Landry (2013) - The Genetic Versus The Axiomatic

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The genetic versus the axiomatic method: Responding to

Feferman 1977
Article in The Review of Symbolic Logic · March 2013

DOI: 10.1017/S1755020312000135
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T HE R EVIEW OF S YMBOLIC L OGIC
Volume 6, Number 1, March 2013
THE GENETIC VERSUS THE AXIOMATIC METHOD: RESPONDING

TO FEFERMAN 1977
ELAINE LANDRY
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis
Abstract. Feferman (1977) argues that category theory cannot stand on its own as a structuralist
foundation for mathematics: he claims that, because the notions of operation and collection are both
epistemically and logically prior, we require a background theory of operations and collections.
Recently [2011], I have argued that in rationally reconstructing Hilbert’s organizational use of the
axiomatic method, we can construct an algebraic version of category-theoretic structuralism. That is,
in reply to Shapiro (2005), we can be structuralists all the way down; we do not have to appeal to
some background theory to guarantee the truth of our axioms. In this paper, I again turn to Hilbert;
I borrow his (Hilbert, 1900a) distinction between the genetic method and the axiomatic method to
argue that even if the genetic method requires the notions of operation and collection, the axiomatic
method does not. Even if the genetic method is in some sense epistemically or logically prior, the
axiomatic method stands alone. Thus, if the claim that category theory can act as a structuralist
foundation for mathematics arises from the organizational use of the axiomatic method, then it
does not depend on the prior notions of operation or collection, and so we can be structuralists
all the way up.
§1. Introduction. Feferman’s 1977 paper, “Categorical Foundations and Foundations

of Category Theory,” has been appealed to often to argue that category theory cannot stand
on its own as a structuralist foundation for mathematics (Bell, 1981; Hellman, 2003).
Others have argued that a category-theoretic structuralist foundation is still possible by
claiming that Feferman misses his mark (Landry, 2006; Marquis, 2006, 2009; McLarty,
2004, 2005). In any case, Feferman (1977), had become, and remains still, the litmus test
for arguments for and against category-theoretic structuralist foundations.
In this paper I will explore the ways in which Feferman’s (1977) arguments have been
used (and misused) in the philosophical literature to argue both for and against category-
theoretic structuralism. Having navigated the philosophical landscape, my aim will be to
directly reply to Feferman (1977) by tying together three threads: a) Hilbert’s distinction
between the genetic and axiomatic method; b) Awodey’s distinction between top-down,
algebraic, and bottom-up, assertory, ways of working; and c) my distinction between the
organizational versus constitutive1 use of the term ‘foundation’. Thus, whereas previously
I was content use the terms ‘language’2 or ‘framework’,3 my intent here is to retake the
Received: December 18, 2011.

1 See Landry (2006, 2011).
2 See Landry (1999).

c Association for Symbolic Logic, 2012
24 doi:10.1017/S1755020312000135
THE GENETIC VERSUS THE AXIOMATIC METHOD : RESPONDING TO FEFERMAN 1977 25
term ‘foundation’ and argue that one can be a category-theoretic structuralist all the
way up. 4
§2. Philosophers’ uses of Feferman 1977. As noted, philosophers of mathematics

have used, and as we will see misused, the arguments and claims found in Feferman (1977)
to argue both for and against category-theoretic structuralist foundations. I begin with
Bell (1981) who, citing Feferman (1977), argues that category theory cannot stand as the
foundation5 for mathematics since the notions of class, operation, and set are epistemically
prior. He first considers the strong, “logico-metatheoretical,” sense in which we might
consider category theory as a foundation. He then considers two aspects of this strong
sense:
the combinatorial [or proof-theoretic] which is concerned with the
formal, finitely presented properties of the inscriptions of the ambient
formal language, and the semantical, which is concerned with the
interpretation and truth of the expressions of that language. [p. 353]
While noting that, given the Gödel results, “[n]either of these aspects is – at present –
reducible to the other” [p. 353], he then continues to consider each aspect in its turn. In
relation to the combinatorial, he notes that “a category is defined to be a class of a certain
kind,6 and classes are extensional, while combinatorial objects are generally not.” [p. 353]
Turning next to consider the semantical aspect, he notes that
. . . the concept of class is epistemically prior to the concept of (classical)
logical truth, [since interpretation involves reference to classes or
pluralities in an essential way (as the range7 of the variables in the
expression)].” [p. 353]
Thus, category theory cannot serve as a foundation in this semantical sense either
because
. . . it is surely the case that the unstructured notion of class is
epistemically prior to any more highly structured notion such as
category; in order to understand what a category is, you first have to
know what a class is.1 [Footnote 1 reads: For a similar conclusion, see
Feferman (1977). My argument here owes much to this article.] This
also applies, mutatis mutandis, to the notion of functor whose explication
4 It is in light, then, of Feferman’s claim that the structuralist view “has been favored particularly by
workers in category theory because of its successes in organizing substantial portions of algebra,
topology, and analysis” [p. 149; italics added.] and is “best expressed” [p. 149] by Lawvere
(1966), that my aim should be understood as showing that in virtue of this organizational role,
we should take category theory as a foundation for mathematical structuralism.
5 Bell, unlike Feferman (1977) and Hellman (2003), seems not to be just considering the question of
structuralist foundations but is rather concerned with what one might term ‘logical’ foundations.
6 See Bell’s definition of a category: “A category E consists of two classes, the members of the first
of which – denoted by the letters X, Y,. . . are called objects (structures) and the members of the
second of which – denoted by the letters f,g,. . . - are called arrows. . . ” (Bell, 1981, p. 350). So
really its not all that surprising that for Bell, the notion of class is presumed!! I will say more
about this in the last section.
7 The notion of a range does not have to be given in terms of a class; it can be understood more
generally as a codomain.
26 ELAINE LANDRY
involves grasping the epistemically prior notion of operation. . . It seems

to be that these considerations show that category theory as currently
conceived is not capable of serving as a foundation for mathematics in
the strong [logic-metatheoretical] sense. [p. 354; italics added.]
He next considers whether category theory can serve as a foundation in the weaker sense,
that is, the sense in which we consider whether category theory, as framed by both the
ETCS and the CCAF axioms, can “serve as a (possibly superior) substitute for axiomatic
set theory in its present role” [p. 353]. As regards the theory of elementary toposes, as
framed by the ETCS axioms, he concludes,
it would be technically possible to give a purely category-theoretic
account of all mathematical notions expressible within axiomatic set
theory. . . [but] the actual translation is awkward and has (unlike the basic
category-theoretic notions themselves) a factitious character. . . What this
translation of set theory really amounts to is the replacement of the
notion of ‘mathematical object as set’ by the notion ‘mathematical object
as pair of arrows (of a certain kind) in a category’ [p. 355].
Next, he notes that
it would seem, however, that a more convincing and natural
formalization of mathematics within category theory would be obtained
if mathematical objects could be construed as categories tout court.
(This would also be more in keeping with the structuralist view that
mathematical objects are given as structures and that categories provide
an embodiment of the idea of structure). [p. 355]
However, when considering Lawvere’s (1966) theory , framed by the CCAF axioms,
for just this task, he claims that
. . . in developing the notions of workaday mathematics within it
seems to be necessary to bring in the notion of set ‘through the back
door’. . . This, it seems to me, will inevitably make a system like
appear artificial as a ‘foundation’ for mathematics, despite the beauty
and naturalness of the category-theoretic notions themselves. [p. 355;
italics added.]
Finally, he considers whether a framework for “full” category theory could reasonably
be sought within the theory of arbitrary properties, suggesting, again with a nod to
Feferman (1977) and his intensional theory T , that “the notion of a category would in
all probability continue to be a derived notion and not a primitive one” [p. 356]. But,
contra Feferman (1977), Bell accepts “framework” (if not “foundational”) pluralism and
thereby chooses topos theory, as framed by the ETCS axioms, as his preferred “general
framework”
. . . for dealing with mathematical structures. . . while still dependent on
set theory as the ultimate source of mathematical entities, [category
theory as expressed by a ‘model’ of set theory called an (elementary)
topos] nonetheless frees mathematics from the particular form imposed
on it by having to regard these entities as pluralities of elements. [p. 356;
italics added.]
Claiming as a result that

[t]his [relativistic] attitude involves abandoning (or, at least, reserving
judgment about) the idea that mathematical constructions should be
viewed as taking place within an ‘absolute’ universe of sets with fixed
and predetermined properties. . . . . . the paramount achievement of topos
theory is to have identified the basic core of set theory in such a way that
the set concept becomes manifest in contexts (such as algebraic geome-
try of constructive mathematics) where before its presence was at most
tacit. Thus category theory far from being in opposition to set theory,
ultimately enables the set concept to achieve a new universality. [p. 358]
Hellman (2003),8 citing both Feferman (1977) and Bell (1986, 1988),9 argues that
“[c]ategory theory and topos theory are found wanting both a prior, external, theory of
relations as well as substantive axioms of mathematical existence” [p. 130]. Neither can
act as a foundation, in the sense of being “strongly autonomous,” because, as Bell (1981)
notes, they either require a “detour through set theory” [p. 133] or, as Feferman (1977)
notes, they “require a prior theory of operation and collection (given in terms of a theory of
relations)” [p. 135]. Furthermore, if we attempt a reply to Feferman by acknowledging10
that “the notion of function is presupposed, at least informally” [p. 133], in much the same
way that it can be taken as presupposed for various set theories, the result is foundational
pluralism, that is, “. . . we get two theories based on the notion of function making their
respective foundational claims” [p. 134].11
In any case, according to Hellman, the problem that remains is that any such reply by
the category theorist “relies on an intended interpretation of ‘composition’, as a binary
operation on functions” [p. 134] which itself is “diametrically at odds” [p. 134] with both
Awodey’s (1996) algebraic account of category theory and the structuralism that “actually
underlies” [p. 134] Feferman (1977).12 Hellman’s conclusion, then, to the question of
taking category theory as an autonomous algebraic, or structuralist, foundation is that yet
still some notions must be taken as prior:
. . . a structural understanding of category theory actually underlies
Feferman’s critique; somehow we need to make sense of talk of
structures satisfying the axioms of category theory, i.e., being categories
8 Hellman is considering the question of what constitutes a structuralist foundation but claims that
this “. . . is naturally viewed in the context of Mac Lane’s repeated claim that category theory
provides an autonomous foundation of mathematics as an alternative to set theory. . . if category
theory is not autonomous but rather must be seen as developed within set theory, then Awodey’s
suggestion could not be realized. . . ” [pp. 129–130]
9 Hellman’s appeal to Bell (1986, 1988) is misplaced, for unlike Bell (1981), in these papers Bell
does take topos theory as a foundational framework, though he does maintain the pluralism of his
earlier work, taking each topos as a “‘possible world’. . . codified within local set theories” (Bell,
1986, p. 245).
10 It is Hellman, not Feferman, who claims that the notion of function is presupposed. Hellman
claims that “There is frank acknowledgement that the notion of function is presupposed, at
least informally, in formulating category theory; indeed, category theory has been described as
investigating the behavior of functions under the operation of composition” [p. 133]. It is unclear,
however, who Hellman has in mind here.
11 This, however, would be no reply to Feferman whose aim is to reject pluralism.
12 See Feferman (1977) footnote #4.
28 ELAINE LANDRY
or topoi, in a general sense, and it is at this level that an appeal to

‘collection’ and ‘operation’ in some form seems unavoidable. Indeed,
one can subsume both these notions under a logic or a theory of
relations (with collections as unary relations); that is what is missing
from category and topos theory both as first-order theories and, crucially,
as informal mathematics. . . [p. 135]
Issues of foundational autonomy aside, Hellman next notes that, if we try to construe
the axioms purely structurally, or schematically as Hilbertian “defining conditions,” as in
Awodey (1996),13 we are left to philosophically face the “home address problem” [p. 136]
or worse still, at a metalogical level, are left in the position of the ‘‘if-then-ist” [p. 138].
In the first instance, then, even if we could somehow side-step Feferman’s “priority
objections,” we are still left to face “questions of existence”:
[m]oving beyond the question of autonomy proper, we turn now to
an equally important, intimately related, problem that of mathematical
existence. . . . (We might dub this the problem of the ‘home address’:
where do categories come from and where do they live?) . . . these
[the category axioms] are to be read ‘structurally’, that is, as
defining conditions, not [as is the case with set theory] as absolute
assertions or (putative) truths based on established meanings of primitive
terms. . . ([this distinction] lays at the root of the famous debate in
correspondence between Frege and Hilbert). . . Or, more formally, what
axioms govern the existence of categories or topoi? [p. 137]
Now Hellman, in a footnote, does consider whether the CCAF axioms can be taken as
providing an answer, but notes, and, in so doing, references Bell (1981),14 that
[a] detailed assessment of Lawvere’s axioms would examine this issue
of credibility, which in turn rests on some prior, not merely structural,
understanding of the primitives and intended interpretation, which does
build in the notion of ‘category’ itself, and thereby presupposes the
notion of ‘collection’ as well as ‘functor’. (Cf. Bell, 1981)15 [footnote
#8, p. 137]
Turning next to consider the Hilbertian “metalogical” strategy of letting “[relative]
consistency imply existence,” Hellman notes that
[a]nything proved from such ‘axioms’ only establishes the conclusion
as holding ‘in any (or any possible) structure satisfying the axioms’,
which is a generalized conditional assertion. . . We are then in the old ‘if-
then-ist’ predicament that plagues deductivism; what we thought
we were establishing as determinate truths turn out to be merely
13 Awodey’s characterization is given in term of the EM axioms.

14 And further, he notes that Bell’s (1981, 1986, 1988) “many topos” view requires “integrating
category theory in a modal structural framework, which would supply both the wanted prior
theory of relations and substantive existence postulates.” [p. 130]
15 What Bell (1981) claimed was that the notions of ‘class’, ‘operation’, and ‘set’ seemed to be
presupposed; it was Feferman who claimed that the notions of ‘collection’ and ‘operation’ are
presupposed. Neither, however, made mention of the notion of ‘functor’ as presupposed.
hypothetical, dependent on the mathematical existence of the very struc-

ture we thougth we were investigating, and threatening to strip mathe-
matics of any disctinctive content (cf. Quine, (1976), 82 ff.) [p. 138]
Finally, Hellman considers the status of Bell’s (1986, 1988) foundational, yet pluralistic,
“many topoi view,” in which topoi are taken as frameworks in the sense of “possible
worlds” for mathematical activity (See Bell, 1986, p. 245). His conclusion, which again
is claimed to build upon the arguments of Feferman (1977), is that
[c]ategory theory does offer an interesting structuralist perspective on
most mathematics as we know it. But it needs to be supplemented
and set within a yet wider framework. As explained above, category
theory – with its non-assertory, algebraico-structural axioms – depends
on prior notions of structure (collection and relations) and satisfaction
by structures to make sense of the very notions of ‘category’ and
‘topos’. . . Although this usually manifests itself through an introductory
appeal to an unspecified ambient domain of sets, that is not necessary.
Instead, one can develop a modalized theory of large domains
relying on the more neutral and general or schematic notions of
‘part/whole’ and plural quantification, as described above. . . [which]
while accommodating the structures defined by both set theory and topos
theory. . . removes any dependence on actual existence [thus avoiding
the home address problem], as it is only possibilities that matter for
pure mathematics; and it even reconstructs a rich theory of relations
[which can be used to frame our talk of functions, or operations and
collections], via the language and logic of plurals. . . [pp. 154–155]
McLarty (2004, 2005) and Awodey (2004) offer sustained and detailed replies to
Hellman (2003) and, in so doing, McLarty further offers a direct reply to Feferman
(1977). 16 McLarty (2004) notes that while Hellman was right to claim that Mac Lane
used a set-theoretic foundation, he missed that this was, in fact, a set theory founded on the
ETCS axioms. Next McLarty offers detailed replies to Hellman’s claims that a set theory so
founded is: i) too weak, ii) too complicated, iii) presupposes the notion of function,17 iv)
cannot address the question of mathematical existence, and v) requires an external theory of
relations. I will only here consider those replies that bear weight on the claims of Feferman
(1977). Of iii) he admits that the ETCS axioms were motivated by the informal ideas of set
and function, and the EM axioms were motivated by a yet different informal idea of func-
tion, but, he argues, motivation is not presumption [pp. 38–41]. Of iv) McLarty notes that
each proposed categorical foundation is a proposed answer. Categorical
set theory says: the sets and functions posited by the axioms
exist. . . SDG, taken as a foundation, says: the smooth spaces and maps
16 McLarty (2005) is an exception; he does directly respond to Feferman (1977). But, as we will
see, his “Feferman” is looked at though the lenses of Hellman (2003).
17 Here it is important to remind ourselves of Feferman’s claim: “. . . let me repeat that I am not argu-
ing for accepting current set-theoretical foundations of mathematics” (Feferman, 1977, p. 154).
So McLarty is mistaken when he states that “Hellman follows Feferman (1977) saying categorical
foundations presuppose a theory of sets and function” [p. 41]. Feferman’s claim is that categorical
foundations require the notions of ‘collection’ and ‘operation’ and it is only the topos axioms,
specifically, the replacement scheme, that is claimed to presuppose set-theoretical notions.
30 ELAINE LANDRY
posited by the axioms exist. . . So Hellman’s claim the ‘category

theory. . . lacks substantial axioms for existence’ is a misunderstanding.
[p. 42]
The EM axioms, according to McLarty, are thus the only axioms that are purely
algebraic in Awodey’s (1996) sense; “these axioms make no existence claims and they
are constantly used in many different interpretations. . . but no one proposes those as
a foundation” [p. 42]. Of v) McLarty notes that “Feferman has never yet given this
general theory [of operation and collection] and this probably explains why “Mac Lane
never responded directly to Feferman’s critique (Hellman, (2003), 133)” [p. 45]. These
claims, however, are odd for two reasons; Mac Lane clearly did offer “in correspondence”
rejoinders to Feferman, in fact, he is noted as having done so in Feferman (1977), and
Feferman’s theory T is clearly offered there as the theory of operations and collections.18
In any case, in so far as Hellman’s claim that category theory requires an external theory
of relations is based on an algebraic reading of the category axioms, and given that, as
explained above, the ETCS and CCAF axioms are intended as assertory, they, according
the McLarty, require no such external theory.
McLarty (2005) continues this argument thread with the aim of showing what we
can learn “from Hellman’s questions, and from the ones he invokes from Solomon
Feferman’s. . . (1977)” [p. 45]. Here he claims that
[t]he deepest point of Feferman’s paper as it seems to me is to show
that we want much more from a foundation than formal adequacy
and practical efficacy. In his [Feferman’s] metaphor, to accept a given
foundation merely because it is formally adequate and practically
productive is like ‘not needing to hear, once one has learned to compose
music’ (Feferman (1977), 153). We want to hear the music. [p. 45]
Offering, then, a direct reply to Feferman’s critique he says:
. . . there had been no explicit reply to Feferman until now, and it
is worth giving it because his position is more subtle than many
people realize. . . [Feferman’s position] can be summed up in three
points: Category theory cannot be a logical foundation; it is also
psychologically derivative; and it is unmusical. What are logically and
psychologically prior, he says, are notions of operation and collection.
He says categorical notions of arrows cannot be logically prior to set-
theoretic account of objects. [p. 45]19
Where things get confusing, however, is that while in this 2005 paper McLarty does
concede that Feferman (1977) offers “a non-extensional theory of his own as progress
18 As we will see, McLarty (2005), however, does recognize that Feferman (1977) offers such a
theory.
19 McLarty next gives the following Feferman quote “My use of ‘logical priority’ refers not to
relative strength of formal theories but to order of definition of concepts, in cases where certain
of these must be defined before others. For example, the concept of vector space is logically prior
to that of linear transformation. (Feferman (1977), 152).” McLarty then proceeds to show how
for the concept of a vector space this was not the case both historically and in modern algebraic,
and for current category-theoretic presentations in terms of Abelian categories. Thus, category
theorists “hear the music just fine.”
towards a correct non-platonist foundation for category” [p. 49] he still makes odd claims
like “For him [Feferman] the music lies, almost, in the structure of the iterative hierarchy
of ZF sets, more in proof theory, and most of all in philosophic question of realism versus
constructivism, which he wants to build into foundations” [p. 48]. In any case, his reply to
Feferman is as follows:
[o]bviously I agree with Feferman that foundations of mathematics
should lie in a general theory of operations and collections, only I say
the current best general theory of those calls them arrows and objects. It
is category theory. . . The theoretical unity and practical power of modern
structural methods make them, to my ear, actually finer music than proof
theory or realism versus constructivism. [p. 49]
But here one must pause; the general theory of objects and arrows is typically taken to
be that framed by the EM axioms, but in his (McLarty, 2004) McLarty claimed that these
are algebraic and as such that “no one proposes those as a foundation” [p. 42], thus he now
seems to open himself to the “existence” and “if-then-ist” objections of Hellman. However,
he does provide “statistical information” showing that, in actual mathematical practice,
the EM axioms are taken sometimes as assertory (41/50 publications) and sometimes as
algebraic (7/50 publications).20 Furthering his reply to Feferman, he then turns to argue
that the CCAF axioms do not presuppose any set-theoretic notions,21 noting that
[t]he key point to grasp here is precisely that categorical foundations
for category theory are not set-theoretic foundation for category theory.
When we axiomatized a metacategory of categories by the axioms of
CCAF, the categories are not ‘anything satisfying the algebraic axioms
of category theory’ [the EM axioms]. They are anything whose existence
follows from the CCAF axioms. They are precisely not sets satisfying
the [EM] axioms. They are categories as described by Lawvere’s CCAF
axioms. [p. 52]
Thus, McLarty’s structuralism (and so his foundationalism) is held as differing from
Awodey’s in the following pluralistic sense:
[o]n my view categorical foundations are not structuralist in this
sense [in Awodey’s sense]. Each [foundation] posits a specific
category. . . They are structuralist in this precise sense: They attribute
only structural properties to their objects, that is only isomorphism-
invariant properties. [p. 53]
While Awodey does not make direct use of, or reference to, Feferman (1977), since
much has been made, (and indeed, will continue to be made in this paper) of his [1996]
and [2004] algebraic view, I will provide a brief outline of his position. Interestingly, for
my purposes, Awodey’s (1996) begins with a Dieudonné quote, which situates category
20 Again, things are a bit unclear here. McLarty gives his “statistical information” for research
involving the terms ‘category’ and ‘functor’ (see, p. 50), which are typically framed by the CCAF
axioms, but then continues his discussion by making reference to the EM axioms (see, p. 51).
21 Note, however, that Feferman never claimed that theories framed by the CCAF axioms require
set-theoretic notions. His claim was that theories framed by the topos axioms, specifically those
including the replacement scheme, require them (see endnote #17).
32 ELAINE LANDRY
theory in the Hilbertian, axiomatic, tradition. Here Dieudonné claims that “this notion
[of structure] has been superseded by that of category and functor, which includes it in
a more general and convenient form” [p. 209]. In this light, Awodey notes that one ought
to distinguish “philosophical structuralism” (here he notes the works of Resnik, Shapiro,
Hellman, Parsons, and Quine) from “mathematical structuralism” (here he notes the works
of Mac Lane, Stein, and Corry). Of the later he claims that,
[f]rom Dedekind, through Noether, and to the work of Eilenberg and
Mac Lane, the fact has clearly emerged that mathematical structure
is determined by a system of objects and their mappings, rather than
by any specific features of mathematical object viewed in isolation.
[pp. 209–210]
His aim, then, is to inform mathematical structuralism by proceeding, “not from model
theory or from scratch,” [but by] “drawing on . . . the mathematical theory of categories”
[p. 210]. Note, however, that his purpose is
not to discuss categorical foundations of mathematics, or to present a
comprehensive structuralist philosophy of mathematics. . . but to elabo-
rate a notion of mathematical structure from a categorical perspective,
so that discussions of other issues may proceed directly. [p. 210]
Next detailing problems with the model-theoretic, Bourbaki, notion of structure,
Awodey notes that
[a] category provides a way of characterizing and describing
mathematical structure of a given kind, namely in terms of preservation
thereof by mappings between mathematical objects bearing the structure
in question. For example, topological spaces and continuous mappings
between them form a category, which we call Top. . . and Set consists of
sets and functions between them. [p. 212]
After proceeding to define a category,22 by use of the EM axioms, in terms of objects and
morphisms, he claims that “[a] category is anything satisfying these axioms. The objects
need not have ‘elements’, nor need the morphisms be ‘functions’, although this is the case
in some motivating examples” [213]. Again, witnessing McLarty’s distinction between
motivation and presumption, Awodey notes that
[g]enerally, suppose we have somehow specified a particular kind of
structure in terms of objects and morphisms. . . Then that category
characterizes that kind of mathematical structure, independently of the
initial means of its specification. For example, the topology of a given
space is determined by its continuous mapping to and from other spaces,
regardless of whether it was initially specified in terms of open sets, limit
point, a closure operator, or whatever. The category Top thus serves the
purpose of characterizing the notion of ‘topological structure’. [p. 213;
italics added.]
22 Awodey’s definition is as follows: A category by definition thus consists of objects A, B, C. . . and

morphisms f, g, h, such that. . . ” [p. 212]. Note, especially, that there is no mention of a class of
objects, a collection of objects or, indeed, a set of objects.
Resisting the pull of a “zealous structuralist” [p. 214], Awodey next notes that the
category of abstract sets, as framed by the ETCS axioms, “provides a structural setting
in which to conduct virtually any piece of mathematical reasoning that can be modeled in
conventional, axiomatic set theory. . . ” [p. 215]. In any case, for my purposes, the crucial
point is this:
. . . let no misunderstanding arise from the fact that the model-theoretic,
Bourbaki notion of structure serves as motivation and provides a source
of examples. The claim being made here is not that that notion has
been pointlessly reformulated in other terms, but that a categorical one
different from it has proven more fruitful in the structural approach
to mathematics, and that it also serves philosophical purposes better.
[p. 215; italics added.]
And to the issue of foundations, he further concludes
the axioms for a bivalent topos with choice. . . provides a structural
axiomatization of the category of sets and so a structural ‘foundation
for mathematics’, to the extent that one takes set theory as such. I do not
think too much should be made of this. For one thing, the structuralist
perspective is at odds with the idea that all mathematical objects exist
in a single, comprehensive universe of sets. . . Moreover, the very idea of
‘foundations of mathematics’ becomes less significant from a categorical
perspective than, say, organizing and unifying the language and methods
of mathematics. . . [p. 235; italics added.]
Continuing in this vein, Awodey (2004) sets out to directly respond to Hellman (2003).
That is, having taken his [1996] to have shown that category theory provides the “currently
dominant framework” for mathematical structuralism, he now turns to consider whether
it, likewise, in response to Hellman’s (2003), provides a framework for philosophical
structuralism. Of Hellman’s question of whether category theory provides an autonomous
foundation, Awodey notes that
this misses the point of my proposal, which is not to prefer that or that
foundation, but to use category theory to avoid the whole business of
‘foundations’. . . Indeed, the view of ‘doing mathematics categorically’
involves a different point of view from the customary foundational one,
as I shall try to explain in this note. [p. 55]
Thus, Hellman’s “home address” problem, in so far as it’s a ‘foundational’ problem,
is dismissed as a misunderstanding of what categorical structuralism amounts to. What
Awodey then notes about his view is that it
emphasizes form over content, descriptions over constructions. . .
characterization of essential properties over constitution of objects
having those properties. . . the ‘foundational perspective’, to which we
are proposing an alternative, is based on the idea of building up specific
‘mathematical objects’ within a particular ‘foundational system’. . . .
[p. 55; italics added.]
The category-theoretic structural view, in contrast,
is based instead on the ideal of specifying. . . the essential features of a
given situation, for the purpose at hand, without assuming some ultimate
34 ELAINE LANDRY
knowledge, specification, or determination of the ‘objects’ involved. The

laws, rules, and axioms involved in a particular piece of reasoning, or a
field of mathematics, may vary from one to the next, or even from one
mathematician or epoch to another. . . The methods of reasoning . . . are
themselves ‘local’ or relative. [p. 56]
To strengthen this point, he then tries a “different tack” by making use of the distinction
between “bottom-up” and “top-down” ways of working; he notes that the foundationalist,
who works, bottom-up “. . . must ‘construct’ the terms involved. . . and then prove that the
specific entities so constructed do indeed have the stated property” [p. 56; italics added.].
The structuralist, on the other hand, works top-down from the structure, which specifies
the relevant features. His statements are not then universally quantified statements “over a
specific range of specific ‘objects’, presumed or constructed, but somehow fixed and given”
[p. 57], rather they are schematic statements “about a structure . . . which can have various
instances.” [p. 57]
Turning next to consider Hellman’s charge of the algebraic structuralist position
reducing to “if-then-ism,” Awodey notes that
the essential difference between the position being sketched here and
old-fashioned, relational structuralism [of, say Russell, in which a
relation has to be a relation on some things] is the idea of a top-down
description, which presupposes no bottom-up hierarchy of things. [p. 61;
italics added.]
Now Awodey does not claim that category theory is the only or the best way to talk about
structures, though he does say “I know of no better one” [p. 61], explaining that “the reason
for this broad applicability has a lot to do precisely with their effectiveness at specifying
and manipulating structures” [p. 61]. In detailing why this is so he notes that
such notions as relation, connection, property and operation are
all subsumed under the primitive notion of a morphism. . . Need
relations, use products and monomorphisms; operations? morphisms
on products;. . . connections between structures? use functors between
categories; connections among connections? categories of functors; and
so on it goes.” [p. 61]
Again, in response to Hellman’s “home address” problem, he notes:
. . . the idea [behind Hellman’s ‘home address’ problem] that one is going
up in a hierarchy, and that this requires stronger and stronger collection
principles and existence assumptions rests on the ‘foundationalist’
conception that the ‘objects’ involved are fixed and determinate. Form a
categorical perspective, one is rather ‘going down’, by specifying more
of the ambient structure to be taken into account. . . [p. 62]
And, finally, noting the schematic character of the axioms, that range over variable
domains, he notes the difference between taking category theory as a language for
structuralism, as opposed to as a foundation:
[h]ow, then, do we make precise the notions of schematic statements
about structures that have different instances? Simply by using the
usual language and methods of category theory; they automatically treat
mathematical objects as ‘structures’, and categorical statements about
them are inherently ‘schematic’, in the required sense. This is what

makes category theory a good language for structuralism. It is also what
gives it an essentially different perspective from the foundational one.
[p. 62]
Citing Hellman (2003), and building on the work of McLarty (2004) and Awodey (2004),
Shapiro (2005) claims, by appeal to analogies drawn from the Frege–Hilbert debate, that
even if the various category-theoretic axioms, either the EM, ETCS, or CCAF axioms,
can be taken foundationally as algebraic, or as schematic in Hilbert’s sense, we still
need a Fregean assertory background metamathematical theory (set, modal or structure,
or categorytheoretic) in which we provide our meta-mathematical analyses of logical
structure that is used to assert or express the acceptability (consistency, satisfiability,
coherence, etc.) of the category-theoretic axiom systems themselves.
As a result, Shapiro (2005) claims that category theory cannot act as a foundation for
a purely algebraic structuralist account of mathematics; because it requires an assertory
meta-mathematical theory, one cannot be a pure algebraic structuralist, or a structuralist
all the way down. That is,
. . . standard set theory, the category-based set theory suggested by
McLarty, my own structure theory, or Hellman’s model set theory are
themselves assertory theories of sets, structures, the possible existence
of systems, etc. As such, each of them is not just another mathematical
theory, providing implicit definition of some structures, or isomorphism
types. The reason for this is that set theory, structure theory, etc., has a
foundational role to pay concerning the coherence of definitions. And
this last is an assertory matter. [p. 74]
According to Shapiro, the only other option, as presented by Awodey (2004) is to
“kick away the foundational ladder altogether, and take the meta-mathematical set theory,
structure theory, or whatever, itself to be an algebraic theory” (Shapiro, 2005, p. 74). This
option, however, is represented by Shapiro as a way not to be looked into because it
supposedly has the unwanted consequence that mathematical logic “is similarly liberated
from theories. . . our theorist can hold. . . that satisfiability, consistency, or coherence implies
existence, but she cannot maintain that any of these notions are mathematical matters”
[p. 75]. The alleged conclusion being that on such a view meta-mathematical analyses of
logical concepts are, as they were for Hilbert, turned into nonmathematical, or, even worse,
philosophical (read Kantian) ones (see Shapiro, 2005, pp. 74–75).
In response, in Landry (2011), I argued that Shapiro (2005), by conflating the roles
of the EM, ETCS, and CCAF axioms, and by confusing the meanings of the category
theorists’ use of the term ‘foundation’, was mistaken in his claim that one cannot use
category theory as a foundation for a purely algebraic structuralist account of mathematics.
Specifically, I showed that in rationally reconstructing Hilbert’s organizational use of
the axiomatic method, we can construct a category-theoretic, purely algebraic, version of
mathematical structuralism. Thus, I concluded that we can be mathematical structuralists
all the way down.
While my [2011] paper did not consider responses to Feferman23 (1977), I would
like, however, to bring to the fore some distinctions that I made there that may help the

36 ELAINE LANDRY
reader to understand my present position. In attempting to pull apart the confusions and
conflations between the various category-theoretic levels,24 that is, between how we are
to understand the foundational roles of the EM, ETCS, and CCAF axioms, I appealed
to three aspects of Hilbert’s foundational programme, and to the Hilbertian distinction
between conceptual analyses of mathematical structure and contentual analyses of
meta-mathematical structure, to note the following:
(1) When conceptually analysing the abstract mathematical structure
of the concepts of any given branch of mathematics, we have the EM
axioms as implicitly defining the abstract concept of a category; here our
task is to present an axiom system qua an abstract conceptual schema
for the facts of any given interpretation (which provides a domain of
objects, i.e., ‘objects’ and ‘morphisms’, for these concepts) in such a way
as to organize what can be mathematically asserted about such objects
as abstract, cat-structured, concepts, i.e., what can be asserted in terms
of anything that satisfies the EM axioms
i. When conceptually analysing the concepts of the branches of
mathematics that are themselves organized set-theoretically, the category
theorist can take the ETCS axioms as a mathematical conceptual scheme
for organizing, in category-theoretic terms, what we say about the
mathematical or logical structure of these set-structured objects as, cat-
structured, concepts, i.e., what can be asserted in terms of anything that
satisfies the ETCS axioms.
ii. When conceptually analysing the concept of a category itself, the
category theorist can take the CCAF axioms as both a mathematical and
a meta-mathematical conceptual scheme; respectively, in the sense that
they organize what we say about the concept category itself, and in the
sense that are about any object that is a category, including the category
Set, as organized by the ETCS axioms, i.e., what can be asserted in terms
of anything that satisfies the CCAF axioms.
(2) When logically analysing axioms or axiom systems themselves,
either at the abstract (EM), set-structured (ETCS) or cat-structured
(CCAF) level, the category theorist can make use of the resources of
the many categorical logics to organize what we say about those logical
concepts, like completeness, independence, consistency, coherence,
satisfiability, etc., that are used as “acceptability criteria” for axioms
or axioms systems themselves. Here our task is, again, to give an
account of those axioms that are necessary and prove, for example, the
consistency of these axioms relative to some stronger theory, and thereby
establish the existence of those objects that satisfy the implicitly defined
concepts.
24 See, for example, Feferman (1977) where he says “It is evidently begging the question to treat
collections (and operations between them) as a category, which is supposed to be one of the
objects of the universe of the theory to be formulated” [p. 150]. There appears to be some
confusion and conflation of levels of the category axioms here: the EM axioms may be taken
as talking about collection and operation in terms of ‘objects’ and ‘morphisms’, but it is only the
CCAF axioms that take categories, themselves, as ‘objects’, with functors as ‘morphisms’.
Having undertaken both (1) and (2) for the branches of mathematics,
category theory included, we thereby establish, via the axiomatic
method, a conceptual foundation for mathematics, where ‘foundation’
is taken in the organizational sense of the term. (Landry, 2011,
pp. 448–449)
In response to any Shapiro-like claim that we are still left to face the charge that, at
the meta-mathematical level, a contentual analysis of logical structure is required and so,
like Hilbert’s appeal to Kantian intuition to provide the syntactic and finitistic content of
proof-theoretic structure, must “turn to philosophy,” I offered the following reply:
[o]n the category-theoretic pure algebraic structuralist view, a meta-
mathematical analysis of the content (semantic, syntactic, or finitistic) of
the logical structure of the concepts of mathematical logic/mathematical
reasoning, including statements of consistency, coherence, etc., does not
require a non-mathematical, “philosophical”, analysis. . . [For example]
we can use the ETCS axioms to provide a meta-mathematical
analysis of the semantic content of the various model-theoretic
concepts of satisfiability, interpretation, truth, relative consistency, in
so far as we consider these concepts themselves as organized set-
theoretically. . . And too, in line with Hilbert’s meta-mathematical, proof-
theoretic, analysis of syntactic content, category theory allows us to
describe deductive systems in terms of categories, so we can employ
categorical methods for proof-theoretic purposes. For example, one
can analyse the proof-theoretic structure of any system by using Ded,
the category of deductive systems, which takes ‘objects’ as formulas,
‘morphisms’ as proofs or deductions, and operations on morphisms
as rules of inference (See Lambek and Scott 1986). . . . Finally, in
line with Hilbert’s preference for finitistic reasoning, we can use the
internal logic of a topos to meta-mathematically analyse the finitistic
content of the various aspects of constructive mathematics, including
constructive set theory, the concepts of recursiveness, independence,
and models of higher-order type theories generally. (Landry, 2011,
pp. 450–451)
Thus, in reply to Shapiro (2005), I argued that category theory has as much to say
about a algebraic consideration of meta-mathematical analyses of logical structure as it
does about an algebraic consideration of mathematical analyses of mathematical structure,
without either requiring an assertory mathematical or meta-mathematical background
theory as a “foundation,” or turning meta-mathematical analyses of logical concepts into
“philosophical” ones. This is the sense in which I showed that we can be category-theoretic
pure algebraic structuralist all the way down.
My present aim is to again use a rational reconstruction of Hilbert to argue, now against
Feferman (1977), that one can be a category-theoretical pure algebraic structuralist all the
way up. It is to this task that I now turn.
§3. Hilbert’s distinction between the genetic and axiomatic method. Having
reviewed philosophers’ reactions, and their reactions to reactions, I now come to consider
the philosophical purpose of this paper, viz., to revisit Feferman (1977) (and Bell, 1981)
38 ELAINE LANDRY
with the aim of investigating whether, having responded to Hellman25 and Shapiro,26
we are still left to face the claim that some unstructured notions (collection, operation;
class, function, set) are prior (logically, psychologically; epistemically) and so we require
a background theory (intensional or extensional; constructive, modal, set, or structure
theoretic) that allows us to talk about (implicitly define; assert) what we say about the
structure of, or between, categories themselves. My aim here will be to directly reply to
Feferman (1977) by tying together three threads: Hilbert’s distinction between the genetic
and axiomatic method; Awodey’s distinction between top-down27 and bottom-up ways
of working; and my distinction between the organizational versus constitutive use of the
term foundation.28 Thus, whereas previously I was content use the terms language29 or
framework,30 my aim here, in addition to responding to Feferman (1977), is to retake the
term ‘foundation’ on behalf of the category-theoretic mathematical structuralist.
To this end, I again turn to Hilbert; I borrow his (Hilbert, 1900a) distinction between
the genetic method and the axiomatic method to argue that even if the genetic method
requires the unstructured notions of operation and collection (or, as Bell, 1981, claims, the
set-structured notions of function, class, or set) the axiomatic method does not. Borrowing
too Hilbert’s (1900b) axiomatic account of foundations, I will then argue that if the claim
that category theory can act as a purely algebraic structuralist foundation for mathematics
arises from the organizational use of the axiomatic method, then it does not depend on the
constitutively prior notions of operation or collection (or function, class, or set). So just as
I used Hilbert to argue against Shapiro (2005) by showing that one can be a pure algebraic
structuralist all the way down, I now intend to use Hilbert to argue against Feferman (1997)
(and Bell, 1981) by showing that one can be a pure algebraic structuralist all the way up.
I will argue that even if the notions of operation and collection (or function and class
or set) are in some, perhaps psychological, sense prior, they are prior in their being
appealed to by the genetic method, not by the axiomatic method. And insofar as the
category-theoretic axioms themselves are taken as top-down implicit definitions, there is
no sense of these, again perhaps psychologically, prior notions being either logically or
epistemologically prior. Finally, since the axiomatic method aims to structure our concepts,
and insofar as the mathematical structuralist works top-down from the axioms, the appeal,
by those adopting the genetic method, and so working bottom-up, from unstructured or set-
structured concepts, like operation and collection or function, class or set, or to structured
concepts, like function and set, is not a problem; it is a side issue.
It is often forgotten that Hilbert, as did Frege (1884), distinguished the context of
discovery from the context of justification. Hilbert did this by appealing to the difference
between the genetic and the axiomatic method. That is, in attempting to extend the
axiomatic method to the foundations of real analysis, Hilbert’s (1900a) “On the Concept
of Number,” distinguishes between his axiomatic method (as laid out in his Grundlagen
der Geometrie) and the genetic method (as employed, e.g., in the works of Dedekind and
Cauchy). He does this by first noting that typically the methods of investigation of the
25 See Landry & Marquis (2005).

27 See Landry & Marquis (2005) for an account of the historical development and philosophical use
of this top-down approach.
principles of arithmetic and the axioms of geometry are thought to be essentially different;
typically it is thought that that latter uses the genetic method and the former the axiomatic.
He then details the genetic method or the genetic “manner of introducing the concept of
number” as follows:
[s]tarting from the concept of the number 1, one usually imagines
the further rational positive integers, 2, 3, 4,. . . as arising through the
process of counting, and one develops their laws of calculation; then, by
requiring subtraction be universally applicable, one attains the negative
numbers; next one defines fraction, say as a pair of numbers – so that
every linear function possesses a zero; and finally one defines the real
numbers as a [Dedekind]31 cut or a [Cauchy] fundamental sequence,
thereby achieving the result that every entire indefinite. . . function
possesses a zero. We call this method of introducing the concept of
number the genetic method, because the most general concept of real
number is engendered [erzeugt] by the successive extension of the
simple concept of number. (Hilbert, 1900a, in Ewald, 1999, p. 1092;
italics added.)
Of the axiomatic method of investigation used in geometry he says:
[o]ne proceeds essentially differently in the construction of geometry.
Here one customarily begins by assuming the existence of all the
elements, i.e., one postulates at the outset three systems of things
(namely, the points, lines, and planes) and then – essentially on the
pattern of Euclid – brings these elements into relationship with one
another by means of certain axioms – namely, the axioms of linking
[Verknüpfung], of ordering, of congruence, and of continuity. The
necessary task then arises of showing the consistency and completeness
of these axioms, i.e., it must be proved that the application of the given
axioms can never lead to contradictions, and further, that the system
of axioms is adequate to prove all the geometrical propositions. We
shall call this procedure of investigation the axiomatic method. (Hilbert,
1900a, in Ewald, 1999, p. 1092; italics added)
Knowing his preference for the axiomatic method, we find it no surprise to then read
[m]y opinion is this: Despite the high pedagogic and heuristic value of
the genetic method, for the final presentation and the complete logical
grounding [Sicherung] of our knowledge, the axiomatic method deserves
first rank. (Hilbert, 1900a, in Ewald, 1999, p. 1093; italics added.)
Hilbert then proceeds to axiomatically present the theory of arithmetic. That is, in
adopting the axiomatic method
[w]e think a system of things; we call these things numbers and
designate them by a, b, c,. . . We think these numbers in certain reciprocal
relationships whose exact and complete description occurs through the
31 See Ewald (1999) who says: “He [Hilbert] contrasts the axiomatic method with the genetic
method that had previously been the standard approach in arithmetical investigation, and it well
exemplified by Dedekind’s Habilitation address. . . ” [p. 1090]
40 ELAINE LANDRY
following axioms. . . (Hilbert, 1900a, in Ewald, 1999, p. 1093; italics

added.)
Now, of course, there’s the “necessary task” of proving the consistency of these axioms,
which Hilbert then thought “needs only a suitable modification of familiar methods of
inference” (Hilbert, 1900a, in Ewald, 1999, p. 1095). But, putting these meta-mathematical
issues aside,32 interestingly, Hilbert next points out that
[u]nder the conception described above, the doubts which have been
raised against the existence of the totality of all real numbers (and
against the existence of infinite sets generally) lose all justification; for
by the set of real numbers we do not have to imagine, say, the totality
of all possible laws according to which the elements of a fundamental
sequence can proceed [as we do with say Cauchy sequences], but
rather – as just described – a system of things whose mutual relations
are given by the finite and closed system of axioms. . . , and about which
new statements are valid only if one can derive them from the axioms by
means of a finite number of logical inferences. (Hilbert, 1900a, in Ewald,
1999, p. 1095; italics added.)33
So, as noted in Hilbert (1900b), as one who adopts the axiomatic method, our
foundational task, is as follows
. . . when we are engaged in investigating the foundations of a science,
we must set up a system of axioms which contains an exact and complete
description of the relations subsisting between the elementary ideas of
that science. The axioms so set up are at the same time the [implicit]
definitions of those elementary ideas; and no statement within the realm
of the science whose foundation we are testing is held to be correct unless
it can be derived from those axioms by means of a finite number of steps
[modulo the independence and consistency of the axioms]. (Hilbert,
1900b, in Ewald, 1999, p. 1104; italics added.)
Next we are told how consistency itself implies existence
. . . if it can be proved that the attributes assigned to the concept can never
lead to a contradiction by the application of a finite number of logical
inferences, I say that the mathematical existence of the concept. . . is
thereby proved. In the case before us, where we are concerned with the
axioms of real numbers in arithmetic, the proof of the consistency of the
axioms is at the same time the proof of the mathematical existence of
the complete system of real numbers or of the continuum. . . . The totality
of real numbers. . . . is not the totality of all possible series in decimal
fractions, or of all possible laws according to which the elements of a
32 See Landry (2011), where, in reply to Shapiro (2005), I do take-up a Hilbertian analysis of
meta-mathematical issues.
33 Extending the above analysis to Cantor’s set theory, Hilbert notes: “If we should wish to prove in
a similar manner the existence of a totality of all powers (or of all Cantorian alephs), this attempt
would fail; for in fact the totality of all powers does not exist, or – in Cantor’s terminology – the
system of all powers is an inconsistent (unfinished) set.” (Hilbert, 1900a, in Ewald, 1999, p. 1095)
fundamental sequence may proceed. It is rather a system of things whose

mutual relations are governed by the axioms set up . . . In my opinion,
the concept of the continuum is strictly logically tenable in this sense
only. . . 34 (Hilbert, 1900b, in Ewald, 1999, p. 1105; italics added.)
Finally we note three things about the axiomatic method: that it is foundational because
it is organizational; that the notion of structure that it considers is relational, as opposed
to constitutive; and that the axioms are to be taken as schematic, as opposed to assertory.
Witnessing this first, organizational, aspect of what is meant by foundation, is Hilbert’s
claims that
[e]very science takes its starting point from a sufficiently coherent body
of facts as given. It takes form, however, only by organizing this body of
facts. This organization takes place though the axiomatic method, i.e.,
one constructs a logical structure of concepts so that the relationship
between the concepts corresponds to the relationship between the facts
to be organized. (Hilbert, 1902, in Hallett & Majer, 2004; italics added.)
Explaining the second, relational, aspect of structure is Bernays’ oft quoted remark that
[a] main feature of Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry is that
the axiomatic method . . . consists in. . . understanding the assertions
(theorems) of the axiomatized theory in a hypothetical sense, that is, as
holding true for any interpretation. . . for which the axioms are satisfied.
Thus, an axiom system is regarded not as a system of statements about
a subject matter but as a system of conditions for what might be called a
relational structure. (Bernays, 1967, p. 497; italics added.)
Finally, noting the schematic aspect of the axioms, is Hilbert’s remark that
. . . it is certainly obvious that every theory is only a scaffolding or schema
of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and
that the basic elements can be thought of in any way one likes . . . .
(Hilbert, 1899, pp. 40–41; italics added).
Thus we see in Hilbert’s distinction between the genetic and axiomatic method the fabric
for the remaining two threads that I plan to pull together. That is, Hilbert’s distinction goes
together with the idea that the axioms, as schematic implicit definitions (as opposed to
assertory truths), structure our mathematical concepts in terms of the relations that bear
between them (as opposed to in terms of the “subject matter” of which they are constructed
or constituted) so that the mathematical structuralist, as Awodey’s distinction between top-
down and bottom-up ways of working suggests, begins with the axioms. Second, insofar as
a foundation “takes place through” the axiomatic method, which itself aims to “structure”
concepts in terms of their relations, and so organizes or founds “the facts” that fall under
such concepts by beginning with the axioms (as opposed to constructing the structure
of concepts by beginning with some fixed domain of facts as its constitutive subject
34 Again, extending the above analysis to Cantor’s set theory, he notes: “I am convinced that the
existence of the latter [Cantor’s higher classes of numbers and cardinal numbers] can be proved
in the sense I have described; unlike the system of all cardinal numbers or of all Cantor’s
alephs, . . . Either of these systems is, therefore, according to my terminology, mathematically
non-existent.” (Hilbert, 1900b, in Ewald 1999, p. 1105; italics added.)
42 ELAINE LANDRY
matter). This distinction, then, underwrites my distinction between the organizational

versus constitutive use of the term ‘foundation’.
§4. Using Hilbert’s distinction to respond to Feferman ‘77. My aim is to now

show, against Feferman (1977), how one can use Hilbert’s distinction between the genetic
and the axiomatic method, to argue that one can be a pure algebraic structuralist all the
way up. More specifically, my aim will be to show that at the mathematical level, that
is, at the level where one uses the category axioms, for example, the EM, ETCS, and
CCAF axioms, to implicitly define the concepts of ‘object’ and ‘morphism’, ‘set’ and
‘function’, and ‘category’ and ‘functor’, respectively, one does not have to presume either
the psychological or logical (or epistemological as claimed in Bell, 1981) priority of the
notions of ‘operation’ and ‘collection’ (or ‘class’, ‘operation’, ‘set’, ‘function’ as claimed
in Bell, 1981; Hellman, 2003).
Recall that Feferman claims that, with respect to the category-theoretic structuralist’s
use of the CCAF and the ETCS axioms, appeal needs to be made, respectively, to the
unstructured notions of operation and collection or to set-structured notions. To provide a
fully structuralist account, yet one in contrast to any extensional (Platonist) set-theoretic
option, his solution is to “structure” these notions by his constructive and intensional theory
T of operations and collections. My solution is to take these “unstructured” concepts as
part of the genetic method, that is, as part of the heuristic and pedagogical path that may
have led us to the axiomatically presented, or category theoretically structured, concepts of
‘object’ and ‘morphism’, ‘set’ and ‘function’, ‘category’ and ‘functor’, etc., as implicitly
defined by the category axioms, that is, by the EM, ETCS, and CCAF axioms, respectively.
As Landry & Marquis (2005) have pointed out, initially, when formulating the EM
axioms, Eilenburg & Mac Lane (1945) saw the concept of a category itself as a purely
heuristic device, depending perhaps35 on the set-theoretic notions of ‘function’ and ‘set’.
They were aware too of the size problems of “large” categories and so considered NGB as
background theory. As we pointed out, however:
[t]he [1945] introduction of the notions of category, functor, and natural
transformation led Mac Lane and Eilenberg to conclude that category
theory “provided a handy language to be used by topologists and others,
and it offered a conceptual view of parts of mathematics”; however, they
“did not then regard it as a field for further research effort, but just as a
language of orientation”. (Mac Lane, 1988, pp. 334–335; italics added,
in Landry & Marquis, 2005, p. 4)
So certainly, the history tells us that the concepts of ‘operation’ and ‘collection’, perhaps
as structured set theoretically in terms of ‘set’ and ‘function’, were needed psychologically
or heuristically, but it is a far different claim to hold that they are yet still needed logically.
35 I say perhaps, because, in the [1945] paper, the definition of a category was given in terms of
‘aggregates’. That is, as noted on Marquis’ (2010) SEP entry on Category Theory, it is defined
as follows: A category C is an aggregate Ob of abstract elements, called the objects of C, and
abstract elements Map, called mappings of the category. And this with the note, by Marquis,
that “The term “aggregate” is used by Eilenberg and Mac Lane themselves, presumably so as to
remain neutral with respect to the background set theory one wants to adopt.” As we will see,
just how a category is defined is an essential aspect of the uses and abuses of Feferman’s claims.
Indeed, my definition will be such as to allow for the Hilbertian reading that I will use to respond
to Feferman.
Again, as the history tells us, and as Landry & Marquis (2005) detail, with the work
of Grothendieck (1957), Kan (1958), and Lawvere (1964, 1966), and certainly, by 1967
category theory was taken as a mathematically autonomous theory. The EM, the ETCS,
and the CCAF axioms had, by this time, come to stand alone. As such, they, as implicit
definitions, needed no prior notions to give meaning or reference, either psychologically
or logically (or epistemologically), to the concepts of ‘object’ and ‘morphism’, ‘set’
and ‘function’, or ‘category’ and ‘functor’. Moreover, it is this mathematical autonomy,
viewed now in light of the use of the axiomatic method, that allows for a purely algebraic
structuralist perspective (again, see Landry & Marquis, 2005; Awodey, 2004). That is,
it allows us to begin with, and work top-down from, the category axioms, without any
presumption of what pretheoretic concepts might have been, or might still be, taken as
prior to, or motivation for these concepts (again, see McLarty, 2004, 2005; Awodey, 2004).
Moreover, these pretheoretic concepts, be they unstructured (as in the case of ‘operation’
and ‘collection’ or structured (as in the case of ‘function’, ‘set’, or ‘class’), are not to
be thought of as yielding a constitutive notion of a structure. What we have in its stead
is a relational notion of their structure. For example, a group is not to be thought of as
“made up” of sets, and sets are not “made up” of elements. Rather a group, as organized
by the EM axioms, is the name we give to an ‘object’ that satisfies the Grp axioms.
Likewise for a set, it is the name we give to an ‘object’ which is organized by the Set
axioms, which we may then further structure by the ETCS axioms. Consequently, for the
category-theoretic mathematical structuralist, no pretheoretic concepts, like ‘collection’
or ‘operation’ are needed to stand as foundationally constitutive “atoms” from which we
construct either meaning or reference. What we have in its stead is an organizational
notion of foundation; one which relies solely on the use of the axiomatic method which
in itself, and by itself, structures our category-theoretic concepts. For example, the EM
axioms express what we say about anything that is structured in terms of ‘object’ and
‘morphism’ so that the categories Set, Grp, etc., organize what we say about, sets and
functions, groups and homomorphisms, etc., as ‘objects’ and ‘morphisms’. Thus, just as
Hilbert claims with respect to the number axioms, “[w]e think a system of things; we
call these things numbers and designate them by a, b, c,. . . ” So Mac Lane explains with
respect to the category axioms “[i]n this [axiomatic] description of a category, one can
regard ‘object’, ‘morphism’. . . as undefined terms or predicates ranging over things” (Mac
Lane, 1968, p. 287; italics added).
Here I pause, but briefly, to note that it has long been my suspicion that much of the
confusion and conflated claims about the foundational status of category theory has grown
mistakenly out of an imprecise, or willfully (set or class) theory laden, explicit definition of
a category, as structured by the EM axioms. This is why I, in all my papers, have taken great
care to implicitly define a category, in line with both Mac Lane and Hilbert, as follows: A
category36 Cis any abstract system of two sorts of things; objects X , Y , . . . and morphisms
f , g,. . . , that satisfy the EM axioms. Notice that there is no use of the terms ‘collection’,
‘operation’, ‘class’, ‘set’, ‘function’ to explicitly define what objects and morphisms are.
This is the sense, then, in which, following Hilbert, we take the category axioms (here
the EM axioms) as a scaffolding or schema of concepts so that the basic elements (here
36 The wording I typically used was “cat-structured system”; this to further indicate that we should
give an in re interpretation of a category as a system that has a structure, as opposed to taking it
as an ante rem structure.
44 ELAINE LANDRY
what we take to be objects and morphisms) can be thought of in any way one likes.37 One
would think from all I have said above, and too from Awodey’s (1996) algebraic definition,
that this type of implicit definition would be obvious, if not standard. Alas, Bell’s (1981)
definition, which as we’ve seen informed much of the philosophical debates, is given in
terms of classes, and, moreover, a quick one hundred page Google search for “category
theory category definition” reveals that all definitions of a category via the EM axioms are
explicitly given in terms of either collections or classes or sets.
Seen now in the light of Hilbert’s use of the axiomatic method, it should be clear
that, by adopting the axiomatic method, the category-theoretic structuralist simply begins
by assuming the existence of a system of two sorts of things (namely, ‘objects’ and
‘morphisms’) and then brings these things into relationship with one another by means of
certain axioms, for example, by mean of the EM axioms, whereby these axioms implicitly
define, at an abstract level, what is meant by anything that satisfies the axioms, and thus
is an object or morphism.38 And, in so doing, and again in line with Awodey (2004),39
it should also be clear that when we characterize any EM organized axiom system as a
category, it should be understood in the Hilbertian schematic sense, that is, a category itself
is a schema used to provide “a system of conditions for what might be called a relational
structure.” (Bernays, 1967, p. 497; italics added.)
Further witnessing the Hilbertian heritage of the use of the axiomatic method for the
resulting category-theoretic consideration of an axiom system qua a relational structure, is
Mac Lane’s claim that
. . . a structure is essentially a list of operations and relations and
their required properties, commonly given as axioms, and often so
formulated as to be properties shared by a number of possibly quite
different specific mathematical objects. . . a mathematical object ‘has’
a particular structure when specified aspects of the objects satisfy the
(standard) list of axioms for the structure. This notion of ‘structure’ is
clearly an outgrowth of the widespread use of the axiomatic method
in mathematics [as exemplified by Hilbert’s Grundlagen]. (Mac Lane,
1996, pp. 174 & 176; italics added.)
37 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to make this point clearer. What
is doing the work here is neither the notion of a system nor the notion of an abstract system,
rather it is the Hilbertian idea of a theory as a schema for concepts that, themselves, are implicitly
defined by the axioms. Thus, we do not need a “fixed domain” of elements (be these objects and
morphisms, or categories and functors), we do not need a system as a “collection” of elements (nor
any appeal to plural quantification to range over all such), and at the EM level we do not need for
our system of objects and morphisms to be an abstract ‘object’ in a higher-order system of CCAF
defined categories. That is, we do not need for EM categories to be ‘objects’ in the CCAF sense
and so do not need to appeal to “Lawvere’s functorial semantics. . . to give a purely categorical
understanding of what it means for such an object to satisfy the EM axioms.” As I argued in my
[2011] paper, there are indeed many ways to provide a contentual analysis of logical structure
to capture the needed meta-mathematical or logical (both semantic and syntactic) notions that
underwrite the acceptability (here satisfiability) of a theory.
38 See Landry (2011), which works out the ways in which the category-theoretic structuralist
position can be rationally reconstructed along Hilbertian lines.
39 See, for example, Awodey, who, in responding to Hellman (2003), claims that “Neither G nor
C. . . are specific things here, they are schematic structures, as it were, specified or determined by
the configurations of objects and arrows and conditions on them. . . ” (Awodey, 2004, p. 62).
Now, of course to psychologically or heuristically get to these axioms we might have

made use of the genetic method and so appealed to other concepts; either set-theoretically
structured concepts like ‘function’, ‘class’, or ‘set’ or even, pretheoretic unstructured
concepts like ‘operation’ and ‘collection’. Indeed, we may, like Feferman, yet see the
need for an axiomatic theory of ‘operation’ and ‘collection’, as too we’ve come to see
the need for an axiomatic theory of ‘morphism’ and ‘object’. But, as should now be clear,
this need is not borne out of some logical or epistemological priority of these notions with
respect to the concepts of ‘object’ and ‘morphism’, ‘set’ and ‘function’, or ‘category and
‘functor’.
Again, we say in line with Hilbert: Despite the high pedagogic and heuristic value of the
genetic method, that is, the high pedagogic and heuristic value of the theory of operations
and collections (or the theory of functions, classes or sets), for the final presentation and
complete logical grounding of our knowledge of category-theoretic concepts, the axiomatic
method, which implicitly defines these concepts, deserves first rank.
Recall that there are four central claims of Feferman (1977): 1) that our aim is to give a
structuralist account of abstract mathematics; 2) that category theory requires a prior theory
of operation and collection; 3) that we want a nonpluralist account of what a foundation
is; and 4) that we want to avoid the Platonistic or extensional accounts and make room for
constructive or intensional accounts.
With respect to 1) and 2), I believe, that I have shown that we can provide a category-
theoretic pure algebraic structuralist account of abstract mathematics, without needing
a prior theory of operations and collections. Yet, in consideration of 1) and 3), if one
takes into account the philosophical literature as outlined above, we are still left asking
which category-theoretic axioms are we to take as the foundation for a structuralist
account of abstract mathematics; the EM, ETCS, or CCAF axioms? Against both Bell’s
(1986) and (1988) topos-theoretic pluralism40 and McLarty’s (2004) category-theoretic
pluralism,41 and in line with Awodey (2004), I take the EM axioms to be the foundation
for a structuralist account of abstract mathematics. Again, where I understand the term
foundation in the Hilbertian, organizational, sense.
As I explained in Landry (2011), and noted here on pages 18–19, the EM axioms
organize what we say about the abstract structure of mathematics, both the abstract
structure of mathematical concepts, like the EM organized categories Set and Grp (where
we take set and function, and group and homomorphism as ‘objects’ and ‘morphisms’),
and the abstract structure of logical concepts, like the EM organized categories Lat and
Bool, (where we take lattices and Boolean algebras as ‘objects’, and structure preserving
homomorphisms as ‘morphisms’). The ETCS and CCAF axioms, in contrast, organize
what we say about the structure of mathematics, insofar as we structure the mathematical
or logical concepts of ‘object’ and ‘morphism’ in terms of set and function or category and
functor, respectively.42 That is, in line with McLarty’s (2005) claim, I too
40 Where, again, every topos represents a framework of a “possible world” for mathematical activity
41 Where “each proposed specific categorical foundation [as given, for example, by the ETCS, SDG,
CCAF axioms] is a proposed answer” [to Hellman, 2003], because each is assertory. (McLarty,
2004, p. 42)
42 Again, one can also use the EM axioms to organize logical structure as well. For example, we can
consider classical logical structure as given by the categories Lat and Bool, where we take lattices
and Boolean algebras as ‘objects’, and ‘morphisms’ as structure preserving homomorphisms, that
is, (, ⊥, ∧, ∨) homomorphisms. Or, and perhaps with reference to Feferman’s constructive aims,
we can consider intuitionistic logical structure as given by the category Heyt, where we take
46 ELAINE LANDRY
. . . agree with Feferman that foundations of mathematics should lie in

a general theory of operations and collections, only I say the current
best general theory of those calls them arrows and objects. It is category
theory. (McLarty, 2005, p. 49)
But again, against McLarty (2005), and in line with Awodey (2004), I feel no need, when
making such foundationalist claims, to read the EM axioms as assertory. Yet, neither, as is
the case with Awodey, do I feel the need to limit the term foundation to its constitutive, or
“atomistic” meaning. Indeed, as already explained, when seen in the light of our rational
reconstruction of Hilbert, it is in virtue of their schematic character that the EM axioms
can be seen as providing the foundation, where foundation is here understood in the
organizational sense of the term.
Finally, with regards to Feferman’s claim 4), viz., that we want to avoid the Platonistic
or extensional accounts and make room for constructive or intensional accounts, I
have certainly shown that we can avoid Platonistic or extensional accounts. That is,
I take it that as pure algebraic mathematical structuralists, we, like the non-Platonist
or nonextensionalist Feferman, want to avoid the need for any “background theory,”
including set theory and both Shapiro’s Platonist theory of structures and Hellman’s
nominalist modal theory of large domains, wherein our ‘objects’, like ‘collections’,
would be considered “independent of any means of definition” and our ‘morphisms’, like
‘operations’, would “identified with their graphs” (Feferman, 1977, p. 151).
To further demonstrate this, and in one last reply to Hellman (2003), what we simply
note is that if we take the CCAF axioms as organizing what we say about categories
and functors, themselves structured as ‘objects’ and ‘morphisms’ then, as McLarty (2005,
p. 52) notes, Hellman’s “home address” problem, insofar as it concerns the existence of
categories, disappears. So in response to Hellman’s “existence” objection, I again turn to
Hilbert: . . . if it can be proved that the attributes assigned to the concept can never lead
to a contradiction by the application of a finite number of logical inferences, I say that the
mathematical existence of the concept of a category. . . is thereby proved. In the case before
us, where we are concerned with the CCAF axiom’s concepts of ‘category’ and ‘functor’
the proof of the relative consistency43 of the axioms is at the same time the proof of the
mathematical existence of the complete system of categories.
Heyting algebras as ‘objects’ and ‘morphisms’ as (, ⊥, ∧, ∨, →) homomorphisms. Finally,

we can consider proof-theoretic logical structure more generally by taking a deductive system
itself as a category, where the ‘objects’ are formulas, ‘morphisms’ are proofs or deductions, and
conditions on morphisms are taken as rules of inference.
43 Here I note that, as should be obvious, relative consistency need not be taken as relative
consistency with respect to ZFC. For example, the consistency of the CCAF axioms can be
proved with respect to the ETCS axioms plus one Grothendieck universe. More generally, ZFC
is consistent if and only if ETCS plus the categorical reflection scheme is consistent. And
ETCS is consistent if and only if the fragment of ZFC called “bounded Zermelo” is; where
bounded Zermelo is the fragment of ZFC where one drops the replacement axiom scheme, and
allows the separation axiom scheme only with bounded quantifiers. More specifically, whatever
proves the relative consistency of the ZFC axioms proves the relative consistency of ETCS
axioms. Moreover, the relative consistency proof between (the fragments and extensions of)
ETCS and (the fragments and extension of) ZFC do not use either ETCS or ZFC. Rather,
both are formalizable in weak fragments of second-order arithmetic by proof-theoretic means.
Much thanks to Colin McLarty for providing me with the details need to make the above
points precise. Again, speaking to this last point, as noted here and in Landry (2011), for
the category-theoretic foundationalist, there are many meta-mathematical and logical options
Yet too this response seems to bring us up against even greater “size issues,” that is,
what now about the status of the category of all categories?44 Again, however, we turn to
Hilbert, for our reply: Under the conception described above, the doubts which have been
raised against the existence of the totality of all categories lose all justification; for by the
category of categories we do not have to imagine, say, the axioms as including the category
of all categories, but rather—as just described—a system of things whose mutual relations
are given by the . . . axioms. That is, we need only assume, as the axioms do, that categories
are ‘objects’ and functors are ‘morphisms’.
But, in our appeal to letting relative consistency imply existence, it would seem that
both Hellman’s (2003) charge of ‘if-then-ism’ and Shapiro’s (2005) related claim that
a meta-mathematical assertory background theory is needed to logically express claims
of “acceptability,” seem to lurk in the background, and so may yet push us into the
extensionalist position of either the Platonist or modal nominalist. There are two replies
to offer here. One, in line with Awodey (2004), is that mathematics itself has an “if-
then” structure, so we should not be either surprised or bothered that our foundation does.
And two, as Bernays reminds us: the axiomatic method . . . consists in. . . understanding the
assertions (theorems) of the axiomatized theory in a hypothetical sense, that is, as holding
true for any interpretation.
However, one may also read Hellman’s ‘if-then-ism’ charge as arising from the question,
equally pointed at Hilbert and the category-theoretic structuralist, “How do you know there
are enough “things” to provide the models for the needed relative consistency proofs?”
In reply, and again, as Hilbert explains: Here one customarily begins by assuming the
existence of all the elements. . . . As I have argued previously, in Landry (2011), this
assumption is no less problematic than is the Platonist assumption that there exists a
set, or structure-theoretic universe, that makes our axioms true or the modal nominalist
assumption that there possibly exits a large plurality of concrete parts that provides the
large domains for our mathematical statements to range over.45
open for the contentual analysis of such proofs. Further, as I explain in endnote 37 (Landry,
2011, p. 451), “[a]t the mathematical level, as algebraic structuralists, we [me, Shapiro, and the
set-theoretic foundationalist] are [all] committed to some type of schema like “If theory T is
acceptable (coherent or consistent, for example), then the objects over which it ranges exist”.
With respect to the acceptability of T, we both agree that all we have is relative consistency (or
relative coherence). At the meta-mathematical level, however, as pure algebraic structuralists, the
statement of T’s acceptability (or consistency) is taken as internally assertory, i.e., is assertory
in some stronger theory TS [where by ‘stronger’ I mean whatever, in light of Gödel results, we
mean, for example, either computationally or information-theoretically stronger] which we take
as “acceptable” for the purpose of proving the relative consistency of the theory T. The statement
‘T is consistent’ holds in TS , but it is not externally assertory in the sense that we need take this
stronger theory TS itself as true. Where we differ, then, is that I deny the claim that statements
of acceptability (or consistency, coherence etc.,) are externally assertory in the sense that at some
point the “If . . . , then. . . ” dissolves because the statement of the acceptability of T is expressed in
some true, assertory, meta-mathematical background, theory TT , that stops the possible regress
of stronger theories, i.e., because for some TS , TS = TT .”
44 Note that Feferman’s theory of collections and operations faces the same problem. That is, as he
notes of this theory T: “It is true that statements of results must now make distinction between
partial and total which previously were made between large and small.” (Feferman, 1977, p. 168)
45 Again, I would like to thank an anonymous referee for motivating me to make explicit the
difference between my approach and Awodey’s. That is, there is a distinction to be made here
between my Hilbertian approach and Awodey’s “if-then” approach. Awodey clearly accepts that
his foundation too has an if-then structure. The Hilbertian, in contrast, as does the set-theoretic
48 ELAINE LANDRY
Again, put simply, the Hilbertian pure algebraic structuralist works top-down and so
begins by assuming the “things” that the Platonist, the nominalist, and even Feferman,
feel the need to “structure” by working bottom-up, from either an extensional theory
of structures, sets, or large domains, or an intensional theory of collections. In any
case, however, none of these assumptions is need to “make up” the objects that found
some constitutive notion of structure in mathematics. This point tells equally against the
Platonist/nominalist viewpoint as it does against Feferman’s constructivist viewpoint. That
is, it tells equally against the need to appeal to any “background theory” as it does against
the need to appeal to any “prior theory”; be it extensionally presupposed or intensionally
constructed. Indeed, as I have used Hilbert and Awodey to show, there is no “making-up”
or “constructing,” in terms of some atomistic notion of constitutive structure; there is only
“organizing down,” in terms of the axiomatic notion of relational structure. And for this
foundational task, category theory more than meets the mathematical structuralist’s needs.
In response to Feferman (1977), then, given that the pure algebraic structuralist works
top-down axiomatically, and only works bottom-up genetically, or heuristically, there is no
sense of the talk of “construction” of concepts, and so no sense of the psychological priority
of any concepts. And given that the category axioms, the EM, the ETCS, and the CCAF
axioms, themselves provide implicit definitions of the concepts ‘object’ and ‘morphism’,
‘set’ and ‘function’, and ‘category’ and ‘functor’, respectively, and so provide, again, to
borrow from Hilbert, “the final presentation and the completely logical grounding of our
knowledge,” there is no sense of talk of either the logical or epistemological priority of any
concepts.
Thus, given that a foundation, understood now in this Hilbertian sense, is that which
best organizes what we say about the structure of mathematical concepts, and insofar as
only the axiomatic method structures our concepts, category theory as framed by the EM
axioms is currently the best foundation for a structuralist account of abstract mathematics.
So, contra Feferman (1977), one can be a category-theoretic pure algebraic structuralist
all the way up!
§5. Acknowledgements. For Aldo; who thinks it’s all abstract nonsense, but who
supports me nonetheless. I hope to have finally convinced you that, while it’s abstract,
it’s not nonsense!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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50 ELAINE LANDRY
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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS
1 SHIELDS AVE
DAVIS, CA 95616
E-mail: emlandry@ucdavis.edu
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The genetic versus the axiomatic method: Responding to

Article in The Review of Symbolic Logic · March 2013

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THE GENETIC VERSUS THE AXIOMATIC METHOD: RESPONDING

§1. Introduction. Feferman’s 1977 paper, “Categorical Foundations and Foundations

Received: December 18, 2011.

§2. Philosophers’ uses of Feferman 1977. As noted, philosophers of mathematics

involves grasping the epistemically prior notion of operation. . . It seems

Claiming as a result that

or topoi, in a general sense, and it is at this level that an appeal to

13 Awodey’s characterization is given in term of the EM axioms.

hypothetical, dependent on the mathematical existence of the very struc-

posited by the axioms exist. . . So Hellman’s claim the ‘category

22 Awodey’s definition is as follows: A category by definition thus consists of objects A, B, C. . . and

knowledge, specification, or determination of the ‘objects’ involved. The

them are inherently ‘schematic’, in the required sense. This is what

23 See Landry (2006).

25 See Landry & Marquis (2005).

following axioms. . . (Hilbert, 1900a, in Ewald, 1999, p. 1093; italics

fundamental sequence may proceed. It is rather a system of things whose

matter). This distinction, then, underwrites my distinction between the organizational

§4. Using Hilbert’s distinction to respond to Feferman ‘77. My aim is to now

Now, of course to psychologically or heuristically get to these axioms we might have

. . . agree with Feferman that foundations of mathematics should lie in

Heyting algebras as ‘objects’ and ‘morphisms’ as (, ⊥, ∧, ∨, →) homomorphisms. Finally,

Mac Lane, S. (1996). Structure in mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica, 4(3), 174–183.

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