UNIVERSITY OF STO.

TOMAS-LEGAZPI
COLLEGE OF LAW
LEGAZPI CITY

PERSONS AND FAMILY LAW

(Case Digest)

Submitted to:

Atty. Cynthia Arias-Ramos

Prepared by:

WILFREDO M. BELBES JR.

II-C
Tison vs. CA 276 S 582
Facts:
This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an
apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an
apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to
him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and
nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the
property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove
filial relation. The respondent contended that the documents/evidence
presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never
presented for cross-examination.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is
inadmissible.
Ruling:
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their
admissibility; however, the same may be admitted by reason of private
respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time
they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection
shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived,
since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship
between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller
Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's
niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree
which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section
39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant
be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that
such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only
before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
Ara vs. Pizarro 817 S 518
Facts:     
Romeo, William, Dr. Pizarro and Henry all claimed to be children of the
late Josefa who died on November 18, 2002. The late Josefa left
properties in Dr. Pizarro’s possession and so Romeo, William and Henry
filed for judicial partition of the properties before the RTC. Dr. Pizarro
averred that she was the only legitimate and only child of Josefa. She
denied that any of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings.
Petitioners Ramon and William argued that during Josefa’s lifetime, she
acknowledged all of them as her children directly, continuously,
spontaneously and without concealment and that in the absence of any
record of birth in the civil register, filiation may be established on
admission of filiation in a public or handwritten document.
Issue:
Whether filiation be proved through open and continuous possession of
the status of illegitimate children after the death of the putative parent.
Ruling:
NO, it is clear that any action seeking to prove filiation sought under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code must be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
To establish, filiation as illegitimate children after the death of a putative
parent, the only evidence allowed is a record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation
made in a public document or a privately signed handwritten instrument
by Josefa.
After Josefa’s death in 2002, petitioners could no longer be allowed to
introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa.
Petitioners also did not present the kind of evidence contemplated under
Article 172 of the Family Code. They did not present evidence of an
admission of filiation as a public document or a privately handwritten
instrument signed by the putative parent.
BBB vs. AAA 750 S 188
Facts:
In 2007, a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) was issued against BBB
upon a petition filed by his wife, AAA. The PPO basically ordered BBB to
stay away from AAA in order to avoid any acts of violence being
committed by BBB against AAA and their children. BBB appealed the
order but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal. BBB elevated the
appeal to the Supreme Court. Pending appeal however, AAA and BBB
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement whereby they settled the
issues on custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of
their minor children. BBB then filed a manifestation before the Supreme
Court for the latter to render judgment based on the compromise
agreement.
AAA’s counsel questioned the validity of the MOA as it turned out that
AAA signed the same without her counsel’s guidance and advice and at
the time of the signing, AAA was emotionally distressed.
Issue:
Whether or not VAWC cases are subject to compromise agreement.
Ruling:
No. The rules on VAWC cases (A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC) intend that cases
filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not subjects of
compromise agreements. As stated in the earlier case of Garcia vs.
Judge Drilon: Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A
process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies
that the victim is somehow at fault.
Mabugay-Otamias vs. Republic 792 S 416
Facts:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias was married to Colonel Francisco Otamias on
1978. The couple had five children. On September 2000, they separated
because of Colonel Otamias’ alleged infidelity. After the separation, their
children remained with Edna. She then demanded support equivalent to
75 percent of the colonel’s retirement benefits. However, Colonel
Otamias executed an affidavit stating that he can commit only 50 percent
of his retirement benefits to his children and wife. Because of this, they
entered into a compromise agreement. On February 26, 2003, the
colonel executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50 percent of
his salary and pension in favor of Edna and his children. Colonel
Otamias retired on April 1, 2003, and the agreement had been honored
until January 6, 2006. According to Edna, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) decided not to honor the agreement.
Issue:
Did Colonel Otamias’ execution of the Deed of Assignment make him
effectively waive his rights to 50 percent of his retirement benefits in
favor of his family?
Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 6 of the Civil Code, rights may be waived
unless it is contrary to law or public policy. In this case, the waiver was
made in order to ensure the support of the retired colonel of his family, a
right granted to them by the Family Code. The waiver is in no way
contrary to public policy or any law for that matter. Thus, it is deemed to
be valid.
Domingo vs. Molina 791 S 47
Facts:
In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a
property. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the
respondent spouses Molina. 10 years after Flora's death, Anastacio sold
his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts.
Then Anastacio died.
Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the
transfer and filed a(Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Ownership Complaint) against the spouses claiming that his father could
not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora's
consent as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale. The spouses
Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title and that they have
been in possession of the subject property before the title was registered
under their names and have religiously paid the property's real estate
taxes.
Issue:
Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without
Flora's consent is valid and legal
Ruling:
Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Flora's
death pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code (now Article 126 (1) of
the Family Code). Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership upon death of a spouse and prohibits any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal
partnership liquidation. While Article 130 of the Family Code provides
that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior
liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since
the provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Carlos vs. Tolentino G.R. 234533 June 27, 2018
Facts:
The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land with an area of 1,000
square meters and all the improvements thereon located in Novaliches,
QC, which was acquired on March 17, 1967 and registered in the name
of Juan C. Tolentino, married to Mercedes Tolentino. Without Juan's
knowledge and consent, Mercedes and Kristoff (grandson of the
respondent), who were then residing in the subject property, allegedly
forged a Deed of Donation dated February 15, 2011, thereby making it
appear that Juan and Mercedes donated the subject property to Kristoff.
In April 2011, Kristoff offered the sale of the subject property to Julieta's
brother, Felix Bacal. After a series of negotiations, Kristoff and Julieta
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated April 12, 2011
stating that Kristoff is selling the subject property to Julieta in the amount
of Two Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,300,000.00),
payable in two (2) installments. On May 28, 2011, Julieta made the first
payment in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) while the
second payment in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00) was made on June 30, 2011. On the same day, a Deed
of Absolute Sale was executed between Kristoff and Julieta.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by Mercedes in favor of
Kristoff was valid.
Ruling:
YES, as to her share since the subject property was acquired on March
17, 1967 during the marriage of Juan and Mercedes, it formed part of
their conjugal partnership. It follows then that Juan and Mercedes are
the absolute owners of their undivided one-half interest, respectively,
over the subject property. Meanwhile, as in any other property relations
between husband and wife, the conjugal partnership is terminated upon
the death of either of the spouses. In respondent Juan's Comment filed
before the Court, the Verification which he executed on February 9, 2018
states that he is already a widower. Hence, the Court takes due notice of
the fact of Mercedes' death which inevitably results in the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership.