Art. 886-914
[G.R. No. 109560. May 26, 1995.]
NESTOR ILANO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Br. 104, HON. ANTONIO J.
FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan City, Br.
131, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 1 we ruled
that when necessitated and justified by
compelling considerations of urgency,
subject, time and place, a court may issue a
search warrant covering a place outside its
territorial jurisdiction. Speaking for the Court
En Banc, Mr. Justice Regalado distinguishes
the act of issuing a search warrant from the
act of acquiring or assuming jurisdiction over
a case, and explains that a warrant is merely
a process issued by a court in the exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal
action which it may entertain pursuant to its
original jurisdiction. And since there is no law
or rule which limits the issuance of search
warrants to cover only those places which are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing
court, this right of the court cannot be
restrained or restricted.
We invoke this precedent in resolving the
present controversy.
In the case at bench, petitioner Ilano seeks to
nullify the search warrants issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan City, Metro
Manila, ordering the search of his house and
parlor in Quezon City, Metro Manila, which is
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC
Kaloocan City. He seeks refuge in Circular No.
19 of this Court, or the Amended Guidelines
and Procedures on Applications for Search
Warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Other Serious Crimes filed in Metro
Manila Courts and Other Courts with
Multiple Salas, par. 1 of which reads -
1. All applications for search warrants relating
to violation of the Anti-Subversive Act,
crimes against public order as defined in the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal
possession of firearms and/or ammunitions
and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, shall no longer be raffled
and shall immediately be taken cognizance
of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, and Municipal Trial Court, under
whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is
located (Emphasis Supplied by
petitioner).cralaw
As a side issue, he laments the "arbitrary" and
"discriminate" denial of his motion for a
reinvestigation, and his subsequent motion
to suppress evidence and suspend the
hearing, which according to him amount to a
denial of his right to a preliminary
investigation tantamount to a denial of due
process. In this regard, he invokes Go v. Court
of Appeals. 2
The present controversy arose when the
PNP-NARCOM, National Capital Region,
through 1Lt. Josephus Angan, applied for a
search warrant before the RTC of Kaloocan
City, Br. 131, to search petitioner Ilano's
house and parlor at No. 7 and 9 Masigasig
Street, Barangay Piñahan, Quezon City,
Metro Manila. After personally examining
1Lt. Angan and his witness, Presiding Judge
Antonio J. Fineza issued Search Warrants
Nos. 1-017-91 (NCR) and 1-018-91 (NCR). As
manifested in the Return of Search Warrant
filed by 1Lt. Angan, the following were seized
during the raid: (a) one (1) stick of suspected
marijuana cigarette; (b) two (2) tablets of
suspected mogadon; (c) one (1) aluminum
foil containing shabu residue; (d) one (1)
improvised tooter used in administering
shabu; and (e) approximately fifteen (15)
grams of suspected wrapped in three (3)
separate transparent plastic bags.
Forthwith, on 1 February 1991 an Information
charging Ilano for violation of Sec. 16, Art. III,
R.A. 6425, as amended, was filed before the
RTC of Quezon City and raffled to Br. 104
presided by respondent Judge Maximiano C.
Asuncion. Some seven (7) months later or on
2 September 1991 petitioner filed a Motion
for Leave of Court to File Reinvestigation on
the ground that "material evidence has been
discovered which . . . due to inadvertence
(was) not produced during the preliminary
investigation and . . . if produced would
probably change the outcome of the said
investigation." 3 On 5 September 1991 the
RTC of Quezon City denied the motion.
Subsequently on 18 February 1992 petitioner
filed a Motion to Suppress and to Suspend
Hearing and/or Postponement assailing to
enjoin the introduction in evidence of the
items seized during the search. Again on 24
February 1992 the motion was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner Ilano went to the Court
of Appeals on Certiorari. On 24 March 1993
the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals
speaking through Mme. Justice Ordoñez-
Benitez unanimously denied the petition
for Certiorari.
Petitioner Ilano's argument is premised on
the proposition that in no instance can a trial
court issue a search ordering the search of a
place outside its territorial jurisdiction.
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 4 which was
promulgated during the pendency of the
instant petition has already resolved this very
same issue. We quote Malaloan where the
factual circumstances bear a striking
similarity with those of the case at bench -
It may be conceded, as a matter of policy,
that where a criminal case is pending, the
court wherein it was filed, or the assigned
branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to
issue the search warrant; and where no such
criminal case has yet been filed, that the
executive judges or their lawful substitutes in
the areas and for the offenses contemplated
in Circular No. 19 shall have primary
jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court
whose territorial jurisdiction does not
embrace the place to be searched cannot
issue a search warrant therefor, where the
obtention of that search warrant is
necessitated and justified by compelling
considerations of urgency, subject, time and
place. 5
Likewise, Malaloan has already jettisoned the
reliance of petitioner Ilano on Circular No. 19
-
From this, it is theorized that "only the branch
of a Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the place to be searched
could grant an application for and issue a
warrant to search that place." Support for
such position is sought to be drawn from
issuance of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13
issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by
Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is
evident that both circulars were not intended
to be of general application to all instances
involving search warrants and in all courts as
would be the case if they had been adopted
as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars
were issued by the Court to meet a particular
exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on
applications for search warrants filed only in
the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other
courts with multiple salas and only with
respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion
Act, crimes against public order under the
Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of
firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words,
the aforesaid theory on the court's
jurisdiction to issue search warrants would
not apply to single-sala courts and other
crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by
petitioners to be adopted by the Court would
actually result in a bifurcated procedure
which would be vulnerable to legal and
constitutional objections. 6 SO ORDERED.
for reinvestigation and thereafter his motion
to suppress and to suspend hearing with a
denial of his right to a preliminary
investigation which we said in Go v. Court of
Appeals 7 to be a substantive right. The
record shows that petitioner himself
admitted that a preliminary investigation was
in fact conducted. 8 Thus the RTC of Quezon
City was merely exercising its sound
discretion in denying petitioner's motion for
reinvestigation which was filed some seven
(7) months after the information was filed
with the trial court and which sought to
disprove the evidence already considered by
the prosecutor during the preliminary
investigation, as well as his motion to
suppress and suspend hearing which is
basically anchored on the supposed nullity of
the search warrants.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC of Quezon
City, Br. 104, the petition for review is DENIED
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
upholding the validity of the assailed orders
of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

In fine, while the trial court which has

territorial jurisdiction over the place has
primary authority to issue search warrants
therefor, any court of competent jurisdiction
when necessitated and justified by
compelling considerations of urgency,
subject, time and place, may issue a search
warrant covering a place outside its territorial
jurisdiction, and this issue has been settled
when Malaloan was promulgated.

The collateral issue raised by petitioner to

strengthen his allegation that he was denied
due process of law is seriously flawed.
Petitioner equates the denial of his motion
[G.R. No. 76873. October 26, 1989.]
DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR.,
SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all surnamed
UYGUANGCO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, Judge SENEN PEÑARANDA and
GRACIANO BACJAO
UYGUANGCO, Respondents.
Constantino G. Jaraulla, for Petitioners.
Anthony Santos for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS,
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD; CLAIMED FILIATION
ALLOWED TO BE ESTABLISHED BY ANY
OTHER MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF
COURT AND SPECIAL LAWS. — The
illegitimate child is now also allowed to
establish his claimed filiation by "any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ACTION TO PROVE FILIATION
REQUIRED TO BE BROUGHT DURING THE
LIFETIME OF THE ALLEGED PARENT. — The
problem of the private respondent, however,
is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of
the Family Code, his action is now barred
because of his alleged father’s death in 1975.
The second paragraph of this Article 175
reads as follows: The action must be brought
within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. (Emphasis
supplied.) It is clear that the private
respondent can no longer be allowed at this
time to introduce evidence of his open and
continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation
through any of the means allowed by the
Rules of Court or special laws. The simple
reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is
already dead and can no longer be heard on
the claim of his alleged son’s illegitimate
filiation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE OF THE RULE. — In
her Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy
explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a
truism that unlike legitimate children who are
publicly recognized, illegitimate children are
usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of
their existence. Who then can be sure of their
filiation but the parents themselves? But
suppose the child claiming to be the
illegitimate child of a certain person is not
really the child of the latter? The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity
to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this,
he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION BARED BY DEATH OF
ALLEGED PARENT. — Graciano’s complaint is
based on his contention that he is the
illegitimate child of Apolinario Uyguangco,
whose estate is the subject of the partition
sought. If this claim can no longer be proved
in an action for recognition, with more
reason should it be rejected in the said
complaint, where the issue of Graciano’s
filiation is being raised only collaterally. The
complaint is indeed a circumvention of
Article 172, which allows proof of the
illegitimate child’s filiation under the second
paragraph thereof only during the lifetime of
the alleged parent. Considering that the
private respondent has, as we see it,
established at least prima facie proof of his
alleged filiation, we find it regrettable that his
action should be barred under the said
article. But that is the law and we have no
choice but to apply it.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is not the status
of the private respondent, who has been
excluded from the family and inheritance of
the petitioners. What we are asked to decide
is whether he should be allowed to prove
that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed
father, who is already dead, in the absence of
the documentary evidence required by the
Civil Code.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The trial court said he could and was
sustained by the respondent Court of
Appeals. 1 The latter court held that the trial
judge had not committed any grave abuse of
discretion or acted without jurisdiction in
allowing the private respondent to prove his
filiation. Moreover, the proper remedy was
an ordinary appeal and not a petition for
prohibition. The petitioners ask for a reversal
of these rulings on the ground that they are
not in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975,
leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate
children (her co-petitioners herein), and
considerable properties which they divided
among themselves. 2 Claiming to be an
illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario,
and having been left out in the extrajudicial
settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao
Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition
against all the petitioners. 3
Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to
Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao
and that at the age of 15 he moved to his
father’s hometown at Medina, Misamis
Oriental, at the latter’s urging and also of
Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he
received support from his father while he was
studying at the Medina High School, where
he eventually graduated. He was also
assigned by his father, without objection
from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at
the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967
to 1973. 4
In the course of his presentation of evidence
at the trial, the petitioners elicited an
admission from Graciano that he had none of
the documents mentioned in Article 278 to
show that he was the illegitimate son of
Apolinario Uyguangco. 5 These are "the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or (in) any authentic writing."
The petitioners thereupon moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the
private respondent could no longer prove his
alleged filiation under the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code. 6
Specifically, the petitioners argued that the
only evidence allowed under Article 278 to
prove the private respondent’s claim was not
available to him as he himself had admitted.
Neither could he now resort to the provisions
of Article 285 because he was already an
adult when his alleged father died in 1975,
and his claim did not come under the
exceptions. The said article provides as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during
the lifetime of the presumed parents, except
in the following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(1) If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his
majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the
mother a document should appear of which
nothing had been heard and in which either
or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced
within four years from the finding of the
document.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
As earlier related, the motion to dismiss was
denied, prompting the petitioners to seek
relief in vain from the respondent court. In
the case now before us, the petitioners
reiterate and, emphasize their position that
allowing the trial to proceed would only be a
waste of time and effort. They argue that the
complaint for partition is actually an action
for recognition as an illegitimate child, which,
being already barred, is a clear attempt to
circumvent the said provisions. The private
respondent insists, on the other hand, that he
has a right to show under Article 283 that he
is "in continuous possession of the status of
a child of his alleged father by the direct acts
of the latter or of his family."cralaw virtua1aw
library
We find that this case must be decided under
a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules
because the parties have been overtaken by
events, to use the popular phrase. The Civil
Code provisions they invoke have been
superseded, or at least modified, by the
corresponding articles in the Family Code,
which became effective on August 3, 1988.
Under the Family Code, it is provided
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The following provision is therefore also
available to the private respondent in
proving his illegitimate filiation:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
While the private respondent has admitted
that he has none of the documents
mentioned in the first paragraph (which are
practically the same documents mentioned
in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the
"private handwritten instrument signed by
the parent himself"), he insists that he has
nevertheless been "in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," which is now also admissible as
evidence of filiation.
Thus, he claims that he lived with his father
from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from
him during that time; that he has been using
the surname Uyguangco without objection
from his father and the petitioners as shown
in his high school diploma, a special power of
attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea
Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio
Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits
of the copra business of the Uyguangcos,
which is a strictly family business; that he was
a director, together with the petitioners, of
the Alu and Sons Development Corporation,
a family corporation; and that in the
addendum to the original extrajudicial
settlement concluded by the petitioners he
was given a share in his deceased father’s
estate. 7 explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a
It must be added that the illegitimate child is
now also allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws," like his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. 8 he or she cannot do if he or she is already
The problem of the private respondent,
however, is that, since he seeks to prove his
filiation under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is
now barred because of his alleged father’s
death in 1975. The second paragraph of this
Article 175 reads as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
The action must be brought within the same
period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the private respondent can no
longer be allowed at this time to introduce
evidence of his open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate
child or prove his alleged filiation through
any of the means allowed by the Rules of
Court or special laws. The simple reason is
that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead
and can no longer be heard on the claim of
his alleged son’s illegitimate
filiation.chanrobles law library
In her Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy
truism that unlike legitimate children who are
publicly recognized, illegitimate children are
usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of
their existence. Who then can be sure of their
filiation but the parents themselves? But
suppose the child claiming to be the
illegitimate child of a certain person is not
really the child of the latter? The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity
to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this,
dead." 9
Finally, it must be observed that the
provisions invoked by the parties are among strict language of the law, that will allow the
those affected by the following articles in the private respondent an equitable share in the
Family Code:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library disputed estate. Blood should tell.

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and
XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, Civil Case No. 9067 in the Regional Trial Court
otherwise known as the Civil Code of the of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, is hereby
Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, DISMISSED. It is so ordered.chanrobles.com :
19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of virtual law library
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, rules and regulations,
or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed.

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive

effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Graciano’s complaint is based on his

contention that he is the illegitimate child of
Apolinario Uyguangco, whose estate is the
subject of the partition sought. If this claim
can no longer be proved in an action for
recognition, with more reason should it be [G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001
rejected in the said complaint, where the
issue of Graciano’s filiation is being raised REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA
only collaterally. The complaint is indeed a PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. AIDA
circumvention of Article 172, which allows FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.
proof of the illegitimate child’s filiation under
the second paragraph thereof only during DECISION
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
PARDO, J.:
Considering that the private respondent has,
as we see it, established at least prima facie May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her
proof of his alleged filiation, we find it share in the estate of her deceased father by
regrettable that his action should be barred a simulated contract transferring the
under the said article. But that is the law and property of her father to his illegitimate
we have no choice but to apply it. Even so, children?
the Court expresses the hope that the parties
will arrive at some kind of rapprochement, The case before the Court is an
based on fraternal and moral ties if not the appeal via certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 declaring void the deed of
sale of two parcels of land conveyed to
petitioners who are illegitimate children of
the deceased to the exclusion of respondent,
his sole legitimate daughter.
The facts 2 are:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso
(hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of
spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la
Cruz, who are now both deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters
of the late Gregorio Francisco with his
common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom
he begot seven (7) children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio)
owned two parcels of residential land,
situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-
117160. When Gregorio was confined in a
hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter
Aida that the certificates of title of his
property were in the possession of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, 3 Aida
inquired about the certificates of title from
her half sisters. They informed her that
Gregorio had sold the land to them on
August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida
learned that there was indeed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983,
Gregorio executed a Kasulatan sa Ganap na
Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the
two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No.
T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-
59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. 4crä lä wvirtu alibrä ry
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against
petitioners for annulment of sale with
damages. 5 She alleged that the signature of
her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on
the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated
August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint,
petitioners denied the alleged forgery or
simulation of the deed of sale. After due
proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court
rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence
adduced and the law applicable thereon, the
Court hereby renders judgment:
a) sustaining the validity of the Kasulatan Sa
Ganap Na Bilihan (Exh.G) executed on 15
August 1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco
in favor of the defendants;
b) affirming the validity of the Transfer
Certificates of Title No. T-59.585 (Exh. I)
issued to defendant Regina Francisco and
No. T-59.386 (Exh. H) issued to defendant
Zenaida Pascual; and
c) dismissing the complaint as well as the
defendants counterclaim for damages and
attorneys fees for lack of merit. 6 crä lä wvirtu alibrä ry
In time 7, respondent Alfonso appealed to
the Court of Appeals. 8crä lä wvirtu a li brä ry
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the
Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
reversing that of the trial court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21,
1994 of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and another rendered as follows:
1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated
August 15, 1983 (Exhibit G) is declared null
and void from the beginning and TCT Nos. T-
59.585 (M) and T-59-586 (M), both of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan
Branch) in the names of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual, respectively, are annulled
and cancelled;
2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan
(Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to cancel the
aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and
T-59.586 (M) and to reinstate Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-132740 and T-
117160 both in the name of Gregorio
Francisco.
3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco
and Zenaida Pascual jointly and solidarily are
ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso
the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages,
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.
4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees
is dismissed for lack of merit.
Costs of suit against said defendants-
appellees. 9crä lä wvirtua lib rä ry
Hence, this petition. 10 crä lä wvirtu alibrä ry
The main issue raised is whether the
Supreme Court may review the factual
findings of the appellate court. The
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is
limited to review of pure errors of law. It is
not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again, unless there is
a showing that the findings of the lower court
are totally devoid of support or are glaringly
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. 11 crä lä wvirtu alibrä ry
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are
not reviewable by this Court, 12 unless the
case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions to the rule. 13 crä lä wvirtu alibrä ry
Petitioner has failed to prove that the case
falls within the exceptions. 14 crä lä wvirtua li brä ry
We affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals because:
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was
no consideration for the contract of sale.
Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the
Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and
Regina Francisco did not have any source of
income in 1983, when they bought the
property, until the time when Felicitas
testified in 1991. 15 crä lä wvirtu a li brä ry
As proof of income, however, Zenaida
Pascual testified that she was engaged in
operating a canteen, working as cashier in
Mayon Night Club as well as buying and
selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August
of 1983 and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the
amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw
money from her bank account at the Rural
Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the
property. She had personal savings other
than those deposited in the bank. Her gross
earnings from the RTW for three years was
P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at
the club. 16
crä lä wvirtua lib rä ry
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a
market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net
income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought
the property from the deceased for
P15,000.00. 17 She had no other source of
income.
We find it incredible that engaging in buy
and sell could raise the amount of
P10,000.00, or that earnings in
selling goto could save enough to pay
P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were
incredible considering their inconsistent
statements as to whether there was
consideration for the sale and also as to
whether the property was bought below or
above its supposed market value. They could
not even present a single witness to
the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the
purchase price.
Since there was no cause or consideration for
the sale, the same was a simulation and
hence, null and void. 18
crä lä wvirtua li brä ry
Second: Even if the kasulatan was not
simulated, it still violated the Civil
Code 19 provisions insofar as the transaction
affected respondents legitime. The sale was
executed in 1983, when the applicable law
was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to
transfer the property to his illegitimate
daughters 20 at the expense of his legitimate
daughter. The sale was executed to prevent
respondent Alfonso from claiming her
legitime and rightful share in said property.
Before his death, Gregorio had a change of
heart and informed his daughter about the
titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
The legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the
remaining half subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving
spouse as hereinafter provided.
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other
property. If indeed the parcels of land
involved were the only property left by their
father, the sale in fact would deprive
respondent of her share in her fathers estate.
By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of
her father as his only legitimate child. 21 crä lä wvirtua lib rä ry
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco
must be determined in proper testate or
intestate proceedings for settlement of the
estate. His compulsory heir can not be
deprived of her share in the estate save by
disinheritance as prescribed by law. 22 crä lä wvirtu alibrä ry
WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED,in
toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR

CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, Petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and
SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Consolacion de la Torre, Respondents.

Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for

private respondent. cha nro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry

Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.: cha nroble s virtu al la w li bra ry

Petition for review of the decision of the

respondent Court which dismissed the
complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No.
7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs.
Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
virtu a l la w lib ra ry
chanrobles
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose
Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy
Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio,
Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias
Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias
Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a
child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any
issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died
intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la
Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua
and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage.
In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower
court issued an order dated January 15,
1931 1adjudicating, among others, the one-
half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum
of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's
widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other
half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias
Chua, his son in the second marriage;
P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and
P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his
sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said
adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was
issued by the Register of Deeds in the names
of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias
Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No.
399.cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage died intestate without
any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his
pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's
time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la
Torre executed a declaration of heirship
adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso
share of her son Juanito as a result of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796
covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in
her name. Then on March 5, 1966,
Consolacion de la Torre died intestate
leaving no direct heir either in the
descending or ascending line except her
brother and sisters.cha n roble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la
Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the
petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the
first marriage and dominador and Remedios
Chua, the supposed legitimate children of
the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the
first marriage filed the complaint a
quo 3(subseqently segregated as a distinct
suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A)
on May 11, 1966 before the respondent
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly
belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed
to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's
death, be declaredas a reservable property
for the reason that the lot in questionn was
subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article
981 of the New Civil Code, Private
respondent as administratrix of the estate of
individually the complaint of petitioners 4 chanroble s virtua l la wlibra ry
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
of petitioner. Hence this instant. chan roble svirtua la wli bra rych a nroble s virtu al la w li bra ry
The pertinent provision of reserva
troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from
his descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may
have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line from which
said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order
that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites
must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was
acquired by a descendant from an
asscendant or from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died
without an issue; (3) that the property is
inherited by another ascendant by operation
of law; and (4) that there are relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came. 5 In the case
before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are
present. Thus, as borne out by the records,
Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage
died intestate in 1952; he died withour
leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2
share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his
mother, Consolacion de la Torre died,
Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had
relatives within the third degree. These
relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and
Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the
suppose legitimate children of the deceased
Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners
herein.cha n roble svirtua la wlibra rycha n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
The crux of the problem in instant petition is
focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal
- whether the property in question was
acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his
father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In
resolving this point, the respondent Court
said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh.
"D", that the property in question was not
acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and
Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a
consideration, namely, that the legatees were
to pay the interest and cost and other fees
resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this
Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in
question is not subject tot a reserva
troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code,
and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the
respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in
question is not subject to a reserva
troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is, As explained by Manresa which this
Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is
gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return." It
matters not whether the property
transmitted be or be not subject to any prior
charges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an
act of mere liberality of the person making it,
without imposing any obligation on the part
of the recipient; and that the person
receiving the property gives or does nothing
in return; or, as ably put by an eminent
Filipino commentator, 6"the essential thing is
that the person who transmits it does so
gratuitously, from pure generosity, without
requiring from the transferee any prestation."
It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage
upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua
was by means of a hereditary succession and
therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the
order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in
Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates
in express terms;
2. - Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de
Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor de
edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor
de edad, todos residente de San Enrique,
Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del
finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas
propiadades: ch a n ro ble s virtu a l la w li brary
14483 ch an roble svirtua l la wlibra ry
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No.
399 del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros
Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados
y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No.
11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por
con la obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil
Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus
intereses, costas y demas gastos resultantes
del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil
Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is
imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and
Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the
deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and
testament but by an order of the court in the
Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January
15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the
property to the heirs is free from any
condition imposed by the deceased himself
and the property is given out of pure
generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not
matter if later the court orders one of the
heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay
the Standare oil co. of New York the amount
of P3,971.20. This does not change the
gratuitous nature of the transmission of the
property to him. This being the case the lot
in question is subject to reserva
troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil
Code. ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra rych an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry
It is contented that the distribution of the
shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the
respondent heirs or legatees was agreed
upon by the heirs in their project of partition
based on the last will and testament of Jose
Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the
supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose
Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that
the will was not probated was admitted in
paragraph 6 of the respondents'
7
answer. There is nothing mentioned in the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
7839 A which is the subject of the present
appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931
of the trial court in the Testate Estate
Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private
respondent's brief, that the Last Will and
Testament of Jose Frias Chua
has ever been probated. With the foregoing,
it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and
Testament has in fact been probated there
would have been no need for the
testamentary heirs to prepare a project of
partition among themselves. The very will
itself could be made the basis for the
adjudication of the estate as in fact they did
in their project of partition with Juanito Frias
Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by
inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose
Frias Chua by the latter's second
marriage. ch an roble svirtu a la wli bra rych an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua
died on February 27, 1952 without any issue.
After his death his mother Consolation de la
Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso
share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject
to the condition that the property was
reservable in character under Art. 891 of the
Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third
degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the
property came. These relatives are the
petitioner herein. cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra rych a n ro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners
to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399
which originally belonged to Juanito Frias
Chua has already prescribed when it was filed
on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It
must be remembered that the petitioners
herein are claiming as reservees did not arise
until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la
Torre, died in March 1966. When the
petitioners therefore filed their complaint to
recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399,
they were very much in time to do so. ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra rychanroble s virtua l la wlibra ry
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is hereby set aside. The
petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador
Chua and Remedios Chua are declared
owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO
covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. DALISAY
Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO
Certificate of Title in the names of and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, Defendants-
Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided Appellants.
portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided
portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios NARVASA, J.:
Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot.
Without pronouncement as to costs. This case, which involves the application of
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
ch an roble svirtu ala wli bra rych an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry

SO ORDERED. troncal, was submitted for judgment in the

lower court by all the parties on the following
"Stipulation of Facts and Partial
Compromise":

1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay

D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs,
Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt
and granduncles. ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra ry ch a nroble s virtu al la w li bra ry

2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant

Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a
common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco
(who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great
grandfather of defendant. The family
relationship of the parties is as shown in the
chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made
an integral part of this stipulation. cha nroble svirtua la wli bra rych a nroble s virtu al la w li bra ry

3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during

her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco
(legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels
of land are presently covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and
64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
virtu a l la w lib ra ry
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died
intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband,
Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate
children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-
Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned
four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of
her said two children in equal pro-indiviso
shares. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco
died intestate, survived by his legitimate
children by his wife Marciana Felix (among
them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the
partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of
land now covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila, copies of which are
attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were
adjudicated as the inheritance of the late
Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased
her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3)
parcels of land devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso
shares. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon
died intestate, single and without issue,
leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share
in the seven (7) parcels of land above-
mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as
his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reserva troncal which
was subsequently annotated on the Transfer
Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C'
and 'C-l'.
ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra ry
cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry ch an robles
ch a n ro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-
Tongko died intestate, and her rights and
interests in the parcels of land
abovementioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho, subject to the
usufructuary right of her surviving husband,
defendant Primo Tongko. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965,
Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his
only legitimate descendant, defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho. ch an roble svirtu a la wli bra rych an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2)
of all the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned as her inheritance from her
mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry ch an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho
also claims, upon legal advice, the other half
of the said seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva
troncal imposed thereon upon the death of
Faustino Dizon and under the laws on
intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also
upon legal advice, oppose her said claim
because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the
one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel
of land, which interest was inherited by
Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-
eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by
virtue of their being also third degree
relatives of Faustino Dizon. ch an roble svirtu ala wli bra ry ch a n ro ble s virtua l la w lib ra ry
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for
judicial determination in this case the legal
issue of whether defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of
the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or
whether the plaintiffs, as third degree
relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios
(together with said defendant) of the one-
half pro-indiviso share therein which was Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son of land, minus the expenses and/or real
Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share
(3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or in the rentals. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib rarych a n ro ble s virtu a l la w li brary

three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of

land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch
the rentals collected and to be collected by as the parties expressly waived all their claims
defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from against each other for damages including
the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
expenses and/or real estate taxes other than the legal interests on plaintiffs'
corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the share in the rentals, the court renders
rentals.
cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry ch a n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to
three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of
12. In view of the fact that the parties are land described in Transfer Certificate of Title
close blood relatives and have acted upon Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546
legal advice in pursuing their respective and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of
claims, and in order to restore and preserve Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-
harmony in their family relations, they hereby Camacho is hereby ordered to make an
waive all their claims against each other for accounting of all rents received by her on the
damages (other than legal interest on properties involved in this action for the
plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this purpose of determining the legal interests
Honorable Court may deem proper to which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their
award), attorney's fees and expenses of shares in the rentals of the property in
litigation which shall be borne by the question. cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry ch a n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

respective parties. 1
SO ORDERED. 2
On the basis thereof, the lower Court
declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as Court.cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry ch a n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho,

entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the
seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question
submitted by the parties, the court holds that
plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths
(3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or
three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of
land involved in this action. Consequently,
they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights
(3/8) of the rentals collected and to be
collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-
The issue raised is whether, as contended by
the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the
lower Court, all relatives of
the praepositus within the third degree in the
appropriate line succeed without distinction
to the reservable property upon the death of
the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art.
891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may
have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from
which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant,
the rights of said relatives are subject to, and
should be determined by, the rules on
intestate succession.
That question has already been answered
in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3where
the reservatario was survived by eleven
nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the
line of origin, four of whole blood and seven
of half blood, and the claim was also made
that all eleven were entitled to the
reversionary property in equal shares. This
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to
be controlling, and ruled that the nephews
and nieces of whole blood were each entitled
to a share double that of each of the
nephews and nieces of half blood in
accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil
Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as
follows: In a case of reserva troncal, where
the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving
the reservista, and belonging to the fine of
origin, are nephews of the descendant
(prepositus), but some are nephews of the
half blood and the others are nephews of the
whole blood, should the reserved properties
be apportioned among them equally, or
should the nephews of the whole blood take
a share twice as large as that of the nephews
of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxxch a n roble s virtua l la w lib ra ry
The case is one of first impression and has
divided the Spanish commentators on the
cha n roble svirtua la wlibra ry
cha n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants
is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the
ch an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry
inheriting ascendant (reservista). cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la w lib ra ry
xxx xxx xxxch a n roble s virtua l la w lib ra ry
The stated purpose of the reserva is
accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line
of origin. But from this time on, there is no
further occasion for its application. In the
relations between one reservatario and
another of the same degree there is no call
for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore,
the respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be governed by
the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In
this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and
that of Spain has resolved that upon the
death of the ascendant reservista, the
reservable property should pass, not to all
the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of
more remote degree (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894;
Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March
1905). And within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation
operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra). ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra rych an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry
Following the order prescribed by law in
legitimate succession when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third
degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatarios over the property which
the reservista (person holding it subject to collaterals of the whole blood should be
reservation) should return to him, excludes likewise operative. cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry ch a n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

that of the one more remote. The right of

representation cannot be alleged when the In other words, the reserva troncal merely
one claiming same as a reservatario of the determines the group of
reservable property is not among the relatives reservatarios to whom the property
relatives within the third degree belonging to should be returned; but within that
the line from which such property came, group, the individual right to the property
inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil should be decided by the applicable rules of
Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891
personal and for the exclusive benefit of does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is
designated persons who are within the third strengthened by the circumstance that
degree of the person from whom the the reserva being an exceptional case, its
reservable property came. Therefore, application should be limited to what is
relatives of the fourth and the succeeding strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of
degrees can never be considered as the law. As expressed by Manresa in his
reservatarios, since the law does not Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250): cha nro ble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

recognize them as such. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry ch an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry

... creandose un verdadero estado

In spite of what has been said relative to the excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse,
right of representation on the part of one sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del
alleging his right as reservatario who is not precepto, manteniendo la excepcion
within the third degree of mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese
relationship, nevertheless there is right of realmente contenida en la disposicion, y
representation on the part of reservatarios aplicando las reglas generales y
who are within the third degree mentioned fundamentales del Codigo en materia de
by law, as in the case of nephews of the sucesi6n, en aquehos extremes no resueltos
deceased person from whom the reservable de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de
property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que
40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) se crea.
cha n roble svirtua la wlibra ry ch an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry

See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de

Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915) ch an roble svirtua l la wlibra ry
The restrictive interpretation is the more
imperative in view of the new Civil Code's
Proximity of degree and right of hostility to successional reservas and
representation are basic principles of reversions, as exemplified by the suppression
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule of the reserva viudal and the reversion
that whole blood brothers and nephews are legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-
entitled to a share double that of brothers 980).
and nephews of half blood. If in determining
the rights of the reservatarios inter se, Reversion of the reservable property being
proximity of degree and the right of governed by the rules on intestate
representation of nephews are made to succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be
apply, the rule of double share for immediate held without any right thereto because, as
aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino
Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded to the succession. This was also and more
from the succession by his niece, the clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code
defendant-appellant, although they are of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil
related to him within the same degree as the Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles
latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed
Ferraris 4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and as follows: cha n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

1009 of the Civil Code were cited and

applied: Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters
and of nephews or nieces, children of the
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when former, whether of the whole blood or not,
it held that, in case of intestacy nephews and the surviving spouse, if not separated by a
nieces of the de cujus exclude all other final decree of divorce shall succeed to the
collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, entire estate of the deceased. ch an roble svirtu ala wli bra ry ch a n ro ble s virtu a l la w lib ra ry

etc.) from the succession. This is readily

apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor
provide as follows: cha n ro ble s virtua l la w lib ra ry
a surviving spouse, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate of
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their deceased. cha n roble svirtua la wlib ra ry ch an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry

children survive with the widow or widower,

the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the The latter shall succeed without distinction of
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or lines or preference among them by reason of
their children to the other half. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry ch an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry
the whole blood. cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry ch a n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be It will be seen that under the preceding
brothers and sisters of the full blood, they articles, brothers and sisters and nephews
shall inherit in equal shares. ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra ry ch an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of
the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive succeeded only after the widower or widow.
together with nephews and nieces who are The present Civil Code of the Philippines
the children of the decedent's brothers and merely placed the spouse on a par with the
sisters of the full blood, the former shall nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
inherit per capita, and the latter per of the deceased, but without altering the
stirpes.
cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry ch an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry preferred position of the latter vis a vis the
other collaterals. ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra ry ch a n ro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers

nor sisters, nor children of brothers and xxx xxx xxx ch a n roble s virtua l la w lib ra ry

sisters, the other collateral relatives shall

succeed to the estate. cha n roble svirtua la wlibra rycha n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under
our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
Under the last article (1009), the absence of and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
decedent is a precondition to the other survive and are willing and qualified to
collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the to the line of origin from which it had
observation, also made in Padura, supra, that temporarily and accidentally strayed during
as to the reservable property, the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are
the reservatarios do not inherit from all agreed that there being reservatarios that
the reservista, but from the survive the reservista, the matter must be
descendant praepositus: deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life
interest in the reservable property. cha n roble svirtua la wlibra ry ch an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry

... . It is likewise clear that the reservable

property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by
will, as long as there
are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona,
58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not
inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol.
VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries,
Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of
Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy
proceedings to determine the right of
a reservatario are not necessary where the
final decree of the land court ordering
issuance of title in the name of
the reservista over property subject
to reserva troncal Identifies
the reservatario and there are no other
claimants to the latter's rights as such:
It is a consequence of these principles that
upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus (the appellee in this case)
becomes, automatically and by operation of
law, the owner of the reservable property. As
already stated, that property is no part of the
estate of the reservista, and does not even
answer for the debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed
directly from the praepositus, there is no
doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would
have been excluded by the defendant-
appellant under the rules of intestate
succession. There is no reason why a different
result should obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was delayed by
the interregnum of the reserva;" 6i.e., the
property took a "detour" through an
ascendant-thereby giving rise to the
reservation before its transmission to
the reservatario. cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry ch a n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

The contention that an intestacy proceeding Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of
is still necessary rests upon the assumption the rulings already cited, the defendant-
that the reservatario win succeed in, or appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is
inherit, the reservable property from entitled to the entirety of the reversionary
the reservista. This is not true. property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-
The reservatario is not appellees.cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry ch a n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is

the reservable property part of WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the
the reservista's estate; lower Court is reversed and set aside and the
the reservatario receives the property as a complaint is dismissed, with costs against the
conditional heir of the descendant plaintiffs-appellants. chan roble svirtua la wli bra ry ch a n ro ble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

(prepositus), said property merely reverting

SO ORDERED. MADE BY HIM SUBJECT TO RESERVATION;
TRANSFEREE’S RIGHT REVOKED BY THE
SURVIVAL OF A RESERVEE UPON DEATH OF
RESERVOR. — The reservor has the legal title
and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to a resolutory condition. Thus he
may alienate the same but subject to
reservation, i.e., the rights acquired by the
transferee being revoked upon the survival of
reservees at the time of death of the reservor
(Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295; Lunsod v.
Ortega, 46 Phil., 664; Florentino v. Florentino,
40 Phil., 480; and Director of Lands v. Aguas,
63 Phil., 279.)

2. ID.; ID.; RESERVA INSTITUTED BY LAW IN

FAVOR OF RESERVEES IS ALIENABLE TO A
RESOLUTORY CONDITION. — THE reserva
instituted in favor of the heirs within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came, constitutes a real
right which the reservee may alienate and
dispose of, although conditionally, the
condition being that the alienation shall
[G.R. No. L-12957. March 24, 1961.] transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reservee survives the reservor.
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET 3. ID.; ID.; WHEN RESERVEE BECOMES
AL., Defendants-Appellees. EXCLUSIVE OWNER. — Upon the death of
the reservor, there being a surviving reservee,
Proceso R. Remollo, for Plaintiffs- the reservable property passes in exclusive
Appellants. ownership to the latter.

Leonardo O. Mancao for Defendants-

Appellees.
DECISION

SYLLABUS
DIZON, J.:

1. "RESERVA TRONCAL" ; RESERVABLE

PROPERTY; RESERVOR HAS LEGAL TITLE AND Appellants commence this action below to
DOMINION OVER PROPERTY SUBJECT TO A secure judgments (1) declaring null and void
RESOLUTORY CONDITION; ALIENATIONS the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the
Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants
Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of
Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros;
and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay,
jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of
P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In
their answer appellees disclaimed any
knowledge or information regarding the sale
allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea
Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged
that if such sale was made, the same was void
on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no
right to dispose of the property subject
matter thereof. They further alleged that said
property had never been in possession of
appellants, the truth being that appellees, as
owners, had been in continuous possession
thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By
way of affirmative defense and counterclaim,
they further alleged that on July 30, 1951,
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only
surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed
a public instrument of sale in favor of the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes,
the said sale having been registered together
with an affidavit of adjudication executed by
Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole
surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased;
that since then the Esparcias had been in
possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the
lower court rendered judgment as follows: jgc: chan roble s. com .p h
"In view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale of
Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the
plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and
Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance
prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale
made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor
of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and
they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that
the reservable property in question is part of
and must be reverted to the estate of
Cipriano Yaeso, the lone surviving relative
and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of
Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No
pronouncement as to costs."cra la w virtua 1a w li bra ry
From the above decision the Sienes spouses
interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower
court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a
reservable property; secondly, in annuling
the sale of said lot executed by Andrea
Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding
that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled
to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
virtu a l 1aw
ch anrob1 es
li bra ry
Lot 3368 originally belong to Saturnino
Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he
had four children named Agaton, Fernando,
Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second
wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son
named Francisco. According to the cadastral
records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by
Saturnino upon his death - the date of which
does not clearly appear of record - where left
to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to
Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375, to
Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to
Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to
Francisco. As a result of the cadastral
proceedings. Original Certificate of Title No.
10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the
name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a
minor at the time, his mother administered
the property for him, declared it in her name
for taxation purposes (Exhs. A & A-1), and
paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 &
A-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932
at the age of 20, single and without any
descendant, his mother, as his sole heir,
executed the public instrument Exhibit F
entitled extra-judicial settlement and sale
whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00, she sold
the property in question to appellants. When
thereafter said vendees demanded from
Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia,
the surrender of Original Certificate of Title
No. 10275 — which was in their possession
— the latter refused, thus giving rise to the
filing of the corresponding motion in the
cadastral record No. 507. The same, however,
was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30,
1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the
surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as
such had declared the property in their name
on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in
favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared
it in their name for tax purposes and
thereafter secured the issuance in their name
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141
(Exhs. 5 and 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the
facts already stated, that the land in question
was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso
inherited it by operation of law from his
father Saturnino, and upon Francisco’s death,
unmarried and without descendants, it was
inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea
Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under
obligation to reserve it for the benefit of
relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which said property came, if any
survived her. The record discloses in this
connection that Andrea Gutang died on
December 13, 1951, the lone reservee
surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died
only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the
weight of opinion is that the reserva creates
two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the
death of the ascendant obliged to reserve
and (2) the survival, at the time of his death,
of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which the property came (6
Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934).
The Court has held in connection with this
matter that the reservista has the legal title
and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to a resolutory condition; that he is
like a life usufructuary of the reservable
property; that he may alienate the same but
subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservista, the
rights acquired by the transferee being
revoked or resolved by the survival of
reservatorios at the time of death of the
reservista (Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295;
Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil., 664; Florentino v.
Florentino, 40 Phil., 480; and Director of
Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of
appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely
acquire ownership, by virtue of the
alienation, only if the vendor died without
being survived by any person entitled to the
reservable property. Inasmuch as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriano Yaeso was still
alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable
that the previous sale made by the former in
favor of appellants became of no legal effect
and the reservable property subject matter
thereof passed in exclusive ownership to
Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale
executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana
Yaesco in favor of the spouse Fidel Esparcia
and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar
resolutory condition. The reserve instituted
by law in favor of the heirs within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came, constitutes a real
right which the reservee may alienate and
dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition
being that the alienation shall transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and when
the reservee survives the person obliged to
reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso,
one of the reservees, was still alive when
Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to
reserve, died. Thus the former became the
absolute owner of the reservable property
upon Andrea’s death. While it may be true
that the sale made by her and her sister prior
to this event, became effective because of
the occurrence of the resolutory condition,
we are not now in a position to reverse the
appealed decision, in so far as it orders the
reversion of the property in question to the
Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the
vendees — the Esparcia spouses — did not
appeal therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as

above modified — is affirmed, with costs, and
without prejudice to whatever action in
equity the Esparcia spouses may have against
the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the
reconveyance of the property in question.

G.R. NO. 176422 : March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity
and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS,
MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all
surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS
MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA
GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA, Petitioners, v. JULIA POLl
CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by
her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS,
ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO,
LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA
P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA
P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS
SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P.
DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed
primarily to assure the return of a reservable
property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant.1ch an roble svirtu ala wli bra ry
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are
three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749
square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area of
5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an
area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684
are presently in the name of respondent Julia
Delos Santos5 (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B,
on the other hand, is also in the name of
respondent but co-owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the
property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and
her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido
Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza
(Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four
children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to
Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners
Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion,
Marcela and Ricardo are the children of
Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes,
Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are
Valentin's children. Petitioners alleged that
the properties were part of Placido and
Dominga's properties that were subject of an
oral partition and subsequently adjudicated
to Exequiel. After Exequiel's death, it passed
on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter,
Gregoria. After Leonor's death, her share
went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died
intestate and without issue. They claimed
that after Gregoria's death, respondent, who
is Leonor's sister, adjudicated unto herself all
these properties as the sole surviving heir of
Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners
claim that the properties should have been
reserved by respondent in their behalf and
must now revert back to them, applying
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation
to reserve the properties as these did not
originate from petitioners' familial line and
were not originally owned by Placido and
Dominga. According to respondent, the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
properties were bought by Exequiel and November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region,
1931. It appears, however, that it was only Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET
Exequiel who was in possession of the ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil
properties.6 ch a n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in petitioners' SO ORDERED.8 cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry

claim and granted their action for Recovery

of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its but the CA denied the same per
Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
disposed as follows: cha n roble svirtua la wlibra ry

In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that

WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing petitioners failed to establish that Placido
judgment is hereby rendered: cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry
and Dominga owned the properties in
dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia assuming that Placido and Dominga
Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels previously owned the properties, it still
of land subject of this action in the name of cannot be subject to reserva troncal as
the plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and
including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease
Mendoza except one-half of the property Exequiel.11 ch a n roble svirtua la wlib ra ry

described in the old title, TCT No. T-

124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Now before the Court, petitioners argue
Pantaleon;crala wlibra ry that:cha n roble svirtua la wlib ra ry

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan A.

to cancel the titles in the name of Julia
Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T- THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE
PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM
3. No pronouncement as to claims for THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS
attorney's fees and damages and costs. MENDOZAS.

SO ORDERED.7 cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry

B.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
reversed and set aside the RTC decision and IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE
dated November 16, 2006 provides: cha n roble svirtua la wlib ra ry LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12 ch a n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the
CA, contending that it is sufficient that the
properties came from the paternal line of
Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva
troncal. They also claim the properties in
representation of their own predecessors,
Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers
of Exequiel.13
ch a n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule in this regard is that
it should raise only questions of law. There
are, however, admitted exceptions to this
rule, one of which is when the CA's findings
are contrary to those of the trial court.14 This
being the case in the petition at hand, the
Court must now look into the differing
findings and conclusion of the RTC and the
CA on the two issues that arise one, whether
the properties in dispute are reservable
properties and two, whether petitioners are
entitled to a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in
Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may
have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line from which
said property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in
reserva troncal. The first transmission is by
cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry
gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or
donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister
to a descendant called the prepositus. The
second transmission is by operation of law
from the prepositus to the other ascendant
or reservor, also called the reservista. The
third and last transmission is from the
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios
who must be relatives within the third degree
from which the property came.15 ch a n roble svirtu ala wlibra ry
The lineal character of the
reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present
case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not
applicable.
-----
The fallacy in the CA's resolution is that it
proceeded from the erroneous premise that
Placido is the ascendant contemplated in
Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it
sought to trace the origin of the subject
properties back to Placido and Dominga,
determine whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased
Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal
are:cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra ry
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from
whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title; cra la wlib ra ry
(2) The descendant or prepositus
(propositus) who received the property; cra la wlib ra ry
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other
ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within
the third degree from the prepositus and
who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from
which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the
reservor.16
ch a n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra ry
It should be pointed out that the ownership
of the properties should be reckoned only
from Exequiel's as he is the ascendant from
where the first transmission occurred, or
from whom Gregoria inherited the properties
in dispute. The law does not go farther than
such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the
property.17 It was also immaterial for the CA
to determine whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is
that Exequiel owned the properties and he is
the ascendant from whom the properties in
dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the
other hand, is the descendant who received
the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous
title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that
the property should have been acquired by
the descendant or prepositus from an
ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous
title when the recipient does not give
anything in return.18 At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in
this case is that the properties in dispute
were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After
his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus)
acquired the properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and
collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged
to reserve the property should be an
ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not
Gregoria's ascendant; rather, she is
Gregoria's collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the
series of degrees among ascendants and
descendants, and those who are not
ascendants and descendants but come from
a common ancestor, viz: ch an roble svirtu ala wli bra ry
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line,
which may be either direct or collateral. A
direct line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among ascendants and
descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the
series of degrees among persons who are not
ascendants and descendants, but who come
from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and
italics ours)
Gregoria's ascendants are her parents,
Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents,
great-grandparents and so on. On the other
hand, Gregoria's descendants, if she had one,
would be her children, grandchildren and
great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria's
ascendants, both petitioners and Julia,
therefore, are her collateral relatives. In
determining the collateral line of
relationship, ascent is made to the common
ancestor and then descent to the relative
from whom the computation is made. In the
case of Julia's collateral relationship with
Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria
to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then
to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and
Leonor's parents (second line/degree), and
then descent to Julia, her aunt (third
line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria's
collateral relative within the third degree and
not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered
reservees/reservatarios as they are not
relatives within the third degree of Gregoria
from whom the properties came. The person
from whom the degree should be reckoned
is the descendant/prepositus?the one at the
end of the line from which the property came
and upon whom the property last revolved
by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregoria's fourth degree
relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins
of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives
and are not reservees or reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim representation of
their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as
Article 891 grants a personal right of
reservation only to the relatives up to the
third degree from whom the reservable
properties came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of nephews and
nieces of the prepositus, who have the right
to represent their ascendants (fathers and
mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the
prepositus and relatives within the third
degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the
Court stated: ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra ry
Following the order prescribed by law in
legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third
ch a n roble svirtu ala wlibra ry
degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which
the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the
one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the
relatives within the third degree belong to
the line from which such property came,
inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of the designated persons who are
the relatives, within the third degree, of the
person from whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and
the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios
who are within the third degree mentioned
by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and
underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may
appear that the properties are reservable in
character, petitioners cannot benefit from
reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now
holds the properties in dispute, is not the
other ascendant within the purview of Article
891 of the Civil Code and second, because
petitioners are not Gregoria's relatives within
the third degree. Hence, the CA's disposition
that the complaint filed with the RTC should
be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If
at all, what should apply in the distribution of
Gregoria's estate are Articles 1003 and 1009
of the Civil Code, which provide: ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra ry
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased
in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers
nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters,
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to
the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of
lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper
position to determine the proper distribution
of Gregoria's estate at this point as the cause
of action relied upon by petitioners in their
complaint filed with the RTC is based solely
on reserva troncal. Further, any
determination would necessarily entail
reception of evidence on Gregoria's entire
estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is
best accomplished in an action filed
specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a
palpable error in the RTC's disposition of the
case. In upholding the right of petitioners
over the properties, the RTC ordered the
reconveyance of the properties to petitioners
and the transfer of the titles in their names.
What the RTC should have done, assuming
for argument's sake that reserva troncal is
applicable, is have the reservable nature of
the property registered on respondent's
titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has
the duty to reserve and to annotate the
reservable character of the property on the
title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who
inherits from a prepositus, whether by the
latter's wish or by operation of law, acquires
the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly
transferring absolute ownership. All the
attributes of ownership belong to him
exclusively.25
ch an roble svirtu ala wli bra ry
The reservor has the legal title and dominion
to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservor. The transferee's
rights are revoked upon the survival of the
reservees at the time of the death of the
reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the
26
reservor. (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is
extinguished,27 that a reservatario becomes,
by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property.28 In any event, the
foregoing discussion does not detract from
the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a
reservation of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated November 16, 2006 and
Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694
insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are
AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice
to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her
estate or for the determination of ownership
of the properties in question.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977

GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,

vs. DOROTEA O. CONANAN and MARILOU
DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.

Dante P. Mercado for petitioner

Laig, Ruiz & Associates for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.: cha n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

Review of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dated June 21, 1973,
dismissing petitioner's petition for
settlement and partition of estate.
On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with
the court below the above-said petition,
subject of which is the estate left by her late
son, Felix L. del Rosario, who died in a plane
crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo,
Rizal (Partial Joint Stipulation of Facts, p. 2,
petition, p. 6, rec.).
On March 17, 1973, respondents filed their
opposition.
On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant
to a verbal agreement forged between the
parties, issued an order requiring them to
come up with a joint stipulation of facts (p. 9,
rec.).
cha n roble svirtua la wlibra rycha n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
On May 19, 1973, the parties submitted the
following stipulation of facts:
OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the
legitimate mother of the late FELIX L. DEL
ROSARIO.
PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA
OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the. legitimate
surviving wife of the deceased FELIX L. DEL
ROSARIO.
PETITIONER admits that MARILOU DEL
ROSARIO, is the legally adopted child of the
late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and DOROTEA
DEL ROSARIO CONANAN
THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX
L. DEL ROSARIO died last September 12,
1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in a plane crash and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court. cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra rych a n ro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry
That the only surviving nearest relatives of
deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO are the
petitioner and oppositors DOROTEO O.
ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra rych an roble svirtua l la wlibra ry CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO.
virtu a l la w lib ra ry
chanroble svirtu ala wlibra rychanrobles
Parties admit to pay their respective counsel
in the amount to be determined by the
court. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la w lib ra ry
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that on the basis of the facts
cha n roble svirtua la wlibra rych an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry
stipulated, the Court declare the heirs of the
deceased (pp. 9-10, rec.).
chan roble svirtua la wli bra rych a nroble s virtu al la w li bra ry
On June 21, 1973, the lower court issued the
challenged order, pertinent portions of which
read:
A perusal of the petition shows that the
instant case was filed under the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which reads as follows:
Whenever the gross value of the estate; of a
deceased person, whether he died testate or
intestate, does not exceed ten thousand
pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the
ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra rych an roble svirtua l la wlibra ry
Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of
the estate by the petition of an interested
person and upon hearing, which shall be held
not less than one (1) month nor more than
three (3) months from the date of the last
ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra rych an roble svirtua l la wlibra ry
publication of a notice which shall be
published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, and after such
other notice to interested persons as the
cha n ro ble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
court may direct, the court may proceed
summarily, without the appointment of an
executor or administrator, and without delay,
to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any
there is, to determine who are the persons
legally entitled to participate in the estate,
and to apportion and divide it among them
after the payment of such debts of the estate adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants
as the court shall then find to be due; and from succession, ... ch an roble svirtu a la wli bra rych an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry

such persons, in their own right, if they are of

lawful age and legal capacity, or by their The contention of the petitioner that Article
guardians or trustees legally appointed and 343 is applicable in the instant case finds no
qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be basis for 'the said article is applicable in cases
entitled to receive and enter into the where there are no other concurring intestate
possession of the portions of the estate so heirs of the adopted child. ... ch an roble svirtu a la wli bra rych an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry

awarded to them respectively. The court shall

make such order as may be just respecting Based on the foregoing, therefore, the
the costs of the proceedings, and all orders petitioner not being included as intestate
and judgment made or rendered in the heir of the deceased cannot be considered as
course thereof shall be recorded in the office a co-owner of or have any right over the
of the clerk, and the order of partition or properties sought to be partitioned and
award, if it involves real estate, shall be under the provisions of Section 1, Rule e 69
recorded in the proper registrar's office. in re action to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court, such action must be
While it may be true that a petition for commenced or instituted by the party in
summary settlement is allowed under the interest. ch an roble svirtu ala wli bra rych an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry

aforequoted provision of the rules, the same

rule specifically limits the action to estates WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
the gross value of which does not exceed findings, the Court hereby DISMISSES THE
P10,000.00, The instant petition, however, PETITION WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS
clearly alleges that the value of the real TO COSTS (pp, 10-12, rec.).
properties alone left by the deceased Felix
del Rosario amounts to P33,000.00 which is On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of
obviously over and above-the value of the appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond
estate allowed under the rules. The action (see respondents comments, p. 18, rec.).
libra ry
cha nro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha nro ble s virtua l la w

taken by the petitioner (cannot be) construed

as one filed under an intestate proceeding as I ch a n roble s virtu al la wlibra ry

the requirements provided by law for the

same has not been complied with. Based on WE rule that on purely jurisdictional
the foregoing observation alone, the petition consideration, the instant petition should be
must perforce be dismissed. ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra rych an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry
dismissed. ch an roble svirtu a la wli bra rych an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry

But granting arguendo that this Court may Indeed, in a litany of precedents dating as far
consider the petition as an exercise (of) the back as the 1938 case of Utulo vs. Pasiono
powers of a probate Court in determining Vda. de Garcia (66 Phil. 802) and reaffirmed
and declaring the heirs of the deceased as in Asuncion and Castro vs, De la Cruz (No. L-
prayed for in the, aforequoted partial joint 7855, November 23, 1955, 97 Phil. 910)
stipulation of facts, the law on intestate and Gutierrez vs. Cruz (G.R. No. L-21027, July
succession is clear that an adopted child 20, 1968, 24 SCRA 69), WE uniformly held
concurring with the surviving spouse of the that for the court to acquire jurisdiction in a
petition for summary settlement of estate
under the rules, the requirement that the (1) Give to the adopted person the same
amount of the estate involved should not rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
exceed P10,000,00 (P6,000.00 under the old child of the adopted; cha n ro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry

rules) is jurisdictional. ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra rych an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the

In the instant case, both parties jointly parents by nature; cha n ro ble s virtu a l la w lib ra ry

affirmed that the value of the realty left by

the deceased Felix del Rosario is in the (3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of
aggregate amount of P33,000.00 which, as the adopted;ch an roble svirtua l la wlibra ry

the court a quo correctly found, is obviously

"over and above the value allowed under the (4) Entitle the adopted person to use the
rules." cha n roble s virtua l la wlibra ry
adopter's surname." ch an roble s virtua l la wlibra ry

II ch a n roble s virtua l la wlibra ry

Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first
place, to the decending direct line. ch an roble svirtu ala wli bra rych an roble s virtu al la wlibra ry

However, by virtue of the transcendental

implications of the holding of the court a Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
quo in the sense that once wholly sustained, decendants suceed the parents and the other
said holding would preclude petitioner from ascendants, without distinction as to sex or
re-filing the proper action - a consequence age, and even if they should come from
which, on the ground of equity and fair play, different marriages.
We cannot allow to befall on petitioner - We
deemed it essential, for the guidance of the WE opine that the governing provision is the
parties especially herein, petitioner, to point hereinafter quoted article 343 of the New
out the demerits of the appealed verdict. ch an roble svirtu ala wlibra rych an robles
Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and
1000 of said law, which directs that:
virtu a l la w lib ra ry

1. Which of the following articles of the New

Civil Code will apply, Article 343 on the one Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by
hand, or Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the legitimate parents or ascendants and by an
other; and ch an roble svirtua l la wlibra ry
adopted person. the latter shall not have
more successional rights than an
2. Whether the material data rule enuciated acknowledged natural child. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

by Rule 41, Section 6 the New Rules of Court

should be followed, ex cathedra, in the Article 343 of the New Civil Code is
present case: cha n ro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry
qualification to Article 341 which gives an
adopted child the same rights and duties as
A ch a n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
though he were a legitimate child. The reason
for this is that: cha n ro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry

The lower court found the following the new

provisions of the New Civil Code gername to (I)t is unjuest to exclude the adopter's
the instant case: parents from the inheritance in facor of an
adopted person (Report of the Code
Art. 341. The adoption shall: ch an roble s virtu al la w li bra ry
Commission, p. 92).
It is most unfair to accord more successional children". Consequently , the respective
rights to the adopted, who is only related shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant
artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, and adopted child should be determined by
than those who are naturally related to him Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which
by blood in the direct ascending line. cha n roble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry reads:

The applicability of Article 343 does not Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the
exclude the surviving parent of the deceased surviving spouse and illegitimate children are
adopter, not only because a contrary view left, the ascendants shall be entitled to
would defeat the intent of the framers of the onehalf of the inheritance, and the other half
law, but also because in intestate succession, shall be divided between the surviving
where legitimate parents or ascendants spouse and the illegitimate children so that
concur with the surviving spouse of the such widow or widower shall have one-fourth
deceased, the latter does not necessarily of the estate, the illegitimate children the
exclude the former from the inheritance. This other fourth.
is affirmed by Article 893 of the New Civil
Code which states: B ch an roble s virtu al la wlibra ry

If the testator leaves no legitimate Anent the other issue, respondents, in their
descendants, but leaves legitimate comment of June 29, 1973, emphasize that
ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a the petitioner's record on appeal violates the
right to onefourth (only) of the hereditary material data rule in that
estate.cha n ro ble svirtua la wli brarych a n ro ble s virtu a l la w li bra ry

It does not state when the notice of appeal

This fourth shall be taken from the free and appeal bond were filed with the lower
portion. court in disregard of the requirment of
Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that
Article 343 does not require that the the record on appeal must contain such data
concurring heirs should be the aodpted child as will show that the appeal was perfected on
and the legitimate parents or ascendants time.
only. The language of the law is clear, and a
contrary view cannot be presumed. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la w lib ra ry
Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally
the material data rule, whenever
It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should circumstances and substantial justice
be made to apply, consonant with the warrant. cha nroble svirtua la wli bra rych a n ro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry

cardinal rule in statutory construction that all

the provisions of the New Civil Code must be The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of
reconciled and given effect. cha n roble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n roble s virtua l la wlib ra ry
Appeal, No. L-336629, September 28, 1973
(53 SCRA 228) and Villanueva vs. Court of
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving Appeal (No. L-29719, Novemner 28, 1975, 68
with legitimate parents of the deceased SCRA 216, 220) are particularly in point. chanroble svirtu ala wlibra rychanroble s virtua l la wlibra ry

adopter, has the same successional rights as

an acknowledged natural child, which is In Villanueva, WE held:
comprehended in the term "illegitimate
The deviation from the rigid rule aopted in The liberal interpretation of the material data
the case of Government of the Philippines vs. rule aimed at serving the ends of substantial
Antonio, etal., G.R. No. L-23736, October 19, justice has found amplification in the recent
1965, is due to our realization that after all cases of Pimental, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
what is of vital importance in the requirement et al., L-39423 and L-39684, June 27, 1975, 64
fo Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of court is SCRA 475; Republic of the Philippines vs.
that the Record on Appeal shall show that the Court of Appeals, Tomas Carag, et al., L-
appeal was really perfected within the 40495, October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322, 328-
reglementary period. If it could ascertained 332; and Manuel R. Luna vs. Court of Appeals,
from the record of the case that the appeal Capati, et al., L-37123, October 30 1975, 67
was perfected within the reglementary SCRA 503, 506. cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la w lib ra ry

period, although such fact did not evidently

appear on the face of the record on appeal, WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS
the defect or deficiency is not fatal. HEREBY DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO PETITIONER'S FILING THE APPROPRIATE
If the appellate court is convinced that the ACTION IS A COMPETENT COURT. NO
appeal was perfected on time, it should not COSTS. ch a n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtua l la wlib ra ry

throw out but assume jurisdiction over it.

After all, that procedural requirement is only SO ORDERED.
intended to enable the appellate court to
determine if the appeal is still within its [G.R. NO. 156539 : September 5, 2007]
jurisdiction and nothing more (Villanueva vs.
Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 220, emphasis DOMINGO A.
supplied). DIZON, Petitioner, v. ELPIDIO R.
DIZON, Respondent.
From the docket and process slip of this case,
it is shown that the date of notice of the DECISION
Court of First Instance decision is July 3, 1973
and that the expiry date to file petition for SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
certiorari with the Supreme Court is
December 14, 1973. Petitioner filed her Before us is the instant Petition for Review
notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
appeal on July 10, 1973 - or still very much of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
within the reglementary period to perfect an Decision1 dated October 18, 2002 and
appeal. And although this is not mentioned Resolution2 dated January 7, 2003 rendered
in the record on appeal. And although this is by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
not mentioned in the record on appeal, it is, 45492, entitled "Elpidio R. Dizon, petitioner,
nevertheless, a fact of record, the veracity of v. The Honorable Presiding Judge, Regional
which this COURT does not doubt. cha n ro ble svirtua la wli bra rych a n ro ble s virtu al la w li bra ry
Trial Court, Manila, Branch 41, Deputy Sheriff
Cesar Q. Cabildo and Domingo A. Dizon,
Perforce, there being substantial compliance Respondents."
with the requirement of the Rules of Court,
WE resolve this issue in favor of Domingo A. Dizon, petitioner, purchased
petitioner.cha n ro ble svirtua la wlib ra rycha n ro ble s virtu a l la w lib ra ry
from his nephew, Elpidio R. Dizon (herein
respondent), a house and lot located on
Limay St., Tondo, Manila. However,
respondent failed to deliver the house and
lot to petitioner. It appears that the co-owner
of the lot, respondent's brother Ricardo, did
not give said respondent a written authority
to sell his - share. Consequently, petitioner
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 41, Manila a complaint for specific
performance and sum of money with
damages against respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 90-51838.
On March 20, 1992, the trial court rendered a
Decision rescinding the contract of sale
between the parties, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1) declaring the contract of sale entered into
by and between plaintiff and defendant over
that undivided portion of Lot 27-B-3 in the
name of Ricardo Dizon and the building
constructed thereon rescinded;
2) ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as
follows:
a) a sum of P207,000.00 with interest thereon
at the legal rate from January 29, 1990 until
the same is fully paid;
b) the sum of P350,000.00 with interest
thereon at the rate of 3% a month from
January 29, 1990 until the same is fully paid;
and cra la wlibra ry
c) the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.3
On January 13, 1997, the trial court issued a
writ of execution implemented by sheriff
Cesar Cabildo. He scheduled the auction sale
of respondent's properties for the
satisfaction of the above judgment on April
3, 1997 at 10:00 a.m.
Petitioner's attorney-in-fact as well as
respondent and his counsel participated in
the sale. Petitioner emerged as the highest
bidder, having offered P180,000.00 for the
two (2) parcels of land owned by respondent
which were attached by the sheriff.
The proceedings at the auction sale were
duly recorded in the Minutes of Sheriff's
Sale4 signed by the parties and their
counsels.
In the afternoon of the same date, the sheriff
went to the house of respondent and showed
him the "Supplemental Minutes on Sheriff's
Sale" specifying that petitioner's counsel
arrived at 10:45 a.m. (after the auction sale at
10:25 a.m.) and offered a new bid
of P1,690,074.41 covering the same
properties in lieu of the earlier bid
of P180,000.00.
Respondent refused to sign the
supplemental sale contending that it will be
difficult for him to redeem the property.
Besides, the auction sale had already been
perfected and, therefore, the subsequent sale
is "a new or second sale." Consequently, he
filed a motion to quash the "Supplemental
Minutes on Sheriff's Sale" alleging inter alia
that the supplemental sale is void because it
was prepared at 10:25 a.m. after the auction
sale at 10:00 a.m.
In an Order dated May 5, 1997, the trial court
denied respondent's motion to quash "it
appearing that the subject supplemental sale
redounds to the benefit of movant-
defendant as it obviates the execution and/or
garnishment of any other property, income,
or deposits of movant-defendant."5
Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was also denied by the
trial court in its Order dated August 12, 1997.
He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals
alleging that the RTC judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in upholding the validity
of the "Supplemental Minutes on Sheriff's
Sale."
In its assailed Decision dated October 18,
2002, the appellate court granted the
petition and set aside the questioned Orders
of the RTC dated May 5, 1997 and August 12,
1997, thus:
The record shows that the auction sale begun
on time, that is 10:00 AM of April 3, 1997,
wherein both parties as well as their
respective counsels appeared and
participated in the bid as reflected in the
Minutes of Sheriff's Sale. As certified by the
respondent sheriff himself, the said sale was
finished at exactly 10:25 o'clock in the
morning of said date. The amended bid
therefore of private respondent's counsel
made at 10:45 AM of even date could not be
considered as valid as the same was made
after the perfection of the auction sale.
xxx
Consequently, the respondent judge is
considered to have gravely abused his
discretion in upholding the validity of the
Supplemental Minutes on Sheriff's Sale.6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied by the appellate court in its
Resolution dated January 7, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that as the highest
bidder, he has the option to amend his bid in
order to conform to the amounts awarded in
his favor by the trial court.
Respondent maintains that since the auction
sale had been perfected, its consideration
can no longer be modified; and that it will be
difficult for him to redeem his properties
valued at P1,690,074.41 instead of
only P180,000.00.
Article 1476, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code
provides:
Article 1476. In the case of a sale by auction:
xxx
(2) A sale by auction is perfected when the
auctioneer announces its perfection by the
fall of the hammer, or in other customary
manner. Until such announcement is made,
any bidder may retract his bid; and the
auctioneer may withdraw the goods from the
sale unless the auction has been announced
to be without reserve.
During the public auction conducted on April
3, 1997 which ended at 10:25 a.m., the sheriff
declared petitioner the highest bidder.
Considering that the auction sale had already
been perfected, a supplemental sale with
higher consideration at the instance of only
one party (herein petitioner) could no longer
be validly executed.
We therefore rule that in denying
respondent's motion to quash the
"Supplemental Minutes on Sheriff's Sale,"
and declaring the supplemental sale valid,
the trial court gravely abused its discretion.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 45492. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.