Bataclan v.

Medina 
[G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]

Facts:
• At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina and driven by its
regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to Pasay City, one of the front
tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned
turtle.
• Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan,
Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.
No evidence to show that the freed passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out
or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle.
• After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, approach the overturned bus, and
almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped
inside it. 
• That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of
Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor
children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
• After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. Both plaintiffs and
defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to SC.

Issue:
W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that burned the bus,
including the 4 passengers left inside. 

Held:
• The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle turned not only on
its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected.
• The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights
were not available. 
• In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning
of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
• Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver
and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus.
• The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor
would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
• In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the Medina Transportation failed to
carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was likewise negligence on the part of the defendant,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding
and that the driver failed to changed the tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina.
• The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers.
Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite
his speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.
Ratio:
• Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
• Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Fernando V. CA (1992)
G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992
FACTS:
• November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the
Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won
• November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto
 Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.
• The bodies were removed by a fireman.
• The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he
expired there.
• The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank without clearance from it
nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. 
• Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.
• Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in
the body and intake of toxic gas
• November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order
• RTC: Dismissed the case
• CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and the indigent
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

• test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:
• Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence
• standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law
• Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences
• The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case
• Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist
• Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury
• Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover
• Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence
• Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would
necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public
• While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements,
the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements
• accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers
• Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an
ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so
with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure,
therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the
accident.
• proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the
petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT vs. FULGENCIO DACARA Sr

G.R No. 150304, JUNE 15, 2005

FACTS:
Sometime on February 28, 1988, Dacara Jr’s car turned turtle after it rammed against a pile of earth/ street
diggings at Matahimik Street, Quezon City, which was then repaired by the Quezon City Government. As a result,
Dacara Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and his vehicle was extensively damaged. Fulgencio Dacara Sr, in behalf
of his minor son, filed a claim for damages against the Local Government of Quezon City and Engr. Ramir J. Thompson
before the RTC. The LGU contended that the fault is on the driver, since the LGU have out up warning signs. The trial
court ruled that the LGU is liable. The petitioners appealed to the higher court but the Court of Appeals affirmed the
rulings of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Engr Ramir Thompson and the Quezon City Government be held liable for damages due to the injuries
suffered by Dacara Jr?

HELD:
Yes. The negligence of Engr Ramir J Thompson as an instrumentality of the Quezon City Government is the proximate
cause of the injuries and damage to property suffered by Fulgencio Dacara’s (respondent) son, which make the LGU
subsidiarily liable for the damage incurred. The petitioner’s claim that they were not negligent insisting that they
placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of the roadside construction, but none were presented
, gave a more substantial support to the report of the policeman who responded to the scene of incident that no
precautionary signs were found on the said place of incident. Thus, the LGU and Engr Ramir J Thompson as its
instrumentality were held negligent in the execise of their functions where as capsulized under Article 2189 of the
New Civil Code that Local Government and its employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance roads/
streets but also for the safety of the public. Hence, compensatory damages was awarded to the respondent.

8. GABETO V ARANETA (1921)

G.R. No. L-15674 October 17, 1921

FACTS:

It appears in evidence that on August 4, 1918. Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in
the City of Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. When the driver of the
carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out
into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that
he himself had called this carromata first. Thedriver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to the effect that he had not heard
or seen the call of Araneta, and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had
offered employment. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the
control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on.

While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward,
in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After
going a few years further the side
of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came
down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street.

Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio Ilano, had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the
sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had
proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and
in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI- Iloilo: awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P3,000, from which judgment the defendant
appealed.

ISSUE:
Is Araneta liable?

RULING:
No.

The evidence is convincing to the effect that, after Julio Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and
that an appreciable interval of time elapsed — same witnesses say several minutes — before the horse started on his
career up the street.
It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote
from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. The evidence
indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken.
According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit it come out of
the horse's mouth; and they say that Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the
bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control,
started to go away as previously stated. Upon the whole we are constrained to hold that the defendant is not legally
responsible for the death of Proceso Gayetano

Urbano v. IAC

Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored
palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened,
and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the
canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of
the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical
expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions.
The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died
the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the
Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that
he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death.

Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected
with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner
had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998

FACTS:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and
was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the
Appellant Manila Pilots’ Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at
the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside
him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor
from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was
ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were
dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion
ensued between the crew members.  After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines
half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov
likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the “full-astern” code. Before the right
anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the vessel to
the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the
master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?
HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship,
and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and
should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a
licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of
the vessel or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of
the vessel but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in
localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage,
and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board
pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted
with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of
navigation. Upon assuming such office as a compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high
standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to
navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the
master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care but must have and exercise the ordinary skill
and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary
circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict
standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As the pilot, he should have made
sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.
(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision. The
master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov’s
testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire
docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a
vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or
negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however,
by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in
compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his
negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the
owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own
negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is
in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all
damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule,
the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate
damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC. G.R. Nos. L-66102-04 August 30, 1990. A

FACTS.
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and driven by Manalo to bring them to Carmen
Rosales Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack,The right rear wheel of the truck was detouch so the driver steps on the
brake as a result of which, the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that the front part face the south where it come from and its rear face the
north where it is going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the death of the three passengers of
the jeepney and injuries to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of SanMiguel Tarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the case of Delos Reyes was dismissed and
Manalo was convicted By the court of first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery of civil damages before the court of first
instance impleading both the defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the IAC.

ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?

RULING.
According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance in this case because this
doctrine applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit where passengers demand responsibility from a
carries to enforce its contractual obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was reinstated.
Phoenix Construction v. IAC
Facts:
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails
and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck
parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck
was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to
the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for
damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to
respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s own negligence

Held:
We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the
accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the
petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as
not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away
from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by
private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at
"bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show
that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of
reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than
he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump
truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been
"almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage
possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of
other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition"
remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions;
but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of
case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some
new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is
important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the
risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a
defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to
the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently
driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that
the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last
clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to
determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The
relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only
one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the
negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for
the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to
allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very
bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.
Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance
of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The
award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of
course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of
damages made by the respondent appellate court.

TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ

FACTS:
The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational
school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. At about four o'clock in the
afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from
the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the
Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building
caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceased's five brothers and
sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The
Court of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. CA reversed.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable.

RULING: Decision affirmed.

RATIO: Petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-
Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not
sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the
very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the
statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.

Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 1 (L-72964) (1988)

157 SCRA 1, G.R. 72964
January 7, 1988 

FACTS:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield and found the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano saw Javier and the latter
admitted that he was the one responsible. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo hacked Javier
hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Urban was also hacked Javier on
the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.

Upon the intercession of Councilman, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay
P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared
before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement.

However, on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with a lockjaw and was having convulsions. The
doctor found that it was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which
could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital. An information for homicide was filed against Urbano. The RTC
found Urbano guilty of the crime charged.
 ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death (YES)

HELD:
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the
time of the infliction of the wound.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges
from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation
period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches
100 percent.

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of
the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano
used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the
symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of
the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day
from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Bustamante V. CA (1991)
G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991

FACTS:
• April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand truck driven by Montesiano and
owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite
• front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping
off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat 
• several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained:
• 1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and father of Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and
Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina
• The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by Magtibay
and Serrado
• before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite
directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front
wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this
circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third
gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to
overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway
• RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary
• CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted

ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to avoid the collision and his act in
proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision making him solely liable
 HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.
• the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of
peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. 
• a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of
his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. 
• since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the
heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred
in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability

MCKEE VS. IAC, 211 SCRA 517 (68102) (1992)

FACTS:
It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between Angeles City and
SanFernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher,
George, andKim, as well as Kim’s babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles
City (northward) in aFord Escort.Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by
Ruben Galang, was headed in theopposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to Manila.
The cargo truck was considerable in size as itwas carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric
tons.As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right
side ofthe road into the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way
or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose
switched his headlights on, appliedhis brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into
the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck.The collision occurred on the bridge.The collision resulted in the
deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap shewas sitting. Loida was
seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort,received
physical injuries from the collision.An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. Theconviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after
the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial by the SC of hisPetition for Review.
Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and
herhusband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded
against as theemployers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These
cases were eventuallyconsolidated.The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and
attorney’s fees.On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its
finding that it wasGalang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident. However, upon filing by
the respondents of an MR, theIAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact
that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck andthe collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise to the
presumption that Koh was negligent

ISSUE:
Whether or not KHO was negligent and such negligence is the proximate cause of the collission.
RULING:
NO.
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best
means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was
not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming,arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in
the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the
tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded
the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper
lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's negligence
becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters
and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a
clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially
accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car
instead of meeting it head-on.

RODRIGUEZA VS. MANILA RAILROAD, (15688) (NOVEMBER 19, 1921)

FACTS:
the defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of Daraga in the municipality of Albay; that on
January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said line, a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the
smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four
plaintiffs respectively, and the same were entirely consumed. All of these houses were of light construction with the
exception of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa
and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was blowing at the time. It
does not appear either in the complaint or in the agreed statement whose house caught fire first, though it is stated
in the appellant's brief that the fire was first communicated to the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it
spread to the others.

The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio Rodrigueza stood partly within the
limits of the land owned by the defendant company, though exactly how far away from the company's track does not
appear. It further appears that, after the railroad track was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his house
off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position. Rodrigueza did not comply with this
suggestion, though he promised to put an iron roof on his house, which he never did. Instead, he changed the materials
of the main roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with cogon. Upon this fact it is contended for
the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio Rodrigueza in having his house partly on
the premises of the Railroad Company, and that for this reason the company is not liable. This position is in our opinion
untenable for the reasons which we shall proceed to state.

ISSUE:
What is the proximate and only cause of the damage?

Ruling:
The proximate and only cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing this fire.
The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant company and
therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the
disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right
of action, because, first, that condition was not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this
ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even
supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
(Grand Trunk Railway of Canada vs. Richardson, 91 U. S., 454; 23 L. ed., 356; Norfolk etc. Ry. Co. vs. Perrow, 101 Va.,
345, 350.)lawphil.net

SABIDO VS. CUSTODIO, L-21512 (AUG 31, 1966)

FACTS:
In Barrio Halang, Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, two trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging
to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in
opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Agripino Custodia a passenger of LTB bus, who was hanging on the
left side as truck was full of passengers was sideswiped by the track driven by Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino
Custodio was injured and died (Exhibit A).
It appears clear from the evidence that Agripino Custodio was hanging on the left side of the LTB bus. Otherwise,
were he sitting inside the truck, he could not have been struck by the six by six truck driven by Aser Lagunda. This
fact alone, of allowing Agripino Custodio to hang on the side of the truck, makes the defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company liable for damages. For certainly its employees, who are the driver and conductor were negligent. They
should not have allowed Agripino Custodio to ride their truck in that manner.

To avoid any liability, Aser Lagunda and Prospero Sabido throw all the blame on Nicasio Mudales. From the testimony,
however, of Belen Makabuhay, Agripino Custodio's widow, we can deduce that Aser Lagunda was equally negligent as
Nicasio Mudales. Belen testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Aser Lagunda
had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks
never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided
hitting Agripino Custodio. It is incredible that the LTB was running on the middle of the road when passing a curve. He
knows it is dangerous to do so. We are rather of the belief that both trucks did not keep close to the right side of
the road so they sideswiped each other and thus Agripino Custodio was injured and died. In other words, both drivers
must have drive in their trucks not in the proper lane and are, therefore, both reckless and negligent.

ISSUE:
whether the petitioners should not be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver, because the latter's
liability arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the former springs from a quasi delict

RULING:
The petitioner is solidarily liable.

The rule is, that:

According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of
two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have
caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor ... .
(38 Am. Jur. 946, 947.)