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3. In what way can ROI lead to dysfunctional decisions on the part of the investment
SBU manager? How does the residual income approach overcome this problem?
ROI may lead to dysfunctional decisions in that divisional managers may reject otherwise
profitable investment opportunities simply because they would reduce the division’s overall
ROI figure. The residual income approach overcomes this problem by establishing a minimum
rate of return which the company wants to earn on its operating assets, thereby motivating
the manager to accept all investment opportunities promising a return in excess of this
minimum figure.
4. Distinguish between a cost SBU, a profit SBU, and an investment SBU?
A cost center manager has control over cost, but not revenue or investment funds. A profit
center manager, by contrast, has control over both cost and revenue. An investment center
manager has control over cost and revenue and investment funds.
5. What is transfer price and why are transfer pricing systems needed?
The term transfer price means the price charged for a transfer of goods or services between
units of the same organization, such as two departments or divisions. Transfer prices are
needed for performance evaluation purposes.
6. If a market price for a product is determinable, why is it generally considered to be
the best transfer price?
The use of market price for transfer purposes will create the actual conditions under which
the transferring and receiving units would be operating if they were completely separate,
autonomous companies. It is generally felt that the creation of such conditions provides
managerial incentive, and leads to greater overall efficiency in operations.
7. Under what situation might a negotiated price be a better approach to pricing
transfers between divisions than the actual market price?
Negotiated transfer prices should be used (1) when the volume involved is large enough to
justify quantity discounts, (2) when selling and/or administrative expenses are less on
intracompany sales, (3) when idle capacity exists, and (4) when no clear-cut market price
exists (such as a sister division being the only supplier of a good or service).
8. In what ways can suboptimization result if divisional managers are given full
autonomy in setting, accepting, and rejecting transfer prices?
Suboptimization can result if transfer prices are set in a way that benefits a particular division,
but works to the disadvantage of the company as a whole. An example would be a transfer
between divisions when no transfers should be made (e.g., where a better overall contribution
margin could be generated by selling at an intermediate stage, rather than transferring to the
next division). Suboptimization can also result if transfer pricing is so inflexible that one
division buys from the outside when there is substantial idle capacity to produce the item
internally. If divisional managers are given full autonomy in setting, accepting, and rejecting
transfer prices, then either of these situations can be created, through selfishness, desire to
“look good”, pettiness, or bickering.
IMPORTANT NOTES ON TRANSFER PRICING
In many organizations, one sub-unit manufactures a product or provides a service that is
then transferred to another sub-unit in the same organization. The price at which
products or services are transferred between two sub-units in an organization is called
transfer price. Transfer prices guide managers to make the best possible decision as to
whether they should buy or sell products and services inside the total organization.
Since a transfer price affects the profit of both the buying and selling divisions, the
transfer price affects the performance evaluation of these responsibility centers. Thus,
the problem of measuring performance in profit centers or investment centers is made
more complicated by transfer of goods or services between responsibility centers.
Management's objective in setting a transfer price is to encourage goal congruence
among the division managers involved in the transfer, where the interest of both the
division and the whole company coincide. In a decentralized organization, the managers
of profit centers and investment centers often have considerable autonomy in deciding
whether to accept or reject orders and whether to buy inputs from inside the
organization or from outside.
Organizations may have to make trade-offs between pricing for congruence and pricing
to prompt managerial effort. Furthermore, the optimal price for either may differ from
that employed for tax reporting or for other external needs. Income taxes, property
taxes, and other similar taxes often influence the setting of transfer prices so that the
firm as a whole will benefit even to the expense of the performance of a segment. For
multinational companies, transfer pricing is affected by some international laws were the
company is affected.