RULE 30
denying the allegations of the complaint and claiming that the
G.R. No. L-21231 July 30, 1975
CONCORDIA LALUAN, et al., petitioners, 
vs.
APOLINARIO MALPAYA, MELECIO TAMBOT, BERNARDINO JASMIN, et al., respondents.
Primicias, Regino and Macaraeg for petitioners.
Saturnino D. Bautista for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
In 1950 the Laluans,1 the Laguits2 and the Sorianos3 (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) filed
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint against Apolinario Malpaya, Melecio
Tambot and Bernardino Jasmin (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) for recovery of ownership
and possession of two parcels of land. The petitioners seek a declaration that they are the owners pro
indiviso of
A PARCEL OF RICELAND, situated in the barrio of Inoman, Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan, Philippines ... containing an area of 1 hectare nine hundred seventy one
(10,971) square meters, more or less; bounded on the N. by Nicolas Estares; on the
E. by Zanja; on the S. by Estero Inoman and on W. by Aniceta Marquez; ...,
and the owners pro indiviso of one-half of
A PARCEL OF RICELAND AND CORNLAND, situated in the barrio of Inoman,
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, ... containing an area of (31,548) square meters, more or
less, bounded on N. by Rosendo Serran; E. by Esteban Malpaya; S. by Creek and W.
by Creek that surround it; ....
They base their claim on their alleged right to inherit, by legal succession, from Marciana Laluan (the
respondent Malpaya's wife) who died intestate on July 17, 1948 and without any children.
The first parcel of land they allege as paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan. They claim
that the respondent Malpaya, taking advantage of the senility of his wife, sold the land to the
respondent Tambot, as evidenced by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" dated June 26,
1948. The second parcel of land they allege as conjugal property of the spouses Malpaya and Laluan,
and charge that the respondent Malpaya, with right to sell only one-half thereof, sold the whole
property, four days after the death of his wife, to the respondents Tambot and Jasmin, as evidenced by
the "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated July 21, 1948.
The respondents filed their answer,4 
parcels of land belonged to the respondent Malpaya as his exclusive property. The respondents Tambot
and Jasmin further aver that the respondent Malpaya had the "perfect legal right" to dispose of the said
parcels of land and that they bought the properties in good faith, unaware of any flaw in the title of
their vendor.
To expedite the proceedings, the parties entered into a partial stipulation of facts at the hearings of
August 31 and October 25, 1950. The petitioners then proceeded to adduce their evidence.
Several postponements of the scheduled hearings followed. Then, at the hearing scheduled on August
1, 1957 neither the respondents nor their counsel appeared, notwithstanding due and proper notice
served on them. Nor did they file any motion for postponement. The petitioners thus moved for leave
to continue with the presentation of their evidence. This the court a quo granted, allowing the
petitioners to adduce their evidence before the clerk of court.
On September 23, 1957 the court a quo rendered judgment declaring null and void the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property" dated June 26, 1948 as well the "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated July
21, 1948, except as regards the one-half portion of the land described in the latter document which
belonged to the respondent Malpaya. With respect to the parcel of land covered by the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property," the court a quo declared the petitioners owners pro indiviso of the
entirety thereof and ordered the respondent Tambot not only to deliver the possession of the land to
them but also to pay them, by way of damages, the amount of P750 — the value of the crops which the
petitioners failed to realize for the last nine years from the land — plus P500 annually from date until
possession thereof shall have been delivered to them. With respect to the parcel of land subject of the
"Absolute Deed of Sale," the court a quo likewise declared the petitioners owners pro indiviso of one-
half thereof and ordered the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the possession of the half-
portion to the petitioners, as well as to pay them, in damages, the sum of P1,343.75 — the value of the
produce which the petitioners failed to realize for the last nine years from the half-portion of the land -
plus P687.50 annually from date until possession thereof shall have been delivered to them.
On October 7, 1957 the respondents Tambot and Jasmin filed their Mocion de Reconsideracion. On
October 18, 1957 the court a quo, finding the grounds invoked by the respondents in their motion
without merit, denied the same.
The respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals (hereinafter referred to as the respondent
Court). On January 31, 1963 the respondent Court rendered judgment setting aside the appealed
decision and entered another remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. The
respondent Court voided the procedure whereby, at the continuation of the hearing of the case on
August 1, 1957, the court a quo, in the absence of the respondents and their counsel, allowed the
petitioners to present their evidence before the clerk of court.
In due time, the petitioners, through a motion for reconsideration, asked the respondent Court to re-
examine its decision. This motion, however, the respondent Court denied.
In the instant petition for certiorari, the petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of the
respondent Court as well its resolution denying their motion for reconsideration, and ask that judgment
be rendered affirming in toto the decision of the court a quo dated September 23, 1957.
The petitioners and the respondents point to what they believe is the sole question for resolution;
whether or not the reception by the clerk of court of the petitioners' evidence, in the absence of the
respondents and their counsel, constitutes a prejudicial error that vitiated the proceedings.
The petitioners argue that a trial court has authority to designate its clerk of court to receive the
evidence of the party present when the other party fails to appear. In receiving evidence, the petitioners
continue, the clerk of court merely performs a ministerial task. The ministerial nature of such a task
allows the clerk of court to dispense with the procedural steps5 prescribed by Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court.
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the court a quo arrogated unto itself the power,
otherwise denied it, to designate its clerk of court to receive the petitioners' evidence. No provision of
the Rules of Court, according to them, empowers a trial court to authorize its clerk of court to receive
the evidence of a party litigant; only when the clerk of court becomes a commissioner, by appointment
pursuant to Rule 33, has he the authority to so receive the evidence of a party litigant, and even in such
a situation Rule 33 requires the clerk of court to observe the procedural steps therein prescribed.
The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both parties properly relate to the reference
by a court of any or all of the issues in a case to a person so commissioned to act or report thereon.
These provisions explicitly spell out the rules governing the conduct of the court, the commissioner,
and the parties before, during, and after the reference proceedings. Compliance with these rules of
conduct becomes imperative only when the court formally orders a reference of the case to a
commissioner. Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no application to the case at bar
where the court a quo merely directed the clerk of court to take down the testimony of the
witnesses6 presented and to mark the documentary evidence7 proffered on a date previously set for
hearing.
No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to
receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of court
constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking
of the pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task of receiving
evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually called
for when the other party who is present objects to questions propounded and to the admission of the
documentary evidence proffered.8 More importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the
case still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the decision based upon
the evidence reported. 9
But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the concomitant result thereof, i.e., the
judgment rendered by the court based on the evidence presented in such limited proceedings, prejudice
the substantial rights of the aggrieved party, then there exists sufficient justification to grant the latter
complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court.
1. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the court a quo, in
its decision dated September 23, 1957, declared it as the paraphernal property of the deceased
Marciana Laluan. In so doing, the court a quo relied mainly on the documents — the deed of
donation propter nuptias and the translation thereof in English — presented by the petitioners before
the clerk of court at the hearing on August 1, 1957. However, the respondents contend — and this the
respondent court took significant note of in its resolution dated March 30, 1963 — that the land
described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" is not any of those set forth in the deed of
donation.
The "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" describes the land subject thereof as follows:
A parcel of riceland, together with all the improvements existing thereon situated in
the Barrio of Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, Philippines, ... containing an area of 1
hectare nine hundred seventy one (10,971) square meters, more or less; bounded on
the N. by Nicolas Estaris; on the E. by Zanja; on the east by Estero Inoman and on
the W. by Aniceta Marquez; the boundaries consists of visible dikes that surround it;
declared under Tax No. 20006 in the name of the Vendor and assessed at P330.00 of
the current year of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan; said land is not registered under Act No.
496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law. 10
On the other hand, the deed of donation propter nuptias treats of three parcels of land in this manner.
First: A parcel of riceland situated in Paldit, municipality of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan,
the measurement and boundaries on all sides could be seen from the sketch at the
back hereof, this parcel of land is given in lieu of jewelry, whose value is TEN
(P10.00) PESOS.
Second: Another parcel of riceland situated in the same place mentioned above, also
its measurements and boundaries on all sides could be seen from the sketch at the
back hereof, and valued at THIRTY (P30.00) PESOS.
... a parcel of riceland ... situated in Inmatotong, this municipality, its measurements
in brazes and boundaries on all sides could be seen on the sketch herein below, and
this said parcel of land is valued at TEN (P10.00) PESOS.
The sketch appearing on the deed of donation covers three parcels of land: the first parcel, 63 X
52 brazas, 11bounded on the north by Jacinto Malpaya, on the west by a payas, and on the south and
east by Pedro Malpaya; the second parcel, 30 X 63 brazas, bounded on the north by Tomas Tollao, on
the west by Jacinto Laluan, on the south by a colos, and on the east by Pedro Malpaya; and the third
parcel, 52 X 23 brazas, bounded on the north and west by Pedro Malpaya, on the south by Roman
Gramata, and on the east by Eustaquio Marquez. All of these three parcels have stated metes and
bounds quite different from those of the land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property,"
the location too of the latter land differs from those of the parcels described in the deed of donation.
While the land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" lies in Inoman, Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan, the parcels included in the deed of donation lie either in Paldit or in Inmatotong, both also
in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. At first sight also appears the marked variance between the respective areas
of those parcels described in the deed of donation and the parcel subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property."
Indeed, there arises the possibility that in the interim of fifty six years from February 15, 1892 (the
date of the deed of donation propter nuptias) to June 26, 1948 (the date of the "Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property"), the parcels of land contiguous to those described in the deed of donation passed in
ownership from one hand to another, or changes in the man-made or natural boundaries used to
indicate the confines of the parcels set forth in the said document occurred. This could very well
explain the discrepancies between the names of the boundary owners of the piece of land described in
the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and the names of the adjacent owners of the parcels
subject of the deed of donation as well as the absence of any mention of the payas and colos in the
later "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property." In addition, the variance between the location of the
land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and those of the parcels set forth in the
deed of donation could reasonably be due to the creation of new barrios in the municipality of
Pozorrubio Pangasinan, or the alteration of the boundaries of the barrios therein.
However, the apparent difference between the area of the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property" and the areas of the parcels included in the deed of donation propter nuptias should
be fully and properly explained. The record shows that the petitioners neither offered nor attempted to
offer any evidence indicating that the land sold by the respondent Malpaya to his co-respondent
Tambot corresponds with any of the three parcels described in the deed of donation. The petitioners
failed to specify precisely which of the three parcels — its location, area, and contiguous owners —
subject of the deed of donation constitutes the very land delimited in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property."
All these give rise to a grave doubt as to the specific identity of one of the parcels of land in dispute
which the court a quo neither noticed nor considered notwithstanding the obvious fact that the location,
area and boundaries of the land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" do not
coincide with those of any of the parcels described in the deed of donation propter nuptias.
The invariable applicable rule 12 is to the effect that in order to maintain an action to recover
ownership, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his
ownership of the property claimed but also the identity thereof. The party who desires to recover must
fix the identity of the land he claims. 13 And where doubt and uncertainty exist as to the identity of the
land claimed, a court should resolve the question by recourse to the pleadings and the record as well as
to extrinsic evidence, oral or written.
Absent, therefore, any indicium in the record to show and identify with absolute certainty any of the
three parcels of land included in the deed of donation propter nuptias as the land described in the
"Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the prudent course open obviously consists in an
investigation by the court a quo, either in the form of a hearing or an ocular inspection, or both, to
enable it to know positively the land in litigation. If, indeed, the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property" treats of a piece of land entirely different and distinct from the parcels described in the deed
of donation propter nuptias, and considering that the court a quo, in its decision dated September 23,
1957, relied mainly on the said deed of donation in declaring the land subject of the "Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property" as the paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan and in nullifying the
latter document, then there exists sufficient ground to remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial
on the matter.
2. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale," the court a quo, in its decision dated
September 23, 1957, found and declared it as the conjugal property of the spouses Laluan and
Malpaya. In so doing, the courta quo relied heavily on the presumption established by article 1407 14 of
the Civil Code of 1889 that "[a] 11 the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in
the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
It needs no emphasis to point out that the court a quo committed no error in declaring that the parcel of
land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale" belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan
and Malpaya. Indeed, the spouses Laluan and Malpaya acquired the said parcel of land from Eustaquio
Marquez "sometime in 1912" or, specifically, during the marriage. Following the rule then that proof
of acquisition of the property in dispute during the marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative, 15 it seems clear enough that the parcel covered by the "Absolute Deed of Sale"
pertains to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya.
Likewise, the court a quo committed no error in declaring the "Absolute Deed of Sale" null and void as
to the one-half portion of the land described therein which belonged to Laluan, spouse of the
respondent Malpaya; in declaring the petitioners the owners pro indiviso of one-half of the land subject
of the said "Absolute Deed of Sale;" and in ordering the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the
possession of the said half-portion to the petitioners. The court a quo also correctly cited and applied
the provisions of articles 953 16 and 837 17 of the Civil Code of 1889 which, pursuant to article
2263 18 of the new Civil Code, govern the rights of the petitioners and the respondent Malpaya to the
property left by Marciana Laluan who died on July 17, 1948 or before the effectivity of the new code.
Consequently, the court a quo correctly ordered the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to pay to the
petitioners, by way of damages, the amount of P1,343.75 which is the value of the produce which the
said petitioners failed to realize for nine years from the half-portion of the land subject of the
"Absolute Deed of Sale" — plus the sum of P687.50 annually from September 23, 1957 until
possession of the said half-portion of land shall have been delivered to them.
ACCORDINGLY, (1) the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1963 and its resolution
dated March 30, 1963 are set aside; (2) the judgment of the court a quo dated September 23, 1957,
insofar as it pertains to the "Absolute Deed of Sale," is hereby affirmed; and (3) the judgment of the
court a quo of the same date, insofar as it relates to the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," is set
aside, and the case (civil case 11219) is hereby remanded to the court a quo for a new trial, to the end
that the identities of the parcels of land in dispute may be specifically established. At the new trial, it
will not be necessary to retake evidence already taken, but the parties shall be afforded opportunity to
present such evidence as they may deem relevant to the particular question raised herein. No costs.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
  Cruz vs. Niño, 18 Phil. 284; Santos vs. Estejada, 26 Phil. 398; Del Valle vs.
Mercado, 34 Phil. 963; Marcelo vs. Maniquis, 35 Phil. 134; Misamis Lumber Co.,
Footnotes Inc. vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil. 881.

1 Concordia, Timoteo, Lorenzo, Maria, Victorio, Florentino, Juanito, Feliciano, 13 Puruganan vs. Martin, 8 Phil. 519; Santiago vs. Santos, 48 Phil. 567.
Severino, Marcela, Florencio, Juliana, Genoveva, Agustin, Alberta, Paula, Filomena,
Victoria, Gregorio and Beatriz. 14 Article 160, Civil Code of the Philippines.

2 Faustina, Inocencia, Jose and Marcelina. 15 Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de llano, 63 Phil. 629.

3 Santiago, Segundo, Felipe and Julita.
4 The respondents subsequently filed an amended answer, substantially pleading the
same allegations found in their original answer, and adding, by way of defense, that
the claim of the petitioners is subject to the expenses incurred by the respondent
Malpaya in connection with the last illness and death of the late Marciana Laluan.
16 "ART. 953. Should brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters survive,
the surviving spouse shall be entitled to receive the part of the inheritance in usufruct
assigned him or her in Article 837."
17 "ART. 837. If the testator should leave no legitimate ascendants or descendants,
the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the estate, also in usufruct."

5 Rule 33 requires the following: (1) order of reference; (2) oath of the 18 "ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a
commissioner; (3) notice to the parties to the proceedings before the commissioner; will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889,
(4) report of the commissioner; (5) notice to the parties of the filing of the report; and by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court..."
(6) hearing upon the report.

6 TSN of August 1, 1957, pp. 1-16, the respective testimonies of the petitioners
Concordia Laluan and Timoteo Laluan.

7 (1) Exhibit "A" (Copy of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" dated June
26, 1948); (2) Exhibit "B" (Copy of the "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated July 21,
1948); (3) Exhibit "C" (Copy of the deposition of Apolinario Malpaya); (4) Exhibit
"D" (The deed of donation propter nuptias dated February 15, 1892); and (5)
Exhibit "D-1" (The English translation of Exhibit "D").

8 Wack Wack Golf and Country Club. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 501.

9 Province of Pangasinan vs. Polisoc, 6 SCRA 299.

10 Exhibit "A".

11 The Diccionario de la Lengua Espanola (Decimoseptima Edicion, Madrid: 1947)

defines a braza thus: "Medida agraria usada en Filipinas, centesima partede loan, y
equivalente a 36 pies cuadrados, o sea a 2 centiares y 79 miliares."

12 Sanchez Mellado vs. Municipality of Tacloban, 9 Phil. 92; Lubrico vs. Arbado,
12 Phil. 391; Belen vs. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Salacup vs. Rambac, 17 Phil. 21; De la
2. G.R. No. L-29742 March 29, 1972 ATTY. LOZANO:

VICENTE YU, plaintiff-appellant,  That is why, if your Honor please, the point if your Honor please, is I do not have to prove that there is
vs. a gasoline engine that was taken by the defendant from the plaintiff for an agreed amount of P6,800.00
EMILIO MAPAYO, defendant-appellee. because the allegation in paragraph 1, No. 2 and No. 3, is admitted in the answer.

Lozano Law Office & Associates for plaintiff-appellant. In other words, if your Honor please, the promissory note in the amount of P2,800.00 ... (interrupted by
court).
Gregorio A. Palabrica for defendant-appellee.
COURT:

Wait a minute, are you going to present evidence or not?

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch II (Judge Alfredo I.
Gonzalez presiding), rendered in its Civil Case No. 4018, dismissing plaintiff's action for lack of
prosecution.
The case originally started in the City Court of Davao, Branch II, where appellant therein had filed suit
to recover from defendant Emilio Mapayo the sum of P2,800, representing the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of a Gray Marine Engine sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, plus attorney's fees. The
answer admitted the transaction and the balance due but contended that by reason of hidden defects of
the article sold, the defendant had been forced to spend P2,800 for repairs and labor, wherefore
plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on the price of the engine, and counterclaimed for
damages and attorneys' fees. The City Court, after trial, disallowed the defenses and ordered the
defendant to pay plaintiff P2,500.00 and costs (Record on Appeal, pages 9-16).
ATTY. LOZANO:
Will you please give me a chance, if your Honor please, because my purpose is, it will turn out that it
will be the defendant to present evidence to prove that there is hidden defect. He admitted the
allegation, he admitted that there is a balance of P2,800.00; it is not paid by him but at the same time
he said that there is a hidden defect.
In other words, if your Honor please, it should be the defendant to present the evidence ... (interrupted
by court).
COURT:
Are you going to present evidence, substantial, oral, or not? Answer the question of the Court.

Defendant Mapayo appealed to the Court of First Instance, filing an answer therein that was a virtual ATTY. LOZANO:
reproduction of his original defenses in the City Court. When, after several continuances, the case was
called for hearing on 13 March 1968, the defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the
If your Honor please, on the complaint, on the allegation of the complaint, all are admitted by the
court scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to present
defendant ... (interrupted by court).
his evidence, and from the unchallenged stenographic notes quoted in appellant's brief, pages 11-14
(Transcript, pages 4-7), the following transpired:
COURT:
ATTY. LOZANO:
The attorney does not answer the question of the Court.
If your Honor please, before I present my witness I should like to present the issue because all the
allegations of the complaint are admitted and I am going to specify by the answer, your Honor. Answer the question, are you going to present evidence OR NOT AND SUBMIT THE CASE ON
(Emphasis supplied) THE PLEADINGS. (Capitals supplied)

COURT: ATTY. LOZANO:

The issue is void on the hidden defect. Would you please allow me, your Honor, because in the answer of the defendant ... (interrupted by
court)
COURT: When the case is called for trial on 19 March 1968, defendants counsel asked again for another
postponement of the trial on the ground that defendant and his witnesses were not able to come for lack
I do not need discussion; I want you to answer the question of the Court. of transportation, notwithstanding a stern warning by the Court, per its order of 9 March 1968 that it
would not entertain further motion for continuation of trial. Counsel for the plaintiff vehemently
ATTY. LOZANO: objected to such motion and insisted in presenting his evidence which the Court grants inspite of
another civil case and one miscellaneous case which were ready for hearing at the same time.
I am not going to present my evidence yet because this moment I am submitting my evidence on the
pleading until after the defendant will present evidence and I reserve my right to present rebuttal Court ordered the plaintiff to present his evidence. Plaintiff's counsel refused to comply with said
evidence. (Emphasis supplied) order. Instead of calling his witnesses, he moved the Court to present them after the defendant had
presented their evidence. The court asked said counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for
the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so and sticked to his demand that he would introduce his
COURT: witnesses only in rebuttal. This is dictation to the Court to disregard its lawful command and a
violation of the order of trial provided in the Rules of Court.
Make it of record that the attorney refuses to present evidence either oral or documentary when
required by the Court. This is an appealed case from the Municipal Court elevated to this Court on 18 May 1963 and from
that time several postponement were granted at the instance of the parties which cause delay and is
ATTY. LOZANO: detrimental to the interest of justice.

Motion for reconsideration, if your Honor please, that is not what I said, if your Honor please, I
manifested that it should be the defendant to prove first, to present evidence and we reserve our right to
present rebuttal evidence, if your Honor please. (Emphasis supplied).
COURT:
All right, denied.
Submit the case for the consideration of the Court.
The court then issued an order on the same day in the following terms (Record on Appeal, page 24):
ORDER
IN VIEW WHEREOF, let this case be dismissed for failure to prosecute on the part of counsel for the
plaintiff without pronouncement as to costs.
Finding defendant's counterclaim not meritorious, same is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Further motions to reconsider having proved futile, the plaintiff appealed.
We find for plaintiff-appellant. Since the answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the
complaint, albeit special defenses were pleaded, plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for
defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses. Section 2 of Revised Rule
of Court 129 plainly supports appellant:

Make it of record that the attorney for the plaintiff refuses to present evidence, either oral or Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.— Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the
documentary, when required by the Court. trial or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to
have been made through palpable mistake.
Submit the case for the consideration of the Court.
While this appeal is not a complaint against the presiding judge, We can not refrain from observing
SO ORDERED. that the trial judge's despotic and outrageous insistence that plaintiff should present proof in support of
allegations that were not denied but admitted by the adverse party was totally unwarranted, and was
made worse by the trial judge's continual interrupting of the explanations of counsel, in violation of the
A motion for reconsideration having been filed by counsel for plaintiff, it was denied by the court by
rules of Judicial Ethics.
an order of 21 March, and the case was dismissed for lack of prosecution (Record on Appeal, pages
34-35), the trial judge reasoning that —
Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal of the case was manifestly
untenable and contrary to law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby revoked and set aside, and the court below is
directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P2,800.00, plus
attorney's fees which this Court considers just and reasonable (Civil Code, Article 2208, paragraph 11).
Costs against defendant-appellee.
3 identified him could not be overcome by the defendant’s alibi. (People v. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232;
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-66884. May 28, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE TEMBLOR alias
"RONALD," defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Wilfred D. Asis, for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF FACT OF
THE TRIAL COURT NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — The settled rule is that the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court
because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when
supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal
(People v. Dava, 149 SCRA, 582).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. — The minor inconsistencies in
the testimony of the eyewitness Victoria Vda. de Cagampang did not diminish her credibility,
especially because she had positively identified the accused as her husband’s assailant, and her
testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable and entirely in
accord with human experience.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIBI; UNAVAILING IN THE FACT OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. —
Appellant’s self serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made
by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TO BE ACCEPTABLE AS A DEFENSE ACCUSED MUST ESTABLISH
THAT IT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME
DURING ITS COMMISSION; CASE AT BAR. — The rule is that in order for an alibi to be
acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol’s house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible
to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved witnesses who had positively
People v. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 256.)
5. CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE; PROOF THEREOF NOT ESSENTIAL WHEN ACCUSED IS
IDENTIFIED. — Proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified
(People v. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FLIGHT, AN INDICATION OF GUILT. — The records further
show that the accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang and taking his firearm. They
hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an implied admission of guilt (People v.
Dante Aster, 149 SCRA 325; People v. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the crime of murder in
Criminal Case No. 1890 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City for shooting to death Julius Cagampang. The information
alledge:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the evening of December 30, 1980 at Talo-ao, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, and
confederating with one another with Anecito Ellevera who is at large, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and with intend to kill, attack, assault and shoot with
firearms one Julius Cagampang, hitting the latter on the vistal parts of the body thereby inflicting
mortal wounds, causing the direct and instantaneous death of the said Julius Cagampang.
"CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was convicted and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties thereof under
Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P12,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, while
Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store adjacent to their house in
Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan del Norte, the accused Vicente Temblor alias
Ronald, arrived and asked to buy a half pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a
pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor,
wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot,
shouted her husband’s name "Jul." Two persons, one of whom she later identified as the accused,
barged into the interior of the interior of the store through the main door and demanded that she brings
out her husband’s firearm. Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The
accused fired two or more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the male-ta"
(suitcase) where her husband’s firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after
inspecting its contents, took her husband’s .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police station by
the Station Commander Milan, where she saw the identified the accused as the man who killed her
husband.
The accused’s defense was alibi. He alledge that from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 30,
1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay in Camagong, Nasipit,
Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as "pulutan," until 8:00
o’clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the dreaded NPA (New People’s Army) were
not apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with other members-followers
of the New People’s Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass
surrendered of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista
public market on November 26, 1981 and detained at the Buenavista municipal jail.  (People v. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People v. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258.)cralawnad
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim’s widow, Victorina, did not know him by name. That
circumstance allegedly renders the identification of the accused, as the perpetrator of her husband’s
killing, insufficient. However, during the trial, the accused was positively identified by the widow who
recognized him because she was less than a meter away from him inside the store which was well
lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp and by an incandescent lamp outside. Her testimony was
corroborated by another prosecution witness — a tricycle driver, Claudio Sabanal — who was a long-
time acquaintance of the accused and who knew him as "Ronald." He saw the accused in the store of
Cagampang at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening of December 30, 1980. He heard the gunshots coming
from inside the store, and saw the people scampering away.chanrobles law library
Dr. Alfredo Salanga who issued the post-mortem examination report certified that the victim sustained
three (3) gunshot wounds.
Rebutting the accused’s alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber
Company’s Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio
Perol (Exh. D), showing that Perol was not at home drinking with the accused and his father, but was
at work on December 31, 1980. The accused did not bother to overcome this piece of rebuttal
evidence.
In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. in the finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the
deceased Julius Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of alibi.
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively identified as the killer of Cagampang? The
settled rule is that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is
generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct
and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar,
shall not be disturbed on appeal (People v. Dava, 149 SCRA, 582).
The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victoria Vda. de Cagampang did not
diminish her credibility, especially because she had positively identified the accused as her husband’s
assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable
and entirely in accord with human experience.
Appellant’s self serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made
by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime. Furthermore,
the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol’s house in
barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-
paved witnesses who had positively identified him could not be overcome by the defendant’s alibi.
Appellant’s alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which opined
that the defendant’s knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as
killings perpetrated by members of the New People’s Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more
arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the
country. It is known as the NPA’s "agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential
when the culprit has been positively identified (People v. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
WHEREFORE, the judge merit appealed from is affirmed in all respects, except as to the civil
indemnity payable to the heirs of the deceased Julius Cagampang which is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
4.
G.R. No. 97130             June 19, 1991
FRANCISCO N. DY, JR., Substituted by his Estate Rep. by ROSARIO PEREZ-DY,
Administratrix, petitioner,  cross-examination in open court, and, that the presentation of the affidavits in question and answer
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FERTILIZER MARKETING COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Loreta F. Sablaya for petitioner.
Rayala & Associates for private respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision dated December 11, 1990, which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 18, 1988, which ordered
the petitioner to pay the private respondent the sum of P337,120.00 plus interest of 12% per annum,
attorney's fees and costs.
Private respondent Fertilizer Marketing Company of the Philippines filed an action to collect from
Francisco Dy, Jr. (now deceased) and the Francisco Dy, Jr. Trading Corporation the sum of
P337,120.00 as unpaid balance on their purchase of fertilizers on credit from the private respondent.
The defendants were declared in default on August 15, 1983 for failure to answer the complaint within
the reglementary period. Private respondent was thereafter allowed to present its evidence ex
parte before the Branch Clerk of Court.
Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion to admit their answer, but it was denied by the court. They
filed a motion for reconsideration; it was granted; the order of default was set aside; their answer was
admitted; and they were allowed to present their evidence without retaking the plaintiff s evidence.
On the date set for the reception of their evidence, the defendants failed to appear despite due notice,
so, judgment was rendered by the trial court against them on January 4, 1984.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment by default was set aside and the case was remanded to
the lower court for pre-trial and trial on the merits (AC-G.R. CV No. 03747, p. 46, Rollo).
At the pre-trial conference on November 12, 1987, the plaintiff and defendant Francisco Dy, Jr.
appeared, but there was no appearance for the defendant trading corporation, so it was declared in
default again and the plaintiff was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of
Court. However, in that same pre-trial conference the parties agreed that the evidence previously
presented by the plaintiff shall remain on record for purposes of the continuation of the trial, subject to
form will constitute the direct testimony of the defendant's witnesses likewise subject to cross-
examination of the adverse counsel.
On motion for reconsideration, the order of default against the corporation was lifted. A second motion
for reconsideration was filed by the defendants on January 22, 1988 to set aside the agreement for trial
by affidavits but it was denied by the court.
On the date of the hearing set on April 25, 1988, the defendants failed to appear to present their
evidence despite due notice, hence, they were deemed to have waived the presentation of their
evidence. The case was submitted for decision upon the plaintiffs evidence.
On July 18, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision (mentioned earlier) for the plaintiff and against the
defendants. The latter appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 23540) alleging that the
court a quo erred (1) in reinstating the nullified proceedings on August 19, 1983 before the Branch
Clerk of Court; (2) in denying her procedural due process; and (3) in awarding damages against her.
During the pendency of the appeal, Francisco Dy, Jr. passed away on June 20, 1989. His wife, Rosario
Perez-Dy, as judicial administratrix of his estate, prosecuted the appeal (Azarraga vs. Cortes, 9 Phil.
698).
On December 11, 1990, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 23540) for lack
of merit.
In this petition for review of that decision, the petitioner reiterates the same issues that she raised in the
Court of Appeals.
With regard to the validity of the proceedings before the Branch Clerk of Court, we agree with the
observations of the Court of Appeals that:
Appellant is now estopped from questioning the retention of the proceedings held on August 19, 1983
before the Branch Clerk of Court since her husband agreed to the same during the pre-trial conference
held on November 12, 1987. Agreements reached at the pre-trial conference and embodied in the pre-
trial order shall control the subsequent course of the trial and should not be disturbed unless there
could be manifest injustice.
The agreement is not unjust to appellant. Aside from appellant having the right to adduce evidence on
her behalf, the parties agreed that the evidence presented by appellee before the Branch Clerk of Court
would be retained, with appellant having the right to cross-examine appellee's witnesses.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The agreement of the parties as contained in the pre-trial order is not invalid. The parties are authorized
by the Rules of Court to consider "[s]uch other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
action." An authority believes this includes "agreement on certain matters so that witnesses need not
and will not be called." Undoubtedly, the procedure agreed upon by the parties in this case would have
greatly accelerated the trial and the decision therein, which, at the, time of the pre-trial conference, had
been pending for three years and had already gone up on appeal to this Court. (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)

The presentation of the plaintiff's evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court was not void. The
Supreme Court, in the case of Continental Bank vs. Tiangco, et al. (94 SCRA 715) departing from its
contrary statement in the Lim Tan Hu case (66 SCRA 425), declared that a decision based on evidence
heard by a deputy clerk of court as commissioner is valid and enforceable because it was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, was not impaired by extrinsic fraud, nor by lack of due process, and
there was no showing that the private respondents were prejudiced by such a procedure, or that the
commissioner committed any mistake or abuse of discretion, or that the proceedings were vitiated by
collusion and collateral fraud. That ruling applies four square to this case.

The practice of designating the clerk of court as a commissioner to receive evidence in the event of the
non-appearance of the defendant and its counsel, is not irregular and is sanctioned by Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court on trial by commissioner (J.M. Tuazon, Inc. vs. Dela Rosa, 18 SCRA 591; Wassmer vs.
Velez, 12 SCRA 648).

The petitioner was not denied due process. As pointed out by the appellate court:

. . . Appellant retained her right to present evidence on her behalf and the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses already presented by appellee. At any rate, if appellant believes that her right to
procedural due process had been curtailed, the same was due to a voluntary waiver by her husband. (p.
28, Rollo)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

RULE 31
5.
G.R. No. 169677               February 18, 2013
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successor-in-interest of ASIAN BANK
CORPORATION,Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and HON.
RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA (in their capacities as Chairman and Members, respectively, of
the Second Division of SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of
claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues. 1 But a separate trial may be
denied if a party is thereby deprived of his right to be heard upon an issue dealt with and determined in
the main trial.
Through this special civil action for certiorari, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank)
hereby seeks to set aside and nullify the resolutions dated June 25, 20042 and July 13, 20053 issued in
Civil Case No. 0004, whereby the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for separate trial filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and upheld its jurisdiction over the Republic’s claim against
the petitioner as the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank Corporation (Asian Bank).
Antecedents
On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents. Among the properties subject of the
action were two parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora (Old Balara), Quezon City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2664234 and TCT No. 2665885 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City registered in the names of Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and Ludivina L.
Genito.
On February 5, 2001, the Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead
Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion.6 It appears that Asian
Bank claimed ownership of the two parcels of land as the registered owner by virtue of TCT No. N-
201383 and TCT No. N-201384 issued in its name by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Asian
Bank was also in possession of the properties by virtue of the writ of possession issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City.7
When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the original defendants
in Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank. 8
Commenting on the motion, Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion until it was
first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary evidence the Republic
had already presented against the original defendants, and contended that it would be deprived of its
day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently apprised about
the evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant. 9
In its reply to Asian Bank’s comment, the Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was
proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely distinct and independent from its
cause of action against the original defendants; and that the issue with respect to Asian Bank was
whether Asian Bank had actual or constructive knowledge at the time of the issuance of the TCTs for
the properties in its name that such properties were the subject of the complaint in Civil Case No.
0004, while the issue as to the original defendants was whether they had "committed the acts
complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful accumulation of wealth which would, as a
consequence, justify forfeiture of the said properties or the satisfaction from said properties of the
judgement that may be rendered in favor of the Republic."10
Asian Bank’s rejoinder to the Republic’s reply asserted that the issue concerning its supposed actual or
constructive knowledge of the properties being the subject of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0004
was intimately related to the issue delving on the character of the properties as the ill-gotten wealth of
the original defendants; that it thus had a right to confront the evidence presented by the Republic as to
the character of the properties; and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to decide Asian Bank’s
ownership of the properties because the Sandiganbayan, being a special court with limited jurisdiction,
could only determine the issue of whether or not the properties were illegally acquired by the original
defendants.11
On June 25, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution granting the Republic’s
motion for separate trial, giving its reasons as follows:
xxxx
A cursory reading of the comment filed by defendant Asian Bank to plaintiff’s request for a separate
trial would readily reveal that defendant is not actually opposing the conduct of a separate trial insofar
as the said bank is concerned. What it seeks is the opportunity to confront the witnesses and whatever
documentary exhibits that may have been earlier presented by plaintiff in the case before the Court
grants a separate trial. This being the situation, we find no reason to deny the motion in light of
plaintiff’s position that its claim as against Asian Bank is entirely separate and distinct from its claims
as against the original defendants, albeit dealing with the same subject matter. In fact, as shown by the
allegations of the Second Amended Complaint where Asian Bank was impleaded as a party defendant,
the action against the latter is anchored on the claim that its acquisition of the subject properties was
tainted with bad faith because of its actual or constructive knowledge that the said properties are
subject of the present recovery suit at the time it acquired the certificates of title covering the said
properties in its name. Consequently, whether or not it is ultimately established that the properties are
ill-gotten wealth is of no actual significance to the incident pending consideration since the action
against defendant bank is predicated not on the claim that it had knowledge of the ill-gotten wealth
character of the properties in question but rather on whether or not it had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the fact that the properties it registered in its name are the subject of the instant
recovery suit. Besides, plaintiff already admits that the evidence it had presented as against the original
defendants would not apply to defendant bank for the reason that there is no allegation in the second
amended complaint imputing responsibility or participation on the part of the said bank insofar as the
issue of accumulation of wealth by the original defendants are concerned. Thus, there appears no basis
for defendant bank’s apprehension that it would be deprived of its right to due process if its not given
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses presented prior to its inclusion as party defendant in the
case. To reiterate, the only issue insofar as defendant bank is concerned is whether there is evidence to
show that it acquired the titles to the sequestered properties in bad faith.
Neither are we inclined to sustain defendant’s bank argument that the Court cannot grant a separate
trial in this case because it has no jurisdiction over the claim that defendant bank acquired the
properties in bad faith. Indeed, the issue of defendant bank’s acquisition of the properties in bad faith is
merely incidental to the main action which is for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein (Russell v. Vestil, 304
SCRA 738; Saura v. Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA 465).12
Asian Bank moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but the Sandiganbayan denied its motion
through the second assailed resolution issued on July 13, 2005.13
Hence, Metrobank commenced this special civil action for certiorari as the successor-in-interest of
Asian Bank and transferee of the properties.14
Issues
Metrobank contends that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that: (1) the
Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank; (2) the only issue as regards Asian Bank
was whether there was evidence that Asian Bank acquired the properties in bad faith; and
(3) the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the issue of Asian Bank’s alleged bad faith in acquiring
the properties.15
Anent the first issue, Metrobank states that the holding of a separate trial would deny it due process,
because Asian Bank was entitled to contest the evidence of the Republic against the original
defendants prior to Asian Bank’s inclusion as an additional defendant; that Asian Bank (Metrobank)
would be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial was held against it, considering that the
Republic had already presented such evidence prior to its being impleaded as an additional defendant;
that such evidence would be hearsay unless Asian Bank (Metrobank) was afforded the opportunity to
test and to object to the admissibility of the evidence; that because Asian Bank disputed the allegedly
ill-gotten character of the properties and denied any involvement in their allegedly unlawful
acquisition or any connivance with the original defendants in their acquisition, Asian Bank should be
given the opportunity to refute the Republic’s adverse evidence on the allegedly illgotten nature of the
properties.16
With respect to the second issue, Metrobank submits thuswise:
8.02 x x x the Honorable Sandiganbayan failed to consider that Respondent Republic of the
Philippines’ claim for the recovery of the subject properties from Asian Bank Corporation is anchored
mainly on its allegations that: a) the subject properties constitute ill-gotten wealth of the other
defendants in the instant civil case; and, b) Asian Bank Corporation acquired the subject properties in
bad faith and with due notice of the pendency of the ill-gotten wealth case. In other words, the
determination of the character of the subject properties as "ill-gotten wealth" is equally important and
relevant for Asian Bank Corporation as it is for the other defendants considering that the issue of its
alleged acquisition in bad faith of the subject properties is premised on Respondent Republic of the
Philippines’ claim that the subject properties form part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President
Marcos and his cronies. Such being the case, Asian Bank Corporation is entitled as a matter of right to
contest whatever evidence was presented by Respondent Republic of the Philippines on these two (2)
issues, specifically the character and nature of the subject properties.
8.03 It must be stressed that the discretion of the court to order a separate trial of such issues should
only be exercised where the issue ordered to be separately tried is so independent of the other issues
that its trial will in no way involve the trial of the issues to be thereafter tried and where the
determination of that issues will satisfactorily and with practical certainty dispose of the case, if
decided for defendant. Considering that the issue on Asian Bank Corporation’s alleged acquisition in
bad faith of the subject properties is intimately related to the issue on the character and nature of the
subject properties as ill-gotten wealth of the other defendants in the instant civil case, there is
absolutely no legal or factual basis for the holding of a separate trial against Asian Bank Corporation. 17
As to the third issue, Metrobank posits that Asian Bank acquired the properties long after they had
been acquired by the original defendants supposedly through unlawful means; that the Republic
admitted that the evidence adduced against the original defendants would not apply to Asian Bank
because the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 did not impute any responsibility to Asian
Bank for the accumulation of wealth by the original defendants, or did not allege that Asian Bank had
participated in such accumulation of wealth; that there was also no allegation or proof that Asian Bank
had been a business associate, dummy, nominee or agent of the Marcoses; that the inclusion of Asian
Bank was not warranted under the law; that Asian Bank was a transferee in good faith and for valuable
consideration; that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over civil cases against innocent purchasers
for value like Asian Bank that had no notice of the allegedly ill-gotten nature of the properties; and that
considering the admission of the Republic that the issue on the accumulation of wealth by the original
defendants did not at all concern Asian Bank, it follows that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to
pass judgment on the validity of Asian Bank’s ownership of the properties. 18
In contrast, the Republic insists that the Rules of Court allowed separate trials if the issues or claims
against several defendants were entirely distinct and separate, notwithstanding that the main claim
against the original defendants and the issue against Asian Bank involved the same properties; that the
allegations in the case against Spouses Genito and the other original defendants pertained to the
Republic’s claim that the properties listed in Annex A of the original complaint constituted ill-gotten
wealth, resulting in the probable forfeiture of the listed properties should the Republic establish in the
end that such original defendants had illegally or unlawfully acquired such properties; that although the
Republic conceded that neither Asian Bank nor Metrobank had any participation whatsoever in the
commission of the illegal or unlawful acts, the only issue relevant to Metrobank being whether it had
knowledge that the properties had been in custodia legis at the time of its acquisition of them to
determine its allegation of being an innocent purchaser for valuable consideration; that because the
properties were situated in the heart of Quezon City, whose land records had been destroyed by fire in
1998, resulting in the rampant proliferation of fake land titles, Asian Bank should have acted with extra
caution in ascertaining the validity of the mortgagor’s certificates of title; and that the series of
transactions involving the properties was made under dubious circumstances. 19
The Republic posits that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth pursuant to Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14 and No. 14-A
issued in 1986, laws encompassing the recovery of sequestered properties disposed of by the original
defendants while such properties remained in custodia legis and pending the final resolution of the
suit; and that the properties pertaining to Spouses Genito were among the properties placed under the
writs of sequestration issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), thereby
effectively putting such properties in custodia legis and rendering them beyond disposition except
upon the prior approval of the Sandiganbayan.20
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is partly meritorious.
The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the Republic’s motion for separate trial,
but was correct in upholding its jurisdiction over the Republic’s claim against Asian Bank
(Metrobank).
First and Second Issues:
Separate Trials are Improper
The first and second issues, being interrelated, are jointly discussed and resolved.
The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order
a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of
claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the
exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.
The rule is almost identical with Rule 42(b) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Federal Rules), a provision that governs separate trials in the United States Federal Courts
(US Federal Courts), viz:
Rule 42. Consolidation; Separate Trials.
xxxx
(b) Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim,
crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims,
crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving the inviolate right of trial
by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States.
The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several principles and parameters whose
application in this jurisdiction may be warranted because our rule on separate trials has been patterned
after the original version of Rule 42(b).21 There is no obstacle to adopting such principles and
parameters as guides in the application of our own rule on separate trials. This is because, generally
speaking, the Court has randomly accepted the practices in the US Courts in the elucidation and
application of our own rules of procedure that have themselves originated from or been inspired by the
practice and procedure in the Federal Courts and the various US State Courts.
In Bowers v. Navistar International Transport Corporation,22 we find the following explanation made
by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on the objectives of having separate
trials, to wit:
The aim and purpose of the Rule is aptly summarized in C. Wright and A Miller’s Federal Practice and
Procedure:
The provision for separate trials in Rule 42 (b) is intended to further convenience, avoid delay and
prejudice, and serve the ends of justice. It is the interest of efficient judicial administration that is to be
controlling rather than the wishes of the parties. The piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single suit is
not to be the usual course. It should be resorted to only in the exercise of informed discretion when the
court believes that separation will achieve the purposes of the rule.
xxxx
As explained recently by the Second Circuit in United v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 92-6158, 6160
1993 WL 100100, 1 (2d Cir., April 6, 1993), the purpose of separate trials under Rule 42 (b) is to
"isolate issues to be resolved, avoid lengthy and perhaps needless litigation . . . and to encourage
settlement discussions and speed up remedial action." (citing, Amoco Oil v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d
664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 469
U.S. 1072, 105 S. Ct. 565, 83 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1984) (separate trials are proper to further convenience or
to avoid prejudice); Ismail v. Cohen, 706 F. Supp. 243, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting, United States v.
International Business Machines Corp., 60 F.R.D. 654, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (separate trials
under Rule 42 (b) are appropriate, although not mandatory, to "(1) avoid prejudice; (2) provide for
convenience, or (3) expedite the proceedings and be economical.") Separate trials, however, remain the
exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d
137 (5th Cir. 1976) xxx (separation of issues is not the usual course under Rule 42 (b)). The moving
party bears the burden of establishing that separate trials are necessary to prevent prejudice or
confusion and serve the ends of justice. Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
In Divine Restoration Apostolic Church v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,23 the US District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division specified that separate trials remained the
exception, and emphasized that the moving party had the burden to establish the necessity for the
separation of issues, viz:
Rule 42 (b) provides that a court has discretion to order separate trials of claims "in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and
economy." FED. R. CIV. P.42 (b). Thus, the two primary factors to be considered in determining
whether to order separate trials are efficient judicial administration and potential prejudice. Separation
of issues for separate trials is "not the usual course that should be followed," McDaniel v. Anheuser-
Bush, Inc., 987 F. 2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1993), and the burden is on the party seeking separate trials to
prove that separation is necessary. 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2388 (3d ed. 2001).
xxxx
Still, in Corrigan v. Methodist Hospital,24 the US District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has cautioned against the unfettered granting of separate trials, thusly:
Courts order separate trials only when "clearly necessary." Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F.
Supp. 1553, 1566-67 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (citing 5 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice at pp.
42-37 to 42-38 & n.4 (1982)). This is because a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense,
and inconvenience to the parties and the courts." 5 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice P.
42-03[1], at p. 42-43 (1994); Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 115 (E.D. La.
1992); Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV. V. Apollo Computer, 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1433 (D. Del.
1989). The movant has the burden to show prejudice. Moore at p. 42-48.
x x x A Colorado District Court found three factors to weigh in determining whether to order separate
trials for separate defendants. These are 1) whether separate trials would further the convenience of the
parties; 2) whether separate trials would promote judicial economy; and 3) whether separate trials
would avoid substantial prejudice to the parties.
Tri-R Sys. V. Friedman & Son, 94 F.R.D. 726, 727 (D. Colo. 1982).
In Miller v. American Bonding Company,25 the US Supreme Court has delimited the holding of
separate trials to only the exceptional instances where there were special and persuasive reasons for
departing from the general practice of trying all issues in a case at only one time, stating:
In actions at law, the general practice is to try all the issues in a case at one time; and it is only in
exceptional instances where there are special and persuasive reasons for departing from this practice
that distinct causes of action asserted in the same case may be made the subjects of separate trials.
Whether this reasonably may be done in any particular instance rests largely in the court’s discretion.
Further, Corpus Juris Secundum26 makes clear that neither party had an absolute right to have a
separate trial of an issue; hence, the motion to that effect should be allowed only to avoid prejudice,
further convenience, promote justice, and give a fair trial to all parties, to wit:
Generally speaking, a lawsuit should not be tried piecemeal, or at least such a trial should be
undertaken only with great caution and sparingly. There should be one full and comprehensive trial
covering all disputed matters, and parties cannot, as of right, have a trial divided. It is the policy of the
law to limit the number of trials as far as possible, and
separate trials are granted only in exceptional cases. Even under a statute permitting trials of separate
issues, neither party has an absolute right to have a separate trial of an issue involved. The trial of all
issues together is especially appropriate in an action at law wherein the issues are not complicated, x x
x, or where the issues are basically the same x x x
x x x Separate trials of issues should be ordered where such separation will avoid prejudice, further
convenience, promote justice, and give a fair trial to all parties.
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant US case law, we
conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as
to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate
from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general
rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum
in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to
the parties and the courts."27
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting
separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will
avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials
of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties.
Otherwise, the general rule must apply.
As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not
constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant
to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of
convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank was necessarily connected with
the cause of action against the original defendants.1âwphi1Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue
against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the basis of the evidence adduced against the original
defendants, the properties would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of
the Republic without Metrobank being given the opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The outcome
would surely be prejudicial towards Metrobank.
The representation by the Republic in its comment to the petition of Metrobank, that the latter "merely
seeks to be afforded the opportunity to confront the witnesses and documentary exhibits," and that it
will "still be granted said right during the conduct of the separate trial, if proper grounds are presented
therefor,"28 unfairly dismisses the objective possibility of leaving the opportunity to confront the
witnesses and documentary exhibits to be given to Metrobank in the separate trial as already too late.
The properties, though already registered in the name of Asian Bank, would be meanwhile declared
liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic, causing Metrobank to suffer the deprivation of its
properties without due process of law. Only a joint trial with the original defendants could afford to
Metrobank the equal and efficient opportunity to confront and to contest all the evidence bearing on its
ownership of the properties. Hence, the disadvantages that a separate trial would cause to Metrobank
would far outweigh any good or benefit that the Republic would seemingly stand to gain from the
separation of trials.
We must safeguard Metrobank’s right to be heard in the defense of its registered ownership of the
properties, for that is what our Constitution requires us to do. Hence, the grant by the Sandiganbayan
of the Republic’s motion for separate trial, not being in furtherance of convenience or would not avoid
prejudice to a party, and being even contrary to the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence, was
arbitrary, and, therefore, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the Sandiganbayan.29
Third Issue:
Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the matter involving Metrobank
Presidential Decree No. 1606,30 as amended by Republic Act No. 797531 and Republic Act No. 8249,32
vests the Sandiganbayan with original exclusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases instituted
pursuant to and in connection with Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14 and No. 14-A, issued in
1986 by then President Corazon C. Aquino.
Executive Order No. 1 refers to cases of recovery and sequestration of ill-gotten wealth amassed by the
Marcoses their relatives, subordinates, and close associates, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or by using their powers, authority, influence, connections
or relationships. Executive Order No. 2 states that the ill-gotten wealth includes assets and properties
in the form of estates and real properties in the Philippines and abroad. Executive Orders No. 14 and
No. 14-A pertain to the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases relative to the ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies.
The amended complaint filed by the Republic to implead Asian Bank prays for reversion,
reconveyance, reconstitution, accounting and damages. In other words, the Republic would recover ill-
gotten wealth, by virtue of which the properties in question came under sequestration and are now, for
that reason, in custodia legis.33
Although the Republic has not imputed any responsibility to Asian Bank for the illegal accumulation
of wealth by the original defendants, or has not averred that Asian Bank was a business associate,
dummy, nominee, or agent of the Marcoses, the allegation in its amended complaint in Civil Case No.
0004 that Asian Bank acted with bad faith for ignoring the sequestration of the properties as ill-gotten
wealth has made the cause of action against Asian Bank incidental or necessarily connected to the
cause of action against the original defendants. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over the claim against Asian Bank, for the Court has ruled in Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan,34 that "the Sandiganbayan has original and
exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth,
but also over all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases." The Court made a
similar pronouncement sustaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Republic of the Philippines
(PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),35 to wit:
We cannot possibly sustain such a puerile stand. Peña itself already dealt with the matter when it
stated that under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, all cases of the Commission regarding alleged
illgotten properties of former President Marcos and his relatives, subordinates, cronies, nominees and
so forth, whether civil or criminal, are
lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, "and all incidents arising
from, incidental to, or related to such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s
exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court."
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for certiorari.
Let the writ of certiorari issue: (a) ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated June
25, 2004 and the Resolution dated July 13, 2005 issued by the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0004
granting the motion for separate trial of the Republic of the Philippines as to Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company; and (b), DIRECTING the Sandiganbayan to hear Civil Case No. 0004 against
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the same trial conducted against the original defendants in
Civil Case No. 0004.
The Court DECLARES that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 as against Asian Bank Corporation/Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company.
No pronouncements on costs of suit. 6
 Id. at 88.

SO ORDERED. 7
 Id. at 54-56.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN 8
 Id. at 39.
Associate Justice
9
 Id. at 164-168.
WE CONCUR:
10
 Id. at 169-175.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice 11
 Id. at 179-182.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. 12

 Id. at 40-42.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
13
 Supra note 3.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice 14
 Rollo, pp. 3-33.

CERTIFICATION 15
 Id. at 18-19.

Pursuant to Section 13, Atiicle VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the 16
 Id. at 19-22.
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division. 17
 Id. at 23-24.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 18
 Id. at 24-30.
Chief Justice
19
 Id. at 261-265.

20
 Id. at 269-271.
Footnotes 21
 According to Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d §2388, the phrase "or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy" was added in 1966 to provide an
1
 Section 2, Rule 3 I, Rules of Court. additional ground, although the addition was on its face "quite unnecessary" because this ground was
considered as a factor by the Federal Courts under the original rule. Wright & Miller write: "The
2
 Rollo, at 38-47. explanation for the change in the rule’s text lies in the union of admiralty and civil procedure effected
in 1966. In certain suits in admiralty, separation for trial of the issues of liability and damages, or of the
3
 Id. at. 48-52. extent of liability other than damages, as for salvage or general average, had been common and
beneficial, particularly in view of the statutory right to interlocutory appeal in admiralty cases, which
4
 Id. at 64-66. the unified rules preserve for those proceedings that are admiralty and maritime cases x x x."

5
 Id. at 67-69.
22
 No. 88 CIV 8857 (SS), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6129.

23
 Civil Action No. 4:09-cv-0926, 2010 U.S. Dist.
24
 No. 94-CV-1478, 874 F. Supp. 657 (1995). The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning
and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
25
 257 U.S. 304; 42 S. Ct. 98; 66 L. Ed. 250 (1921).
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
26
 CJS 88 Trial § 8-9. married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:
27
 Corrigan v. Methodist Hospital, supra note 21.
Dear Bet —
28
 Rollo, p. 261.
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
 Banal III v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 164, 174; Freedom from
29

Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157, Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.
199.
Paquing
 P.D. No. 1606 is entitled Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special Court To Be
30

Known As "Sandiganbayan" And For Other Purposes, approved on December 10, 1978. But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

 Republic Act No. 7975 is entitled An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization
31
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended, LOVE .
approved on March 30, 1995.
PAKING
 Republic Act No. 8249 is entitled An Act Further Defining The Jurisdiction Of The Sandiganbayan,
32

Amending For The Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
And For Other Purposes, approved on February 5, 1997.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
33
 Rollo, pp. 43, 54-58, and 100. evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
RULE 32 damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

6. On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and
motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2,
G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this
stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,  of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for
vs. resolution."
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant. filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee. stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the
possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September
8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the
parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable
negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant
filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule
38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated:
"That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the
plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control."
An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid.
(Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December
29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October
30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to
receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's
consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus
had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557,
October 30, 1959).
with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for
plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing
changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is
raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in
the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the
same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of
this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and
contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628,
Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a
promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated
from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C).
The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased
(Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then,
RULE 33
7.
[G.R. No. 138739. July 6, 2000]
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Spouses VICENTE and MA.
SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court cannot
remand the case for further proceedings. Rather, it should render judgment on the basis of the evidence
proffered by the plaintiff. Inasmuch as defendants in the present case admitted the due execution of the
Promissory Note both in their Answer and during the pretrial, the appellate court should have rendered
judgment on the bases of that Note and on the other pieces of evidence adduced during the trial.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the December 9, 1997 Decision[1] and the May 3,
1999 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 47737. The assailed Decision disposed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed order (dated November 4, 1994) of the Regional
Trial Court (Branch XIV) in the City of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-66507 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.[3]
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration.[4]
The Facts
The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 2, 1991, Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del
Rosario (herein respondents), jointly and severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of
Radiowealth Finance Company (herein petitioner), a Promissory Note[5] for P138,948. Pertinent
provisions of the Promissory Note read:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, on or before the date listed below, I/We promise to pay jointly and
severally Radiowealth Finance Co. or order the sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT Pesos (P138,948.00) without need of notice or
demand, in installments as follows:
P11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months starting on ________ 19__ until the amount
of P11,579.00 is fully paid. Each installment shall be due every ____ day of each month.A late
payment penalty charge of two and a half (2.5%) percent per month shall be added to each unpaid
installment from due date thereof until fully paid.
x x x x x x x x x
It is hereby agreed that if default be made in the payment of any of the installments or late payment
charges thereon as and when the same becomes due and payable as specified above, the total principal
sum then remaining unpaid, together with the agreed late payment charges thereon, shall at once
become due and payable without need of notice or demand.
x x x x x x x x x
If any amount due on this Note is not paid at its maturity and this Note is placed in the hands of an
attorney or collection agency for collection, I/We jointly and severally agree to pay, in addition to the
aggregate of the principal amount and interest due, a sum equivalent to ten (10%) per cent thereof as
attorneys and/or collection fees, in case no legal action is filed, otherwise, the sum will be equivalent to
twenty-five (25%) percent of the amount due which shall not in any case be less than FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) plus the cost of suit and other litigation expenses and, in addition, a
further sum of ten per cent (10%) of said amount which in no case shall be less than FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00), as and for liquidated damages.[6]
Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed
to pay their obligations under their Promissory Note.
On June 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Complaint[7] for the collection of a sum of money before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14.[8] During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and
collection officer of petitioner, presented in evidence the respondents check payments, the demand
letter dated July 12, 1991, the customers ledger card for the respondents, another demand letter and
Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the
transaction or the execution of any of these pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been
endorsed to him.
On July 4, 1994, the trial court issued an Order terminating the presentation of evidence for the
petitioner.[9] Thus, the latter formally offered its evidence and exhibits and rested its case on July 5,
1994.
Respondents filed on July 29, 1994 a Demurrer to Evidence[10] for alleged lack of cause of action. On
November 4, 1994, the trial court dismissed[11] the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its
claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Hence, this recourse.[12]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
According to the appellate court, the judicial admissions of respondents established their indebtedness
to the petitioner, on the grounds that they admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note, and that
their only defense was the absence of an agreement on when the installment payments were to
begin. Indeed, during the pretrial, they admitted the genuineness not only of the Promissory Note, but
also of the demand letter dated July 12, 1991. Even if the petitioners witness had no personal
knowledge of these documents, they would still be admissible if the purpose for which [they are]
produced is merely to establish the fact that the statement or document was in fact made or to show its
tenor[,] and such fact or tenor is of independent relevance.
Besides, Articles 19 and 22 of the Civil Code require that every person must -- in the exercise of rights
and in the performance of duties -- act with justice, give all else their due, and observe honesty and
good faith. Further, the rules on evidence are to be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of an action.
Issue
The petitioner raises this lone issue:
The Honorable Court of Appeals patently erred in ordering the remand of this case to the trial court
instead of rendering judgment on the basis of petitioners evidence. [13]
For an orderly discussion, we shall divide the issue into two parts: (a) legal effect of the Demurrer to
Evidence, and (b) the date when the obligation became due and demandable.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has merit. While the CA correctly reversed the trial court, it erred in remanding the case
"for further proceedings."
Consequences of a Reversal, on Appeal, of a Demurrer to Evidence
Petitioner contends that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant should be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court should render judgment
on the basis of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the trial court "for further
proceedings" would be an outright defiance of Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
On the other hand, respondents argue that the petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its claim,
simply on the ground that they lost their right to present evidence in support of their defense when the
Demurrer to Evidence was reversed on appeal. They stress that the CA merely found them indebted to
petitioner, but was silent on when their obligation became due and demandable.
The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the
consequence on appeal of a demurrer to evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent
provision of Rule 33 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.[14]
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v.
Javellana[15] pronounced:
The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal
(i.e., demur to the plaintiffs evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the
applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion,
i.e., finds that plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary
evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the
defendants evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed
before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The
doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial
court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all
possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the
material before them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the
case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still
another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same
token that if his demurrer is granted  by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal,
the movant losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have
elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiffs case and evidence.  In such event, the appellate court
which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of
plaintiffs evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present
their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on
appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants
lose the right to present their own evidence. [16] The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case
and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations. [17]
In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint
on the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate
court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of
evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants.
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the
basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly ruled that the
documentary evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated xxx,
and that the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary exhibits xxx enumerated in the
appealed order,[18] we agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide the
collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the
basis of the facts on record.
Due and Demandable Obligation
Petitioner claims that respondents are liable for the whole amount of their debt and the interest thereon,
after they defaulted on the monthly installments.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the installments were not yet due and
demandable. Petitioner had allegedly allowed them to apply their promotion services for its financing
business as payment of the Promissory Note. This was supposedly evidenced by the blank space left
for the date on which the installments should have commenced.[19] In other words, respondents theorize
that the action for immediate enforcement of their obligation is premature because its fulfillment is
dependent on the sole will of the debtor. Hence, they consider that the proper court should first fix a
period for payment, pursuant to Articles 1180 and 1197 of the Civil Code.
This contention is untenable. The act of leaving blank the due date of the first installment did not
necessarily mean that the debtors were allowed to pay as and when they could. If this was the intention
of the parties, they should have so indicated in the Promissory Note. However, it did not reflect any
such intention.
On the contrary, the Note expressly stipulated that the debt should be amortized monthly in
installments of P11,579 for twelve consecutive months. While the specific date on which each
installment would be due was left blank, the Note clearly provided that each installment should be
payable each month.
Furthermore, it also provided for an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, both of which
showed the intention of the parties that the installments should be paid at a definite date. Had they
intended that the debtors could pay as and when they could, there would have been no need for these
two clauses.
Verily, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties manifest their intention and knowledge
that the monthly installments would be due and demandable each month.[20] In this case, the conclusion
that the installments had already became due and demandable is bolstered by the fact that respondents
started paying installments on the Promissory Note, even if the checks were dishonored by their
drawee bank. We are convinced neither by their avowals that the obligation had not yet matured nor by
their claim that a period for payment should be fixed by a court.
Convincingly, petitioner has established not only a cause of action against the respondents, but also a
due and demandable obligation. The obligation of the respondents had matured and they clearly
defaulted when their checks bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one
month (April 2, 1991) after the date of the Note because the check representing their first installment
bounced.
As for the disputed documents submitted by the petitioner, the CA ruling in favor of their
admissibility, which was not challenged by the respondents, stands. A party who did not appeal cannot
obtain affirmative relief other than that granted in the appealed decision. [21]
It should be stressed that respondents do not contest the amount of the principal obligation. Their
liability as expressly stated in the Promissory Note and found by the CA is P13[8],948.00[22] which is
payable in twelve (12) installments at P11,579.00 a month for twelve (12) consecutive months. As
correctly found by the CA, the "ambiguity" in the Promissory Note is clearly attributable to human
error.[23]
Petitioner, in its Complaint, prayed for 14% interest per annum from May 6, 1993 until fully paid. We
disagree. The Note already stipulated a late payment penalty of 2.5 percent monthly to be added to
each unpaid installment until fully paid. Payment of interest was not expressly stipulated in the
Note. Thus, it should be deemed included in such penalty.
In addition, the Note also provided that the debtors would be liable for attorneys fees equivalent to 25
percent of the amount due in case a legal action was instituted and 10 percent of the same amount as
liquidated damages. Liquidated damages, however, should no longer be imposed for being
unconscionable.[24] Such damages should also be deemed included in the 2.5 percent monthly
penalty. Furthermore, we hold that petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees, but only in a sum equal to 10
percent of the amount due which we deem reasonable under the proven facts.[25]
The Court deems it improper to discuss respondents' claim for moral and other damages. Not having
appealed the CA Decision, they are not entitled to affirmative relief, as already explained earlier. [26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is MODIFIED in that the remand
is SET ASIDE and respondents are ordered TO PAY P138,948, plus 2.5 percent penalty charge per
month beginning April 2, 1991 until fully paid, and 10 percent of the amount due as attorneys fees. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. plaintiff has shown no right to relief. However, if the motion is granted and the order of dismissal is
reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf.

[15]
 33 SCRA 755, 761-762, June 30, 1970, per Zaldivar, J.

 Siayngco v. Costibolo, 27 SCRA 272, 284, February 28, 1969; Tison v. Court of Appeals, 276
[16]

SCRA 582, 599-600, July 31, 1997.

 Rollo, pp. 23-30. Promulgated by the Third Division composed of J. Ramon Mabutas Jr., ponente; JJ
[1]
[17]
 Atun v. Nuez, 97 Phil. 762, 765, October 26, 1955; Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil. 493.
Emerito C. Cui, Division chairman, and Hilarion L. Aquino, member, both concurring.
[18]
 CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 26-27.
[2]
 Rollo, p. 20. In this Resolution, J. Cui was replaced by J. Corona Ibay-Somera.
[19]
 Respondents Answer, p. 1; rollo, p. 35.
[3]
 Assailed Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 29.

 Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that [i]n order to judge the intention of the contracting
[20]
[4]
 Rollo, p. 20.
parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
[5]
 Annex C; rollo, p. 31.
 Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330, May 21, 1998; Dio v. Concepcion, 296 SCRA
[21]

579, September 25, 1998. Filflex Industrial & Manufacturing Corporation v. National Labor Relations
[6]
 Annex C; rollo, p. 31. Commission, 286 SCRA 245, February 12, 1998; Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 300 SCRA 37, December 10, 1998; Quezon
[7]
 Rollo, pp. 32-34. Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 206, December 16, 1998.

[8]
 Presided by Judge Inocencio D. Maliaman.  There was a typographical error in the CA Decision. As reflected in the Promissory Note, the
[22]

amount should be P138,948 not P130,948.

[9]
 Appellants Brief before the CA, p. 4; rollo, p. 48.
[23]
 CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 27.
[10]
 Rollo, pp. 37-38.
 Article 2226 of the Civil Code provides that [l]iquidated damages, whether intended as an
[24]

[11]
 Rollo, pp. 40-41. indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.

 This case was deemed submitted for decision upon receipt by this Court on April 28, 2000 of the
[12]
 Law Firm of Raymuncdo A. Armovit v. CA, 202 SCRA 16, September 27, 1991, Pascual v. CA,
[25]

petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Allan B. Gepty of Singson Valdez & 300 SCRA 214, December 16, 1998.
Associates. Respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty. Eduardo V. Bringas of Romeo R. Bringas &
Associates, was received earlier, on April 3, 2000. [26]
 See note 21.

[13]
 Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 4; rollo, p. 96. Original written in capital letters.

[14]
 In the old Rules, the same provision is worded in Section 1 of Rule 35 as follows:

SECTION 1. Effect of judgment on demurrer to evidence.After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the
motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
8.
[G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002]
LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a
certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion; and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or speedy under the
circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiffs evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to prove
the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the defendant
to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome
imposition on the courts docket and an assault on the defendants resources and peace of mind. In short,
such denial needlessly delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
March 16, 2000 Decision[1] and the May 22, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. [4]
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born,
Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a Complaint[5] for the annulment of his marriage to
petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098.Afterwards he filed an Amended
Complaint[6] dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based
on her alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified,
he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits[7] dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection
to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)[8] dated May 11, 1998. The lower
court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order[9] denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It
held that [respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert. [10] After
her Motion for Reconsideration[11] was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order,[12] petitioner elevated the
case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari,[13] docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence;
and if an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom. [14] In any event, no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders. [15]
The CA also ruled that the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound
exercise of the [trial] courts discretion.[16] Further, the [p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the
court below [had] been resolved arbitrarily or without basis.[17]
Hence, this Petition.[18]
The Issues
In her Memorandum,[19] petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is she under obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals required
of her, to present her evidence, and when an unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law, despite the palpably and patently weak and grossly insufficient or so
inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of marriage case, grounded
on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such circumstances, can the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and
2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did the Court of Appeals
wantonly violate, ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this
Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019,
January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA 17)?[20]
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to
evidence? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring
the applicable law and jurisprudence?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent weakness and gross
insufficiency of respondents evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the immediate recourse of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent counters that appeal in due course, not
certiorari, is the proper remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21] this Court declared that appeal -- not
certiorari -- in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari
when the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule
41 provides:
No appeal may be taken from:
x x x x x x x x x
(c) An interlocutory order;
x x x x x x x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. [22]
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.[23]
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition for certiorari. [24] In Cruz v. People, this exception was
stressed by the Court in this wise:
Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory
orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.[25]
Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances, this Court is
now tasked to determine whether the present case falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC
indeed committed a patent error or grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at
law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law
(whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.[26] The demurrer challenges the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict.[27] In passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.[28]
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence
against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological
incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the
latters psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges
included Complaints for perjury,[29] false testimony,[30] concubinage[31] and deportation.[32] According to
him, the filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner)
wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that this
is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the
father of her children, had acted to the contrary.[33]
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her
as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases
against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the
cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not
only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary
offerings, sufficient to prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:
Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. What do you mean by that?
A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want it Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of
aborted by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention of procreative petitioners personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and
sexuality.[34] (3) lack of an intention of procreative sexuality. None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes
psychological incapacity. Far from it.
x x x x x x x x x
In Santos v. CA,[37] this Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
ATTY. CHUA: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.[38] Said the Court:

And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
elaborate on this what you mean by carefree approximating psychologically incapacitated? deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
ATTY. MIRANO: psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
I think we better ask the witness what he means by carefree. Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must
ATTY. CHUA: stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
Okay. incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
COURT: obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
Witness may answer.
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. [39]
WITNESS:
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,[40] we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than
She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants me to hire an just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that
attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not bother to let a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
the children see a doctor.[35] psychological incapacity.

x x x x x x x x x In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get
along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or
STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua): incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.

ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any
characteristic or traits which you consider as psychological incapacity?
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she wont talk to me when I call
her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am
busy with some other things. So, I think that is all.[36]
Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to
bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we
affirmed that mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity.The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. [41]
Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative sexuality is easily
belied by the fact that two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no
showing that the alleged defect was already existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony
presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove
the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the
incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony are quoted thus:
ATTY. CHUA:
And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband and
the wife in the present case have a personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?
WITNESS:
They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they are not
compatible with each other?
A. Yes.
Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder,
bordering on abnormality?
A. Yes.
Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?
A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to
handle marriage, that should try to intervene.
Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call maximum tolerance
and give and take, will that serve the purpose?
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?
A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot be
harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried professional help to take care of their marital problem,
it could have been solved.
Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any from Tom,
Dick and Harry could handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities which
they were incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they will not mix, they will be always
quarreling with each other. They should not have got married.[42]
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that
both are normal?
A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.
Q. Normal, simply incompatible.
A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last page. That
they are like oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and water, they will not mix.
Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the frequent
quarrels had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major quarrel?
A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.[43]
x x x x x x x x x
Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?
A. Yes.[44]
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?
A. Yes. A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and
he said, he doesnt know.
Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?
ATTY. CHUA
A. Yes.
Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and
Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the written psychological examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that?
necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
WITNESS
A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.[45]
A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile. [49]
x x x x x x x x x
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely
Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case? been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand
information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and
A. Yes. unreliable.

Q. Because of the
A. The incompatibility.
Q. Incompatibility.
A. Yes.[46]
His testimony established merely that the spouses had an incompatibility, a defect that could possibly
be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent
insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions
communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of
her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion[47] began with the
statement [I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x.[48]The expert witness testified
thus:
ATTY. CHUA
Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the
plaintiff who is the husband?
WITNESS
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioners character, not
only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also through the formers at least fifteen
hours[50] of study of the voluminous transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a
whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of
petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never been objected to, the
objection raised thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It
held that although the question of admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on
appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has
no probative value.[51]
We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish
the incapacity adequately.[52] Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was
completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any
medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and
taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as
we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing
contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly insufficient to support a
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of
discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in
point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for
the parties and an unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.
We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates [9]
 Id., pp. 442-445.
or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. [53] Any decision, order or resolution
of a lower court tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is [10]
 Order dated December 2, 1998; records, pp. 444-445.
unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.[54]
[11]
 Records, pp. 446-449.
There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the case at bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the [12]
 Id., p. 461.
patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go
needlessly through a protracted trial, which would further clog the court dockets with another futile
case.[55]
[13]
 Petition dated June 3, 1999; CA rollo, pp. 2-22.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET

[14]
 CA Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 27.
ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No
[15]
 Ibid.
pronouncement as to costs.
[16]
 Id., pp. 4 & 27-A.
SO ORDERED.
[17]
 Ibid.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
 The case was deemed submitted for decision on February 12, 2001, upon this Courts receipt of the
[18]

Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on official leave. Memorandum for respondent signed by Attys. William N. Mirano and Gina H. Mirano of Mirano,
Mirano & Mirano. Petitioners Memorandum, received on December 29, 2000, was signed by Atty.
Joselito T. Bayatan.

[19]
 Rollo, pp. 108-127.

[20]
 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p. 116.

 Annex A of the Petition; rollo, pp. 25-28; penned by Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by
[1]
[21]
 300 SCRA 744, December 29, 1998.
Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and Andres B. Reyes Jr. (member).
[22]
 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
 Annex C of the Petition; rollo, p. 39.
[23]
 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[3]
 CA Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 27-A.
[24]
 Ong v. People, 342 SCRA 372, October 9, 2000; Gutib v. CA, 312 SCRA 365, August 13, 1999.
[4]
 Annex B of the Petition; rollo, pp. 29-38.
[25]
 303 SCRA 533, 538, February 23, 1999, per Pardo, J.
[5]
 Complaint dated October 27, 1993; records, pp. 13-21.
[26]
 Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990), p. 433.
[6]
 Records, pp. 25-33.
[27]
 Ong v. People, supra; Gutib v. CA, supra.
[7]
 Id., pp. 239-261.
[28]
 Ibid.
[8]
 Id., pp. 377-389.
[29]
 As evidenced by Exhibits D to M and FF to GG. [50]
 Id., pp. 14-15.

[30]
 As evidenced by Exhibits O to P.  City Government of Davao v. Monteverde-Consunji, GR No. 136825, May 21, 2001; People v.
[51]

Williams, 357 SCRA 124, April 20, 2001; Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. CA, 351 SCRA 445, February
[31]
 As evidenced by Exhibits Q to R. 9, 2001.

[32]
 As evidenced by Exhibits HH to JJ.
[52]
 Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000.

[33]
 Formal Offer of Exhibits, p. 3; records, p. 241.  Republic v. COCOFED, GR Nos. 147062-64, December 14, 2001; Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 161,
[53]

April 15, 1998.

[34]
 TSN, February 28, 1996, p. 10.
[54]
 Ibid.
[35]
 Id., p. 15.
 Emergency Loan Pawnshop, Inc. v. CA, 353 SCRA 89, February 28, 2001; Far East Bank and
[55]

[36]
 Id., p. 19. Trust Co. v. CA, 341 SCRA 485, September 29, 2000; MB Finance Corp. v. Abesamis, 

[37]
 240 SCRA 20, January 4, 1995.

[38]
 Id., p. 33, per Vitug, J.

[39]
 Id., p. 34.

[40]
 268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

[41]
 Id., pp. 211-212.

[42]
 TSN, February 11, 1998, pp. 23-27.

[43]
 Id., pp. 41-42.

[44]
 Id., p. 46.

[45]
 Id., pp. 49-50.

[46]
 Id., pp. 62-63.

[47]
 Exhibit MM; records, pp. 367-370.

[48]
 Professional Opinion, p. 4; Exhibit MM, records, p. 370.

[49]
 TSN, February 11, 1998, pp. 48-49.
9.
G.R. No. L-60601 December 29, 1983
CESAR NEPOMUCENO, LEON ARCILLAS and RUBEN AVENIDO, petitioners,  resolution that its reference therein to 'due process — is the filing of the proper petition in accordance
vs.
THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and OSCAR LASERNA, respondents.
Ceferino P. Padua, Amado R. Perez and Marciano P. Brion Jr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
This is the third time that petitioners have come to this Court to challenge the actuations of the
respondent Commission on Elections in PDC Case No. 65, entitled "Oscar Laserna, Petitioner, versus
Cesar Nepomuceno, et al., Respondents."
Petitioners Cesar Nepomuceno, Leon Arcillas and Ruben Avenido were the official candidates of the
Nacionalista Party in the 1980 local elections for the positions of mayor, vicemayor and member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. On January 14, 1980, private respondent
Oscar Laserna filed a petition before the COMELEC, docketed as PDC Case No. 65, to disqualify
petitioners on the ground of turncoatism. On January 25, 1980, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8484, granting said petition, thereby denying due course to petitioners' certificates of candidacy.
Alleging denial of due process, petitioners assailed said resolution in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed with this Court on January 28, 1980
[G.R. Nos. 52427 and 52506]. We issued a restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from enforcing
Resolution No. 8484, by reason wherefore petitioners were allowed to be voted for in the elections of
January 30, 1980. It appears that in said elections, petitioners won and were Proclaimed winners in
their respective positions.
On May 15, 1980, We issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 52427 and G.R. No. 52506, setting aside the
challenged resolution and remanding the cases to respondent COMELEC "for a full dress hearing in
accordance with due process and to decide the cases as expeditiously as possible after giving the
parties full opportunity to present all evidence relevant to the issue of alleged turncoatism."
The COMELEC accordingly set PDC Case No. 65 for hearing on the merits. However, on July 17,
1980, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the said case, alleging that it being a pre-election case, the
same should be dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate quo warrants proceedings
pursuant to Section 189 of the 1978 Election Code. Having obtained an unfavorable ruling from the
COMELEC, petitioners filed another petition with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 54633, assailing
the COMELEC's resolution which denied their motion to dismiss. On December 22, 1980, We
dismissed this second petition, as follows:
... there is no legal basis for the allegation in the instant petition that this Court "meant by said
with Section 189 and 190 of the 1978 Election Code' and that the disqualification Case PDC No. 65 in
the Comelec has become functus officio after the election, proclamation and assumption to office of
petitioners herein, the Court resolved to DISMISS the petition. Had this Court intended to convert the
pre-proclamation proceedings in PDC Case No. 65 into either a protest or a quo warrants, the
resolution would have been so worded and the case would not have been remanded to the COMELEC
which has no jurisdiction, as corrective pointed out by petitioners, over such protest or quo
warranty which belongs to the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, Of course, the resolution is
without prejudice to petitioners choosing, if they prefer to expedite proceedings, to abandon the pre-
proclamation contest and instead proceed directly to the Proper Court of First Instance with a protest
or quo warrants, as may be proper.
Likewise, denying the motion for reconsideration of the above Resolution on June 8, 1982, We said:
G.R. No. 54633 [Cesar Nepomuceno, et al., vs, Commission on Elections, et al.]. — Acting or, the
motion filed by petitioners for reconsideration of the resolution of this Court of December 22, 1980,
the Court resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit. With the clarification made in sari resolution,
it is now the law of the case as to the parties herein that PDC No. 65 pending in the Comelec is a pre-
proclamation proceeding. However, the Court did not deem it wise to issue any order disturbing the
continuance in office of Petitioners precisely because they are entitled to due process in the
disqualification case PDC No. 65 This denial is final ...
Thereafter, the Comelec proceeded to hear PDC Case No. 65, with petitioners' manifestation 'That
"They do not waive their right to question the jurisdiction of the Comelec" having been placed on
record. After respondent Oscar Laserna had terminated the presentation of Ms evidence, petitioners
filed their respective Motions to Dismiss/Demurer to Evidence, which were reasonably opposed by
respondent Laserna. Rejoinders and memoranda were filed by the parties, and on March 31, 1982, the
Comelec issued the following order denying the demurrer to evidence, to wit:
RESPONDENTS BY COUNSEL individually filed demurers to the evidence, to which the petitioner
did not lose time to oppose. lt is uniformly maintained by said respondents that the evidence already
adduced by the petitioner does not establish a good cause to proceed against them, for which reason the
petition as against them should be dismiss. Petitioner disagreed, arguing otherwise.
The demurers should be DENIED. The Commission [Second Division] would rather have the complete
facts and evidence of the parties upon which to reach a decision than prematurely go into it now upon
the facts and evidence of the petitioner only. The rationale behind such a procedure is to enable this
Body to properly adjudicate the case on its merits and to ventilate the adversary issues on the basis of
all the facts and evidence presented by the contending parties. [See Singco vs. Costobolo, No. L-
22506, Feb. 28, 1982] [Annex "L", Rollo, p. 89]
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the above order were likewise derived.
On April 15, 1982, petitioners filed with the Comelec another Motion to Dismiss, which was denied in
an order dated April 16, 1982. This order was designed for the division by presiding commissioner
Luis L. Lardizabal [Annex "T", Rollo. p. 126]. From these orders, petitioners come to Us, alleging:
1. THAT THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
AN ACT IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO RESOLVE
PETITIONERS' DEMURER TO EVIDENCE BY WAY OF A JUDGMENT WHEREIN IT SHOULD
STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH THE IS RESOLUTION IS BASED.
2. THAT THE RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF' DISCRETION, AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION. IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO DISMISS.
3. THAT THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN PROMULGATING THE RESOLUTION OF
APRIL 16, 1982 THROUGH THE ACT OF ONLY ONE MEMBER OF A DIVISION.
Petitioners are obviously misled by the title of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, "Judgment on Demurer
to Evidence." Said Rule, consisting of only one section, allows the defendant to move for dismissal of
the case after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, and
provides for the effects of the dismissal or non-dismissal, as the case may be, on the right of the
defendant to present his cause. Otherwise stated, it authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part as the relief sought. The demurrer,
therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to
dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.
It is thus apparent that the requirement of Section 1 of Rule 36 1 would only apply if the demurrer is
granted, for in this event, there would in fact be an adjudication on the merits of the case, leaving
nothing more to be done, except perhaps to interpose an appeal. However, a denial of the demurrer is
not a final judgment, but merely interlocutory in character as it does not finally dispose of the case, the
defendant having yet the right to present his evidence, as provided for under Section 1 of Rule 35.
In Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 2 We have ruled that "... Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution and
Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court, which require express findings of fact in a decision, have no
application to the questioned Order. Here involved is not a decision on the merits but a mere order
upon a motion to reconsider. The judge could simply dish out a routine capsule form order denied for
lack of merit' or 'motion for reconsideration denied.' And yet, that kind of order would serve to
immunize the judge against an unlawful neglect of duty charge. ..."
The challenged order being merely an interlocutory order and not a final judgment or decision, no
abuse of discretion was committed by respondent Comelec in its failure to state the facts and the law
on which its order denying petitioners' demurrer to evidence is based.
The second issue raised by petitioners hardly deserves serious consideration. It had long been laid to
rest in our Resolutions in G.R. No. 54633, and considering the number of times petitioners have
succeeded in suspending the proceedings before the COMELEC, their insistence on raising said issue
over and over again is an obvious dilatory tactic intended to frustrate this Court's directive to
respondent COMELEC to have the case heard and terminated as expeditiously as possible.
Neither is there merit in petitioners' third contention that the order of April 16, 1982 signed for the
division by Presiding Commissioner Luis Lardizabal violated Sec. 3, Art. XII c of the Constitution,
which provides:
SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases
may be heard and decided by divisions, except contests involving Members of the National Assembly,
which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be
decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Comment,
It is plain that this provision refers to a decision on the merits of the case, where the contending causes
of the parties are decided with finality, one way or the other. The fallacy of petitioners' contention is
obvious. Their argument proceeds from the erroneous premise that the April 16, 1982 resolution is a
decision on the merits.
Clearly, the said resolution is merely interlocutory, and being such, the Presiding Commissioner of the
Division is competent to sign said resolution alone (Resolution No. 9805 dated June 18, 1980 of the
Comelec).
WHEREFORE, the petitioner is hereby denied. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr. ,JJ., concur
Fernando, CJ., Makasiar J., took no part.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's judgment which, four years after the holding of the 1980 local elections,
would still allow the pre-proclamation petition to disqualify petitioners (on grounds of alleged
turncoatism filed by a mere voter) as the duly elected and proclaimed mayor, vice mayor and
Sangguniang Bayan member of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. I reiterate the grounds and considerations therefor
as stated in my separate opinions in G.R. Nos. 52427 and 52506 dated May 15, 1980 and in G.R. No.
54633 dated December 22, 1980 which are hereby reproduced by reference in the interest of brevity.
Suffice it to reproduce, however, what I mad stressed in my above-cited separate opinion of May 15,
1980, viz: "(I) reiterate my stand that all such pre-election cases seeking to disqualify the winner
simply on the ground of alleged turncoatism should be ordered dismissed after the last January 30th
elections, subject to the filing all an appropriate quo warrants action or election protest against the
winner in the appropriate forum."
In my separate dissenting opinion in the second case of December 22, 1980, I had pointed out that
"Guaranteed, it would be a legal anomaly if at this late stage, almost a year after the January 30, 1980
elections [it is actually now 4 years after the elections, the Comelec would be still dealing with the
cases at bar as if they were a pre-proclamation contest when petitioners had already been duly
proclaimed and had duly assumed their respective offices by virtue of the Comelec's very Resolution
(No. 9258) of February 23, 1980, which lifted the previous suspension of the effects of their
proclamation. These effects and realities can no longer be challenged or undone in a pre-proclamation
controversy (which has long become moot and functus officio by the Comelec's own action of
February 23, 1980) but in the proper election protest or quo warrants action before the court of first
instance."
Finally, it should be pointed out that the principle invoked by me has been reaffirmed by the Court in a
continuous host of cases, mostly penned by the Chief Justice, the latest, old which was issued on this
very same month in G.R. No. 57219-20, entitled "Ramon B. Resurreccion et al. vs. Comelec, et al.
wherein the Court once adore reaffirmed that "this petition falls squarely within the authoritative Sande
Aguinaldo doctrine. 1 As therein set forth: 'Since Venezuela v. Commission on Elections, this Court has
invariably adhered to the principle that after the holding of the January 30, 1980 election, and a
proclamation thereafter made, a petition to disqualify a candidate based on a change of political party
affiliation when six months immediately preceding or Following an election. filed with this Court after
January 30, 1980, arising from a pre-proclamation controversy, should be dismissed without prejudice
to such ground being passed upon in a proper election protest or quo warrants proceeding. Where,
however, such constitutional provision had been seasonably invoked prior to that date with the
Commission on Election is having acted on it and the matter then elevated to this Court before such
election, the issue thus presented should resolved. 2 Since its promulgation on January 5, 1981, such a
principle was followed subsequently in the following cases: Laguda v. Commission on
Elections; 3 Agcaoili Jr. v. Santos; 4 Mitmug v. Commission on Elections; 5 Jagunap v. Commission on
Elections; 6 Mogueis Jr. v. Commission on Elections; 7 Faderanga v. Commission on
Elections, 8Pasion v. Commission on Elections; 9 Mangca v. Commission on Elections; 10 Disini v.
Commission on Elections;11and Robes v. Commission on Elections." 12
As I had stated in my separate opinion in Singco v. Comelec, 13 only "In this wise (would) this Court's
dockets be cleared of all such pending pre-proclamation or post-election cases seeking to disqualify the
winners or to prevent or annul their proclamation (even at this late stage, 10 months after the holding
of the elections.), 14 in the with the President's own view as reported in the February 27, 1980
newspapers whereby he 'ordered the lawyers of the KBL [Kilusang Bagong Lipunan] to withdraw all
disqualification charges to allow already proclaimed opposition candidates involved in such cases to
assume office, reserving the right to file an election protest' (although such Presidential orders seem to
have been ignored since I am not aware of any disqualification case before us that has been so
withdrawn).
 
 
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's judgment which, four years after the holding of the 1980 local elections,
would still allow the pre-proclamation petition to disqualify petitioners (on grounds of alleged
turncoatism filed by a mere voter) as the duly elected and proclaimed mayor, vice mayor and
Sangguniang Bayan member of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. I reiterate the grounds and considerations therefor
as stated in my separate opinions in G.R. Nos. 52427 and 52506 dated May 15, 1980 and in G.R. No.
54633 dated December 22, 1980 which are hereby reproduced by reference in the interest of brevity.
Suffice it to reproduce, however, what I mad stressed in my above-cited separate opinion of May 15,
1980, viz: "(I) reiterate my stand that all such pre-election cases seeking to disqualify the winner
simply on the ground of alleged turncoatism should be ordered dismissed after the last January 30th
elections, subject to the filing all an appropriate quo warrants action or election protest against the
winner in the appropriate forum."
In my separate dissenting opinion in the second case of December 22, 1980, I had pointed out that
"Guaranteed, it would be a legal anomaly if at this late stage, almost a year after the January 30, 1980
elections [it is actually now 4 years after the elections, the Comelec would be still dealing with the
cases at bar as if they were a pre-proclamation contest when petitioners had already been duly
proclaimed and had duly assumed their respective offices by virtue of the Comelec's very Resolution
(No. 9258) of February 23, 1980, which lifted the previous suspension of the effects of their
proclamation. These effects and realities can no longer be challenged or undone in a pre-proclamation
controversy (which has long become moot and functus officio by the Comelec's own action of
February 23, 1980) but in the proper election protest or quo warrants action before the court of first
instance."
Finally, it should be pointed out that the principle invoked by me has been reaffirmed by the Court in a
continuous host of cases, mostly penned by the Chief Justice, the latest, old which was issued on this
very same month in G.R. No. 57219-20, entitled "Ramon B. Resurreccion et al. vs. Comelec, et al.
wherein the Court once adore reaffirmed that "this petition falls squarely within the authoritative Sande 4 G.R. No. 52791. Feb. 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 350.
Aguinaldo doctrine. 1 As therein set forth: 'Since Venezuela v. Commission on Elections, this Court has
invariably adhered to the principle that after the holding of the January 30, 1980 election, and a 5 G.R. No. 54082, Mar. 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 455.
proclamation thereafter made, a petition to disqualify a candidate based on a change of political party
affiliation when six months immediately preceding or Following an election. filed with this Court after 6 G.R. Nos. 53062 & 53345, Apr. 24, 1981, 104 SCRA 204.
January 30, 1980, arising from a pre-proclamation controversy, should be dismissed without prejudice
to such ground being passed upon in a proper election protest or quo warrants proceeding. Where,
however, such constitutional provision had been seasonably invoked prior to that date with the 7 G.R. No. 53376, May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA 476.
Commission on Election is having acted on it and the matter then elevated to this Court before such
election, the issue thus presented should resolved. 2 Since its promulgation on January 5, 1981, such a 8 G.R. No. 55938, June 26, 1981, 105 SCRA 123.
principle was followed subsequently in the following cases: Laguda v. Commission on
Elections; 3 Agcaoili Jr. v. Santos; 4 Mitmug v. Commission on Elections; 5 Jagunap v. Commission on 9 G.R. No. 54151, Nov. 16, 1981, 109 SCRA 238.
Elections; 6 Mogueis Jr. v. Commission on Elections; 7 Faderanga v. Commission on
Elections, 8Pasion v. Commission on Elections; 9 Mangca v. Commission on Elections; 10 Disini v. 10 G.R. Nos. 58309-10, Feb. 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 273.
Commission on Elections;11and Robes v. Commission on Elections." 12
11 G.R. Nos. 52502, Dec. 30, 1982, 119 SCRA 511.
As I had stated in my separate opinion in Singco v. Comelec, 13 only "In this wise (would) this Court's
dockets be cleared of all such pending pre-proclamation or post-election cases seeking to disqualify the
12 G.R. No. 63130, June 28, 1983, 123 SCRA 193.
winners or to prevent or annul their proclamation (even at this late stage, 10 months after the holding
of the elections.), 14 in the with the President's own view as reported in the February 27, 1980
newspapers whereby he 'ordered the lawyers of the KBL [Kilusang Bagong Lipunan] to withdraw all 13 G.R. No. 52830, prom. Nov. 28, 1980.
disqualification charges to allow already proclaimed opposition candidates involved in such cases to
assume office, reserving the right to file an election protest' (although such Presidential orders seem to 14 It should be noted that 4 years have already elapsed now since the local elections of January 30,
have been ignored since I am not aware of any disqualification case before us that has been so 1980.
withdrawn).

Footnotes

1 Section 1, Rule 36 provides:

Rendition of judgments. All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally
and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of the court".

2 8 SCRA 890.

TEEHANKEE, J.,

1 G.R. No. 53953, Jan. 5,1981.102 SCRA 1.

2 Ibid.

3 G.R. No. 53747, Feb. 20, 1981, '102 SCRA 857.

10. CORPORATION,

Republic of the Philippines Respondent.

SUPREME COURT

Manila
G.R. No. 150731
 
 
 
Present:
SECOND DIVISION
 
 
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
 
CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., TINGA, and

Petitioner, VELASCO, JR., JJ.

   

  Promulgated:

   

- versus - September 14, 2007

 
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
PHILBANKING
 
DECISION
 
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 
On appeal to this Court through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the March 29, 2001 Decision[1] and
November 7, 2001 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63979
entitled Philbanking Corporation v. Casent Realty Development Corporation. The CA reversed the
May 12, 1999 Order[3] of the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 145 in Civil Case No.
93-2612, which granted petitioners demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint filed by
respondent.
 
The Facts
 
The facts according to the appellate court are as follows:
 
In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor of
Rare Realty Corporation (Rare Realty) involving the amounts of PhP 300,000 (PN No. 84-04) and
PhP 681,500 (PN No. 84-05). It was agreed in PN No. 84-04 that the
loan it covered would earn an interest of 36% per annum and a penalty of 12% in case of non-payment
by June 27, 1985, while the loan covered by PN No. 84-05 would earn an interest of 18% per annum
and 12% penalty if not paid by June 25, 1985.[4] On August 8, 1986, these promissory notes were
assigned to respondent Philbanking Corporation through a Deed of Assignment.[5]
 
Respondent alleged that despite demands, petitioner failed to pay the promissory notes upon maturity
such that its obligation already amounted to PhP 5,673,303.90 as of July 15, 1993. Respondent filed
on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the Makati City RTC for the collection of said amount. In its
Answer,[6] petitioner raised the following as special/affirmative defenses:
1.                 The complaint stated no cause of action or if there was any, the same was barred by
estoppel, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, laches, prescription, payment,and/or release;
 
2.                 On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago[7] (Dacion) which ceded and
conveyed petitioners property in Iloilo City to respondent, with the intention of totally
extinguishing petitioners outstanding accounts with respondent. Petitioner presented a Confirmation
Statement[8] dated April 3, 1989 issued by respondentstating that petitioner had no loans with the bank
as of December 31, 1988.
3.                 Petitioner complied with the condition in the Dacion regarding the repurchase of the
property since the obligation was fully paid. Respondent sent confirmation statements in the latter
months of 1989, which showed that petitioner had no more outstanding loan; and
4.                 Assuming that petitioner still owed respondent, the latter was already estopped since in
October 1988, it reduced its authorized capital stock by 50% to wipe out a deficit of
PhP 41,265,325.12.[9]
 
Thus, petitioner, by way of compulsory counterclaim, alleged that it made an overpayment of
approximately PhP 4 million inclusive of interest based on Central Bank Reference Lending Rates on
dates of overpayment. Petitioner further claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fee,
amounting to PhP 4.5 million plus the costs of suit as a consequence of respondents insistence on
collecting.[10]
 
The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial
conference. Thereafter, respondent presented its evidence and formally offered its
exhibits. Petitionerthen filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence, [11] pointing out that
the plaintiffs failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since
the Dacion obliterated petitioners obligation covered by the promissory notes, the bank had no right to
collect anymore.
Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition[12] which alleged that: (1) the grounds relied upon
by petitioner in its demurrer involved its defense and not insufficiency of evidence; (2) the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement had yet to be offered in evidence and evaluated;
and (3) since respondent failed to file a Reply, then all the new matters alleged in the Answer were
deemed controverted.[13]
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint through the May 12,
1999 Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] finding defendants Motion For Judgment On Demurrer To
The Evidence to be meritorious[,] the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, considering that the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff having been extinguish[ed] by a Dacion en Pago duly
executed by said parties, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice. Without Cost.
[14]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, respondent alleged that the trial court gravely erred because the promissory notes were not
covered by the Dacion, and that respondent was able to prove its causes of action and right to relief by
overwhelming preponderance of evidence. It explained that at the time of execution of the Dacion, the
subject of the promissory notes wasthe indebtedness of petitioner to Rare Realty and not to the
Bankthe party to the Dacion. It was only in 1989 after Rare Realty defaulted in its obligation
to respondent when the latter enforced the security provided under the Deed of Assignment by trying
to collect from petitioner, because it was only then that petitioner became directly liable
to respondent. It was also for this reason that the April 3, 1989 Confirmation
Statement stated that petitioner had no obligations to repondent as of December 31, 1988. On the other
hand, petitioner claimed that the Deed of Assignment provided that Rare Realty lost its rights, title, and
interest to directly proceed against petitioner on the promissory notes since these were transferred
to respondent. Petitioner reiterated that the Dacion covered all conceivable amounts including the
promissory notes.[15]
The appellate court ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to be resolved in a
demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the facts presented and the
law. Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer which alleged the Dacion,
and that its genuineness and due execution were not atissue. It added that the court a quo should have
resolved whether the two promissory notes were covered by the Dacion, and that since petitioners
demurrer was granted, it had already lost its right to present its evidence. [16]
The CA found that under the Deed of Assignment, respondent clearly had the right to
proceed against the promissory notes assigned by Rare Realty. Thus, the CA ruled, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated May 12, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 145, Makati City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 
Judgment is hereby entered ORDERING [petitioner] Casent Realty [Development] Corporation to:
1.      pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation the amount of P300,000.00 with an interest of 36% per
annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay the same on its maturity date, June 27, 1985 as
stipulated in Promissory Note No. 84-04;
2.      pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation the amount of P681,500.00 with an interest of 18% per
annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay the same on its maturity date, June 25, 1985 as
stipulated in Promissory Note No. 84-05; and
 
3.      pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation, the amount representing 25% of total amount due as
attorneys fee as stipulated in the promissory notes.
SO ORDERED.[17]
 
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[18] which was denied by the CA in its November 7,
2001 Resolution.[19]
 
The Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE PETITIONERS
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ITS ANSWER IN RESOLVING A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
AND
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY THE RESPONDENT
 
In other words, the questions posed by this case are:
1.     Does respondents failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under
oath constitute a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents?
 
2.     Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to evidence? If yes, are the
judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the complaint?
 
Petitioner asserts that its obligation to pay under the promissory notes was already extinguished as
evidenced by the Dacion and Confirmation Statement. Petitioner submits that when it presented these
documents in its Answer, respondent should have denied the same under oath. Since respondent failed
to file a Reply, the genuineness and due execution of said documents were deemed admitted, thus also
admitting that the loan was already paid. On the other hand, respondent states that while it failed to file
a Reply, all the new matters were deemed controverted pursuant to Section 10, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court. Also, the loan which was covered by the Dacion refers to another loan of petitioner amounting
to PhP 3,921,750 which was obtained directly from the respondent as of August 1986.
[20]
 Furthermore, petitioner argued that assuming respondent admitted the genuineness and due
execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement, said admission was not all-encompassing as to
include the allegations and defenses pleaded in petitioners Answer.
The Courts Ruling
 
The petition is partly meritorious.
Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we defined a demurrer to evidence as an objection by one of the parties
in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.[21]
 
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule
on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as
capacity to sue.[22] However, the plaintiffs evidence should not be the only basis in resolving a
demurrer to evidence. The facts referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by the
Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial admissions,
matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and
presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendants evidence.
Petitioner points out that the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, which were submitted in
the Answer, should have been specifically denied under oath by respondent in accordance with Rule 8,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court:
 
Section 8. How to contest such documents.When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section,
the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth, what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the genuineness and due
execution of said documents. This judicial admission should have been considered by the appellate
court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
 
Section 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceeding in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
On appeal to the CA, respondent claimed that even though it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters
alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:
 
Section 10. Reply.A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in
denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make
issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the
answer are deemed controverted.
 
We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a
written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section
10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is
based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise,
the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted.[23] Since respondent
failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under
oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to
evidence. We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc. that
[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the
adverse partys failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented
formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.[24]
In any case, the CA found that:
From the facts of the case, the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion en Pago were never put to
issue. Genuineness merely refers to the fact that the signatures were not falsified and/or whether there
was no substantial alteration to the document. While due execution refers to whether the document was
signed by one with authority.[25]
The more important issue now is whether the Dacion and Confirmation Statement sufficiently prove
that petitioners liability was extinguished. Respondent asserts that the admission of the genuineness
and due execution of the documents in question is not all encompassing as to include admission of the
allegations and defenses pleaded in petitioners Answer. In executing the Dacion, the intention of the
parties was to settle only the loans of petitioner with respondent, not the obligation of petitioner arising
from the promissory notes that were assigned by Rare Realty to respondent.
We AGREE.
 
Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement does not NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the DEBTOR hereby transfers and
prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the Dacionexcludes the promissory notes. Petitioner, conveys in favor of the BANK by way of Dacion en Pago, the above-described property in full
by way of defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the promissory satisfaction of its outstanding indebtedness in the amount of P3,921,750.00 to the BANK, subject to x
notes. x x terms and conditions.[27] (Emphasis supplied.)

   

The promissory notes matured in June 1985, and Rare Realty assigned these promissory notes The language of the Dacion is unequivocalthe property serves in full satisfaction of petitioners
to respondent through a Deed of Assignment dated August 8, 1986. The Deed of Assignment provides, own indebtedness to respondent, referring to the loan of PhP 3,921,750. For this reason, the bank
thus: issued a Confirmation Statement saying that petitioner has no unpaid obligations with the bank as
of December 31, 1988.
 
 
Rare Realty Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with law, with office
at 8th Floor Philbanking Building, Ayala Ave., Makati, Metro Manila (herein called Assignor) in In 1989, however, Rare Realty defaulted in its payment to respondent. Thus, respondent proceeded
consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND & 00/100 against the security assigned to it, that is, the promissory notes issued by the petitioner. Under these
pesos [PhP 3,790,000.00] and as security fee or in the payment of the sum, obtained or to be obtained promissory notes, petitioner is liable for the amount of PhP 300,000 with an interest of 36% per annum
as loan or credit accommodation of whatever form or nature from and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay on the maturity date, June 27, 1985; and for the amount of
the [PHILBANKING] CORPORATION, with office at Ayala Ave., Makati, Metro Manila (herein PhP 681,500 with an interest of 18% per annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay on the maturity
called Assignee), including renewals or extensions of such loan or credit accommodation, now existing date, June 25, 1985.
or hereinafter incurred, due or to become due, whether absolute or contingent, direct or indirect, and
whether incurred by the Assignor as principal, guarantor, surety, co-maker, or in any other capacity,  
including interest, charges, penalties, fees, liquidated damage, collection expenses and attorneys
fee, the Assignor hereby assigns, transfers and conveys to Assignee all its rights, title and interest in WHEREFORE, the March 29, 2001 Decision and November 7, 2001 Resolution of
and to: (a) contracts under which monies are or will be due to Assignor, (b) moneys due or to be due the CA are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
thereunder, or (c) letters of credit and/or proceeds or moneys arising from negotiations under such
credits, all which are herein called moneys or receivables assigned or assigned moneys or receivables,
and are attached, or listed and described in the Attached Annex A (for contracts) or Annex B (for  
letters of credit).[26]
SO ORDERED.
 
 
It is clear from the foregoing deed that the promissory notes were given as security for the loan
granted by respondent to Rare Realty. Through the Deed of Assignment, respondent stepped into the  
shoes of Rare Realty as petitioners creditor.
 
 
 
Respondent alleged that petitioner obtained a separate loan of PhP 3,921,750. Thus,
when petitioner and respondent executed the Dacion on August 27, 1986, what was then covered PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
was petitioners loan from the bank. The Dacion provides, thus:
Associate Justice
 
 
   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

  WE CONCUR:

   

   

  LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

  Associate Justice

  Chairperson

   

   

   

  ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

  Associate Justice Associate Justice

   
   

  Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
DANTE O. TINGA assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Associate Justice  

   

   

   

ATTESTATION REYNATO S. PUNO

  Chief Justice

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

   Rollo, pp. 79-87. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and
[1]

concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador.

 
[2]
 Id. at 99-100.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
[3]
 Id. at 73-78. The case was presided over by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
Associate Justice
[4]
 Id. at 32-33.
Chairperson
[5]
 Id. at 34-40.
 
[6]
 Id. at 41-47.
 
[7]
 Id. at 48-51.
 
[8]
 Id. at 52.
CERTIFICATION
[9]
 Supra note 1, at 80-81.
 
[10]
 Id. at 81.

[11]
 Rollo, pp. 53-64.

[12]
 Id. at 65-68.

[13]
 Supra note 1, at 81-82.

[14]
 Supra note 3, at 78.

[15]
 Supra note 1, at 83.

[16]
 Id. at 84.

[17]
 Id. at 86.

[18]
 Rollo, pp. 88-98.

[19]
 Supra note 2.

[20]
 Rollo, p. 187.

[21]
 G.R. No. 131209, August 13, 1999, 312 SCRA 365, 371.

 Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, G.R. No. 161817, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 690,
[22]

693-694.

[23]
 See Toribio v. Bidin, No. L-57821, January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 162, 170.

[24]
 G.R. No. 87434, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 194, 204.

[25]
 Supra note 1, at 84.

[26]
 Id. at 85-86.

[27]
 Rollo, p. 49.
11. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

JOANIE SURPOSA UY,   G.R. No. 183965  

Petitioner,    

  Present: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated 25
June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which granted the demurrer to
    evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 12562-
CEB.
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
 
  Chairperson,
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition[1] for the issuance of
  CHICO-NAZARIO, a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. The Complaint was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
 
  NACHURA, and
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship
with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother,
  PERALTA, JJ. Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959,
and instructed that petitioners birth certificate be filled out with the following names: ALFREDO F.
    SURPOSA as father and IRENE DUCAY as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of
Irenes father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irenes mother. Respondent financially supported
  Promulgated: petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she
got married. He also provided her with employment. When petitioner was still in high school,
JOSE NGO CHUA,   respondent required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was
later on able to work at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondents efforts. Petitioner and
Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondents
Respondent. September 18, 2009
illegitimate children. During petitioners wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino)
as his representative, and it was the latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondents relatives even
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x attended the baptism of petitioners daughter.[2]

   

  In his Answer[3] to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had an illicit
relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.[4]Hearings then ensued during which
DECISION petitioner testified that respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until
she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also
  presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Subsequently, on 27
March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence[5] on the ground that the Decision dated 21
 
February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res 4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand with respect to
judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24. the subject matter of the present petition.

   

It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, 5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent dismissal with
petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with
against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch prejudice his counterclaim.
9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision[6] dated 21 February 2000. The  
full contents of said Decision reads:
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby approves the same. Judgment
  is rendered in accordance with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The parties are enjoined
to comply with their respective undertakings embodied in the agreement. [7]
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18, 2000, praying
that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which follows:  

   

1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February 2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in
relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein respondent] Special Proceeding 8830-CEB was declared final and executory.
JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or acknowledgement is concurred with
petitioners brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes his signature to this  
pleading and also abides by the declaration herein.
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition[8] to respondents Demurrer to Evidence in Special
  Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now assailed Resolution dated 25
June 2008 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting respondents Demurrer.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brothers (Allan) civil, monetary
and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds  
himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWO
MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother
hereby acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise amount. RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and petitioner in the Demurrer and
Opposition, respectively, as follows:
 
This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the Evidence submitted to this Court; the
Opposition thereto; the Comment on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes of
action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or
against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against all corporations,  
companies or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and
Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may xxxx
have interest or participation.
 
 
1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata because there was a judgment entered
based on the Compromise Agreement approved by this multiple-sala Court, branch 09, on the same
issues and between the same parties.
2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is beyond review, reversal or alteration by
another Regional Trial Court and not even the Supreme Court, no matter how erroneous.
3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioners pleadings to the effect that there is no blood
relationship between petitioner and respondent, which is a declaration against interest, are conclusive
on her and she should not be permitted to falsify.
4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioners father is Alfredo Surposa is a public
document which is the evidence of the facts therein stated, unless corrected by judicial order.
 
5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their compromise agreement, she is
estopped from refuting on the effects thereof to the prejudice of the [herein respondent].
 
The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by the open, and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds for a Motion to Dismiss.
 
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can not be subject to compromise.
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief
against the same defendant.[9]
Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions of the parties, RTC-Branch 24 held that:
Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court believes that its hands are tied. Unless
the Court of Appeals strikes down the Compromise Judgment rendered by Branch 09 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, this Court will not attempt to vacate, much more annul, that
Judgment issued by a co-equal court, which had long become final and executory, and in fact executed.
This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do otherwise would result in patent abuse of
judicial discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The defense of lack of jurisdiction cannot be
waived. At any rate, such is brought forth in the Affirmative Defenses of the Answer.
 
This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of allowing herein case involving same parties
to re-litigate on the same issues already closed.[10]
 
In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Evidence is hereby given due course, as
the herein case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.[11]
 
RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[12] in a Resolution[13] dated 29 July
2008.
Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the following issues for resolution of this Court:
 
I
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a compromise
agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
 
 
 
 
II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties herein before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City effectively bars the filing of the present case. [14]
 
At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondents Demurrer to
Evidence, petitioner went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is
raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.
Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or resolution of the trial
court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact exists, on the other hand, when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not
disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the
undisputed facts.[15]
The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner
and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still
pending before RTC-Branch 24.
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy
and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual that he should be
vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.[16]
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there
must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. [17]
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9, and Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions for the issuance of a
decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence, there is apparent identity
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases. However, the question arises as
to whether the other elements of res judicata exist in this case.
 
The court rules in the negative.
 
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation
or put an end to one already commenced.[18] In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,[19] the
Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply
with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b)
object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is
established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise
agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no
obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all.[20]
 
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which
states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
 
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
 
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
 
(4) Future support;
 
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
 
(6)               Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
 
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and
approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-
CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioners status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an
illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that
they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00
each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that
petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of
respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Advincula v. Advincula[21] has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar. Manuela
Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for
acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both parties, said
case was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same court, Civil Case
No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil
Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case
No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for
acknowledgement, affecting a persons civil status, which cannot be the subject of compromise.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.
[22]
 Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established,
and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of
the parties.[23]
 
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no
legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.[24]
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its Decision
dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said contract valid and
legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is
illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that
was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and submitted for approval
by both parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant the
approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to
circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The following quote
in Francisco v. Zandueta[25] is relevant herein:
It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a matter
which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a competent court
has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before it, but whether the court itself is competent under any
circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where there is want of jurisdiction of
the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can never impart to it the
vitality which a valid judgment derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by
express provision of law, as its agent to pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people. (7
R. C. L., 1039.)
 
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or
the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have
no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may
be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever
and whenever it exhibits its head.[26]
 
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata, since
RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondents Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to
law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction,
could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between petitioner
and respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy, the admission petitioner made
therein may still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is
only reminded that while petitioners admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself,
conclusively establish the lack of filiation.[27]
 
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to the RTC-Branch 24 for the
continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for respondents
presentation of evidence.
Although respondents pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more appropriately a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
 
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is reproduced
in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.
 
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to
submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is
not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or
deny.[28]
promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that
dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion.That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought
to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take backseat
against substantive rights, and not the other way around.[30]
 

  WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of

the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB
The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be granted, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is ordered REMANDED to the said trial court for further
thus: proceedings in accordance with the ruling of the Court herein. No costs.

   

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no SO ORDERED.
right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to  
evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every
proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably  
inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his
case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be  
sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery. [29]
 
 
 
 
  MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether petitioner has been able to
show that she is entitled to her claim, and it is incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make such a
determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 in Special Associate Justice
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter. It did not take into
consideration any of the evidence presented by petitioner. RTC-Branch 24 dismissed Special  
Proceedings No. 12562-CEB on the sole basis of res judicata, given the Decision dated 21 February
2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, approving the Compromise Agreement  
between petitioner and respondent. Hence, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24
should be deemed as having dismissed Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res  
judicata rather than an adjudication on the merits of respondents demurrer to evidence. Necessarily,
the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court should not apply herein and respondent should
WE CONCUR:
still be allowed to present evidence before RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.
 
It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a strong showing that grave
miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate
to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The Rules of Court were conceived and  
  DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

  Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO  

Associate Justice  

Chairperson  

  ATTESTATION

   

  I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
  hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
  [14]
 Rollo, p. 7.

  [15]
 Philippine Veterans Bank v. Monillas, G.R. No. 167098, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 251, 257.

  [16]
 Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372, 385 (2000).

REYNATO S. PUNO  Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, 26 October 2007, 537 SCRA 513,
[17]

537.
Chief Justice
[18]
 Civil Code, Article 2028.

[19]
 Supra note 17, citing Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 239 (2004).

[20]
 Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273, 17 May 2005, 458 SCRA 714, 735.

[21]
 119 Phil. 448 (1964).
[1]
 Records, pp. 1-7.

 Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 438, 447-448,
[22]
[2]
 Id. at 1-6.
citing Baluyut v. Baluyut, G.R. No. 33659, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 506, 511.
[3]
 Id. at 19-32. [23]
 De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 515, 522 (1999).
[4]
 Id. at 19. [24]
 See Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 366 Phil. 863, 871 (1999).
[5]
 Rollo, p. 53. [25]
 61 Phil. 752, 757-758 (1935).
 Copy of the Petition and the RTC decision in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB not attached to the
[6]
[26]
 Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo, G.R. No. 155785, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 85, 97.
records of the petition before this Court.
[27]
 See De Asis v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23.
[7]
 Records, pp. 210-211.
[28]
 Condes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161304, 27 July 2007, 528 SCRA 339, 352.
[8]
 Id. at 237.
[29]
 Id. at 352-353.
[9]
 Id. at 304.

 
[10]
 Id. at 304-305.

 See People v. Flores, 336 Phil. 58, 64 (1997), citing De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182,
[30]
[11]
 Id. at 305.
188 (1996).
[12]
 Id. at 308.

[13]
 Id. at 315.