners, or, if one prefers, certain vibrations of air would reach their ears. And eventually their minds would receive the ideas. Where the instrument of transmission is writing, printing, and reading, the basic pattern is the same, only the details are more complex. ‘Those are the facts; they are what Interaction denotes. ‘There are no facts in this field which challenge Interaction. But other theories, developed in other fields to interpret facts of a different sort, have {implications which appear as objections to Interaction. It is important that, this be understood. The psychologist, notably the experimental psycholo- gist, is a Dualist by inheritance and an Interactionist in practice. If the payche had not been regarded as a distinct kind of being, Psychology as an independent science would not have been begun. If he did not rely on. in- teraction, the experimentalist would never ask his subjects to cooperate and to make reports, It is not in Psychology, but in other sciences, even in metaphysics, that we first find enunciated such principles and theories as ‘entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity,’ ‘final causes are as sterile as virgins dedicated to God,’ ‘multiple observation is the test for reality,’ and s0 on. These theories in the fields of their origin and initial application are substantiated by their fruits. A notable exception may well be the principle of economy called Ockham’s razor, since, as was noted centuries ago, however useful economy may be to man, it may not be & regulative principle for either nature or God. In any case, these theories arose outside Psychology and said nothing directly about interaction of tind and body. It is only when they are generalized and then extended to Psychology, that they are found to involve objections to the independent, reality of mind and to interaction. ‘A careful observer, for example, would not fail to report the presence of purpose in human activity, and anyone who doubted this finding, would then not be given argument but would be referred to the facts. Yet purpose in human behavior is often denied, and the avoidance of teleological terms in psychological explanation is today commonly regarded as scientifically desirable. The explanation of this is a matter of record. In the history of the physical sciences we can read that progress in precise knowledge and the limination of teleology went on together. What brings success stimulates imitation. Procedures and principles highly successful in the physical A Cass ron Duatis aNp Iwreraction 467 sciences have been generalized and set up as standards for scientific method in general, and then applied to different sorts of subject matter. ‘When this produces clashes, as it certainly does in Psychology, between the ‘imported ideas and those developed directly from the native subject matter, the latter have often been condemned simply on the basis of the alleged universal standards of scientific method. This is not sound empiricism, but it is not done completely without reason. That last sentence needs to be noted and remembered in the case of Interaction, for the objections to Interaction are largely reasons and not facts. That is why these objections require such careful consideration, instead of just summary disposal by confrontation with the relevant facts. But in giving them serious con- sideration we should not forget their origin, nor be taken in by their resilience, their ability to return in full vigor after what seems a conclusive

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