JURISDICTION

ARANES VS JUDGE OCCIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390

April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:

Mercedita Mata Aranes and her husband Dominador Orobia got married on the 17 th of February
in 2000. The marriage was solemnized by the respondent Judge Salvador Occiano. When petitioner’s
husband passed away, the properties cannot be transferred to the respondent because their marriage
was null. Judge Occiano solemnized the marriage without the requisite marriage license and married the
two at Nabua, Camarines Sur even though he was a presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. Hence, petitioner charged the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law through a sworn letter-complaint in 2001.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside of his Jurisdiction?

HELD:

Yes. The Court contends that under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B. P. 129, the
authority given to the judges of regional trial courts and to other inferior courts in solemnizing marriages
is limited into their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. Thus, the case at bar
denotes that the respondent judge acted contrary to the law and shall be subject to an administrative
liability.

PEOPLE VS OLERMO

FACTS:

There are separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela for Marlene
Olermo also known as Marlene Tolentino for the crime of Estafa. She has been found guilty for the crime
beyond reasonable doubt and was given separate charges for each criminal cases. The respondent
appealed from the said judgment and claimed that the RTC erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
despite alleging its lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
 WON the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela have jurisdiction?

HELD:

Yes. In the case at bar, the prosecution proved that the element of offering, promising and
advertising overseas employment took place in Olermo's office in Valenzuela. In all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be tried in the territory where in the offense was committed or any of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.

LIM vs. DUMLAO – A.M. No. MTJ-04-1556, 31 March 2005

Complainant : PURITA LIM

Respondent :JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAO, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela

Ponente :YNARES-SANTIAGO

FACTS

Complainant Purita Lim (verified letter-complaint dated June 5, 2003) charged respondent Judge Cesar
M. Dumlao of the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Isabela, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Abuse of Authority.

Complainant filed two criminal cases for carnapping and theft with the RTC Santiago City, Isabela, Branch
35, against a certain Herman A. Medina. Medina was apprehended and detained at the BJMP,
Santiago City Jail, by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by Presiding Judge Fe Albano Madrid of
Branch 35. However, Dumlao issued three separate orders for the release of Medina on the ground
that he had posted bail with his court.

Lim alleged that Dumlao frequently approves bail bonds for cases filed in other courts and outside the
territorial jurisdiction of his court. He also issues search warrants for implementation outside of his
court’s jurisdiction. Which, resultantly, are often quashed and the corresponding cases dismissed
because the articles seized were inadmissible as evidence.

As proof to her complaint, complainant attached three (3) copies of Search Warrant and was later on
ordered quashed for being infirmed and fatally defective.

Complainant requested for an investigation into the activities of respondent judge, Dumlao. Acting on
the said issue, Court Administrator referred the complaint to Dumlao requiring his comment thereon
within ten days from receipt, but he failed to file the required comment notwithstanding his receipt of
the order.

The OCA’s evaluation stated :

Respondent’s failure to submit his comment as required is indicative of his admission of the charges
pending against him. Indeed, the practice of respondent accepting and approving bail bonds of
detained persons who are charged of crimes in courts other than his own constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
ISSUE WoN respondent found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority by
approving bail bonds for accused person who were detained in another place outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
HELD / DECISION

Yes. Judge Cesar M. Dumlao of the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Isabela, is found GUILTY of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority and was SUSPENDED from office for a period of six
(6) months without salary and other benefits with a WARNING that a repetition of the same shall merit a
more serious penalty.

It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to an accused arrested
outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 must be complied with
before a judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of
the law and that, if com mitted in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the law is straightforward and the
facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is expected
to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve Medina’s bail and
issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error.

Espaol and Suluen v. Mupas , the court have stated:

Thus, a judge who approves applications for bail of accused whose cases were not only pending in
other courts but who were, likewise, arrested and detained outside his territorial jurisdiction is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and violates Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It must be
emphasized that the rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to
ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines
the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict compliance
therewith at all times in their respective jurisdictions.
Respondent judge’s predicament is further aggravated by his unauthorized or irregular issuance of search
warrants not once but a number of times. His violations cannot be excused as mere lapses in judgment but
blatant

Morillo vs People of the Philippines

 G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015

Facts: Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing
themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio Construction,
purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo,
owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%)
of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery and the remaining eighty percent (80%)
to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall be via postdated checks. Pursuant to
the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction
site where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid
P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the
amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her savings
account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for
payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be
honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks
were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which they were drawn was already a closed
account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail,
prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2)
Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong.

Issue: Whether or not MeTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Yes. It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which
means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case
for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the
check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations
of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga
does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject
check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of
Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of
its jurisdiction.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of respondent. Basic
is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based
on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the
dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal. In the oft-cited People v. Salico, the
Court explained: This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and
acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not
show that defendant’s guilt is beyond a
reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the
evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word
dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution
has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on the
ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the
dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that
the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is
not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of
competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same
offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction
over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of respondent’s guilt
or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The appellate court merely dismissed the case
on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower court’s
jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be
repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, petitioner’s resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its
exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the Court of Appeals erred when it
ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing
that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was
filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal cases, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law
prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime
charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a
question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.

Tabao vs. Barataman

 April 11, 2002 | 380 SCRA 396

Facts: Respondent Judge Barataman issued an order granting the motion for bail on recognizance filed by the
father of the accused in a criminal case for abandonment of minor for which Rasmia Tabao was the private
complainant. Tabao then charged him with Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The Court Administrator found respondent guilty of the charge for releasing the accused in recognizance
before it could acquire jurisdiction over his person. The accused was still at large when the motion for bail was
filed.

Issue: WON Barataman is liable for gross ignorance of the law? YES.

Held: Barataman did not deny that the accused was at large when the motion for bail was filed and subsequently
granted. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Sec. 15 Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance. Bail
is intended to obtain provisional liberty and cannot be granted before custody of an accused has been acquitted by
the judicial authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
A court cannot grant provisional liberty to one who is actually in the enjoyment of his liberty. Court held
that it is premature to file a motion for bail for someone whose liberty has yet to be curtailed.
In the case at bar, Barataman was fully cognizant that the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused who was still at large and yet he entertained and granted his motion for bail. He violated a
tenet in criminal procedure which is too basic as to constitute gross ignorance of the law, thus he is subject for
disciplinary action.

TOPIC : Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

 Case: Talag vs. Judge Reyes

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint filed against Judge Amor A. Reyes of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila for partiality, grave abuse of authority and oppression in connection with entitled “People of the
Philippines v. Wilfredo Talag.” Wherein Talag was charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa
occasioned by the dishonor of four checks.

On May 12, 2003, complainant filed a verified complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator charging
respondent Judge with partiality, grave abuse of authority and oppression allegedly committed. That the
Information was filed on May 7, 2002 while the warrant of arrest was issued May 23, 2003 despite complainant’s
pending omnibus motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest. Also, when the matter was elevated to the Court
of Appeals and a temporary restraining order was issued, respondent seemed to have waited for the TRO to expire
and for the dismissal of complainant’s petition before the Court of Appeals because she did not resolve the motion
for inhibition, and she immediately issued a warrant of arrest against him after said petition was dismissed. And
Respondent had a predisposition to deny the motions filed by complainant since, although she was in haste in
issuing the warrant of arrest, she nonetheless dilly-dallied in resolving the motions filed by complainant;

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge show partiality, grave abuse of authority and oppression?

Held:

The Court Administrator find that the charges filed against respondent are baseless.

When complainant filed the omnibus motion on May 7, 2002, the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over his
person. With the filing of Information, the trial court could then issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused as
provided for by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The issuance of the warrant was
not only procedurally sound but it was even required considering that respondent had yet to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of complainant. Consequently, complainant’s charge that respondent Judge failed to act on the
omnibus motion before issuing the arrest warrant is untenable. Whether respondent correctly disregarded the
omnibus motion in view of the alleged fatal defects is a judicial matter, which is not a proper subject in an
administrative proceeding. It bears noting that respondent court immediately deferred the execution of the
warrant of arrest upon issuance by the Court of Appeals of the TRO.

Neither can we ascribe partiality nor grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent for issuing anew an alias
warrant after the expiration of the Court of Appeals’ 60-day TRO. With the lifting of the restraining order, no legal
obstacle was left for the issuance of the arrest warrant and thus set in motion the delayed prosecutorial process by
acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

PEOPLE V MATEO
People vs. Efren Mateo
 G.R. No. 147678-87 July 7 2004

VITUG, J.:
On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on ten different dates
- 07 October 1995, 14 December 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 29 February 1996, 08 May 1996, 02 July
1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 - were filed against appellant EFREN MATEO.

FACTS

1. According to Imelda Mateo, she was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses Dan Icban and Rosemarie
Capulong. Rosemarie Capulong and appellant started to live together without the benefit of marriage
when private complainant was only two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother and appellant in a
house in Buenavista, Tarlac, and adopted the surname of appellant when she started schooling.
2. Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred her mother, Rosemarie, was not at home.
On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie went to Bamban and returned home only the
next day. The second rape was said to have occurred on 14 December 1995, while her mother was
attending a seminar for day-care workers. Imelda recalled the third rape to have been committed on 05
January 1996, the same day her mother resigned from her job and left for Manila. The fourth rape, she
said, happened a week later, on 12 January 1996, when Rosemarie Capulong was attending yet another
seminar for day-care workers. The last rape was committed on 28 August 1996. According to private
complainant, she never reported any of the ten incidents to anybody because the accused had threatened
to kill her and her mother if she were to disclose the matter to anyone.
3. Appellant denied each of the charges.
4. At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, dated 23 January 2001, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape - "WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to indemnify the complainant the sum of P50,000.00 as
actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape."[2]
ISSUE

Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court

HELD

No. Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on
the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed).

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate
review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the
Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth.

No costs.

PACIS

PALANA vs. PEOPLE

ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent. G.R. No. 149995
September 28, 2007
FACTS: The September 23, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal
Case No. 91- 5617 convicted petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22
otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law". Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
findings of the lower court that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case, despite the fact that at the
time the accused was arraigned on July 25, 1995 R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court was already in effect.
ISSUE: WON the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: YES. Jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action and not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction
is B.P. Blg. 12916 which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling
under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance by the latter. x xx x
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise: x xx x
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one
year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed ₱200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment17 at the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine
imposable is ₱200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.18 The
Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for
offenses punishable with a fine of not more than ₱4,000.00.

Dayap v. Sendiong, et al.,

G.R. No. 177960
January 29, 2009

Facts: Dayap was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and
damage to property. It was alleged that Dayap was the driver of a cargo truck which figured in an accident with a
Colt Galant driven by Sendiong causing instant death to the latter and less serious physical injuries to the
passenger. The MTC granted Dayap’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitted Dayap. The RTC affirmed the acquittal of
Dayap but ordered the case remanded to the MTC for the hearing of the civil aspect. The Court of Appeals ruled
that there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction
of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the complex crime.

Held: Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes such offense with prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods. The offense Dayap was charged is a complex crime. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed. The imposable penalty is prision
correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months
and 1 day to 6 years). Thus, taking into account the period of the imposable penalty, jurisdiction is with the MTC.
 Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 148944, February 5, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner, then mayor of Cebu City, entered into a three-year contract with F.E. Zuellig for the city's supply of
asphalt. Due to alleged anomalous purchase on subject contract, COA officials conducted a special audit.

Thereafter, they submitted a Special Audit Report and joint affidavits for the purpose of initiating a preliminary
investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman ordered the petitioner to
submit his counter affidavit, but the latter did not comply and instead now seeks to restrain the criminal
investigation before the Ombudsman.

Petitioner argued that the Ombudsman cannot compel him to file a counter affidavit because the COA Special
Audit Report and the other supporting affidavits of State Auditors do not constitute a valid complaint that is
sufficient to support a criminal proceeding.

ISSUE:

WON the Office of the Ombudsman may act promptly on complaints filed “in any form or manner” against public
officials / government employees.

HELD:

Yes.
Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution states that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on "complaints filled in any form or manner against public officials or employees of
Government.”

In this case, the complaint being referred to by petitioner is the complaint filed in court in a criminal case. The SC
ruled that for purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint
"in any form or manner" is sufficient.

Hence, the joint affidavits submitted by State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada contain allegations specific enough
for petitioner to prepare his evidence and counter-arguments.

PEOPLE vs JUDGE YADAO, G.R. No. 169727-28

FACTS: In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police’s Anti-Bank
Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then headed by Police Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along

Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation
Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who
were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved.
On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the
police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the
provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation
of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. The case was reopened in
March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition on the ground of double jeopardy but
on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge
Yadao. Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against Lacson and other police officials for lack of probable cause.
On March 3, 2004 the prosecution filed the present special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE: Did Judge Yadao gravely abuse her discretion when she deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest?

RULING: NO. The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. But
here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent
statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for
Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and
examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were
part of the records. Besides, she received no new evidence from the respondents. The SC held that the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered
the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. But the option to order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to “immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” That is the situation here: the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents. In the absence of probable
cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

People vs. Montejo (108 Phil. 652)

•Facts

This is a case for murder filed against the former Mayor Leroy Brown of Basilan City together with some Basilan
policeman. Brown ordered his men to arrest the suspect and he was interrogated. It is in the course of the
investigation or interrogation that they committed the crime of murder.

•Issue

Was the crime of murder committed in relation to his office?

•Held

Yes, the crime of murder was committed in relation to his office. If they were not public officers they would not
have succeeded in committing the crime. Although the public office is not an element of the crime of murder in the
abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense
therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-
defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor
of Basilan City.
 MARILYN GEDUSPAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

An information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was filed against Geduspan and
Farahmand on July 11, 2002.

Geduspan was the Regional Director of PhilHealth Region VI. Farahmand was the Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the Tiong Bi Medical Center.

Geduspan and Farahmand contested the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over them.

Geduspan’s appointment papers and salary adjustment show that she was appointed as
Department Manager A of PhilHealth, with a salary grade of 26.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

HELD:

Yes. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758),specifically including:

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) xxx xxx xxx

(c) xxx xxx xxx

(d) xxx xxx xxx (e) xxx xxx xxx

(f) xxx xxx xxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the
above quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the
second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.

Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual
charged together with her.

The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within
the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Sanchez vs Demetriou

FACTS:
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including
the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileeniti Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.

A warrant of arrest was issued by the RTC and served to Sanchez. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS
Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.

Respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez along
with others with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.

RTC issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.

The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases might
result in a miscarriage of justice SC thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro
Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.

Petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because as a public officer, he
can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

The RTC has jurisdiction over the case

There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office
as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand
independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime
charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under
the exception laid down in People v. Montejo.

Even if their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection
between the office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it within the definition of an
offense "committed in relation to the public office."

The Court examined the information’s in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime of rape with
homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that
there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an
ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.

Petition dismissed

G.R. No. L-62075 April 15, 1987

NATIVIDAD CORPUS, AURORA FONBUENA, JOSIE PERALTA, CRESENCIA PADUA, DOMINADOR BAUTISTA, LEOLA
NEOG, EPIFANIO CASTILLEJOS AND EDGAR CASTILLEJOS, petitioners, vs. TANODBAYAN OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FISCAL JUAN L.

VILLANUEVA, JR., AND ESTEBAN MANGASER, respondents

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the January 30, 1980
elections. Private respondent then sent a letter to the President charging the petitioners with violation of the 1978
Election Code, specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the voting centers during the election. The
COMELEC ordered an investigation and the Regional Election Director recommended its dismissal. Respondent
then withdrew the complaint and stated his intention to refile with the Tanodbayan. Later on, COMELEC dismissed
the case for insufficiency of evidence.

The provincial prosecutor then started the preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by respondent
with the tanodbayan. The COMELEC legal assistance entered its appearance and moved for its dismissal but it was
denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting exclusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the COMELEC
Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to
conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses committed by COMELEC officials in relation to their
office.

Issue:

WON the power to investigate, try and prosecute election offenses committed by a public

officer in relation to his office belongs to the COMELEC and the CFI (now RTC) or the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan.

Held:

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear
intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed
by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of
whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the
offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct
of elections.
 CARLITO BONDOC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 191 SCRA 252

FACTS:

Two employees of the Central Bank – Manuel Valentino and Jesus Estacio and 9 private individuals were charged
with several felonies of estafa thru falsification of public documents in 3 separate informations filed by the
Tanodbayan with the Sandiganbayan on April 15, 1982. Before the prosecution rested its case, the Tanodbayan
filed with the Sandiganbayan another set of 3 indictments, this time against Carlito P. Bondoc, assistant Manager
of CITIBANK & Rogelio Vicente, also a private individual.

Bondoc moved to quash the informations on the basic theory that as a private individual charged as co-principal
with government employees, he should be tried jointly with the latter pursuant to Sec. 4 of PD 1606, as amended.
Hence, the separate proceedings commenced against him were invalid, for lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the offenses and his person.

The Third Division denied Bondoc’s motion to quash. It ruled that a) the joint trial of private individuals and public
employees charged as co principals, dealt with in the cited provision of law, is not a jurisdictional requirement; b)
Bondoc’s theory would practically make the Court’s “jurisdiction over a private individual charged as co-principal,
accomplice or accessory with a public officer or employee dependent upon such private individual” (as by evading
service of legal processes until “joint trial is no longer feasible”); and c) it is the intention of the law, manifested in
the same Section 4, “to avert split jurisdiction (and) thus avoid multiplicity of suits”.

ISSUE:

Who has the jurisdiction to try a private individuals who are co-accused with public official or employees in a case –
RTC or Sandiganbayan?

RULING:

It is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court for the simple reason that the latter
would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to
hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same
crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6, 000.00, committed by government
employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the
fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.
 AZARCON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, 79 SCAD 954 (1997)

Facts:

Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were
contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were
left at the former’s premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional
Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of
accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by
accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession
owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to
retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said
property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that
Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.

Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs,
4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by
Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of
distrained property.

Held:

SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only
instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges
the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has
been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public
officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a
public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the
truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law
nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck,
the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power
authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a
public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

301 SCRA 298

Facts:

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in
bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among
those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitionerintervenors. Twenty-six respondents including herein
petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories were indicted for
multiple murder. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan,
where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A.
7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of
the “principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal”
from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that
the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases.

Held:

Yes. Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
following requisites must concur, among others: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery). Considering that herein petitioner and
intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code,
the governing on the jurisdictional offense is paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249 which pertains to "other offenses
or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is
one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in
pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused
public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of
the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 Jejomar C. Binay vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against
Mayor Binay of Makati for ‘Illegal Use of Public Funds’ (RPC A220) and ‘Violation of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices
Act’ (RA 3019) on September 1994. The informations filed constituted crimes which were committed by the
petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation
of his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the resolution of
the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash and further the latter’s
motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused ‘pendente lite’
(benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even
before he could file his reply to the petitioner’s opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file said
reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after the submission of the reply.
Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so much so that the
petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction
over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution
denied the petitioner’s motion.
Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal
cases.

Issue:
WoN SB has jurisdiction over the case of after the passage of RA 7975.

Held:

YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense: 1. Officials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989

Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are "local officials classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher.