(ii)

DECLARATION

I declare that the work presented in this thesis is,

to the best of my knowledge and belief, original,

except as acknowledged in the text, and that the

material has not been submitted previously, either

in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any

other institution.

-"

M~~')'~
C. G. P. Rakisits/
 (iii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract iv
Acknowledgements vi
Preface vii
List of Tables and Charts xii

PART I: INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Theoretical, Analytical and Conceptual approaches 9
Chapter 3. The "Two-Nation Theory" 35

PART II: EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 53

PART III: RELIGION

Chapter 4. The Religious Dimension to the Creation of Pakistan 106

Chapter 5. The Modernist Period (1947-1977) 129
Chapter 6. The Islamization Period (1977-1985) 183

PART IV: ETHNICITY

Chapter 7. The Ethnic Composition of Pakistan 215

Chapter 8. The East Wing - West Wing Polarization (1947-1971) 249
Chapter 9. New Pakistan's Ethnic Problems (1971-1985) 301

PART V: THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Chapter 10. The Search for Friends (1947-1971) 352

Chapter 11. The Middle East Attraction (1971-1985) 401

PART VI: CONCLUSIONS 443

BIBLIOGRAPHY 460
 ABSTRACT

The process of national integration in Pakistan has been hampered by

the interaction of two opposing forces: religion and ethnicity. While the

Indian Muslims succeeded in establishing a state on the basis of the "Two

Nation Theory" which argued that Muslims and Hindus were two separate and

distinct 'nations', Islam soon proved not to be the unifying force the

national leaders had expected it to be. This was mainly due to the

presence of three irreconciliable schools of thought, that is, the

Modernists, the Traditionalists and the Fundamentalists, regarding the

role Islam should have in the social and political order of the country.

The persistent disagreement between the adherents of these threee

approaches has diminished the power of Islam as the most important locus

for affective identity and, accordingly, strengthened the affective

loyalty for ethnic groups.

Although Pakistan is certainly not unique in having a multi-ethnic

character, it has been the consistent policy of the successive national

governments to implement highly centralized systems of government which

has coapounded the centrifugal pull of ethnicity. The dissatisfaction

with this policy has been reinforced by two elements: first, the centre's

domination of the political system at the expense of the provinces is in

direct contradiction with the 1940 Lahore Resolution which had guaranteed

full provincial autonomy in the future state of Pakistan; and, second, the

Punjabis' control of all major national institutions, including the armed

forces and the civilian bureaucracy, has resulted in the 'peripheral'

ethnic groups viewing centralization as being tantamount to the

'Punjabization' of Pakistani society.

 (v)

Not only has the clash of religion and ethnicity created political

instability and adversely affected the process of national integration,

but the presence of a hostile environment has further compounded the

country's political developments. Surrounded by bellicose neighbours, and

faced with the unenviable task of defending a territory which, until 1971,

consisted of two wings separated from one another by over 1000 kilometres

of Indian territory, the national leaders decided that the dual objectives

of promoting a feeling of nationhood amongst the ethnic groups of the two

wings and defending the country's national integrity would best be met by

pursuing a strategy of centralization. It is this decision which led to

increased Bengali demands for provincial autonomy, ultimately leading to

the seccession of East Pakistan. And, although post-l97l Pakistan is

certainly more easily defendable, this has not resulted in the central

governments changing their approach.

In sum, it is the convergence of the three forces of religion,

ethnicity and the external environment which has impeded the process of

national integration in Pakistan. Until the national leaders are able to

resolve the religious debate, reduce the centrifugal pull of ethnicity by

granting provincial autonomy, the Pakistan polity will remain vulnerable

to the influence of the external environment, and the process of national

integration will continue to stagnate.

 (vi)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere gratitude is due to many individuals who have, in some way,

contributed to the completion of this dissertation.

First and foremost, I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor,

Dr U. Sundhaussen, for his unfailing support and his valuable comments
without which the completion of this study would not have been possible.

Financially, I would not have been able to undertake this study if it

had not been for the University of Queensland Postgraduate Research
Scholarship and the University of Queensland travel grant which enabled me
to conduct my field trip to Pakistan. In this regard I wish to thank
Professor R. Scott and Dr B. Stinebrickner for supporting the extension of
my scholarship.

I wish to acknowledge the assistance I received from the many

Pakistanis who gave me valuable insight into their.society. Certainly the
ones to whom I owe a special debt are: Col. Qayum of the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, Muzzaffar Abbas, Director of the Information
Service Academy, Brig. (ret.) Noor Husain and Ali Sheikh of the Institute
of Strategic Studies in Islamabad and the members of Department of
International Relations at the Quaid-i-Azam University and the Pakistan
Institute of International Affairs in Karachi. I also owe a special debt
of gratitude to Baron R. Capelle-Burny of the Belgian Embassy in Islamabad
for his personal support while in Pakistan.

For assisting me with the word processor, the printing out of the
dissertation and indulging me with their patience, I am indebted to Linda
Buckham, Sue Harris, Gail McGill and Carol Parker.

Also, I wish to record my appreciation to my family and friends for

their continued interest in the progress of the dissertation. Finally,
but certainly not least, I owe a special feeling of gratitude to Rhondda
Nicholas for her patience and support during this whole period.
 PREFACE

For the last twenty-five years Pakistan has been the focus of many
scholars interested in the study of political development, and

specifically the process of national integration, in Third World

countries. However, while many of the resultant studies have helped in

having a better understanding of Pakistani politics and society, none have

systematically examined the combined effect of the interaction of three

factors which I suggest are vital for the process of national integration

in Pakistan; these factors are ethnicity, religion and the external

enviroDlllent.

I have chosen to attempt to fill this lacuna because, although each of

these three factors are by themselves important elements in the process of

national integration, and they have been sufficiently examined on an

individual basis in the many publications on Pakistan, it is the

convergence and connectedness of ethnicity, religion and the external

enviroDlllent which has compounded Pakistan's political developments. While

Islam, the basis for the creation of Pakistan, should have been a uniting

factor and facilitated 'nation-building', it has proven unable to counter

the centrifugal forces of ethnicity. This persistent struggle between, on

the one hand, the successive military and civilian governments' drive to

establish a highly centralized polity using Islam as a legitimizing device

and, on the other hand, the provinces' demand for greater political

autonomy as promised to them prior to independence, has been compounded by

the presence of a hostile environment. It is these three forces pulling

in different directions which will be the focus of this dissertation; for,

I suggest, it is only by analysing the three together that one may gain a

clearer understanding of the process of national integration in Pakistan.

 (\liii)

Right from the start I wish to acknowledge some inevitable short-

comings in my research. First, I conducted my field research from

September 1983 until February 1984. This was certainly the most turbulent

period of President Zia's tenure in office, since it covered the period

during which the Pakistani government had to contain the violent rural

uprising in Sind. This resulted in a stiffening of Martial Law Orders

regulating the activities of opposition politicians. Consequently,

because all politicians of any standing had either been gaoled, placed

under house arrest or sent into tvoluntary' exile abroad, I was unable to

interview the top leaders of the opposition alliance, the Movement for the

Restoration of Democracy, and thus was limited to interviewing the less

prominent opposition politicians. Second, I was categorically refused by

the Army Chief of General Staff the authorization to interview active

high-ranking military officers. Moreover, I was also denied access to the

library of the National Defence College, a sure source of valuable

information. Nothwithstanding these limitations, I managed to gather

valuable primary information for this study. These fall into three

categories: interviews, official documents, and newspapers and weeklies.

My first category of primary sources consisted of approximately 75

interviews conducted in all four provinces of Pakistan and, to a more

limited ~xtent, in India and Bangladesh. There were essentially seven

categories of interviewees. These were: retired high-ranking military

officers, some of whom had been cabinet ministers of Ayub's, Yahya's and

Zia's governments, former federal ministers in Bhutto's cabinet, federal

ministers in Zia' s government, including active military officers, high

and middle ranking civil servants, journalists, academics, lawyers and

religious leaders.
 (ix)

However, although the overwhelming majority of interviewees discussed

candidly the highly sensitive subject of national integration in Pakistan,

I was often asked not to reveal their names. Accordingly, except for

statements which are generally accepted opinion, or which are attributed

to government officials, I have deliberately omitted the name of the

interviewees. Similarly, wishing to avoid possible government censure

against the interviewees, I have decided, in consultation with my

supervisor, not to follow the general practice of including an appendix

listing the individuals interviewed during the field trip.

The acquisition of official documents, the second category of primary

sources, met with mixed results. While the Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting generally had a wide selection of material publicly available

on the early years of Pakistan, notably regarding Mohammad Ali Jinnah,

leader of the All-India Muslim League and the first Governor-General of

Pakistan, and Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1951-1953,

sources on President Ayub Khan (1958-1969) were definitively scarcer, and

material on President Yahya Khan (1969-1971) and Prime Minister Bhutto

(1971-1977) were virtually non-existant. I was told this was because

every new leader either had all published material from the previous

administration destroyed or refused public access. In this regard even

speeches of Jinnah which cast doubts on President Zia's Islamization

programme have been taken off the shelves and deleted from official

documents dealing with the Jinnah period. Needless to say that speeches,

statements and other official material relating to President Zia-ul-Haq

and his government's programme were abundant.

 (x)

Finally, also included in this category of primary sources have been

the various books and articles written by former Pakistani leaders, for

example, Ayub Khan, Liaquat Ali Khan, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali and Bhutto.

Some of the most important sppeches and discourses made by prominent

members of the Muslim League and government officials in the first ten

years of Pakistan's existence have been compiled by private publishers

with the 'blessing' of the government. As with offical publications,

these works clearly deleted any statements which, for example, made any

allusions to ethnic dissension, Bengali demands for provincial autonomy,

and opposition to the establishment of an Islamic system of government.

The third category of primary sources widely used in this study

involved newspapers and weeklies. The two newspapers upon which I relied

most heavily for my research were the relatively independent Muslim

published in Islamabad, and the government-supported Karachi-based Dawn.

While both had their drawbacks, The Muslim having a Shi'a orientation and

Dawn supporting muha,iir interests, they were certainly more objective in

their reporting than The Pakistan Times, the de facto official mouthpiece

of the government. Two weeklies of diametrically different political

orientation were also used: the Dawn (Overseas Weekly), published abroad

for the purpose of promoting a positive image of the government's

policies, and the blatantly pro-Moscow-oriented Viewpoint which

surprisingly has been allowed to continue although it is highly critical

of Zia and his government.

As a result of the relatively limited amount of primary sources

available in Pakistan and in Australian university libraries on the first

30 years of Pakistan's political history, I have had to rely substantially

 (xi)

on the re-interpretation of secondary sources. These can be categorized

into two classes, depending as to where there are published. First,

because of the tough censorship laws presently existing in Pakistan, all

books published in Pakistan are, except for a few, apologetic of the Zia

government and critical of past governments. Works on Jinnah, especially

the ones which promote his Islamic credentials, are abundant and widely

circulated. Similarly, books on Islam, Pakistan's position in the Muslim

World and the Muslim unity of the Pakistan tnation' are plentiful. The

second category of books on Pakistan are the ones published abroad. These

works can be classified into essentially three types. All works published

in India, whether by Indians or Pakistanis, are overwhelmingly subjective

and highly critical of all matters relating to the domestic politics, the

military, and the foreign policy of successive Pakistani governments. The

second category of books published abroad are the ones written either by
Western scholars, essentially American and British, and Pakistani

expatriates residing in the West. These works, while generally critical

as well of the various governments' policies, are nevertheless

intellectually sounder and their approach certainly more rational.

Finally, the third type of books published abroad, mainly in Britain, are

the ones written by Pakistanis scholars and journalists who tend to be as

subjective as their counterpart in Pakistan; except that in this case they

dogmatically follow a Marxist approach in their analysis of Pakistani

politics.
 (xii )

TABLES AND CHARTS

Theoretical model with variables affecting

national integration process 5

Ethnic Stratification in Pakistan 14

Model with sequential stages of national
integration 30

Graphic Representation of the or~glns of the

three major Islamic schools of thought 126
Political position of the different categories
of Muslim belief systems 127
Grid categorizing participants in Partition
debate according to the Islamic schools
of thought and political orientation 128
Proportion of refugees in the population of
the major cities of Pakistan, 1951 245

Composition of the armed forces 252

Literacy ratio 328

Ranking of districts of provinces according

to rural development criteria 332

Distribution of seats in the Majlis-i-Shoora 344

 PART I

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION
 Since achieving independence in 1947, Pakistan has been plagued with a
high level of political instability. This situation is the consequence of
the interaction of three forces, ethnicity, religion, and the external
envir~t. On the one hand, the various ethnic groups that constitute
Pakistan have been acting as a powerful centrifugal force, hampering the
process of national integration. On the other hand, the successive
central governments have, in various degrees, attempted to use Islam, the
basis for the creation of the country, as a centripetal force to promote
national unity. Furthermore, the resulting clash of these two powerful
affective values has been compounded by the presence of a hostile
envirou.ent which has had adverse domestic effects on the political
develo~nts of the country. Nevertheless, even with these deeply
divisive forces present in Pakistan since independence, the country has
.anaged to survive, albeit since 1971 only in a truncated form.

The study of national integration in Pakistan is probably the most

interesting aspect of the polical development process of the country,
aainly because of the basic premise on which Pakistan was founded: it was
assu.ed that with the Muslim League's "Two-Nation Theory" Muslim loyalty
would supersede all the various ethnic identities that affected the
indigeneous population of the future state of Pakistan. The inevitable,
but logical, consequence of this belief was that since Pakistan was now a
'nation' based on Islam it became necessary for the government authorities
to suppress all ethnic-based affective loyalties, and ignore the
legitt.ate aspirations for provincial autonomy by the various ethnic
groups. Had the successive governments not followed this policy, and had
decided instead to acknowledge the importance of these ethnic
identifications, it would not only have threatened the supremacy of Islam
as a focus of affective loyalty, but it could have and, indeed did, put
into doubt the validity of the quasi-sacred "Two-Nation Theory". Simply
put, any "counter-theory" that suggests that ethnic loyalty is more
 2

powerful than Muslim identification is considered by the regt.e in power

as being anti-national; because an acceptance of any dissension would be
tanta.ount to admitting that Pakistan has no raison d'@tre, and that
MUsl~ of British India never had any legitiaate basis for demanding a
state of their own. This state approach was aade abundantly clear in the
way the central government reacted to the East Pakistan-based Awami
League's re-interpretation of the Lahore Resolution, Pakistan's founding
document.

Moreover, this state-directed policy of suppresing ethnic-based

sentt.ents has been compounded by the Punjabis' and .uhajirs' (Indian
Muslim migrants) domination of all major state institutions, especially
the ar.ed forces and the civil service, at the expense of all other ethnic
groups, that is, the Baluch, the Pukhtuns, the Sindhis and (until 1971)
the Bengalis. Thus, the successive governments' use of Islam as a
legitimizing ideology to implement a centralized system of government has
been perceived by the 'peripheral' ethnic groups as amounting to the
'Punjabization' of Pakistani society. It is the de facto establishment of
a unitary sytem of government dominated by two ethnic groups which has
embittered the other component ethnic groups, for it contradicts the
spirit and the letter of the 1940 Lahore Resolution which had guaranteed
the provinces complete autonomy vis-a-vis the centre.

Alongside the divisive forces of ethnicity, Pakistan's process of

national integration has been compounded by the inability of the religious
and lay leaders to agree as to what role Isla. should have in the social
and political order of the country. The adherents of one school of
thought, the Modernists, believe that Islam should be limited to the
private sphere, free from government interference. On the other hand, the
 3

Traditionalists and Fundamentalists, who are themselves deeply divided

according to the religious interpretation of the Islamic scriptures,
advocate the implementation of an Islamic system of government which would
regulate the public and private lives of all Pakistanis. While there have
been periods of compromise, it is nevertheless the failure to reach a
lasting consensus on this highly emotional issue which has been a .ajor
obstacle in the country's process of national integration.

Moreover, because of the particular territorial composition of the

country - until 1971 its two wings being separated by over 1000 kilometres
of Indian territory - the impact of a hostile external environment
definitively has had a negative influence on the country's quest for
national integration. This has been exacerbated by the fact that Done of
Pakistan's component ethnic groups wholly inhabit the country, all of them
have kin in the neighbouring countries; a reality that has often been
exploited by India and Afghanistan. Faced with such real or perceived
threats to its precarious territorial integrity, the Pakistan leaders,
soon after independence, began to search for allies outside the region,
notably the United States.

Following the United States' lack of support for Pakistan during the
1965 Indo-Pakistan War, the second conflict between these two countries,
the leaders began to look toward China for external support. After the
loss of East Pakistan, an outcome in which India had a decisive role,
Pakistan began to assert its Islamic character by strengthening its ties
with the Muslim world. Finally, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
Pakistan has been propelled into the role of a 'frontline' state, leading
to a rejuvenated alliance with the United States. As will be exaained in
this study, the continuous imPact of a hostile environment upon the
 4

.ulti-ethnic and fractured nature of the Pakistani polity has had a direct
bearing on the country's political developaents, and specifically on its
process of national integration.

Too often academic research in the field of national integration, both

at the empirical and theoretical levels, fails to include or recognize the
important and often decisive role the external environment performs in the
political development of a country. Accordingly, the analysis of the
inter-action of these three factors - ethnicity, religion and the external
environ.ent - in the process of national integration will be the focus of
this study. Although the selection of these three variables does not mean
that that there are no other elements involved in tnation-building', in
the case of Pakistan, however, the satisfactory reconciliation of these
three variables is a minimum requirement if the country is to proceed
successfully with national integration.

Even though the theoretical model that will be applied to the case of
Pakistan is certainly applicable to the study of national integration in
other Third World countries, the aim of this dissertation is not to fill a
major lacuna in the theoretical research of national integration, however;
rather, its objective is to contribute to the study of political
developaent in Pakistan, and, specifically, the role of the three
forementioned variables in the process of national integration.
 5

THEORETICAL MODBL WITH VARIABLES AFFECTING NATIONAL INTEGRATION PROCBSS

~-------t NATIONAL INTEGRATION

PROCESS

OUTCa.mS

DBC IS IONS

~ CENTRAL AUTHORITIES ~
,. .1--_----,------"\
I
" \
\

,, ,
I \
\
\
DEMANDS \
\
I
\

/~..---------.,\\\
I
I
,
/

\
.....-.---I,f~ BTHNIC GROUPS <-----) ',---I
RELIGIOUS GROUPS ~:~.
I
" '" "'~--- - -
-~ ,. , " \

I
I
I

~~-:..;'-----
_'" ,.'"
,.
'"
.-
- - --.......

.... ..- .- ... --

--- --::...
----
_....... - -
.... --....... , '-
- . ....."
-----~,~.
"
,
\
\

BXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT <---------------~ INTERNAL FACTORS

 6

Briefly, the aim of this .odel is to demonstrate the causal

relationship between, on the one hand, the direct demands aade by the
ethnic and religious groups and the influence of other internal factors,
such as the economy, the .ilitary, political parties and parliament, and
the external environment, and, on the other hand, the process of national
integration. The model also indicates how the external environment and
the other internal factors influence each other, and, in turn, affect the
ethnic and religious groups. Inevitably, the outcome of the government's
decisions, which are a direct result of the internal and external
'pressures', will have a direct bearing on the country's national
integration process. Moreover, since there is a direct correlation
between this process and the subsequent demands and influences of the
internal and external actors, the resulting level of national integration
will have a feedback effect - either positive or negative depending the
gove~t's decision - on the future demands of the ethnic and religious
groups and other internal actors and the influence of the external
envirou.ent. In sum, this model demonstrates two facts: (1) the causal
relationship between the various internal and external actors, and the
process of national integration, and (2) the dynamic nature of national
integration. As Zolberg correctly indicated: "In order to be meaningful,
integration must incorporate the notion of a system's capability to deal
with a limited range of internally and externally generated stresses".l

Ca.plementing this model, three hypotheses have been formulated which

will be tested by examining the most important events which have affected
the process of national integration. Thus, my examination of the three
variables will not be exhaustive, for this would be beyond the scope of

1. A.R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration", The Journal of Hodern African Studies, vol. 5,
NO.4, 1967, p. 450.
 7

this dissertation; instead, I selected the .ast important events and

decisions in the three categories which I believed were decisive and
indicative of the country's process of national integration.

The three hypotheses are as follows:

1. In a multi-ethnic state the domination of all major 'national'
institutions by one or two ethnic groups compounds the
heterogeneous and fractured nature of the state, and thus ~es
the national integration process.
2. In an ideological state the failure to reach a consensus with
regard to the role national ideology should have in the
ad.inistration of the country reinforces the centrifugal forces
of ethnicity which, in turn, facilitates the establishment of
authoritarian regimes, both civilian and ailitary.
3. In a multi-ethnic and fractured state the external environment
may have an important impact upon the process of national
integration of that state.

Methodologically, this dissertation follows a thematic approach, with

each of the three variables analysed in a chronological fashion. Thus,
this .ethod facilitates the examination of the evolution of each of the
three factors as they developed over time. Therefore, while this study
covers the whole period from independence until 31 December 1985, when
General Zia lifted martial Law, the time-span for each chapter varies
according to its significance with regard to the variable under study.
Accordingly, this study is divided into six sections. Part I, the
introductory section, includes the introduction, a theoretical chapter and
a brief analysis of the Muslim League's "Two-Nation Theory". Part II,
essentially descriptive, examines the major events and trends that have
deterained the political evolution of the country since independence. It
does not deal with religion, ethnicity and the external environment in any
detail, since these are the subjects of the following three sections.
 8

Part III, which is wholly concerned with the role of religion in the
process of national integration, is sub-divided into three chapters.
Chapter four examines the political differences between the Modernists,
the Traditionalists and the Fundamentalists with regard to the creation of
Pakistan. Chapters five and six involve the analysis of the debate
regarding the role religion should have in the administration of the
country. Because General Zia's regime is undoubtedly a turning point in
this respect, Chapter six is solely concerned with the analysis of his
Islamization programme. Part IV, similarly constructed, has a background
chapter describing the socio-economic structures of the various component
ethnic groups at the time of Partition. Chapter eight, which spans from
1947 until 1971, and Chapter nine examine the most important events which
have affected the process of integrating the disparate ethnic groups into
a 'nation'. In this ethnicity part, post-l97l Pakistan was chosen as the
deter.ining date for delimiting the two chapters, for after the secession
of Bast Pakistan the drastic alteration of the ethnic composition of the
country had a decisive effect on the process of national integration.
Finally, Part V, which deals with the external environment, is divided
into two chapters: chapter ten covers the period from independence until
the secession of Bast Pakistan, and chapter eleven examines the Bhutto and
Zia-ul-Baq regimes, when the country's foreign policy changed
significantly.

Finally, Part VI examines the usefullnesss of the theoretical

literature in the context of national integration in Pakistan, the
validity of the three hypotheses postulated in the Introduction, and
compares and assesses the three variables as they relate to the process of
national integration in Pakistan.
 CHAPTER 2.

THEORETICAL. ANALYTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

 This chapter bas a dual purpose: first, it briefly examines the
literature dealing with national integration. and, second, it defines the
teras and outlines of the approaches that will be used in this study.
However, since this dissertation is empirical rather than theory-oriented,
this chapter is not meant to be exhaustive in its review of the
theoretical literature; instead, it is meant to examine the most important
concepts that have influenced the study of national integration.

Pakistani society is characterized by pluralism; in that it exhibits,

to a greater or lesser extent, two basic features. Van Den Berghe has
identified them as follows: "first, segmentation into corporate groups
that frequently, though not necessarily, have different cultures or sub-
cultures; and, second, a social structure compartementalized into
analogous, parallel, non-complementary but distinguishable sets of
institutions".l He elaborates this concept by enumerating additional

characteristics frequently associated with pluralist societies. These

are, inter alia: absence of value consensus, presence of cultural
heterogeneity, presence of conflict between the significant corporate
groups, autonomy between parts of the social system, coercion and economic
interdependence as basis of social integration, and the political
domination by one of the corporate groups over the others.2 Smith
complements this definition by stating that "pluralism simultaneously
connotes a social structure characterized by fundamental discontinuities
and cleavages, and a cultural complex based on systematic institutional
diversity".3

1. Pierre l. Van Den Berghe, ·PluraliSi and the Polity: ATheoretical Exploration·, in leo Kuper and
H.G. Slith (eds.), Pluralisl in Africa, (los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969), p. 67.
2. Ibid .• p. 68.
3. H.G. Stith. ·Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralisl·, in leo Kuper and H.G. Slith
(eds.), op. cit., p. 27. For an elaboration of Slith's vieNS on the various dilensions of Pluralisl
(cultural, social, structural), see by the sate author: ·Sole Developlents in the Analytic Fralework of
PluraliSI·, in leo Kuper and H.G. Slith (eds.), Ibid., pp. 415-458; and. The Plural Society of the British
West Indies, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965. Also see: Joel C. Edelstein, ·Pluralist and
Harxist Perspectives on Ethnicity and Nation-Building", in N. Bell and N. E. Freelan (eds.), Ethnicity and
Nation-Building: COlparative. International. and Historical Perspectives, (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage
Publications, 1974), pp. 45-57; and, leo Kuper, ·Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problels·, in leo
Kuper and H.G. Slith (eds.), Ibid., pp. 7-26.
 10

The approach to the study of pluralism baa been divided along two
schools of thought: the 'equilibrium' and the •conflict , approaches.
Adherents of the 'equilibrium' school consider pluralist societies as
being dynamic, developing into integrated systems because of the ~ers'

comai t.ent to cOBllllon values, such as: feelings of communal affinity among
the elites, respect for the rule of law, moderation in political
involva.ent, commitment to gradual change, and recognition of the dignity
of other values and activities within the society.4 The 'conflict'
school, which had its beginning with Furnivall's study of colonial
societies,S is based on the premise that plural societies are held
together by the coercive powers of a cultural minority. Common values and
common .ativations are absent and, consequently, this plural society can
only survive by regulation. 6 In this intellectual framework the state is
of pri.ardial importance; for it controls and orders inter-group
relationships with the aim of .aintaining existing structures to the
advantage of a dominant ethnic group. In order to further clarify these
two models and avoid the misuse of theoretical terms, Kuper has
distinguished the two approaches by stressing that a "pluralist" society
represents the "equilibrium" model and a "plural" society pertains to the
"conflict" model. 7

Although Pakistan's bleak history of inter-ethnic relations would

appear to .eke the 'conflict' school approach the most relevant analytical
tool, one should be cautious of attempting to categorize Pakistan in
exclusive terms; for pluralism is not only a matter of degree, but its
acuteness is unevenly distributed within society. It can vary according

to the size of the different ethnic coaponents of society, the real or

4. luper, Ibid., pp. 8-9.
5. 1.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, london, Calbridge University Press, 1948.
6. luper, op. cit., p. 13.
7. Ibid., p. 8.
 11

perceived institutional differences between the corporate aembers, the

level of cultural compatibility between the various ethnic groups, the
relationship between the dominant ethnic group and other societal members,
the criteria for the distribution of economic and political awards amongst
the ethnic groups, and the degree to which ethnic cleavage is compounded
by social, economic or religious cleavages. 8 Therefore, the position a
plural society will take along the 'conflict-equilibrium' spectrum will
essentially depend on the situational or contextual nature of the issue.
In other words, "the givenness and boundaries of ethnic groups are
contextual not only historically contextual in a broad, secular sense, but
also politically contextual in terms of specific configurations of
particular confrontations".9

Pakistani society is plagued with deeply engrained ethnic clevages

and, to a lesser degree but nevertheless fundamental, religious, elite-
.ass, and inter-elite divisions. An ethnic group has generally been
defined as "a self-perceived group of people who hold in common a set of
traditions not shared by the others with whom they are in contact".lO
Enloe ca.plements this definition by assigning three cammon
characteristics to all ethnic groups. First, they are biologically
self-perpetuating; second, they share clusters of beliefs and values; and,
third, they have internal differentiations. ll Finally, it is essential
8. For an interesting discussion about the .ajor di.ensions of variability in a plural society, see:
Yan Den Berghe, op. cit., pp. 69-72.
9. Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: AConceptual Fra.ework,(Colu.bia University Press,1981), p.130.
10. George De Yos, "Ethnic Pluralis.: Conflict and Acco••odation", in G. De Yos and l. Ro.anucci-
Ross (eds.), Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change, (Hayfield Publishing Co., 1975), p. 9.
11. C.H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Develop.ent,(Boston:little,Brown and Co, 1973),
PP.18-19. For cOIPlelentary definitions of ethnic groups, see: Talcott Parsons, "So.e Theoretical
Considerations on the Nature and Trends of Change in Ethnicity", in Nathan Glazer and D.P. Hoynihan
(eds.), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, (Ca.bridge, Hass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 56-57;
and, R.A. Scher.erhorn, COlparative Ethnic Relations, (NY: RandOl House, 1970), p. 12, cited in ".E.
~aley, "Effec!S of Ethnic Conflict on National Develop.ent: ACOllentary", in W. Bell and W.E. Free.an
eds.), QP. tIt., p. 270. For an exalination of the properties (biological, cultural, linguistic,
structural) of ethnic groups, see: Willial J. Foltz, "Ethnicity, Status, and Conflict", in W. Bell and
W.E. Free.an (eds.), op. cit., p. 103.
 12

to r~er that an ethnic group will legitimate and sustain this common
value system through cultural self-expression. 12 Accordingly, ethnicity
simplY refers to "the identity of groups who share a particular cultural
heritage and tradition, but whose identity .ay not be the nation-
state".13

However, defining ethnicity is only part of the process of under-

standing the issue of ethnic conflict in plural societies. Of greater
analytical value is the approach one takes in examining the role of
ethnicity in the process of national integration. Enloe distinguishes two
approaches for the analysis of ethnicity.14 The ascriptive
interpretation, which emphasizes fixed ethnic attributes, is very much a
static approach, attaching slight importance on the effects of domestic
politics on ethnic identity and its value system. On the other hand, the
scholars who adhere to the situational school contend that ethnic
boundaries are fluid and that ethnic values are in a constant state of
change.

In the study of Pakistan the dynamic approach is of greater analytical

value, since it acknowledges the linkage between internal and external

factors in the context of national integration. ls As Horowitz has

stated: "Whether a secessionist movement will emerge at all is determined
by da.estic politics, by the relations of groups and regions within the
state. Whether a secessionist .ovement will achieve its aims, however, is
detenained largely by international politics, by the balance of interests

12. C.H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies, (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1980), p. 9.
13. Galey, op. cit., p. 273.
14. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, pp. 4-5.
15. For an enlightening discussion of this linkage, see: Hyron Weiner, "The Hacedonian Syndrole: An
Historical "odel of International Relations and Political Developlent", World Politics, Yolo 23, No.4.,
July 1971, pp. 665-683; and, leo E. Rose, "South Asia and the Outside World", in A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton
(eds.), The States of South Asia:Problels of National Integration, (Delhi, Yikas,"1982), pp. 313-327.
 13

and forces that extend beyond the state".16

Regarding ethnic stratification, Horowitz has identified two types of

,roup differentiation: vertical and horizontal. On the one hand, vertical

stratification, viz, a hierarchical system, is synonimous with ethnicity.

Its fundamental characteristic is that socia-economic mobility is based on

one's position on the superordinate-subordinate vertical spectrum. On the
other band, horizontal stratification, vis, parallel ethnic structures, is
identified with ethnic groups competing on relatively equal footing for

the allocation of resources. 17

Ethnic differentiation in Pakistan is essentially a hybrid of vertical

and horizontal stratifications; it is characterized by a two-tier level of

role and resource allocation. On the one hand, Pakistani society exhibits

the features of a two-levelled vertical system, L e., hierarchical ethnic

structures, and, on the other hand, each of these two levels are in turn
horizontally differentiated, i.e., parallel ethnic structures. At the

upper tier of the vertical system two groups compete for the monopoly and
control of resources, Le., muha.iirs (migrants) and Punjabis. At the
lower tier of the hierarchical system four groups, Baluch, Pukhtuns,
Sindhis, and Bengalis (until 1971), compete for the allocation of

resources at that level. However, because of the dynamic nature of ethnic

relations, the institutional ranking of these four corporate groups will

vary according to the locus of competition. For example, Pukhtuns will

have an edge over other ,roups in that lower tier in the allocation of
awards in the armed forces, but Bengalis would have greater success in

16. D.l. HoroNitz, 'Patterns of Ethnic Seperatis.·, eolparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.
23,1981, P. 167. For a sililar vieN, see: Walker Connor, "Ethnology and the Peace of South Asia·, World
Politics, vol. 22, No. I, Oct. 1969, p. 57. ------
17. D.l. HoroNitz, "Three Dilensions of Ethnic Politics·, World Politics, vol.23, No.2, Jan.I97I,
p.232.
 14

attaining their ,oal with re,ard to the language issue. Nevertheless,

,enerally speaking, one can confidently position these four ethnic groups
at the lower echelon of the vertical system. Finally, although ethnic
stratification in Pakistan varies according to the period under study,
i.e., either 1947 to 1971 or 1971 to the present, in both cases the
Punjabis dominate the political system; that is, in the first period it is
a politically dominant minority versus a subordinate majority, and in the

second period it is a politically dominant majority controlling

,
subordinate minorities. 18 In sum, one of the main reasons for the

virulent inter-ethnic relations that have existed in Pakistan since

independence has been due to the conscious decision by the central
authorities to categorize the various ethnic groups according to their
political dependability and reliability. This deliberate policy of
consolidating the state system of ethnic stratification, which Enloe
refers to as the operationalization of ethnic state security maps,19 has
intensified the degree of ethnic cleavages.

ETHNIC STRATIFICATION IN PAKISTAN

I MUHAJIR I I PUNJABI

~~
B P S B
ONE A U I E
VERTICAL L K N N
STRATIFICATION U H D G
C T H A HORIZONTAL
H U I L STRATIFICATIONS
N I

18. Rothschild. op. cit .• pp. 71-77.

19. Enloe. Ethnic Soldiers, pp. 12-21.
 15

It is essential to remember that, because of the heterogeneous nature

of the component ethnic groups, ethnic cleavage is not limited to
inter-ethnic competition only, but is also compounded by intra-ethnic
rivalry. This lack of compartementalization of the ethnic cleavage is
aainly due to the fluidity of intra-ethnic boundaries and the changing
nature of the value system within these ethnic groups. This line of
division manifests itself at the elite amd mass levels. Conversely, one
will also witness the presence of inter-elite cooperation, cross-cutting
ethnic identification and competing against a coalition of lower classes
from various ethnic groups. This already complex situation of inter- and
intra-ethnic conflict is further complicated by one's religious
affiliation to one of the several legal schools of the Sunni and Shi'a
sects, identification with one's Pir (saint), membership in the non-Muslim
Abmadiyah sect, or loyalty to one of the several minority groups, e.g.,
Christians, Pars is , Hindus. Consequently, one's attitude and position in
this plural society will be dynamic; that is, it will be determined
according to the contextual aspect of the conflict under
consideration. 20 However, it should be noted that in cases when an
ethnic group as a whole feels threatened by a real or perceived danger to
its corporate identity, for example, Bengalis in 1971 and Baluch in 1973,
then ethnic identification supersedes other ca.peting loyalties. 21

Before proceeding to the analysis of national integration per se, a

definition of the various concepts related to 'nation-building'22 would

20. For a sililar vieN, see: H. Islal, 'Islal and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and
Bangladesh', International Journal of Hiddle East Studies, Yolo 13, No. I, 1981 , pp. 55-72.
21. loane Nagel and Susan Olzak, 'Ethnic Hobilization in NeN and Old States: An Extension of the
COlpetition Hodel', Social Problels, vol. 3D, No.2, Dec. 1982, p. 130.
22. The terls nation-building and national integration Nill be used inter-changeably as it is done
in the literature of political developlent. Only a select feN differentiate betNeen these tNO terls;
hONever, in the context of Pakistan this selantic exercise is leaningless. For exalple, see: R.l. Sklar,
'Political Science and National Integration - ARadical Approach', The Journal of Hodern African Studies,
vol.5, No.1, 1967, p. 3.
 16

help clarify the confusion existing in this field. The terms "nation" and
"state" have often been erroneously referred to as meaning the same
thing. This analytical mistake has led to the aisuse and abuse of these
two concepts by scholars and laypersons, especially when dealing with the
phenomenon of national integration. 23

Smith defined a nation as usually being "a single inclusive corporate

group whose members - or the majority of them - share common traditions,
institutions, history, and ethnic identity".24 Emerson has complemented

this definition by stating that this community of people have a feeling of

belonging together not only because they share the elements of a common
heritage, but also because of a feeling that they have a common destiny
for the future. 25 In the case of Indian Muslims the latter criteria
would certainly come closest in reflecting their view of what constituted
a 'nation'; or, as Renan indicated, "more than anything else it is cOJllllon
grief that binds a nation together, more than triumphs".26 The tera has
been further qualified with the differentiation between objective
characteristics of nationhood, e.g., territorial identification, ca.mon

history, community of culture and language(s), common economic

organizations, and subjective traits, e.g., psychological identity,

willingness to assert that identity vis-a-vis analogous identities, ethnic

loyalty.27 As with any loyalty, the feeling of nationhood is a matter

23. For an elaboration of this confusing inter-utilization of these tNO terls, see: W. Connor,
"Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying", World Politics, vol. 24, No.3, April 1972, pp. 332-336, and "A
Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a... ", Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 1, No.4,
October 1978, pp. 377-400.
24. Slith, "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralisl, p. 32.
25. Rupert Elerson, Frol Elpire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples,
(Calbridge, "ass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 95-96.
. 26. Ernest Renan, Ou'est-ce qu'une nation 1, (1882), cited in Frederick Hertz, Nationality in
HIstory and Politics, (london:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1944), p. 12.
27. R. "ukherjee, "Diagnosing Processes of Nation-Building: An Overall Perspective and an Analysis
of DeveloPlent on the Indian Subcontinent", in S.N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Building States
and Nations: Analyses by Region, (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, vol. 2, 1973), p. 275. For an
el~boration of these attributes, see: D.A. RustON, "Nation", International Encyclopedia of the Social
SCIences, 1968, vol. 11, pp. 9-11.
 17

of degree that cannot be quantified. Moreover, the importance of these

objective and subjective attributes will vary according to the issue
involved and its affective value to the members of the 'nation'.
Further:.ore, it is only an ethnic group's perception of itself and of its
uniqueness vis-a-vis other ethnic groups which will define it as a
'nation'. As Connor has stated: 'tan ethnic group may, therefore, be
other-defined, but the nation must be self-defined".28 One will
appreciate that since the concept of nation is a non-quantifiable feeling
of loyalty, identity and membership, it will always remain in the realm of
subjectivity as opposed to the more tangible and concrete traits of the

'state'.

As opposed to the 'nation', which is essentially a psycho-cultural

concept, the 'state' is basically a political-legal term. 29
Consequently, there is general agreement as to the basic definition of the
'state'; that is, a geographically delimited segment of human society
united under a determinate rule of law in which a single authority
exercises sovereign powers both de jure and de facto. 3o However,
proble.s arise when "the term may refer to the society as a whole or, more
specifically, to the sovereign authority that controls it".31

Territoriality and sovereignty are two characteristics related to the

definition when applied to society as a whole. These two traits, however,
depend to a great extent to the perceived level of legitimacy which the
sovereign authority possesses vis-a-vis the population that inhabits the

28. W. Connor, ·The Politics of Ethnonationalis.", Journal of International Affairs, vol. 27, No. I,
1973, p.3. For a sililar view, see: J.A. Fishlan, (ed.), language loyalty in the United States, (The
Hague: Houton, 1966), p. 329, cited in C. Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralisl, (Hadison, University
of Wisconsin Press, 1976), p. 45.
29. Nostafa Rejai and Cynthia H. Enloe, "Nation-States and State-Nations·, International Studies
Quarterlr. vol. 13, Ho. 2, June 1969, p. 143.
. 30. Frederick H. Watkins, "The State: The Concept", International Encyclopedia of the Social
SCIences, 1968, vol. IS, p. 150.
31. Watkins, Ibid., p. 150.
 18

state. In other words, there is a direct relationship between, on the one

hand, the legal authority's level of sovereignty and the territorial
integrity of the state and, on the other hand, the sovereign authority's
level of perceived legitimacy. This relationship has been proven to be
valid with the Bast Pakistanis' perception of the central government as
being illegitimate, and eventually opting for secession; thus, affecting
the sovereignty and territoriality traits of the Pakistani state.

In a plural society the sovereignty-Iegiti.acy linkage is even more

powerful, for the potential for conflict in a fractured and vertically-
horizontally stratified society is that much greater. Consequently, in
this type of society "the state is merely the external political form of
the dominant group, the instrumental framework of its domination, and the
ultimate source and expression of prevailing sectional inequalities".32

In the case of Pakistan, the Punjabis, and to a lesser extent the

muhaiirs, have manipulated the state institutions in such a way as to
maximize their political power. 33 By dominating the state's
authoritative apparatus and by being closely bound to the 'national'
identity, the Punjabis may no longer consider themselves as simply another
ethnic group, but the norm which all other ethnic groups must follow.
Furtheraore, they will be unwilling to accept the distinction between the
'state' and the 'nation'.34 To them, national integration will simply
mean a submersion of other ethnic groups' cultural values in order to
tmpose "their value system on the remainder of Pakistan".35 Thus, all
anti-Punjabi feelings, or other ethnically-based sentiments, are labelled

32. Seith, 'Institutional and Political Conditions of PluraliSl", p. 33.

33. Asaf Hussain, "Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianis.: The Case of Pakistan",Asian
Survet, vol. 16, No. la, OcL 1976, p. 927. --
34. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, p. 13, and Ethnic Conflict and Political Develop.ent, p. 213.
35. Albert levak, 'Provincial Conflict and Nation-Building in Pakistan', in W. Bell and W.E. Free.an
(eds.), gpo cit., p. 206.
 19

as anti-state behaviour. As Alfred Cobban so aptly put it:

The modern belief in the identity of nation and state,

with its corollary that unless a state is also a
cultural nation it is no legitimate state, has provided
a strong incentive to hasten the process, in so far as
it can be done by governmental action. This results in
an attempt by the state to compel all its members to
identify themselves culturally with the ruling nation.
As a result of the belief that the political state must
perish unless it can achieve cultural unity, all the
democratic and national rights of minorities are swept
away. 36

The fundamental and inter-related goals of national integration are:

the transfer of affective loyalties from the parochial to the national
level; the increase in elite cohesion; the reduction of the centre-
periphery dichotomies (structural, institutional, geographic, psycho-
logical, political, social and economic); and, the narrowing of the
elite-.ass cleavage. 37 However, for any of these goals to be attained
the development of shared 'national' values is the essential pre-
requisite. This must take place at both the horizontal plane (inter-
ethnic and centre-periphery relations) and vertical plane (elite-.ass
relationships), if the process of national integration is to be minimally
disruptive. The process of national integration involves four stages of
inter-relationships between the different groups in the country. Mazrui
has identified them as being: first, coexistence (neighbouring groups may
not even be aware of each other's existence); second, contact (there is a

ainimum degree of inter-action between the various groups, but not

necessarily on a friendly basis); third, compromise (inter-group dealings
36. Alfred Cobban, The Nation-State and National Self-Deterlination, (NY: Tholas Y. Crowell,
1'69),pp.1l1-2.
. 37. Hyron Weiner has stated that national integration is onlv one of the five tvpes of political
Integration, with the other four being: territorial integration, elite-lass integration, value integration
and integrative behaviour. See his article: ·Political Integration and political Developlent', in J.L.
Finkle and R.W. Gables (eds.), Political Developlent and Social Change, (NY: John Wilev and Sons, 1966),
Pp. 551-2. For a sililar view about the goals of national integration, see: Jahan Rounaq, Pakistan:
Failure in National Integration, (Dacca, University Press lilited, 1972), p. 3.
 20

are .ore ca.plex, diverse and interdependent requiring a climate of

peaceful reconciliation); and, fourth, coalescence (there i8 a coalescence
of identities, but not a merger of interests).38 It is evident that the
process of integration is characterized by regional disparities in the
stage attained in inter-ethnic relations. Moreover, the level reached
would invariably fluctuate with the issue concerning the inter-acting
ethnic groups. In other words, one would not be able to give a definitive
and an across-the-board ranking of inter-ethnic relations in a specific
society. For example, Bengali-Punjabi relations may have been
characterized as being at the stage of coalescence with regard to the
issue of Indo-Pakistani relations, but only at the contact stage when the
issue of the distribution of central civil service positions was involved.
This would tend to confirm that "as identity tends to expand with an
expanding context, often shaped by expanding territorial boundaries, it
tends to contract with a contracting context, again often defined by
contracting territorial boundaries".39 In sum, the process of national
integration is essentially a process of depluralizing society or, as
Geertz puts it, modernizing ethnocentrism. 40 The aim is not to repress
pluralism, but to move away from a plural and fractured society; and, if
this is to be achieved, the stage of coalescence must have been fully
reached throughout society.41

The process of national integration is not only dependent upon

inter-ethnic relations, but just as importantly, if not more so, on the
relationship between the central authorities and the various ethnic
groups. As with the previous identifiable stages of inter-ethnic

38. A.A. Hazrui, "Pluralisl and National Integration", in l. Kuper' H.G. Slith (eds.), op.cit.,
p.334.
39. D.l. Horowitz, "Ethnic Identity', in Nathal Glazer' D.P. Hoynihan (eds.), op.cit., p. 137.
40. C. Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution: Prilordial Sentilents and Civil Politics in the New
States', in C. Geerts (ed.), Old Societies and New States, (NY: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 154.
41. Hazrui, op. cit., pp. 346-347.
 21

relations, three levels of centre-periphery inter-action can be discerned:

from the periphery's rejection of central authority, going through a
relationship of tolerance, to one leading to centre-periphery cooperation,
the ultimate goal of national integration. 42 Needless to say that the
stage reached on the rejection-cooperation spectrum will not only be a
matter of degree, but will be contextually determined. For example,
centre-Pukhtun relations may be characterized as cooperative with regard

to affairs relating to the armed forces, but may drop to the stage of
rejection with regard to the centre's decision to increase its
authoritative powers in some areas of the Northwest Frontier Province
which until then had remained outside its domain of control. A country
will therefore exhibit, as is the case with the level of inter-ethnic
integration, different degrees of centre-periphery integration. Deutsch
referred to this phenomenon as the "imperfect assembly line syndrome"
which is influenced by the sequence of integrative factors, such as
religion, population, language, and the state. He believes this is
because "nations are not organism, and national integration is not an
organismic process!'. 43

Ironically, the process of national integration in a plural society

will compound the fractured nature of the multi-ethnic state and stimulate
ethnicity, "because it introduces into society a valuable new prize over
which to fight and a frightening new force with which to contend".44
Consequently, as state power grows and becomes more efficient and
effective in meeting societal demands, it will inevitably begin to
penetrate policy areas which until then had been the sole responsibility

42. For a cOlplelentary vieN on centre-periphery relations, but elphasizing central control over the
periphery, see: Daniel Lerner, ·Sole COllents on Centre-Periphery Relations·, in R.L. Herritt and Stein
Rokkan (eds.), COlparing Mations, (Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 265-295.
43. Karl W. Deutsch, Tides Along Nations, (NY: The Free Press, 1979), p. 279.
44. Geertz, op. cit., p. 120.
 22

of the campartementalized ethnic groups. This will cause, what students

of political development have referred to as, a "crisis of penetration".
LaPaloabara has defined it as "relating primarily to certain changes in
governmental performance and to certain kinds of outputs of the political
system".45 The crisis of penetration is not only a question of
territory and its occupation through organizational-technological means,
but it is also the penetration by socio-psychological means of the
population inhabiting the area. This state 'interference' by the military

and civilian bureaucracies into mostly rural and remote areas, which are
predominantly inhabited by subordinate ethnic groups, will increase the
target group's awareness of their cultural and ethnic differences

vis-a-vis other ethnic groups.

As noted above, the development of national values, accepted by the

majority of the population, is of fundamental ~ortance if a country
wishes to attain a minimum degree of integration based on a voluntary
shift of loyalty from the parochial to the national level. The population
at large must believe that their transfer of affective identities is in
their long-tern interest and not simply a means for the central authority
to strengthen its power. Consequently, the more the ruling elite promotes
a central value system, which includes general standards of judgement and
action, but with which the public cannot identify, the less this
centrally-oriented value system will be considered sacred and the greater
the potential that the population will consider the central authority
illegitimate. The ultimate consequence of this perception will be a
lessening of identity and belief in the government's goal of national
integration. 46 Moreover, in countries where nationalism is

.. 45. Joseph laPolalbara, 'Penetration: ACrisis of Governlent Capacity', in Crises and Sequences in
PolItIcal DeveloPlent, Studies in Political Developlent, No.7, (Princeton University Press, 1971), p.20S
46. EdNard Shils, Center and PeripherY: Essays in Hacrosociology, (Chicago University Press, 1975),
Pp.4, 408.
 23

state-directed - necessitated by the lack of national feelings prior to

the creation of the state, and aimed at legitimizing the existence of the
state - "there is a suspicion of any nationalist sentiment which appear to
emerge at the mass level",47 for such development, instead of promoting

national integration, could have the opposite effect of compounding the

already fractured nature of society. Consequently, as Deutsch clearly
stated in his work, Tides Among Nations:
The compatibility of major politically relevant values
and value patterns aay then be a crucial condition for
political integration. Where such major values are
incompatible, common institutions and frequent contacts
are likely to produce not integration but bitter and
protracted conflict.48

While the lack of consensus with regard to a set of shared values

can be attributed to the sequence in which Pakistan was formed, that is

the structure of the state was essentially formed prior to the development
of nationalism. leading to the establishment of what Rejai and Enloe have
coined "state-nations",49 another important factor which has compounded
this development is the fractured nature of the socialization process; in
that, it has failed to inculcate a common view of societal values that
would provide a firm basis for consistent attitudes toward the 'nation'.
The consequences of this are that the various members of society will
relate differently to the political structures, as well as disagree as to

the function, scope, and domain of state institutions. 5o This lack of

consensus is most evident at the elite level of societal inter-action,
where deeply engrained ethnic and functional fragmentation is present,
thus preventing the development of integrative relationships.51
47. Rejai and Enloe, op. cit., p. 152.
48. Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 270-271.
49. Rejai and Enloe, op. cit., p. 140.
50. Robert E. Scott, 'Nation-Building in Latin Alerica', in K.N. Deutsch and N.J. Foltz (eds.),
Nation-Building, (NY: Atherton Press, 1963), p.77.
51. Gerald A. Heeger, The Politics of Underdeveloplent, (London: The Haclilian Press, 1974),
PP.79-88.
 24

Different patterns of socialization, often creating compartementalized

sets of value systems, result in the various elites having contradictory
expectations about the role and the value of central institutions, e.g.,
the constitution, political parties, national and provincial assemblies.
Inevitably, this lack of elite cohesion trickles down to the elites'
factional followings, and, therefore, compounding the fractured nature of
society. This type of vertical factionalism characterized Pakistani
society soon after independence; for even with regard to Islam, which was
ostensibly the rallying factor for the creation of the state, there was
fundamental disagreement as to the role it should have in the
newly-created country. So once the value potential of religion as a
cohesive force drastically diminished the result was a return to parochial
values as centres for the competition of individual and group loyalty. As

Daalder pointed out:

The elite culture is in itself a .ost important
independent variable which may go far to determine how
cleavages are handled in a political society, to what
extent they become loaded with political tension, and
to what degree subcultural divisions are solved in a
spirit of tolerance and accommodation or by violence
and repression. 52
According to Syed Husain, it is the political culture, which he
defines as the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward
politics among member of a political system, which is the main obstacle to
the achievement of a minimum level of national integration in Pakistan,
for he feels that the political culture of the country is not conducive
either to the recognition of pluralism or the adoption of democratic
norms. 53 This view has been underscored by Ziring, who has postulated
that Pakistan's long tradition of responding to the vice-regal tradition
or, as he puts it, the presence of the "Great Leader" syndrome, has been
52. Hans Daalder, ·On Building Consociational Nations·, Paper delivered at the UNESCO Meeting on the
ftoblels of State Forlation and Nation-Building, Cerisy-Ia-Salle, 1970, p. 16.
53. Syed Husain, Developlent of Pakistan: ACritical Analysis of the Role of Politics and
Adlinistration, (Unpublished PH.D. Thesis, University of Cincinnati, 1979), p. 368.
 25

an t.portant inhibiting factor in the political developaent of

Pakistan. 54 Riggs, on the other hand, theorized that the presence of a

"low polical culture", defined by Finer as a relatively, narrow and weakly

organized public compounded by a lack of stable, adequate, effective and
legitt.ate institutions, could be a consequence of the pre-mature
developaent of bureaucratic structures before parties, interest groups and
legislatures had had an opportunity to develop into responsive
institutions. In such cases, not only is the democratization process
slowed down, but there is also the possibility of unresponsive
bureaucratic systems developing. 55

Finally, another obstacle in the process of national integration in

plural societies has been the presence of regionalism. This special type
of parochialism, which has been defined "as a strong sentiment of loyalty
or attachment among the population of a geographical segment of a state to

that particular territory",56 can potentially have far-reaching

implications for the territorial integrity of the country if it develops
into a secessionist movement, as was the case with the 1971 East Pakistan
crisis. Moreover, regionalism in one part of the country can have a
'spill-over' effect in other parts of the national territory; "if a state
incorporates more than two ethnic groups and if its political integration
is low or incomplete, and if, finally one of its subordinate, peripheral
groups bids for external intervention, then the subordinate groups, though

54. lawrence Ziring, ·Hilitarisl in Pakistan: The Yahya Khan InterregnuI·, in W. Howard Wriggins
(ed), Pakistan in Transition, (University of Islalabad Press, 1975), p. 209.
55. Fred Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Developlent: AParadoxical View·, in Joseph PaLolbara
(ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Developlent, (Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 128. S.E. Finer, The
Han on Horseback, (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 79. Braibanti has postulated that the cOlbination of a
powerful civilian bureaucracy and a weak political party systel has been the deterlining factor for the
lack of growth of representative political institutions. See: R. Braibanti, ·Public Bureaucracy and
Judiciary in Pakistan·, in Joseph laPalolbara (ed.), Ibid., pp. 360-440. Also, S.P. Huntington, Political
Order in Changing Societies, (Yale University Press, 1968), p. 87.
56. "ohallad A. Nawawi, ·Stagnation as a Basis of Regionalisl: ALesson frol Indonesia", Asian
Surv~, vol. 4, No. 12, Dec. 1969, p. 934.
 26

not initially revolutionary or secessionist, aay nevertheless 'hedge their

bets' by 'putting on ice' or keeping tentative their loyalty to the state,
or at any rate to its political syatea, regt.e or authorities".57

In sum, national integration is a subjective and long-term process

that essentially involves the development of shared values, the attainment
of a pattern of conflict resolution by way of accommodation and

comproaise, and the resolution of vertical and horizontal cleavages.

Accordingly, the achievement of these goals will require a number of

tactics and strategies considered suitable by the central authorities for
the fulfilment of their long-term goal of national integration.

It is a basic fact of the international nation-state system that the

infrastructure within which national integration has to be sought, is the·
state. The consequence of this is that once former colonies were granted
their independence the resulting states became an immutable fact of life;
and for these states this meant that the principle of national
self-determination, upon which these countries had been able to rid
themselves of foreign rule, was no longer to be considered a legitimate
demand for the various ethnic groups inhabiting the new states. Such
demands were now to be viewed as being anti-state-oriented, regardless of

their philosophical validity. Consequently, the central authorities'

unyielding belief that the territorial integrity of the country is to
remain intact 58 has increased the level of conflict between the two
opposing forces of the state and ethnicity, especially in the case of
deeply fractured and plural societies like Pakistan; for the presence of
ethnically-based centrifugal tendencies not only put into doubt the
legitiaacy of the state, but a failure to arrest these divisive .ovements
57. Rothschild, op. cit., p. 182.
58. Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalis.·, p. 12.
 27

could lead ultimately to the disintegration of the state. As the civilian

and ailitary governments have made abundantly clear through their
inflexible attitude toward the provinces, the supremacy of the state is to
remain paramount; thus, any provincial demands with ethnic overtones are

considered to be anti-state and must therefore be dealt with accordingly.

However, apart from the normative aspect of emphasizing state-building

over nation-building, at least in the short-term, one has to acknowledge
that the political environment dictates that the government authorities
adopt such priorities; for the leaders of a developing country are well
aware that they cannot hope to achieve a minimum degree of integration
within the context of a disorderly and chaotic milieu. Accordingly, a
syste. of order and management has to be established with the objective of
limiting the level of violence, which is what state-building is all about.
Nordlinger, however, believes that although limiting violence is an
important goal it is, according to him, a negative one. 59 One may
understand his concern, especially if controlling violence is the sole
objective of the government in power, but in the short-term the pursuance

of such tactic is indispensable if a country is to attain the long-term

gaol of national integration. Therefore, it is only once the level of
state-building has developed to an extent that institutions are capable of
absorbing societal demands that the subjective process of national
integration can proceed. This process of national integration is part and
parcel of what Huntington defines as political modernization; that is, the
"assertion of external sovereignty of the nation-state against
transnational influences and of the internal sovereignty of the national
government against local and regional powers".60 However, as previously

59. Eric A. Hordlinger, "Hilitary Governlents in COllunally Divided Societies: Their Ilpact upon
National Integration", in Willel A. Veenhovel (ed.), Case Studies on HUlan Rights and Fundalental
FreedOls, (The Hague: Hartinus Nijhoff, vol. 3, 1976), p. 544.
60. Huntington, op. cit., p. 34.
 28

examined, nation-building will be hindered if the component ethnic groups

resent the domination of state institutions by one or two ethnic
groups.51

This segmental pattern of state-building followed by nation-building

also aeans that as national integration proceeds state power increases
substantially, for the different national factions will have reached the
stage where they agree that if the need arises the state should be the
only legitimate institution to be allowed to use physical force to resolve
internal conflict. It is therefore vital that, if national integration is
to proceed with the least amount of internal upheaval, the development of
state institutions must keep pace with the rate of social and political
mobilization. 52 The ultimate objective of nation-building is the
replace.ent of force as a means to conflict resolution by a pattern of
accommodation and compromise. 53

Unfortunately, state power is more often than not abused by the

government authorities behind a facade of national integration.

Therefore, in order to counter this real or perceived misuse of power the
central authorities follow a number of tactics and strategies aimed at
legit~zing the altruistic goal of national integration.

The means employed by the ruler will vary according to the three
sequential ends confronting the regime: first, the consolidation of
central authority; second, state-building; and, third, nation-building.
This stage-ordering has been empirically proven to be correct. For
example, in December 1971 the central government of Pakistan was crumbling

61. "artin R. Doornbos, 'Sole Conceptual Problels Concerning Ethnicity in Integration Analysis',
Civilisations, vol. 22, No.2, 1972, p. 273.
62. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 78ff.
63. Kazrui, op. cit., pp. 336-343.
 29

under the pressure of internal and external forces. This affected the
very survival of the state, leading to the secession of the eastern wing
of the country; and this, in turn, affected the whole process of national

integration. Rulers obviously realize the validity of this sequence and,

accordingly, emphasize policies that will first and foremost strengthen
the central authority. It should be noted, however, that these three
stages are not completely seperate from one another, but are in fact
inter-connected in the way communicating vessels are; that is, once the
central authority will have reached a certain degree of consolidation the
level of state-building will start to rise. And, once the first stage has
been reached and progression toward the second stage is substantially
advanced, then the process of national integration will also begin.
Finally, full attainment of national integration, if that is ever
possible, will only be potentially feasible once the process of
state-building will have been completed. However, the fulfilment of this
stage .ay seriously be hampered in Pakistan because of the Punjabis'
domination of the state institutions; for "the over-etbnicization of
important, and in theory neutral, institutions of the state may compromise
their legitimacy and discredit their acceptability as supposedly impartial
executors of the society's transcendent regulative rules and values".64
Therefore, the fact that the goal of state-integration may never be fully

reached also means that full and complete national integration may, in

turn, always remain but an unrealizable dream. Nevertheless, as Zolberg

has pointed out, "it is perfectly possible in the contemporary world for

countries to persist as political units even though they are poorly

integrated't.65 The case of Pakistan proves the validity of this
statement.

64. Rothschild, op. cit., pp. 217-218. Also see: Doornbos, op. cit., p. 276.
65. A.R. Zolberg, ·Patterns of National Integration·, The Journal of Hodern African Studies, vol. 5,
NO.4, 1969, p. 467.
 30

t«>DBL WITH SEQUENTIAL STAGES OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

STAGE 3

STAGE 2

STAGE 1

CONSOLIDATION
OF CENTRAL STATE-BUILDING NATION-BUILDING
AUTHORITY

In a plural society the policies followed by the ruler in the quest

for national integration are determined by the realization that legitimacy

is the building block upon which everything else depends. This commitment
to the pursuit of a minimum degree of legitimacy is directly related to
the means by which the ruler achieved power. If the leader gained power
through means of fair elections the search for legitimacy will not be the
initial priority; the ballot box will have done that for him. However, if
the new ruler came to power by means of a coup d'etat, regardless of its
justifications, he will be greatly concerned with the desire of
establishing an aura of legitimacy around his regime; but, the attainment
of that goal will be hampered by the fact that his initial
'extra-constitutional' act will have reduced the permissible and
acceptable margin of error allowed in his future performance.
 31

At the level of central authority consolidation, i.e., stage one in

the process of national integration, regime legitimacy is sought by
various means, depending as to which stategy is most likely to assure
long-term regime survival. Regardless of the methods chosen, the ultimate
criterion in determining the level of legitimacy is the perception the
public has of two basic factors: first, the government's performance in
the fulfilment of its stated objectives; and, second, the actual motives
for the regime's selection of specific policies, i.e., whether they are
used .erely for the short-term goal of government consolidation or rather
for the long-term and altruistic goal of national integration.
Consequently, no matter what type of strategy the government decides to
follow in its attempt to mobilize the people to its cause, e.g., emphasis
on the personality of the ruler, ideology, manipulation of symbols,
foreign policy, economic development, organization, as long as it is not
endowed with the positive perception of the population its level of
legitimacy will always remain at best minimal. 66

Because of the important role the military has had in the politics of
developing countries, and in Pakistan in particular, this theoretical
discussion about national integration would not be complete without a
brief examination of the armed forces' performances in tnation-building'.

There are two schools of thought with regard to the military rulers'
ability to integrate a multi-ethnic society. On the one hand, there are
scholars who believe that the armed forces' corporate cohesion and
institutional socialization, coupled with their general isolation from
society as whole, diminishes their identification with a specific ethnic
66. For an interesting discussions of the strategies followed by rulers in their quest for political
sur~ival, see: N.H. Nriggins, The Rulers' I.perative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and
Afrlca, (NY: Colu.bia University Press, 1969), pp. 37-57.
 32

group. Moreover, the military's supra-national outlook and its modern

views about societal development, developed through its long years of
training in Western military academies, are factors which assure that the
praetorian rulers will promote effective conflict regulating schemes. 57
On the other hand, however, there is a school of thought that believes the
military rulers are generally ineffective in preventing the disintegration
of c~ally divided societies. The armed forces are unwilling or unable
to contain the severity of the internal conflicts and, thus, tend to
exacerbate them. 58 The proponents of this school feel that the

military's ethnic attachment, compounded with concentrated ethnicity,

gives it a dual cohesiveness, both corporate and ethnic, which is unlikely
to be a positive factor in developing an ethnic-conflict regulating

outlook. While the Pakistan Army's confrontational approach to

ethnic-based differences, as demonstrated in the 1971 East Pakistan
crisis, would certainly indicate that it is an unsuitable state
institution for the 'peaceful' resolution of ethnic conflict, the
fundamental reason for its inadequacy in the field of 'nation-building',
however, is not so much due to its corporate approach as it is its

predominantly Punjabi character, a legacy of pre-Partition days.

67. "anfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and Horth Africa, Princeton
University Press, 1963; J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics:The Military Dilension, HY:Praeger, 1969; H.
Janowitz, The Hilitary in the Political Developlent of Hew Nations, Chicago University Press, 1964; Harion
levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies, Princeton University Press, 1966; Lucian W. Pye,
·Arlies in the Process of Political Hodernization', in J.J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Hilitary in
Underdeveloped Countries, (Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 69-89; RaYlond A. Hoore, Jr.,
Nation-Building and the Pakistan ArIY. 1947-1969, Lahore, Aziz Publishers, 1979; H.A. Rizvi, The Hilitary
and Politics in Pakistan, Lahore: Progressive Press, 1976; and, Edward Shils, ·The Military in the
Political Developlent of the New States·, in J.J. Johnson (ed.), op. cit., pp. 7-67.
68. Henry Bienen, The Background to Contelporary Study of Hilitaries and Hodernization", in H.
Bienen (ed.), The Hilitary and Modernization, (Chicago:Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp. 1-33; Enloe, Ethnic
Soldiers; C. Enloe and DeWitt C. Ellinwood, "Ethnicity in the Evolution of Asia's Arled Bureaucracies',
Ethnicity and the Military in Asia, Special Studies Series No. 118, Buffalo: State University of New York,
1978; Edwin lieuwin, Generals vs Presidents:Neo-Hilitarisl in Latin Alerica, NY:Praeger, 1964; Hartin c.
Needler, ·Political Developlent and Military Intervention in latin Alerica', Alerican Political Science
Review, Vol. 60. No.3, Septelber 1966, pp. 616-626; and, Eric A. Nordlinger, ·Soldiers in Hufti:The
I.pact of Military Rule Upon Econolic and Social Change in the Non-Western States, Alerican Political
Science Review, Vol. 64, No.4, Dec. 1970, pp. 1131-1148.; and, L. Ziring, 'Bureaucratic Politics and the
Fall of Ayub Khan", Asian Affairs, vol. 8, No.5, 1981, pp. 304-322.
 33

When one considers the track record of both the military and civilian

goverRDeDts in Pakistan since independence, one would have great

difficulty in neatly categorizing either types of government according to
their ability to resolve society's internal conflicts. Only by examining
the specifics of each regime can one evaluate their contribution to state
and nation-building. However, one can point out that although generally
speaking the civilian governments have attempted to apply a

non-confrontational model, though sometimes only as a facade for the

control model, and the military rulers have relied on the
control-management model, in both these cases there has also been the
selective application of the opposite model. 59 For example, although
Bhutto initially opted for the consociational approach to try to resolve
the centre-Baluch differences, once he realized this would not be
suitable, he decided to apply the control model instead. On the other

hand, General Zia has tended to apply both models: consensual with the
Baluch, the Pukhtuns and the Punjabis, and control with the Sindhis.
Therefore, the general tendency by many scholars of trying to lay the

blame for all of society's ills on either one of the two types of
goveru.ent, is analytically shallow. What must ultimately matter when

examining the political development of these societies is not so .uch the

type of regime in power but, rather, the effectiveness with which the
goveru.ent is able to develop state institutions conducive to national
integration.

Unfortunately, the failure of all governments, civilian and military,

has been to consider state-building as an end in itself and not a means to
the ultimate objective of integrating society by means of negotiation,
consensus and compromise. Nevertheless, as pointed out before,

69. For an interesting cOlparison of these two lodels, see: Ian lustick, ·Stability in Deeply
Divided Societies·, World Politics, vol. 31, No.3, April 1979, pp. 330-332.
state-building, i.e., the establishment of an orderly system of
institutional management, is a necessary and indispensable process which
the country must undergo if it wishes to attain the ultimate goal of
national integration. However, as state institutions mature governmental
decisions must be taken that will transform the existing plural state into
the more stable configuration of social heterogeneity. These include,
inter alia: "the effective institutionalization of uniform conditions of
civil and political equality; the provision of equal, appropriate, and
uniform educational, occupational and economic opportunities to all

cultural sections of the society; the principled recruitment of active

participation in approximately equivalent ratio from all major ethnic

groups; and, the public enforcement of the fundamental freedoms of

worship, speech, association, and work".70 These are the goals which,
once attained, will mean society has been completely integrated on a

national basis. It is an objective, though appearing utopian for most

Third World countries, toward which progress can only be made once the
public, by way of state institutions, has been instructed, enlightened and
disciplined in the expression of its societal demands. 71

In sum, if ethnic cleavages are to be resolved, national integration

will have to proceed beyond mere state-building. State institutions will
have to be developed in such a way that orderly channels of communication
are established, providing meaningful participation for the newly
aobilized ,roups, more equitable access to state resources, and a gradual
disappearance of the vertical stratification of ethnic groups. Once the
central authorities come to realize that the future of the state is at
stake, they will begin to gear state-building to the task of
nation-building rather than merely using it as an end to itself.

70. S.ith, -Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralis.-, p. 60.

71. For an elaboration of this vieN, see: Shils, op. cit., p. 448.
 CHAPTER 3.

THE "TWO-NATION THEORY"

 On 14 August 1947, with the Partition of British India into the two

independent states of India and Pakistan, the dream of creating a homeland

for the Muslims of the Sub-continent became a reality. Against all odds,
the All-India Muslim League, the most important Muslim organization in
British India, had been able to convince the British administrators that
Pakistan was the only viable solution to the increasingly incompatible
objectives of the Hindu and Muslim communities.

Two Muslims were at the forefront in the struggle to achieve this

goal: Sir Muhammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Ironically, these two
individuals had very little in common, except the desire to see the
Muslims of India obtain a country of their own in which they could
regulate their lives according to their religious and social norms. Iqbal
was the idealist who first suggested the creation of a Muslim homeland,
and Jinnah was the realist who made it become reality.

Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877~1938), a well-respected Muslim poet-

philosopher from the Punjab, is generally considered as the spiritual

founder of Pakistan. He had a vision of an 'ideal Islamic society' which

would be, as in Western countries, democratic and tolerant towards people
practising other faiths;l he was adamantly opposed to a theocratic
state.

While he was relatively clear as to what the Islamic state should be,
it was when he attempted to apply his theory in the context of the Indian
environment that his thinking became nebulous and confusing. He believed
Islam could survive neither if defined in terms of narrow nationalism, nor

1. Riaz Hussain, The Politics of Iqbal, (lahore, Islalic Book Service, 1977}, p. 47 ..
 36

in the establishment of a universal state, as the downfall of the Ottoman

Caliphate had demonstrated, but only if considered in the framework of a

.ulti-national free association. 2 This theoretical 'model' contradicted

his definition of a 'nation'.

It is not the unity of language or country or the
identity of economic interest that constitutes the
basic principle of one nationality: it is because we
all believe in a certain view of the universe, and
participate in the same historical tradition that we
are members of the Society founded by the Prophet of
Islam. 3

Moreover, when Iqbal, in his 1930 Presidential Address to the All-India

Muslim League, put forward a concrete proposal for the establishment of a

Muslim homeland in India, he did not indicate how this state would fit
into his multi-national free association .

... 1 would like to see the Punjab, the North-West

frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated
into a single state. Self-government within the
British Empire, or without the British Empire, the
formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim
State appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims,
at least of North-West India. 4

Although a Muslim state in India could theoretically become a member

of a multi-state association, it could certainly not become a component

part of a multi-national association. In other words, if according to

Iqbal Muslims automatically formed a nation, then his ideal 'model' could

only be interpreted as meaning either a multi-state or multi-ethnic-based

association.

2. Aziz Ahlad, Isla.ic Hodernisl in India and Pakistan: 1857-1964, (Karachi, Oxford University
Press, 1967), p. 140.
3. Hussain, op. cit., p. 23.
4. Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Huslil League Doculents, Vol. II, 1924-1947, Syed Sharifuddin
Pirzada (ed.), (Karachi, National Publishing House, 1970), pp. 153-171.
 37

Although Iqbal may have been unclear about some of his ideas, it is

certain that the cornerstone of his thinking was his deeply-held belief

that the Indian Muslims as a nation had a legitimate right to a state of

their own. According to him, Dot only had "God endowed Man with the

ability to create" ,5 and this would include the foundation of a state,

but the state was an inherent part of tawhid (unity with God).
In Islam, it is the same reality which appears as the
church from one point of view and the state from the
other ..• The essence of tawhid as a working idea is
equality, solidarity and freedom. The state from the
Islamic standpoint is an endeavour to transform these
ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration
to realize them into a definite human organization. 6

Sir Iqbal was instrumental in the creation of Pakistan not so much

because of his position as president of the Punjab Provincial Muslim

League, but for the moral support he accorded to Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
President of the All-India Muslim League. They had a very close personal

rapport, especially during the last two years of Iqbal's life, during

which Sir Iqbal urged Jinnah to mobilize the Muslim community to the cause

of Pakistan which he considered as "the supreme solution to the crucial

problem of Muslim identity". 7

It would be appropriate at this point to mention briefly the origin of

the word cPakistan', for in many ways it represents a continuation of Sir

Iqbal's conceptualization of a homeland for the Indian Muslims. In 1933,

Choudhary Rahmat Ali, an Indian Muslim studying at Cambridge University,

and deeply committed to the need for a separate Indian Muslim state,
created a name for the country-to-be. As he stated in his book, Pakistan,
the Fatherland of the Pak Nation:

S. Hussain, op. cit., p. 44.

6. "uhallad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islal, (Lahore, Sh. Huhal.ad Ashraf,
1962), p. 154.
7. Choudhary Rah.at Ali, Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation, (Lahore, Hustafa Naheed, n.d.),
p. 255.
 38

It had therefore to be a name born of all the elements

of our life - spiritual and fraternal, moral and
ethnical, historical and geographical, supra-regional
and supra-national. In other words, it had to be
charged with an irresistible, eternal appeal to the
heart and head of all our people, and possessed of
elemental power to seize on our being and make us all
go out crusading for the Millat's (Muslim cODDDuinity)
mission. s .

Thus, the word •Pakistan , is actually an acronym whose letters stand

for countries or areas where Muslims live, hence, ~unjab, ~fghania

(North~est Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, ~indh, Iurkharistan,

~fghanistan and BaluchistaQ. He went on to say that it also stood for the
Land of the Paks, meaning in Farsi-Urdu, the Land of the Pure. 9 Like
Iqbal, he did not visualize the inclusion of any Muslim Majority areas of
eastern India in his 'Pakistan'. One can hypothesize that perhaps he
deliberately omitted Bengal, Assam and Bihar on the premise that, being of
different ethnic stock and separated from the western part by over 1000

kilometres, it would not make 'Pakistan' a viable country if they were

included in his plan. Ironically, however, the name he coined was

eventually adopted in toto by the Muslim League even after East Bengal was

included into M.A. Jinnah's own version of Pakistan.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) was by birth a Shi'a of the Ismailian

Kboja CODDDunity of Karachi. However, he rarely identified himself with
that religious sect but simply referred to himself as a Muslim. He went
to the United Kingdom to study law and was eventually called to the Bar in

1895, setting a precedent as being the youngest Indian to do so. After

returning to India in 1897, he established himself as a successful lawyer
in Bombay. Soon after joining the Indian National Congress in 1907, and

8. Ibid.,
9. Sharif Al Hujahid, Quaid-i-Azal Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation, (Karachi, Quaid-i-Azal
AcadelY, 1981), p. 38.
 39

the Muslim League in 1912, he came to be known as the 'Ambassador of

Hindu-MUslim unity'. In 1916, he was instrumental in drawing up the
League-Congress "Lucknow Pact" which called for joint action on the
question of constitutional reforas and asked for Dominion status for
India. Disagreement with the Congress Party over the issue of the
Khi1afat Movement 10 caused him to resign from the Congress in 1921.

This was the turning-point in his political life, for it marked the

beginning of his shift toward the idea of a separate state for the Indian
Muslims. After the Congress rejected, in 1929, Jinnah's 14 Points,ll

which essentially demanded from the British authorities a greater

recognition of the religious factor, the Muslim League felt it was left
with no other option but to opt for Muslim separation. The road toward
the achievement of that goal would not be an easy one, for the Muslim
League would have to handle opposition from the Congress, the British and
orthodox Muslims. However, one must acknowledge that without M.A. Jinnah
at the helm Pakistan would probably not have come into existence at the
time it did, nor by means of a formal partition of British India. 12

The demand for the establishment of a Muslim State was given a strong
impetus with Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) Mohammad Ali Jinnah's formulation
of his "Two-Nation Theory". It not only brought the debate into the realm

of national self-determination for the Indian Muslims, but it also marked

the point at which a possible Muslim-Hindu agreement was no longer

attainable. Moreover, as president of the All-India Muslim League,

Jinnah's "Two-Nation theory" armed the League's demand for the creation of

10. A joint Hindu-Huslil non-cooperation lovelent ailed at preventing the downfall of the Ottolan
Khilafat.
11. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see: K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Forlative Phase,
1857-1948, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1968, 2nd. ed.), pp. 72ff.
12. For a detailed chronology of 3innah's political life, see: Hujahid, op. cit., pp. 512ff.
 40

Pakistan with an argument that appeared to the general Muslim Population

as both credible and morally legitimate.

In his Presidential Address at the Twenty-seventh Session of the

All-India Muslim League, held in Lahore on 22 March 1940, Jinnnah

elaborated on his "Two-Nation Theory", which in many ways complemented
Iqbal's philosophy.
The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different
religious philosophies, social customs, and literature.
They neither intermarry, nor interdine together, and
indeed they belong to two different civilizations which
are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.
To yoke together two such nations under a single state,
one as a numerical minority and the other as a
majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final
destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for
the government of such a state. Musulmans are a nation
according to any definition of a nation, and they must
have their homelands, their territory and their state.
We wish to live in peace and harmony with our
neighbours as a free and independent people. We wish
our people to develop to the fullest our spiritual,
cultural, economic, social and political life in a way
that we think best, and in consonance with our own
ideals and according to the genius of our people. 13

Jinnah, deeply influenced by liberal thinking, not only believed in a

broad interpretation of the religious tenets, but he also applied Western

philosophy to the problems of the Sub-continent. As Callard pointed out:

... for such men (Muslim Leaguers) the Muslim cause,

which is inescapably bound up with Islam, embraces
nationalism and patriotism as well as the narrower
meaning of religion. Acceptance of Islam leads to the
assertion that the Muslims are a separate nation.
Western political theory is then applied to establish
the claim for national self-determination. Muslim
nationhood was advanced as an axiom; the case for
Pakistan was derived from that axiom, not by citation
from the law books of Islam but by the political logic
of liberal nationalism. 14

13. Foundations of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 338-339.

14. Keith Callard, Pakistan: APolitical Study, (london: Allen &Unwin, 1957), p. 201.
 41

At the same session of the All-India Muslim League the party passed
the Lahore Resolution, later to be called the Pakistan Resolution, which

was to become the cornerstone of the Muslim state-to-be. Just like

Jinnah's "Two-Nation Theorytt was essentially a philosophical continuation

of Iqbal's theory on the existence of two incompatible cultures in India,

the Lahore Resolution was also an elaboration of Iqbal's wish to see a

Muslim state in the north-western part of India. However, there was a

fundaaental difference with the poet's concept, for this time it included
the Muslim majority areas of eastern India. Ironically, this all

important resolution was moved by the Chief Minister of Bengal, Maulvi

Abul Kasem Fazul Haq. The basic principles that the Muslim League

resolved to follow were:

..• that geographically contiguous units are demarcated
into regions which should be so constituted, with such
territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the
areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a
majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of
India, should be grouped to constitute Independent
States in which the constituent units shall be
autonomous and sovereign.1S

It is quite apparent that this resolution was open to many

interpretations: first, it did not specify by name the provinces that were

to be included in this scheme, but only mentioned the general areas that

were to constitute the new state; secondly, it could be understood to mean

that the future homeland would take the form of two independent countries
each autonomous and sovereign vis-a-vis one another; and, thirdly, it
could be interpreted as meaning each zone, that is, each country, would

itself be composed of autonomous and sovereign units. For example, Abul

Bashi. made a passionate plea at the All-India Muslim League Legislators'

Convention, held in Delhi in April 1946, in favour of the creation of a

separate state in East Bengal on the basis that the Lahore Resolution made

IS. Foundations of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 341.

 42

allowances for such interpretation. iS In an attempt to correct these

problems of interpretation, the Muslim League passed a resolution at the

1946 Convention, with the modifications superseding the previous text.
The modified section relevant to this discussion went as follows:

That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the

North-East and the Punjab, North-West Frontier
Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the North-West of
India, namely Pakistan zones where the Muslims are in a
dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign,
independent state and that an unequivocal undertaking
be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan
without delay.17

This resolution, as opposed to the Lahore Resolution, left no room for

conflicting interpretations. It quite specifically named the provinces to

be included in Pakistan, which in this case would be a sovereign and

independent state in the singular only. There were also two other major

differences with the 1940 resolution. First. the adjective autonomous was
no longer included in this resolution. Whether this was a deliberate
omission or due to an imprecise wording of the resolution is difficult to
ascertain. Nevertheless, the importance this word, or rather the omission
of it, was to have in the future was not obvious in those days, but in

subsequent years the right to provincial autonomy was to become an issue

of paramount importance in the political life of the country. Although

in legal terms the 1946 resolution superseded the Lahore Resolution as the

founding document of Pakistan, in psychological terms the Lahore

Resolution has remained the cornerstone document of the country. This

point was to a certain extent clarified in an interview Jinnah gave in

1943 to a Western journalist in which he acknowledged the shortcomings of

the Lahore Resolution. As he emphasized, the 1940

16. (.e. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 66.
17. F~Jndations of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 513. At the 28th session of the All-India Huslil League a
resolution vas passed which was supposed to clarify the albiguities. However, it did quite the opposite;
for it inserted new words, e.g., Huslil Free National Homelands, and kept old ones, e.g., Independent
States, which only compounded the problels of interpretation. Foundations of Pakistan, Ibid., p. 372.
 43

resolution was only meant to outline the objectives of the Muslim League

and was Dot supposed to be a blue-print for the future structure of the

Pakistan. is In other words, the significance of the Labore Resolution

resides basically in the fact that it marked the point of no-return in the

struggle for a Muslim homeland.

The second fundamental difference with the Labore Resolution is the

omission of the phrase "with such territorial adjustments as may be

necessary". The significance of this discrepancy between these two
resolutions cannot be sufficiently stressed, for in practical terms this

meant that the Muslim League was demanding in the name of Pakistan the
inclusion of all of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, including the areas
where the Muslims were in a minority. According to Sharif Al Mujahid,

Jinnah's argument for including these Muslim minority areas in the

Pakistan scheme was that these three provinces were cultural, economic and

administrative units that could not, and should not, be partitioned. 19

However, in an interview Collins and Lapierre had with Lord Mountbatten,

the last viceroy of British India, Jinnah is said to have advanced

arguments that were substantially different from the ones Mujahid stated.

The Muslim League leader is said to have told Mountbatten:

Your excellency doesn't understand that the Punjab is a

nation. Bengal is a nation. A man is a Punjabi or a
Bengali first before he is a Hindu or a Muslim. If you
give us those provinces you must, under no conditions,
partition them. 2o
If Lord Mountbatten's recollection of the conversation he had with
Jinnah is correct, it would cast serious doubts on the credibility of
Jinnah's "Two-Nation Theorytt; for, on the one hand, he emphasized that

18. Waheed Quraishi, Ideological Foundations of Pakistan, (lahore, Aziz Publishers, 1982), p. 150.
19. Hujahid, op. cit., p. 182.
20. l. Collins and D. lapierre, Hountbatten and the Partition of India, (Diehi, Yikas, 1982), p. 43.
This passage is deleted in the edition sold in Pakistan.
 44

"there has never been .•• either social or political unity between these two
major nations" (MUslims and Hindus),21 but, on the other hand, he argued

that the Punjabis and Bengalis regarded their provinces as unified

territories. 22 However, this apparent contradiction in Jinnah's stance
could perhaps be better understood if one analysed his position from a
political perspective rather than strictly from a religious point of

view. Having got the British to agree to a partitioning of India on the

basis of his "Two-Nation Theory", Jinnah then donned the mantle of a

national politician who simply wished to extract as much as possible from

the out-going administration. Of course Lord Mountbatten was aware of

these political manoeuvres, and therefore held discussions with Jinnah on

the basis of the Lahore Resolution, rather than on the subsequent 1946

Resolution. Eventually Jinnah was forced to accept a "moth-eaten

Pakistan"23 because, by refusing minority status in an un-divided India,

he could hardly expect the Hindus to agree to minority status in

Pakistan. 24 Although Jinnah's apparent vacillation at the time of

Partition has given plenty of ammunition for Indian critics of the Muslim
League's "Two-Nation Theory",25 it is interesting to note that in 1960

S.V. Patel, a high-ranking Hindu member of the Congress, admitted that

Whether we (the Congress leadership) like it or not,
there were two nations in India ... MUslims and Hindus
could not be united into one nation. There was no
alternative except to recognize this fact.26

21. league legislators' Convention, Delhi, April 1946. Foundations of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 50B.
22. Viceroy's Personal Reports, Report No.3, 17 April 1947, cited in Collins and lapierre, ~
cit., Part III, (Reports), p. 91.
23. Ibid., p. 92.
24. Hujahid, op. cit., p. IB2.
25. See for exalple: P.C. Hathur, "Theories of Nation-Building in the Indian Subcontinent: A
Political Analysis with Special Reference to the Elergence of the State of Bangladesh", Indian Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 3B, no. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1977, pp. 435-443.
26. Abul Kalal Azad, India Wins Freedol, (N.Y.: longlans and Green, 1960), p. 217, cited in Hafeez
H~lik, "Nationalisl and the Quest for Ideology in Pakistan", in l. Ziring et al. (eds.), Pakistan:The long
Vlew, (Durhal, N.C.:Duke University Press, 1977), p. 289.
 45

One may easily assume from the above discussion that all Indian
Musl~ were wholeheartedly in favour of the creation of Pakistan.
However, this was certainly not the case, because opposing the Muslim
Nationalists, essentially represented by the Muslim League, were two other
important Muslim groups: the Nationalist Muslims and the Islamic
Nationalists. Although the two groups which opposed the Muslim League

eventually lost out in the debate, the fact that a large number of these
non-Mus1im Nationalists decided to migrate to Pakistan inevitably created
serious inter-Muslim clashes over the role Islam should have in the
administration of the country.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958), the leader and theoretician of

the Nationalist Muslims, was, ironically, a scholar who in the first
period of his political life (1906-1920) closely identified with Iqbal's
philosophy. As a member of the Muslim League, he believed religion was the
only valid criteria for group loyalty, rejecting cooperation with Hindus
on the basis that it would deviate Muslims from the Qura'nic
Sirat-i-Mustagim (Straight Path). However, his philosophical and

political stances changed dramatically with the establishment, in 1919, of

the Khilafat Conference, a Hindu-Muslim organization aimed at stopping the
British from imposing the Treaty of Sevres on Turkey, of which he was one
of the original founders. It introduced into Indian politics the first
large-scale coalition of Hindus and Muslims opposed to the British. 27

In order to legitimize the Muslim alliance with the Congress, Azad

relied on the Qur'an (40:8-9), in which was described the covenant that
had been agreed upon in 622 A.D. between Muhammad and the non-Muslim

27. For an interesting discussion as to the repercussions of the downfall of the Ottolan Caliphate
upon the Indian Huslils, see: Ahlad, op. cit., pp. 135, 138-139.
 46

population of Medina. 28 Not only did he believe Hindus to be

sympathetic to Muslim needs, but he strongly urged the Muslims to join ~

masse the Congress, for he did not believe Islam had any special interests
to protect. 29 He felt Muslims should merge with the Indian nation and

that they "should content themselves with only safeguards as the majority
community might vouchsafe them regarding personal law and religion".3o

Their cultural excellence would enable the Muslims to live and prosper

without having to demand cultural autonomy. However, he failed to

convince the Muslims of the Hindus' good faith, especially after the

Congress refused to share power with the Muslims at the provincial level
as they had promised they would prior to the 1937 elections.

This did not deter Azad from expounding his theory of 'composite'
nationalism as the counterpart to Sir Iqbal's Muslim homeland objective.
He believed all Indians made up one Qawn (national community) which was
itself composed of several Millats (religious communities). In practical
terms this meant that "a group could be co-national with another group in

one sense, and separate from it in another".31 Iqbal considered this

argument as merely an exercise in semantics; because for him the Indian

Muslims constituted a nation, both as a Qawn and a Millat. 32 It was

therefore logical that, after having aligned himself with the Congress and

legitimized his position through the use of the religious scriptures,

Maulana Azad would virulently oppose the creation of Pakistan.

Azad had the backing of the first independent organization of ulama

(men of religious learning, pl. of alim) in India, the Jamiyat al
28. Ibid., pp. 183-189.
29. I.H. Qureshi, Ulela in Politics, (Karachi, The Inter-Services Press, 1972), pp. 233-235.
30. Ibid., p. 308.
31. Ahlad, ~cit., p. 192.
32. Hussain, op. cit., p. 76.
 47

Ulama-i-Hind (JUH), which, as an adherent of !zad's covenental theory of

•composite , Indian nationalism, was opposed to the principle of Muslim
separatism. 33 Accordingly, in October 1945, the president of the JUH

issued a fatwa (the formal opinion of a canon lawyer) forbidding Muslims

from joining the Muslim League, for such an action would be considered
un-Islamic. 34 Like !zad, it vehemently opposed the creation of

Pakistan.

Although the JUH was essentially composed of ulama of the Deoband

Traditionalist school of thought,35 not all members of Deoband agreed to

join the political organization, mainly because they felt uncomfortable

with an alliance that identified them too closely with the Congress.

Further.ore, they did not wish to worsen their standing with the Muslim
masses which had been deteriorating since the failed 1857 uprising. This
loss of influence was made obvious with the failure of the Muslims to join
en masse the Congress. 36 However, the DeObandis who agreed to ally
themselves with the Congress did so only on the condition that the

movement for political freedom would be strictly in accordance with Muslim

juristic precepts, would avoid excesses or chaos and would not harm Muslim
interests. 37 But, to the dismay of many ulama, these conditions were
not always adhered to.

Two other religious groups did ally themselves to the Congress. The
Punjab-based Ahrar party,38 whose goal was the restoration of the purity

33. Ibid., pp. 103, 107, 109-113, 124.

34. Sayeed, Pakistan: The For.ative Phase, p. 199.
35. The distinction between the various schools of thought will be analysed in detail in Part III
Suffice to lention that the Deobandis essentially believe in the strict adherence to the four recognized
religious legal schools.
36. Qureshi, op. cit., p. 227.
37. Ibid., p. 228.
38. Y.Y. Gankovsky, AHistory of Pakistan. 1947-1958, (Lahore, People's Publishing House, n.d.),
p. 62.
 48

of the Our'an, was completely committed to the Congress Party, for it felt
that it was the only party that was fully determined to fight the British
without compromising its political stance. 39 Its hatred of the Muslim

League was so deep that Maulvi Ali Azhar, one of its original founders,
even went as far as to call Jinnah a Kafir-i-Azam (great unbeliever).4o
Another religious party, the Ahl-i-Hadith, also followed Azad's

philosophy. It was an urban-based party which, along with the DeOband,

had a strong influence in the Punjab. 41 It rejected the Muslim
Nationalists' demand for Muslim separation and, instead, believed in a

Hindu-MUslim alliance based on respect for each other's religious needs.

It should be noted that two important issues were always in the minds
of the Nationalist Muslims. First, although some prominent ulama had

joined the Hindu-Muslim alliance, " ..• the ulama were angry with the new
leadership (Muslim League) mostly out of jealousy because the people

listened to it and had no use for the ulama who had gradually come to sing
a tune that was completely out of harmony with the feelings of the
communi ty". 42 A second "problem perpleKing the ulama, which they felt

would only be eKacerbated by the demand for a separate homeland, was the
burden that would be placed upon those Muslims left behind in the
Hindu-dOlll.inated portion of India tl • 43 1.1. Chundrigar, leader of the

League in the Bombay Assembly, dismissed this second criticism on the

basis that:

39. ~~reshi, op. cit., p. 289.

40. Ibid. ' . p. 354. For an interesting discussion of the Ahrars by a Ian Mho Mas later to become
President of the Huslil league, see: Choudhry IhaliQuzzalan, PathMay to Pakistan, (lahore, long.ans,
1961), p. 150.
41. David Gil.artin, 'Religious leadership and the Pakistan Hove.ent in the Punjab", Hodern Asian
Studies, Vol. 13, No.3, 1979, p. 491.
42. Qureshi, op. cit., p. 384.
43. lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigla of Political Development, (Folkestone: W. Dawson &Sons,
1980), p. 23.
 49

••• Muslims in the minority provinces supported Pakistan

because a Muslim state would thereby be established in
the Subcontinent, and it would create a balance of
power between Hindustan and Pakistan."44

The undisputed leader of the Islamic Nationalists was the Amir of the
Funda.entalist Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), Maulana Abu'l A'la Mawdudi

(1903-1979).45 Although he did represent a third force, he was in many

ways, especially in the eyes of the Muslim masses, defending arguments
from a position that was quite often similar to the one held by the Muslim

Nationalists. One of these was the question of what constituted a

nation. Religion, as far as he was concerned, was the only basis upon
which a nation could be defined. He stated:
A group becomes conscious of nationhood by the
continuity of the effects of history and cultural
heritage. When some people live for a long period of
time with similar ethical ideas and cultural
traditions, united together but different from other
groups and this heritage is transmitted from one
generation to another they develop a sense of permanent
collective existence which is called a nation. 46
He used the term gawn as meaning not only a national community but a
religious one as well, for he believed the two meant the same thing. His
vision of the world was very simple: all those who accepted Islam

constituted one nation and all those who rejected it formed another.47

On that basis, he followed Iqbal's thinking. However, where he did part

ways with the Muslim Nationalists was on the latter's belief in the
necessity to establish a state. Mawdudi's views were that territorial

nationalism would destroy the very foundation of Islamic nationalism

44. league legislators' Convention, Delhi, 7-9 April 1946, Foundations of Pakistan, op. cit.,
P. 518.
45. As will be exa.ined in greater detail in Part III, the Funda.entalists believe in the Isla.ic
values as they existed in the 7th Century A.D.
46. Haulana Abu'l A'ia Hawdudi, Husullan aur Hawjuda Siyasi Kash.akash, (Pathankot, 1942, Vol. 3 ),
cited in lali. Bahadur, The Ja.a'at-i-Isla.i of Pakistan, (Lahore, Progressive Books, 1983), p. 40.
47. Bahadur, Ibid., pp. 36-37.
 50

because it would create national exclusiveness and therefore hamper the

creation of a 'greater' Islamic nation. 48 Accordingly, he considered
that the tlMuslims' real duty was the establishment of the Islamic way of
life and not the setting up of a Muslim national state tl • 49 But
Mawdudi's position became quite tenuous when, on the one hand, he accepted
the validity of the Muslim League's adoption of Iqbal's definition of a

nation but, on the other hand, he sided with the Traditionalist Deoband
school in their criticism of the Western-educated Muslim League leaders,

claiming to be the flag bearers of Islam. As Mawdudi so bluntly put it:

From the League's Ouaid-i-Azam down to the humblest
leader, there was no one who could be credited with an
Islamic outlook and who looked at the various problems
from an Islamic point of view. SO

It should be emphasized that although he joined forces with the main

stream Traditionalists in his criticism of the Muslim League, he strongly
opposed Maulana Azad's theory of 'composite' nationalism and his alliance

with the Congress. The greatest danger in pursuing this strategy was the

ultimate absorption of Islam into Hinduism,s1 a stance which,

ironically, the Muslim League closely identified with as well. Mawdudi's

views of the Congress were uncompromising, as he so clearly stated:
Our death is its life, its death is our life. Not only
is there no common ground between its principles,
objects and methods of work and ours, but in fact they
are totally opposed. The difference is of such
magnitude that they and we do not converge on any
point, the differences (in its aims and goals and ours)
are like the difference in the cardinal points of the
East and the West, one cannot go in one direction
without turning one's back on the other.52

48. Douglas Ashford, National Developlent and local Refort: Political Participation in "orocco,
Tunisia and Pakistan, (Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 317.
49. 8ahadur, op. cit., p. 13.
50. Kunshi Abdur Rahtan Khan, Talir-i-Pakistan aur Ulala-i-Rabbani, (Hultan, Idarah Nashar
AI-Haarif, 1956), p. 122, cited in Sayeed, Pakistan: The Forlative Phase, p. 199.
51 .•~tad, op. cit., p. 213.
52. Kau!ana Abu'! A'la Hawdudi, Tahrik-i-Azadi-i-Hind aur Husullan, (Lahore, 1964), p. 450, cited in
Qureshi, Of. cit., p. 338.
 51

Although Maulana Mawdudi agreed with the Muslim Nationalists'

interpretation of what constituted a nation, his harshest attacks against
the Muslim League were with regard to their goal of establishing a Muslim

state along Western democratic lines. He stated:

Islam is the very antithesis of secular Western
democracy. The philosophical foundation of Western
democracy is the sovereignty of the people. Lawmaking
is their prerogative ••• Islam ..• altogether repudiates
the philosophy of popular sovereignty ••• s3

It is obvious that the Fundamentalists' idea of an Islamic state was

of an authgritarian nature in which there could be no flexibility with

regard to the application of the Shariat (Holy law of Islam).54 If it
were based on anything else it would merely be a Muslim state, meaning it
could eventually secularize itself with its Muslim population adhering to
the tenets of Islam as it saw fit.55 And, as far as Mawdudi was
concerned, "Muslim nationalism is as reprehensible in the Shariat of God
as Indian nationalism".56

Another religious group, the Khaksars (the humble people), which was
essentially a para-military Islamic organization considered by some as

being part of the neo-Islamic totalitarian movement,57 also joined the

ranks of the Islamic Nationalists. It was led by Allamah Inayatullah

Mashriqi, a mathematician and modern-trained scholar, who believed that an

Islamic government on earth could be established with the help of his

53. Ouoted in E.I.J. Rosenthal, Isla. in the Hodern National State, (Calbridge University Press,
1965), p. 138, cited in Hugh Tinker, 'South Asia at Independence: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka", in A.J.
Wilson and D. Dalton (eds.), The States of South Asia: Problels of National Integration, (New Delhi, Vikas
Publishing House, 1982),p.8.
54. K.B. Sayeed, "The Jala'at-i-Islali Hovement in Pakistan", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXX, No.1,
Karch 1959, p. 67.
55. Ahlad, op. cit., p. 264.
56. Hawdudi, Husullan ... , p. 76, cited in Bahadur, op. cit., p. 39.
57. Hanfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change, (Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 134,
150-151; W.C. S.ith, Hodern Isla. in India, (london, 60llancz, 1946), pp. 235-245; and, David Taylor, "The
Politics of Islam and Islamization in Pakistan", in J.P. Piscatori (ed.), Isla. in the Political Process,
(Calbridge University Press, 1983), p. 191.
 52

volunteer corps of shock-troops, mainly composed of illiterate and

uneducated young, urban-based men, acting as the vanguard of a new Islamic

order. 58 The Khaksars were intensily opposed to the creation of

Pakistan, and, consequently, were willing to cooperate with the
Nationalist Muslims. 59

As a result of these deep philosophical and political cleavages

regarding the creation of a homeland for the Muslims of British India,
when Pakistan became a reality, the Muslim Nationalists migrated to
Pakistan and the Nationalist Muslims remained in India. The Islamic

Nationalists, on the other hand, faced a dilemma, since they had

criticized both groups with equal hostility. They eventually decided to

opt for Pakistan, hoping to mould Pakistan into a truly Islamic state
based on the Shariat. It was the inevitable clash between the various
groups of Muslim Nationalists and the Fundamentalist Islamic Nationalists
which was going to create the ideological problems present in the Pakistan

polity since 1947.

58. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Forlative Phase, p. 180.

59. Qureshi, oP. cit., pp. 324-327. AKhaksar lelber attelpted to assassinate Jinnah in July 1943.
AKhaksar Nas responsible for the lurder of Prile Hinister liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951.
 PART II.

EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

 The political system of Pakistan has variously been characterized as
vice-regal,l patriDlonial,2 and "Great Leader"3-oriented, and, except

for a five year interlude in the early 1970s, it could generally be

classified as being non-participatory and restrictive. The political

history of Pakistan can readily be divided into five distinct periods

according to whether it was civilian (1947-1958;1971-1977) or military

(1958-1969;1969-1971;1977-1985) rule.

'1'HB EARLY YEARS: 1947-1958

The first period under consideration, 1947-1958, was dominated by the

Governor-General and later, under the 1956 Constitution, by the

President. The concentration of political power in the hands of the

Governor-General, a post that was meant to be essentially ceremonial,

began with M.A. Jinnah's decision to become the first Governor-General of

Pakistan. His decision to fill that post was not only given unanimous

support by the members of the Muslim League, but with the prestige and

charisma he possessed as the Quaid-i-Azam(Great Leader) of Pakistan it was

the only position that would be acceptable to him as the founder of

Pakistan. Moreover, as leader of the Indian Muslims who had led them to

their "homeland", Jinnah felt he was above parochial politics.

Accordingly, he was determined to see to it that the Governor-General

1. Although K.B. Sayeed restricted his 'vice-regal" approach to his study of M.A. Jinnah's period as
Governor-General of Pakistan, one can readily apply this lodel to the subsequent regiles that have existed
in Pakistan. Pakistan:The Forlative Phase, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 196B.
2. In his study of the Bhutto regime, G.A. Heeger relied on Max Weber's definition of
patrilonialiSl, i.e., 'where authority is prilarily oriented to tradition but in the exercise lakes a
claim to full personal powers', to analyse the post-Yahya civilian governlent. This definition, however,
need not be limited to the Bhutto period, but is also applicable to the other regimes. 'Politics in the
Post-Military State:Sole Reflections on the Pakistani Experience', World Politics, Yolo 29, No.2, Jan.
1977, Pp. 242-262.
3. lawrence Ziring, Pakistan:The Enigla of Political Development, (Folkestone, Kent: WE Dawson &
Sons, 1980), pp. 38-40.
 54

would be more than a mere figure-head. 4 Having been sworn in as

Governor-General as well as elected President of the Muslim League and the

Constituent Assembly, Jinnah was in a position to centralize all power in

the office of the Governor-General. Furthermore, he applied a wide

interpretation to the powers of that office, as outlined in the

Independence Act. 1947, which not only gave him extensive federal power

but also the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the

provinces. 5 This amassing of power in the hands of one man was never
really challenged, for as Cal lard so aptly put it:
..• they looked for guidance to their Great Leader,
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. There was no one
else, he was Pakistan; and wherever he went he was
received by vast crowds with adulation amounting almost
to worship.6

As de facto Chief Executive, Jinnah skilfully used the civilian

bureaucrats to his advantage. The Governor-General had often declared

that Pakistani bureaucrats constituted the "backbone of the State" and

that ttGovernments are formed, ... Prime Ministers come and go, but you stay

on, and, therefore, there is a very great responsibility on your

shoulders".7

The bureaucratic elite's feeling of knowing what was good for the

country ultimately led the civil service to see itself as the ttsteel

4. In a conversation the last viceroy of British India, Lord Hountbatten, had with Jinnah, he told
the Leader of the Huslil League: ·You realize you've chosen the wrong thing. The Ian you want to be is
the Prile Minister, he runs the country·. Jinnah replied: aNot in IY Pakistan, there the Prile Hinister
will do what the Governor-General tells hil". Larry Collins and DOlinique Lapierre, Hountbatten and the
Partition of India, (New Delhi, Vikas, 1982), p. 47.
5. SOle exalples of the powers Jinnah accululated as Governor-General: He extended the reasons which
allowed for the imposition of a State of Elergency; as Governor-General, Jinnah created and headed the
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions; in August 1947, he sacked the Chief Hinister of NWFP; and, in
April 1948, he replaced the Chief Hinister of Sind. For an interesting legal approach to the
Governor-General's constitutional powers, see: Sayeed, op. cit., pp. 233ff.
6. k. Callard, Pakistan:A Political Study, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 19.
7. Speech delivered to Civil Officers at Governlent House, Peshawar, on 14 April 1948. Speeches by
MLe Quaid-i-Azam Hoha.mad Ali Jinnah. 1947-1948, (Islalabad, Hinistry of Information and Broadcasting,
Governlent of Pakistan, n.d.), p. 126.
 55

frame"8 of Pakistan, justified its monopolization of the decision-making

process at both the economic and political levels and, in the end, created

the bureaucratic state. 9 Furthermore, not only was bureaucratic rule

reinforced by Jinnah's actions, it was also facilitated by the Government

of India Act, 1935, Pakistan's acting constitution, which entrenched the

civil service in the political arena and gave it legal blessing for its

activities.

After the death of the politically towering figure of M.A. Jinnah only

a year after independence, the centre of power shifted away from the

Governor-General to the office of the Prime Minister. This was made

possible because Liaquat Ali Khan, having had a long association with

Jinnah. was easily able to overshadow the relatively weak Governor-

General, Khawaja Nazimuddin, a politician from East Bengal. Although

Liaquat did not have the same degree of national appeal as the

Quaid-i-Azam, it was only during the brief period between the death of

Jinnah in September 1948 and his own assassination in October 1951 10

that he rightfully established, as expected in a parliamentary system, the

supremacy of the Prime Minister's office. Liaquat's views of

parliamentary democracy were somewhat unorthodox, though. In a speech

delivered on 28 October 1950, he stated: tiThe formation of new political

parties in opposition to the Muslim League is against the best interests

of Pakistan tl • 1l He essentially believed the League was Pakistan, and

8. For an excellent discussion of the first 20 years of the civilian bureaucracy in Pakistan, see:
R. Braibanti, ·Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan·, in J. Palolbara (ed.), Bureaucracy and
Political Developlent, (Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 366ff.
9. A. Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State:The Case of Pakistan, (Folkestone, Kent: WI
Dawson &Sons, 1979), p. 65.
10. The alleged assassin, an Afghan exile, was a lelber of the Khaksars, a para-lilitary Islalic
organization. The circulstances surrounding his assassination were never cOlpletely clear. There are
rUlours liaquat was the vic til of a power struggle within the Huslil League. For a short exalination of
this incident, see: Impact International, 8-21 October 1992, pp. 3-4.
11. The Statesman, 28 October 1950, cited in M.A. Rizvi, The Hilitary and Politics in Pakistan,
(Lahore: Progressive Publishers,1976), p.63.
 56

therefore any "opposition to the League was tantamount to opposition to

pakistan". 12 Following Liaquat's death, the centre of executive power
reverted back to the office of the Governor-General, which this time was
filled by the ailing but strong-willed former Minister for Finance, Ghulam
Mohammad. Like Jinnah, the newly-installed Head of State did not see his

function as being one of mere figure-head; on the contrary, with the help
of the bureaucratic apparatus he ruled the country in a semi-dictatorial

fashion.

In April 1953, Ghulam Mohammad dismissed the Cabinet of Prime Minister

Khawaja Nazimuddin, even though it still enjoyed the confidence of the

Constituent Assembly, on the basis that it had been unable to handle the
anti-Ahmadiyah issue adequately.13 Not only did the Governor-General

replace Nazimuddin with Mohammad Ali Bogra, the Pakistani ambassador in

Washington and a man with no political following in view of his minor
position in the Muslim League, but he personally selected Bogra's cabinet
members. Eventually, matters seemed to settle down for a while on the
federal front, but in the provinces political problems were in the making.

On 30 May 1954, the Governor-General imposed Governor's Rule in East

Pakistan and dismissed the Provincial Assembly. Major-General Iskander

Mirza, an Army officer turned bureaucrat, was chosen as the new Governor
of that province. This was brought about by the overwhelming defeat of
the Muslim League in the 1954 provincial elections. The United Front, a
coalition of opposition parties led by the East Pakistan Awami League, had

been able to win all but 10 of the 309 seats in the provincial
legislature. The clear rejection of the Muslim League in favour of the

12. Ibid.,
13. The anti-Ahladiyah issue Nill be discussed in detail in Part III of the thesis.
 57

united Front not only threatened the supremacy of the Punjabi and muha.iir

(Muslim migrants from India) governing elite which dominated the League,

but also the power of the bureaucracy in East Pakistan, since the civil

service was also dominated by these two groups. The United Front's

victory not only reflected East Pakistan's disenchantment with West

Pakistan, but it also demonstrated that initial latent ethnic differences

had shifted to a dynamic level of ethnic polarization hardly seven years

after the creation of Pakistan.

Ghulam Mohammad took yet another step which proved, once again, that

the bureaucratic elite was in command. In 1954, the Civil Service of

Pakistan (CSP) sponsored the One-Unit Plan which merged the four provinces

of West Pakistan into one Province. This scheme was implemented in order

to counter the more culturally and politically homogeneous East Wing and

prevent a possible anti-Central government, and by the same token

anti-Punjabi, alliance between East Pakistan and the individual western

Provinces. With the One-Unit Plan, the three non-Punjabi provinces of

West Pakistan became mere appendages to the Punjab; it institutionalized a

de facto situation. Furthermore, this new federal set-up would reinforce

Punjabi and muhajirbureaucratic rule in Pakistan.

The state of Pakistan's already weakened parliamentary system

gradually lost more of its power to the civilian bureaucracy. In Autumn

1954, the Constituent Assembly, in an attempt to reduce some of the

Governor-General's ever increasing powers, passed three bills curtailing

the Head of State's prerogatives. 14 Ghulam Mohammad, however, was in no

mood to accept a diminution of his powers. On the grounds that the

14. Riaz Ahled, Constitutional and Political DeveloPlents in Pakistan, 1951-1954, (Rawalpindi,
Pak-American COllercial, 1981), pp. 42-43.
 58

Constituent Assembly had been unable to produce a constitution, he

dissolved it, dismissed the central government, ,and declared a State of

Emegency. He offered the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Mohammad

Ayub Khan, the reins of power and asked him to produce a constitution.

Declining the premiership, Ayub did agree, though, to participate in a

"Cabinet of Talents" as Minister of Defence. General Mirza, recently

appointed Governor of East Pakistan, accepted the post of Minister of

Interior, and Mohammad Ali Bogra, a civil servant turned politician,

continued as Prime Minister. Thus, a system of military-bureaucratic rule

had begun. From October 1954 to July 1955, all "democratic' institutions

were suspended; the Governor-General's rule was reminiscent of the

Viceroy's Executive Council.

In July 1955, an indirectly elected new Constituent Assembly15 began

working on a new constitution. By March 1956, almost 9 years after

independence, under the direction of the Prime Minister, Chaudhri Mohammad

Ali, the country finally inaugurated its first constitution. This new

legal document, however, would neither strengthen the fragile political

institutions, nor put to rest the latent discontent of East Pakistan.

The 1956 Constitution gave the president wide ranging powers. He

could appoint and dismiss federal ministers and provincial governors, rule

by ordinance if he felt the circumstances required it, and proclaim an

Emergency if he deemed the security or economic life of Pakistan was

threatened. The constitution also entrenched the power of the civilian

bureaucracy by ensuring the tenure of CSP officers. The legislature was

unicameral and composed of 300 members equally divided between East and

15. The distribution of seats was as follows: Husli. League, 35 seats, United Front, 16 seats; Awami
league, 12 seats.
 59

West Pakistan. This legislative set-up obviously discriminated against

East Pakistan which had over 6~ of the total population.

With the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution, political stability

did not improve. During the thirty-one and half months during which the
new constitution was in force, Pakistan had four prime ministers, each of

whom heading coalitions having no ideological bases or political

programmes. The last cabinet lasted only 55 days. As for provincial

politics, the situation was no brighter. This was because the federal

government could, and did, interfere in provincial politics 1S by simply

imposing President's Rule and suspending or dismissing provincial

assemblies. 17 The catalyst events which finally led to the imposition

of Martial Law were: the assassination of the deputy speaker of the East
Pakistan Provincial Assembly during theated' debates, the murder of Dr.

Khan Sahib, founder of the Republican Party, the planned legislative

elections for November 1958, the announcement on 6 October 1958 by the

former ruler of Kalat State of secession of the State from Pakistan and,

lastly, demonstrations by the Muslim League's National Guard, which

eventually turned into riots.

On the economic front the situation was equally disastrous. The

Government's treasury was literally empty and the country was incurring

foreign exchange liabilities to the extent of Rs 30 million every

month. is The First Five-Year Plan (1955-1960) was not prepared until

one year after commencement of the Plan period, and was published only two

years later. Furthermore, widespread industrial unrest and strikes,

16. This was a continuation of the All-India Huslil League's pre-Partition policy of interfering in
provincial Huslil League politics.
17. For exalple, General Hirza ilposed President's Rule in East Pakistan on 2S June 1958.
18. Rizvi, op.cit., p. 90.
smuggling, black-marketeering and hoarding were becoming increasingly

common. In the face of these economic and political turmoils, General

Ayub Khan, under heavy pressure from certain sectors of the population and
the armed forces, coupled with a feeling of newly-won confidence, decided

it was time for the only integrated and well-disciplined organization of

the country, the military, to intervene. Its aim was to restore and

maintain law and order, and thus assure the survival of the state.

THE AYUB KHAN PERIOD: 1958-1969

The .ilitary intervention on 28 October 1958 did not stun anyone. 19

The army was efficient, disciplined and incorrupt; its prestige and

popularity, accumulated over the years, gave it the will to act

decisively.20 The coup was facilitated by what Finer terms "the

disposition and opportunity to intervene", especially after Ayub was first

appointed Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and then Prime Minister

on 24 October 1958,21 Finally, General Ayub Khan's personal experience

both as Commander-in-Chief of the Army for two terms (1951-1958), and as

Minister of Defence (Oct. 1954-July 1955), coupled with the 'demonstration

effect' of other successful military interventions, e.g., Egypt (1952),

Sudan (1958), Iraq (1958), were definitively powerful stimuli in the

decision-.aking equation to supplant the civilian regime. 22

19. H. Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 3.

20. S.E. Finer, The Han on Horseback, (London, Penguin, 1976), p. 71. For two different views of the
Pakistan military, see: Fazal Huqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Karachi, Oxford University .
Press, 1963; and, S.P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984.
21. Ibid., p. 74.
22. Ibid., p. 219. In the State versus Dosso Case, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
~akistan, Hohammad Hunir, on the basis of Kelsen's General Theory of Law and State, brought down a
~udge.ent which legalized the 1958 take-over. He argued that 'if a revolution succeeds it is a legalized
Illegality· and • ... its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled constitution but by
reference to its own success·. The court held that the 1958 Revolution fulfilled these conditions of
efficacy. See: The All-Pakistan Legal Decisions, November 1977, Supplement, pp. 749-750.
 61

The fact that the country was plagued by what Finer refers to as "low

political culture tt , made the system more prone to overt military

supplantment of the civilian government. 23 Huntington complements the

definition of this level of societal development by stating that tt ... in

oligarchical praetorianism ... social institutions are still relatively

undifferentiated, and the members of the ruling class easily and

frequently combine political, military, religious, social and economic

leadership roles tt . 24 This was the case in Pakistan in October 1958

where the following situation existed: a non-responsive legislature and

shallow political parties lacking legitimacy, an entrenched civilian

bureaucracy fighting to maintain its powers and provileges, and a strong

and respected military institution not yet tarnished by extensive

political involvement.

It was the weakness of these civilian institutions which generated the

political behaviour of the Pakistan Army; a need to fill an existing power

vacuum with the military, a situation described as ttreactive

militarism tt . 25 General Ayub Khan may have labelled his 28 October 1958

take-over a "revolution" ,26 but Huntington merely called ita ttreform

coup It , that is, tta combination of military and civilian groups which

seized power intending to make reforms in the political, economic or

social structure ... though they do not instigate a convulsive revolutionary

process tt . 27 He nevertheless came to praise Ayub Khan very highly by

23. Finer defined low political culture as "a relatively narrow and weakly organized public
compounded by a lack of stable, adequate, effective and legitilate institutions". op.cit., pp. 79, 99.
24. S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (Yale University Press, 1968), p. 199.
25. H. Janowitz, Hilitary Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, (University of
Chicago Press, 1977), p. 92.
26. The 1958 coup lerely finalized President Hirza's ousting which had begun with his ilposition of
Hartial Law and the designation of General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Adlinistrator (CMLA). General
Hirza's overthrow was justified by Ayub on the basis that his past connection with the previous governlent
would cOlprolise the legitilacy of the new government.
27. S.P. Huntington Changing Patterns of Military Politics, (New York:The Free Press of Glencoe,
1962), Pp. 32-40.
 62

declaring that " ••• more than any other political leader in a modernizing
country after World War II, Ayub Khan came close to filling the role of a

Solon or Lyargus or "Great Legislator' on the Platonic or Rousseaunian

model" .28 Khalid Bin Sayeed rightfully stated that "Ayub represents a

watershed in the history of Pakistan". 29 This statement is justified

not only by the fact that under his leadership industrialization took off,

agricultural output improved, and a modest land reform was initiated, but

also because it introduced into Pakistan politics the first of a series of

overt military interventions.

Ayub identified the main problems of Pakistan as being

... the cultural diversity of the country which

created divisiveness in spite of the unifying pull
of Islam; the whole system of parliamentary
democracy which created further divisions because
of the presence of too many political parties; the
lack of universal literacy; and, the hold of
traditional leaders like the big landlords and the
pirs (sufis) over the illiterate voters.30

Accordingly, .he abrogated the 1956 Constitution, dissolved the

National Assembly, outlawed political parties and imposed Martial Law.

His plan was to reject the British parliamentary system, for he felt the

country was culturally, economically or politically not ready or suited

for such a political structure, and build a system that would bring the

people, both urban and rural, into politics through indirect electoral

politics and thus avoid the need for political parties.

Ayub Khan in his article, "Pakistan Perspective", defined four

pre-requisites for the success of any democratic system in a country like

Pakistan: first, it should be simple to understand, easy to work and cheap

28. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 251.

29. K.B. Sayeed, "Developmental Strategy under Ayub Khan', Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. XIV,
1979, p. 8S.
30. Cited in Ibid., p. 76.
 63

to sustain; second, it should put to the voter only such questions as he

can answer in the light of his personal knowledge and understanding

without any external prompting; third, it should ensure the effective

participation of all citizens in the affairs of the country up to the

level of their mental horizon and intellectual calibre; and, fourth, it

should be able to produce reasonably strong and stable governments. 31

The programme of action which the regime implemented was the result of

a long thought-out 1954 plan by General Ayub entitled: "A Short

Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan".32 This Plan

was to become the blueprint of the future 1962 Constitution; it would be a

'guided' and gradual process for the establishment of representative

institutions. 33 Accordingly, in order to attain his goal of bringing

long-term stability to the country, Ayub Khan followed a three-pronged

approach: the purging of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the

establishment of the Basic Democracies, and the promulgation of a new

constitution.

If Ayub's October "Revolution" was to attain its objective of creating

a new political system better suited for Pakistan, and therefore maintain

legitimacy, the military regime would have to, with the effective but

controlled cooperation of the civilian bureaucracy, clamp down on the old

regime with legal devices that would suppress political activity at all

levels. The military elite was aware that it would need the cooperation

of the bureaucracy, and especially of the small and exclusive CSP, to

carry out its programme. However, while it had to take certain measures

31. Ayub Khan, 'Pakistan Perspectives·, Foreign Affairs, Yolo 38, No.4, 1960, p. 551.
32. For the full text of his 1954 Plan, see: Ayub khan, Friends not Hasters, (karachi, Oxford
University Press, 1967), pp. 186-191.
33. k. von Yorys, Political Development in Pakistan, (Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 150.
 64

that would subordinate the CSP to the role of a junior partner, it was

very cautious not to alienate the CSP, for it knew it needed its expertise

and skills to manage the country.

Accordingly, in early 1959, the government promulgated Martial Law

ordinances which made the civil service subject to scrutiny through the

establishment of review boards looking into the misconduct and

inefficiency of the bureaucracy.34 This was carried out for three

reasons: (a) to clearly establish the primacy of the militarYj (b) to

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil servicej35 and,

(c) to give symbolic satisfaction to the Pakistan public at large. Two

other .easures dismayed the civil servants, namely, the government's

tendency to ignore seniority and, second, the army's decision to fill the

ten percent quota of civil service appointments allowed it by law. It was

a prerogative never previously partakenj however, after 1958 the army

overfilled its quota. 36

Although the supreme powers of the CSP had been challenged, the

bureaucratic-military alliance remained. By 1966, the bureaucratic elite

had regained its political strength. It had successfully out-manoeuvred

the military, arguing that such reforms as advocated in the Report of the

Pay and Services Commission would result in "psychological upheaval" and

for many years to come the country and the administration would be busy

settling problems introduced by the attack on the "steel frame" of the

civilian administration. 37 Therefore, although it was ostensibly a

34. Punitive action was taken against 1662 officials for past corruption, inefficiency, lisconduct
and insubordination; however, out of these only 13 belonged to the esp. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 109.
35. In Karch 1959, the lilitary governlent reloved the constitutional guarantees of tenure for the
civil servants. The reaction to this love was so strong that by July 1959 the governlent was forced to
reinstate the civil servants' constitutional prerogative.
36. v~~ Yorys, op. cit., p. 114.
37. For an analysis of this report, see: Hussain, op. cit., pp. 74,135.
 65

military regime, the armed forces' refusal to become directly involved in

the administration of the country transformed the system into an

administrative state dominated by the military; decision-making had become

restricted to senior military officers and high civil servants. 38

After subduing the CSP, the military government could now begin to

suppress all opposition by introducing a certain number of legal devices

that would stifle any counter-action against the government. First,

although The Continuance in Force Order. 1958 was issued, declaring that

until a new constitution was promulgated Pakistan would be governed as

nearly as possible in accordance with the abrogated 1956 Constitution,

fundamental rights were suspended. Second, strikes and agitation in

educational institutions and public utility works and installations were

banned. Third, the Effective Bodies (Disqualification) Order.l959 (EBDO)

was issued by virtue of which former political leaders could be prosecuted

for "misconduct".39 Fourth, a strict control over newspapers, calling

for a "responsible press" which would follow a government-directed code of

ethics, was imposed. 40 Fifth, there was an abandonment of judicial

review which existed prior to 1958.

Having established his authority over the politicians and •subdued'

the civilian bureaucracy to his liking, Ayub could then proceed to

re-organize the political structure. The re-structuring of the political

system, which he knew would be the only means to legitimize the

military-bureaucratic regime, would be ordered and controlled; 'guided'

33. Heeger, op. cit., pp. 245-250.

39. Approxi.ately 7000 politicians were affected by this order. The prosecution could be avoided,
however, if the politician 'voluntarily' disqualified hi.self frol lelbership or candidacy for any
representative or elective body. E. Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats:Hilitary-Administrative Regimes and
Political Developlent, (Boston: Houghton Hifflin, 1973), p. 70.
40. W. Dobell, "Ayub Khan:A de Gaulle in Asia", Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol.I, 1971, p.7S.
 66

democracy would be the ideological foundation of the country. The only

•proper' government would be the establishment of Ayub's new system of

local self-government: the Basic Democracies. 41

The Basic Democracies, introduced on the eve of the first anniversary

of the ailitary take-over, were characterized by hierarchy and control.

Candidates were to be elected to a variety of governing bodies from the

local to the provincial level, and each of these lower levels were to be

represented in the higher tiers. 42 This indirect system of government

was seen to have three functions: first, the Basic Democracies would

legiti.ize Ayub Khan as president;43 second, the new system would be an

instrument around which continuous mass support could be organized, and by

the same token an alternative to political parties; and, third, it would

serve to align the regime with the rural masses from whom the army usually

obtained its greater support. The overal theory was that the Basic

Democracies would perform local government functions as well as focus the

consciousness of the rural population on developmental needs and

activities. 44

The objective of the military regime was to develop a cadre of new

leaders who would provide the basis for the new polical system. However,

due to the socia-economic and political conditions at play, a uniform

41. Arub Khan, 'Pakistan Perspectives·, p. 550.

42. There were five tiers in the Basic Democracy system: Union Councils, Thana Councils, District
Councils, Divisional Councils and Provincial Developlent Advisory Councils. The upper tier was eventually
abolished after the election of the provincial asselblies under the 1962 Constitution.
43. On 13 January 1960, the Presidential (Election and Constitution) Order,1960, was prolulgated.
It called for a referendul by the Basic Delocrats "to lake known their confidence in the president and to
authorize hi. to formulate a constitution". On 14 February 1960, the BDs were polled. Ballots were so
printed as tc perlit only a yes vote. In addition, each was nUlbered and registered against a specific
voter so that the governlent could identify those who spoiled their ballots. The results were: out of a
total of 7B,720 votes casts, 75,282 were affir.ative. von Yorys, op. cit., p. 202.
44. Feit, op. cit., p. 74; and for a perceptive analysis of the Basic Delocracies, see: K.B. Sayeed,
'Pakistan's Basic Democracy', The Hiddle East Journal, Vol. IS, No.3, SUIler 1961, pp. 249-263.
 67

pattern of leadership did not develop; for with the promulgation of the
Basic Deaocracies Order.l959, which de facto handed over control of these

local bodies to the civil servants, power mostly remained in the hands of

those who already had it, that is, the bureaucrats. Huntington praised
very highly the Basic Democracies scheme because "for the first time

political activity was dispersed outward from the cities and spread over

the countryside tl • 45 He may have been correct in stating that a new

class of local politicians throughout the country had evolved; but, their

powers were seriously restricted by the civil servants who chaired the

District Councils, and who had the power to quash the proceedings, suspend

the execution of any resolution passed or an order made by the local

council, and prohibit the implementation of any proposal. 46 In brief,

although the Basic Democracies did have some positive results in the

socio-economic field, in the political realm the experiment turned out to

be a failure. 47

Having achieved the first two stages of his political programme, Ayub

Khan could now proceed with the promulgation of a new constitution. The

1962 Constitution, which was more elaborate and precise than, but in

essence identical to, Ayub's 1954 Plan, was promulgated on 4 March

1962. 48 It established a strong centralized system in which the

executive powers of the president were considerably greater than in the

French Fifth Republic, the model for his own constitution, for Ayub did

not want to be tlsubservient to the whims and operations of pressure

45. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 252.

46. Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 135-140. The participation of the bureaucrats was significant because the
Basic De.ocrats forled the electoral college for the election of the President, the lembers of the
National Asselbly and the provincial assemblies.
47. von Vorys, op. cit., p. 206.
48. Hartial law was lifted on B June 1962 after the election of the deputies to the National Assemby
and provincial asselblies.
 68

groups".49 He defended the structure of the constitution as being "best

suited to the genius of the people and would be in consonance with the
teachings and history of Islam".50

The President, who combined both functions of Head of State and Head

of Government, was indirectly elected by the Basic Democrats, but was not

responsible to them. Furthermore, the federal ministers, the provincial

Governors and their cabinets were held responsible only to the President

and not to any of the elected assemblies, national or provincial. Thus,

the only important institution which had a certain degree of control over

the president was the judiciary.51 Moreover, the control the National

Assembly had over the State purse was particularly limited. It could only

discuss 'recurring' expenditure but could not vote on it; only 'new

expenditure' could be put to a vote. Similarly, the procedure for

amending the constitution was a difficult process, especially if it went

counter to the President's wishes. 52 Finally, the President could

declare a State of Emergency (Art.30), if he felt an emergency existed in

which the country was threatened from within or without. 53

General Ayub allowed no constitutional changes which could facilitate

the restoration of civilian control over the armed forces. According to

Article 238, for a period of 20 years, the President was required to name

as Minister of Defence a person who had held a "prescribed rank" (not

lower than that of a lieutenant-General in the Army or its equivalent in

49. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 185.

SO. Ayu~ Khan, Friends not Hasters, p. 204. The Islamic aspects of the 1962 Constitution will be
dealt with in Part III of the thesis.
51. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 253.
52. Two ilportant alendlents were nevertheless ratified: In December 1963, civil rights were lade
enforceable in the courts; and, in January 1964, the word "Islamic· was re-instated into the official name
of the countr" hence, The Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
53. General Ayub Khan declared such a State of Emergency during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.
 69

another arm of the Defence Services of Pakistan, unless the President had

himself held such a rank in these services. In order to maintain their

support, Ayub Khan did permit the Commander-in-Chief of each service to

exercise a degree of autonomy in the internal administration of his

forces; however, his power over them, as Supreme Commander of the Armed

Forces, was nevertheless omnipresent. The next two Commanders-in-Chief of

the army who succeeded him were "his' men; General Musa Khan (1958-1966)

and General Yahya Khan (1966-1971) were both Pathans whose tribes had no
strong following. He assumed, wrongfully, that they could have

difficulties attempting to build up support to overthrow him.

Ayub also assured the military's support by promising the officers

salary increases and respectable status after retirement. Retired

military officers emerged as a class occupying the top posts of public and

private enterprises, government and semi-government companies, and

autonomous bodies and boards. Regarding these pecuniary conditions, Ayub

stated: " ••. these easements will go a long way in making this Army more

efficient, happier and loyal to the Government".54 Under Ayub, however,

defence expenditure, as a percentage of total government spending,

actually declined. 55

Although Ayub Khan had been able to proceed as planned with regard to

the presidential system of government and his Basic Democracies, he

increasingly came under heavy pressure to legalize political parties. His

position was clear: political parties had been the cause for the breakdown

of democracy and he would not tolerate the chaos that they engendered to

re-occur. His associates, nevertheless, persuaded him to accept parties

54. von Vorys, op. cit., p. 268.

55. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 162. This issue will be discussed in Part VI of the thesis.
 70

as a necessary institution in a modern polity. They argued "political

parties would provide an organizational framework for mass mobilization on

behalf of the government, as well as fragment the leadership of the

opposition".56 Ayub Khan eventually gave in, and on 16 July 1962,

legalized political parties. 57

As to quasi-civilianize his regime and give it a greater semblance of

legitimacy, Ayub Khan decided to head the Convention Muslim League, which

eventually became the most powerful party in the country due to its

efficient organization. 58 In order to completely legitimize both his

position and the new political structures of the country, Ayub Khan

decided he would run for president when his first term came to an end in

1965. Accordingly, in 1964, a joint front, the Combined Opposition Party

(COP),59 was formed designating Miss Jinnah, sister of the late founder

of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, as their candidate in the presidential

election. COP's 9 point programme promised, if elected: the restoration

of a parliamentary system of government with direct elections and

universal franchise, and a promise to •democratize' the 1962

Constitution. With the Basic Democrats understandably wanting to maintain

their jobs, they decided to support Ayub Khan rather than vote for Miss

Jinnah and see the system of Basic Democracies terminated. In the

bureaucratic-controlled 1965 elections Ayub Khan obtained 63.13% of the

votes against his opponent's 36.63%. As for Ayub's party, it won an

overwhelming majority of 124 seats out of 156 in parliament. 6o

56. von Vorys, op. cit., pp. 255-256.

57. There were two liaitations, however. Heabership to these political parties were restricted up
to 5 years for EBDOed politicians and civil servants; and, if Ayub felt a party tried to 'subvert' his
power or that of the governaent's, he could invoke special powers, i.e., the Safety Act and the Defence of
Pakistan Rules.
58. Finer, op. cit., pp. 245-252.
59. COP was coaposed of : the Council Huslia League, the Awami League, the National Awali Party,
Nizal-i-Islal and the Jaaa'at-i-Isiali.
60. Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 154-155.
 71

Although the Convention Muslim League gave Ayub Khan a facade of

legitimacy and links with the Basic Democracies, this did not hide the

fact that there was an increasing number of sectional groups dissatisfied

with Ayub's system of government.

Three opposition groupings were most vocal in their criticism of

Ayub. First, religious leaders61 became increasingly critical of the

regime's 'un-Islamic' ways as well as for the corruption, nepotism and

bribery62 that, allegedly, characterized Ayub's rule. Second, Bhutto,

who had been dismissed as Foreign Minister, was able to rally behind him

students, rural and urban poor, and all sections of society disaffected

with Ayub's rule and the inequities of the system he represented. The

ubiquitous corruption in all sections of the civilian bureaucracy was hard

to tolerate in view of the fact that Ayub Khan had intervened with the aim

of eliminating this problem. Corruption simply reinforced the image of

the elite exploiting the majority.63 The liberal economic policies that

President Ayub Khan adopted had a dual effect on the economy. On the one

hand, Pakistan witnessed quite spectacular economic growth64 but, on the

other hand, income distribution worsened both at the inter- and intra-

regional and class levels. The benefits of this economic achievement had

simply not "trickled-down" to the lowest segments of society as Ayub had

promised it would. 64 Moreover, not only was West Pakistan favoured over

61. The role of this section of society will be discussed in Part III of the thesis.
62. One of the lain targets of criticisl was Ayub Khan's son, Gohar Ayub. For detailed inforlation
about his acquired wealth, see: Herbert Feldlan, From Crisis to Crisis:Pakistan, 1962-1969, (London,
Oxford University Press, 1972), Appendix B.
63. Dr. Hahbub-ul-Haq identified 22 families that owned 66% of Pakistan's industrial assets, 79% of
the Insurance Business and BO% of the banks. The Tiles, 27 Harch 1973, (special section, p. vii.)
64. GNP growth rate increased frol 2.19% in 1950/51 - 1957/5B to 5.7% in 1959/60 - 1966/67. Per
capita incole growth rate auglented frol no growth in 1950/51 - 1957/58 to 20.1% in 1957/5R - 1966/67.
Industrial production registered a 61.4% increase during the Second 5-Year Plan (1960-1965) over the
previous Plan. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 127. Finally, agricultural output increlented from 2.6% in the 1950s
to 6.2% in the 1960s, which is lore than the annual 3% population increase during that decade. Pakistan,
Etonolic Survey. 1966-1967, Hinistry of Finance, Governlent of Pakistan, 1968.
 72

the eastern wing for capital investment because of the more developed

economic infrastructure, but the industrial belt was shifted from its

original centre, Karachi, to other areas in the Punjab. 55 Thus, through

the implementation of the government's industrial strategy, Punjabi

preponderance was reinforced to an even greater extent. Consequently, the

government's unfulfilled promises to East Pakistan, and its ever

increasing use of coercion to repress East Bengali demands for a more

equitable share of resources and responsibilities in the administration of

the country, alienated Pakistan's East Wing. Accordingly, East Pakistan,

the third source of opposition against Ayub's regime, also became a major

factor in his downfall.

Ayub Khan's "decade of development" was no more than the "facade of a

modernizing autocracy".57 He attempted to use Islam as a unifying force

by injecting 'window dressing' articles into the 1962 Constitution but

failed to prove that Islam was as much a centralizing force as he tried to

demonstrate it was. Furthermore, his regime was plagued with corruption,

higher illiteracy rate than when he took over power, rampant inflation,

continuing income mal distribution and a skewed land distribution system

despite his 1959 land reform. 68

Confronted with ever increasing opposition, President Ayub decided not

to seek re-election at the end of his term. This decision caused the

Basic Democrats to drop their support for their leader. Although they

65. Sayeed, "Develop.ental Strategy under Ayub khan", p. 79; and, G. Papanek, Pakistan's
Development:Social Goal and Private Incentives, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 242.
66. Sayeed, ibid., p. 80.
67. e_ LaPorte, Power and Privilege:Influence and Decision-Haking in Pakistan, (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1975), p_ 55.
6B_ Fer a discussion of the 1959 land Reform, see: N. Sanderatne, "Land-Owners and land Reform in
Pakistan", South Asian Review, Vol. VII, Mo. 2, 1977, p. 124; and, S.H. Haseem, "Rural Poverty and
Landlessness in Pakistan", in Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia, (Geneva, ILO, 1977), p_ 41.
 73

realized that whatever legitimacy they may have had would vanish with Ayub

Khan's departure, they were not about to support a lost cause, even if

this meant the end of a system founded by Ayub. Included in the Basic

Democrats were not only the politicians, but, even more important, the
bureaucrats, and the latter's backing had been one of the two main pillars

of his rule.

But Ayub Khan's loss of support from the military, the other

cornerstone of his administration, was the determining cause for his

downfall. There are several reasons why the armed forces decided to

withdraw their support from their leader. First, the land reform he

initiated, although not very radical in nature in view of the fact that

many of the officers were members of the wealthy landowning families,

alienated the landowning elites and, through their structural linkages

with the military elite, also displeased the upper echelons of the armed

forces. Second, Ayub Khan's restrictions on defence expenditure

restrictions were resented by the armed forces. 69 • Third, the president

also lost the support of the military by attempting to legitimize his

political role by both establishing his own support base through the Basic
Democracies, and by becoming leader of the Convention Muslim League.

Thus, by de-linking with the military, his original constituency, it made

the armed forces feel as if they were no longer needed in the

administration of the country. Senior military officers, hoping to

replace him peacefully and constitutionally, began to openly criticize him

and his regime. 70 Fourth, by going to war with India in 1965, he not

69. Total government expenditure four years prior to 1959-1960 was $1,823 lillion of which $1,020
lillion was for defence, i.e., 56% of the total. In 1959/60 - 1964/65, total expenditure was $2,645
lillion of which $1,384 lillion or about 52.7% was for defence. Total governmental expenditure during
1959-1965 increased by 48.2% but defence only increased by 21%. LaPorte, op. cit., p. 69.
70. For example, Air Harshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan, Lt-Gen. (Retd.) AlaI Khan, Haj-Gen. Jilani,
Haj-Gen. Akbar khan and Major-Gen. Sarfraz.
 74

only alienated the population by not winning, but the military turned

against him for accepting the 1966 Tashkent Agreement. The armed forces

felt they had 'won' the war and never should have accepted the terms of

the settlement.

Consequently, Ayub Khan, faced with a growing civilian opposition,

including an increasing number of riots and incidents of public

unrest,71 and a loss of support from the civilian bureaucracy and the

military, decided on 25 March 1969 to transfer the reins of power to his

Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. 72

By stepping down he was ending a dream that had become a nightmare.

He was methodical and orderly. Consequently, he never understood why

society could not be administered along military lines. However, had he

been bent on personal power at all cost he probably could have held on,

transforaing a paternal autocracy into a military dictatorship.73

Referring to his vision of bringing political stability to Pakistan, he

stated the day he resigned: "It grieves me to see that a great desire of

my life could not be realized". 74

THE YABYA KHAN PERIOD: 1969-1971

General Yahya Khan and the armed forces, by taking over control of the

country, initiated a "guardian" type coup with the aim of halting the

71. For an account of the turbulent days leading to Ayub's ouster, see: Feldlan, op. cit., pp. 241ff
72. For an interesting chronological discussion of Ayub's last days in office by a close associate
of the President, see: A. Gauhar, ·Pakistan:Ayub Khan's Abdication", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7,
No. I, Jan. 1985, pp.117ff.
73. W.H. Dobell, "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 42, No.3, 1969, p. 30B
74. Pakistan News Digest, 1 April 1969, p. 1.
 75

rapid .abilization of social forces into politics and defusing the

explosive political situation. 75 . Consequently, in order to "protect

the country from utter destruction", Yahya Khan re-imposed Martial Law on

25 March 1969; abrogated the 1962 Constitution,76 barred all political

activities, dissolved all provincial and national assemblies, dismissed

national and provincial cabinets, and assumed the supreme command of the

armed forces and the presidency of Pakistan.

Yahya Khan's objectives were similar to Ayub's on 28 October 1958. A

new constitution would be framed by the people, and the protection of

life, liberty and property would be guaranteed by law. Moreover, "a clean

and honest administration was a pre-requisite for sane and constructive

political life and for a smooth transfer of power to representatives of

the people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult

franchise ... ".77 Accordingly, Yahya Khan issued the Legal Framework

Order.l970 which set five principles which had to be embodied in the

future constitution. First, Pakistan must be based on Islamic ideology;

second, it must be democratic, with periodical elections on the basis of

universal adult franchise;78 third, Pakistan's territorial integrity

must be upheld in the constitution; fourth, the disparities between the

two wings, especially economic, must be eliminated by statutory

provisions; and, fifth, the distribution of power must ensure the maximum

autonomy for the provinces. Directly related to the last criterion was

75. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 216.

76. Although Yahya Khan issued the Provisional Constitutional Order, which stipulated that Pakistan
would be governed as nearly as possible by the 1962 Constitution until a new constitution could be
ilPlemented, all fundamental rights were suspended, and the President could make 'such provisions,
including constitutional provisions, as he may deel fit, for the administration of the affairs of the
state". Rizvi, op. cit., p. 218.
77. Cited in Rizvi, op. cit., p. 212.
78. Full political activity, qualified by certain restrictions, would be perlitted after 1 January
1970, and general elections would be held after 5 October 1970. These elections were deferred to 7
Decelber 1970 due to severe floods in East Pakistan.
 76

Yahya's far-reaching decision to dismantle the unpopular One-Unit Plan.

In an attempt to satisfy demands for a more equitable income

distribution and East Pakistan's desire for greater economic and political

autonomy, the Yahya Khan government implemented several reforms in three

major areas: the civil administration, the economic sphere, and the

political realm. In January 1970 Yahya Khan charged 303 CSP senior

officials on charges of corruption, misuse of office, and misconduct. All

were suspended pending investigation. 79 The military government

established a Services Reorganization Committee (SRC), aimed at reforming

the CSP. The latter's reaction was immediate; it felt that "the solution

to the problems of responsiveness, accountability and responsibility layed

not in the weakening of the bureaucratic system but in the intensification

and strengthening of the representative institutions".8o Their

corporate interests demanded that the "steel frame" of Pakistan not be

touched; their talent was essential to the development and survival of the

state. This reform was never implemented, for the government was too

preoccupied with reorganizing the political structure into a viable

system.

The second area in which Yahya Khan attempted to impose change was the

economic sphere. There were very deep grievances against 30 families

which were alleged to control about 50% of Pakistan's GNP. Accordingly,

Yahya issued the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and

Prevention) Ordinance. 1970 which was meant to protect the country from

undue concentration of economic power and other inequitable trade

policies. Though it did not go far enough for the critics, it was

nevertheless a sign that the government was at least partially interested

79. Though there was strong pressure put on Yahya to have Ayub Khan and his son, Gauhar Ayub, tried
for corruption, Yahya decided to drop the cases against the •.
 77

in redistributive justice. 81 Within the economic realm, the government

also announced a new labour policy which was aimed at attaining higher
productivity and more equitable distribution of wealth. 82 This was

coupled with a series of anti-privilege business class acts, including

anti-trust legislation and fair trade practices codes. The government's

desire for greater equitable distribution of economic development was also

reflected in its fourth Five-year Plan (1970-1975). However promising

this Five-year Plan may have appeared it unfortunately encountered

troubles from the very beginning. Due to the rise in non-developmental

expenditures the capital funds necessary for the first Annual Development

Plan were not available and, consequently, per capita income actually

declined.

Finally, the political system, the third sphere target ted for the
government's reforms, was to be modified as outlined in the Legal

Framework Orders.1970 (LFO). This presidential decree, although it

appeared to have had all the elements for overall national reconciliation,

did not .eet the approval of the political leaders. The main point of

contention was the president's powers to "authenticate" the constitution.

They felt this 'veto' power gave too much power to the armed forces.

Related to this issue was their objection to the 120 days limit allowed

for drafting the new constitution. Finally, the president's ultimate

authority to interpret the LFO, which not even the military courts could

challenge, did not please the political leaders.

80. Hel~randum SUbmitted to the SRC by the CSP Association, 1970, p.2.
81. L. iiring, "Hilitarism in Pakistan:The Yahya Khan Interregnul", in H. Wriggins (ed.), Pakistan
ill. Transition. (Islalabad: University of Islalabad, 1975), p. 208.
82. This new labour policy included, inter alia: the right of collective bargaining, right to strike
and lock out after failure of bilateral negotiations, the nUlber of essential and public utility services
~here strikes could be prohibited was reduced, and the linilul wage for the unskilled workers was
lncreased.
 78

The issues debated in Pakistan prior to the elections varied widely in

each wing; however, a definite 'ideo-political' thrust could be identified

in each of these two parts of the country. In East Pakistan the subject

of autonomy was the rallying point of the population. West Pakistan's

long history of generally callous and unsympathetic attitudes toward the

needs of East Pakistan was the backdrop for the Awami League's 6 Point

political campaign platform,83 a programme the military government in

Islamabad felf was tantamount to political secession. East Bengalis did

not so .uch desire civilian democracy as they wanted fundamental changes

to the system. They felt that only if deep-seated reforms were made to

the existing system could the political and socio-economic inequities,

perpetrated by the Punjabi-dominated federal government since

independence, be halted and equitable distribution of political and

economic resources be implemented.

West Pakistan's main political party, the Pakistan People's Party

(PPP), led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, used Islam as the thrust for its

campaign. Bhutto's Islamic Socialism had three inter-acting directions:

"Islam is our Faith"; "Democracy is our Polity"; and, "Socialism is our

Economy". The PPP's Islamic Socialism made deep inroads in West Pakistan,

especially in the urban areas, for it attacked the leaders for using Islam

as a justification for the existing inegalitarian socio-economic system of

the country. Bhutto's new type of Islamic ideology appealed to the

population as a valid alternative to the 'old order' which had created a

credibility gap in the eyes of the majority.84 Coupled with his

domestic programme was his promise to have Pakistan wage a IOOO-year war

against India, if the survival of Islam on the sub-continent required it.

83. The rise of the Awami League and its 6 Point programme will be discussed in Part IV.
04. K.B. Sayeed, ·political Leadership and Institution-Building under Jinnah, Ayub and Bhutto", in
Lawrence 2irin~ et al. (eds.), Pakistan:The Long View, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), pp.260-70.
 79

As the results of the election were to demonstrate, the Muslim League and

the traditional religious parties were divided amongst themselves, and,

consequently, Bhutto's slogan, "Islam in Danger", swept away the votes

from the established religious parties. 8s

The results of the elections are most indicative of the profound

changes the electorate wished to see effected. The Awami League obtained

53% of the votes, or 160 seats out of 300, in the National Assembly,

sweeping 99% of the seats reserved for East Pakistan; the PPP only won 81

seats, or 27% of the total number of National Assembly seats, as a result

of winning 59% of the seats allocated to West Pakistan. a6 The election

returns clearly re-inforced the profound socio-political dichotomy which

had been present in Pakistan since its inception. The Awami League's

landslide victory in East Pakistan and the clear-cut majority it obtained

in the National Assembly gave it the right to demand to form the next

civilian government. But the fact that each of the main parties

exclusively won seats in their respective wings further radicalized the

East Wing-West Wing polarization process.

During the three months following the elections, Yahya Khan, Bhutto

and Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, began a series of

negotiations with the aim of reaching a modus vivendi which would suit the

three major actors involved in the political debate. 87 However, the

major stumbling block in these discussions was the inability of the PPP

and the Awami League to reach an agreement regarding the modality for

framing a new constitution. Moreover, Bhutto's unyielding position in his

demand for power-sharing at the centre had the effect of radicalizing

85. The results and consequences of the 1970 elections will be discussed in Part IV of the thesis.
86. G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (London, C. Hurst, 1974), p. 129.
87. These post-election negotiations will be discussed in detail in Part IV of the thesis.
 80

public opinion in East Pakistan, forcing Mujib to increase his demands for
greater regional autonomy.88 By early March 1971, the military

government's position as 'arbitrator' was becoming untenable, especially

since the Awami League's non-cooperation movement was becoming

increasingly violent.

Therefore, by the end of March, as a result of Yahya Khan's failure to

abide by the election results, coupled with Bhutto's intransigence, the

government had created a situation in which a political solution to the

crisis was no longer possible. Consequently, on 25 March 1971 the

Pakistan Army intervened in East Pakistan in an attempt to re-establish

government writ in the province. Following this military crack-down, the

Awami League unilaterally declared the independence of East Pakistan, and

de facto took over the reins of power in the province. A long and
ruthless civil war, eventually involving India, began.

After the total debacle of the West Pakistan Army in its war against

India, the military government of Yahya Khan resigned itself to the

inevitable: the loss of its East Wing as well as the transfer of power to

the civilians. General Yahya and his military associates were ridiculed

and insulted publicly as being womanizers and alcoholics. Their inability

and ineffectiveness both as a government and a military institution was

proof they were inept to govern, and a sufficient reason for the

population to withhold from them the right to govern; they had lost

whatever legitimacy they had remaining. 89 Consequently, they had no

other choice but to transfer power, on 21 December 1971, to Z.A. Bhutto,

the candidate who had obtained a majority of votes in West Pakistan.

BB. R. Jahan, Pakistan:Failure in National Integration, (Dacca, University Press, 1977), pp. 194ff.
89. In 1972 the Suprele Court of Pakistan ruled that Yahya's coup was not a revolution, like Ayub's
take-over, but an usurpation of power, and was, therefore, illegal and illegitilate. As reported in the
All-Pakistan Legal Decision, Novelber 1977, (Supplelent), (lahore, PlD Publishers), p. 750.
 81

TBB BIIUftO PERIOD: 1971-1977

zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a complex individual whose political behaviour

was continuously under the strain of two opposing forces. On the one

hand, he was a member of the Sindhi landed aristocracy.9o Being part of

that rural upper class his childhood socialization moulded him into the

basic behavioural norms of the Waderas (large Sindhi landlords) which

emphasizes that respect from other landlords and peasants can only be

attained by acts of ruthlessness, power and revenge. The influence of

this social class on his attitude toward the conduct of power was to be

quite noticeable during his years as president and later prime

minister.91 On the other hand, he was the product of Western education,

having obtained his degrees in the United States and in Britain. He

applied his liberal democratic learnings when accusing Ayub Khan's

political system of being dictatorial and corrupt. Ironically, it was a

regime with which he had had a long association92 but which by 1966,

after the controversial Indo-Pakistani Tashkent Agreement, had outlived

its usefulness as a means for his political rise; he realized it was

quickly becoming a liability to be identified with a • sinking' ship.

Accordingly, he spearheaded the West Pakistan opposition movement against

Ayub Khan.

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which Bhutto launched in November

1967, was similar to the All-India Muslim League not only by its heavy

reliance on one individual to lead it, but also by its acceptance as party

90. Z.A. Bhutto was the son of Sir Shanawaz Bhutto, a wealthy Sindhi landlord who had been active in
politics. Bhutto inherited the powerful political e.pire that his father had built in central Sind.
91. For interesting psychoanalytical explanations for Bhutto's authoritarianisl, see: S.J. Burki
~istan Under Bhutto. 1971-1977, (London: The Hacaillan Press, 1980), pp. 81-91.
92. Bhutta was Hinister of Co •• erce (1958), Hinister of Natural Resources (1961) and Hinister of
Foreign Affairs (1963). He was also Secretary-General of Ayub's Convention Huslia League.
 82

member of anyone who was opposed to the ruling elite. This not only

created a deeply fractionalized party but it also hampered it from

developing into a cohesive political party; thus, it never evolved into

more than a political movement. In the late 1960s the PPP had attracted
the urban poor of Sind and the Punjab, the faction of the large landed

aristocracy that was not aligned with Ayub's Convention Muslim League, and

the whole spectrum of leftist politicians and intellectuals. 93

Bhutto mesmerized his audience, especially the urban poor, with such

popular slogans as "roti, kapra and makan" (bread, clothes and shelter)

which he promised to deliver if elected. He was also able to attract the

people with his promise that the ppp's "Islamic Socialism" would bring

about a classless society where egalitarianism would prevail and

exploitation would be banned. This type of rhetoric was bound to fallon

fertile ground, for after over a decade of military rule and Ayub's

failure to significantly improve the standard of living of the vast

majority, the traditional parties associated with Ayub had lost

credibility. Bhutto promised them nirvana, and the people naively

believed him. 94

The first target in Bhutto's socia-political reform programme was the

skewed system of land tenure prevalent in Pakistan. The ppp's land reform

involved reducing ceilings of irrigated lands down to 150 acres in the

first stage (1972) and to 100 acres in the second stage (1977).95

However, in order to avoid the wrath of the large landowners, a

93. For an interesting discussion of the four factions of the left which constituted the PPP in the
early years of its existence, see: Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, pp. SO-51, and "Econolic Decision-Making
in Pakistan·, l. Ziring et a1. (eds.), op. cit., pp. HOff.
94. For an analysis of the PPP's Foundation doculents and Election Manifesto, see: Anwar H. Syed,
·The Pakistan People's Party: Phase One and TWO·, in ibid., pp. 70-116.
. 95. The land Reforms Act. 1977, was prolulgated on 9 January 1977; however, it was never
lip lelen ted.
 83

significant pillar of support for the PPP, Bhutto had important loopholes

included as a means for these landlords to avoid being negatively affected

by his .easures. 96 The ultimate result of Bhutto's land reform left

much to be desired, since the area actually resumed in 1972 was much

smaller than the land redistributed under the 1959 land reform. 97

Furtheraore, no more than one percent of the landless and small owners

benefitted from Bhutto's reform, and only approximately 10% of all owners

with holdings over 150 acres, were affected by the land reform. 98 In

the final analysis, the 1972 land reform did not affect the power base of

the large landowners in Sind and the Punjab; it had simply re-inforced the

results of the 1959 land reform. 99

Bhutto's other major target of socio-economic reform was the

industrial and commercial class. In his drive to break the power the "22

families" had on the economic and industrial development of the country,

the PPP in January 1972 decided to nationalize ten heavy,

capital-intensive industries and place them under state control.100

This was subsequently followed by the nationalization of the life

insurance business, banks, shipping and vegetable ghee industry. The net

result of this massive take-over of a whole range of industries was a

96. SOle of the escape clauses involved: calculating the allowable acreage in terls of falily
holdings, and taking into account allowances granted for tractors, tubewells and other land ilprovements.
Thus, the ceiling of 150 acres could easily be ignored. In certain areas of the country the average
landholding per falily was far above the fixed limit. Included in the falilies that were able to exploit
these loopholes was Bhutto's falily which was able.to retain ownership of 2,200 acres of agricultural
land. k.B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan:The Nature and Direction of Change, (New York: Praeger, 1980),
PP. 91-92.
97. Hahlood Hasan Khan, Underdeveloplent and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan, (Lahore: Vanguard,
1981), p. 181.
98. Ibid., pp. 187-190.
99. For further reading on other aspects of the 1972 Land Reforl, see: Ronald Herring and H. Shaffar
Chaudhry, arne 1972 Land Reforls in Pakistan and their Econolic Ilplications', Pakistan Developlent
Review, Vol. XIII, No.3, Autumn 1974, pp. 245-280.
100. These ten industries consisted of: iron and steel, basic letals, heavy engineering, heavy
electrical, lotor vehicles, tractor plants, heavy and basic chemicals, cement and electricity, and gas and
oil refineries. Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Pakistan in 1972:Picking Up the Pieces", Asian Survey, Vol. XIII,
NO.2, February 1973, pp. 187-198.
general feeling of financial insecurity leading to an absolute decline in

private industrial development. IOI This policy of establishing state

capitalism in Pakistan, which was neither full socialism nor efficient

capitalism, was not only disastrous for the economy in general but it also

failed to deliver the • goods' Bhutto had promised to the urban poor. I02

Bhutto did however legislate a number of social reforms which were

meant to improve the general conditions of the poorer section of the

population. He introduced new labour laws,I03 a new health policylo4

and ambitious educational reforms. lOS These apparently liberal

government policies, which increased the lower classes' expectations,

incited the trade unions into demanding better working conditions and

higher wages. Instead of being receptive, as would be expected from a

government ostensibly committed to the general improvement of the working

class, the PPP quickly crushed the rising militancy of the unions. I06

Bhutto was not going to tolerate any threat to his monopoly of state

power; the working class would be given its share of economic benefits on

his terms only. It was this 'carrot and stick' approach to the urban

lower classes that was to erode Bhutto's original appeal to this vitally

important section of society.

101. Not only was industrial growth fro. 1971/72 to 1976/77 limited to 2% comparee to a% during the
1960s, but capital also fled the country to the Middle-East and Africa. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto,
pp. 112-119.
102. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, pp. 97-99.
103. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 269.
104. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, pp. 130-131.
lOS. Ibid., pp. 125-126.
106. For a detailed account of these workers' uprising and Bhutto's reaction to thea, see: Aijaz
A~.ed, "Democracy and Dictatorship·, in H. Gardezi and J. Rashid (eds.), Pakistan:The Roots of
Rlctatorship, (London, led Press, 1983), pp. 103-104.
 The .anner in which Bhutto handled union militancy was characteristic

of the type of order the prime minister wished to impose on Pakistan.

Heeger theorized that Bhutto's rule was a standard patrimonial system of

government in which personal power is the means and end of the Head of
Governmentj all power eminates from, and is controlled by, the

ruler. I07 In his drive to bring under his control the civilian

bureaucracy and the armed forces, the two institutions which had de facto

been managing the country for the last twenty-five years, Bhutto decided

to reform and purge these two organizations and re-mould them according to

his needs.

In July 1972, Khurshid Hasan Meer, a Cabinet Minister and an important

member of the PPP, stated that the new administrative system would have to

be reformed in such a way as to reflect the ideology of the governmentj

ft • • • it would be developed as an integral part of the political

structure ft • 108 Accordingly, the government took immediate steps to

implement this policy. Although the civilian bureaucracy as a whole was

going to be reformed, the most important target was the elite CSP.109

Since the CSP had always enjoyed a privileged position in the

administration of the country, whether under civilian or military rule,

Bhutto felt he had to once and for all harness the CSP under his control

if he wished to introduce his new political order. IID

Bhutto took several co-ordinated steps to insure that his bureaucratic

reform would be effective. First, he abolished the CSP, as well as the

107. ~eger, 'Politics in the Post-Military State", pp. 254ff.

lOB. l. Ziring and R. laPorte, Jr., "The Pakistan 8ureaucracy:Two Views', Asian Survey, Yolo 14,
No. 12, Decetber 1974, p. l086.
109. In 1968, there were lore than one lillion persons in the bureaucracy, but only 522 of the. were
of the CSP. Ibid., p. 1089.
110. Ibid., p. 1094.
 86

powerful Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), and merged them into the
All-Pakistan Unified Grade. This new 22-grade single structure was meant

to herald a new era of equality of opportunity where one's position in the

bureaucratic hierarchy would be based on performance, skill and

competitive examinations rather than on traditional ascriptive criteria.

Second, he terminated the "constitutional guarantees" of tenure for civil

servants. This effectively ended their corporate independence vis-a-vis

the government. Third, he followed a dual track of dismissing civil

servants who were not sympathetic to his governmental policies 111 and

filling the vacancies with political appointees. 112

The result of these reforms, which the bureaucracy naturally opposed

on the basis that they would damage the tsteel frame' that had kept the

country together, was disappointing for the Bhutto government. As a

reaction to this fundanental restructuring of the bureaucracy, the civil

servants were in no mood to co-operate with Bhutto. On the contrary, they

tended to oppose or block the implementation of the government's reformist

policies. Furthermore, not only had the appointment of political men

displeased the told esp guard' but because of their lack of expertise and

knowledge, the level of bureaucratic effectiveness had commensurably

declined. Finally, by dismantling the esp, Bhutto may have altered the

formal structure of this elite cadre but their power, although somewhat

diminished, was still to be reckoned with. As the political appointees

realized only too quickly, the former esp members still wielded

substantial decision-making power over Bhutto's tmen ,. This fact was not

lost in their minds, for when Bhutto's fortunes began to falter their

allegiance to their political mentor vanished just as quickly.

Ill. For a detailed account of the CSP lelbers he dislissed, see: Burki, Pakistan Under ehutto,
P. 100; and, Aijaz Ahled, OP. cit., p. 102.
112. Halza Alavi, 'Class and State·, in H. Gardezi and J. Rashid (eds.), op. cit., p. 76.
 87

The ailitary, the second state pillar, was the other important target

in Bhutto's drive to reform the national institutions. His first

objective was to 'neutralize' the military's monopoly over the means of

violence enabling it to intervene in domestic law and order situations.

Bhutto felt that one of the factors that had facilitated the armed forces'

proclivity to intervene was the previous governments' heavy reliance on

the Army where the police had been unable to control large-scale unrest.

Accordingly, the PPP government set-up a para-military force, the Federal

Security Force (FSF) , which was under the direct control of Bhutto, to

fill the military's 'traditional' role in the domestic realm. 113

Theoretically, the government's FSF concept appeared to be a constructive

move in the process of reducing the military's involvement in internal

security. In reality, however, the role it came to fill was quite

different: "it was used ruthlessly to bully and intimidate the

opposition".114 Anyone who opposed Bhutto, regardless of whether they

were from the opposition or the PPP, were either kidnapped, tortured or
murdered by the FSF.115 In February 1976, in an attempt to change the

notorious image the FSF was quickly developing, Bhutto extended its scope

of activity by associating it with 'nation-building' and development

programmes, i.e., construction of houses in urban areas, integrated rural

development programmes, flood control and adult education. Bhutto's

objective in assigning the FSF with these activities was to demonstrate

that the armed forces were no longer Pakistan's unique 'nation-builders'.

113. The strength of the FSF in 1974 was 13,875. Bhutto also established the Federal Investigation
Agency to reduce the governlent's dependence on the armed forces for internal intelligence latters. Rizvi,
QP. cit., pp. 264-265.
114. H. Asghar ~han, Generals in Politics:Pakistan, 1958-1982, (Delhi, Vikas, 1983), p. 74.
" . 115. For an exalination of the lost outstanding cases, see: Ibid., p. 69; and, S. Baid,
Paklstan:Crisis is Inherent", Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, Vol. XV, NO.1.
JulY-Sept. 1982, p.l07.
 88

Secondly, he retired, purged or appointed as ambassadors all military

officers who appeared to be opposed to his regime, or who had been closely

identified with Yahya Khan's government. llS Conversely, he promoted

officers to the top posts not so much on the basis of merit and seniority,

but rather on their degree of loyalty toward him. 117

Furthermore, with the objective of establishing civilian supremacy

over the armed forces, Bhutto also re-organized the military high command

structure. All three service chiefs were put under the command of the

Joint Chiefs-of-Staff Committee with the Prime Minister as Commander-in

Chief. Bhutto also hoped to have greater control over the armed forces by

reducing the term of tenure of each of the service chiefs from four to

three years. llS He saw two advantages in this move: first no commander

would be able to consolidate his hold over Chis' troops; and, second,

lengthy tenure blocks the promotion of junior officers and encourages

intrigues at the top.

116. The total nUlber of senior .ilitary officers, i.e., brigadiers to generals, who were relieved
frol their duties was as follows: Army, 29; Navy, 7; Air Force 7. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 262. Included in
these purges were It-Gen. Gul Hassan and Air Harshal Rahim Khan, who had been appointed COllander-in-Chief
of the Army and the Air Force as a reward for having been instrumental in having General Yahya Khan hand
over power to Bhutto. As (King-Iakers', however, they were always considered a threat to Bhutto's
position. Consequently, on 3 Harch 1972, less than threee lonths after their appointlent, they vere
relieved frot their duties because of allegations of "Bonapartist" tendencies and sent abroad as
albassadors. Baid, Ibid., pp. 100-101.
117. On 3 Harch 1972, General Tikka Khan, also known as the 'Butcher of Bengal' for his ruthlessness
against the Bengalis in the 1971 War, vas the first Chief of ArlY Staff (COAS) to be appointed after
Bhutto's re-organization of the military high cOlland. After his retirelent from active duty, on 1 Harch
1976, he becale Special Assistant on National Security to Prile Hinister Bhutto (1 Harch 1976 - 27 April
1977) and later Hinister for Defence and National Security (27 April 1977 - 5 July 1977). On 1 March
1976, Bhutto promoted· to COAS the then junior It-Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, who, in 1973, had tried 35 young
officers involved in the "Bardaker Conspiracy Case" in an attelPt to overthrow the governlent, for his
seelingly strong loyalty to the governlent. Chief of Air Staff, Air Harshal Zafar Choudhury, was
~islissed in April 1974 for disagreeing with Bhutto's decision to reinstate the Air Force officers
Involved in the 1973 coup attempt.
lIB. This rule, however, did not apply to Gen. Tikka Khan, COAS (Harch 1972 - Harch 1976) and Air
Chief Harshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Chief of Air Staff (April 1974 - April 1978).
 89

Finally, he hoped to institutionalize the principle of civilian

supremacy by embodying into the 1973 Constitution several clauses which

stipulated that any attempt to overthrow the elected government was

tantamount to high treason. Moreover, for the first time the

'traditional' role of the armed forces, that is, the defence of the

country's borders, was specifically stated in the constitution.

Nevertheless, Bhutto did envisage the possibility of calling out the army

in cases of deteriorating law and order situations, but only upon the

specific instructions of the elected government. 119

Even with his wide-sweeping reforms of the military institution,

Bhutto was ultimately unable to keep the armed forces out of

politics. 120 The failure to achieve this objective can be traced

directly to his decision to rely on the army not only for normal
non-political 'nation-building' activities 121 but, more significantly,

also to quell disturbances, such as language riots, labour trouble, tribal

unrest in Baluchistan,122 anti-Ahmadiyah disurbances 123 and post-l977

election urban demonstrations. All these activities enabled the armed

forces to improve their post-197l image of being an ineffective

'nation-building' institution. It also gave them the opportunity to

demonstrate to the civilian government that they were still an

indispensable element in the administration of the country.

119. Art. 6(1) dealt specifically with cases of attelpts to subvert the Constitution, and Art 245
with the use of the arled forces in cases of law and order situations.
120. s. Tahir-~heli, "The Hilitary in Contelporary Pakistan", Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 6,
NO.4, 198u, pp. 645-646.
121. These activities included: developlent projects in Baluchistan, stopping the sluggling of
foodgrain to India and Afghanistan, and giving assistance in case of natural calamities. In all these
cases the press and the government paid glowing tribute to the lilitary for their Iucn needed assistance.
Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 285-288.
122. This issue will be anlysed in-depth in Part IV of the thesis.
123. These anti-Ahladiyan disturbances are exalined in detail in Part III of the thesis.
 After temporarily 'neutralizing' the civilian bureaucracy and the

armed forces, Bhutto, in his drive to increase his personal power,

implemented constitutional and judicial measures which would not only

bring about a highly centralized system of government but also a heavy

dose of authoritarianism. He was conscious of the fact that he had been

elected under Yahya Khan's Legal framework Order.1970 and made president

and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) as a consequence of a mutiny

within the armed forces. These two factors, he felt, would not give him

sufficient long-term popular legitimacy to allow him to re-structure the

state institutions according to his plans. Accordingly, he decided it was

essential for his government to frame a new constitution that would have a

wide base of support.

Although the 1973 Constitution that was finally promulgated on 14

August 1973 was a compromise solution between the parties involved in its

drafting, it did reflect Bhutto's desire to have a highly centralized

system of government. 124 The parliamentary system implemented was at

best only a mockery of the Westminster model; it was to all intents and

purposes a quasi-presidential system but where all powers were vested in

the Prime Minister. Theoretically, the Prime Minister could be removed by

a vote of no-confidence, but there were so many exception clauses that his

position was virtually impregnable. 125 Moreover, the president, who was

elected by the parliamentarians, was in no position to counter-balance the

powers of the Prime Minister, since he could only act "in accordance with

the advice of the Prime Minister and such advice was binding on him" [Art.

124. Four parties were involved in the Hulty-Party Parlialentary COllittee discussions: Bhutto's
PPP, Wali khan's National Awali Party (NAP), Haulana Hufti Hahlud's Jali'at-i-Ulala-i-Islal (JUI), and
Qayyum Khan's Huslim League.
125. See Article 96, sections 2,3,5,6, with regard to the procedure for reloving the Prime Minister
frol office.
 91

48(1)(3)]. Thus, the 1973 Constitution continued the vice-regal

tradition, albeit in this case it was the prime minister who had the

monopoly of power. 126

Bhutto, however, was not completely satisfied with the powers the

constitution endowned him. He did not wish to take any chances of

allowing sources of opposition to develop against him; it was a reflection

of his inherent personal insecurity. Accordingly, his government brought

down a series of constitutional amendments and ordinances that were

essentially concerned with the curtailment of the fundamental rights of

the citizens and the powers of the courts.127 Moreover, although

fundamental rights had legally been restored under the 1973 Constitution,

since Pakistan continued to be ruled under the State of Emergency and the

Defence of Pakistan Rule it meant these rights actually remained

suspended. Considering the actions Bhutto took to restrict the powers of

the courts, one could safely say that under his government the

independence of the judiciary, the only institution which had been able to

remain out of the reach of political intervention since independence, was

seriously diminished. 128

By the time Bhutto called the 1977 elections, he had already lost the

"support of the bulk of the politically articulate electorate - the

middle-c1ass";129 and, combined with the withholding of working class

126. For an opposite interpretation of the 1973 Constitution, see: E.L. Tepper, "The New
Pakistan:Problels and Prospects·, Pacific Affairs, Yolo 47, No. I, Spring 1974, p. 59.
127. SOl2 of the lost ilportant were: (24 Hay 1974) Art. 17 was amended to give power to the central
government to ban political parties; (9 September 1974) Ahmadiyahs were declared a non-Huslim sect; (11
February 1975) the period of preventive detention was increased from one to three lonths; (11 November
1975) High Courts were deprived of their power to grant bail to any person detained under the Preventive
Detention Law; and, (3 September 1976) the powers of the High Courts were further reduced with the
withdrawal of their power to order interim relief to anyone detained under the Preventive Detention Law.
128. Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State, p. 124.
129. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, p. 200.
 92

support for Bhutto, the PPP had lost two of its main popular pillars of

support. 130 Moreover, the opposition was certainly not passive; for it

had organized itself into a Jama'at-i-Islami-led nine party electoral

coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Its major grievances

were Bhutto's nationalization programme, whose resultant atmosphere of

economic uncertainty had caused a drastic drop in private investment, and

the government's increasing use of the FSF to repress all sources of

opposition. While the urban working class was certainly dissatisfied with

Bhutto's heavy-handedness toward their industrial unions, it was the urban

middle-class, such as shopkeepers, merchants, white collar workers, the

social class which had been adversely affected by the government's

economic policies, which formed the core of PNA support. 131

This disaffection was given a powerful impetus following the rigging

of the 1977 National Assembly elections 132 in which the PNA only won 36

seats against the ppp's 155 seats. 133 The PNA's successful call for a

boycott of the provincial elections, and its ability to sustain an urban

protest .ovement, even after the imposition of tlimited' Martial Law in

four major cities, was essentially due to its power to mobilize the

middle-class around one major issue: the establishment of an Islamic

system of government. Furthermore, The PNA had been able to exploit this

religious demand because the urban middle-class and the Muhajirs

(migrants) were the two sections of society most sensitive about Bhutto's

tsocialist' and tun-Islamic' policies. Political polarization was such

130. Urban workers' support for Bhutto rapidly diminished after his decision to use the FSF to
repress union .ilitancy. Urban and rural poor were also dissatisfied with Bhutto's failure to deliver
i.proved health facilities as promised.
131. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, pp.1S7ff.
132. President Zia's government investigated the rigging allegations and subsequently published a
.assive 1044 page report on its findings. White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in Harch
1977, Rawalpindi, Government of Pakistan, July 1978. Bhutto refuted these accusations of fraudulent
elections in his book, If I al Assassinated, (Delhi, Vikas, 1982, 3rd ed.), pp. 61-90.
133. Dawn, 9 Harch 1977.
 93

that nothing short of Bhutto's resignation would suit the PNA; and with

only non-urban support remaining, such as small peasants, tenants and

landless labourers, the PPP had virtually no political power left to

confront the PNA. Consequently, faced with a situation where the PNA and

the PPP were unable to peacefully resolve their differences, the army, led

by General Zia-ul-Haq, a Muhajir openly sympathetic to the PNA's religious

demands, decided on 5 July 1977 to intervene with the stated aim of

quickly restoring societal peace in Pakistan and calling fresh elections.

THE ZIA-UL-HAQ PERIOD: 1977-1985

General Zia-ul-Haq's 'veto' coup was the consequence of a developing

. country plagued by mass praetorianism. 134 This state of societal

disequilibrium was the result of a society moving into the phase of mass

participation without developing effective political institutions to

absorb the wants and demands of the population. Accordingly, Huntington

believes that in such cases only two remedies are available for restoring

political stability; either repress or demobilize the population. Z.A.

Bhutto tried both and failed in each case. When all sectors of society

have been politicized, i.e., unions, students, military, and religious

groups, the political de-mobilization of society is an extremely difficult

objective to attain, especially when a government is relying on political

parties for legitimacy. On the other hand, however, the repression of the

population requires the assistance of the armed forces which ultimately

becomes counter-productive, for it further politicizes the military.

Consequently, the Pakistan armed forces, in the face of growing political

Uhrest and the government's inability to resolve the explosive situation,

134. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 192-198.

 94

decided to supplant the civilian government in order to 'purify' the

system of its weaknesses. General Zia's intervention was a textbook case

of a 'de-modernizing' coup. In the case of a mass praetorian society, the

military regime established after the coup can only be conservative in

nature; "it becomes engaged in a conservative effort to protect the

existing system against the excursions of the lower classes, particularly

the urban lower classes", and becomes "the guardian of the existing
middle-class". 135

In sum, one could delimit two sets of motives for the military

take-over. On the one hand, the many changes Bhutto imposed on the

military institution must have been perceived by the military bureaucracy

as a direct threat to their corporate interests. On the other hand,

Bhutto's use of the armed forces to squelch the uprising in Baluchistan

and the urban riots in different parts of the country increased the

military disenchantment with the political leadership. Consequently, the

second major reason for the coup, as advanced by General Zia, was the

upholding of the country's national interest.

It must be quite clear to you now that when the

political leaders failed to steer the country out
of a crisis, it is an inexcusable sin for the
Armed Forces to sit as silent spectators. 136

General Zia had his take-over and the imposition of Martial law

legitimized by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on the basis of the "Doctrine

of Necessity" which, according to the principle of Salus Populi Suprema

Lex, entitles the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) to govern the

country and exercise supra-constitutional powers. 137 The Chief

134. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 192-198.

135. Ibid., p. 222.
136. Address to the Nation,S July 1977, (Islalabad, Hinistry of Inforlation and Broadcasting), p.5.
137. According to H.S. Bhatia, this principle is recognized in the Our'an and the judicial systel of
Western countries. See his: Hartial Law:Theory and Practice, (New Delhi,Deep and Deep,1979), pp.151-95.
 95

Justice's ruling in favour of General Zia was conditional, however: this

"constitutional deviation" was only to be of a temporary nature until

General Zia held fresh elections as solemnly pledged in his first address

to the Nation. Moreover, although some parts of the 1973 Constitution

were to be put in "abeyance", the Supreme Court would still have the right

of judicial review. 138 General Zia, by his subsequent actions, would

eventually repudiate this ruling.

The Zia era can be divided into two distinct periods. First, from the

time of the take-over until March 1985, the government followed a strategy

of "retain and restrict"; that is, the military retained power and

continued to resist the expansion of political participation. Second,

following the 1985 elections, the regime shifted to a strategy of "retain

and expand", viz, the military retains power but gradually expands the

rise of new groups to political power. 139

Although he had given the country a solemn pledge to hold elections

within 90 days of the coup d'etat, General Zia not only rescinded this

promise, but he later cancelled subsequent elections planned for November

1979. It soon became apparent that the Gen~ral's real intentions was not

a speedy restitution of civilian government but the implementation of an

Islamization programme. This involved reforming the penal code, economic

laws, the judiciary and the social and educational fields according to the

injunction of the Qur'an and Shariat laws. 140 Several measures were

taken to ensure that this first phase proceeded as planned.

138. Musrat Bhutto versus Chief of Arty Staff &Federation of Pakistan Case, The All-Pakistan Legal
Decision, November 1977, (Supplement), (P.L.D. Publishers, Lahore, 1977), pp. 721-723.
139. For a perceptive article on the military's options for withdrawal frot politics, see: U.
Sundhaussen, "Military Withdrawal from Government Responsiblity", Armed Faces and Society, Vol. 10, No.4,
SUller 1984. Pp. 543-62.
140. For an analysis of these Islamic reforts, see: Riaz Hassan, "Islamisation: An Analysis of
Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan", Middle Eastern Studies, (Forthcoming).
 96

First, General Zia, with the objective of donning his regime with an

aura of legitimacy and expanding its base of support, entered into a

'coalition' with the religious elements of the Pakistan National

Alliance. This religious-military alliance, which was the first of its

kind in Pakistan, was to characterize General Zia's regime. Secondly, in

order to ensure that his Islamization programme proceeded as scheduled,

General Zia, apart from imposing Martial Law and placing the 1973

Constitution in 'abeyance', decided to outlaw all political parties and

imprison the leading politicians opposed to his regime. However, even

these coercive measures, coupled with the execution of Z.A. Bhutto on

charges of attempting to murder a political opponent, did not prevent the

opposition, in February 1981, from launching an eleven-party alliance, the

Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).141 Their major demands

were the holding of elections under the 1973 Constitution, with the

simultaneous lifting of Martial Law.

In March 1981, one week after the hijacking of a PIA plane to Kabul by

the AI-Zulfikar, an underground organization led by one of Bhutto's sons,

the government promulgated the Provisional Constitution Order.1981 (PCO)

which established a new framework for the governance of the country. The

three most important aspects of this third measure which, according to the

government, was to legally arm the administration with authority to deal

adequately and effectively with threats to the 'integrity and sovereignty

of Pakistan and its Islamic Ideology'142, were: the end of the

judiciary's independence vis-a-vis the executive, the dismantling of the

141. The lost ilportant lember parties of the HRD are: the PPP, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), National
Delocratic Party (HDP), Pakistan National Party (PNP), Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Jalia't
ul-Ulaaa-i-Islam (Fazalur Rahman Group)(JUI), Hazoor Kissan Party (HKP), QauI! Hahaz-i-Azudi (QHA),
Pakistan Huslia league iKhairuddin group)(PHL).
142. The Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, CHLA Order No. I, 1981. The Gazette of Pakistan, 24
Harch 1981, Preamble, Islaaabad, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, 1981.
 97

PPP as a political party, and the establishment of a 288-member

Ma.ilis-i-Shura (Federal Council), a consultative body that would have no

independent authority to legislate.

These three measures, complemented with a favourable economic

environment, the skilful use of the Afghanistan 'factor' to prolong the

life of the Zia regime, the support of a loyal army, the successful

holding of non-party-based local elections in 1979 and 1983, and

factionalism within the opposition parties, have allowed the government to

pursue its political programme. Accordingly, General Zia, satisfied that

the opposition had lost its momentum and that his Islamization programme

was progressing well, decided the time was right for the government to

shift into its second political phase, that is, the institutionalization

of politics conducive to the 'national interest' as perceived by the army.

The foundation for the government's four-step second phase is based on

General Zia's "August Plan" which he outlined in an address to the

Majlis-i-Shura on 12 August 1983. 143 The essential features of the

speech related to the government's desire to amend permanently the 1973

Constitution in two specific ways: first, to reduce the powers of the

Prime Minister in favour of the President; and, secondly, to 'bring the

constitution in harmony with the Islamic principles'.144 General Zia

sought to endow these planned alterations with an aura of moral legitimacy

by quoting at length several statements made by Quaid-i-Azam M.A.Jinnah

where he specifically stated that he regarded a presidential form of

government best suited for Pakistan. 145 In view of Jinnah's

143. Political Plan Announced, Seventh Session of the Federal Council, Address by President
Zia-ul-Haq, Islalabad, 12 August 1983. Hinistry of Information and Broadcasting, 1983.
144. Ibid., p. 26.
145. Ibid., p. 24.
 98

authoritarian tendencies as first Governor-General of Pakistan, there is

general agreement that Jinnah was in favour of a powerful Head of state.

The first stage, the holding of the national plebiscite on 19 December

1984, was a tour de force on the part of Zia. Although it was only meant

to deal with the role of Islam in Pakistan, by skilfully linking the

Islamization issue with his desire to be elected President, Zia

transformed the plebiscite question into a referendum-cum-presidential

election. Although the turnout for the plebiscite was low,146 this

successful strategy did ensure that Zia attained two fundamental

objectives. First, to have himself "elected' as President; and, secondly.

as President with increased powers under the amended constitution, to

oversee personally that no in-coming government could dismantle the

Islamic system which he had been establishing since he had taken power in

1977. 147 Both these objectives would guarantee that the programme would

be continued even after the forthcoming elections.

The next stage in the political programme, the non-party-based

national and provincial elections, held in February 1985. were going to be

controlled, so as to "bring positive results" .148 Zia did offer the MHO

leaders a chance to participate in the polls on an individual basis on the

condition that they accepted him as the duly elected President of

Pakistan. The MRD politicians rejected the offer for four reasons. First.

it would have forced them to recognize the results of the referendum, an

act that would be unacceptable considering their strong opposition to the

plebiscite; secondly, the MHO is deeply committed to the party-system;

146. According to independent observers, there was only a 10 to 35% turnout. The Observer, 23
Decelber 1984.
147. Thf second objective was re-asserted in an address General Zia delivered to the Hajlis-i-Shura
cn 22 October 1983. The MusIi" 23 October 1983.
148. The Husli~, 23 October 1983.
 99

thirdly, the elections would still be held under the umbrella of Martial

Law, another inadmissible condition; and, fourthly, accepting the offer

could lead to even greater internal polarization within the MHO

coalition. 149 As the MRD was soon to discover, its rejection of the

Zia initiative, coupled with its boycott of the elections, was to be a

grave tactical mistake. On the other hand, the religious and right-wing

parties which have been in a de facto alliance with the Zia government

were eager to participate in these elections. And although these parties

were plagued with internal factionalism, the leaders nevertheless saw this

as an opportunity for them to improve their weak electoral standing. ISO

There were more than 6000 contestants competing for 217 National

Assembly seats and a total of 483 seats for the four provincial

assemblies, with the largest number being Shura members, former members of

the national and provincial assemblies, local bodies councillors and

Jama'at-i-Islami and Muslim League party members. lSI Also involved in

the elections were approximately 200 maverick members of the MRD, 157 of

whom were from the PPP. All these candidates were subsequently expelled

from the party. Finally, apart from the 31 women candidates, other

categories of contenders included: retired civil servants and military

officers, religious scholars, middle-ranking industrialists and traders

and, of course, representatives of the old established landed families.

Ironically, these candidates did not even know what powers they would

have in the assemblies, since President Zia had yet to amend the

constitution outlining the powers and responsibilities of the various

149. The Huslil, 3 January 1985.

150. In the 1970 elections, the Jalla'at-i-Islali lias onh able to luster 7% of the vot.es. The
Huslil, 3 March 1985.
151. The Huslil, 8 January 1985, 14 February 1985, 18 February 1985, 25 February 1985.
 100

political institutions. Since political parties were legally not allowed

to participate, contestants were reduced to campaigning according to their

individual political platform. This resulted in the contenders limiting

their outlook to strictly local issues, and thus rarely discussing vital

national concerns, such as the Islamization programme, the continuation of

Martial Law, education and the economy. The consequence of this election

system was to force the candidates to resort to clan, tribal, family and

sectarian affiliations rather than political identification to muster

support for their candidature. These elections constituted a return to

the type of elections Pakistanis had witnessed in the 1940s, 1950s and

1960s.

Although there were many pre-election 'restrictions', such as the ban

on political activities and the imprisonment of MRD politicians and rigid

campaign rules prohibiting the use of megaphones and loudspeakers, banning

political rallies and limiting the election campaign to 21 days, these

non-party-based elections were nevertheless fair and free from government

intervention. Almost 53% of registered voters exercised their right of

franchise;152 it was a clear-cut rejection of the MRD's call for a

massive boycott of the elections. Voters were displeased with the MRD's

political tactics of refusing to participate in the polls, even though

General Zia had partially lifted the ban on their participation.

Moreover, the MRD was perceived as being interested only in opposition

tactics rather than in trying to put forward a well thought out political

programme for the post-election period. However, the majority's decision

to participate in the elections should not be interpreted as popular

support for the government; for, as the results clearly indicated, several

of the Federal Ministers, Shura members, Jama'at-i-Islami candidates, and

152. The Kuslil, 27 February 1985.

 101

anyone who was remotely identified with the regime were defeated. 153

On the contrary, their decision to participate demonstrated in no

uncertain terms that they not only wanted to exercise their right to vote

after an eight year hiatus, but that they also wished to show their

disapproval of the government's Islamization programme, a point that had

already been made quite clear by the relatively low turnout for the

referendum-cum--presidential election.

Following the provincial elections, Zia unveiled the Government's

Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order,l985 (ReO), the third step of

his political programme of gradually returning state power to the

civilians. He justified the enactment of the Order on the basis that he

thad sought to bring the 1973 Constitution closer to Islam and, secondly,

that this would prove a shield against future crises'.154 He

strengthened the role Islam would henceforth have in the administration of

the country by enshrining into the revived constitution the 1949

Objectives Resolution which outlined the country's Islamic objectives.

General Zia has always felt that had the office of the president been

more than a mere figure-head position the 1977 mass urban unrest could

have been averted. Accordingly, General Zia, wishing to avoid a

repetition of those days of political instability, decided it would be in

the best interests of the country to reduce the almost dictatorial powers

of the Prime Minister and, commensurably, increase the authority of the

Head of the State. Some of the prerogatives General Zia has granted the

President are: appointment of the Prime Minister and other Federal Cabinet

Ministers from amongst National Assembly members (Art.9l), appointment of

153. The Muslil, 3 March 1985.

154. Ibid.
 102

the provincial Governors (Art.101),155 discretionary powers as to the

Governors' selection of Chief Minister and provincial ministers (Art.I05),

dissolution of the National Assembly with or without the consent of the

Prime Minister (Art.48), power to revoke a bill passed by the National

Assembly and send it back to the parliament for reconsideration (Art.75),

appointment as supreme commander of the armed forces (Art.243) ,

appointment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the

three services chief (Art.243), and the holding of a referendum on any

matter of national importance (Art.48).

Although the powers of the President have been substantially increased

under the RCO, a step that was necessary to counter-balance the

quasi-impregnable position of the Prime Minister, the President's

relatively authoritarian position can, however, be challenged. First,

future Presidents would not be elected by referendum but would be chosen

indirectly by an electoral college consisting of the members of the two

houses of parliament, the National Assembly and the Senate, and the four

provincial assemblies, thus, granting the provinces a voice in the

selection of a President. (Art.41) Secondly, the President may be removed

from office through a procedure of impeachment initiated by half the

membership of either Houses of the parliament. (Art.47) Thirdly, any

article of the Constitutional Order may be amended by a two-thirds

majority of both Houses of Parliament and a majority in each of the

provincial assemblies.(Art.239)

Except for the traditional religious parties favouring the

government's Islamization programme, reactions to the President's RCO were

overwhelmingly negative. Generally, the criticism advanced against the

155. This presidential power was already present in the non-a.ended 1973 constitution.
 103

government's amendment of the constitution centred on whether the

President actually had the authority to enact such an order, and why had

he not given the task of amending the constitution to the newly-elected

National Assembly members? The MRD leaders, nationalists from the

minority provinces and the various Bar Associations were the most critical

of the ReO, accusing the government of having introduced an amended

constitution which institutionalized a civilianized-type military

rule. lss .

The final and most important step in Zia's political programme of

gradually restituting power to the civilians was the lifting of Martial

Law on 31 December 1985. Although the end of Martial Law has been a

significant step in the decision to increase civilian participation in the

administration of the country, its termination, however, should not be

construed as heralding a period free of military involvement. The formal

termination of Martial Law was not a difficult procedure in itself, for

General Zia, by establishing secure institutions and ensuring he had a

seemingly loyal military constituency supporting him, has paved the way

for the smooth transition to the 'civilianization' of his regime. Three

important factors, however, may stand in the way of the complete and

permanent withdrawal of the military from the administration of the

country.

First, military officers, both active and retired, are so deeply

entrenched in the federal and provincial civilian bureaucracies and other

semi-governmental organizations, that their withdrawal will not only be a

long and arduous process, but one unlikely to meet with the approval of

the military institution; for it will not only threaten the jobs of

156. The Muslim, 3 March 1985, 4 March 1985.

 104

current officers, but also the potential for lucrative civilian posts for

future retiring officers. Secondly, by assigning to the armed forces a

domestic role that goes beyond merely maintaining law and order to the

task of 'guarding the ideological frontiers of the country',157 Zia has

inevitably granted the military 'moral' veto power over any future

governmental decision that would alter the central role of Islam in the

sphere of public policy. Moreover, by having had the 1949 Objectives

Resolution, the country's Islamic cornerstone, integrated into the body of

the constitution, Zia has effectively given the armed forces carte blanche

to intervene at will in the domestic arena. That is, in the future, if

the military believed the government was not pursuing the Islamization

process, it would be fulfilling its constitutional obligation by

intervening against the civilian administration in order to enforce the

Objectives Resolution, thus deflecting any accusations of high treason for

subverting the constitution.

In sum, General Zia has successfully attained his two fundamental

objectives: the implementation of the Islamization process, enshrined in

the newly-amended constitution, and the temporary defeat of the PPP as a

credible political force. President Zia accomplished this feat by

following a strategy which de-mobilized the population away from the

secular-oriented ideology of the PPP, and re-channeled society toward the

fundamentals of Islamic tenets. Coupled with this policy, he selectively

rased to the ground all post-1971 political forces, specifically Bhutto's

party which pursued programmes which were anathema to Zia's value system,

and he proceeded to build, from the ground up, a new generation of

politicians. He complemented this dual strategy by entering into de facto

alliances with like-minded forces.

158. Political Plan Announced, pp. 42-43.

 105

In the future, President Zia will have to playa very delicate

balancing game, however, if he wishes to ensure the consolidation of his

newly-attained inter-related objectives. On the one hand, General Zia,

whose real constituency is still the army, will have to make sure he has

the loyal support of the military officers when deciding matters relating

to the extent of civilian participation in government decision-making. On

the other hand, it will only be through the gradual process of granting

real power to the National Assembly that President Zia will be able to

demonstrate to the population that the parliament represents an authentic

sovereign arena and not merely a rubber-stamping institution for the

President's policies. By the same token, this strategy will discredit the

MRD, the major obstacle to his Islamization programme, as a credible

political force. In either case, he will have to tread a fine line; for,

if he fails to satisfy the armed forces, he could himself be toppled by a

coup d'etat, and if he is perceived by the population as failing to

reinstate genuine power to the civilians, he could be forced to resign as

a result of a mass uprising. However, even at this stage, General Zia

still faces the typical dilemma of most military rulers: how to withdraw

the army completely from politics while at the same time creating a

political environment that will make it unecessary for the military to

re-intervene in the domestic arena. This third phase in General

Zia-ul-Haq's programme has yet to be achieved.

PART III.

RELIGION
 CHAPTER 4.

THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION TO THE CREATION OF PAKISTAN

 As noted in the introductory chapter, not all Indian Muslims were in

favour of the creation of Pakistan. Briefly, on the one hand, there were

the Muslim Nationalists, essentially the Muslim League, who spearheaded

the Pakistan 'Movement', and, on the other hand, there were the

Nationalist Muslims and Islamic Nationalists, who were both against the

creation of Pakistan but for different philosophical reasons. Thus, while

the cases of the Muslim Leaguers and Nationalist Muslims were

straightforward, and which resulted in the former migrating to Pakistan

and the latter remaining in India, the case of the Islamic Nationalists

was not as simple. Having opposed both groups, the Islamic Nationalists

were faced with a difficult choice; however, they eventually opted for

Pakistan, believing they would be more successful in applying their

religious beliefs in Pakistan than in India. Unfortunately for the future

political development of the country, the religious-cum-political 'camps'

were not limited to the Islamic Nationalists, who were basically adherents

of the Fundamentalist religious stream, and the Muslim Nationalists, for

the latter were themselves composed of several different schools of

thought. On the one hand, they consisted of the Traditionalists and

Modernists, both part of 'orthodox' Islam, and, on the other hand, they

also included the pirs of 'popular' Islam. Consequently, because of this

high degree of heterogeneity amongst the Muslim groups of Pakistan, the

goal of achieving a consensus with regard to the role Islam should have in

the administration of the country was virtually impossible to attain. In

order to understand their basic philosophical differences, a brief review

of the ideological foundations of each of these religious groups should

assist in the understanding of their respective positions as they stood

when the Indian Muslims were finally granted a state of their own.

Islam (submission to God) is a great practical religion; it is a

religion of ethics. As Smith put it: "It is a trascendant religion,

 107

ineffable; no form can contain it or exhaust it".l However, Muhammad,

Allah's Prophet, did not only preach ethics; he also organized a state

based in Madinah. The establishment of this religio-political

sovereignty, which marks the beginning of Islamic history, was in

accordance with God's revelation.

The Qur'an (revelation), Allah's religious precepts as communicated to

Muhammad, is more than simply the Muslims' Holy Book; it is the major

source of guidance for every aspect of their lives, religious and

secular. According to Allah, all of nature is ordered; it is free of

chaos. Therefore, the entire universe is run according to purposive laws,

both physical and moral. The Qur'an purports to be a guide toward the

achievement of the moral order. At the peak of that moral order, higher

than the angels, stands Man, created not in God's image but as His

representative on earth. 2 In God's eyes, all men are equal amongst

themselves. The Qur'an emphasizes knowledge and learning; it urges Man to

study nature and to investigate his environment.

One of Islam's main concerns is the organization of the Umma (Muslim

community). Although the Qur'an includes laws as to how the civil

community should be administered, interpretations as to their

applicability have been creating internal problems and divisions within

the Muslim community. One consequence of this was the development of

Sufism (mysticism) as a reaction to the emphasis "placed on the expansion

and organization of the Umma at the cost of the spiritual development of

the individual soul".3

1. W.C. Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State, (Lahore, So. Huhammad Ashraf, 1951), p. 20.
2. F.K. Abbott, rslam and Mistan, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 15.
3. Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power, (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1982), p. 53.
 108

•pOPULAR' ISLAM: THE PIRS

The Sufis, as opposed to the adherents of • orthodox' Islam, emphasize

reason over revelation. Salvation, according to them, can only be

achieved with love and mercy through a personal union with God. It is

because of their ability and their willingness to integrate themselves

within the Hindu environment, and adopt many of its rituals and

beliefs,4 that the Sufis became a more powerful source of religious

loyalty than the more scholastic, legalistic and severe approach of the

ulama (men of religious learning, pl. of alim).5 Accordingly, sufism

has come to be known as •popular , Islam, as opposed to the ulama's

• orthodox' Islam. 6

The exact origin of sufism in India is difficult to determine;

however, since Sind was the first point of entry of Islam in India by

Muhammad Bin Qasim's army in 712 A.D., one can safely assume that it is

also the home of Indian sufism. 7 Subsequently, five major sufi Orders

established themselves on the Indian Subcontinent between the 12th and

17th century. The original founder-saints of these Orders in India were

followed by pirs (saints) ,a called sa.i.iada nash in , who were either

appointed or hereditary successor of the original saint. From their

4. S.B. Husain, Develocment of Pakistan: ACritical Analysis of the Roles of Politics and
Administration, (Unpublished Ph.d. Thesis, University of Cincinnati, 1979), p. 311.
5. Mortimer, ~p. cit., p. 53.
6. Sellner has coined sufism instead 3S 'peripheral' Islam, thus giving the impression that it is
unimportant. One would have to agree with Hassan that this is not the case, at least not in Pakistan.
'Orthodox' Islam has also variably been called 'central' (Gellner) and 'purist' (Hassan). I have
preferred to refer to it as 'orthodox' because: first, it is not central to Pakistan's religious belief
system; and, second, the only 'purist' Islam weuld be the one originating from Arabia. Ernest Gellner,
Musli~ Society, Cambridge University Press, 1981;and Riaz Hassan, 'Pirs and Politics', Paper presented at
the 5th Conference of the ASAA, Adelaide, 13-19 May 1984.
7. M.T. Titus, Islam in India and Pakistan: AReligious History of Islam in India and Pakistan,
(Calcutta, YMCA Publishing House, 1959), p. 116.
B. Murshid is also another name given to a ill. For an interesting discussion and analysis on the
difference between these two interchangeable designations, see: A.C. Mayer, 'Pir and Murshid: An Aspect of
Religious Leadership in West Pakistan", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 3, No.2, 1967, pp. 160-169.
 109

headquarters (khangah), usually built around the tomb of the original

saint, the pirs developed their Orders by means of an extensive network of

disciples (murids). As Gilmartin indicated:

These khangahs served as outposts of Islam which linked

the diffuse, tribally organized population ... to the
larger Islamic Community ... and it was to these centers
that the population looked for religious leadership.9

Today the sa.i.iada nashin still assures the continuation of his Order

by regulating the function of its members, propagating the knowledge of

the Order, maintaining its practices, and initiating new murids to the

fraternity.IO The pir-murid relationship can become very complex and.

at times, have very intricate ramifications. For example, the descendant

of a pir may sometimes have divided his disciples according to some

hierarchy, and the disciples may have later become pirs themselves. In

practical terms, this means that one individual could be both a disciple

of a pir and a pir himself. Put simply, the institution of sufism is a

type of religious patron-client system in which the affective value placed

in the pir's authority is wholly dependent on his position in the line of

descent from the original saint. 11

Consequently, it is because of this ever expanding network of

pir-murid relationships, which has literally affected every human

settlement, especially in the rural areas, that one can but only agree

with Hassan's assertion that ttSufism was a principle (sic) historical

force in the spread of Islam in the Indian sub-continent tt . 12 As one

scholar, who deserves to be quoted in length, so aptly put it:

There is no other phase of the life of Muslims in India

and Pakistan that is so full of human interest as this
which has to do with the religious orders and saints.

9. David Gilmartin, "Religious Leadership and the Pakistan ~ovement in the Punjab', ~odern Asian
Studies, Vol. 13, No.3, 1979, p. 486.
10. Titus, op. cit., p. 122.
1i. ~ayer, op. ci t., p. 16,).
12. Hassan, GP. cit~, p. 2.
 110

It may not be orthodox; it may be condemned by the

maulvis, the Wahhabis, and the modern reformers of the
day, but nevertheless it does not die. It persists,
lives, and functions in the lives of those who believe,
because for them there is something intimately personal
and satisfying in this form of worship which they do
not find in the more rigid and respectable forms ... it
is not likely that there will be much lessening of the
hold that the pirs have on the minds, hearts , and
purses of the common people ... 13

The pirs came to perform a very important role in having the Muslim

League's "Two-Nation Theory" gain acceptability amongst the rural

population, especially during the crucial 1946 Punjab elections.

Since 1923, the Punjab had been in the control of the Unionist

party,14 a provincial party based on a pro-rural agriculturalist

ideology, which was a coalition of rural-based Muslim, Sikh and Hindu

communities. Included in the landed elite which controlled the Unionist

party, were the highly influential rural-based pirs. They came to be

included as part of the landed aristocracy with the assistance of the

colonial administration. In order to further strengthen the power base of

the Unionist party, the British had decided to grant the pirs, who had

earned a high level of respectability as guardians of the Holy shrines,

large tracks of land in the newly developed fertile Canal Colony of

Western Punjab. Is On the other hand, the Muslim League, dominated by

leaders coming from Muslim minority provinces, that is, areas not to be

included in Pakistan, had very little support in the Punjab. Moreover, it

had too closely identified itself with the urban-based ulama 16 who

13. Titus, op. Cl t.! p. 152.

1~. For an in-depth analysis of the role the Unionist party had in the Punjab, see by I.A. Talbot:
'The 1946 Punjab Elections', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No.1, 1980, 65-91; 'The Growth of the Muslim
League in the Punjab, 1937-1946', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 20, No.1, 1982,
5-24; and, 'Deserted Collaborators: The Political Background to the Rise and Fall of the Punjab Unionist
Party, 1923-1947', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Histery, Vol. 11, No.1, 1982, 73-93.
15. Talbot, "Deserted .. .', pp. 74-75.
16. One of the programmes that the Muslim League adopted for the ensuing 1937 elections was: "In all
matters of purely religious character, due weight shall be given to the opinions of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i
-Hind ... ·, Historic Documents of the Musli~ Freedom Movement, (Lahore, Publishers United, 1970), p. 22.
 III

promoted the mosque-based •orthodox , Islam with which the rural masses

could not readily identify.17 Consequently, the 1937 elections were to

be disastrous for the Muslim League: the Unionist party won 99 of the 179

seats, and the Muslim League and the Congress, together, were only able to

capture 19 seats. IS

Consequently, after these elections the Muslim League, realizing that

an association with the urban-based ulama was more of a liability than an

asset, broke with the ulama and appealed to the pirs for religious

support. 19 The Muslim League conducted a well-organized campaign to

obtain mass support. 20 In 1946, a Masha'ikh Committee consisting of

eminent pirs, was appointed. Because many politicians were murids of

pirs, the impact of this committee was great. 21 However, the religious

credentials of some of these pirs were rather questionable, for "included

in this Committee were political leaders with dubious pretentions to

piety".22 Of course, by taking the decision to co-opt the pirs to its

side, the Muslim League was obliged to agree to a quid pro quo, even if it

meant reneging on these promises after independence was granted. In a

letter to the powerful Pir of Manki Sharif, Jinnah clearly stated in

November 1945:

It is needless to emphasize that the Constituent

Assembly which would be predominantly Muslim in its
composition would be able to enact laws for Muslims,
not inconsistent with the Shariat law and the Muslims
will no longer be obliged to abide by the un-Islamic
laws. 23

17. Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League ... ·, p. 17.

18. K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase: 1857-1943, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1963,
2nd ed.), p. 83.
1'~. Gil:nartin, op. cit., p. 503.
20. Sayeed, op. cit., pp. 196-20l.
21. Talbot, "The 1946 .. .', p. 82.
22. Gilmartin, cp. ciL, p. 508; Sayeed, op. ciL, p. 203.
23. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 9 March 1949, Vel. V, No.3., p. 46, cited in Sayeed,
Ibid., p. 198.
 112

The fundamental reason as to why the pirs were able to deliver the

votes to the Muslim League resides in the fact that the pirs appealed to

the baradaris (Kinship group, brotherhood), the cornerstone of the social

structure of rural Punjab. And, although relying on this strategy went

against the League's "Two-Nation Theory", the Muslim League realized this

was the only means by which they would be able to sway Punjabi peasants

and landlords to their side. 24 Because the pirs, as opposed to the

mainstream Deoband ulama, felt that an Islamic state under the leadership

of Muslim League politicians would be quite acceptable since the pirs' own

belief system would be reflected in the politicians' behaviour, themselves

likely to be murids of one of the pirs,25 they were, accordingly, more

than willing to issue fatwas (the formal opinion of a canon lawyer) to

their disciples in favour of the Muslim League. 26

In sum. the Muslim League was able to win the Punjab elections 27 not

only because of religious slogans which legitimized their cause, but, just

as importantly, on the promise to help the peasants and returning

servicemen overcome their economic problems. 28 As Sayeed noted:

The Muslim League was, on the one hand, satisfying a

craving for power and influence free from Hindu
competition among the Muslim intelligentsia and, on the
other hand, the more vague and religious urge for power
among the Muslim masses. 29

24. Talbot, "The Growth .. :, p. 17.

25. Gilmartin, op. cit., p. 509.
26. Talbot, ·Deserted ... ·, pp. 36-87.
27. The Muslim League won 7S out of the 86 Muslim seats. Sayeed, cpo cit., p. 217.
28. Talbot, 'The 1946..:, p. 90.
29. Sayeed, Dp. cit., p. 180.
 113

•ORTHODOX , ISLAM: THE TRADITIONALISTS, MODERNISTS AND FUNDAMENTALISTS

The indisputable founder of the Traditionalist school of thought on

the Subcontinent has widely been accepted to have been Shah Waliullah

(1702-1762). He was the fountainhead from which sprang the various

reformist ideas that shook the stagnant state of Islam in India out of its

stupor. His beliefs, considered revolutionary during those decaying times

of the Moghul Empire, were the product of a sufi upbringing by his father

and the teachings of Medina's religious scholars of the Shafi'i legal

school. His thinking was •unorthodox , in that he not only blamed the poor

state of Islam in the Mughal Empire on the intolerance and dogmatism of

the ulama and on their monopoly in the interpretation of the Holy

scriptures, but he also offered an alternative approach to the

understanding of Islam. He was convinced that in order to re-establish

public and private morality in Muslim society it would be essential to

re-introduce the people to the fundamentals of Islamic doctrine and law.

He proceeded to write a book outlining the principles to be observed in

the interpretation of the Our'an, and went on to question the function and

scope of ijtihad (use of individual reasoning) in the formulation of figh

(classical Muslim jurisprudence), one of the most guarded intellectual

domains of the ulama. 3D He felt there was a strong case to be made in

widening the scope and domain of Utihad and at the same time reduce the

importance attached to the different schools of opinion in the field of

details of figh. 31

What contributed to Shah Waliullah's importance as a scholar was his

decision to go beyond simply addressing the metaphysical aspects of Islam

30. LH. Quresh , Ulema in Politics, (Karachi, The Inter-Services Press, 1972), pp. 118-119.
31. Ibid...,., p. 1 1.
 114

and to examine the economic and poli tical problems confronting the Muslims

of the Subcontinent. Although his thoughts were not always consistent, he

did attempt to establish a system of thought that would integrate all the

issues into one 'model'. As Fazlur Rahman described it:

In this system, a broad, humanistic sociological base
is overlain by a doctrine of social and economic
justice in Islamic terms and crowned by a sufi
world-view. 32

In the field of morality, his feelings were that in order to keep

society together, through the inculcation of high moral values, religion

must be made not only accessible to all, but with the help of mysticism

can be made more palatable to the common people not trained in the highly

legalistic and scholastic aspects of Islam. It is in this line of

thinking that he emphasized the necessity to impart a proper place to

mystic training; that is, the use of sufism for the purification of one's

soul and the search for conformity to God's will through love for Him. 33

Unfortunately this search for the attainment of higher moral standards

also meant in practical terms that Muslim and Hindu societies should not

mix, for if they did, Shah Waliullah believed, it could only mean a

further dilution of Islam's belief system on the Subcontinent. At first

this would appear to be a logical outcome of his drive to re-establish

moral order to Muslim society, but it also points out the inconsistency in

his line of thinking. On the one hand, he stressed the positive value of

sufism, a religious practice with strong Hindu overtones, for the

attainment of a closer relationship with God but, on the other hand, he

was a staunch believer in the cultural separation of Muslim and Hindu

societies. It was this contradiction that led to the development of two

opposing schools of thought: the Puritans and the Modernists.

32. Fazlur Rahman, Islam, (University of Chicago Press, 1979, 2nd ed.), p. 203
33. Qureshi, cp. cit., p. 122.
 115

After his death, the puritanical elements of his thoughts became the

basis for a jihad (holy war), aimed at purifying Islam of un-Islamic

beliefs and practices. 34 This school of thought, under the leadership

of Sayyid Ahmad Bareli (1782-1831), was the spearhead of what was to be

called the Wahhabi movement. 35 The essential characteristics of this

movement in India were: a renewed emphasis on tawid (the unity of God),

the adherence to the principle of l,j tihad for individuals, a rejection of

the four orthodox schools of canon law, the opposition to the worship of

saints, and the removal of all traces of the practices of earlier faiths

from the worship of Hindu converts to Islam. 36 However, it should be

understood that although Bareli largely stripped sufism of its ecstatic

and metaphysical character, such as the belief in angels, spirits,

spiritual guides, disciples, teachers, prophets and saints, he did not

completely abolish the institution but, instead, replaced its content with

the principles of 'orthodox' Islam. This neo-sufism was characteristic of

this phase of Islamic development in India during which there was an

intense desire to adhere to the devotions and practices as observed by the

Prophet Muhannnad. In order to propagate his brand of Islamic reformism,

Bareli established ultra-conservative Barelwi (Urdu adj. for Bareli)

madrasahs (religious schools) in northern India which trained chiefly for

service in small towns and rural areas. 37

Another 19th century reformist sect that emerged on the Subcontinent,

and which may be considered an off-shoot of the Barelwi school of thought,

34. ~ortimer, op. cit., p. 69.

35. Although its name originated from 3 puritanical sect founded in Arabia in the 18th century by
Muhammad Abd-ul-Wahhab, the philosophical substance of the movement was quite different from Arabian
Wahhabism. Rahman, op. cit., p. 203. The Faraidi movement, a parallel sect of the Wahhabi variety, also
developed in Bengal at about the same time. However, by the later 1800s this sect had essentiall, died
out. Titus, op. cit., p. 188.
36. Titus, Ibid., p. 186.
37. Ibid., p. 78.
 116

was the Ahl-i-Hadith (people of Tradition) sect, a movement that

emphasized Waliullah's belief in the supremacy of the hadith (a technical

term for a tradition of what the Prophet said or did) over the rulings of

the juristic schools. 38

This sect sought "to go back to the first principles and restore the

original simplicity and sincerity of faith and practice", 44 using the

hadith as the ideal guide to social behaviour and individual piety. The

logical correlations to this philosophical position were: first, a belief

that ijtihad should be a right allowed to all and not merely restricted to

Islamic jurists; second, a rejection of the principle of ijma (consensus),

believing that interpretations of the Holy scriptures should be adapted to

the times; and, third, a refusal to blindly abide to taglid

(traditionalism).40 Similar to the Barelwi philosophy, it was

considered to be an obligation and a duty to live a life of conformity,

that is, conformist obedience to the norms of the life of Muhanunad to the

point of absolute self-identification with the Prophet. 41 Accordingly,

it believed in the principle of pirimuridi (spiritual preceptorship),42

since the Prophet had been, to a certain degree, a mystic himself.

However, they did reject the speculative excesses of sufism and other

Hindu customs that had found their way into Islamic practices.

After the failure of the 1857 uprising against the British

administration, in which sufis and ulama were at the forefront of those

who had been working patiently for the overthrow of the British,43 it

33. Aliz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India ~nd Pakistan: 1857-1964, (Karachi, Oxford University
Press, 1967), p. 114.
39. Titus, Dp. cit., p. 1%.
40. Ibid.,
41. Ahmad, Dp. cit., p. 116.
42. Titus, ~. cit., p. 194.
43~ Qureshi, co. ::it., pp. 13:3-196,209,211.
 117

was felt that by establishing a madrasah, which would re-establish contact

between the ulama and the average Muslim and "re-orient the Muslim

community to its 'original' cultural and religious identity" ,44 the

weakness and decay of Muslim society could be remedied and the struggle

against the British continued. Accordingly, a madrasah was established in

1876 at Deoband, United Provinces. Since 'perfection' of Muslim society

would only be re-established in the conservation of its traditional

heritage, it was essential that the curriculum at Deoband greatly stress

Islamic sUbjects. 45 Once the students graduated from Deoband, they were

considered knowledgeable enough to act as imams (one who leads the

prayers) in mosques and teachers in madrasahs. The theological influence

of Deoband quickly grew and eventually spread throughout the Subcontinent

and Afghanistan. Still, today, it enjoys the reputation of being one of

the most outstanding theological seminaries in the Muslim world.

As noted, the Deoband movement emphasized the elements of orthodoxy in

Shah Waliullah's thought, excluding his more 'revolutionary' ideas. As

Riaz Hassan stated:

The cultural concern of movements like Deoband was/is

to expunge Islamic culture of extravagant customary
practices such as lavish weddings, doweries and other
ritual celebrations which they regarded as un-Islamic.
These movements were/are also anti-Pir and anti-Saintly
cults ... They saw/see themselves as teaching Muslims to
be good Muslims by following the teachings of great
past reformers, including the Prophet himself for whom
the ending of false customs and the creation of
religiously responsible individual had been
central. 46

Because of their emphasis on orthodoxy, some of their most bitter

critics were, and still are, some of the ulama of the Barelwi school of

thought. Since this reformist sect emphasized the legitimacy of sufism,

44. Ahmad, at. cit., p. 104.

45. Ibid., p. 105.
46. Hassan, 00. cit., p. 16.
 118

they considered the Deobandis to be outside the pale of Islam. 47 These

differences in interpretation were to have fundamental and lasting

repercussions on the Muslims of India, dividing them into two hostile

camps: the Deobandis and Barelwis.

Apart from the Traditionalist religious stream, Shah Waliullah's works

also gave rise to the development of two other separate schools of

thought: the Modernists and Fundamentalists.

The Modernist movement, started by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898),

a member of the Moghul aristocracy, had two objectives: the reform of

religious thinking and the modernization of Muslim education. Sir Sayyid

held the 'unorthodox' view that the ulama's dogmatic and rigid

interpretation of the holy scriptures had caused the ossification of

Muslim society. They had refused to adopt to the changing times, and,

consequently, were to be blamed for the poor cultural and economic

conditions of the Muslims of the Subcontinent. Accordingly, he decided to

make a frontal attack on the religious thinking of the day, and questioned

every basic Islamic principle as interpreted by the ulama. He believed

there could be "no contradiction between the word of God and the work of

God", meaning thereby that "revealed truth and natural sciences are

different facets of the same reality and therefore the one cannot

contradict the other".4B Sir Sayyid even went as far as to assert that

the Qur'an did not subscribe to the generally held beliefs that the

Prophet had performed 'miracles'.49 It is obvious that by taking such

extreme rationalist positions he was bound to provoke the wrath of the

conservatives. He went on to scrutinize the classical data of the hadith,

47. yureshi, op. cit., pp. 224, 364.

48. Ibid., p. 226.
49. Kalim Siddiqui, Conflict. Crisis and Mar in Pakistan, (London. Macmillan Press, 1972), p. 9.
 119

upheld the view that Utihad was the inalienable right of every Muslim,

rejected the principle of ijma (consensus) in the classical sense which

confined it to the ulama, and emphasized the religious and sufi

speculation as originally advanced by Shah Waliu11ah. so Therefore, by

taking such a stand on the religious thinking of the day he not only

threatened the ulama's position in the monopoly of interpretation of

Islamic law but, more importantly, he put into question their raison

d'iHre in a rapidly changing Muslim society.51 He was an ardent

believer in the dynamic change of societal conditions, and this included a

need for a new approach to education in India.

Sir Sayyid held the view that, along with the retrograde religious

thinking, the decrepit state of Muslim education was the fundamental cause

for the rapid downfall of the Muslims' cultural, economic and political

positions in India. This, he felt, had been proven in vivid terms with

the failed 1857 Mutiny against the British. So, with the aim of

correcting this poor state of education, he established on 24 May 1875 the

Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College at Aligarh. His argument was that

by eschewing Western education and modern sciences, which the Hindus had

quickly embraced with the arrival of the British, the Muslims had caused

their own downfall. Accordingly, the curriculum that was set at Aligarh

emphasized Western science and political tradition. He stressed the need

to study modern sciences not only because he perceived Islamic sciences to

be outdated, but also because he felt it to be the best way to protect

Islam against Western attack and re-establish the Muslims' lost

grandeur. 52

50. K.B. Sayeed, "Religion and Nation-Building in Pakistan", The ~iddle-East Journal, Vel. 17, No.
l, Summer 1963, p. 230; and, Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 53-54, 104.
51. l. Binder, Religion and Polites in Pakistan, (University of California Press, 1961), p. 42. It
is surprising to note that Binder never mentions anything about 'popular' Islam.
52. Sa'feed, Pabstan ... , ~. 15.
 120

However, in order to attain this goal and consolidate the position of

the Indian Muslims, it would be necessary to call a truce with the British

and demonstrate to them that they were just as loyal and reliable subjects

as the Hindus. Eventually, they were able to establish with the colonial

administration a de facto contract that proved to the British that the

Muslims wished to continue to live under British protection. It was an

agreement that the adherents of the Aligarh movement felt was sufficiently

binding for them to refuse to join the post-World War I Hindu-Muslim

Khilafat Movement against the British. 53 Sir Sayyid was also able to

alter much of the Muslims' political and social outlook. He declared

India to be Dar-ul-Islam (land of Islam) as opposed to the Deoband and the

Ahl-i-Hadith considering it to be Dar-ul-Harb (non-Islamic land). He also

urged Muslims to learn English and adopt the English way of life; it could

only be to their advantage, for it would facilitate their re-entry into

the administrative apparatus. 54

This movement was to have an ever-lasting effect upon the Muslim

community, especially on the Western-educated elite that was to lead the

Muslims in their quest for an independent homeland. As Fazlur Rahmad

correctly indicated: the MAO College was to become the "nerve centre of

the Muslim nationalist movement leading to the creation of Pakistan".55

However, a third type of movement, Fundamentalism, in a way

philosophically related to the Modernists in the need for the

re-interpretation of the tenets of Islam, was also to have deep-seated

repercussions on the thinking of the Muslims of the Subcontinent.

53. Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 190-191.

54. Titus, op. cit., pp. 201-206.
55. Rahman, Islam and Modernity ... , p. 74.
 121

The Fundamentalists, or Revivalists, is a type of conservative who is

directly influenced by Shah Waliullah's reform movement. However, he

differs from the Traditionalists in that "he does not accept as

authoritative the whole gamut of orthodox beliefs and practices that have

developed throughout the Islamic past",56 but instead wishes to return

to the period of the Khulafa-i-Rashida in the 7th century A.D. when Islam

was still in the pristine stage of its religious practices. Where the

Modernists part way with the Fundamentalists is over the direction

re-interpretation should proceed, since the Modernists wish to see Islam

adapt to the changing times and not adopt values of days gone by.

The Fundamentalists are influenced by Shah Waliullah's opposition to

taglid (traditionalism) and ijma (consensus) as set forth by the jurists

of the four schools of Islamic law. Like the Traditionalists, they

recognize the validity of Islamic canon law as unalterable and immutable

and uphold the principle that the six collections of hadith are the

supreme source of canon law. 57 Where there is a significant doctrinal

difference between the Traditionalists and the Fundamentalists is over the

issue of figh (classical Muslim jurisprudence): first, its suitability to

meet the challenges of modern times;58 and, second, the equal importance

the ulama tend to give to the four legal schools and the original

scriptures. As Binder stated: " ... Fundamentalism and ulama are actually

defending the same laws by different arguments, the Fundamentalists

specifically by a more extensive use of reason".59 Therefore, the

applicabili ty of i,jtihaq, but this only in a limited sense, is granted

more importance in the Fundamentalists' Weltanschauung. It is also over

the scope of interpretation that they differ with the Modernists. Just as

56. Rahman, Islam, p. 230.

5i. Ahmad, cpo cit., p. 212.
58. Ibid., p. 213.
59. Binder, ~it., p. 75.
 122

the Fundamentalists consider the ulama's use of i.itihad too narrow, they

believe the Modernists, by using the standard of reason to judge the very

basis of Islam, that is, the Qur'an and the Sunnah (practices and precepts

of the Prophet), to have gone too far in the application of Utihad.

On the Subcontinent Fundamentalism was given a powerful impetus with

the founding of the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) in August 1941 by Maulana Abu'l

A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979). Although not an alim but a journalist by trade,

Mawdudi had sufficient knowledge of Arabic to be able to interpret

classical Arabic literature of Islam. He was a prolific writer who not

only did not shy away from covering every possible aspect of Islam, but

whose mass following was to have far-reaching consequences for the future

political developments of Pakistan.

Mawdudi's Fundamentalist philosophy emphasized Islam as it developed

up to the fourth Caliph; it was an urge to return to the 'romantic' days

of Muslim history. The two basic premises upon which his ideology was

based were: the Unity and the sovereignty of God. 50 He argued that

Islam was basically a 'simple' and 'clear-cut' affair which the ulama and

the Sufis had complicated by adding to it superfluous ideas and

practices. 51 Man, God's viceregal on earth, "must mould human society

according to the immutable everlasting, divine law of Wahy (divine

revelation}".52 According to Mawdudi, it was due to Man's deviation

from the natural relationship that existed between God and him, coupled

with the infiltration into Islam of other religions, that Man's behaviour

became unethical, sinful and un-Islamic. Not only is God to be

acknowledged as occupying the centre of Islamic society, but He must be

60. Kalim Bahadur, The Jama'at-i-Islami af Pakistan, (Lahore, Pregressive Books, 1983), p. 160.
61. Rahman, Islam and ~oderni~y, pp. 116-117.
62. Ah~ad, op. cit., p. 209.
 123

fully obeyed according to the laws He revealed to the Prophet.

Accordingly, Mawdudi stauchly believed that anyone who advanced the notion

that these divine injunctions could be tampered with, or selectively

adhered to, was not fit to belong to the Islamic society.63

For Mawdudi, his ultimate goal was the establishment of an Islamic

state based upon the Shari at (Holy law of Islam), for this Holy scripture

was "a complete scheme of life and an all-embracing social order - nothing

superfluous and nothing lacking". 64 He went on to define an Islamic

State as:

... nothing more than a combination of men working

together as servants of God to carry out His will and
purposes. 65

Moreover, he stated:

The basic principles (sic) of Islamic politics is that

individually and collectively human beings should waive
all rights of legislation and all power to give
commands to others. The rights vest in Allah alone. 66

As far as he was concerned, only his school of thought would be able

to bring about the Islamic revolution he envisaged. It is in this context

that he opposed the Western-educated Muslims as well as the ulama who had

been trained in conservative religious madrasahs. He asserted:

The old-fashioned schools are steeped in conservatism

to such an extent that they have lost touch with the
modern world. As for our modern, secular institutions,
they produce people who are ignorant of even
rudimentary knowledge of Islam and its laws. 67

63. Tbid., pp. 210-211.

64. Charles J. Adams, "The Ideol:Jgy Gf Hawlana Hawdudi·, in D.E. Smith (ed.), South Asian PGlitics
and Religion, (Princeton University Press, 1%6), p. 388.
65. Maulana Abu'l A'ia Mawdudi, The Process of Islamic Revolution, (Lahore, 1955), p. 14, cited in
Banadur, oe. eiL, p. 161.
66. Maulana Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, The political Theory of Islam, (Lahore, n.d.), pp. 27-28, cited in
Binder, op. cit., p. 91.
67. Maulana Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, Islamic Law and Constitution, (Karachi, 1955), pp. 51-52, cited in
K.B. Sayeed, "The Jama'at-i-Islami Movement in Pakistan, Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXX, No.1, Harch 1959,
P. 62.
 124

Accordingly, Mawdudi decided to establish his own organization, which

today is still very active in Pakistan, with the purpose of correcting

this major deficiency present in India's Muslim community. The JI, which

is essentially a neo-Islamic totalitarian organization with strong

fascistic overtones,58 has a highly centralized and elitist structure,

composed of small cells independent from one another but each accountable

to the Amir (leader) of the party. Its aim IS to train young,

urban-educated recruits into future leaders of the masses. 59

In order to expand its influence amongst the masses, it relies heavily

on propaganda and publicity. From the early days of its foundation it

involved itself in educational institutions with the aim of socializing

the children to think and behave along Mawdudi's philosophy. At the

tertiary level, it established a student wing, the Islami Jami'at Tulaba,

with the purpose of indoctrinating and recruiting college students to the

party. Apart from numerous and widespread party literature, available in

most of the vernaculars of India, it also formed the Halqa-i-Adab-i-Islami

(Islamic Literature circle), comprised of writers of light literature

easily accessible to the general public, with the sole aim of countering

the Modernists' own writings. Finally, it involved itself in the field of

social services, such as hospitals, food for the poor, charity houses,

with the purpose of offering people attractive alternatives to state-run

welfare services. However, by the time independence was granted to India,

its influence was limited to the Punjab, United Provinces, Bihar,

Hyderabad and Madras, with, ironically, very few followers in the Muslim

majority provinces of Sind, Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province and

Bengal. 70

68. Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change, (Princeton University Press, 1963', p. 135.
69. Maulana Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, Jama',lt-i-Islami, (Lahore, 1952), p. 36, cited in Sayeed, "The
Jama'at-i-Islami ... ", p. 63.
70. At the time of independence it had only one member in East Bengal, Ibid., p. 129.
 125

After having briefly examined the major groups of Muslims who

participated in the Pakistan 'movement', it becomes quite apparent that,

apart from their common opposition to Hindu domination, these adherents of

the various schools of thought were deeply divided over the role Islam

should have in the field of public policy. (please refer to the schema on

the following page for a graphic representation) As the subsequent 40

years would clearly demonstrate, these various groups were unable to work

out a compromise formula because, in practice, each of the groupings

envisaged different practical applications of their thoughts. Although

the Modernists, essentially the Muslim Leaguers, acknowledged that

Pakistan was a Muslim state by virtue of its religious composition, they

believed religion should be a private matter clearly separated from the

public domain. On the other hand, the Traditionalists agreed amongst each

other that Islam should determine public and private behaviour; however,

their lack of unified approach to the fundamentals of Islam hampered their

ability to present a coherent religious-cum-political framework for

Pakistan. Finally, while the Fundamentalists basically agreed with the

Traditionalists' belief that religion should be the cornerstone of state

policy, they strongly disagreed with them over which Islamic tenets should

be used as the standard to achieve a truly Islamic state. Therefore, as a

,
consequence of these varied and often opposed views about the role

religion should have in Pakistan, the country would be plagued with

persistent ideological differences.

 GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF 'l'HE ORIGINS OF THE THREE MAJOR ISLAMIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

SHAH WALIULLAH (1703-1764)

'I I (
, I
j----------------- 1 - - - - . - - ' - - - - - - - --I
r
I
I
I
i
SAYYID AHMAD BARELI (1782-1831)

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(\/
.--I

,
I ,..,,
I
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I
DEOBAND'f (1876) AHL-I-HADITH
,
I
I
I
,
I I

•
I
V
MAULANA MAWDUDI (1903-1979) SIR SAYYID AHMED KHAN
JAMA'AT-i-ISLfu~I ALIGARH (1875)

FUNDAMENTALISTS TRADITIONALISTS MODERNISTS

 POLITICAL POSITION OF THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF MUSLIM BELIEF SYSTEMS

'POPULAR' ISLAM

l"-
N
r-I

ISLAMIC NATIONALISTS NATIONALIST MUSLIMS MUSLIM NATIONALISTS

 GRID CATEGORIZING PARTICIPANTS IN PARTITION DEBATE ACCORDING TO THE

ISLAMIC SCHOOLS OF THOUGH'l' AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

-
HUSLIH NATIONALIST ISLAMIC
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT POLITICAL ORIENTATION
~
NATIONALISTS HUSLIHS NATIONALISTS

MODERNISTS HUSLIH LEAGUE

co
N
rl

AHL-i- SUNNAT DEOBAND

(BARELWI)
~It
AHL-i-HADITH
TRADITIONALISTS
JAM{AT-al- JAMTIAT-al-
ULAMA-i-ISLAA ULli.Mli.-i-HIND

JAf.m'AT-i-
ISLAMi
FUNDli.HENTALISTS AHRARS
KHAKSARS

- - -- - ------ ----------- -------

j
 CHAPTER 5.

THE MODERNIST PERIOD (1947-1977)

 Having examined in the previous chapter the various political and

religious forces which were instrumental in the drive to have Pakistan

become a reality, one can now proceed to the analysis of the interaction

of the secularists and religious parties in their endeavour to mould the

state institutions according to their different belief systems. This

chapter will be divided into four historical parts, that is, 1947-1958;

1958-1969; 1969-1971; and, 1971-1977, with each of these sections

examining three questions: first, the demands made by the different

political-religious groups in the establishment of state institutions;

second, the decisions taken by the government of the day; and, third, the

consequences of these governmental decisions upon the religious debate.

THE EARLY YEARS: 1947-1958

As indicated in the previous chapter, the pre-Partition debate

relating to the establishment of a homeland for the Muslims of the

Subcontinent, although heavily influenced by the religious attitudes of

the protagonists, was essentially political in nature. It divided the

Indian Muslims into two irreconciliable camps: on the one hand, the

Nationalist Muslims and Islamic Nationalists who wanted to maintain a

united India after independence and, on the other hand, the Muslim

Nationalists who were advocating the creation of Pakistan. After

Partition the debate turned on what kind of Pakistan. This debate pitted

against one another two diametrically opposed groups: the religious

leaders and the Modernists. The former consisted of two factions: the

Muslim Nationalists, essentially, the Traditionalists who had always been

advocating the creation of Pakistan, and the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) Islamic

Nationalists, who decided nevertheless to migrate to Pakistan even though

they had been ardent opponents to the principle of Pakistan. The

 130

Modernists, on the other hand, were more homogeneous and essentially

comprised of the Muslim League leadership and the nascent bureaucracy.

The inherent fundamental disagreement between the two camps was the result

of the clash of two opposing value systems: the Western-oriented

Modernists and the madrasah (religious schools)-educated ulama. It

quickly became obvious that these deeply-rooted philosophical and

socio-political differences were going to create overall instability and,

consequently, hamper the process of national integration. It was during

the period of writing the first constitution, which lasted nine years,

that these conflicting positions came to a head.

As leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah's conceptualization of what

type of political structure would be best suited for Pakistan and the role

religion should have in the administration of the state, were generally

accepted as the official position of the Muslim League as a whole. When

reading Jinnah's speeches and declarations it becomes quite apparent that

the establishment of an Islamic system of government, as envisioned by the

Fundamentalists, was completely anathema to his political philosophy.

Considering his background this should come as no great surprise. His

education in a liberal democracy led him to adopt the view that a Western

type democracy would be the ideal political model for Pakistan. Moreover,

Justice (Retd.) Muhammad Munir has gone as far as to say that Jinnah

wished to establish a government along secular lines. 1 Privately, this

may have been his desire, but in view of the cultural environment he could

hardly state this publicly for fear of upsetting the moderate faction of

the ulama. On the other hand, neither did he ever suggest that Pakistan

would be an Islamic state. Excerpts from some of his speeches and

statements will clarify Jinnah's position.

1. Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, (Lahore, Vanguard Books, 1930), p. 29.
 131

In 1946, in an interview with Doon Campbell, Reuter's correspondent in

New Delhi, he stated:

The new state would be a modern democratic st.ate with
sovereignty resting in the people and the members of
the new nation having equal rights of citizenship
regardless of their religion, caste or creed. 2

In his concluding address at the League Legislators' Convention held

in Delhi in 1946, Jinnah specifically excluded the idea of a future

Islamic Government in Pakistan.

What are we fighting for? What are we almlng at? It is

not theocracy - not for a theocratic state. Religion
is there, and religion is dear to us. All the wordly
goods are nothing to us when we talk of religion; but
there are other things which are very vital - our
social life, our economic life ... 3

However, he went on to assert in December 1947 at the League Council

meeting: "Let it be clear that Pakistan is going to be a Muslim state

based on Islamic ideals ... "4 These Islamic ideals were, according to

Jinnah: "Brotherhood, equality and fraternity of man ... "s

What one can deduce from Jinnah's statements is his desire to

establish in Pakistan a democracy that would be based on the ideals of its

people, i.e., Islamic values. However, being a follower of the Modernist

school of thought, the type of Islam he had in mind was one that was the

most liberal in its interpretation of the religious tenets. I,itihad, for

example, could easily be considered a form of democracy applied to the

political realm. Moreover, as far as a Muslim is concerned, Islam is a

way of life in which the secular and the spiritual fields cannot be

separated for the simple reason that in his Weltanschauung these two

2. Ibid.,
3. Foundations of Pakistan, All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947, Vol. II, 1924-1947, Syed
Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.), (Karachi, National Publishing House, 1970), p. 523.
4. Ibid.,
5. Speeches of Jinnah as Governor-General, (Islamabad, Ministry of Information, n.d.), p. 103.
 132

facets of life, as Westerners know it, does not exist. W.C. Smith saw no

contradiction in the term Islamic democracy but, rather, a tautology,

since Islam is democracy-oriented. 6 However, to be truly democratic, in

such a way that it accommodates the people's values, Pakistan's system of

government would have to reflect the Islamic belief system rather than the

Western one. 7 Of course, by Islamic state one does not refer to a

theocracy, for Islam, specifically the Sunni sect, abhors the idea of a

priestly class governing the state. 8

Many critics of Jinnah have referred to his Presidential Address to

the Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947 as a basis for an attack on his

political philosophy. In it he stated:

You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that

has nothing to do with the business of the state ... you
will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to
be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in
the religious sense, because that is the personal faith
of each individual, but in the political sense as
citizens of the state ... 9

Two points should be taken into consideration when examining this

speech. First, the context in which it was delivered. The whole

Subcontinent was in turmoil and wholesale human carnage was taking place

between the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim migrants. In view of the existing

situation, Jinnah's speech was an attempt at calming and reassuring the

various religious communities involved in this debacle. As Mujahid

correctly noted:

... statemenship (sic) now demanded the healing of the

wounds, the burying of the bitter memories of the past,
the building up of trust and confidence in the
minorities. lo

6. w.e. Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State, (Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1951), p. 50.
7. [bid.,
3. Sharif Al Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah:Studies in interpretation, (Karachi, Quaid-i-Azam Academy,
1931), p.26S.
9. Speeches of Jinnah, p. 9.
 133

Many critics believe that this speech is proof that Jinnah was never

sincere about his "Two-Nation Theory". Such a view of a man who was

wholeheartedly committed to the cause of the Indian Muslims is both

shallow and erroneous. This speech has also been used by Jinnah's critics

as a proof that he wished to establish a secular form of government. Such

an interpretation is plausible considering his background. However, this

was the only time he ever suggested a secular type of government, and this

in very disguised terms.

Using Jinnah's speeches as a philosophical point of reference, the

Modernists were adamant in their opposition to the ulama's desire to have

the tenets of Islam, as enunciated in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, made law

of the land. Moreover, in purely political terms, the Muslim League

politicians wished to restrict the influence of the ulama, and this was

only possible if they limited the Islamic aspects of the constitution.

Accordingly, the Modernists, as a compromise to the ulama, were willing to

follow the quite harmless and safe path of making the tenets of Islam a

part of state policy, an approach qui te di fferent from implementing it as

law of the land. To the ulama this political attitude was tantamount to

betrayal, for by entering into an alliance with the Muslim League the

ulama had expected to be given a voice with regard to the future form of

the constitution, and especially the role of Islamic tenets in the new

state institutions. Regardless of the politicians' political manoeuvres

to reduce the role of the ulama, the religious leaders, bitter about the

treatment they were given by the Muslim League, nevertheless persisted in

their endeavour to have the Sunnah enshrined in the constitution.

The ulama's unyielding position was the consequence of the Muslim

10. Nujahid, Or. cit., p. 249.

 134

League's pre-Partition strategy of "following a revolutionary policy of

mobilizing strength by politicizing religion"ll; for by having been

co-opted into the Pakistan Movement, the ulama rightfully felt that as

junior partners in the struggle for a Muslim homeland they should have an

important voice in the formulation of the future structure of the state

institutions. However, as opposed tO,the Modernists who were relatively

homogeneous in their position with regard to the role of Islamic tenets

should have in the future constitution, the ulama were deeply divided

according to the two religious schools of thought, that is, the

Traditionalists and the Fundamentalists.

During the early years of Pakistan's existence three events reflected

this deep cleavage between the Modernists and the religious groups: the

adoption of the 1949 Objectives Resolution, the 1953 anti-Ahmadiyah

disturbances, and the constitutional debates leading to the promulgation

of the first constitution.

Soon after the establishment of Pakistan, important representatives of

the three religious schools of thought voiced their opinion regarding the

role of Islam in the administration of the country. Leading the

Traditionalists was the Jami'at-ul-Ulama-i-Islami (JUI). Its highly

respected founder and president, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, lost no

time in putting across his organization's point of view. According to him:

The Islamic State means a State which is run on the

exalted principles of Islam ... it can only be run by
those who believe in those principles ... People who do
not subscribe to those ideas (Islam) may have a place
in the administrative machinery of the State but they
cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of framing
the general policy of the State or dealing with matters
vital to its safety and integrity.12

11. Wayne A. Wilcox, "Ideological Dilemmas in Pakistan's Political Culture", in D.E. Smith (ed.),
South Asian Politics and Religion, (Princeton University Press, 19661, p. 344.
12. The Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. 5., 1949, p. 45.
 135

As an outstanding figure amongst the ulama and recipient of official

patronage for the work he had done for the cause of the Muslim League, his

opinion was taken seriously by government officials and other religious

groups. Maulana Usmani relentlessly followed the argument that

acknowledgement of Allah's sovereignty meant acceptance of His law as the

law of the land and, consequently, that the state institutions must be

based not merely on vague notions of Islamic principles but strictly on

the basis of the Qur'an, the Sunnah and Shariat law. 13

The Fundamentalists, who were in agreement with the Traditionalists in

their drive to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan, outlined the four

principles upon which the constitution should be based in a speech

delivered by Maulana Maududi on 18 February 1948. They were:

1. That we Pakistanis believe in the supreme sovereignty of

God and that the State will administer the country as
His agent;
2. that the basic law of the land is the Shari'ah which has
come to us through our prophet Muhrunmad ;
3. that all such existing laws as are in conflict with the
shari'ah will be gradually repealed and no such law as
may be in conflict with the shari'ah shall be framed in
the future;
4. that the State, in exercising its powers, shall have no
authority to transgress the limits imposed by Islam. 14

Maulana Maududi not only had utter contempt for the Western model of

democracy, but as far as he was concerned it had no place in his vision of

an Islamic state. As he so often repeated in his polemical speeches:

Islam is the very antithesis of secular Western

democracy. The philosophical foundation of Western
democracy is the sovereignty of the people. Law-making
is their prerogative ... Islam ... altogether repudiates
the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its
polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and
the vice-regency [Khilafat] of man. 1S

13. Inamur Rehman, Pakistan Opinion and political Devel~pment in Pakistan, 1947-1958, (Karachi,
Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 7.
14. Leonard Binder, Religion and Palities in Pakistan, (Ber~ele" University of California Press,
1%1), p. 103.
15. Cited in E.I.J. Rosenthal, Islam ~n the Modern National State, (Cambridge University Press,
1965), p. 138.
 136

The Modernists, on the other hand, insisted on a more liberal

interpretation of the tenets of Islam, especially with regard to the

principle of i.i tihad which they felt, as M. A. Jinnah and Sir Iqbal had on

several occasions emphasized,l6 should be applied to the political

field. They believed that the true spirit of Islam could only be achieved

through the application of personal interpretation of the Islamic tenets

and community consensus on issues that affected society as a whole. It

was not going to be through dogmatism and Shariat laws imposed from the

top, as advocated by the Traditionalists and the Fundamentalists, which

would inculcate into the people the true Islamic way of life, but rather a

progressive and liberal education of the population about the real meaning

and values of Islam. Moreover, the Modernists severely criticized the

ulama for their lack of consensus over which Islamic laws should be

applied and the extent of their application. This they felt was mainly

because there was no specific guidelines in the Our'an outlining the

political structures of a state, let alone the form it should take for a

twentieth century country.17 Finally, they were highly critical of the

ulama who persisted in their drive to see the establishment of an Islamic

state when at the same time corruption and poverty was so pervasive

throughout society. How could they speak of inplementing the spirit of

Islam when the basic needs and wants of the vast majority were being

ignored? Although he did not not wish to alienate the ulama, the prime

minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, generally did support the Modernists' stance.

We have pledged that the state shall exercise its power

and authority through the chosen representative of the
people. In this we have kept steadily before us the
principle of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance
and social justice as enunciated by Islam. There is no
room for theocracy, for Islam stands for freedom of
conscience, condemns coercion, has no priesthood and
abhors the caste system. lS

16. Ibid., pp. 205-206.

17. Rehman, ~.cit., p. 7.
lB. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan:Heart of Asia, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 6.
 137

It was in this atmosphere of increased religious polarization that

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan took his first major' 'religious' decision,

which was to have adopted by the Constituent Assembly the 1949 Objectives

Resolution, undoubtedly an important step taken by the federal government

of Pakistan in the drive to establish an Islamic state. The relevant

sections were:

Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs

to God Almighty alone, and the authority which He has
delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people
for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him
is a sacred trust;
This Constituent Assembly representing the people of
Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the
sovereign independent state of Pakistan;
Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and
authority through the chosen representatives of the
people;
Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom,
equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated
by Islam shall be fully observed;
Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their
lives in the individual and collective spheres in
accord with the teaching and requirements of Islam as
set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna;
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the
minorities freely to profess and practise their
religions and develop their cultures;
Whereby the territories now included in or in
accession with Pakistan and such other territories as
may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan
shall form a Federation wherein the units will be
autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on
their powers and authority as may be prescribed;
Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights
including equality of status, of opportunity and before
law, social, economic and political justice, and
freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship
and association, subject to law and public morality;
Wherein adequate provision shall be made to
safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and
backward and depressed classes; 19

This compromise document, due to its lack of specificity and inherent

vagueness, was acceptable to all schools of thought. The ulama were

satisfied with its general direction because it "created the impression

that Pakistan would move in the direction of an orthodox Islamic

19. C.A.P. Debates, Vol. V, No 1, (7 Mad 1'?49), pp. 1-2, cited in Binder, op. cit., pp. 142-143.
 138

state".20 Although there was no mention of the shariat anywhere in the

text, or for the establishment of an Islamic state for that matter, the

fact that it started off by stipulating that sovereignty over the entire

universe, which would presumably include Pakistan, belonged to Allah was

sufficient assurance that the government had come around to accepting the

Traditionalists' and Fundamentalists' .point of view. The Modernists, on

the other hand, saw no contradiction between Islam and the Western model

of popular representation, as indicated in the resolution. Actually, the

document was rife with contradictions, such as, giving sovereignty rights

at the same time to Allah, the people, parliament and the State. As to
who or what would have precedence was anyone's guess and, as such, open to

all kinds of interpretations. The Pakistan Times clearly questioned the

arrangement: did the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance

and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, mean that these social values

were already clearly indicated in the religious texts, or did it mean they

still would have to be determined according to a specific school of

thought to the exclusion of other sects' interpretation?21 If it was

the latter case, this would, and did, reinforce the already existing

sectarian divisions. The only strong opposition to the Resolution came

from B.K. Datta and s.c. Chat topadhyaya , the Hindu representatives in the

Constituent Assembly, who concluded that if sovereignty belonged to Allah

it could not at the same time belong to the people and, on that basis,

Pakistan could not claim to be a democracy.22 Apart from the Hindu

critics, the Resolution was acceptable to all sections of the Muslim

community and, as a result, was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 12

March 1949 after only five days of debate.

20. K.B. Sayeed, "Religi3n and Nation-Building in Pakistan", Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, No.3,
Summer 1963, p. 283.
21. Rehman, CD.Clt., pP. a-9.
22. Binder, op.cit., p. 144.
 139

Soon after the 1949 Objectives Resolution was passed, the Constituent

Assembly appointed a 24 member (21 Muslims and 3 non-Muslims) Basic

Principles Committee (BPC) with the task of framing a constitution for the

country. At the same time was constituted, on the advice of Maulana

Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the Board of Ta'limat-i-Islamia, a committee of

seven with expertise in Islamic principles assigned "to advise on matters

arising out of the Objectives Resolution and on such matters as may be

referred to them by the various sub-committees".23 The members of the

BPC and the Board of religious experts quickly set themselves to work, and

on 27 September 1950 presented the Interim Report to the Constituent

Assembly.

The most important aspect of the Report was its recommendation that

the 1949 Objectives Resolution should not be integrated into the text of

the future constitution, but merely act as "Directive Principles of State

Policy". This was severely criticized by the ulama, for this failed to

give the Resolution force of law. The other Islamic provisions strongly

reflected the Modernist approach to the whole issue. 24 For example, it

advocated freedom of conscience, the free exercise of religion, the right

to propagate other religions, and every religious denomination was free to

manage its own affairs. All these liberal provisions were contrary to the

basic principles of classical Islamic doctrines which placed restrictions

on the religious practices of non-Muslims.

But what really upset the ulama was to discover that the BPC had

rejected outright all of the Board of Ta'limat-i-Islamia's recommend-

ations which were based on the classical theory of the caliphate.

Consequently, as a result of the vehement opposition to the Interim Report

23. Ibid., p. lS6.

24. Rehman, op.cit., p. 14.
 140

from all religious circles, as well as dissatisfaction with its federal

aspects,25 the government had no other option but to withdraw it for

consideration and present a second report more to the liking of the ulama.

After working full-time on a revised draft for a constitution, the BPC

was ready to submit the Final Report to the Constituent Assembly for

general debate on 22 December 1952. However, before the report could be

discussed, full-scale religious opposition against the Ahmad iyahs, which

had begun in Karachi in May 1952, forced the temporary halt in the

constitutional discussions in order to find a solution to these civil

disturbances.

The Ahmadiyahs or Qadianis, a minority Muslim sect who derive their

name from the sect's founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, question one of the

fundamental tenets of Islam, that is, Khatam al Nubbuwat (Seal of

Prophethood). Thus, by rejecting the finality of the Prophet Muhammad and

claiming that Mirza Ahmad was the last Messiah of Islam and a prophet, the

Ahmadiyahs, in the eyes of the Traditionalists and Fundamentalists, are to

be considered beyond the pale of Islam and should, therefore, be declared

a non-Muslim sect. Ironically, Mirza Ahmad himself had never layed claims

to prophethood, but had stated that since he had been spoken to by God he

simple considered himself a Muhaddath (prophet metaphysically).26 Apart

from the religious content of the opposition to this sect, there was also

a socio-political element to it. Under the British Raj, the Ahmadiyahs

had been given special treatment by the British in the social, educational

and cultural fields, with the result that when independence arrived, which

incidentally the Ahmadiyahs had opposed,27 this minority sect were

25. The Federal aspects of the Interim Report Nill be discussed in Part IV of the thesis.
26. Rosenthal, op.cit., p. 232.
27. Binder, op.cit., p. 260.
 141

disproportionately represented in the administrative and business sectors.

It was the conspicuous presence of this minority in top positions which

reinforced the religious-oriented opposition to them.

With the aim of influencing the religious content of the on-going

constitutional debate, no effort was spared by the religious groups

involved to use this issue as a means to establish an Islamic state. The

opposition movement against the Ahmadiyahs was spearheaded by the Ahrars,

a Fundamentalist religious organization which, ironically, had also

opposed the creation of Pakistan. Following the All-Pakistan Muslim

Parties Convention held on 2 June 1952, during which the participants

agreed to back the Ahrars' demands, the extremist ulama and the

Jama'at-i--Islami decided to ally themselves with the Ahrars in their

demand to have the government meet three conditions if they wished to see

an end to the unrest. First, the internationally-respected Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Zafrullah Khan,28 had to be dismissed from the

government, since as an Ahmadiyah he could not be relied upon to promote

the values of an ideological state; second, all Ahmadiyahs who held

important policy-making and administrative positions had to be replaced by

Muslims; and, third, the sect had to be declared a non-Muslim minority

and, therefore, only be given seats in the legislature reserved for

minority groups.

The worse anti-Ahmadiyrul riots, which took place between 27 February

and 9 March 1953, were centred in the Punjab with Lahore, Rawalpindi,

Lyallpur and Sialkot witnessing the worst unrest. As a result of these

disturbances, during which 52 people died and 182 were injured, Martial

28_ Interesting " Zafrullah Khan published a book, Islam:Its Meaning for ~odern Han, (London,
Routledge ~ Kegan Pau , (962) in ~hich he only made t~o brief comments about the Ahmadiyah, and neither
one of them ever ment oned their fundamental differences ~ith mainstream Islamic sects.
 142

Law was declared in Lahore from 6 March until 15 May 1953. Two of the

leaders in the disturbances, Maulana Maududi, Amir of the

Jama'at-i-Islami, and Maulvi Niazi, member of the Punjab Legislative

Assembly, were awarded the death penalty, later commuted to fourteen years

jail sentences. 29 As Binder indicated, although it is rare to see ulama

leading violent movements against the,state, if the rebellion "is sure to

succeed, it is obligatory upon all Muslims to uphold the right and

suppress the evil".30 It was the demonstration of this deeply felt

feeling of righteousness by the ulama, especially in a political

environment in which the future role of Islam in the state institutions

was the centre of the constitutional debates, which further polarized the

positions on the religious-political spectrum. The participation of the

ulama in these disturbances was widely criticized by the major

newspapers. The editorial in Dawn of 4 June 1952 clearly reflected the

general feeling of opposition to the activities of the ulama .

... to capture political power, not by virtue of their

services or struggles as political leaders but merely
by virtue of the fact that they belong to the class
known as ulama and consider themselves as the sole
trustees and exponents of Islam ... Their claim to
become a privileged class of omnipresent law-givers
must be resisted and rejected ... 31

Inevitably, these religious-oriented anti-Ahmadiyah disturbances

spilled into the political arena, with the most prominent casualties being

Mumtaz Daultana, Chief Minister of the Punjab, and Khawaja NazimudDin,

Prime Minister of Pakistan. Although initially Daultana tried to suppress

the disturbances, the fact that the anti-Qadiani movement was a popular

issue in the Punjab made it politically difficult for him to go against

it. Consequently, with the aim of making political gains out of the

disturbances, he decided, along with 377 other Muslism Leaguers, to join

29. Keesings Report, 1953, Vol IX, p. 12926.

30. Binder, oe.cit., p. 292.
31. Cited in Rehman, op.cit., p. 21.
 143

the anti-Ahmadiyah movement. Using Wlder-handed methods, such as

diverting part of the Government of PWljab's fWlds for Adult Literacy to

promote the press campaign against the Ahmadiyahs and channelling the

agitation to Karachi, then the federal capital, Daultana hoped to

discredit the government of Nazimuddin for its failure to take a stance on

the issue and, hopefully, force him to bear the responsibility for the

disturbances. 32 However, following the end of these events, the central

government dismissed Daultana and his provincial government, accusing them

of condoning the religious disturbances.

On the federal front events were taking a turn for the worse for Prime

Minister Nazimuddin. Although he was a very religious individual,

Nazimuddin could not get himself to support the anti-Ahmadiyah movement

for fear that it could give Pakistan a bad image abroad. 33 However, by

fail ling to adopt a strong stance one way or another on the issue and at

the same time attempting to divide the religious groups, the prime

minister reinforced the image of lacking decisiveness and leadership.

Consequently, the civilian bureaucracy, unhappy with his poor performance,

urged the governor-general, Ghulam Mohammad, a man who did not view his

functions as being a mere figure-head, to have the prime minister

replaced. 34 Accordingly, on 17 April 1953, Ghulam Mohammad, who

ironically had been installed as governor-general on the advice of

Nazimuddin, dismissed the prime minister and his cabinet on th~ groWlds

... the cabinet of Khwaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely

inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the
country. In the emergency which has arisen I have felt
it incumbent upon me to ask the cabinet to relinquish
office so that a new cabinet fitted to discharge its
obligations towards Pakistan may be formed. 35

32. U. Sayeed, "Islaill and tiatiooJI Integration', in D.E. Sllith (ed.), op.cit., p. 404.
33. Ibid.,
34. Binder, OD. cit., p. 299.
35. Keit.h Callard, PaHstan:A P8litical StJ'!Y., (Lcndon: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 22.
 144

Following the disturbances, a Court of Inquiry was set up under the

chairmanship of the then Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, Justice

Mohammad Munir. The inquiry, which lasted from 1 May 1953 until 10 April

1954, was limited to three specific terms of reference: the circumstances

leading to the declaration of Martial Law in Lahore on 6 March 1953, the

responsibility for the disturbances, and the adequacy or otherwise of the

measures taken by the provincial civil authorities to prevent, and

subsequently to deal with, the disturbances. 36 The judges on the Court

of Inquiry, who ultimately compiled a report close to 400 pages long,

apart from investigating the actual disturbances, examined the wider

aspects of the whole issue,37 mainly the definition and meaning of an

Islamic state as advocated by the ulama involved in the anti-Ahmadiyah

movement. After questioning many prominent ulama and experts in Islamic

doctrines and jurisprudence, and realizing no two religious leaders could

agree as to what constituted a Muslim, the judges came to the following

conclusion:

Keeping in view the several definitions of a Muslim

given by the ulama, need we make any conunent except
that no two learned divines are agreed on their
fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each
learned divine has done and that definition differs
from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of
the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition
given by anyone of the ulama, we remain Muslims
according to the view of the alim but kafirs according
to the definition of everyone else. 38

The Munir Report is significant because it provides an insight into

two problems which had been, and continue to be, central to Pakistan's

quest for an Islamic Ideology. First, it demonstrates a definite lack of

consensus amongst the various schools of thought regarding Islamic beliefs

36. Report of the Court Inquiry. constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to inquire into the Punjab
Disturbances of 195:.
37. The judges' decision to go beyond the scope of the terms of reference ~as severely criticized by
the Jama'at-i-Islami. Their own rebuttal to the Hunir Report too~ the form of a book entitled: An
Analysis of the Hunir Repcrt, by Khurshid Ahmad, Jar.la'at-Hslami Publications, Y.amhi, 1956. -
33. Report of the Court of InquirY, p. 218, cited in Hunir, From Jinn3h to Zia, 00. cit, p. 45.
 145

and principles and how they should be applied to a modern state; and,

second, it proves the necessity for a bold re-orientation through a

process of I'e-interpretation and reform of Islam, to meet modern needs and

demands.

Although debate on the Final Report had continued during the

anti-Ahmadiyah movement, full reswnption of its examination only resumed

as of 7 October 1953, and proceeded until 21 September 1954, after the new

prime minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, had introduced his "Parity Formula",

which satisfactorily resolved the on-going parallel debate regarding the

federal structures of Pakistan. 39 This second draft constitution

presented by the BPe was looked upon much more favourably by the

Traditionalists, since it took into account many of the Board of

Ta'limat-i-Islamia's suggestions. It contained a set of eighteen

"Directive Principles of State Policy", fifteen more than in the Interim

Report. Amongst them were specific requirements that the state prohibit

drinking, gambling and prostitution, eliminate usury as soon as possible,

promote and maintain Islamic moral standards, set up an organization

"commanding the good and prohibiting the evil", bring existing laws into

conformity with the Islamic principles, "codify such injunctions of the

Holy Gur'an and the Sunnah as can be given legislative effect, and

inculcate the spirit of the fundamental unity and solidarity of the Millat

{Muslim community)".40 Also of vital significance to the ulama was the

establishment of a board of ularna advising the Head of State on whether or

not a Bill passed by the parliament was repugnant to the tenets of Islam.

Their advice, however, was not binding upon the Head of State.

39. Mohammad Ali B3gra's 'Parity Formula" will be discussed in detail in Part IV of the thesis.
40. Binder, op. cit., p. 269.
 146

As was to be expected, there were a large number of critics,

especially Modernists and Hindu members of the Constituent Assembly.

There was a feeling amongst the Modernists that by having a board of ulama

supervising every legislative Bill according to its Islamic credentials

Pakistan had accepted the rule of priests at the expense of democracy.41

Some Hindu and Christian members of the assembly were highly critical of

the provisions stipulating that only a Muslim could become Head of

State. 42 Finally, there were some ulama who felt that some of the

Islamic provisions were actually un-Islamic or did not go far enough in

their application of the Islamic tenets. 43

As a result of the anti-Ahmadiyah movement and the publication of the

Munir Report, the ulama had lost moral credibility and political clout

vis-a-vis the Modernists; they had lost all bargaining power. This drop

in their political standing was made quite evident in the statements made

by a number of politicians. For example, Choudhri Khaliquzzaman, a Muslim

Leaguer and the new governor of East Bengal, stated that the threat to

Pakistan came from Communists and theologians; and, although the state

should be guided by Islam, "the • church' would have to be subordinate to

the ·state'''.44 Malik Feroz Khan Noon, the Chief Minister of Punjab who

replaced Daultana, was opposed to an Islamic constitution. Similarly, the

Chief Minister of NWFP, Sardar Abdur Rashid, favoured a secular state

instead of a theocratic state. 45 Consequently, as a result of the

re-alignment of forces in the Constituent Assembly, the Final Report was

passed by 29 votes to 11. The assembly was to reconvene on 27 October

1954 when the Drafting Committee was scheduled to present its draft on the

41. Riaz Ahmad, Constitutional and Political Developments in Pakistan, 1951-1954, (Rawalpindi,
Pan-American Commercial, 1981), p. 23.
42~ Ibid.,
43. Ibid.,
44. Binder, op.cit., P. 304.
~5. Ibi:J.,
 147

constitution. However, a major political 'coup' was in the offing once

again.

During the last session of the Constituent Assembly three Bills had

been passed which seriously curtailed the governor-general's powers.

Ghulam Mohammad, unwilling to accept any infringment on his

quasi-dictatorial powers, decided to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and

declare a state of emergency. Because of this extra-constitutional

political act which was a blatant and crude attempt at maintaining his

powers, Ghulam Mohammad caused the constitutional process to be set back

once again. Pakistan had to wait another one and a half years before it

finally would have a constitution.

By the time the second Constituent Assembly reconvened on 7 August

1955 the ulama's general standing had seriously declined. As previously

noted, this was the result of the anti-Qadiani disturbances and the

publication of the Munir Report, whose findings had been highly critical

of the ulama's inability to define what they meant by an Islamic state.

These two factors were to heavily influence the constitutional debate, for

"the Islamic constitution controversy was considered the root cause of the

dreadful effects of the Ahmadi agitations".46 Consequently, with the

general mood of the population on their side and a desire to finally pass

a constitution that would once and for all put an end to the Islamic state

debate, the Modernists were determined to playa leading role in the

forthcoming debates. Moreover, by having as acting governor-general

Major-General Iskander Mirza, a man who did not hide his contempt for the

ulama,47 the religious leaders had no illusions; they knew they were

46. Binder, cpo ~it., p. 303.

47. Hugh Tinker, "South Asia at Inaependence: InOla, Pa istan and Sr Lanka", in A.J. Wilson and D.
Dalten leds.l, The States Df South Asia:Prablems of National ntegratico, Delhi, Vikas, 1982), p. 18.
 148

fighting a loosing battle.

The Preamble of the 1956 Constitution, which was the complete text of

the 1949 Objectives Resolution, and the "Directive Principles of State

Policy" (Part III of the constitution) were not justiciable and were only

meant to give general guidance to successive governments. The Directive

Principles covered such areas as: the promotion of Muslim unity and

international peace (Art.24), the promotion of Islamic principles

(Art.25), the discouragement of prejudice (Art.26), the protection of

minorities (Art.27), and the principles of social uplift (Art.28). Only

four articles can actually be considered as being Islamic in character.

Article I of the constitution stipulated that the full name of the country

was to be "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan". Article 32 specifically

indicated that only a Muslim could be eligible to become Head of State.

This reservation was nothing particular to Pakistan, since similar

'religious' restrictions are to be found in European constitutions, for

example, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.48 An organization for Islamic

Research and Instruction was to be set up with the purpose of assisting in

the "reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis"(Art.197).

Finally, the president of Pakistan was to appoint a commission within one

year of the enforcement of the constitution "to make recommendations as to

the measures for bringing existing laws into conformity with the

Injunctions of Islam" (Art. 198(3) ).

Although the 1956 Constitution was essentially a "compromise

document",49 since it satisfied all groups, it was nevertheless a major

defeat for the ulama. The religious parties had been stripped of their

48. E.J. Newman, Essays on the Constitution of Pakistan, (Dacca, Pakistan Ca-cp~rative Book Society,
2nd ed., (980), p. 227.
$9. J.L. Esposito, 'Pa~istan:Quest for Islamic Identity', in J. Esposito led.), Islam and
Devei!JPinent, (Syracuse Universit ,{ Pres;;, 19:30), p. 144.
 149

past gains. The Objectives Resolution and the "Directive Principles" were

not justiciable, the Board of ulama, which had been agreed upon in the

1954 Constituent Assembly, had been replaced by a conunission which could

not take any decisions contrary to any provisions of the constitution, and

full freedom and equality had been given to other religious denominations,

which obviously included the controversial Ahmadiyahs. As Esposito so

aptly put it: "It reflected Pakis tan's ideological di fficul ties for it

lacked any systematic statement and implementation of a clear Islamic

rationale".50 The eclectic nature of the document was the only viable

solution to nine years of bitter and acrimonious debate. The general

feeling was that the process of constitution-making had taken long enough

and that changes could always be made to the constitution by way of

amendments.

Although by the end of the civilian period the Modernists may have

temporarily won the battle regarding the role of Islamic tenets in the

administration of the country, this did not mean that the ulama were a

spent force nor that the debate had been settled once and for all. On the

contrary, and as subsequent events would demonstrate, the fundamental

religious differences remained a major obstacle to the integration of

society. The failure to resolve this debate not only adversely affected

the population's perception of Islam as a unifying force, but as Ziring

observed, "the raison d'@tre for Pakistan as an Islamic state ceased to

have much significance ... ".51 As a consequence, this major development

had the effect, especially in East Pakistan, of reinforcing the appeal of

political forces demanding provincial autonomy.

50a Ibid.,
51. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan:The Enigma Df Political Development, (Folkestone, Dawson &Sons,
1980), p. 75.
 150

THE AYUB KHAN PERIOD: 1958-1971

As predicted, the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution did not

resolve the religious debate; on the contrary, it was still a highly

controversial issue by the time General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of

the Army, decided to take over the reins of power. With the forceful

transfer of power to General Ayub, however, the Modernists had found a new

Head of State who would strongly defend their point of view vis-a-vis the

ulama's insistence on giving religion a position of primacy in the

administration of the country. He had a clear understanding of the

problem that was plaguing Pakistan and the obstacle it was creating for

the ultimate resolution of the ever-present religious cleavage. He

correctly felt that unless the ideological dilemma was quickly resolved

Pakistan could fall victim to the process of disintegration. Accordingly,

he decided that enough divisive debate had taken place for the last decade

and that the time had corne for decisive steps to be formulated and

implemented. As a Sandhurst-trained military officer with an affinity for

technological progress and innovation, General Ayub only naturally joined

the camp of the Modernists. Excerpts from his speeches reveal quite

clearly where he stood on the political-religious spectrum. As he

indicated in his political autobiography, Friends not Masters,

But more than anything else it was the irreconcilable

nature of the forces of science and reason and the
forces of dogmatism which was operating against the
unification of the people. A sharp cleavage had been
created between the State and the Religion, and all the
controversies--the temporal versus the spiritual, the
secular versus the religious--revived. In more precise
terms the essential conflict was between the ulema and
the educated classes ... the two had not been able to
work out a common and positive approach to national
problems. Instead, the educated regarded the ulema as
relics of the past WId the ulema treated the educated
as heretics and unworthy.52

52. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 195.
 151

Being squarely on the side of the Modernists, Ayub blamed the ulama

for the ideological morass in which Pakistan society found itself and,

accordingly, believed that it was "essential for the ulema to acquaint

themselves with the advancement of science, philosophy, economics and

contemporary history".53 He went to add that:

... the sermons which are delivered these days at Friday

prayers ... are critical of even the minor innovations of
modern life merely because thay are novel. This I
consider a great disservice to Islam, that such a noble
religion should be presented as inimical to
progress. 54

After identifying the major cause for the lack of ideological

integration, General Ayub repeatedly advanced his views as to how Pakistan

could resolve once and for all the dilemma it was faced with.

Being an ideological State, our first objective must be

to adhere unflinchingly to our ideology--the ideology
of Islam. It is for this that we demanded and obtained
Pakistan. It is the source of our strength and
cohesion. We must do all we can to promote it so as to
gain unity, equality, brotherhood and social and
economic justice. 55

He felt very strongly that the ideology of Islam could best be achieved by

using the Qur'an as the major point of reference. 56 This, he believed,

would eliminate the divisiveness present amongst Muslims, for it was due

to all the subsequent additions to the Qur'an that disunity in Islam had

developed. This simplified approach to the application of Islam was

wholly rejected by the Traditionalists because it did not take into

account the subsequent development of the four schools of orthodox figs

(Islamic law) and by the Fundamentalists who felt that Ayub's

interpretation and Modernist thinking would not lead to the establishment

of a full fledged Islamic state. However, it was acceptable to the

53. Excerpt from ConvDcation Address at the Darul Ulocm Islamia, Tando Allahyar, 3 May 1959,
~eeches by President Ayub Khan. (Karachi, Ministry of inforl!lation, n.d.,l, p. 112.
54. Ibid., p. Ill.
55. 'Pakistan Day Broadcast', The Pakistan Times, 23 March 1962.
56. Inaugural Speech at the University Grounds, Lahore, 25 February 1959, Speeches by President Ayub
Khan, p. 65.
 152

Modernist G.A. Parwez who, as leader of the Ahl-i-Hadith school of

thought, believed that the Our'an is the only source of true, authentic

Islam. Moreover, a complete implementation of the Our'anic laws and

principles would not only establish a democratic system but also an

Islamic state. 57

The ulama's adverse reaction to Ayub's approach not only reinforced

his contempt for the ulama, but it also confirmed his feelings that the

religious leaders' "true intention was to re-establish the supremacy of

the ulema and to re-assert their right to lead the community".58

Moreover, since General Ayub saw no place in his future political

framework for a supra-body of ulama,59 he was determined to break their

political standing by refusing to grant them any representation on the

religious councils and institutes he was later to establish under the 1962

Constitution. Not tolerating opposition to his rule, probably one of

Ayub's major failures, General Ayub had no misgivings in arresting

religious leaders, as was the case with Maulana Maududi, leader of the

Jama'at-i-Islami, in January 1964, if he felt this would help him

implement his political programme. 60

Having rejected the ulama's demands, and as Chief Martial Law

Administrator applying the force of Martial Law orders and ordinances,

Ayub Khan proceeded to change and regulate some of the most important

religious practices. One of his earliest decisions, and one that would

have far-reaching repercussions in the rural areas, was the promulgation

c' 'nr'ar'/iaw
Ji • 1;"', [ril .A
..... 1:; ... . P'r~ft.
I '..I~ftUe~'Dftr 10p7
;.'jeL, ."Iv. iii CI J. ......I .....
1J Also see his pamphlet: Genesis and Ideology of
Pakistan, Lahore, Idira-e-Tclu-e-Isiam, n.d.
sq Ayub Y.han, op. eiL, p. 203.
59. Ibid., p. l'?'?
60. Maududi and 18 others were arrested under the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order
Ordinance, 1960 (Section 31 and the Jama'at-i-!slami was declared an unlawful association under the
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908. Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis:Pakistan, 1962-1969, (London,
OxfGrd Universi ty Press, 1972), p. ,S6.
 153

of the Augaf Ordinance of 1959. When he passed this law, General Ayub had

two objectives in mind. First, the ordinance placed approximately 700

Sufi shrines under government management. At the same time it arranged to

have Khatibs (religious men who deliver the Friday sermons) paid a

government salary based on the provincial civil service scale. 61 The

purpose of placing under government c9ntrol these highly venerated

shrines, and essentially making the pirs government employees, was not

only to strengthen the state in the rural areas but, according to Ayub,

"to free the people from the yoke of pirs and fagirs which was worse than

slavery".62 Although the government had placed the pirs' shrines and

estates under bureaucratic control, by giving them a secure and

alternative source of income it had broken the pirs' dependence on, and

exploitation of, the peasants living close to the shrines. The

government's aim, therefore, was not to destroy the religious institution

of the pirs; on the contrary, it only wished to break the economic link

between the rural masses and the pirs in order to use to its advantage the

religious hold these pirs had over their rural constituencies. As an

observer of 'popular' Islam correctly noted:

Through 1959 and subsequent ordinances an attempt was

made to change the religious significance of the pir,
not his religious hold by invoking a new ideology of
the pir which emphasized piety and spirituality of the
pirs in the eyes of the common man ... sought to meet a
sense of unanimity between government policy direction,
religious values and the reformist ideals of the
pirs. 63

The second objective to be achieved was to have the rural imams and

khatibs into thinking along Modernist lines. In order to fulfil this

goal, the government established religious institutions and academies

specifically geared to training these religious leaders. Once

61. Rcsenthal, 02. cit., p. 278.

62. The Pakistan Times, 29 Augus 1961.
63. Rial Hassan, ·Pirs and Polit cs·, unpublished paper presented at the 5th Conference of the Asian
Studies AssociatiDn of Australian Meet ng5, Adelaide, 13-19 May, 1984, p. 18.
 154

're-educated' these imams and khatibs, who also had a strong hold on the

rural population, would, through their Friday sermons, in turn educate the

people into changing their outlook on Islam and, hopefully, adopt more

progressive views about their world.

Both these objectives were important elements in Ayub's essentially

rural-oriented Basic Democracies scheme, for he felt that his new

political system would only function properly if the people were educated

into following a liberal and modern approach to politics and religion.

Therefore, his decision to educate and reform the backward-looking local

religious leaders was an astute way to put to good use the existing

Islamic institutions for the benefit of state-building as he saw it.

The second important initiative General Ayub introduced was the

enactment of the Muslim Fmnily Laws Ordinance, 1961 which brought about

reforms in marriage, divorce and inheritance. 64 Its aim, which, as

stated by Ayub, was "to restore social justice to those who were denied

their fundamental rights under the twisted cloak of religious

sanction"65, introduced a progressive and liberal approach to family

matters which until then had essentially been the religious preserve of

the ulama. Briefly, in the field of marriage it introduced a procedure

regulating polygamous marriages which, in general terms, protected the

interests of the husband's first wife or wifes. It did not outlaw

polygamy as such, however; but, instead, attempted to discourage the

practice on the basis that the Qur'an actually prohibits polygamy as a

matter of principle. 66 Similarly, divorce procedures were altered in

6~. This ordinance essentially adopted the 1956 recommendations of the Comm ssion on Marriage and
Fanily laws ~hich had had never been implemented. For an analysis of the Ccmmiss on and the report it
published, see: D.E. Smith, "Emerginq Patterns of Religion and Politics", D.E. Sm th (ed.), OP. cit., pp.
42"43.
65. "Message to the Nation Broadcast", 22 March 1961, Speer es by President Avub Khan, p. 108.
66. Fazlur Rahman, :ljne Muslim Family Laws", in D.E. Smith ed.;! GP. cit. ~ p. 416.
 155

such a way as to follow the 'graduated' approach of divorce which was

based on the Arabian custom as applied during Prophet Muhammad's time as

opposed to subsequent norms developed during the caliphate of Umar. This

gave the Modernists a high degree of religious legitimacy in their

approach to divorce procedures. 57 Finally, the inheritance section of

the ordinance essentially dealt with the right of orphan grandchildren to

a share of the paternal grandfather's inheritance.

Complementing the Family Laws Ordinance, was the establishment of the

National Research Institute of Family Planning. Not surprisingly, this

bold but necessary initiative taken by the government was going to be

ardently opposed by the ulama who described the whole concept as being

utterly un-Islamic. The Modernists, however, argued on the principle that

since there was nothing in the Qur'an forbidding the practice of family

planning it must therefore be permitted. 58

The initial reaction to the Family Laws Ordinance on the part of the

Traditionalists and Fundamentalists was rather subdued; however, once the

National Assembly was reconvened in June 1962 they launched a full-scale

attack against the government. Spearheaded by the well-organized

Jama'at-i-Islami, they accused Ayub of having promulgated rul un-Islamic

law, issued joint statements vehemently criticizing the ordinance and

demanded its immediate repeal. Ostensibly, they were concerned with the

un-Islamic nature of the laws, but their real complaints had to do with

Ayub's interference in Muslim personal laws, a matter that had until then

been the unique preserve of the ulama. 59 To these harsh criticisms,

Ayub, who had the full support of the All-Pakistan Women's Organization

67. Ibid., pp. 420-423.

6:3. Rosenthal, CPo cit., p. 273.
69. Kalim Bahadur, The Jama'at-i-Islam of Pakistan, (Lahore, Progressive Books, 1933), p. 99.
 156

(APWA) , the population in general and the majority of the members of the

National Assembly, felt secure enough to openly challenge the authority of

the ulama and declare that "those who feel upset by it should do well to

have a good look at their conscience and check upon their own motives and

desires".7o However, as a compromise to the religious leaders, he did

agree to the appointment of a commission to examine whether the ordinance

was repugnant to the injunctions of the Gur'an. The commissioners'

verdict was disappointing to the Traditionalists and Fundamentalists, for

it accused them of mis-interpreting the three matters dealt with in the

ordinance. 71 Consequently, when the ulama in the National Assembly

attempted to pass a bill rejecting the ordinance, the outcome was a

foregone conclusion, with the bill being easily defeated. General Ayub

and the Modernists had once again outmanoeuvred the ulama.

Determined to promulgate a new constitution as promised when he

launched his 'revolution', General Ayub set up a Constitutional Commission

on 17 February 1960. In order to assist it in its task, the commission

sent out a questionnaire to prominent members of the community asking them

for their opinion as to why parliamentary democracy had failed until now

and what form should the future constitution take. Included in the 6,269

replies to the questionnnaire72 was the answer of 19 ulama, which

included Traditionalists and four Jama'at-i-Islami members. They not only

accused the bureaucracy of having prevented parliamentary democracy to

develop in the country, but also that democracy had never really existed

since there had never been any elections, only competition between the

politicians and the bureaucrats. In order to avoid a repetition of this,

they suggested that "fear of God" and "fair play" should be the basis for

70. "Message to the Nation Broadcast", 22 Har~h 1961, Speeches by President Ayub Khan, p.l08.
71. Munir, op. cit., p. 170.
72. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, (Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 2nd
ed., 1976), p. 138.
 157

the conduct of civil servants and political leaders.73 Moreover, they

recommended a parliamentary form of government, a federal structure and

the inclusion of the Islamic provisions as written in the 1956

Constitution. As previously examined, G.A. Parwez, on the other hand,

wished to have the Qur'an used as the basis for the future constitution.

On 6 May 1961, the Commission submitted its report, in which it blamed

the ulama for the country's lack of consensus on matters of ideology,

arguing that "Islam is not merely incessant prayers and meditations but

actual social life lived in accordance with the ideal". 74 In that

context, and with the objective of keeping the ideology of Islam an

effective value system that would still attract the younger generation,

the Commission recommended that the teaching of Islam be based on the

Qur'an as interpreted by the Modernists. Although the commissioners

criticised the mullahs' inability to offer forward-looking interpretations

to the tenets of Islam, they did understand the dilemma these imams found

themselves in. They assessed the situation along the same lines as

General Ayub , when they stated that:

He(the imam) has to depend on the bounty of one or a

few rich members of the limited society he serves and
cannot therefore afford to criticise any action which
does not infringe the ritual however anti-social and
un-Islamic in effect it may be. 75

The 1962 Constitution which Ayub Khan eventually enacted was, as

expected, a document characterized by a modern and liberal outlook, at

least in terms of its religious content. Nevertheless, he attempted to

satisfy the ularna by inserting into the constitution Islamic features

which, he hoped, would placate them but at the same time not betray his

inherent Modernist approach to the role of Islam in the administration of

73. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 100.

74. Report of the Constitution Commission, Pakistan, 1961, (Karachi. 1962), p. 1, cited in
Rosenthal, 00. ciL, p. 120.
75. I~dd. I p. 125.
 158

the country. In other words, it was a bold attempt in trying to resolve

the dilemma of adhering to the Islamic ideology, as interpreted by the

Modernists, without having to establish an Islamic state, as demanded by

the Traditionalists and Fundamentalists.

Two features in the constitution had the distinct stamp of President

Ayub's Modernist thinking. First, in contrast to the 1956 Constitution in

which the country was officially called "the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan", in the 1962 Constitution the epithet "Islamic" was omitted.

Second, the 1949 Objectives Resolution, which had constituted the Preamble

of the previous constitution, was not only completely modified but in its

new version two important sets of words were omitted. First, although the

stipulation that "sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah"

was left intact, "the authority exercisable by the people" was no longer

restricted by the additive of "within the limits prescribed by Him".

Second, the 1962 version stated that "the Muslims of Pakistan should be

enabled ... to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and

requirements of Islam", omitting in this case the previous addition of "as

set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah".76

As for the Islamic provisions per se, they were basically the same as

the ones found in the 1956 Constitution. In the 1962 document they were

dealt with under the headings of "Fundamental Rights" and "Principles of

Policy".77 These provisions included: "no law shall be repugnant to the

teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and

76. The omission of the words Holy Quran and Sunnah was, according to Fazlur Rahman, probably a
reflection of G.A. Par~ez's religious influence on the government leaders. Fazlur Rahman, "Islam in
Pakistan", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. VIII, No.4, Summer 1985, p. 49.
77. These two hapter headings were the substitute for the original section, "Principles of
Law-Making and Df Po icy', 3S modifi2d by Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963 (Art. No.1 of 1964).
Canstituti~n of the sl3mic Republic af Pakistan, (Kar3ch~, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs,
1968), ~p. 163-177.
 159

Sunnah", the promotion of an "Islamic way of life", the discouragement of

"prostitution, gambling, drug-taking and the consumption of alcohol" and

the strengthening of "the bonds of unity amongst Muslim countries". As

was the case with the previous constitution, these chapters were not

justiciable, for in each case there was an important stipulation that

essentially stated that a law would not be considered null and void on the

grounds that it was inconsistent with, or repugnant to, any provisions of

those two chapters [Arts.6(2) and 8(2)].78 The constitution had some

more inconsistencies with regard to the application of Islamic tenets.

For example, in a note of explanation following the repugnancy clause, it

is stated that "in the application of this principle to the personal law

of any Muslim sect, the expression "Quran and Sunnah" shall mean the Quran

and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect". 79 This reservation with regard

to the interpretation of the holy scriptures was not only contradicting

the repugnancy clause itself, but it opened the door to literally dozens

of sectarian interpretations as to the application of this clause.

Moreover, since President Ayub had promulgated the Family Laws Ordinance,

which itself was protected by the constitution, it made this reservation

null and void in the fields of marriage, divorce and inheritance. 8o

Although the Islamic provisions were not justiciable, President Ayub,

as a gesture of compromise to the ulama, established two Islamic

institutions which he hoped would prove to the religious leaders that the

government, although not legally implementing the tenets of Islam, was

sincere when it stated that Pakistan was based on the ideology of

Islam. 8l Similar to the 1956 version of the Institute of Islamic

Research, the Islamic Research Institute, whose function was to "define

72. Ibid., pp. 4, 12.

79. Ibd., p. 13.
30. Fazlur Rahman, "Islam in Pakistan", op. cit., p. 49.
 160

Islam in terms of its fundamentals in rational and liberal manner" so as

to "bring out its dynamic character in the context of the intellectual and

scientific progress of the modern world",82 was an attempt by President

Ayub to give intellectual and religious credibility to his modern approach

to the application of Islam, especially with regard to Muslim personal

laws. The other Islamic institution, the Advisory Council of Islamic

Ideology, whose mandate was to

make recommendations to the Central government and the

Provincial governments as to the means of enabling ...
the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in all
respects in accordance with the principles and concepts
of Islam, and to examine all laws with a view to
bringing them into conformity with the teachings and
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and
Sunnah83

was similarly an attempt to placate the religious leaders' criticism of

the government's failure to establish an Islamic state. However, the

Council's powers were very limited, since it could only advise the

government and, moreover, whose recommendations did not have to be heeded

by the law-making authorities. Of course, there was always the

possibility for the Council members, or any aggrieved person for that

matter, to resort to Article 98 of the constitution84 and have the High

Courts give a ruling on whether any fundamental rights had been breached.

However, it was up to the courts to determine the validity of the

application.

As expected the ulama and the Fundamentalists were not pleased with

the Islamic clauses, which were seen to be too few and too weak at that.

Consequently, as a result of the religious leaders' persistent attack

against some of the more glaring un-Islamic features of the document, and

82. The Central Institute of Islamic Research, (published by the Institute, Karachi, 1963), p. 3.,
cited in D.E. Smith, Gp. cit., pp. 32-33.
83. Constitution of the Islamic Repub ic of Pakistan, art. 204 (1)(a), p.113.
:34. As amended by the Constitution (F rst Amendment) Act 1963 (No 1 of 1964), Section 6.
 161

in an attempt to a avoid a further polarization between the Modernists and

the ulama, President Ayub decided to yield to the religious elements.

Accordingly, with the enactment of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,

1963, several changes were made to the constitution. First, the epithet

"Islamic" was re-introduced into the official name of the country, hence

the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan"; secondly, the people's authority, as

indicated in the Preamble, was to be restricted "within the limits

prescribed by Him"; and, thirdly, to the clause in the Preamble which

indicated the Muslims "should be enabled ... to order their lives in

accordance with the teachings of Islam" was added "as set out in the Holy

Quran and Sunnah". The ulama also resented the fact that Ayub, influenced

by his dislike of narrow-minded ulama, had decided to have both Islamic

institutions dominated by lay people. As with the constitutional

amendments, the ulama's perseverence paid off in the long run, for Dr.

Fazlur Rahman, who was a leading intellectual in the Modernist stream, was

forced to resign as director of the Institute of Islamic Research.

As Rosenthal indicated, "the 1962 Constitution tries to bridge the

gulf between the theological and the rational approach to politics".85

President Ayub enacted a constitution which, even after taking into

account the subsequent amendments, was Islamic only in name. This does

not mean, however, that it did not reflect the Islamic ideology as

interpreted by the Modernists. Ayub and his ministers did not wish to

stamp out Islam but, ra~her, apply to Pakistan the more tolerant, liberal

and modern version of the religion. That is why in the section dealing

with fundamental rights Ayub insisted on having clauses, such as: giving

every citizen "the right to profess, practise and propagate any religion",

allowing "every religious denomination to establish, maintain and manage

85. Rosenthal, CPo cit., p. 279.

 162

its religious institutions", not requiring any person "to receive

religious instructions" which related "to a religion other than his own",

permitting "every religious community the right to establish and maintain

educational institutions of its own choice", and not discriminating

against any citizen applying for an appointment in the service of Pakistan

on the grounds of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of

birth.86 These were features which for the proponents of an Islamic

state were considered anathema to their value system. But as President of

all Pakistanis, which included Hindus, Christians and Ahmadiyahs, Ayub

felt it was his duty and responsibility to ensure that all citizens were

equally protected under the constitution.

Even after amending the constitution, religious leaders, led by

Maulana Maududi, Amir of the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), increasingly attacked

not only the un-Islamic aspects of the constitution but also the

authoritarian features of his rule. The JI was probably the most

determined of the religious parties to want to oust President Ayub from

office. The extent of its opposition to the regime was reflected in its

willingness to support Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of the late M.A. Jinnah,

as the Combined Opposition Party's87 presidential candidate for the 1965

elections. Of course backing a woman for the post of president was

probably considered a cardinal sin as far as the shariat was concerned.

However, the JI manoeuvred around this restriction when it passed a

resolution stating:

... some of the things were declared impermissible

(Haram) in the Shariah and their impermissibility was
absolute and permanent. However ... there were others
which could be changed in case of necessity.s8

86. Constitution of the Islamic ReD~lblic of Pakistan, pp. 5-11.

87. COP was composed of: The 'Council" Musl mLeague, The Awami League, The National Awami Party,
The ~i:am-i-:slarn and the Jama'at-i-Islami. COP ad no cemmon programme except to oust President Ayub
fr;);) ;)ffice.
 163

Maududi's opposition against Ayub caused a strong reaction amongst

many of the president's allied ulama and pirs. For example, the Pir of

Dewal Sharif, who was an ardent supporter of Ayub Khan, even went as far

as to claim that God had communicated to him His displeasure with the

Combined Opposition Party.ss The pro-Ayub Traditionalist ulama,

including Abdul Hamid Badayuni of the Jami'at al-Ulama-i-Pakistan, were

issuing Fatwas against COP, and especially against Maududi, almost every

day. They not only criticized Maududi's pre-Partition stance against the

creation of Pakistan and his belief that the 1948 Indo-Pakistan War was

not a jihad, but also his decision to attack the established authority, an

act which ulama have seldom done in history.gO The J1 was eventually

banned by the government in January 1964, accused of promoting violence at

their All-Pakistan Conference in Lahore in October 1963.

The content of the J1's criticism of the government after Ayub's

successful defeat of Miss Jinnah in the presidential elections, and

especially after the Tashkent Declaration, shifted from an emphasis on the

un-Islamic aspects of the regime, such as the constitution and the Family

Laws Ordinance, to one stressing the socio-economic failures of Ayub's

"Decade of Development". This quite dramatic change in the J1's approach

was necessitated by the fact that by 1968 the application of the Islamic

tenets to the administration of the country was no longer the most

important issue. Consequently, Maududi, in order to avoid missing out on

the growing anti-Ayub movement, was compelled by political necessity to

follow the mood of the country. Accordiqgly, it decided to join the

8:3. Muhammad ilawaz, "Dini Masa:l Aur Iztarar", Faran, Vol. L', NQ. 3, p.l'?, cited in Bahadur, ~
cit., p. 107.
89. Feldman, ap. cIt., p. 73.
'10. Bahadur, ap. elt., pp. 107-103.
 164

Democratic Action Committee (DAC),91 an alliance of eight parties, which

demanded the establisl~ent of full and complete democracy and the

restoration of sovereignty to the people of Pakistan. Interestingly, none

of their demands included the establishment of an Islamic state.

Consequently, President Ayub's ultimate decision to relinquish power had

little, if anything, to do with Islamic ideology; it was strictly due to a

mass political movement, resulting from a decline in the socio-economic

standards for the majority of the population, aimed at terminating

President Ayub Khan's government.

As noted, the outcome of the government's decisions, especially the

enactement of the 1962 Constitution, did not resolve the whole religious

debate. On the contrary. by failing to once and for all define the

meaning of the Islamic ideology, religious cleavages remainded as

polarized as ever; and, the ideological integration of the country had yet

to become a reality. Moreover, while Ayub's increasing emphasis on

promoting the secular ideology of socia-economic development failed to

have much integrative value,92 especially after it became evident that

the benefits of development had neither "trickled down" to the lowest

strata of society nor to East Pakistan, it did not strengthen the ulama's

appeal. however; instead, it reinforced the province-based ethnic

loyalties, a process which had already begun prior to Ayub's regime.

Thus, after over 20 years of independence religion had definitively failed

as a powerful enough integrative force to counter the centrifugal pull of

ethnicity.

91. DAC was composed of: The Awami League (6 Points), the National Awami Party (Requisitionists),
the Jami'at-ul Ulama-i-Islam, the Naticnal Democratic Front, the Awami League (Nawabzada Nasrullah group),
the ·Ccuncil" Muslim League, the Jama'at-i-[slam 3nd the Hizam-i-Islam.
92. S.J. Bur~i, Mistan Under Bhutta, 1971-1')77, (Landon, ihe Macmillan Press, 1980), pp. 67-68.
 165

THE YARYA KHAN PERIOD:1969-1971

General Yahya Khan's relatively short term at the helm of the country

was going to make possible, albeit in very unfortwlate conditions, what a

small number of vocal Muslim Leaguers had repeatedly advocated and

demanded prior to Partition. For example, Maulana Hasnat Mohani stressed

to Jinnah at the Twenty-ninth session of the All-India Muslim League held

in Allahabad, in April 1942, two years after the adoption of the

historical Lahore Resolution, that "the object of the Muslims of India was

to establish completely (my emphasis) independent zonal states whose

constituent units should also be autonomous and sovereign".93 As noted

in the previous chapter, their voices were smothered in the general

excitement of the inevitable Partition of British India. There was no

time to discuss internal divisions; the Muslim League had to present a

united front to the departing British administration and, especially, to

the Congress party. Consequently, the Pakistan that finally emerged in

1947 was in the eyes of many Bengali nationalists, especially during the

first decade of its existence, a betrayal of the Muslim League cause,

since the West Pakistani politicians had failed to adhere to the spirit

and letter of the Lahore Resolution.

It was therefore inevitable that after almost 25 years of continuous

debate regarding greater autonomy for the provinces, especially for East

Pakistan, the religious dimension was no longer the focal point of

political discussion. 94 Too much had happened in the last ten years for

the 'new' parties, e.g., the Pakistan People's Party and the Awami League,

to be concerned with the Islamic issue; the focus of attention was on

regional autonomy and improvement of the socio-economic living standards

93. Foundations Gf Pakist.an, ~ cit.., p. 391.

94. The ethnic dimensions of the debate ~ill be discussed in detail in Part IV of the thesis.
 166

of the vast majority. This inevitably placed the religious parties in an

akward position, as they had never really paid much attention to these two

issues; and, their failure to do so was reflected in their abysmal

performance in the first general elections ever held in the country.

The December 1970 elections were held under President Yahya Khan's

Legal Framework Order (LFO) which outlined five points which he regarded

as minimum requirements for a united Pakistan. Included in these five

principles was the stipulation that Pakistan must be based on Islamic

ideology. Naturally all political parties involved in the election

campaign agreed with this principle, since any party suspected of .

promoting a political philosophy critical of the Islamic ideology was

liable to be banned under the Political Parties Act, 1962. Consequently,

even the most secular-oriented politicians, such as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,

leader of the East Pakistan-based Awami League, stated:

Islam is the deeply cherished faith of the overwhelming

majority of the people. The Awami League affirms that
a clear guarantee shall be embodied in the constitution
to the effect that no law repugnant to the injunctions
of Islam as laid down in the Holy Koran and Sunnah
shall be enacted or enforced in Pakistan. 95

By uttering such reassuring words, Mujib was protecting his political

life vis-a-vis the government and avoiding the potential loss of voters

who could have been frightened away if he had failed to confirm his

Islamic credentials. For identical reasons, Z.A. Bhutto, chairman of the

Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was promoting "Islamic Socialism" which he

increasingly related to the great ideal period of the righteous caliphs

(Khulafah-i-Rashidin), emphasizing such slogans as Musawat-i-Muhammadi

(equality of Muhammad) and Islami Musawat (Islamic equality).96 This

type of rhetoric attracted the poor and the religious-minded voters.

95. G.W. Chaudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (London, C. Hurst and Co., 1974), p. 116.
96. EspositJ, Dp. dt., pp. 160-162.
 167

The Traditionalists and the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), who referred to

themselves as Islam-Pasand (Islam-loving) parties, did not like the way

the political debate was progressing. The fact that the secular parties

were willing to work within the Islamic ideology framework meant that the

religious parties no longer had any special attraction to the voters.

Moreover, while the non-religious parties were promising the electorate

greater regional autonomy and improvement in the standard of living, the

ulama and, especially, the JI were not offering anything new, only the

establishment of an Islamic state with a strong central government. Their

arguments were stale, and in the eyes of the voters they represented the

status guo. Nevertheless, the JI persisted in attacking the Awami

League's 6 Point programme for autonomy and Bhutto's Islamic Socialism and

advocating the preservation of national unity and the upholding of

democratic principles. 97 It was obvious the J1 was desperate, since it

had never previously promoted the concept of Western-type democracy. The

ulama even went as far as to issue a fatwa (formal legal opinion) that

condemned socialism as kufr (un-Is lamic) .99 The Is lam-pasand parties

could, however, console themselves with the fact that they did have the

covert, if not overt, support of the military government. Apart from the

fact that Major-General (Retd.) Sher Ali and Major-General Ornar, members

of General Yahya Khan's cabinet, were members of the JI,99 the

government raised private funds from industrialists and distributed it to

the religious parties with the hope it would assist them in the

forthcoming elections. 1oo Inevitably, these religious parties came to

be identified with the ruling generals; and, this was reflected in their

overwhelming rejection at the election.

'?7_ Bahadur, op_ cit., p_ 123_

'~8_ Chaudhry, op_ cit-, p_ 125.
99_ This widely know fact has been refuted by Najar-General (Retd_) Sher Ai Pataudi in his
autobiography, The Story of Soldiering and Politi s in India and Pakistan, (AI-! tab, 1983), p_ 312_
Int2rv~ew! [A fermer PPP minister without Portfa! 0, Ncvember 1983.]
100_ Inter'li8W, [A retin~d Air ChieF Marsha, November l'~:33_ J
 168

For the National Assembly elections, the JI fielded 70 candidates in

East Pakistan and 80 in West Pakistan. As for the Traditionalists, they

had 64 candidates running for the East Pakistan seats and 144 in West

Pakistan. IOI Regarding the provincial elections, the JI fielded 183

candidates for the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly and 158 for the four

West Pakistan provincial assemblies. lo2 The results were as follows:

out of 300 seats in the National Assembly, the JI only won 4 seats

(Punjab:l/Sind:2/NWFP:l) and the Traditionalists together won 14 seats

(Punjab:4/Sind:3/NWFP:6/Baluchistan:l). Out of a total of 600 seats to be

won in the provincial assemblies (E.Pakistan:300/Punjab:180/Sind:60

NWFP:40/Baluchistan:20), the JI won 3 seats in the West Pakistan

provincial assemblies (Punjab:l/Sind:l/NWFP:l) and one seat in in the East

Pakistan Provincial Assembly. The total number of seats won by the

Traditionalists was 19, all in West Pakistan (Punjab:6/Sind:7/NWFP:4

Baluchistan:2).I03

The Islam-Pasand parties blamed the government, Bhutto and Mujibur for

their dismal results in the elections; but, the real reason for their

devastating loss was due to their unattractive political platform, and

especially so with the JI. Maulana Maududi had repeatedly stated that

Bengali nationalism was the result of the nefarious influence of the

Hindus, going as far as to insinuate on several occasions that this had

caused them not to be as good Muslims as the West Pakistanis. lo4 It is

little wonder then that with such statements, coupled with its opposition

to ceilings on land holdings and its rejection of provincial autonomy,

that the JI fared so poorly not only in East Pakistan but also in the

Punjab, supposedly the heartland of its support.

101. Chaudhry, Dp. cit., pp. 113-114.

102. Bahadur. Dp. cit., p. 125.
103. Chaudhry, cp. cit., p. 123.
104. Bahadur. ap. cit., pp. 123ff.
 169

It was with this attitude of righteousness that the JI and other Islam

pasand parties openly supported General Yahya Khan's military actions in

East Pakistan, since it was for the cause of national integration and the

preservation of the Islamic Ideology.los Moreover, the J1 had good

reason to believe the East Bengalis could be subdued, for it had

infiltrated the middle ranks of the officer corps,106 that is, captains

and majors, inculcating into these men, who were mostly of rural

lower-middle class origin and easy targets for Islamic indoctrination, the

notion that they were sent to East Pakistan to save the local Muslims from

the Hindu enemy. Members of the J1 even went as far as to participate in

"Peace Conunittees" and razakars (armed volunteer corps) in an attempt to

oppose the Bengali guerrilla group, the Mukti Bahini.lo7 However, after

several months of civil war, followed by the Indian intervention and the

armed forces' surrender en masse to General Aurora, the lower ranking

officers of the Pakistan Army turned against their superior officers,

accusing them of 'un-Islamic' behaviour and blaming them for the loss of

East Pakistan. loa

General Yahya Khan's regime, and the elections which were held under

his government, revealed the inherent contradiction between religion and

ethnicity. It was the persistent inability of the various religious and

political leaders to agree amongst each other as to what role Islam should

have in the public sphere which destroyed Islam's integrative potential,

and led to the regionalization of politics, as clearly proven by the

elction results. However, as subsequent Bangladeshi politics would

demonstrate, the secession of East Pakistan should not to be interpreted

as a rejection of Islam; rather as a refusal by Bengalis to continue to

IDS. The Pakistan Observer, 20 April 1971.

106. Interview, [A Journalist, The Muslim, December 1983.]
107. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan:Failure in Hational Intecraticn, (Oxford University Press, 1972), p.202.
108. The New Ycrk Times, 24 December 1971.
 170

accept the West Pakistanis' use of Islam as a legitimizing strategy to

maintain the status guo in centre-periphery relations. And Bhutto and

Yahya's refusal to abide by the 1971 election results was viewed by the

Awarni League as merely the continuation of Punjabi domination.

THE BHUTTO PERIOD: 1971-1977

When Z.A. Bhutto became president of Pakistan on 21 December 1971, the

ulama had no illusions about his lack of religious credentials. Like

President Ayub, under whom he developed his skills as a politician, Bhutto

was at best a Modernist, at least publicly; however, considering his

educational background and his political philosophy, it would probably be

closer to the truth to categorize him as a secularist. As a minister

under Ayub, he had p~phasized the need for Pakistan to adhere to the

Islamic ideology if it wished to survive. In 1962, however, in an address

at a conference of educationalists and ulama, he stated:

That is why in a truly Islamic polity, there is no room

for theocracy or governance through a sacerdotal class.
For the matter, Islamic constitution or, in other
words, a constitution for an Islamic state can only be
secular. 109

He went on to add:

Let us not fight shy of scientific inquiry. There is

no antagonism between pure science and true religion.
Both deal with "signs of God", that is, in the Quranic
terminology, CAayattullah'. Of these signs or CAayat',
religion is concerned with what is revealed, while
science is concerned with what is perceived. 110

Although Z.A. Bhutto's ideas on the matter had essentially remained

the same since that speech, except perhaps that they had become somewhat

ID9. The Pakistan Times, 19 February 1962.

110. Ibid.
 171

more secular in content, he realized he would still have to accommodate

the ulama's viewpoint. If there is one thing he learned from his

apprenticeship under President Ayub was that in a Muslim country like

Pakistan religion could not be completely relegated into the background.

Although the ulama had been overwhelmingly rejected at the polls, Bhutto

believed it was best to have them on his side rather than have to fight

them. Accordingly, Bhutto's five and half years in office can be

characterized by a constant attempt to adapt as best as possible the

government's policies to the ulama's demands. Along with the army and the

centre-province issue, the religious leaders were the major potential

threat to his rule; and he was going to ensure they never threaten his

hold on power.

The first major challenge to Bhutto's rule were the June-July 1972

language riots in Sind, mainly centred around Karachi and Hyderabad. 111

The main issue was the promulgation of a language Bill in the Sind

Provincial Assembly establishing Sindhi as the sole official language of

the province. Although this was basically a non-religious matter, two

religious parties, the Jami'at-ul Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUI) and the

Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), both of whom had a strong following amongst the

non-Sindhi-speaking muha,jirs, nevertheless decided to get involved in the

debate with the hope of embarassing the PPP government. Bhutto, however,

adroitely diffused the potentially difficult situation; but the fact that

two important religious parties had intervened in the language debate

confirmed Bhutto's apprehensions about the ulama's real intentions.

Bhutto realized the best strategy to deal with the religious parties

was to out-manoeuvre them in the non-religious fields or even join forces

111. ThIS issue will be discussed in great2r detail in Part IV of tile thesis.
 172

with them to avoid a confrontation. An example of this approach was the

ppp's decision in 1973 to support the Karachi-based JI-backed PIA union at

the next union elections. This was an important issue for the government,

for the winner in these elections would represent the PIA employees at the

negotiations with the government. Accordingly, at the instance of Bhutto,

influential government ministers l12 only addressed the JI-supported

union meetings, ignoring the other left·-oriented trade union. This

strategy, which paid off, had a dual purpose: to crack-down on the leftist

elements in the unions who were making 'unreasonable' demands on the

government, and to enter into a tacit coalition with the JI in order to

avoid a confrontation.

One of Bhutto's priorities was the enactement of a new constitution,

since the second one, the 1962 Constitution, had been abrogated by General

Yahya Khan. The 'compromise document' that resulted from the inter-party

negotiations between the PPP and the United Democratic Front,113 and

which came into force in August 1973, was in many ways, like the 1956

Constitution, an attempt to please the religious parties. Yet, it had few

Islamic features which had not been included in the previous

constitutions. As with the two previous constitutions, the 1973

Constitution retained the epithet "Islamic" in the official name of the

country. Also, the 1949 Objectives Resolution was once again included in

the Preamble, leaving wlresolved the political-religious dilemma between

Allah's sovereignty and the representatives of the people.

112. Some 8f the ministers included: Khan QaYYUffi, Minister of Interior and a Muslim Leaguer, Maulana
Kausar Nia:i, Minister of Infcfffiaticn and Religious Affairs and Infcr]ation Secretary of the PPP as well
as former member of the Ja~a'at-i-[slami, Mohammad Hanif Ramay, ~inister of Finance in the Punjab
government and d leading memb2r of the PPP Central Committee, dnd Mustapha Khar, Chief Minister of the
Pun1)\0/
ia k \.IIl\.l "'t an t pDD.
,n.; 311n;.dnpw, r, rn~
II memLJe,. .i,r.;;W, [A......
J.11~.e:I'";'''
• f~',mer III
DDP "~i.
. . n.i._.~.e:
r ;"t.
,.; .F l;n Ncvem ber 19°3]
th·" t.. rUrl.IO.i..~Vl
~.i.Lo,vlL
nn o.
113. The Parties inclused in the UDF wer~: the Jama'at-i-Isiailli, the Jami 'at-ul Ulama-i-rslam, the
Muslim League, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the National Awami Party, the Khaksars and the Jammu and
Arad lash~ir Muslim Conference.
 173

The only innovation was the emphasis on the need to improve the

socia-economic standards of the people. And although the constitution

included several progressive elements, there was never any mention of

Bhutto's political slogan "Islamic Socialism", a term which had previously

been propagated by Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Ayub Khan. 114 There

was, however, a new clause included in the Preamble which came closer to

advocating socialism, stating "to protect our national and political unity

and solidarity by creating an egalitarian society through a new

order".llS This idealistic goal was given some muscle in Article 3:

The State shall ensure the elimination of all forms of

exploi tation and the gradual fulfilment of the
fundamental principle, from each according to his
ability to each according to his work.

This socia-economic objective was repeated in Article 38(a) of the

Principles of Policy when it declared the state shall

secure the well-being of the people ... by raising their

standard of living, by preventing the concentration of
wealth and means of production and distribution in the
hands of a few to the detriment of general interest.

Finally, Article 2530) (a) indicated that "Parliament may by law prescribe

the maximum limits as to property ... which may be owned, held, possessed or

controlled by any person". This clause had already been put into practice

with the 1972 land reform when it placed a ceiling on land holdings.

Alongside the secular and progressive articles included in the

Principles of Policy chapter were to be found Islamic clauses. Article

310) stated:

steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan

... to order their lives in accordance with the
fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam ...
and be enabled to understand the meaning of life
according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

114. Anwar H. Sled, The Pakistan People's Party:Phas2s One d~d Two·, in Lawrence Ziring et al.
(edsa), P.lt~ist.3n: The Long 'Jfew, (Du~~e Universit?' Press, 1977 pp. 84-85.
115. The Constitution Jf the Islamic Rep!Jblic of ~l~is an, (Karachi, 1973), p. 2.
 174

The fundamental problem with this clause, and which was repeated in

the Preamble, was the failure to define Islam, leaving the door open to a

number of in terpretations. This was an issue the fr·amers of the

constitution believed was best left unresolved for fear of repeating the

long and inconclusive debates of the previous constitutions. Other

Islamic clauses included: "Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan"

[Art.2], making the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compulsory

[Art. 31(2)(a)], securing the proper organization of zakat(alms) ,

auqaf(religious endowments) and mosques [Art.3l(2)(c)], preventing

prostitution, gambling, and drug-taking [Art.37(g)], preventing the

consumption of alcohol [Art.37(h)], eliminating riba(usury) as early as

possible [ Art.38(f)] and strengthening relations with other Muslim

countries [Art.40]. The integration of the clauses dealing with zakat and

riba with general economic policies was criticized by the religious

parties on the basis that by including these two basic tenets of Islam

with other socia-economic articles it downgraded their religious and moral

values and gave the impression that the implementation of these two taxes

was further government interference in private wealth in order to satisfy

the public purse. Moreover, the principle of riba had not been properly

defined either, since the Traditionalists use it to refer to all types of

interest" as opposed to the Modernists who, keeping in mind the

necessities of the modern banking system, limit it to meaning "usury",

i.e., excessive interest payments. llS It is because these Islamic

principles were not dealt with separately that most religious leaders have

considered the 1973 Constitution essentially a secular document.

Also included in the Principles of Policy were clauses dealing with

the freedom of religion and education for non-Muslims [Arts.20 and 22] and

116. Fa: ur Rahman, "Islam and the Mew Constitution of Pakistan", in J.H. ~orscn led.), contemporary
Pr0bl;~ms of Pa istan, (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1'~7~), pp. 3Sff.
 175

safeguards against religious discrimination for employment in the services

of Pakist.an [Art.27], similar to the ones found in the 1956 and 1962

Constitutions. Finally, freedom of speech and expression was guaranteed,

"subject. t.o any reasonable rest.rictions imposed by law in t.he interest of

the glory of Islam ... " [Art.19J. Needless to say that such a wide

sweeping statement was open to many int.erpretations. However, all these

progressive and Islamic clauses were denied the force of law, since, as in

the 1962 Constitution, these Principles of Policy could be superseded by

any law enacted by the government and "shall not be called in question on

the ground that it. is not in accordance with the Principles of

Policy"[Art.30(2)].

Part IX of the 1973 Constitution dealt specifically with Islamic

provisions. Article 227(1) stated:

All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with

the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran
and Sunnah ... and no such law shall be enacted which is
repugnant to such Injunctions.

This potentially far-reaching stat.ement was restrict.ed by the

following clause [Art. 227 (2)] which stipulated that effect would "be given

to clause (1) in the manner provided in Part IX", i.e., the process of

determining the repugnancy of a law had to go through the Council of

Islamic Ideology. This Islamic Institution, which consisted of 8 to 15

members representing the various religious schools of thought, advised the

parliament. or the president. regarding the Islamic credent.ials of a law.

The major difference with the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology which

existed in the 1962 Constitution is that., although it still only had an

advisory role, its decisions seemed to carry more weight, since a law

deemed to be repugnant to Islam had to be reconsidered by the law--making

authorities. It does not indicate, however, the required extent of the

 176

review. One of the features of the constitution involved improving the

management and control of the sufi shrines, the celebration of urs

(anniversary of the death of a saint) and mosques under the hospices of

the Auqf (religious endowments) bureaucracy. This policy was a

continuation of President Ayub's tactic to use to the government's

advantage the institution of the sufi.saints. Bhutto emphasized the sufi

tradition of the saints' traditional opposition to the ulama's Islamic

orthodoxy and identifying it with the government's reformist views. 117

It was an astute way to by-pass the essentially urban-based ulama and to

communicate directly with the rural population. In other words, the

government wished to reduce the pirs' (guardians of sufi shrines)

political hold on the rural population while at the same time avoiding the

destruction of the sufi tradition itself. It displaced the pirs at the

political level by such means as refurbishing some of the most important

and popular shrines, demonstrating to the population that the government

was a more efficient and dependable guardian of the shrines than the pirs

themselves.

Although the 1973 Constitution was essentially a secular document, it

did have some important Islamic elements that should have satisfied the

ulama. One of these Islamic provisions dealt with the oath of office of

the president and other high-ranking officials had to take in which

Muhammad had to be explicitly declared as the final Prophet, 118 a

stipulation aimed at barring Ahrnadiyahs to ever hold such high office.

This clause, instead of appeasing the religious leaders, had the opposite

effect of contributing to a surge of anti -Ahmad i yah feelings, leading to

riots in Lahore and Lyallpur in June 1974; it was reminiscent of the same

117. Kather ne Ewing, "The Politics of Sufism:Red2fining the Saints of Pakistan", Journal of Asian
Studies, Vol. '1LI, Nc. 2, Febr!Jary In3, p. 253.
lU~. Ibid'l
 177

religious-motivated disturbances of 1953. 119 The army was called out to

suppress the civil unrest. Bhutto, recalling what had happened to Prime

Minister Nazimuddin in a similar situation, could see that these

disturbances had the potential to be politically damaging for his

government. Consequently, Bhutto decided to act quickly and have them

declared a non-Muslim sect. The Ahmadiyah Bill was virtually passed

unanimously in the National Assembly. Ironically, for the

Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) this was a pyrric victory since "an assembly elected

on a secular basis sat in judgement over a purely theological

issue".120 A potentially explosive issue, which the JI had hoped to

exploit to its advantage, had been diffused by the laymen. The Ahmadiyah

community never forgave Bhutto for doing this to them, since they had

generously contributed financially to his election campaign in 1970.

In March 1976, Z.A. Bhutto took a decision that he was going to regret

until his execution in April 1979: the selection of Lieutenant-General

Zia-ul-Haq as Chief-of-Army Staff (COAS). As to why he decided to select

a relatively junior lieutenant-general as the next officer to lead the

army is difficult to determine. As previously examined, General Zia had

headed the Martial Court that tried the officers who had made a coup

attempt in 1973. The harsh sentences he brought down against them may

have impressed Bhutto and convinced him that that General Zia would be a

loyal COAS who believed in the principle of civilian supremacy. However,

it was a known fact that General Zia was a man who, apart from being a

devout Muslim, was highly sympathetic to the Jama'at-i-Islami's

philosophy. Perhaps this was the factor that pushed Bhutto to select Zia

over seven other more senior officers in the hope that this would satisfy

the ulama and, specifically, the Fundamentalist Jama'at-i-Islami. Another

119. Fazlur Rahman, "Islam in Pakistan", p. 51.

120. Sahadur, op. cit., p. 213.
 178

reason given has to do with General Zia's highly subdued behaviour towards

Bhutto. As one retired high-ranking officer and a close associate of

General Zia put it: "Zia was so servile to Bhut to that it was embara~sing

to be a member of the armed forces!".121 Another theory is that because

of Pakistan's ever increasing dependence on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf

states for development funds, and as ~ source of remittances for its

thousands of skilled and un-skilled workers employed in those countries,

Bhutto was pressured by Saudi Arabia to select General Zia as the new COAS

in order to satisfy the Jama'at-i-Islami's wishes. 122 Regardless of the

real reasons, the decision not only greatly pleased the ulama and the

Jama'at-i-Islami, but it placed at the head ot the army, an officer who

identified with the demands of the religious leaders.

Bhutto's alleged socialist and secular policies, or even anti-Islamic

attitudes according to the religious parties, coupled with an omnipresent

repressive apparatus, led to the formation of a nine party electoral

coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA).123 Following its

defeat in the 1977 election to the National Assembly, in which it only won

36 seats against the PPP's 155 seats,124 the PNA decided to call for a

massive boycott of the provincial elections on the basis that the National

Assembly election had been rigged. A political clash was inevitable when,

on the one hand, the PPP government was only willing to admit there had

been a few minor irregularities and, on the other hand, the PNA demanded

the holding of fresh elections.

121. !nt2rview, [A retired Air Chief Marshal, November 1983.]

122. Interview, [A Farler PPP Minist2f without portfolio, November 1983.]
123. The PNA ~as cJmpcsed of: the Jama'at-i-Islami, the National Democratic Party, the
JamiJt-u!-ulema-i-Is13~, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the Kashmir Mus!im Conference, the Khaksar
Movement, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, Jarni'at-ul-ulema-i-Pakistan and the Pakistan Muslim League.
124. Dawn, 9 Harch 1977.
 179

The PNA, however, was ready for this eventuality. Widespread

discontent being present, it only needed to organize these disparate

segments of society into a cohesive and credible opposition movement; and,

it succeeded in doing just that. In the face of crumbling middle class

support for the PPP, the PNA had two unique advantages. First, it was

able to exploit its organizational strength, for example, madrasahs

(religious schools), mosques, Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) and Jami'at-ul

Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP) party cells, commercial associations, Mandi (local

market) organizations and some trade unions, to mobilize the disaffected

middle-classes into an effective urban protest movement. 12S Second,

Bhutto's seemingly un-Islamic policies and personal life-style, such as

his public acknowledgement that he drank liquor, put him beyond the pale

of Islam. 126 By attacking the government's 'sinful' behaviour', the

religious parties of the PNA were able to don the movement with an aura of

moral legitimacy by demanding the establishment of Nizam-i-Mustafa

(Government of the Prophet). The latter tactic fell on very receptive

ears with the urban middle-class and the muha.iir (migrant) population from

India, two categories known to be generally more sensitive about the role

of religion in society than other members of the community. Furthermore,

the PNA was well aware of the fact that General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army

Staff and a muha.iir himself, was a devout Muslim who was highly

sympathetic to the opposition's political views. 127 In a desperate

attempt to placate the religious parties and mitigate the on-going

conflict with the ulama, the government decided to commit itself to a more

125. Middle-class disaffection ~ith Bhutto~s economic policies coversd 3 whole spectrum of
professions, far example: docters, fer 3 lack of facilities wher2 to practise; teachers, due to the
nationalization of education which had lowered the general standard of education; small and middle-size
entrepreneurs, who had been adversely affected with the nationalization of the silk industry; textile
own2fS and cot~cn traders, whose ccst Jf coarse cloth had doubled; sugar mill owners, who had to pay twice
as much far raw sugar; and landowners, who had been alienated ~ith the nationalization of the
agro-processing industry. K.B. Sayeed, Politics in ?~kistan:The ~ature 1nd direction of Change, (Praeger,
1980), PP.157ff
126. fbid._, p. m.
127. Genera! Zia-ul-Haq is related to Hian Tufail Mohammad, A~ir of the Jama·at-i-Islami.
 180

Islamic system of government. This included: drinking, gambling and night

clubs were outlawed; religion was made a compulsory subject in all

schools; the weekly holy day was changed from Sunday to Friday; a minist.ry

of religious affairs was established for the first time; all restrictions

on the hajj were lifted; and, in April 1977, Bhutto declared that within

six months the shariat would be enforced. 128 This decision, however,

only made matters worse for Bhutto, for it proved to the opposition that

the government was buckling under pressure. With Bhutto on the run, his

days in office were numbered, and only his ouster would satisfy the PNA.

After 6 weeks of continuous agitation, Bhutto decided to callout the

army and impose 'limited' Martial Law in Karachi, Lahore and

Hyderabad. 129 With the hope of by-passing the opposition, Bhutto

suggested he would go directly to the people and ask them, by way of a

country-wide referendum, for their verdict on the situation. 130 The

PNA, fearing of losing the momentum, was adamantly opposed to it.

Finally, the PPP government, now under pressure from the armed forces to

find a solution, agreed to enter into negotiations with the PNA. Several

proposals were offered from both sides but, ultimately, even with the

participation of the Saudi ambassador in the discussions, the talks proved

to be inconclusive. 131 At this point the armed forces felt it was time

for them to activate "Operation Fairplay", the process by which the PPP

123. s. ~ur~shi, ":slam dnJ Developlnent:The Zia Regime in P3k~stJn", World Development, Vol.S. Has
7_0
I W, 1931, pp_ .563-565.
~ccQrdi~g to the Attorney-General~ the number of casualties 3S a result of the agitations (14
March - 27 May), were: 241 killed and 1198 ~ounded. The PHA's figures, en the other hand, were: 296
killed and 83,825 pecple imprisoned. Asghar Khan, Generals in Politic~, 19S8-1 QS2, (Delhi, Vikas, 1983),
pp. 122-122.
!30. Holding a referendum would have been unconstitutional si~ce there was no provision for it in
the 1973 Constitution.
131. Interview [A retired Air Chief Marshal, Novembe 1983.] Ac~crd ng to the interviewee, who was
at the very highest level of the military hierarchy as weI as a close fr end of Bhutto, the Prime
Minister had telephoned him en the evening of 4 July to te 1 him that he ad Jgreed to meet all the PNA's
demands, i.e., the holding of fresh elections, the r21ease of the nationa Awami Party leader, Wali Khan,
and the ~ithdrawal of troops from Baluchistan.
 181

government would be removed from office. 132 Accordingly, on 5 July

1977, General Zia-ul-Ilaq and the six corps commanders 133 supplanted the

civilian government; thus began Pakistan's third military government.

Prime Minister Bhutto's attempts to either outmanoeuvre or even

accommodate the religious elements of society proved to be a failure.

Bhutto became president, and later prime minister, at a time when Pakistan

was deeply involved in trying to resolve its whole raison d'~tre. Having

lost its eastern wing, the debate centred around the role Islam should now

have not only in the administration of the country but also its general

function in society. The question then being asked was whether East

Pakistan had seceded because religion had not been a sufficient

centripetal force to keep the country together, or whether it was due to

the failure to implement the Islamic tenets and establish an Islamic

state. Bhutto never answered these questions; but, instead, decided to

downplay Islam and pronlote secular policies. However, what certainly had

a major influence in tipping the balance of power in favour of the

Traditionalists-Fundamentalists was the Islamic 'revival' which began soon

after the 1973 oil crisis. 134 This movement, which swept across the

entire Muslim World and strengthened the religious forces, legitimized the

ulama's argument that had Islam been properly followed as government

policy the East Pakistan crisis would never have occurred. Thus it was

the Modernists' 30 years of failure in integrating Pakistani society,

coupled with the influence of the external environment, which facilitated

the rise of Fundamentalism and the downfall of Bhutto. However, the

return of the ulama to centre stage certainly did not mean that the

132. Lt-Gen. Chishti. one of the coup leaders and corps commander based in Rawalpindi. told Air
Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan that 5 July had been chosen as the day fer the coup, since they had reliable
infOf]ation that the PPP planned an armed prJcession in Lahore on that day. Asghar Khan, cp. cit., p. 129.
13l. Lieutenant-Generals Iqbal, Jahanzeb, Sarwar Khan, Chishti, Ghulam Hassan and Major-General
Ghdam Mohammed.
l:~. This issue ~ill be discussed in Part Vof the thesis.
 182

religious debate had been resolved; on the contrary, it increased societal

polarization not only between religious schools of thought, but also

between ethnic groups, political parties and the military and society.
 CHAPTER 6.

THE ISLAMIZATION PERIOD (1977-1985)

 In his first televised address following the coup d'~tat that toppled

Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto from power on 5 July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq,

"as a true soldier of Islam", indicated in no uncertain terms where his

sympathies lied when he declared:

I must say that the spirit of Islam, demonstrated

during the recent movement, was commendable. It proves
that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam,
will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam.
That is why I consider the introduction of an Islamic
system as an essential pre-requisite for the
country. 1

According to a pamphlet published by the Ministry of Information, the

overthrow of the 'un-Islamic' PPP government was morally justified, since

obedience, according to Shariat, to those in authority,

is binding in what one likes or dislikes except where
it involves violation of a divine command. In such a
situation there is a right to get the issue decided in
accordance with the commandements of Allah and His
Prophet. When conflict is clear, there is an
obligation to disobey. Not only to disobey, but to
right the wrong to the best of one's capacity.2

Given that according to General Zia, he had been destined by God to

guide the country along the correct path of Islam,3 it is his sincere

belief that Islamizing Pakistan society will be the only way to bring

about "genuine national integration" to the country.4 As he has so

often repeated on various occasions,

I want only to emphasize the fact that the ideology of

Pakistan is Islam and only Islam. There should be no
misunderstanding on this score. We should in all
sincerity accept Islam as Pakistan's basic
ideology ... 5

Undoubtedly, the ulama and religious leaders had finally found in the

person of the Chief-of-Army Staff a man who would listen to their demands

to have Nizam-i-Mustafa (System of the Prophet) implemented in Pakistan.

1. Addr2ss to the Nation,S July 1977, (Ministry of Infcrmaticn Jnd Broadcasting, (977), pp. 6, 10.
2. Social Justice and Role of Law in Islam, (Ministry of !nf8rmaticn and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 8.
3. Inteniew iIIith BBC Correspondent, Rawalpindi, 12 Octcber 1982, (Ministry of Information and
BrJadcasting, n.d.j, p. 13.
4. Revival of Islamic Values in Pakistan, (Ministry of lnfcrmation and Broadcast ng, n.d.l, pp. 8-9.
S. The President on Pakistan's Ideological Basis, Address by President General Z a-ul-Haq at the
Inauguration af Shariat Faculty at the Quaid-i-Azarn University, Islamabad, BOctober 1 79, [Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 2.
 184

Moreover, since General Zia has donned his rule with an aura of moral

legitimacy by identifying himself as the Amir (Head of State) who abides

by the injunctions of Allah, "obedience becomes mandatory for his

subjects".6 Accordingly, armed with religious and Martial Law

authority, General Zia could proceed to the implementation of his

Islamization programme.

The process of Islamization which General Zia initiated soon after

taking over power has been all embracing,7 for "Islamisation of law

alone can be neither meaningful nor successful"8; thus, it has permeated

every facet of Pakistani society. The re-structuring and role

re-definition of national institutions along Islamic lines has essentially

been aimed at five major areas: religion, judiciary, economics, education

and culture. 9

Generally speaking, Zia's views of Islam basically follow the

Jama'at-i-Islami's (JI) Fundamentalist Islamic principles. lo However,

there are some distinct differences in his approach when it comes to the

implementation of the Islamic tenets to the aruninistration of the

country. In the sphere of Islamic doctrine, General Zia identifies with

the Fundamentalists' and Modernists' belief that "the doors of I,itihad

(interpretation) must always remain open for Muslims".ll In many ways,

6. Political Plan Announced, Address at the Seventh Session of the Federal Council, Islamabad, 12
AU{Just 1?:33, (Hinistry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.) P. 38.
1

7. One of General Zia's first 'Islamic' decisions after taking aver power was to change the Army's
mctt) to: Imam (fai th), Tagwaa (piety) and Jihad (Hoi)' )jar).
8. Islamic Laws in Pakistan: Achievements and Prospects, (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
December 1979), p. 32.
9. Riaz Hassan "!slamisation: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan-,
l

Middle Eastern Studies, (forthcoming), p.4.

10. Three prominent members of the JI joined the PNA government: Khurshid Ahmad (Deputy Chair~an of
the Planning COffimissicnl, Mahmud Azam Faruqi (Minister of InfDr~ationl and Ghafcar Ahmad (Minister of
Comme'·ce I.
11. Political Plan Anncunc~d, p. 20.
 185

probably because of their military background, General Zia's and the late

President Ayub's positions about the type of Islam required for Pakistan

society are very similar. Both emphasize the progressive and dynamic

aspects of Islam, and how it can best be applied to Pakistan's needs. As

Zia has stated:

I believe that in keeping with the true spirit of

Islam, religious scholars, thinkers of Islam and
Islamic states must turn to Utihad so that
requirements of the modern age may be met in accordance
with the dictates of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 12

This philosophical approach to Islam has not been limited to General Zia

only, since the other two Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and Navy in the

early days of Zia's regime were all closely identified with the

Jama'at-i-Islami 13 or G.A. Parwez's school of thought.14.

This CODunon understanding with the JI in the field of Ijtihad has,

however, not spilled over into the arena of ·popular' Islam. As opposed

to the Fundamentalists' staunch anti-shrine approach, General Zia has

followed a more conciliatory path by attempting to reduce the distinction

beteen sufism and the Shariat. This does not mean that the government

supports the institution of the pirs; on the contrary, i t denies their

legitimacy. Instead, it has re-defined the original saints as actually

having been ulama who adhered to the Shariat. 1S By altering the very

philosophical raison d'etre of the saints, General Zia, like his

predecessors, Bhutto and Ayub, has been able to mould these saints and

their shrines to suit the government's Islamization progranune.

12a Ibid. I p. 21.

13. The two other Chiefs-of-Staff were: Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim and Admiral Muhammad Shar ff.
14. Intervi2N [Lt.-Gen. Mujibuf Rehman, Secretary of InFormation and Broadcasting, October 1983.
15. Katherine Ewin , "The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan", Journal of Asian
Studi:?s, Vel. XLII, ~IQ.! Feb. 1';;:33, p. 26~. For example, the Punjab Auqaf department has begun
publishing baoks on the ife of mystic Muslim saints of the pravinve, highlighting their contribution to
the propagation of Islam Jnd Islamic values. The Husli:n, 17 July 1985.
 186

To complement this intellectual approach to the saints, General Zia

has pursued three strategies to ensure that this rural-based religious

institution fits into the government's overall plans of religious

re-structuring. First, he has co-opted a certain number of influential

pirs into the Ma,ilis-i-Shura (Federal Council). Zia has also been able to

gain the support of the pirs' 'political organization', the Markazi

Jami'at-ul Mashaikh Pakistan, which has openly advocated the acceleration

of process of Islamization. I6 He has also co-opted some of the pirs by

selectively improving the state of the shrines of some of the most popular

saints. I7 Second, the government has regulated the activities of the

pirs, and thereby their influence, by using a number of shrines as

religious and social welfare centres under government management, and

having high government officials performing the ~ (anniversary of the

death of a saint) of some of the most popular saints; thereby,

undercutting the pirs' aura of indispensability.Is It has also

suggested taxing the pirs through the Auqaf (religious endowments)

department. Also related to the government's desire to wield greater

control over religious activities in the country-side is the fact that the

Augaf department has begun appointing the imams affiliated to the rural

mosques. Third, General Zia has resorted to coercive measures to force

the pirs to abide by the government's Islamization policy. It is this

third strategy which led a number of pirs to join the Sindhi

anti-government movement in Autumn 1983. They resented the government's

decision to impose the Shariat; for this clashed with the fundamental

belief system of the pirs "who had preached that there was no single

uniform way to divine grace".19 As a policy, however, the government

16. The Hus!im, 2 July 1984.

17~ Dawn, 3 June 1'?84 , The Muslim,
18. Ewing, DD.cit., p. 264.
19. K.B. Sayeed, -IlDpact of Islam: Domestic and Foreign Policies of Muslim States', Third World
!~uarterly,Vol. 7, No.2, April InS, p. 432.
 187

has generally followed a conciliatory approach to the pirs for fear of

causing discontent within the ranks of the Karachi-based

Jami'at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP). an ulama organization with a strong

muhajir following that has always been tolerant of the institution of the

pirs. 2o The government simply cannot afford to alienate the JUP, since

it controls many of ulama-based mosques.

In order to assist the government in its formulation of Islamization

policies, General Zia has relied on the Council of Islamic Ideology. With

the initial assistance of the late King Khaled's religious adviser, the

Council has been playing a • vanguard' role in aligning national laws with

Shariat laws. 21 Its four major' areas of interest have been: to

accelerate the process of Islamization; to create a suitable environment

for the establishment of Islamic democracy; to offer the government its

views on important international issues; and, to assist the government in

dealing with general socio-economic problems. 22 It has had a major

influence in the implementation of Islamic criminal and economic laws, the

backbone of General Zia's Islamization programme. However, the Council

has yet to publish its recommendations on the status of Ayub's progressive

Family Laws Ordinance, 1962.23 In June 1983, the Council, at the

government's request, released its recommendations for the establishment

for an Islamic system of government. Most of the Council's suggestions

regarding the form of government, the components of the Islamic state and

elections on a non-party basis were subsequently integrated in General

Zia's own plans for an Islamic system of government. However, the

20. !nter'ii~W1 [i\ far:ner PPP !1inister withGut Partfclic, Nc:vp.mbHf 11?:33]
21. Hassan, ap. cit., p.ll.
22. J.L. Esposito, W!slami:ation: Religion and Politics in Pakistan·, The Muslim World, Vol. LXXII,
No 3-4, July-Oct. 1982, pp. 201-205.
23. l. Carroll, "Nilam-i-Islam: Processes and Conflicts in Pakistan's Programme of Islamisation,
With Special Reference to the Position of Women", Journ11 of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.
XX, No. I, Mar~h 1982, pp. 68.
 188

Council's reconunendation to have established a supreme council of ulama,

whose decision regarding the interpretation of Islamic tenets would be

final and binding to the govemment, was ultimately rejected by the

president. 24

One controversial reconunendation of the Council which was subsequently

implemented by the government because of strong pressure from the ulama

concerned the 'religious' position in Pakistan society of non-Muslim

sects, specifically the Ahmadiyahs. The Council stated:

It shall be obligatory on the State to make and enforce

a law under which a person, who is not a Muslim shall
neither pose himself nor adopt or use Sha'a'ir-i-Islam
(Islamic symbols), and in case of violation shall be
liable to punishment. 25

Accordingly, on 26 April 1984, the government promulgated an ordinance

which declared that any person who called himself an Ahmadi and used

Islamic terminology for their rites or preaching to Muslim, for example,

giving out adhan (call for prayers), would be liable to three years

imprisonment. 26 The group at the forefront for the promulgation of

this ordinance is undoubtedly the Tahaffuz-e-Khatme Nabuwwat (Movement to

protect the finality of the Prophet), an organization of religious

scholars and laymen established after Partition. They felt that Bhutto's

1974 constitutional amendment, declaring the approximately six million

Ahmadiyahs a non-Muslim sect, was not being fully observed and,

consequently, felt that the penal code needed to be amended in order to

provide severe punishments for Ahmadiyahs who did not abide by the

constitutional amendment. 27 Their major criticism was that the

Ahmadiyahs, fronting as Muslims, were still in influential governmental

24. Council of Islamic Idealogy! Constitutional Reccmmendat ons for the Islamic System of
GovernmEnt, (Islamabad, G::riernment of Pakistan, June l'?~33J ~ pp. 1 -13.
25. Ibid., p.6.
26. Dawn, 27 April 1984.
27. Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 May 198., p. 47.
 189

and military positions and were undermining the ideological basis of

Pakistan. 28 Opponents of the government even went as far as spread

rumours insinuating that General Zia and his Vice-Chief-of-Army Staff,

General A.K. Arif, were themselves Ahmadiyahs. These accusations were

quickly denied with press statements and public Qura'nic readings

conducted by the two generals. 29

The legal system, the second area of institutional re-structuring, has

undergone two major changes: the Islamization of all laws and the reform

of the existing court system. In February 1980, the government announced

a series of steps for the enforcement of Nizam-i-Islam in the form of

Islamic Penal laws. These are based on the notion of man's duty to God

for whose infraction God has himself prescribed specific punishments

subject to the hudud system (unalterable punishment stipulated by the

Shariat for specific crimes), for example, amputation, lashing and

stoning. Accordingly, General Zia promulgated six ordinances and orders

to enforce Nizam-i-Islam. These are: 1) the Prohibition (Enforcement of

Hadd) Order which modifies the existing laws regarding prohibition of

intoxicants to bring them into conformity with the injunctions of Islam;

2) the Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance involves the

administration of whipping for certain types of offences; 3) the Offence

of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance relates to false accusation of

adultery; 5) the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudud) Ordinance provides

for stoning to death if the offence of adultery is committed by a married

person; 6) the Offences against Property (Imposition of Hudud) Ordinance

involves the punishment by amputation of the right hand and the left foot

for certain types of thefts; and, 7) the Code of Criminal Procedure

2~:. Zia has banned the annual Yadiani meeting held at Rabwan, Punjab. 'Li?wpoint, 26 Dec. 1985, p. 8.
2'? The Muslim, 17 Nove!llber 19:33; Impact International, 22 June - 12 July 1984, p. 14.
 190

lAmendment) Ordinance which 8lnends the appropriate sections of the

existing penal code to include the hudud described above. 3D

Complementing the promulgation of these Islamic ordinances has been

the establishment, in May 1980, of a Federal Shariat Court and a Shariat

Bench of the Supreme Court which acts, as an appeal court for matters

relating to the Shariat. 31 The government, however, has restricted the

courts' fields of review; and, specifically excluded from their purview is

Muslim Personal Law, a restriction which has caused a great deal of

resentment amongst the ulama and the Fundamentalist JI.32 Following the

ruling in 1981 by the Federal Shariat Court against the punishment as

stipulated in the 2ina ordinance, General 2ia, under heavy pressure from

the ulama who were disatisfied with the court's decision, modified the

composition of the Federal Shariat Court by including three ulama on the

court, bringing the total number of judges to seven. 33 Also favouring

the position of the religious section of the community has been the

introduction of Qazi (religious) courts, in which the ulama's "character

and qualifications are judged by Islamic rather than modern

standards",34 and the induction of religious scholars as judges of the

Supreme Court. The institutionalization of Islamic courts and Islamic

penal laws alongside a Common Law civil code and Martial Law has caused a

great deal of confusion amongst the general public. 35 Moreover, this

state of flux in which the legal system finds itself has compounded the

bureaucratic corruption present in the country, and has failed to provide

"quick and inexpensive justice" to the people. 36

30. A~GllectiQn ;}f the IsIJmic Laws, Islamabad, Ministry of Law ~nd Parliamentary Affairs, 1980.
31. This Shariat court system replaced the earlier version of Shariat Benches in the High Courts and
th~ Supreme Court which had been established in early 1979.
32. Hassan, op. ci t., p. 10.
33. Carroll, ap. cit., pp. 71-72.
34. Islamic Law in Pakistan, p. 33.
35. Hassan, or. c: t., p. 9.
 191

The third area which has been the target of General Zia's Islamic

reforms has been the economic system of the country. In an effort to

achieve an equitable distribution of wealth and establish a welfare state,

the government has institutionalized three fundamental Islamic economic

tenets: Zakat (alms giving), Ushr (tithe) and the abolition of Riba

(interest).37 The introduction of zakat and ushr has been one of the

government's cornerstones in its pursuit to completely Islamize Pakistan

society; for as general Zia has stated: "Zakat is one of the most

important fundamentals of Islam and forms an essential pillar of the

edifice of Islamic welfare system".38 The 2.5% zakat levy is

automatically applied across-the-board on all private bank savings, bank

deposits, company capital and government securities held by individuals.

All other assets such as cash, gold, mineral production and animals are

not subject to compulsory zakat levy but are to be voluntarily contributed

to the zakat fund as prescribed by the Shariat. 39 Ushr, which is

strictly a land levy, is applied at the rate of 5~' of the landowners'

share of the produce. The beneficiaries of zakat, which is administered

by a three-tier Zakat Fund bureaucracy at the Federal, provincial and

local levels, are "the needy, the indigent and the poor, particularly

orphans and widows, the handicapped and the disabled". 40 The abolition

of riba, the third economic reform implemented by the government came into

force on 1 January 1982.

The Council of Islamic Ideology was instrumental in the formulation of

the policy to be followed for the elimination of interest from the

36. Address to the Nation, by Preside~t General Zia-ul-Haq on the occJssion of Huharram-ul-Haram 1,
1~01 AH, (9 November 1'180) (Ministry of Inf:Jrmaticn and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 10.
37. Hassan, Dp. sit, p. 5.
38. Za~3t and Ushr Enforced, Announcement by President General Zia-ul-Haq, Islamabad 20 June 1980,
(Ministry of Infor~ation and Broadcasting, July 1980), p. 3.
39. Za~at and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, (Ordinance No. XVIII of 1980) First Schedule.
40. Ibid., Chapter IV, Section 8(a). As of August 1983, Rs 2,550 million had been distributed to
the recipients of Zakat. Pditical Plan Announced, p. 16.
 192

economy. It based its l27-page report on Qur'anic dictates which

according to the members of the Council "explicitly and emphatically

prohibits riba (interest) ... in all its types and forms".41 This

Qur'anic interpretation of riba has been strongly contested by the

Modernists who consider riba as only referring to usury. not interest.

Their main concern is that the abolition of interest would create utter

chaos in the Pakistani banking system. Regardless of this opposition, as

of 1 January 1982, the customary bank transactions based on interest were

replaced by the traditional profit/loss sharing system of madaraba. Under

this system the depositor and the bank share in the profits and losses of

their investment; however, since the banks only invest in financially

secure companies the depositors have been getting a higher return on their

accounts than under the former interest-based system of banking.42

In its drive to conduct a jihad (holy war) against ignorance, the

government has followed a dual approach towards the reform of the

education system in Pakistan: the improvement of educational levels and

the Islamization of education curricula. Wit.h a rural literacy rate of

only 17%,43 the government has corne to realize that the only possible

way to rapidly increase the literacy rate of the population would be to

stress primary and adult literacy education rather than emphasize

secondary, higher and professional education as it is the case to day.

Accordingly, General Zia has set up a 29-member Literacy and Mass

Education Commission which is to recommend "strategies of formal and

non-formal approaches for the purpose of promoting functional

~!. Report of the Council Jf Islamic Ides!cQy an the Eliminat~c1 of Interest from the Economy,
(Islamabad, Gcvernment of Pakistan, June 1980)~ p. 7.
42. Esposito, 02. cit., p. 212.
43. Acccrding to the 1981 census, overall literacy is 26.17: and urban literacy is 47.12%. Although
literacy rates are already very low in the rural areas, when broken down according to sex the findings are
e'ien more distressing: Hale Rural Li terac'{ 26.24% compared to Female Rural Li teraC\' of 7.33%. Hain
F!ndings of 1981 Populatian Census, (Papulation Census Organisation, Government of Pakistan, 19831,p.ll.
 193

literacy".44 Since this is a long-term objective, the results of the

government's decisions on this matter cannot be assessed immediately.

However, any education progranune which the government decided to implement

cannot but help improve the sad state of literacy levels in the rural

areas.

Alongside General Zia's desire to increase the number of educational

facilities available, there has been a drive to improve the Islamic

content of the education curricula. This has meant that school books must

conform to Qur'anic precepts and that Islamic and Pakistan studies have

been made universally compulsory at all levels, including in tertiary

institutions. The Islamic reform of education has also included the

establishment in 1980 in Islamabad of the Islamic University, affiliated

to the multi-million dollar Faisal Mosque. Its aim is to "prepare

suitable manpower for the enforcement of an Islamic system".45 The

Islamization of education has also involved the gradual sexual segregation

of educational institutions, especially at university level, for

coeducation is considered by the ulama and the Fundamentalists as being

repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. 46 The long-term effects of this

policy will be to force women to concentrate on 'female' subjects due to a

lack of funds to cover the expenses of having two full-fledged, parallel

and mutually exclusive systems of tertiary education.

Surprisingly, however, General Zia's approach to educational reforms

has not been one-sided only. Following a similar line of thinking as

President Ayub Khan, General Zia has come to realize the need to evolve a

truly "national school system".47 In order to put an end to the

44. Dawn (Over'::eas W2ekl,t), 23 February 1981.

4. Pcliti~31 Plan Announced,p. 17.
4 Carroll, cp. cit" pp. 74-76.
4 . Hassan, op. cit., p. 5.
 194

existing dual track system of modern and traditional Islamic education,

General Zia has decided to introduce a common educational programme for

both streams and equalize the distribution of resources to all schools so

as to narrow the bridge between the madrasahs (religious schools

affiliated to the mosques) and the modern schools. 48 Zia urged the

ulama "to examine the curriculum and educational standards of madrasahs in

order to teach history, geography, mathematics and science, along with

Hadith (tradition of what the Prophet said or did) and Figh (classical

Muslim jurisprudence) to the students".49 Accordingly, the government

established the National Educational Council which is to help find "a

formula for genuine implementation of the new education policy, which is

aimed at producing good Pakistanis, well versed in Islam and the ideology

of Pakistan while being in a position to meet the needs of modern

times". so

If this reform programme is allowed to proceed as planned, including

the injection of modern, scientific analysis in the curriculum of the

madrasahs, then a major step will have been taken in the drive to

terminate the educational dichotomy that has been present in Muslim

society since the days of the British Raj. It is the very existence of

these parallel streams of education - modern and traditional - which has

been the cause for the failure of the religious and political elites to

reach a consensus regarding the ideological foundations of the state. The

juxtaposition of these two 'schools' will certainly improve the

integrative prospects of Pakistan society.

48. Ibid., p. 12.

49. Press Conference Given by General ~ia-ul-Hag, Rawalpindi, 1 January 1978 (Islamabad, Government
of Pakistan, 1978), p. 5.
SG. Dawn (Overseas Wee/d'il, 2G January 1921.
 195

Finally, the cultural institutions, General Zia's fifth target for

reform, have been undergoing fundamental changes both in content and

approach so as to assist the government in its goal of promoting a more

"Islamic way of life" for all Pakistanis. In September 1982, under the
chairmanship of the then Federal Minister of Information and Broadcasting,

Raja Zafur-ul-Haq, General Zia set up a Social Reform Committee to look

into ways to Islamize Pakistan's customs and traditions. Amongst some of

its recommendations were: the death penalty for prostitutes, a ban on

ballroom dancing, rules to stop the growth of shops promoting pop music,

and the establishment of watchdog committess to safeguard public

morals. 51 Publicly, at least, all these 'un-Islamic' activities have

been eradicated. This has been possible because of the appointment of a

federal Mohtasib (supervisor of public behaviour and morality) who has

been very efficient in following up on petitions given to him regarding

members of the community who have been acting in manners considered

'un-Islamic'. But, as General Zia has pointed out, the Mohtasib's success

is probably more the result of the threat of punishment than a desire on

the part of Pakistani society to suddenly decide to self-Islamize

itself .52

Included in the measures taken by the government to inculcate a more

'correct' Pakistani behaviour have been: the replacement of English by

Urdu as the medium of instruction in schools and increasingly as the

working language in the civil service, and the requirement that the

national dress, the Shalwar and IDlameez, be worn during working hours by

bureaucrats, businessmen and academics alike. However, the government has

not limited itself to these decisions, it has gone a step further by

imposing measures, both symbolic and practical, which it hopes will

51. The T mes, 18 Octaber 1982.

 196

transform the country into a truly Islamic state and identify it with the

Middle-East rather than South Asia. In November 1981, in a speech

delivered to the cadets of the Academy fot, Administrative Training,

General Zia stated:

I want you to acquire not only the mastery of English

and Urdu, but also a working knowledge of Arabic,
because it is the Lughat-ul-Quran (the language of the
Holy Quran). This is not such an unreasonable demand
on my part. My object is to develop in you a greater
sense of identity as a Pakistani. 53

Not only has the government stressed the importance of Arabic, a

language foreign to Pakistanis except for the ulama who use it in Qur'anic

reading, but it has done so at the expense of Pakistan's regional

languages. As President Zia indicated:

All these languages (regional) will be developed in

accordance with their importance. But at the same time
the teaching of English is of vital importance and that
of Arabic even more SO.54

Clearly, the ultimate aim of the government is to downgrade local and

regional Pakistani culture, through such measures as the increase use of

Arabic and consistently equating Pakistan with Islam, in favour of

identification with a greater Islamic culture. Some of the steps taken to

achieve this goal have been: daily Arabic news on television, emphasis of

Arabic in education, televised Qur'anic reading, the increase use of the

Islamic calendar, the accelerated construction of new mosques with the

financial assistance of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the continuation

of the lifting of Hajj restrictions coupled with great propaganda fanfare

at the time of the hajjis' departure, and the renaming of cities and

institutions along more Islamic lines.

53. Address at the Academy for Administrative Training, Lahore, 1 NDve~ber 1981, (Ministry of
Infar~ation and Broadcasting , n.d.), p.9.
54. !f:a!lQural Address, ·m Session of ~he Federal Council, Islamabad, 9 Oct8ber 1982. (Ministry of
Information an(j Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 1?
 197

In this pr'ocess of Islamizing society as a whole, the mass media has

played a key role in spearheading the indoctrination of the population.

Censorship of television and r'adio is complete; that is, all 'un-Islamic'

programmes have been eradicated and replaced by an extensive coverage of

Islamic history and culture. 55 Similarly, all cinemas and publishing

houses have been told to toe the Islamic line or face the threat of being

shut down. As President Zia has unequivocably stated:

The Gibla (orientation) of the mass media, particularly

of the Radio and Television has been corrected and
their services are being utilised for the propagation
of Islam ... they are fully geared to the service of
Islam. 56

In order to consolidate his Islamization programme and ensure it

continues even after the eventual lifting of Martial Law, General Zia

proceeded to implement his 'August' Political Plan, as announced on 12

August 1983. 57 Three aspects of it are directly related to the role of

Islam in the administration of the country: the referendum. the National

and Provincial elections, and the enactment of the Revival of the

Constitution of 1973 Order. 1985.

The first stage, the holding of the national plebiscite on 19 December

1984, came as a surprise to everyone. Although it essentially dealt with

the issue of Islamization, it was never mentioned explicitly in the

'August Plan'. However, this did not prevent General Zia, astute

politician as he is, from performing a coup de force. A three-part

question was posed asking the people: whether or not they agreed with

first, the Islamization programme that the government had been

55. Esposito, OPe cit., pw 21. An interesting lit:nus t2St. of the pecp12's negative attitude
awards the Islamizatian of televis on is that ~he illegal import of Video Cassette Recorders (VCR) has
ncreased dramatically 5 nee Genera Zia has embark2d cn his pr8gramme. Mcreover, the majority of popular
11egal films are cf Ind an or!gin.
56. Political Plan Announced, p. 18.
57. Ibid.,
 198

implementing for the last seven years, secondly, the continuation and

consolidation of this programme, and thirdly, the transfer of power to the

civilians. 58 Since General Zia had been the initiator of this religious

programme, he always felt that it was his responsibility to ensure that

his Islamization programme was pursued until its full implementation was

attained. Thus, by skilfully linking the Islamization issue with his

desire to be elected President, General Zia transformed the plebiscite

question into a referendum-cum-presidential election. For, as stated

prior to the plebiscite, if a majority of the respondents approved of the

government's policy on that issue, General Zia would interpret that as a

public vote-of-confidence in himself and would, accordingly, consider

himself elected as President for a five year term as of the day the

newly-elected National Assembly held its first session. This was a very

shrewd strategy adopted by General Zia to ensure that he attained two

fundamental objectives. First, to have himself 'elected' President; and,

secondly, as President with increased powers under the amended

constitution, to oversee personally that no in-coming government could

dismantle the Islamic system which he had been establishing since he had

taken power in 1977. 59 Both these objectives would guarantee that the

programme would be continued even after the subsequent provincial and

national elections phase had been completed.

The results of the referendum were a foregone conclusion, since the

S2. The 2xact warding of the question was as Fel!Dws:

'Whether the people Df Pakistan endorse the prCC8SS initiated by General
Hohammad lia-ul Haq, the President of Pakistan, for bringing in laws of Pakistan
in conf~rmity with the injuncticns Jf Islam as laid dcwn in the Holy Quran and
Sunnah of the Holy Prcphet(Peace Be Upon Hi~l and ~or the preservation of the
ideology of Pakistan! for the continuation arId consolidation of that process and
for the smooth and orderl'l transfer of power tD the elected representatives of
the people.'
The Muslim, {Islamabadl 2 Decembpr 1?84. It should be noted that no absentee ballots ~ere allowed.
59. The second objective ~as re-asserted in an address Genera! lia delivered to the Hailis-i-Shura
on 22 October 1983. The Hus!~m! 23 0ctober 1983.
 199

government Ime\v perfectly well that the vast majority of respondents would

not openly oppose the Islamization programme. Because of the role

religion played in the creation of the country, Pakistanis do not, in

principle, criticize any aspects of Islam, even if it were perceived as

merely a legitimizing strategy for regime survival. According to Justice

Nusrat, Chief Election Commissioner, of the 62 per cent of registered

voters who participated in the referendum, 97.7 per cent of the

respondents approved of the government's Islamization programme. 50

Other observers, however, did not assess the turnout in such favourable

terms: the secular-minded opposition the Movement for the Restoration of

Democracy (MRD) insisted that only 5 per cent of voters participated, and

independent journalists estimated the turnout to have ranged between 10 to

35 per cent.51 As expected, the reaction to the plebiscite followed the

usual political lines, with the MRD and other 'progressive' non-MRD

parties strongly condemning the whole exercice. On the other side, the

government sympathisers, the Jama'at-i-Islami (.II), the Muslim League

(Pagara group) and the Progressive People's Party, generally supported the

government's conduct of the referendum-cum-presidential election. The

first step of the "August Plan" having been completed, General Zia could

now proceed to the next stage of his political programme.

The national and provincial elections General Zia decided to hold on

25 and 28 February 1985, respectively, were going to be controlled, "bring

positive results", and would be conducted on a non-party basis, for

according to him, there was "no room for a party system in Islam".62

Nevertheless, based on "compulsions of internal peace and external

security and the complexities of the geo-political situation surrounding

60. The M~slim, 21 December 1984.

61. The Observer, 23 Deceffiber 1q8~.
62. The Muslim, 23 October 1983.
 200

the country",53 he did offer the MRD leaders a chance to participate in

the polls on an individual basis on the condition that they accepted him

as the duly elected President of Pakistan. The MRD politicians rejected

the president's offer.

On the other hand, the parties which have been in a de facto alliance

with the Zia government, that is, the Jr, the Muslim League (ML)(Pagara

group) and the Progressive People's Party, were only too willing to

participate in these elections. Since there would be no organized and

credible political opposition against whom they would have to compete for

votes, the leaders saw this as an opportunity for them to improve their

weak electoral standing. However, similar to the MRD leaders, these

parties were also plagued with internal factionalism according to the

members' position regarding their party's participation in the elections.

For example, Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, deputy chief of the Jr, was against

the party's decision to participate in the elections. Similarly, a major

division developed in the Muslim League (Pagara group) between the

Secretary-General of the party and Pir Pagara who was fully committed to

the elections. 54 Regardless of their internal dissensions, the number

of candidates standing for election was, nevertheless, substantially

higher than in the 1970 polls, fielding their political heavyweights in

some of the most pivotal national and provincial constituencies, such as

Lahor'e, Karachi, Mul tan, Hyderabad and Faisalabad. 55

The total number of candidates was staggering: more than 6000

contestants competing for 217 National Assembly seats and a total of 483

63. The Muslim, 3 January 1985.

c4. Th~ ~lus!iffi, a January 1?85, l~ Febr~ary 1985, 25 February 1985.
65, The Jama'at-i-Islarni had 58 candidates for the Natienal Assembly elect on and 81 for the
provincial e!2ctions, ~nd the Musl mleagu2 (Pagara group) had a total of sa par y members running or
contestants whom they were support ng for the National Assembly polls and appro x ~at21y 31 candidates for
the provincial Jssembly 21ections.
 201

seats for the four provincial assemblies, with the largest number being

Shura members, former members of the national and provincial assemblies

and local bodies cowlci llors. 66 Ironically, these candidates did not

even know what powers they would have in the assemblies, since President

Zia had yet to amend the constitution outlining the powers and

responsibilities of the various political institutions. Given that

political parties were legally not allowed to participate, contestants

were reduced to campaigning according to their individual political

platform. Moreover, due to the absence of national political

organizations which would have given the contestants a common political

programme, the contenders limited their outlook to strictly local issues,

rarely discussing vital national concerns, such as the Islamization

programme, the continuation of Martial Law, education and the economy.

The consequence of this election system was to force the contenders to

resort to baradari (brotherhood), clan, tribal, family and sectarian

affiliations to muster support for their candidature. These polls were

reminiscent of the type of elections Pakistanis had witnessed in the 40s,

50s and 60s. Finally, the Election Commissioner having laid down very

rigid campaign rules prohibiting the use of megaphones and loudspeakers,

banning political rallies, and limiting the election campaign to 21 days,

the election was effectively reduced to a "war of posters and

banners" . 6 7

Apart from pre-election 'restrictions', such as, the ban on political

activities and the emprisonment of MRD politicians, these non-party

elections were fair and free from government intervention.

66. Other contenders were: retired civil servants, retired military officers, film stars,
journalists, sports cclebr~ti2s, middle-ranking industrialists and traders, and representatives of the old
established landcMning families. The "uslim, 18 February 1985
67. nH~ ~usliml 9 February 1985.
 202

Notwi ths tanding the fact that only 41. 36~' of the populat ion was on the

electoral roll, 52.93% of registered voters did exercise their right of

franchise. s8 The majority's decision to participate in the elections

should not be interpreted as popular support for the government, however;

for, as the results clearly indicated, seven out the eleven Federal

Ministers who ran were defeated. 59 On the contrary, their decision to

participate demonstrated that they not only wanted to exercise their right

to vote, but that they also wished to show their disapproval of the

government's policies and programmes, a point that had already been made

quite clear by the low turnout for the plebiscite. One of the biggest

losers in the elections was the JI which was only able to win 12 seats in

the National Assembly, and 23 in the four provincial assemblies. 70

Although these results are an improvement on the JI's performance in the

1970 elections,71 it still clearly demonstrated overall rejection of the

JI's Fundamentalist philosophy and also disapproval of the government's

Islamization programme. Finally, Shura members, and anyone who was even

remotely identified with the regime, were in most cases defeated by

unknown political entities.

Two days after holding the provincial elections, General Zia delivered

a 90 minute television address in which he highlighted the most important

aspects of the government's Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order.

1985 (RCO) , the third step of his political programme of gradually

returning state power to the civilians. He justified the promulgation of

63. The :1usli~1 27 F2br!Jary 1?85.

69. The Fedef"al Ninist2r: ~ho last were: Raja :afar-~!!-H3~ (Information and Broadcasting), Ghulam
Dastgir Khan (Labour and Manpower) I Major -GenefJl (Ret.) RaG Farman (Petrnleu;j and ~·Jatural Resources!, Mir
Ali Ta!pur (Defence), Niaz Arbab {Culture ~nd Tourism), Raja Sikander Zaman (Minister-of-state for Prison
and Youth Affairs). Also included in the losers was Sheikh Ishr3t Ali (AJy~ser to the President fer
Int~rnal trade;.
70. The Muslim, 3 ~Iar,~h 1985.
71. In 1970, it only won ~ seats in the National AssemblYr and one candidate in each of the
provincial assemblif?s of m~FP and Sind. Ibid.
 203

the Order on the basis that he "had sought to bring the 1973 Constitution

closer to Islam and, secondly, that this would prove a shield against

future crises". 72 He accomplished this by enhancing the role of Islam

in the constitutional fr~lework and increasing the powers of the

president.

In order to ensure that his Islamization progr~lIDe continues as

planned after the lifting of Martial Law, General Zia has made several

significant changes to the 1973 Constitution. Undoubtedly, the most

radical alteration has been to enshrine into the body of the constitution

the original, unaltered 1949 Objectives Resolution which, as opposed to

the modified version found in the 1973 Constitution, stipulates that the

people must exercise their sovereignty according "to the authority which

He (Allah) has delegated to the State of Pakistan". This amendment

[Art. 2AJ is of fundamental importance, for by integrating the Resolution

into the corps of the constitution it not only places 'religious'

restrictions on the people's method of governing but it also gives the

state, as repository of political authority, an aura of divine right as

delegated by God. The ultimate result is that it makes the implementation

of the tenets of Islam law of the land, shifting it from a theoretical to

a concrete level. In other words, President Zia has accomplished what the

Fundamentalists and Traditionalists have been attempting to do ever since

Pakistan came into existence; that is, to change the implementation of

Islamic tenets from the policy level to the realm of law.

Another amendment to the constitution, aimed at curbing the activities

of regional and secular-oriented parties, was the new wording of Article 5

which now states that "loyalty to the state is the inviolable duty of

72. Ibid. ,
 204

every citizen". The objective of this article is to ensure that the

Islamic ideology, the State belief system which downplays ethnic

differences and emphasizes the Umma (Muslim conununity), is strictly

adhered to by the population. Similarly, qualifications required to be

elected to the Majlis-i-Shura (Parliament) were modified in such a way as

to facilitate the ascendancy of religious parties at the expense of the

secular parties, specifically the PPP. To qualify for election to the

Shura a candidate must be "of good character and is not commonly known as

one who violates Islamic injunctions" [Art. 62(d) J, has to have "adequate

knowledge of Islamic teachings and practises obligatory duties prescribed

by Islam as well as abstains from major sins"[Art.62(e)l, and "has not,

after the establishment of Pakistan, worked against the integrity of the

country or opposed the ideology of Pakistan". [Art. 62(h)] Similarly,

anyone "propagating any opinion, or acting in any manner, prejudicial to

the ideology of Pakistan" is automatically disqualified from running for a

Shura seat. [Art. 63 (g) ] These religious restrictions are applied in an

identical fashion for candidates to the provincial assemblies. [Art.1l3]

wbile secular-minded politicians have been severely limited from

participating in elections, the ulama, on the other hand, have been

provided reserved seat.s in the Senate, the Upper House of the

Shura.[Art.59(1)(d)] Although it is a far cry from the Council of Islamic

Ideology's recommendation to have a supreme religious council

established, it does give the ulama an assured constitutional role in the

legislative process.

Finally, the amendment of Article 227, introduced in 1980, is probably

the most controversial of all the religious articles. It states: "All

existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam

 205

as laid down in the Holy Our'an and Sunnah". The amendment adds: "In the

application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the

expression 'Our'an and Sunnah' shall mean the Our'an and Sunnah as

interpreted by that sect". 73 As was the case with a similar repugnancy

clause in the 1962 Constitution, the various sectarian interpretations of

the Our'an and Sunnah will not only make it difficult for the courts to

apply a uniform set of Islamic rules to the application of the Family Laws

Ordinance, but it will also "prohibit the law-makers from exercising the

prerogative of progressive re-interpretation of (IjUhad). 74

Except for a few staunch supporters of the government's Islamization

programme, reactions to the President's RCO were overwhelmingly negative.

The criticisms advanced against the government's amendment of the

constitution were of two types: first, whether the President actually had

the authority to promulgate such an order; and, second, why had he not

left the task of amending the constitution to the newly-elected National

Assembly members? The MRD leaders and the various Bar Associations were

the most critical of the RCO, accusing the government of having brought

down an amended constitution which merely institutionalized military rule

with a civilian facade. 75 Even Traditionalist groups, such as the

Ahl-e-Sunnat and the Jami'at-ul Ulama-e-Pakistan, felt the amendments

should have been made by the newly-elected members of the Shura. However,

these groups were also cd tical of the Pres ident' s failure to

constitutionally outlaw political parties, for them a concept anathema to

Islam. 76 Even Mian Mohammad Tufail, leader of the Jr, termed the

constitutional changes a denial of the rights of the elected

73. Presidential OrG2r 14 of LnG (13 Sept21l1Der 1980).

74. Carroll op. ciL, p. 70.
75. The Mus ], 3 March 1985, 4 March 1?85.
76. The Mus m, 4 March 1985.
 206

assemblies. 77 This, however, was a reversal of his pre-election plea

that General Zia should immediately introduce the constitutional

amendments. 73 The only group which generally welcomed the RCO was the

ML (Pagara group) which felt it introduced a fair balance between the

powers of the President and the Prime Minister.79

The outcome of the government's decision to introduce its Islamization

programme has been not only greater polarization between the secularists

and the ulama, but also a dramatic increase in sectarian divisions. The

secularists, mainly represented by the MHD, have been at the forefront of

the opposition against General Zia's Martial Law government; however,

although privately they oppose the Islamization programme on the grounds

that it is both an infringement on people's right to choose the way they

wish to conduct their private lifes and a crude means for the military

government to legitimize its rule, they have been very careful to avoid

openly criticizing the Islamization programme per se, given that publicly

attacking Islam is tantamount to political suicide. The government, on

the other hand has retorted that the PNA's 1977 mass movement against the

then Bhutto government was proof that the people demanded the Islamization

of society and that the present government was merely fulfilling their

wishes. 3o The government, however, has at times been hard put to try to

justify on moral grounds the need to have military rule in order to

introduce an Islamization programme. The Minister for Interior, Mahmoud

Haroon, in an interview attempted to clarify the seemingly inherent

contradiction between Martial Law and Quar'anic law. On the one hand, he

stated that:

~, Viewpoint, 7 March 1985, p. 15.

i:::. The r1usl::n, 18 Fsbruary 19;35.
79. The Muslim, 4 March 1?B5.
30. Interview, [Raja Muhammad Zafarul Haq, Minister for Information and Brcad~.JSting, October 1983]
 207

In Islam there is only God's law; and, although Martial

Law is normally the negat ion 0 f all laws, this
government has been using God's law.

On the other hand, he added:

The Prophet was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed

forces. Therefore, Martial Law can exist and is
sanctioned by the Qur'an. 81

Notwi thstanding these contradicti(:)[}s, the government has emphasized

the point that, as the "ideological guardians of the State", the military

would not permit a future civilian government to radically change the

present Islamization programme. 82 These severe moral and political

restrictions on subsequent non-military gover'nments have de facto been

enshrined into the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985 with

the insertion of the 1949 Objectives Resolution into the body of the

constitution. A departure from its full implementation would in the

opinion of the military justify it to intervene in order to uphold the

Islamic ideology. It is this Islamic straightjacket, imposed by the

military government, which has most embittered the secular-oriented

section of the community.

Dealing with the secularists, especially the MRD members, has been a

relatively easy affair for the military authorities. The government only

needed to accuse them of propagating political ideas that went against

the Pakistam ideology and, accordingly, imprison them under Martial Law

regulations. On the other hand, controlling the opposition stemming from

the ulama and the pirs has required a more subtle and delicate approach on

the part of General Zia. The ulama's major criticism of the government's

Islamization programme has been the slow implementation in the

~31. I:ltcrv ;;;·J l Mahmoud HarGen, Minister far Interior, November 100,1
.:. . 'J""J
82. Interv 2~, AI-Haj Moh1ffiffi3d Abbas Kh~n Abbasi , Mi1ister fer Religious anti Minority Affairs,
~~ove~ber 1983]
 :;08

establishment of a tr'uly Islamic system of governnent. They have been

highly critical of Zia's failure to grant greater power to the ulama, such

as not permi tting them to have veto r'ights with regard to legislation and

not entrusting them with the power to award Islamic penalties. Another

area of disagreement is General Zia's insistence on applying an

essentially Modernist philosophy to the realm of education and family

planning. The ulama have not only been annoyed by his decision to

interfere in the administration of the madrasahs, a well-guarded preserve

of the ulama, but also resent the order that their curriculum be

modernized in order to meet the demands of the twentieth century. In the

field of family planning, President Zia's decision in 1980 to approve the

National Population Planning Policy and the Population Welfare Plan for

1980-1983 has corne under severe attack by the ulama who see this as the

continuation of President Ayub's highly criticized family planning

scheme. The ultimate aim of the Plan is to reduce the 3% annual

population growth rate down 2.5% within three years. This would be

accomplished through the general education of the public with the

assistance of government departments, private industry, trade unions, the

media and public welfare agencies. 83 Although Modernists have attempted

to legitimize this programme by citing Muslim thinkers who have advocated

the use of contraception, the ulama have considered the whole principle of

family planning as being beyond the pale of Islam. 84 However, the ulama

did score a major victory, in 1984, with General Zia's decision to pass a

law which reduced the value of a woman's evidence to half that of a man's

in adultery cases. as But even with this concession, the ulama have

criticized the slow pace of Islamization, blaming it on the civil servants

who, according to them, are "mostly the creation of Western education and

!~; Dawn (Overseas ~2e~dyj? 27 Dee~r:lber 1980.

84. Carroll, cp. cit., po 8~.
85, The Muslim, ? August 1984,
 209

fond of the Western way of life".a6

On the political front, the ulama and the Fundamentalists have also

been critical of the government's political programme. The

Traditionalists, essentially represented by the Jami' at-i -Ulama-i -PaId stan

and the Jami'at-i-Ulama-i-Islam, have,been opposed to Zia's 'August

Plan'. Although they were part of the PNA government in 1978, today they

have joined the ranks of the MRD in criticizing General Zia for using

Islam as a means to legitimize the military's right to govern. The

Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), which did participate in the 1985 elections, was

highly critical of the government's failure to quickly lift Martial Law.

Whether the JI took this position because it was politically expedient to

do so for fear of being too closely identified with the military regime,

or as a matter of principle, is difficult to determine. Regardless of the

true motives, it is a fact that it has never forgiven the government for

having banned the Jami'at-i-Talaba, the student wing of the party, from

participating in student politics at tertiary institutions. a ? Their

stated goal, however', has not changed, which is "to press for the

supremacy of the Shariat and the serious implementation of the Islamic

system".a8 The one Fundamentalist who has been probably the most vocal

and consistent critic of Zia's government is the octogenarian B.D.

Kaikaus, a retired supreme court judge. He has openly accused Zia of

being the greatest kaffir (non-believer), since, according to him, the

Qur'an clearly states that "to rule men is to act like God, and Allah

punishes those who obey men".89 Similarly, he has accused the religious

leaders of hypocrisy, "for they only want to establish an Islamic state in

86. Da~n {Overseas Wee~:ly}, 30 August 1980 3na 5 September ~':j80J ~it2d in Carroll, op. cit., p. 78.
87. Dawn, 12 February l'J:34.
88. Impact Internat~onal, "Interview with Mian Tufall Huhaffimad! Amir of the Jama'at-i-Islami·, 12-25
July 1985, p. ID.
[JUStiC2 (R2t.: BoZ. Kaibius, tloV21iDer
 210

which they would have power".90

Another source of religious opposition, which has on several occaS:LOns

er'upted into urban riots, is the highly volatile Shia't community. The

Shia't strongly resent the government's Tslamization programme on the

grounds that they should have the right to be regulated in accordance with

their own body of personal law, the Figah-i.-Jafariya, and that it should

be treated on par with the Sunni's four recognized schools of legal

thought. 91 The most controversial aspect in this dispute has been the

government's decision to promulgate the zakat ordinance. Although the

Shia't recognize the Our'anic basis for the implementation of zakat, they

differ with mainstream Sunni fiqh in that they believe zakat should only

be contributed on a voluntary basis. Following a massive Shia't

demonstration in Islamabad in early 1980, which, interestingly, was

organized by leftist and secular elements,92 the government was forced

to give in to Shia't demands and exempt them from having automatically to

contribute to the Zakat Fund. 93 Instead of resolving the issue, General

Zia's decision was resented by the majority Sunni population, since it was

perceived as preferential treatment for a religious minority whose members

are generally better educated and more affluent than them. This special

treatment for the Shia't, who only represent approximately 15-20% of the

total population but with a high concentration in Karachi, has led to a

series of violent Sunni-Shia't clashes. The most serious one, which went

on intermittently for three months in early 1983 and caused the death of

over thirty people, forced the government to step in and impose a military

90. !b!d. ,
91. W.L. Richter and W.E. GustafsC1, "Pakistan 1~7?: Bac~ to Square One", Asian Survev~ Vol. 20,
No.2, February 1980, p. IQ2.
92. Impact International, 9-22 t~ovember 1984, p. 11.
93. Zakat an!! Ushr (Affi2nJment) Orji~anceJ 1?80: promulgated on 29 October 1980, provides lega cover
t.o these ~usllms whcse faith and fi::lh do not oblige the~ tc pay the Jlhole or part 8f ra~~3t or ushr n the
manner laid down in the original ordinance. The Muslim, S August 1?85.
 211

curfew on parts of Karachi. Close to 200 members of both sects were

eventually sentenced and publicly flogged. 94 Similar clashes

re-occurred in October 1984 in Karachi and in July 1985 in Quetta, each

time requiring the intervention of the army to restore order. Following

the latest incident, the government and representatives of the Shia't

community entered into negotiations to try to resolve the on-going

dispute.

Within two weeks, the Federal Minister of State for Religious Affairs

and the main Shia't organization had reached an agreement which included

the release of the Shia't leader, Arif Hussaini, and the government's

promise to enforce the Shia't's own legal code. 95 Another important

result of the Quetta disturbances has been the establishment of a high

level 16 member commi ttee, which include representatives of various

religious sects, including the Shia't, as well as Federal ministers and

religious experts. Its mandate includes: examining the whole Sunni-Shia't

cleavage, determining the causes for the recent unrest, and advising the

government on how to proceed with its Islamization programme. It has been

gi ven six months to report its findings to the president. 96 The

establishment of this committee is not the first attempt in trying to

resolve this sectarian problem increasingly plaguing Pakistani society.

In May 1985, with the objective of bringing about a rapprochement, a

Sunni-Shia't Unity Council was formed. 97 This attempt by a

representative of 'popular' Islam proved to be a failure, since less than

a month later a Sunni convention passed a resolution demanding that

Pakistan be declared a Sunni state. 98 It is this dogmatic stance of

94. Far ~~st2rn Economic ~eviewt 28 April 1983 and 16 June 1983.
95. The ~uslimr 26 July 1985.
96. The Muslim, 18 July 1985.
97. Vi,~wpeint,30 Hay 19:35, pp. 7-3.
Ij8. The Muslim, 5 August 1985.
 212

lDany ulama and Fundamentalists which has hindered the peaceful resolution

of the Sunni-Shia't differences.

Finally, religious divisions have also been present within the Sunni

conununity itself, as was evident by the clashes in Lahore in May 1984

between members of the rival Barel vi and Deobandi schools of thought. 99

Their intense competition for followers was quite evident in Karachi

during the political campaign leading to the 1985 elections. As

previously noted, this intra-Sunni division is further compounded by the

opposing stances each group takes with regard to the position of pirs in

the religious sphere; and, since pirs have been generally opposed to

General Zia's brand of Islam, their support by some sections of the Sunni

urban community, especially the Barelvis, has further intensified the

religious divisions in Pakistan society.

Nine years ago, when General Zia successfully toppled Z.A. Bhutto, the

country was 1n a state of political chaos, law and order had broken down,

and the population, especially the urban community, had lost faith in

Bhutto's 'Islamic Socialism'. The military government came to the

following conclusion: since thirty years of essentially secular

governments had failed in their task of integrating society, only a

complete adherence to Islamic values would resolve Pakistan's political

and social crises. Accordingly, General Zia has been fully committed to

the complete Islamization of Pakistan society.

The sections of Pakistan society most receptive to Zia's Islamization

programme have been the urban workers, who were disaffected with the ppp's

~~9. ~4.L. Richter 1 "Pakistan in 1984: Digging in" AsiJn Survey, Vel. 25,
J ~10. 2, Feb. 1985, p. 151.
 213

policies of repressing their demands, and the urban middle-class which

needs Islamic values for psychological support. Both these urban classes

are the product of two factors which are common to all developing

countries: rural-urban migration and a higher literacy rate. These two

rapid developments, which effectively mean a physical and psychological

break with the rural environment, inevitably result in the loss of

affective identification with the traditional values of the village and

the tribe. This has to be compensated with a readily accessible and

identifiable value system. Therefore, since Pakistan was ostensibly

created in the name of Islam and the secularists have failed to resolve

the societal problems, perhaps the solution was a return to the original

values of Pakistan; that is, Islam. Moreover, given that Islam is an

all-embracing religion that promises fulfilment in all aspects of life, it

is not surprising then that the urban community has been most responsive

to the Islamization programme. IOO

In the rural areas, however, the government has been less successful

in its attempt to have its programme accepted by the people. Two

obstacles have hindered the acceptance of Zia's brand of Islam. First,

although the government has taken several steps to reduce the religious

base of the pirs, 'popular' Islam still has a very strong appeal for the

rural population. Secondly, in the rural areas of Sind, Baluchistan and

NWFP the government's Isla~ization programme is perceived as being

tantamount to the 'Punjabization' of the minority provinces of Pakistan.

Given that the Pakistan Army is overwhelmingly Punjabi, Zia's Islamization

is viewed as a. crude means by the military to impose the Punjabi, and to a

lesser extent the muha.jir (migrant), value system upon the rest of the

country.lOl Moreover, the population of these provi.nces not only

123. Has~:an, ;}Q. fit., ~p. 21ff.

101. The ethnic facta,' in the Is11mi:3tiGn be examined in Part IV of the thesis.
 214

question the legitimacy of the military government but also the moral

authority of the armed forces to teach them about Islamic principles.

Consequently, the imposition of the Islamization programme by a Martial

Law government, coupled with the absence of political parties to

legitimately channel the population's grievances, has had two negative

consequences. 102 First, although all.religious groups agree that

religious loyalty must supersede ethnic identification, it has

nevertheless intensified sectarianism amongst all religious groups, since

they all wish to see their own school of thought used as the model for the

Islamization programme. Second, given that the population is essentially

at the receiving end of the Islamization programme and has little input in

its formulation and implementation, it is inevitable that the vast

majority, except to a certain degree the urban lower and middle class,

would reject Zia's drive to Islamize society. Consequently, ethnic

loyalty, the next affective value level, has increasingly replaced the

Pakistan 'nation' as the primary symbol of affective identification.

102. Richt~r, GP. cit.., p. 151.

PART IV.

ETHNICITY
 CHAPTER 7.

THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF PAKISTAN

 The establishment of Pakistan in August 1947 on the basis of the

"Two-Nation Theory" was the fulfilment of the Muslim League's belief in

the right of national self-determination for the Muslims of India. The

two-winged country the Muslims were awarded may have been overwhelmingly

Muslim in its religious composition, but its ethnic, cultural, historical,

linguistic, and geographic diversities were factors that were to give a

powerful impetus to its inherent centrifugal tendencies. Surprisingly,

united Pa.kistan did survive for 25 years; but the secession of its eastern

province, amounting to the second Partition of the sub-continent on the

basis of self-determination, proved beyond doubt that a state required

more than religion to insure its survival, let alone its political

development.

This chapter will be limited to the examination of the most important

and relevant societal structures of the five ethnic groups that inhabited

the Pakistani state in 1947, i.e., the Punjabis, the Pukhtuns, the Baluch,

the Sindhis and the Bengalis. The framework of analysis chosen has been

the ethnic groups, as opposed to the provinces, since linguistic and

provincial boundaries not only do not coincide, but Pakistan's internal

administrative divisions and external boundaries are in many ways

illogical. 1 A sixth important group that will be analysed are the

Muslim refugees who decided to emigrate from India to take up permanent

residence in Pakistan. With the examination of the dominant features of

each of these societies will also be discussed the political attitudes of

each of the six groups and the contribution they made in the establishment

of the Muslim state.

1. C. Maloney, PeDDles of S8uth Asia, (N.Y.:Holt, Rinehart and Winston, (974), p. 365.
 216

THE PUNJABIS

The Punjabis, who represent the largest ethnic group of (West)

Pakistan, are of Indo-Aryan origin. 2 They are tightly bonded in kin

groups, the baradaris, which consist of all persons related by blo~d

through the male line, incorporating the descendants of 5 to 6 generations

as recognized members; furthermore, it is the fundamental socio-economic

group beyond the extended family with which the Punjabi identifies,

especially in rural areas.

Four broad hierarchical castes, each divided into sub-sections, can be

identified: first, the ashraf, essentially the noble classes;3 second,

the a.ilaf representing the lower echelons of the agricultural social

hierarchy; third, the artisan and manial castes; and finally, the lowest

caste, considered as quasi-untouchables but with no religious

sanction. 4 What is interesting about the Punjabi social system, apart

from the fact that it is not acknowledged as being a caste system by the

Punjabis themselves, is its relative flexibility in caste membership and

the possibility of social mobility. Although this social stratification

is still prevalent in the rural areas and the villages of the province, it

can no longer be applied to the same extent in the larger towns and

cities; for with rural-urban migration affective ties with one's ancestral

village quickly disappears to be replaced by other foci of loyalty.

With the annexation of the province in 1849 and its promotion to the

status of a Governor's Province in 1919, the system of social interaction

2. Y. Gankevsk 1' ! Th~ ~~Gptes of P.lkistan , (Lahore, Peop12's Publishing Hcusp., 1975i, p. 105.
3. Far a description of these neble classes, see: R.V. Weekes, (ed.), Muslim Peeples: AWerld
Ethnographic Survey, (Westpor , Conn.: Greenwcod, 19781, pp. 316-117.; Maloney, CPo cit., pp. 237-239.
4. For jn extremel'{ weI -detailed study of the Punjab castes, see: ~ir Denzil Ibbetscn, Punjab
Castes, Lah:;re, sh. t1ubarak ~ i, 19:32.
 217

was permanently altered in such a way as to suit British interests.

Originally, the Baradari was a 'brotherhood of cultivators' whose function

was to prevent property from being alienated from the family; and its

leader was not a landlord, but a senior member of the brotherhood. S

This social set-up, however, was eventually modified as a result of the

British wishing to fulfil three objectives: maintain law and order, make

"friends among the enemy", and increase agricultural production. s

The first objective was attained by implementing two administrative

measures. First, the British decided to sub-divide the province into

homogeneous administrative units, comprised of tribes and castes of

similar origin, that would be headed by either the head of the tribe or

the leading landlord. 7 Second, a revenue settlements system, called

mahalwari, was implemented. Its function was to insure agricultural

revenues would be efficiently collected; the village leader, who was a

landlord (zamindar), was made responsible for collecting these

revenues. S According to Thorburn, the object of these settlements was

not so much fiscal as it was for the preparation of the records of rights,

i.e., tenures were investigated and meticulously recorded. 9

This extensive bookkeeping layed the groundwork for the granting of

private land rights on large estates held by zamindars and jagirdars 10

and on smaller plots owned by ryots (peasant-cultivators); a policy which

5. Hassan N. Gardezi, "Feudal and Capitalist Relaticns in Pakistanh~ in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil
Rashi;J (eds.), Pakistan: The Root.s of Dictat:;rship, (London, Zed Press, 19:33) I p. 31.
6. HahmoJd Hasan Khan, Under;jevelopment and Agrarian Struct~re in Pakistan, (Lahore, Vanguard
Publications, 1981} p. 132.
1

7. K.B. Sai'eed, Palit.ics in Pakist.an 1 (~LY.: Praager, 1180), P.S.

1

:3. M.H. Khan, op_cit., p. 13l.

9. 5.S. Thorburn, H!.!sulmans and Money'-lenders in the Punjab, (Lahore, Mustafa Waheed, n.d.), p. 4B.
O. Under the Hughals, landlords who supplied troops to the emperor were allowed to collect for
the!llse ves land revenues from their peasants. The lands they owned were called jagirs(grants/gifts) and
these andlords were known as jagirdars. M.H. Khan, op.cit., p. 130.
 218

was meant to help achieve the second objective of co-opting certain

influential elements of the population to the side of the colonial

administration. The consequences of this action were two-fold: first, by

only selectively granting land rights to some, and thus creating a

two-tier system of agriculturalists, this policy irrevocably altered the

relative egalitarian and secure baradari system, under which land was

collectively owned. into a hierarchical social organization that allowed

for the alienation of privately owned land; and, second, the

implementation of private ownership in rural Punjab increased the

indebtness of the small peasant proprietor to the urban-based Hindu

money-lenders (banias), who had the right to repossess land from the

agriculturalists who were not able to repay their debts. This

asymmetrical relationship led to the net transfer of 20 to 40% of the land

to the non-agriculturalist Hindu money-lenders. l l The British,

realizing the damage they had done to the agricultural system, decided the

only way they could halt the spread of the Hindu banias' power in the

rural areas as well as reverse the decline of their rural allies was by

promulgating the Punjab Alienation Act. 1900, which excluded

non-agriculturalists from owning agricultural land. 12 This measure,

however. did not eliminate the peasants' indebtness; for it simply made it

easier for the zamindars to become the "new' money-lenders. And since the

zamindars were not interested in the produce of the land but, rather, in

the land itself, their power became overwhelming. 13

The colonial administration's third objective of increasing the

agricultural production of the province was attained with the construction

11. M.M. Khan, op.cit., p.lj3.

12. K.B. Sayeed, Politi:;s in Pa i:;tan. p. 5.
13. Sir Halcom Darling, The Pun ab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, (Lahore, Vanguard Books Ltd., 4th
ed., n.d.), p. 199.
 219

of a complex system of canals ,14 Furthermore, this vast irrigation

network also fulfilled three other related goals: first, it relieved the

population pressure of the central Punjab; second, with the creation of

new villages, it improved the standard of living for the peasants; and,

third, it made available grazing lands for the purpose of breeding horses,

mules and camels urgently needed for the South African War. lS Moreover,

with the opening of these new lands, the British not only had the

opportunity to continue their policy of recompensating their rural allies,

the zamindars and pirs (descendants of sufi saints),16 but they

transformed the Punjab into the most prosperous agricultural province of

British India.

By the mid-1940s Jinnah, aware how vital it was for the Muslim League

to WIn over the zamindars and the pirs, the two dominant pillars of rural

Punjab society, promised them that their socio-economic position in an

independent Pakistan would not be threatened if in return they supported

the Pakistan "movement'. With this guaranteed quid pro quo, the zamindars

and the pirs became ardent supporters of Jinnah's "Two Nation Theory", and

were instrumental in having it win the 1946 elections. As a reward for

their assistance, large landlords were given important positions in the

provincial branch of the League,17 They were to remain dominant in the

political life of the Punjab and Pakistan for the next 40 years,

14. Ibid. pp. 112-113.

1

15. Ibid., p. 16.

16. For an ana ysi5 of the s~ewed land distribution in the Punjab at the time of independence, see:
M.H. Khan, op.cit., pp. 135-136.
17. Y. Gankovsky, AHistory of Pakistan, (Lahore, People's Publishing House, n.d.', p. 78.
 220

THE PUKHTUNS

Living on the western frontiers of Pakistan, along with the Baluch,

are the Pukhtuns. 18 Although determining their racial origins has been

an on-going debate amongst historians and ethnologists ever since the

British first came into contact with the inhabitants of that area,19 the

Pukhtuns appear to be in general agreement with regard to the claim of

being descendants of one common ancestor, Qais Abdur Rashid, who lived

approximately 20 to 25 generations ago. 20

As with every other ethnic group in Pakistan, the administrative and

ethnic divisions do not coincide. Pukhtuns not only inhabit the Northwest

Frontier Province (NWFP), but they also live in Afghanistan, Baluchistan,

Punjab and Sind. In their quest for a secure and defencible border with

Afghanistan, the British established the Durand Line, defined in principle

in the Anglo-Afghan Agreement of November 1893, as the international

boundary between British India and Afghanistan. 21 Although the border

was delimited in such a way as to avoid cutting through tribal

territories, it was inevitable, however, that this would nevertheless

occur; the two most important tribes bisected were the Muhmands and the

Wazirs.

18. Pukhtuns have also been referred to as Pushtuns and ?ukhtocns. The most common term used in
West2rn literature, however, has been PJthans~ which is an Anglicized versicn of the local name.
According to Davies, the ~ord UPathan 'l is pj"8bably an Indian corruption af Pakhtana, meaning the
Pakhtu-speakers. The Problem of the North-West Frontier:1890-1909, (London, Curzon Press, 1975, 2nd. ed.),
p. 43.
19. For an authoritative analysis of the history of the Pukhtun, see the work by the former British
governor of the Ncrth-West Frontier Province. Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 550 B.C.- A.D. 1957, Karachi,
Oxford University Press, 1983.
20. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 132.
21. A. Lamb, Asian Frontiers, Studies in a Gantinuing Problem, (Melbourne, F.W. Cheshire Publishing,
196:~), pp. S6ff.
 221

Wi th the establishment of the international border, peace with the

Pukhtun tribes did not automatically follow; instead, Britain's Forward

Policy, which essentially consisted of 'pacifying' the tribes as far west

as possible, led to the 1897-1898 Tribal wars. Realizing it would never

be possible to completely subdue the Frontier tribes, the colonial

administration decided to implement the Close Border Policy22 which

involved establishing a number of tribal agencies, enclosed by a chain of

posts and cantonments, where the "free" Pukhtun tribes, albeit confined to

these reserved areas, would be allowed to govern their society according

to their own laws and customs. 23 Not only was British law not

applicable in these agencies, but even after 1947 the Pakistan authorities

decided to continue this same policy; and, today, government writ still

does not run in these areas. In October 1901, When the Frontier was

separated from the Punjab and established as a full fledged province, the

Pukhtun territory was once again split, with the low-land Pukhtuns

incorporated into Baluchistan24 and the remaining "settled" tribes

placed under the administrative control of NWFP.25

The social organization of the Pukhtun tribes 26 can be categorized

into two types: the acephalous and the "ranked". The acephalous type is

characterized by egalitarianism and is usually located in low-productive

zones. 27 Although acephalous societies lack centralized authority, an

administrative machinery, and judicial institutions, these societies are

22. For an examination of the Close Border Policy by a Farmer British palical agent stationed in
Baluchistan, see: R.I. Bruce The Forward Policy and its Results, (Quetta! Gosha-e-Adab, 1977), p. 14.
l

23. FDr an in-dEpth st:.;dy of the Pukhtun, see: R. T. I. Ridg~~j)y! Pat-hans; Peshawar ~ Saeed Book Bank,
1983.
24. Mir ~huda Bakhsh Bijarani Harri Saloch, Searlights on Baloches and Balochistan, (Quetta,
Gosha-e-Adab, 1977), p. 294.
25. Ridgway! Ope ~it" pp. 228-231, 247-250.
26. For an interesting discussion refuting the notion that the Pukhtuns are tribal in the
sociological-anthropological sense of the word, see: A.S. Ahmed, Social and Economic Change in the Tribal
Areas, (Karach i, Ox ford Un i versi tv Press, 19 7j, pp. 12-13.
27. A.S. Ahmed, Religion and Politics n Muslim Society, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1183), pp. j--g.
1
 .........
???

far from being chaotic; and, accordingly, they are referred to as "ordered

anarchy".28 The acephalous type social organization, which is

essentially limited to the tribal areas, has three major traits: first, it

has one common male ancestor; second, the tribe is segmentary in

composition, i.e., the entire body of society is composed of inter-related

segments; and, third, equality and democracy amongst the tribal members

are highly developed norms, to the point that a Pukhtun will refuse to

obey even his tribal chief or malik. 29 The basic institution that

ensures the maintenance of this equality is the jirga, the village or camp

council, the function of which is to consider matters of common interest.

Voting does not exist and, therefore, decisions are unanimous and are

arrived at by taking the "sense of the meeting".30

The second type of social organization to be found in Pukhtun society

is of the "ranked" variety. This group of tribal society is characterized

by a centralized authority, an administrative machinery, judicial

institutions supported by a coercive force, and a social stratification

system based on socio-economic clevages corresponding to the various

levels of power and authority. This hierarchically-oriented society is to

be found essentially in areas where the land is irrigated, i.e., in the

administrative districts of NWFP.31

Notwithstanding the presence of these two distinct social

organizations, Pw{htuns are culturally and religiously homogeneous. Their

social behaviour is always ordered according to Pukhtun law and custom,

i. e., Pukhtunwali, or "way of the Pukhtun", which is based on three

28. A.S. Ahmed, Sucial and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas, p. 13.
29. Ibid., pp. 14-17; Davies, op. ciL, p. 47.
30. James W. Spain, The Way of the Pathans, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 50.
31. A.S. Ahmed, Social and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas, pp. 13, 20.; A.S. Ahmed, Religion
and Politics in Muslim Society, p. 8.
 223

fundamental pillars: genial hospitality, right of asylum and blood feud or

revenge;32 and the non-observance of these obligations will lead to

dishonour and ostracism. 33 Furthermore, as with the Punjab is , warfare

plays an important role in Pukhtun culture. Undoubtedly, this reinforced

the British administrators' categorization of these two ethnic groups as

'martial races'.34 Consequently, service in the armed forces, British

or Pakistani, has over the years attracted many Pukhtuns, and, along with

the Punjabis, they have constituted one of the most important ethnic pools

from which officers have been recruited.

Finally, except for a few tribes which are Ismami Shi'a,35 the

Pukhtun are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi division. Sufism

is also widespread in NWFP, with the pirs, who claim high social status,

wielding a considerable degree of political and religious influence. On

the other hand, the mullahs, who are the representatives of 'orthodox'

Islam, do not hold any special place in the social hierarchy; for they are

technically outside the tribal structure, and thus are excluded from any

inherent roights. Their functions are essentially limited to performing

religious ceremonies. 36

The inclusion of NWFP in the Pakistan scheme was probably one the most

troublesome problems facing the departing British administration.

Althought the vast majority of the inhabitants of the province were

Muslims, there was, nevertheless, the Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of

32. Weekes, GP. cit., p. 328.

33. Davies, cp. cit., p. 49.
34. For an analysis of the Indian 'Marti11 faces', see: Sir Gecrge MacMunn, The Martial Races of
India, Quetta, Gosna-e-Adab, 1977.
35. For a discussian of these tribes, i.e., the Turi, the Bangasn and the OraKzai, see: Spain, ~
cit. p. 100; Ri dgwJ Y op. cit., p. 31.
I I

36. A.S. Ahmed, Social and Economic Chanae in the Tribal Areas, pp.49-50. The Pukhtun are not only
superstit DUS, but some of their observances would tend to prove that they are definitively of semitic
origin. R agway, Ibid., p. 32.
 224

God),37 led by the charismatic Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, nicknamed the

"Frontier Gandhi", which advocated the establishment of an independent

state for the Pukhtuns, viz, Pukhtunistan. 38 This quasi-political

party,39 was led by nationalist intellectuals and small landlords who

were pro-Indian National Congress, anti-Muslim League and anti-British.

Since they considered the League as merely being a creation of the

British, they quite logically opposed the idea of Pakistan on the grounds

that it was a colonial invention. On the other hand, the Pukhtunistan

scheme was ardently supported by Afghanistan and the Congress party. The

Afghanistan authorities, not recognizing the Durand Line, wanted the

'Pakistani' Pukhtuns to either join Afghanistan or create their own state

of Pukhtunistan out of NWFP and parts of Baluchistan, but without

including the Pukhtun areas of Afghanistan.

A second source of trouble for the Muslim League, which had a weak

provincial organization since it had only been established there since

1937, was the Congress ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib, Khan Abdul Ghaffar

Khan's older brother. 40 Dr. Khan had been elected in winter 1946 with a

clear parliamentary majority for his party.41 Realizing a Congress-led

NWFP would mean the exclusion of the province in Pakistan-to-be, the

Muslim League put pressure on the British to call a referendum, directly

asking the Pukhtun people for their decision. The plebiscite, held on 7

37. The inembers of this organi:ation i~prcvised a uniform for thems21ves by dyeing their shirts with
local jrick :just. The British administration, suspecting there was idso!cgical significance to the
selection of this colour, decided to call ~hem "Red Shirtsn. This ~2scriptive term has remained ~ith them
~V~r since. Spain, CP. ~it. ~ p. 20.
38. Pukhtunistan, as viewed by the Pukhtun themselves, is 190,000 squ~r? miles and is loc3ted on
beth sid2S of th~ D!Jrand Line. It is theoretically compcsed of numerous Pukhtun and Baluch tribes.
N. E~tessar, "Baluchi ~atiGnalism,~ Asian Aff3irs, Vel. 7, No.2, Nev.-Dec. 1979! p. 97.
3? L. Ziring, Pa~istan: The Enigma of Political Development, (Folkestone: Wm Dawson, (980), p. 152.
40. The only other provincial party with any sort of following was the United Xuslim Nationalist
P;lrt'{, led by Sir Abdul QayulD. After Parti tion it quickly lost support..
41. The results ~ere: 19 seats for the Congress Party, 15 seats for the Muslim League and 2 for the
Jami'3t-al-Ulama-i-Hind. It is asserted by sOIDe that these elections were rigged on a large scale. Sharif
Al Huiahid, Jinnah: Studies ~n Interpretation, (Karachi, Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981), pp. 135-136.
 225

July 1947, only offered two choices: to either join India or Pakistan,

there was no Pukhtunlstan option. Consequently, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan

called for a massive boycott of the plebiscite. The results were very

close: of the 51% of eligible voters who took part in the referendum, 97%

voted for joining Pakistan, i.e., only 50.5% of the total population voted

in favour of the Muslim League's demand for a Muslim homeland. 42

THE BALUCH

The origin of the word "Baluch"43 has yet to be determined; and,

accordingly, many theories have been formulated with the hope of shedding

light on this enigma. 44 Alongside this intellectual debate there has

also been disagreement as to the racial origins of the Baluch 'nation'.

Two schools of thought have emerged from this discussion: the proponents

of the Semitic theory,45 and the adherents of the Aryan thesis. 46

Whatever may be the 'source' of the Baluch, it is generally agreed upon

that these nomadic people first entered the Indian sub-contintent during

the thirteenth century and, subsequently, spread to Sind and Punjab in the

fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 47

Baluch society is characterized by a traditional, stratified social

and political organization, internally differentiated by the two forms it

42. Out of 3 total electorate of 572,920, 280,760 people bcycCtt2d the plebiscite, i.2., 49%. The
remainin:; .51! voted 97% fGr Pa!{istan. Mujahid, op. cit, pp. 137-138.
~3. I'Baluch" is the athnlc group, as opposed to nBaluchi which refers to the language.
n

~4. For various theori2s DO the origin of the word, see: 5drdar Khan Baluch, History of Baruch Race
Jn~ 91!~chi:t3n! ~Q~etta, Gosha-~-Adab, 1977, 2nd. ed), p.S.; Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 144;
Janmahmad, The Baruch C~ltur11 Heritage, (Karachi, Roy~l Book COffiPany,1982)! p. 1; and, Hir Khuda Bakhsh
Bijarani Harri Balach, op. cit., p. 14.
45. For an excellent discussi8n cf the Semitic theory, see: Sardar Khan Baluch, 02. cit., pp. 4-27.
46. For an in-depth analysis af the "Aryan" school of thought, see: Janmahmad, op. cit., pp. 2-38.
47. Mir Khuaa Bakhsh, op. cit.. p. 7; Sardar Khan Baluch, cpo cit., p. 35.
 226

takes: tribal and feudal. The tribal form of society is mainly found

amongst the tribes living in the tribal territory of eastern Baluchistan,

the most important of them being the Marri and the Bugti. 48 The social

organization of these tribes is based on real or fictive blood kinship

ties to eponymous ancestors.49 A tribe (tuman) is divided into clans

(Phara) which are further subdivided into sub-clans (Paro) each

representing a family. Each tribe is headed by a chief (Sardar), who

maintains a traditional medieval system of justice and authority over his

followers. so

In southern Baluchistan, on the other hand, there is a feudal system

of hierarchical social order not unlike the Hindu caste system, in which

"people from a variety of endogemous social strata are inter-connected in

ties of superordination based on patron-client bonds" .51 As opposed to

the Hindu system, the Baluch system of social stratification does not have

any religious overtones; but, rather, it is based on racial

differentiation, with the Baluch considering themselves superior to the

indigenous population whom they subjugated when they entered the area from

the west. 52 Regardless of whether the tribe is nomadic or sedentary,

the population of southern Baluchistan can be divided into three ascribed

social strata: first, the top tier or Hakim represents the aristocratic

class wielding unlimited powers and having a degree of prestige undisputed

by the other social strata of Baluch society;S3 second, the middle-caste

or Baluchs4 are usually either freeborn landlords or pastoral nomads

48. For an in-dept.h disc:Jssion ~Jf their social behaviour ~ '322: Sardar Khan Balufn, Ibid., pp . 238-42.
~9. }'e~k:"?s, OPicit., p. 65.
50. Nasir Islam, aIslam and National Identity: The CaS2 of Pakistan an~1 9angladesh," International
Journal af Middl2-East Stu!jies, Vol. 13, No.1, 1981, p. 65.
51. Weekes, cp. cit., p. 66.
52. Janmahmad, Dp cit . , pp. 69-70; H. Sardar Khan Baluch, np. cit., pp. 172-176.
53. Sardar Khan Baluch, Ibid., p. 172.
54. For an outsider all inhabitants of Ba uchistan are considered Baluch, but in its local social
system a Baluch specifically refers to the midd e-classes who traditionally served in the military
retinues of ;?cancmic and power elite lineages, .e., the Hakims. Weekes, op. cit., p. 66.
 227

whose economic interests and allegiance to the Hakims have long determined

political activity in southern Baluchistan; and, third, the bottom tier of

the social echelon, the Hizmatkar, is composed of, inter alia: tenants,

craftsmen, tinkers and fishermen. Although the area has undergone a

dramatic improvement in the socio-economic living standards of the people

and has been under the cultural influence of external forces, this

traditional system of caste hierarchy still remains an important criteria

of social differentiation, albeit with less rigidity than under past

generations.

Also inhabiting Baluchistan are the Brahui,55 whose origin remains

undetermined, with various theories claiming them to be either of

Tartar56 or Arab descent. 57 The majority of historians and

etymologists, however, have concluded that the Brahuis are actually the

direct descendants of the Dravidians who were the original inhabitants of

southern Baluchistan. 58 Although the ethnic boundaries between the

Baluch and the Brahuis have become imprecise due to inter-ethnic marriages

and other modes of social interaction, it has always been agreed upon that

Kalat in southern Baluchistan has definitively been the homeland of the

Brahui since they first entered the area from the west. By the middle of

the seventeenth century, the Brahui tribes had incorporated themselves

into a semi-military organization, the Brahui Confederacy(Kalat Khanate);

it was to dominate Baluchistan until its accession to Pakistan in 1948.

55. According to A.W. Hughes, "Brahui~ is a corruption of Ba-rch-i , me1ning iiterally, of the waste.
The Ccuntry of Baluchistarl, (~uetta~ Gosha-e-Adab, 1977), p. 29. Sardar Khan Baluch would disagree with
that interpretation, and inst2ad he asserts that Srahui means (iwellers of th2 mountains. Moreover, he
definitively refutes the notion that 2rahui carries any racial significance, but, instead, conveys status
rather than race. Ibid., p. 266.
56. Hughes, Ibid, p. 29.
57. Sardar Khan Baluch, OP. cit., p. 265.
53. Wee!~es, Q2.! c1 t., p. 116.
 228

The political organization of the Brahui is the tribe, with its

membership being determined by patrilineal descent and political

allegiance to the sardar(chief); however, these two criteria need not

necessarily coincide as long as all its members adhere to the concept of

shad-i -gham, 1. e., one's obligation to share in the joy and sorrow of the

tribe. The significance of this flexible social system is that it

facilitated the integration of non-Brahui tribes, i.e., Pukhtuns and

Baluch, into the Brahui Confederacy.59 Authority in the Brahui

hierarchy is highly centralized in the person of the sardar, the

hereditary authoritarian chief, who, until the creation of Pakistan, had

"a monopoly on the right to issue binding decisions". 60 Although the

sardars were vested with overwhelming authority, they were never

successful in suppressing inter-tribal conflicts within the loosely

organized confederacy.61

Though the Baluch are essentially Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi figh

(jurisprudence), their primary focus of affective loyalty remains the

tribe. This is quite noticeable by the marginal influence religious

leaders wield in determining social behaviourS 2 and the relatively

casual attitude the Baluch show toward religious rituals. 53 They tend

to place more value on age-old superstitions, which tend to govern much of

their daily lifes, and on long-established patron-saints which each tribe

has relied on in case of war, famine or personal trouble. 64

59. Sardar !~h.}n Ealuch, :JO. cit., p. 267.

50. Nina Swid12r ngrahui political Organization and the tlaticnal State,n in A.T. Embree (ed.),
l

Pakistan's Western 30rjerlan~j5~ (Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1979), p. 121.

61. Fcr an int0fcsting Ijiscussion of the history of the ~31at Khanate by its last ruler, see: Mir
Ah;ne!j far Khan Baluch~ Inside Baluchistan, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1975.
62. Nevertheless, tinder the Khan of Kalat the 'clerg'{', composed af maulanas and pirs, was treated
as a privileged stratum of society in that they ~ere usually exempted Fram having to pay land taxes.
Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 153.
63. S.S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Te~ptation, (N.Y.:
Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, 1991), pp. 8-9.
64. There is also a 15th century non-orthodox Muslim sect, Zikrism, which still claims to have a
number of follcwer~. Sardar Khan Baluch, op. cit., pp. 188-190, 234.
 229

After the British first entered Baluchistan in the late 1840s, they

realized how important this area would be as a strategic outpost of their

Indian empire. Therefore, in order to make it a useful staging area for

incursions into south-east Persia and Afghanistan, the British had to be

assured the Baluch would maintain a 'friendly' attitude toward British

interest. 55 The 'pacification' of th~ Baluch tribes was successfully

achieved with the implementation of the Sandeman System, named after the

British officer who so adroitly co-opted the sardars to follow a policy of

non-interference in Britain's Forward Policy in the north-west

frontier.56 The Sandeman System was based on two principles: the

territorial division of Baluchistan and the manipulation of the existing

jirga system to the advantage of the British administration.

This "peaceful penetration" of the tribal homeland was based on the

assumption that "given the chance to improve their economic lot, the

impoverished hillmen would abandon their predatory habits in favour of

more peaceful ones".67 The linchpin of the whole structure was the

sardar. Accordingly, the British obtained the sardars' co-operation

through means of financial subsidies, land grants and titles; and were

thus able to maintain peace in Baluchistan by simply relying on the

sardars' personal authority. 58 Consequently, by following a policy of

indirect rule through the authoritarian system of sardars and by not

developing participatory institutions as, for example, in the Punjab and

Bengal, the British administration unknowingly hampered the cultural and

65_ L,3.mb] QP. cit.., p. 79.

66. Far an in-depth analysis of the Fcrward Policy and the Sandeman System by a British political
officer who was clas21y invclv~d in its implementation, see: Richard Issaq Bruc2, The Forward Pelicv 3nd
its Results, Quelta, Gcs~a-e-4dab, 1977. For a short work about Sir Robert Sandeman by another British
political officer, see: A.L.P. Tucker, Sir Rebert Sandeman, Lahcr2, Tariq Publishing Hcuse, 1979.
67. James W. Spain, 'Political Prcblems of a Borderland,' in A.T. Embree (ed.), Pakistan's Western
Bcr1er!ands: The Transformation of 3 Political Order, (Karachi, Royal Beck Company, 19 79), p. 13.
68a P3st.ner and Hee, vp. r.: t.! p. 127.
 230

political integration of the Baluch into Pakistan. So at the time of

Partition, Baluch political parties 69 were virtually non-existant and

the provincial branch of the Muslim League in Baluchistan was at best very

weak. 70 Nevertheless, this did not prevent members of the shahi (royal)

jirga, except for one sardar, from voting in favour of joining Pakistan.

THE SINDHIS

The fourth major ethnic group of (West) Pakistan, the Sindhis,71

traces its ethnogenesis back to the Indo-Aryan tribes that established

themselves along the lower reaches of the Indus in the first millennium

B.C.72 Of all the external influences, e.g., the Jats,73 the

Baluch74 and the Rajput, with which the inhabitants of this area have

come in contact, the Arabs, who invaded Sind in the eighth century, have

left the most important marl{ on Sindhi society. Not only is this quite

noticeable in Sindhi vocabulary and syntax, but even more so in the role

it had in reinforcing the existing tribal system; since their own society

was also structured along tribal lines, the Arabs felt their objective of

propagating Islam would be most effectively met by building upon the

69. The only political party in Baluchistan with same sort of following was the local nationalist
Jrgani:aticn~ Khadim-~-~ataQ (Servants of God), which collaborated ~ith ~he Indian National Congress
Party. It was 2ss2ntially ~cmp8sc:j of small landlards , the top section of peasants and Baluch
intellectuals. Gankovsky, A~istcry of P3kistan, p. 64. Thers ~as alsc the ]incr Karat Nationalist Party,
fCl·~ed in 1935 by Bizenjc, who was latrr to become Governor of 8aluchistan under Shuttor and other Baluch
nationalists. They were dedicat2d to the gcal of an independent, unified Baluchistan following the
!jepartur2 of the British.
70. For an intef2sting insight into the Khan of Ka11t s role in promoting th2 cause of the Muslim 1

Leagu0, see his autobiography: Hir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch CPo cit. pp. 135ff. 1 l
- SInd
,'1. "h11. ana" tne prOVlnC2
. or, SIno
. , ,nave .Deen :leslgnat2~
,. " arter tne
, fiver
. . 'h I,1nous.
SIno ' ')
T,he name 0f
t.he river can be tracS'd back ta th8 Sans~~rit wcrd Sindr;u meaning river. GankDvskYJ The Peoples of
T

.p~!.··.i<:~.·
~ ___ ..'~n,"
" ('. l'e.· ·'-<oar
J."". Mfl... 7-'n;,j y.~,-
~Qr.i.'Y .\/;\,.;/1, :Hi<ot"t·"
i >n'l'
.I. .. ·~v '..J.!' ;.I:....i."'\.i:.~ ~f
1'I"lb,vo .~., (!;n,j
·J.i.:/·.A, (val·~c'n;
1\ U i ... , •RO,,~1
}U'" D,,~I,
DIJUh r.~m"anv
uVifii'" v ;1
11 19°0 , 1
p• •
72. Gankovsky, The Peeples of Pakistan, p. 116.
73. Their generic term is "Sirai originally mean n
, ng "a man from the north". Most of these tribes
speak Lahnda or northern Punjabi, also known as Siraiki n Sind. H.T. Lambrick, Sind: AGeneral
T t '
.n.fOCUCLlcn, L'
,Hyaera
I' d S'Ina'h'1 Haaul
ba, A' k' B
·oare,' l!lw
a~<:) ,pp. 2n9'" ~
w, ,l~.
74. Sardar Khan Baluch, Dp. cit., p. 244.
 231

Sindhi tribal system. 75

Upon the tribal system has been juxtaposed a class structure, similar

to the one found in the Punjab, which contains caste-like hereditary

occupational groups called zats; it is a proof that Hindu influence, even

after the majority of the population has converted to Islam, is still an

important factor in the Sindhi belief system. 76 Members of a zat who

can trace common consanguineal descent to one another are grouped together

into a bradri which is directed by senior male members. 77

The upper class is essentially divided into two tiers: the jagirdars,

who were granted large tracts of land under the Mughuls in return for

which they were expected to render military services for the local

governor, and the zamindars (large landlords); and, the whole range of

religious officials such as: the gadis and the ulama, who are respected

for their scholastic learning, and the pirs and the masha'ikhs, recognized

for their piety and ascetic religious lifestyle. Although the ulama

played an important role in propagating torthodox' Islam and countering

non-Muslim doctrines,78 the sufi pirs and masha'ikhs undeniably had a

greater impact on the population,79 for their teachings of tpopular'

Islam was more easily understood and identifiable to the illiterate masses

of the rural areas. The rulers of Sind recognized the role these pirs

could play in maintaining the existing social stratification and assuring

peace among the tribes, and, accordingly, granted them fertile tracts of

75. ~Jeekes, ;JP. ~!~., p. 363; An~:ar J GP. cit., pp. 15-16~ 215.
76. Gan~ovsky, The P?cpl~s of Pakistan, p. 118. Hindu influenc2 is also evident in the songs and
poetry of th2 famous Sin~hi mystic Shah Abdul Latif (b. 1690). Fer a short, but int2rasting work on
Sindhi sufis, see: J.P. Gulraj, Sind and its Sufis, Lahore, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1979.
77. Hote the similarity ~ith the Punjabi baradari system. Weekes, cp. cit., p. 363.
78. Ansar, op. cit., pp. 298-301.
79. Ansar Zahid Khan, "The Role of the Qadiri Sufis in the Religious Life of Sind,' in Hamida Khuhro
(ed.l, Sind Through the Centuries, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 19811, pp. 120ff.
80. Ansar, History and Culture of Sind, p. 202.
 232

land in order to help them protect their status. 80 The hold these pirs

had over their murids (followers and disciples) was stupendous. 81

Although the majority of their followers were ordinary peasants, the pirs

also counted among their disciples large landlords and members of the

ruling dynasty. After several generations these families of sufis not

only increased their political power, ·but also became one of the dominant

agricultural classes in Sind. 82 Today, in the highly stratified society

of rural sind, these pirs are a force that can still wield credible

political power.

Although in the rural areas there has always been very little scope

for a middle-class, there were, however, the Hindu banias (money-lenders),

mainly petty shop-keepers, who occupied an important middle position in

the social stratification of Sindhi society. These Hindu banias fulfilled

an important role in the economic system of the area, for the landlords

and peasants needed their capital for their own survival. Nevertheless,

an economic equilibrium was present in the rural areas, in that the

anti-usury laws of Islam did not allow these banias to acquire rural

property in exchange for the payment of debts. s3 All this changed when

the colonial administration passed the 1866 Civil Procedure Code which

essentially allowed Hindu banias to foreclose on their debtors' lands,s4

thus overriding local customary Islamic law. This was to permanently

alter the economic system of rural Sind. Prior to the British annexation

of Sind, there was only approximately one percent of the zamindars (called

81. For example! they levied fr:;ffi Jne .~ight~ t.O 8ne half of the income of their hundreds of Murids,
and the lands of t.he pirs would Gft2rt be cultivated free by their murids. Gank~)vsk'{, Th~ P~Qples l)f
P3~istan! p. 123.
82. Ansar, History and Culture of Sind, pp. 279-299.

84. David Cheesman "The Omnipresent Bania: The Rur31 Moneylenders in ~ineteenth Century Sind,·
Medern Asian Studies, Vo . 16, No.3, 1982, p. 454. Some claim the Civil Procedure Code actually came into
effect in 1863. Ansar, Hstory and Culture of Sind p. 203.
i
 233

waderas in Sind) who were Hindu. ss By 1896, the Hindu banias owned 28%

of the occupied area. 86 This situation, whereby "the bania, without

whose finance cultivation could hardly have continued at all, prospered at

the expense of the agrarian population, simultaneously keeping

agriculturalists alive and impoverishing them",87 continued until 1930,

when the government decided to stop allowing banias from acquiring

agricultural lands. ss

Although the financial situation of the wader as and the small

peasant-proprietors was nothing to be envious about, compared to the haris

(tenant-at-will), they were enjoying a life of luxury and ostentation.

And still today the haris, constituting the lowest strata in the class

structure of Sind, live in a state of abject poverty reminiscent of

medieval times. 89 Furthermore, not only is the hari totally dependent

on the local wadera for his survival, but he his also morally oppressed by

the pirs' message which is: "He is low forever because God has made him

SO".90 Moreover, land distribution in Sind was even more skewed in

favour of the waderas than in the Punjab. At the time of Partition, one

percent of all owners had more than 500 acres of land and owned 30% of all

the cultivated area, and 52% of all the area was owned by 9% of

agriculturalists who had 100 acres or more of land. On the other hand,

30% of all owners possessed 5 acres or less, but only owned 4% of all the

~~:5. Ibid" p. 203.

86. Hc~ever, if one includ2d the areas from ~hich they 2njoyed the produce of the land which was
morgaged to them, the total Jf"2a they benefited from ~as ~2% of the OCCUpi2d land. Cheesman, OP. cit.,
P. H7.
;37. Ibid., p. 462.
88. M.H. Kh30, Un;j2rdevelGpment ... ~ p. 133. Already prior to the 1930 ijecisicn to stop allowing
Hindu ban:]:: from acquirinq land! ther:? alrGady was a ~ell-:?ntrenched class of agriculturalist
money-lenders? most of ~hcm ~ere Punjabis ~hc took ~p land frem the Sindhi farmers. As stated by S.H.
Cavern ton in the 1927 Report cn "Legislation to Restrict the Alienation of Land in Sind by Members of the
Agricultural Classes.": "It is likely that the Punjabi agriculturalist money-lender may become a far
greater danger in Sin than he is in the Punjab". Cited in Viewpoint, (Lahore), 27 Dec. 1984, p. 4.
89. S.17'eed, Pal tics in Pa~jstan, p. 6.
90. Ibid.
 234

cultivated lands. As for the haris, who had no rights to any land, they

cultivated 75% of the land owned by the large absentee landlords. 91

The situation that existed in Sind at independence was the result of

years of British policy of not wishing to change the social conditions or

alter the essentially patriarchical and tribal structure of the province.

Moreover, Sind, having been part of the Bombay Presidency until 1936, was

largely relegated to a secondary position vis-a-vis Bombay and, thus,

excluded from all the major reforms implemented in the capital city.92

Therefore, not only was the hierarchical social stratification of the

rural areas reinforced at the expense of the haris, benefiting the Hindu

banias and the waderas, but, coupled with this situation, the people of

Sind, until 1936, were not given a chance to experiment in any type of

democratic parliamentary system as was the case in the other provinces of

British India. 93

Although prior to 1936 political parties were non-existent,94 by

the time Sind was conferred Provincial status and the first elections were

called in 1937, several political parties had been formed, however. The

most important of these were: the pro-British Sind United Party and Sind

Muslim Political Party and the Hindu-dominated Sind Congress Party and

Sind Hindu Sabha. 95 As in the Punjab, these four provincial parties

overwhelmingly defeated the Muslim League, winning all 37 seats.

91. M.H. Khan, GP. cit., 9P. 134-136.

'?2. :i;"ing, cp. cit., ;1. 142.
93. Hamid.3 Khurc, "Muslim Political 0rganization in Sind, 1843-1938,' in M. Khuro (ed.), Sind
Through the C2nt.llri2s, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1981;, pp. 170-1il.
94. There did exist several quasi-poli ieal organiza ions, such as: the Sind Mohammedan Association,
the Sind Pr~)'Jincial Conference, the Sind lam ndar Associat on and the Sind Educational Conference. Ibid.,
Pp. 170-179.
95. 2iring, OP. ~it., pp. 143-144.
 235

The Muslim League's poor standing in Sind did not last long, however.

The League successfully exploited to its advantage the growing wave of

Muslim hostility toward the Hindu community over its perosis tent opposition

to the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency for fear of being

reduced to a minority, and, more importantly, over its control of the

economy; so that by 1945, seven years.after having opened its offices 1n

Sind, the Muslim League had absorbed all the provincial Muslim

parties. 96

Though the League reigned all powerful in Sind, its provincial branch

was deeply factionalized into two camps: the waderas and the'radicals'.

The landlords, inherently conservative, were essentially interested in

gaining power once independence was granted; they were not interested in

the social transformation of Sind society. On the other hand, the

'radicals', led by G.M. Sayed, were idealists who wished to improve the

lot of haris and other lower classes. They only had contempt for the

upper class, which included the zamindars, the pirs and the Mullahs.

In order to avoid further internal divisions which could threaten the

League's position in the forthcoming 1946 provincial elections, Jinnah was

forced to take sides in these factional disputes. Being a pragmatist who

understood where the power lied in the province, Jinnah had no other

choice but to support the landlords, for through their control of the

rural areas they would be able to deliver the votes the League needed to

win the elections. Once again, Jinnah had co-opted the provincial Muslim

parties to the side of the Muslim League, assuring it a victory in the

1946 elections and support for its Muslim homeland scheme.

96. In that same period two other organizations were established, albeit with limited political
influence. These were: the Sind Hari Committee (1938), a peasant organization ~hose aim was the granting
of occupancy rights to the naris, and the ind People's Association (1939), a grouping of radical
intellectuals. Gankovsky, AHistory of Pak stan, p. 76.
 236

THE BENGALIS

In the eastern wing of Pakistan the Bengalis not only represented the

overwhelming majority in East Pakistan, ethnically making it a very

homogeneous province as opposed to West Pakistan,97 but they also

constituted the largest ethnic group of pre-197l Pakistan. Bengalis were

not confined to East Pakistan only, but similar to the case of the

truncated West Pakistan ethnic groups, they also constituted the majority

ethnic group of West Bengal in India. In societal terms, though, they did

consider themselves quite distinct from their ethnic brethren across the

border; it was the separate historical evolution of these two Bengal areas

which ultimately determined East Bengalis' decision to opt for Pakistan.

For approximately six centuries, from the sixth to the thirteenth

century A.D., the Bengalis shared common rulers; however, during that

period the East Bengal region, called Vanga, and the West Bengal area,

Gauda,98 were already witnessing separate developments. The Gauda area

carne early under Aryan influence and colonization, as opposed to

predominantly Buddhist Vanga which resisted foreign invaders.99 With

the arrival of Arab merchants in the ninth and tenth century, followed by

the Turkish conquest of the area, the rule of the Delhi Sultanate and the

Mughal Empire, and the spread of sufi orders,lOO the people of Vanga

were introduced to a new religion, essentially egalitarian in nature,

97. According to the Census of 1951, out of a total populatian of 42!063,OOO, 287,688 people,
constituting the Hill Tribes, lived in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, i.e., 0.69% of the total East Pakistan
population. These tribes are 2ssentially of Tibetc-Burman origin. Syed Hurtaza Ali, "Hill Tribes of
r'n;
~I ••.."d·j""·j,.' C ca;;'· H".:a;n
· ... ,.,~.," ;0 "''',;JIJG fpd) East Pa1';.:>an·
"'~.L'\_" .".~ • • . .A•Dr"f;le
.IJ iD'c~o I)r;ent ''-'nr-man''
,\·'.I;,,,,',.
... ,-,,;:;.11':>, 1'9/..2'
v i " 0 •224
•

98. For an interesting analysis of the etymology of Vanga and Gauda, see: Gankovsky, The Peoples of
Pakistan, p. 159.
99. Talukder Maniruzzaman, "The Future of Bangladesh," in A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton (eos.), The
States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration, (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1982), p. 267.
100. Eight sufi orders were eventually established in East Bengal. Abdul Karim. "Impact of Islam in
East Pakistan," in S. Sajjad Husain (ed.), Gp. cit., p. 41.
 237

which offered them an alternative social order to the highly hierarchical

system established by the Hindu Brahmins. As a consequence, Islam was

wholeheartedly embraced by the lower and middle caste Hindus and Buddhists

for whom social mobility was not possible. l 0 1 Moreover, the fact that

the sufis used lDany of the same Hindu and Buddhist holy shrines for the

propagation of Islam not only facilitated the absorption of the new

religion by the local population, but it instilled in the people a strong

belief in the religious institution of sufism. Being basically

rural-based, this type of (popular' Islam the sufi pirs were preaching

easily imparted a spirit of unity amongst the Vanga people. 102

With the advent of Islam in East Bengal, all egalitarian-oriented

social organization, samaj, meaning "going together",103 was eventually

established. The adoption of this system was relatively easy, since Hindu

Brahmanism was never able to implant itself as deeply in East Bengal as

it had in West Bengal; moreover, a strong Buddhist influence in the region

had acted as a counterweight to the Hindu caste system and had helped

foster a sense of egalitarianism. lo4 This sense of consensus and

egalitarianism is reflected in the societal values they adhere to; that

is, in contrast to the Punjabis and Pukhtuns of West Pakistan, they do not

idealize traits such as honour, militarism and personal forcefulness. lOS

Hindu influence has left its mark, however, in the form of social

ranks, based not on religious determinents but correlated with wealth and

A.l~. Jani, "The L~nd and the People," in S. Sajjad Husain (ed.), OD. cit., p. 4.
103. Weekes, OPe cit., p. 91.
104. Trevor Ling, "Creating a New State: the Bengalis Jf Bangladesh,n South Asian Review, Vol. 5,
Nc. 3, April 1972, p. 225.
105. Maloney, Peoples of South Asia, p. 359. Keeping in mind historical and pc itical reasons, this
cultural characteristic ~as reflected in the unwillingness on the part of the Bengal s to join the
Pakistan armeij farces, even though recruitment ~as actively promoted.
 238

prestige, and associated with the distribution of titles relating to

religious status or historical roles in the administration of land

control.l06 Similarities with the Hindu caste system end here, however;

for there is no obligatory permanency in the Bengali Muslim structure.

One can ascend the social latter by either changing occupation, obtaining

an education, or adhering to "Islamic·ethical and social practices as

interpreted in Muslim Bengali [sic] culture".107 One can identify five

'loose' castes as follows: the upper classes, who usually hold Islamic

titles, e.g., Sayyid (descendant of the Prophet), Shaikh (descendant of

the Prophet's tribe); the clerics, e.g., Mullahs and Khandakars; the vast

majority of cultivators; the various specific occupational groups, e.g.,

butchers, oil pressors, weavers; and, the lowest classes, essentially

composed of traders and petty commercial specialists. IDS Prior to the

arrival of the British, there did exist a Muslim aristocracy; however,

with the penetration of the Europeans into India this Muslim class quickly

disappeared.

After the military defeat of Nawab Sirajuddowala at Plassey in 1757 by

the East Indian Company, the British, wishing to assure the Muslims would

not pose a threat to their interests in Bengal, implemented a series of

administrative acts that destroyed whatever economic and political power

the Muslims still had, and, at the same time, made the Hindus the

intermediaries between the British and the majority of the population.

The most far-reaching acts that altered Muslim-Hindu relations during

British rule were the Permanent Land Settlement System (1793) and the

Resumption Regulation (1819).109 Ostensibly, these acts were enacted in

106. Weekes, op. cit., p. 93.

107. Ibid., p. 94.
108. Ibid., pp. 93-94.
109. Mohsin Ali, The Beng31~ Huslims, (Karachi, Pakistan Publicati~ns, 1971), p. 19.
 239

order to improve the administration of the land revenue system. The real

objective, however, was to deprive the Muslim aristocracy of its economic

base of power and foster the growth of a Hindu middle-class that would

assist the British in the administration of the area. By expropriating

the land that belonged to the Muslim aristocracy, the British broke the

power of the Muslims and, with the transfer of land ownership to the

Hindus, accelerated Hindu bania ascendency.110 Except from having to

pay a fixed sum of land revenue to the government, these Hindu zamindars

were allowed a free hand in the manner in which they wished to manage

their estate. The result was exploitation of the Muslim peasantry at the

hands of their Hindu landlords, leading ultimately to their total

impoverishment as a result of their high level of indebtness to the Hindu

banias. 111 This system continued unabated until Partition.112

The British also implemented a series of creforms' in the field of

education and culture which were to further affect the socio-economic

position of the Muslims in Bengal. Included in the Permanent Settlement

System was the termination of the rent-free grants accorded under Muslim

rule for the maintenance of the Muslim educational system. This resulted

in the closure of most of the Muslim educational institutions. 113

Coupled with this educational atrophy, the colonial administration decided

to have English replace Persian as the official language in government

business and in the higher courts of law. The Muslims' reaction to these

psychological, educational and socio-economic blows was to 'retreat' to

the mosques, which were controlled by the traditional-minded ulama,114

110. Gan~ovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, p. 166.

l! 1. K. Siddiqui, Confl~::t, Crisis 1nd War in P.l!~istan, (Karachi, RoI'al BGGk CG., 197.3), p. 29.
1 '')
.:.1L.. Ghaudhri M. Ali, The Emergence of Pa~istan, (Lahore, Reseat'ch Society of Pakistan, 1973),p.346.
113. Ibid., p. .
114. The Bengal Muslims did not always accept this Hindu domination ~ithout opposition, however.
In tni:? early 1:300s an unsuccessful peasant iDOVeiill?nt, the Faraizi Mo'/elRent, ~as launched by a religious
scholar, Haji Shariat Ullah, which aimed at ending the economic exploitation of the Muslim peasantry.
 240

and reject any sort of inter-action with the British. The lIindus, on the

other hand, welcomed all these government directives, for it finally gave

them an opportunity to avenge the Muslims for having been the rulers of a

continent that was overwhelmingly Hindu in composition. Accordingly, the

Hindus, as opposed to the Muslims, quickly embraced English. With Persian

eliminated as the official language, the Muslim aristocracy, who had

relied on their professional occupations as ta~ officers, lawyers and

police officers for their source of wealth, were quickly displaced by the

newly-emerging Hindu middle-class, 115 so that by 1871, although

province-wide they were approximately equal in numbers to the Hindus, the

Muslims only held ninety-two responsible government positions as opposed

to the 681 occupied by the Hindus. ll6 In the field of education the

Muslims did not fair any better. In 1878, of the total number of Bengalis

holding graduate and post-graduate degrees, 3155 were Hindus and 57 were

Muslims. Il7 Furthermore, having decided to keep aloof from the British

educational system, Muslim attendance in British high schools in 1880-81

was limited to 363 pupils as compared to 36,686 Hindu students. IIS The

long-term effects of their deliberate decision to reject English culture

was that at the time of independence there was only one Bengali Muslim in

the Indian Civil Service. II9 This meant that the majority of civil

service positions in East Pakistan would inevitably have to be filled by

Muslims from either West Pakistan or Muslim minority areas; the long-term

consequences of having another 'foreign' class of people dominate the

administration of the province after Partition were to be deeply

destabilizing and divisive.

115. Ling , cpo ~it._, p. 225.

116. Sayeed, Pa~istan: The Formative Phase, pp. 13-14.
117. Chaudhri, OPe cit.,
118. Ibid., p. 7.
119. Ibid., p. 362.
 241

As a consequence, this asymmetrical Hindu-Muslim socia-economic

relationship would eventually have a direct repercussion on the Bengali

Muslims' desire to have a homeland of their own free from Hindu

domination; and although Bengali Muslims and Hindus were essentially of

the same ethnic stock, the resentment against the Hindu landlords and

money-lenders, which took a religious~cum-political significance, forced

the Bengali Muslims to opt for an alliance with the Aryan Muslims of

North-west India. 120 As in the other Muslim areas, the Muslim League

did not automatically enjoy the support of the local Muslim population; it

had to compete with the provincial parties that had more secure power

bases in Bengal. This was vividly demonstrated in the 1937 election

results in which the Muslim League was only able to win 37 of the 119

Muslim seats. 121 Nevertheless, with such a high level of religious

polarization in the province, it is not surprising that it was Fazlul Haq,

Chief Minister of Bengal, who moved the Lahore Resolution, Pakistan's

founding document, in the All-India Muslim League Session at Lahore in

1940. 122 And al though there was factionalism in the Bengal branch of

the Muslim League, the Muslim League managed to win 113 of the 119 Muslim

seats in the 1946 elections. 123 The Muslim League's hold on Bengal was

complete. Accordingly, the League members of the Bengal Legislative

Assembly voted in favour of joining Pakistan, even though it meant Bengal

would be partitioned along religious lines, with Calcutta, the commercial

centre of United Bengal where all the jute mills on which East Bengal's

rural economy depended upon were located, going to West Bengal.

120. Islam, 00. cit., p. 62.

121. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, p. 33.
122. 10il1. 1 p. 1\,-
i..i.J.

123. Chaudhri, OPe cit' p. 48.l

 242

THE MUHAJIRS

Although Partition enabled the Indian muslims to have a state of their

own, it also brought about one of the largest migration occurring in the

shortest time span in modern history, with 5.8 million Hindus and Sikhs

migrating to India, and over 7 million Muslims going to Pakistan. 124

The Muslim migrants eventually came to represent approximately 10% of the

total pre-197l Pakistan population. Their distribution was quite uneven,

however, with West Pakistan absorbing 90.4% of the total migrant

population and East Pakistan only taking in 9.6% of all refugees. In

relation to the indigeneous population of West and East Pakistan, they

represented 20% and 2%, respectively.125 These muhajirs, a name derived

from muhajirin meaning one who migrates from a place not under Muslim rule

(Dar-ul-Harb) for one that is (Dar-ul-Islam),126 were to playa role in

the future political developments of the country much greater than their

numbers ever warranted.

Two distinct categories of migrants, based on their origin, should be

distinguished: the Urdu and the non-Urdu-speaking refugees. The largest

category of migrants, the non-Urdu-speaking refugees, was the one composed

of the Muslims living in the Hindu majority areas, adjacent to Pakistan,

which had been awarded to India according to the Radcliffe Award. 127

12t. ANOt2 an Statistics of the Ref~G2eS lnd the Ev~c1e2s' Problem, (Board of Economic Inquiry,
Government Jf West Punjab, 1~47), p. 17. FGf JO account of ~his migr3ticn by an East Punjabi refugee see:
1

Chaudhri! ap. cit., pp. 254ff.

125. According to official f2cords, 7,226,600 ]igrants t80k ~p f2sicience in Pakistan. The
gcvernment acknowledges that these figures may be misleading, however; for many refugees did not claim
themselves as being migrants, ?articularly these ~hc ~ere r2t~rning to their provinc2 of birth! or whose
move was not connected with Partition per see Census of Pakist1n. 1951, (Karachi, Government of Pakistan,
1951), Vol. 1, ~. 31. For a brief survey of ather estimates, see: Tayyeb, OPe cit., p. 169.
126. Thecdare P. Wright, Jr., "Indian Muslim Rafug22s in the Politics of Pakistan 1 n Journal of
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vel. 12, No.2, July 1974, p. 191.
127. Fer a detailed examination of boundaries demarcated according to the Radcliffe Award, see:
Tayyeb, ap. cit., pp. 81-95. An exact breakdown of the Urdu and ncn-Urdu-speaking muhajirs is not
possible, since it is not avaible in the 1951 Census Report. The only available data is with regard to
 243

By far the most important of these areas was East Punjab. 12S The

Muslims who resided in that part of the province suddenly found themselves

living in a hostile environment, forcing them to flee for their lives.

Similarly, Sikhs and Hindus living in West Punjab were also forced to

leave their ancestral homes for fear of being the target of retaliation

for the massacres inflicted against the Punjabi Muslims of the eastern

part of the province. According to official sources, within three and

half months of independence there had been a human exchange of

approximately 5.5 million Muslims and 3.5 million Hindus and Sikhs in the

Punjab alone. 129

Strictly in ethnic terms, the eastern Punjabis had no difficulty

integrating into the West Punjabi environment, since their language,

customs and value system were identical to the West Punjabis'. Where

problems did arise were with regard to their socio-economic level. As

opposed to the fleeing non-Muslims, who had mostly been small shopkeepers,

petty government employees and clerical workers, the in-coming Punjabi

Muslims were in the vast majority semi-skilled or unskilled labourers and

peasants of the lower socio-economic bracket. 130 Not only did the loss

of all these middle-men create enormous difficulties for the

administration of the Punjab, but the economic absorption of such large

number of refugees presented even greater problems. First, there was the

the origin of the ]uhajirs according ~o the zones from ~hich they originated; however since these zones
t

encompassed Urdu and ncn-Urdu-speakin] areas, it is impossible to det2r~ine their mother tongue. The only
data one (an r~!y on to confirm that ~on-Urdu-speaking muhajirs wers in a majority is by examining their
pravirlce of destination. Given that it is a known fact that the ~ajority of Urdu-speaking muhajirs
jr~ft8d ~8 Kdi·Jchl, i.2.~ 616,900, and the oon-Urdu-speaklng ~i~rants went to the Punjab. i.e., S,2S1~200,
one can safely state that the Urdu-speaking ~uhajirs were in d mincrity. Ce~sus of Pa~istan, 1951, p. 71.
l~a. Other important areas in ~hich the Muslims faced 1 similar situ3tion were some of the adjacent
districts of Rajasthan, Delhi and the United Provinces, and in the east, but to a much lesser degree,
Assam, West Bengal and Bihar. Wright, cp. cit., p. 192.
129. Sayeed, Pakis an: The Formative Phase, pp. 263-264.
130. Taneb, Gp. C t. p. 170.
I
 244

need to distribute the vacated lands to the muha.iirs. The fortunate ones

obtained plots of land between five and eight. acres in the Canal Colonies

of the southern Punjab and Sind. The less fortunate families had to

accept tracts of land either in the over-populated areas of the northern

districts of the Punjab or in the poor, non-irrigated western districts of

the province. 131 The second source of difficulty, which was directly

related to the refugees' lack of professional skills, was the migrants'

unfamiliarity with the high standards of farming techniques left behind by

the Sikhs and the Hindus, especially in the irrigated areas. 132 It

quickly became obvious that Muslim solidarity was not limitless,

especially when it threatened the vested interests of the landed

aristocracy. With the aim of alleviating the hardship of the refugees,

there was an attempt by some 'radicals' of the Muslim League to try to

bring about structural changes to the land tenure system in West

Punjab. 133 However, the idea of breaking up the large estates of the

province and distributing the land to the muha.iirs was not only vigorously

opposed by the ministers who represented the interests of the landed

elite,134 but it was rejected by the central government, including the

Quaid-i-Azam. 135

Consequently, as a result of a lack of sufficient land to settle,

large numbers of refugees ended up crowding the cities, especially of the

Punjab and Sind, sometimes accounting for one-third to two-thirds of the

urban population.

The Formative Phase, p.

t~~ T3yyeb~ cit.! p. 170.
CP.
13}. Chaudhri, Cpo cit., p. 269.
1~j Hast Jf the opponents of the scheme ~ere landlords themselves and former members of the
pre-Partition Unionist Party, 2.J., the Chief Mini~t2r, fti~har Husain Khan of Mamdot; the Finance
Minister, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana; and, the Mnister fer Revenue, Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan.
Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase. p. 266.
135. In order to reassure the Punjab landlords who ~ere ~Drried of the influence of the left in the
Muslim League, Jinnah stated: "The League is n8t against any interests among the Muslims". Siddiqui,
:JP. cit.., p. 59.
 245

Table 7.l.

Proportion of refugees in the population of the major cities of Pakistan,1951

City Province Total Refugees Refugees as

Pop. (000) (000) % of Total

Karachi Karachi 1065 613 57.5

Lahore Punjab 849 366 43.0
Dacca E. Bengal 340 71 17.5
Hyderabad Sind 242 160 66.0
Rawalpindi Punjab 237 89 37.3
Multan Punjab 190 94 49.2
Lyallpur Punjab 179 124 69.4
Sia1kot PWljab 168 54 32.3
Peshawar NWFP 151 14 9.4
Gujranwala Punjab 121 61 50.2
Quetta Baluchistan 84 19 22.5
Sargodha Punjab 78 54 68.8

Source: Census of Pru{istan, 1951, Karachi, 1951, Table 2, Section 2-3.

The second· category of refugees, the Urdu-speaking muhajirs,

essentially emigrated from the United Provinces, the Central Provinces,

Bombay and Bihar. Though they are ethnically and geographically diverse,

this class of migrants possess a strong sense of group identity based on

cultural and historical factors, i.e., the Islamic religion, a Persian

cultural tradition, a common language and a tradition of Muslim supremacy

in northern India, especially under the Mughal emperors. 136

As opposed to the first category of refugees, these Urdu-speaking

muha.iirs were better educated than the indigeneous population of Pakistan,

and had capital to invest in their new state. As a consequence, they

easily came to dominate the business sector of society, since the Hindu

who had occupied this position had emigrated to India and had left behind

them a vacuum that needed to be filled. These large business

families,137 which were mainly composed of "returnees", i.e., Muslims

136. Weekes, cpo cit., p. ~S5.

137. Approximate y a dozen businessmen and their families came to centra! the eccnomic sector.
GankOV~~Y1 A HistorY J Pakistan, p. 115.
 246

who originally came from Pakistan but who in the course of their trade

needed to move either seasonally or permanently to the great coastal ports

of India, only naturally migrated to the large cities where business

opportunities were most favourable, e.g., Karachi and Hyderabad. 138

East Bengal also had its share of. refugees, albeit on a much smaller

scale than West Pakistan. Out of the total refugee population, East

Pakistan only absorbed 699,100 muhajirs, Le., 9.6% of the total Pakistan

intake. 139 However, only 14.5% of these immigrants were Urdu-speaking

muhajirs, pejoratively referred to as "Biharis", who emigrated from the

United Provinces and Bihar; the others were Bengali-speaking

refugees. 140 The economic situation of these migrants in East Pakistan

was, however, not as promising as the one their counter-part enjoyed in

West Pakistan. As opposed to the situation existing in the western wing

of the country, the Hindus did not leave en masse East Bengal. 141 This

meant that there was no middle-class vacuum to be filled by the muhajirs,

be it in the agricultural or business sectors of the economy. Furthermore,

these "Biharis", who were closely "identified with the dominant North

Indian culture of the West Pakistani governing elite",142 were never

able to integrate themselves into East Bengali society as their

Urdu-speaking counter-part had been able to achieve, to a greater degree,

in West Pakistan. This was mainly due to the fact that Urdu culture was

more compatible with West Pakistan culture, especially Punjabi, than with

Bengali tradition, social norms and language.

138. Amongst this :las: of "returnees there was the ~ery irlF!~ent~31 !smaili community, mainly
u

based in Bombay: ~hi~h had ~een instrumental in giving substantial financial support to the Muslim League
and Jinnah, hi~s31f a ~emb8r of that community. Siddiqui, cpo ~it. p. 58.
1

139. Cen"sus of Pakistan, 11?51, p. 31.

140. ~Jr~:;ht, Ope cit., p. 194.
141. Although the political situation in East Bengal was generally peaceful, there was nevertheless
an exodus of Hindus to West Bengal in 1948. The nderlying factor for this migration is said to have been
psychological. Chaudhri, op. cit., p. 272. Accord ng ot 1951 figures, there were 41 ,700 Hindus in East
Pakistan, or .9% of the total provincial populat cn. Census of Pa~istan! 1951, Tab e 6-2
142. \~r qht, op. cit. p. 194.
 247

Apart from the upheaval such a large influx of refugees was bound to

create for the administration of the country, the greatest source of

ins tability, according to Burki, was the implantation in Pakistan,

specifically West Pakistan, of an unstable 'alien' societal system. 143

At the time of Partition, the rural-based indigeneous social structure of

West Pakistan was characterized as archaic but stable, hierarchically

organized, with well-defined vertical links between the landlords and the

peasantry. The urban-based Urdu--speaking muhajirs, on the other hand,

were organized into a loose system of horizontal linkages between

different social groups, based on modern participatory ideas, in which

there was no permanent allegiance to anyone. As a result of having been

the backbone of the Pakistan Movement, these muhajirs were in a position

to dominate the political realm in the early 1950s and impose

institutions, especially economic, that were most compatible with their

value system. 144 It was the clash of these two societal system that

created the greatest political conflict in Pakistan, thus delaying the

establishment of stable political institutions.

There were several reasons as to why West Pakistan attracted the bulk

of the Muslim migrants. First, the area that suffered the most with

Partition, as far as inter-religious hatred was concerned, was the

province of Punjab; and, consequently, it was only natural that the East

Punjabi Muslims migrate to West Pakistan, since it was physically the

closest part of Pakistan where they could easily integrate with the

indigeneous population with whom they shared close ethnic, religious and

historical affinities. Second, West Pakistan was less populated than East

Bengal, and, with its newly-irrigated lands vacated by the Hindu and Sikh

H3. S.J. Surki, Pakistan ander Shutt!). 19iI-19i7, (London, the Hacmillan Press, 1'180), p. 14.
144. Ibid.! p. 17.
 248

farmers, it offered promising opportuni ties for the in-coming

agriculturalists. Third, Karachi, having been chosen as the capital of

Pakistan, presented itself as a powerful magnet for refugees interested in

a career in business or the public service. Dacca, on the other hand,

provided no such incentives, since it still had the majority of

middle-class Bengali Hindus living there, but, more importantly, Calcutta,

the driving force of United Bengal, had been awarded to West Bengal,

transferring with it vasts amounts of Hindu capital. Finally, for the

Urdu-speaking muha.iirs West Pakistan was a more attractive venue for

re-settlement, for Urdu was not only more widely understood in that wing

than in East Bengal, but its provincial vernaculars, especially Punjabi,

were, linguistically speaking, closely related to Urdu. 145 So within a

few months of independence, one could already discern the beginning of a

regional imbalance between East and West Pakistan; a phenomena that was to

adversely affect inter-wing relations for the next 25 years.

14 . c. Shac~ 2, ·Puniabi in Lahore,· Medern Asian Studies, Vel. 4, Nc.3, 1970, p. 242. For an
interest ng discuss on of the historical links b2t~een Urdu and Punjabi, see: Gankovsky, The Peoples of
Pakistan, pp. 190-191.
 CHAPTER 8.

THE EAST WING - WEST WING POLARIZATION (1947-1971)

 Alongside the religious debate has been the issue of integrating into

a cohesive, national unit the component parts of this multi-ethnic state.

The successive leaders, civilian and military, have taken steps which they

considered appropriate in order to achieve this goal. Accordingly, in

this chapter will be examined the major policy decisions of the various

governments from 1947 until 1971 and the consequences these had on the

process of national integration. However, before analysing these

governmental decisions, a brief examination of the ethnic composition of

the most important state institutions, that is, the bureaucracy, the

military and the Muslim League, will assist in understanding the process

and the reasons that led to the implementation of policy decisions in the

realm of centre-province relations.

With Partition, Pakistan inherited the Muslim contingent of the former

Indian Civil Service (ICS).l Unfortunately, as a result of the legacy

of British recruitment policy, the ethnic composition of the Muslims in

the ICS was heavily skewed in favour of residents of East Punjab and

United Provinces, two areas not to be included in Pakistan. The net

result of this policy was that the very selective Civil Service of

Pakistan (CSP),2 Pakistan's version of the ICS, was completely dominated

by Urdu and non-Urdu-speaking muha.iirs. 3 This ethnic imbalance, which

continued until at least 1949 when the central government decided to

implement a federal quota system for recruitment to the federal

1. During the first quarter of 1947 the Indian Civil Service/Indian political Service (IGS/IPS)
1

cadr~s had a strength of 1,157 officers, of these 101, or 9%, were Muslims. Ninety-five of these officers
eventually opted for service in Pakistan. R. Braibandi, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan- in
J. laPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Deve!8pment, (Princeton University Press, 1967), pp.364-6.
2. For an interesti~g analysis of the structure, organization and ethos of the CSP, see: H.H. Khan,
"The Civil Service of Pakistan", The Indian Political Scienc2 Revi~w, Vol. 13, July 1979, No.2, pp.133-S4.
3. Interview [an academic at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, October 1983] There was only one
East Bengali Muslim in the rcs at the time of independence. Chaudhri Huhammad Ali, The Emergence of
P.'lKistan, (Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, 1?73), p. 362.
 250

bureaucracy,4 inevit.ably meant that West Pakistanis and muha.iirs would

be filling not only the Federal posts in the civil service but also the

positions in the provincial public services. 5 This quickly gave rise,

especially in East Pakistan, to a feeling of being 'colonized' by the West

Pakistanis, since by 1955 Bengali representation in the higher ranks of

the Central Secretariat was still only 7.4% of the total. 6 To make

matters worse, not only was there bitterness on the part of the East

Pakistanis, but there was also resentment amongst the West Pakistanis who

had to spend time in the less developed eastern wing of the country, two

attitudes unlikely to promote a better understanding between the two

groups of people who, already prior to independence, had very little

interaction with one another.

So although the initial Punjabi and muha,iir domination of the Pakistan

bureaucracy was the result of historical factors, this ethnic imbalance,

however, was perpetuated either deliberately or because of the East

Bengalis' low level of educational skills, with the result that these two

original ethnic groups have continued to maintain to the present their

preponderent positions in the civil service. This low level of Bengali

representation was also reflected in another state institution, the Armed

Forces of Pakistan.

As was the case with the Indian Civil Service, the British Indian

Army's (BrA) men and equipment had to be divided between Pakistan and

4. This quota system ~3S ~as2d on the principle that 20: of the vacancies in the Central Superior
Servic2s wer2 to be filled on the b~sis of nffierit~ and the r2ffiaining 30% equally divided between the two
wIngs.
5. By 1950-1951, out of a total of 2,618 federal civil servants, only 113, or 4.3%, were East
Bengalis. Pakistan Times, 7 and 9 February 1956, cited in Y.V. Gankovsky and L.R.S. Polonskaya,
AHistery of Pakistan, 1947-1 QSB, (Lahore, People's Publishing House, n.d.', p. 154.
6. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan:F1ilure in National Integration, (Dacca, Oxford University Press, 1973),
p.26.
 251

India at the time of Partition.7 Similar to the ethnically selective

policy applied to the civil service, the British limited Indian

recruitment into the BIA to the 'martial races', for example, Punjabi

Muslims, Pukhtuns, Sikhs and Jats. a Conversely, because of sub-standard

physical attributes or simply for political reasons, some ethnic groups

were classified as non--martial races, as was the case with the

Bengalis. 9 Regardless of whether there ever was any physiological basis

to the 'martial race' theory or whether it was simply a policy of 'divide

and rule' in order to ensure indigeneous reliability in the BIA, the fact

of the matter is that at the time of Partition the Muslim contigent of the

BIA overwhelmingly consisted of Punjabis and Pukhtuns. 1o Moreover, the

in-take of these two Muslim ethnic groups was limited to the northern

districts where the land was arid, non-irrigated and over-populated. 11

Since agriculture was poor and there was a lack of industries, the young

men had no other outlet for employment but the BIA. As with any

institution that relies heavily on tradition to maintain a high level of

esprit de corps, Pakistan's recruitment policy has essentially followed

the imperial pattern of the BIA.12 As it is clearly evident in Table

8.1, the East Pakistanis were, as was the case

7. For a bac~grGund to the SIA, see: S.P. Cohen, The Indian Army, Berkeley, University of California
Pr2ss 1'?71; ?hilip Mason, A Matt:?f of Honour, P~n:;uin! 11]76; and: H.S. Bhatia, (ed.; Militar,t HistGry of
1

2r~tish I~diJ (1607-1947)~ Delhi, Deep and Deep PUblications, 1977.

8. DeWitt c. Ellinwood, ~Ethnicity in a cnlonial Asian Army:British Policy and the Indian Army,
1914-19!8ft~ in DeWitt Ellinwocd and C. Enloe (eds.), Ethnicity and the Military in Asia, Special Studies
Seri~5, no. 118, (Buffalo, State University ;-jf New Yor~, 1978), p. 50.
9. Ibid.
10. This was a legacy Df British recruitment policy during W.W.II. Out of a total of 2,047,430
recruits, 712,'152 (35:) were Punjabis and Pukhtuns and 171,252 (:3.3%) were Bengalis. H.S. Riz'li, The
Militarv 1nd Politics in Pakistan, (Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1976, 2nd ed.), pp. 177-178.
11. Military recruitment in the ncrthern Punjab! or Petwar: r~li~s h2av~ly on the districts of
Rawalpindi, Campellpuf, lhelum and Sujarat. As far NWFP, it is limited tc Peshawar and Kohat, relying on
the Yusufzai, Khattak, Afridi and Bangash tribes fDr their recruits_ K.B. Sayeed, "The Rele of the
Military in Pakistan", in J. Van Doorn !ed.)~ Armed Fcrces and Society, (The Hague, Mouton, 1968), p.276.
12. Because of a lacuna of hi]her and middle-rankin9 officafs at the time of Partition, many British
officers r2~ained in P3kistan during the transition periDd_ Until January 1951, 20: of the officers in
the Pakistan armed for~es ~ere British. (Keesings, VI, p. 9028). The posts of Commanders-In-Chief of the
three services ~ere occ~pied by British officers for a number of years: 1951(Army), 1953(Navv) and
1'?57(Air Fnr(p).
 252

with the civil service, once again completely outnwnbered by the West

Pakistanis, particularly by the Punjab is, a situation which the Bengalis

came to resent increasingly in the face of military involvement in

politics. 13

Table fl.l Composition of thp. Armed Forces (1956)

Population % of total % of Army % of senior

(1951) Population (1956) (A) Officer Corps(B)

East Pakistan 42,063,000 55.5 5 1.6

West Pakistan 33,779,902 45.5 98.4

Punjab 20,651,000 27.2 60

NWFP( Set tled) 3,253,000 4.2
(FATA) 2,647,000 3.5 35
Sind 6,540,000 8.6
B'istan 1,174,000 1.5

Total Pakistan 68,640,902 100

(A) As for the Navy and the Air Force, East Pakistani representation in
the officer corps was 1.2% and 6.3%, respectively. (B) Major to Lt.-Gen.
Source: K.B. Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan", in J. Van
Doorn, (ed.), Armed Forces and Society, (The Hague, Mouton, 1968), p. 276.
Census Report, 1951, (Karachi, Government of Pakistan), Vol. 1, Table 1.

The Muslim League at the time of Partition could be characterized as

being dominated by the Urdu-speaking muhajirs and the large landlords of

the Muslim majority provinces of India. Since the Muslims politicians

from the Muslim minority provinces had been at the forefront in the

struggle for the creation of Pakistan, it was inevitable that they would

come to dominate the Muslim League organs. For example, in 1942, out of a

total membership of 503 in the Council of the All-India Muslim League,

there were 245 members from the Muslim minority provinces. More

importantly, however, was their control of the powerful Working Committee:

they claimed 13 of the 23 positions.1 4 The problem that arose after

13. Fer an apologetic view of the military involvement in Pakistan politics, 522: Raymond A. Moore,
Jr., N3ti~n-euiliinq and ~he Pakistan Army, Lahore, Aziz Publishers, 1979 On the ather hand, for a
high!y critical assessment, albeit somewhat simplistic a ti~2S, of the mlitary's role in Pakistan
politi~:, ";ee: K. r:3ma!, The Scrr::::Jo State, New Delhi, ntellectual Pu 1 shing House, 1':82 .
. K.E. Sdyeed, Pakistan:The Formative Phase, ISS -1948, (Karach , Oxford University Press, 1968,
2nd cd. , p. 206.
 253

Partition, however, was how these muha,iir politicians, whose former

constituencies were now located in India, would be able to participate in

the political activities of Pakistan. The dilemma was resolved by simply

allocating, by co-option, Constituent Assembly seats to these politicians,

regardless of whether or not they resided in the electorate they were

meant to represent. lS

The non-muhajir component of the Muslim League was, as previously

examined, essentially composed of the large landlords from the Punjab,

Sind and East Bengal who, in the face of the Muslim League's growing

popularity with the masses, had defected from their own provincial parties

to join the Muslim League. Moreover, not only was the Muslim League a

relatively new party with regard to its mass appeal, but it was also

poorly organized. ls Furthermore, although it had no national

socia-economic progranmle to implement after Partition, the provincial

branches of the League were fractionalized along 'radical' and

conservative lines. In some, it was essentially a loose coalition of

Muslim politicians primarily interested in power and the status the

political office would bestow them. Their dubious commitment and

allegiance to the Muslim League, and what it was meant to stand for, was

made painfully clear soon after the establislment of Pakistan when

politicians changed parties and alliances according to the benefits it

would ensure them.

15. In the Constituent Asse~bly 6 seats (S in the Punjab ~nd 1 iri Sind) were provided for these
muha~irs. Others ~ho lived n ~est Pakistan, 2.9., LiaquJt Ali Khan, Prof. I.H. gureshi and Haulana
Shabbir Ahmad Osmani, ~e~'2 9 ven East Bengal seats. Also the West Punjab Assembly granted membership to
all members ~Iected fro~ Hus im constituencies in East Punjab. T.P. Wright, Jr., "Indian Muslim Refugees
in the Politics af Pakistan", Journal 8f C8mmcn~ealth and Comparative Politics , Vol. l~, No. 21 July 1974,
p.194
16. K.B. Sayeec, Polit.ics in Pakist.an, (N.Y.:Praeger, 1980), p. 2g.
 254

So at the time of Partition, three 'national' institutions dominated

the political scene: the relatively homogeneous civil service and Armed

Forces, essentially controlled by Punjabis, muha.iirs and, to a lesser

extent, Pukhtuns, and the heterogeneous Muslim League, an amalgamation of

disparate politicians whose only common link was religion and economic

interests. Inevitably, once the bureaucracy and the military had

consolidated their internal organization, they would easily come to

dominate the deeply divided politicians.

THE EARLY YEARS: 1947-1958

Soon after Partition, the federal government followed a policy of

centralization which consisted of two parts. First, the Karachi

government intervened in the domestic affairs of the provinces. This

approach was not novel, however; since this was essentially a continuation

of the policy followed during the pre-Partition days when the Muslim

League's Central Parliamentary Board "reduced the status of the Provincial

Parliamentary boards to that of subservient and subordinate bodies".17

It was the second component of the government's policy which was radically

different from the Muslim League's stated aims of the pre-Partition days.

As examined in the "Two-Nation Theory" chapter, the Lahore Resolution

emphasized the autonomous nature of the future provinces, and the 1946

Resolution modified this stand by completely omitting the word 'autonomy'

from the up-dated resolution. Although the validity of the 1946

Resolution has been questioned because it was the Muslim League Council

which had altered a Resolution passed in an open conference, this did not

17. Sayeed, The F~rmative Phase, p. 192.

 255

prevent the Muslim League government from following a highly centralized

policy vis-a-vis the provinces. IS It was the clash of these two

interpretations, with the Bengalis leading the 'autonomy' camp and the

Punjabis advocating a centralization approach, which led to a rapid

deterioration of centre-province relations.

The first case of crude interference into provincial matters occurred

in the North-West Frontier Province(NWFP) within one week of independence.

As noted in the previous chapter, the results of the July 1947 referendum

indicated only 50.5% of the total population of the province wished to

join Pakistan. Dr. Khan Sahib, who had a parliamentary majority in the

provincial assembly, had campaigned in support of joining India and had

stated that if he lost the referendum he would resign as chief minister.

However, he not only stayed in office after the plebiscite, but, according

to some official sources, he refused to take the oath of loyalty to

Pakistan. 19

Whatever may have been the reasons for Dr. Khan's behaviour, Jinnah

did not consider them relevant; for on 22 August 1947 he asked the NWFP

governor, Sir George Cunningham, to dismiss the Congress government of

NWFP, as allowed under the adapted Government of India Act, 1935,20 and

instead install the leader of the provincial Muslim League, Khan Abdul

Qayyum Khan, as the new chief minister. Mujahid, in his highly apologetic

work on Jinnah, stated that "political and security reasons dictated the

1:3. Jan an, 8p. cit. p. 22.

1

19. Sharif Al Mujahid, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, Studies in Int2f?retation, (Karachi, Quaid-iAzam

Academy, 1981), p. 140. According to information Lord HGuntbatten is said to have received from Liaquat
Ali Khan, the future prime minister of P3kistan, Khan Sahib had intentions of proclaiming an independent
Pukhtunistan an 15 August 1947. Sayeed, The Formative Phase, p. 271.
20. Section 51(5) of the adapted Government of India Act, 1935 clear y indicated: "In the exercise
of his function under this section with respect to the choosing and summon ng and the dismissal of
ministers the governor shall be under the general control of, and comply w th such particular directions,
if ;In,{, as ;nay from time to time, be given to him ~y the governor-general. Sayeed, ibid., p. 247.
 256

removal of Dr. Khan Sahib".21 One can understand the governor-general's

fear that the Pukhtunistan issue could be used by Afghanistan and India to

create domestic problems for Pakistan. 22 Consequently, he felt that by

reIDoving the Congress leader from office, the Pukhtunistan problem could

more easily be dealt with in the future. However, one should also be

mindful of the fact that this Congress-led cabinet in NWFP must have been

an affront to the Muslim League's prestige as the sole representative of

the Indian Muslims. Moreover, the very narrow margin of victory at the

referendum must have seemed threatening to Jinnah's "Two-Nation Theory",

especially if this had a spill-over effect into other provinces.

Therefore, one should interpret Jinnrul's action as a pre-emptive move to

avoid a potentially threatening situation.

The political situation in the Frontier province did not improve,

however. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan's heavy-handed style of rule did not

endear him to the Pukhtuns. Soon after taking over as chief minister, he

gaoled the popular nationalist figure, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, along with

most of the Pukhtun leaders. Not only did the majority of the population

refuse to yield to Qayyum's authoritarian rule, even when he had the army

and air force called out to suppress disturbances in the Tribal areas,23

but influential members of the Muslim League who had been instrumental in

promoting the cause of Pakistan in the Frontier distanced themselves from

the party.24 In 1953, the authoritarian governor-general, Ghulam

Mohammed, sensing the ill-effect this could have on the political

stability of the province, decided to repeat Jinnah's own action and

removed Qayyum from office, shifting him to a central cabinet position.

The position of chief minister was filled by Abdur Rashid Khan, a former

21. Mujahid, Ope cit.! p. 135.

22. The Pu~htunistan issue ~il be discussed in deta 1 in Part IV.
23. L. Ziring, P1kistan:rh~ En gm2 of P8litica! DeV2 cpment, (Fclkestcne, Wm Dawson, 1980), p. 77.
24. Cha~jhri ~uhamffiad Ali, OPe cit., p. 368.
 257

inspector-general of police of ~~FP, who had no interest or experience in

politics.

In Sind the political situation was just as volatile as in NWFP. On

26 April 1948, the governor-general requested the governor of the

province, under Section 51(5) of the adapted Government of India Act.

1935, to dismiss Chief Minister M.A. Khuhro on charges of

maladministration, misconduct and corruption. A special court of inquiry

eventually found him guilty and debarred him from holding any public

office for three years. 25 His successor, Pir Ilahi Bakhsh, only

remained in office for one year after an election tribunal found him

guilty of wrongdoings during the 1946 elections. Khuhro eventually

returned as chief minister in 1950, having succeeded in having his

disqualifacations removed on technical grounds, only to be removed once

again by the governor the following year. As of December 1951, the

province, as a result of the politicians' inability to resolve their

differences, was placed under Governor's Rule, with the provincial

assembly dissolved and the governor assuming emergency powers until the

May 1953 provincial elections. Although the polls indicated that Khuhro

was still the most popular provincial politician, the governor-general

overrode the provincial branch of the Muslim League and instead chose

Pirzada Abdus Sat tar as the new chief minister of Sind.

In the case of Baluchistan, the Quaid-i-Azam played an important role

in having it accede to Pakistan. Following the Stanstill Agreement of 11

August 1947 between Kalat State and Pakistan, in which it was recognized

that Kalat state was an independent state, Jinnah invited Kalat to merge

with Pakistan. After several months of delay, due to the Khan of Kalat's

25~ ~ujahid, GO. ~it~ 1 p. 135.

 258

need to obtain the ascent of the members of the state parliament before

formally agreeing to a merger, the central cabinet unilaterally decided to

separate Kharan, Lasbela and Mokran from Kalat, thus forcing the Khan of

Kalat, now isolated, to accede to Pakistan on 30 March 1948. However,

what really embittered the Baluch was not so much the government's

under-handed way by which it had the Khan of Kalat merge with

Pakistan,26 but the governor-general's decision to re-establish the

status quo ante in Kalat; that is, a Political Agent, directly responsible

to the governor-general, was appointed to administer the state and advise

the chief minister. Soon after this order was handed down, several

ministers of the Kalat government were arrested or exiled. 27 Moreover,

Baluchistan came under the direct control of the newly created ministry of

State and Frontier Regions, a portfolio which Jinnah, as governor-general,

decided to head himself. This unprecedented decision to have the Head of

State responsible for a ministry set the pattern for the future

involvement of the governor-general in the administration of the country.

The governor-general also became directly involved in the political

affairs of the Punjab. The provincial branch of the Muslim League, which

essentially consisted of the for"mer Unionist leaders who had joined the

League prior to 1946 provincial elections, was deeply fractionalized and

beset with political intrigues. Divisions within the provincial branch

was not determined according to political criteria but rather on the basis

of personality and the clash of opposing baradaris (brotherhood). Already

in 1948 Jinnah attempted to reconcile the feuding factions, but to no

avail. 28 Consequently, confronted with this deep-seated factionalism,

and mindful of the problems the influx of millions of refugees were

26. Interview [A Former minister in the government of Kalat. Quetta, January 1984J
27. For an account of these events, see the Khan of Kalat's political autobiography: Hir Ahmed far
Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, (Karachi, ROY\ll Book ca., (975), pp. lS2ff.
23. Ch3udhri Muhammad Ali, GD. cit., p. 367.
 259

creating for the general administration of the Punjab, Governor-General

Khwaja Nazimuddin, a politician from East Bengal, decided in January 1949

to impose Governor's Rule in the province.

Undoubtedly, one of the most important decisions with which the

politicans were faced was with regard to which language to adopt as the

state language of Pakistan. Although this controversial issue was

eventually resolved equitably, it was the manner in which it was

approached which most embittered the Bengalis, and ultimately affected

their perception of the Muslim League politicians.

On 21 March 1948, during Jinnah's only trip to Bengal, the governor-

general made two speeches in which he stated in no uncertain terms that

"the state language of Pakistan 1S going to be Urdu and no other

language".29 Although Jinnah's aim was to avoid "the curse of

provincialism"3o at the federal level, the Bengalis resented the

imposition of a 'national' language which only a very small minority in

East Bengal spoke; ruld, though Urdu was recognized as the language of the

Muslims of India, it failed to acknowledge that Bengali was spoken by the

majority of Pakistanis, albeit only in the eastern wing.

Jinnah's stance on this issue was a reversal of his previous

position. Back in 1937, at the Lucknow session of the Muslim League, a

resolution had been brought forward recommending that Urdu should be made

the lingua franca of Muslim India. However, in the face of strong Bengali

opposition to the resolution,31 Jinnah, wishing to present a united

29. ~uJiJ-i-A:Jm ~cha~~mJ;j Ali Jinnah, Sp22ches as SovernGr-Gen2r~1 of Pakistan, 1947-1948 (Ministry
1

of Infcrmat!Gn Jnd BrGadcast.ing, n.d.), p. 89.

JD. Ibid.
31. On the other hand, Ch.:ludhri Mchammad Ali. an Urdu-speaking !lIunajir asserts that "during the
J

Pakistan m:mment it had ~een universally acceptad that Urdu ~ould be the national language of Pakistan".
Gp. ~it. 1 p. 365.
 260

front to the Congress and the British, skilfully hinted that he was

opposed to the resolution as it stood, and the issue was temporarily put

aside.32 It was the subsequent volte face on the part of the

Guaid-i-Azam which gave the Bengalis a feeling of having been betrayed by

the leader of the Muslim League. However, the turning point in the

Bengalis' rejection of the Muslim League was when the Bengali prime

minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, re-iterated the government's desire to have

Urdu chosen as the only state language of Paldstan. 33

In March 1954, the United Front, a coalition of four parties

representing the interests of the middle and lower-middle classes of East

Bengal,34 completely decimated the Muslim League in the provincial

elections, with the United Front winning 309 seats against the League's 10

seats. The United Front's programme essentially demanded that the Lahore

Resolution be fully implemented as it was envisaged when passed in 1940;

that is, full autonomy for East Bengal with only defence, foreign affairs

and currency under the jurisdiction of the federal government. This

demand for autonomy and the subsequent defeat of the Muslim League, which

included the rejection of the Bengali members of the League, was a clear

demonstration of the Bengalis' complete dissatisfaction with the central

government's attitude toward their province. Although Bengalis had an

equal representation at the national level, real power lied with the

Punjabi and muha,iir elite through their control of the armed forces and

the bureaucracy.35 The Bengalis were simply asking for an equal voice

in the administration of the country, including the recognition of Bengali

as a state language.

32. Sayeed, The F~rmativ~ Phase~ p. 210.

33. Given that Nazimuddin could only speak Ur:ju, he was neverc~nsidered a 'true~ Bengali. Interview
(Prof. Razzak, University of Dhaka, February 1?84]
34. This coalitiGn consisted of: The Awami League, the Krishak Sramik Party, Ganatantri Dal and the
Ni:am-i-Isldm Party.
 ~61

These anti-centre feelings were not only perceived as being <radical',

but for the Punjabis and muhajirs they were viewed as a direct challenge

to their control over the eastern wing. Accordingly, steps were taken to

counter these threats. First, Fazlul Haq, the chief minister of East

Bengal and the man who originally moved the Lahore Resolution in 1940, was

described by Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra, also a Bengali, as "a

self-confessed traitor to Pakistan".36 Consequently, Fazlul Haq, leader

of the United Front, and hundreds of party members were either dismissed

from their office or placed under house arrest. 37 Secondly, following

the elections, there was a breakdown of law and order in East Pakistan

with major clashes between Bengalis and non-Bengalis. 38 This factor,

along with accusations of communist infiltration in the United Front, led

to the imposition of Governor's Rule by the Punjabi governor-general,

Ghulam Mohammad. 39 The province was placed under the direct control of

the secretary of Defence, Major-General Iskander Mirza, a muha.iir from

East. Punjab.

Following the Muslim League's electoral defeat in East Pakistan and

the fear that the Bengalis' demand for greater autonomy may spread to the

smaller provinces of West Pakistan, the Central government suggested the

unification of the four western provinces into a single entity. In the

formulation of this scheme the role of General Ayub Khan, then

Commander-in-Chief of the Army, should not be underestimated; for not only

had he already suggested such an idea in his own political framework,40

but as a member of Bogra's "Cabinet of Talents" his objective was "to

unify the provinces of West Pakistan into one unit".41

36. Broadcast, 1 June 1954, cited in K. Gallard, Pakistan, Apclitical Study, (London, Allen and
Unwin, 1957), p. 53.
37. Gankcvsky, GP. cit., p. 206. Ironically, he later joined Hohammad Ali Bogra's cabinet in 1955.
38. Approximately 400 people died in these disturbances. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 40.
39. Constituent Assembly Debates, 28 June 1954, Yolo 1, p. 136, cited in Gallard, cp. cit., p. 74.
40. Hcham!ndd Ayub KhjlO, Friends Not Masters, (Karachi, Oxford University Pr2ss, !967), pp. 186-91.
 262

This One-Unit Plan was strongly opposed by the smaller provinces of

West Pakistan. Heading the opposition to the scheme were the politicians

of Sind who resented the Federal government's tendency to centralize

national decisions at the expense of the less powerful provinces.

Sindhis, even more than the Bengalis, had good reasons to be disappointed

with the Central government's general ,attitude of contempt for their

provincial feelings.

First, the basic reason for their opposition to the One-Unit Plan

resided in the fact that it contradicted the fundamental principle upon

which the country was founded, that is, autonomy for the provinces as

indicated in the Lahore Resolution. Moreover, the implementation of this

merger would be a renunciation of Jinnwl's personal assurance that every

province would have full autonomy, a stipulation which the Quaid-i-Azam

had given in order to induce the ·radicals' to join the Muslim League's

cause. 42 Secondly, the Sindhis resented the imposition of Urdu as the

state language of Pakistan, once again at the expense of a provincial

language which had a long history of literary development both in prose

and poetry. The Sindhis' opposition to Urdu was not only an attempt to

protect their language but, more importantly, to demonstrate their

displeasure with the Federal government's policy of giving priority to the

interests of the Urdu-speaking muhajirs over the Sindhis' own needs and

wants.

The Sindhis were embittered with three of the Federal government's

decisions. First, its policy of allocating to Urdu-speaking urban

refugees 40% of the land vacated by the Hindus;43 thus, the Sindhis

41. Ibid., p. 192.

42. Gankovs!(y, 00. c t., p. 91.
~3. Viewpoint, (Week y) 12 September 1985, p. 28.
 263

"felt they had exchanged one set of masters for another", with the Punjabi

bureaucracy supporting the muha,iirs' interests at the expense of the

Sindhis'.44 A second source of discontent was the Federal government's

inequitable distribution of resources amongst the provinces. For example,

of the 1.3 billion rupees allocated for various development projects

during the 1948-1951 period Sind received a mere 56 million rupees, or 4%

of the tota1. 45 Finally, the Federal government's decision in July 1948

to make Karachi the national capital was not only resented because Sind's

largest city was taken over by Urdu-speaking muhajirs, but, more

importantly, it represented a significant loss of revenue for the

province.

Therefore, when the One-Unit Bill was put to a vote in the Constituent

Assembly in September 1954 it was overwhelmingly defeated. The

governor-general was not going to accept this verdict, however; instead,

he dissolved the Constituent Assembly, formed a new "Cabinet of

Talents",46 had the chief ministers of NWFP, Sind and Punjab dismissed,

and had members of the provincial assemblies opposed to the One-Unit Plan

arrested. 47 Following these unorthodox tactics of persuasion, the

month-long debate in the Constituent Assembly merely became a formality;

and, consequently, the Punjabi and muhajir-dominated bureaucracy's goal of

having a united West Pakistan to counter the homogeneous East Pakistan

finally came to be fulfilled with the passing of the One-Unit Bill on 5

October 1955. In order to make this One-Unit Plan more palatable to the

smaller provinces, the Punjab did agree to a ten year limitation of 40%

representation in the West Pakistan legislature, even though it had 56% of

44. N.A. Hughal, QThe Elit~ Groups and Aspects of Confrontation within Pakistan d
, Asian Profile,
Vol. 5, Nc. 3, June 1977, p. 264.
45. Itdd., pp. 265-266.
46. Included in the pro One-Unit cabinet was the Commander-In-Chief of the Army, General Ayub Khan.
47. Pakistan Ti~2S, 23 Havernber 1955.
 264

the total West Pakistan population.

During the term of the first Constituent Assembly, the Parliamen-

tarians were mainly concerned with two issues: the role Islam should have

in the administration of the country, and the search for an acceptable

solution to the regional character of,the country. As previously

discussed, a modus vivendi was eventually reached with regard to the

religious aspects of the constitution. However, reaching a consensus

concerning the federal character of the country was no easy matter either,

since one had to take into account growing Bengali demands for provincial

autonomy. There were essentially two schools of thought with respect to

provincial representation at the central level: the Punjabis advocated

parity between the two wings and the Bengalis stressed the demographic

character of the country.4S It was not only the clash of these two

approaches, but also the conflict between Punjabi power versus Bengali

majority which hampered the process of constitution-making.

Undoubtedly the most promising solution of all the schemes put forward

was Mohammad Ali Bogra's 'Parity Formula' which would have established

parity in the combined chambers, each of which would have had equal

powers. Bengal would have had a majority of seats (165) in the House of

People while the country would have been divided into five areas, each of

which equally represented in the House of Units. 49 However, the

Punjabis, fearing a loss of power if this formula were implemented,

decided to advocate the merger of the four western provinces in order to

counter the more homogeneous eastern province. Being opposed to this

48. L. Sinder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, (Serkeley, University of California Press, 1961),
p. 203
49. Riaz Ahmad, Canstitutiona and Political Development in Pakistan, 1951-1954, (Karachi, Pak
American Commercial, 1981), pp. 26f
 265

One-Unit Plan, Bengali and Sindhi members of the Constituent Assembly,

attempted to reduce the dictatorial powers of the governor-general, a

Punjabi and a former member of the ICS. These threatening actions against

the Head of State eventually led to the dissolution of the Assembly, a

decision which further stalled the whole process of constitution-making.

When the second Constituent Assembly resumed the task of formulating a

constitution, Bogra's federal scheme had become outdated, for now the

country was equally divided into two provinces. As with the problem of

reaching a consensus regarding the role of Islam in the political

structure of Pakistan, the politicians were eager to work out a compromise

in the field of ethnic representation. Surprisingly, an agreement was

soon reached, and by 23 March 1956 the country promulgated its first

constitution.

It is evident from the way the document was framed that the parliamen-

tarians attempted to resolve the problem of national integration by

establishing a federation in which substantial power devolved to the two

provinces. 50 The essential elements of the constitution included, inter

alia: there was to be only one federal chamber in which the two wings were

equally represented with 150 members each (Art.44); Bengali and Urdu were

both recognized as the state languages of Pakistan, with English as the

official language for the next 20 years (Art.214); residuary power of

legislation was given to the provinces (Art.l09); steps were to be taken

to ensure people from the different provinces were given equal

representation in the armed forces and the bureaucracy (Art.31)i the

president was to be indirectly elected by the members of the National

Assembly and the two provincial assemblies (Art.32)j the provincial

50. S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under BhuttD. lQ71-1 Q77, (London, The Macmillan Press, 19801, pp. 67-68.
 266

governor was to be appointed by the president (Art.70); in case of

emergency the president was given powers to intervene in the domestic

affairs of the provinces (Art. 191) ; and, any amendments to the

constitution required the approval of both provincial assemblies and an

absolute majori ty of 2/3 of the National Assemb 1y (Art. 216).

Although the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages

could be viewed as a major victory for the East Pakistanis, the fact that

the constitution only provided for one chamber based on territorial

repr'esentat ion was a major set-back for the Bengalis. It not only failed

to recognize that the majority of the population lived in the eastern

wing; but, by being unicameral, it de jure gave the country a unitary

structure, a political form which contradicted the federal features of the

Lahore Resolution. Moreover, given that Bengali representation in the

bureaucracy and the armed forces was minimal, the East Pakistanis' ability

to counter Punjabi and muha,iir power of centralization, including their

control over East Pakistan's administration, would remain very low. It

was the failure of the central government to grant a minimum degree of

provincial autonomy which increased the Bengalis' disillusion with the

'federal' character of their partnership with West Pakistan.

However, the promulgation of the 1956 constitution did not resolve

centre- province relations. For example, on 25 June 1958, after two

months of continued political instability in East Pakistan, President

Mirza decided to impose Governor's rule. Similarly, army troops on 6

October 1958 were sent into the State of Kalat to put down an alleged

secessionist movement led by the Khan of Kalat. The Khan of Kalat's own

version of events is quite different, however. He asserts that the

 267

government's claim that the Khan was leading a secessionist movement is a

total fabrication on the part of President Mirza who merely wished to find

an excuse to impose Martial Law throughout the country in order to cancel

the impending federal elections in which he was sure to 10se. 51

The outcome of the federal gover~ent's decisions to implement highly

centralized policies vis-a-vis the provinces was to reinforce the

inherently centrifugal nature of the country. As indicated in the

theoretical model, outlined in the Introduction, the governments'

decisions had a negative feedback effect on the ethnic groups' perception

of the state authorities, and ultimately on the process of national

integration. Therefore, by failing to abide by the autonomous features of

the Lahore Resolution, the government, and especially the Head of State

and the bureaucracy, alienated the smaller provinces of West Pakistan and

the Bengalis of East Pakistan. The direct consequences of these policies

was the rejection of the Muslim League as the sole, legitimate and

national representative of the people, as demonstrated in the United

Front's election victory, and the establishment of provincial-based

parties, such as the Awami League in East Pakistan and the National Awami

Party in the non-Punjabi provinces, as counter-forces to the discredited

Muslim League. In an attempt to arrest the rapidly deteriorating

situation, the government decided to impose Martial Law, a decision which,

instead of resolving the issue, merely froze the situation.

51. Hir Ahmed ~ar l:han aluch, cp. cit., pp. 180f. The K3n~s account of the events is widely
supported by the intelligents a of Baluchistan. Int2fv e~s, [Ba uch high civil servant and Baluch author,
O!lott-'l
........ ",,:..u, '.T·~r:!!1.'~"
,/ '.l..I ... U, ~ lCII~"]
J./1_,'"
 268

THE AYUB KHAN PERIOD

In a speech he deli 'Jered in 1960, General Ayub Khan's military

background and the influence of his professional ethos to the promotion of

national integration were clearly visible, when he stated:

Their (Armed Forces) well-knit organisation is a bright

example of the underlying unity that runs through every
region, every language and every section of the people
of Pakistan. 52

Ayub Khan wished to see a society which would be free from chaos and

political upheavals, so that it could proceed with its economic

development. However, as a realist who was aware of the disruptive forces

of regionalism, Ayub came to realize that only a highly centralized system

of government would successfully counter the centrifugal forces of

ethnicity. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Ayub's views

about ethnic loyalties and centre-province relations not only changed over

time, but were often inconsistent and self-contradictory. For example, in

1959, contrary to Jinnah's own statements stressing that identification

with a specific ethnic group had become irrelevant and that Pakistanis

were only Muslims, 53 Ayub acknowledged publicly the ethnic ingredient of

Pakistan, when he stated:

We are not only Muslims; we are also Pakistanis and in

addition to being Pakistanis, we are Bengalis, Sindhis,
Punjabis, Baluchis and Pathans. 54

However, on the other hand, Ayub had been instrumental in the

implementation of the One-Unit Plan which was not only aimed at countering

the more homogeneous East Wing, but which resulted in the

institutionalization of Punjabi domination in West Pakistan. Also, in the

field of centre-provincial relations, Ayub's thinking and actions were

52. Message cn the occasion of the Armed Forces Day, held in Karachi, 9 January 1960, cited in Ayub
Khan, Speeches and State~nents, (Karachi, F2fczsons, n.d.),
53. Speeches as Governor-Genera!, p. SB.
54. Convocation Addr2SS at the Darul Uloom Islamia Tando A!lahyar, 3 May 1959, cited in Ayub Khan,
S22e~hes j}nd Statements p. 114.
1
 269

inconsistent with one another. In his 1954 Plan he emphasized that "the

,
provinces should have as much aut.onomy as possible ... leaving defence,

foreign affairs and currency in the hands of the centre",55 and, on the

other hand, he endorsed the highly centralized One Unit Plan. It was only

after being president for two years that he managed to consolidate his

political views, believing that if the country was to make any headway in

the process of national integration it would need a strong centre to guide

it along the correct path; and, moreover, it would require the people to

cease to identify with their linguistic group and instead make Pakistan

their focus of affective value. This marked change in approach was

already quite evident in 1960, when he stated:

... we have got to develop a higher loyalty which

transcends the smaller and narrower parochial
loyalties. Our mission is to weave unity out of
diversity. We can expect benefits from the country we
have created only in direct proportion with the higher
loyalty we give it. All other diversions are
tantamount to positive subversion. 56

Clearly, it was during the period of Martial Law, which lasted from

October 1958 until June 1962, that Ayub demonstrated his preference for a

centralized approach to the resolution of regionalism. The most

noteworthy example of his approach to national integration during that

period was the case of Baluchistan. Following the failed • secession'

attempt. by the Khan of Kalat, tribal leaders who opposed the central

government's method of tre-integrating' Kalat into the country, decided to

flee into the hills and lead a guerrilla campaign against the army. After

two years of military stalemate, the government promised the leader, Nawab

Nauroz Khan, that if he surrendered along with his men no charges would be

laid against them. Unfortunately for the Baluch tribesmen, they naively

assumed the Punjabis strictely adhered to the same code of honour as the

55. A/:;lb Khan, Friends Not ~asti?rs! p. 190.

56. Broadcast to the Nat~on, 23 ~arch 196D, cited in Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, p. 123.
 270

Baluch; for after sullrendering to the authorities, all the Baluch

fighters, except for the ninety-year old Nauroz Khan who was given life

imprisonment, were hanged. 57 Needless to say that this approach to

'nation-building' was not well received amongst the people of

Baluchistan. Consequently, a low·-intensi ty guerrilla war began between

the central authorities and the rebel. tribesmen, involving at times aerial

bombings by the Pakistan Air Force,58 and which continued throughout

Ayub's term in office. Furthermore, Baluch leaders were often arrested on

charges of sedition and detained under the Defence of Pakistan Rules

merely for opposing the Punjabi-dominated One-Unit Plan. 59 These

confrontations were, as Braibanti indicated, the inevitable result of the

cultural clash "between the Anglo-oriented bureaucratic elite on the one

hand, and the tradition-directed masses and lower-ranking civil servants

on the other".60

Al though the ad-·hoc approach to the Baluch rebellion appeared

effective in containing the problem, at least in the short term, Ayub Khan

was determined to establish permanent institutions which would resolve

once and for all Pakistan's problems. The cornerstone of his new

political system would be the promulgation of a new constitution. A brief

examination of the most important features of the constitution regarding

the distribution of power between the centre and the provinces will

denlonstrate that his later approach to centre-province relations prevailed

over his earlier thinking.

58. Herbert Fei;iman , Fr8m Crisis to Crisis, PaJ:istan 1962-1969, (Landen, 0~fcrd University Press,

59. Ibid., pp. 20lff.

60. R. Bra banti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakis an, (Durham, N.C.:Duke University Press,
IQ6~), p. 134, c ted in S. Pastner and Carroll MeG, "Adaptat on to State-Level Polities by the Southern
Bal~ch~, in L. Z ring et al. (eds.), Pakistan:The Long View, (Durham,Duke University Press, 1977), p.13.
 - 271

While the most redeeming feature of the 1962 Cons titution was that all

residuary powers went to the provinces (Art.132);51 the fact that the

president. was so powerful both at the federal and provincial levels

ultimately diminished the relatively autonomous prerogatives of the

provincial governments. 52 First, not only was the governor of the

province appointed by the president but "in the performance of his

functions", which included the selection of a provincial cabinet (Art. 82),

he was "subject to the directions of the president" (Art. 66) ; and, since

the provincial ministers were nominees of the governor, they were

accountable only to the governor and not the provincial assembly (Art.81).

Moreover, if there was a deadlock between the governor and the provincial

assembly over a Bill, the governor could refer the matter to the National

Assembly for resolution (Art. 77). Second, the province's residuary powers

were further reduced with the central legislature's "exclusive power to

make laws for the whole or any part of Pakistan" with regard to security,

planning and "the achievement of uniformity in respect of any matter"

(Art.131). Similarly, included in the Federal list was the central

legislature's powers to determine national economic planning and

coordination (3rd Schedule,pt.6) , a major point of concern for the

Bengalis given that since independence the profits from East Pakistani

jute, the major national earner of foreign exchange, had been used to

develop the West Pakistan economy.53 Finally, the two-hundred and

~ghteen-m~nber (later reduced to 156) unicameral legislature was equally

divided between East and West Pakistan (Art.20), a federal set-up which

undoubtedly discriminated against the majority Bengali population.

61. Th2 Constitution cf the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (as ~cdificd up to 10 April 1968), Karachi,
Ministry of Law and Parli1mentary AffaIrs, Gcvern~2nt of Pakistan, !968.
62. For an int2f2sting comparison of the constitutions anal sing the distribution of powers between
the provinces and the c2ntr2~ S22: Sayid Zaffar Hasan, "An Ana!ys s of the distribution af Powers between
the Federation and the PrGvinc~s in the five Constitutions of Pak stan", Sind ~uarterly, Vol XI, No.4,
1?83,
1
~p. 21-30.
63. Sa,{eed, P~lit.ics in Pakistan, p. 76.
However, at the provincial level, Pun,jabi representation in the West

Pakis tan Provincial Assembly, which had been limited to 40?~ of the total

house, was increased to its actual populat ion ratio in West Paldstan, thus

institutionalizing Punjabi domination in the western wing (Art.239,8th

Amendment, 1967). This application of double standards inevitably

reinforced the feeling of discrimination amongst the non-Punjabi

population.

Apart from continuing to recognize Bengali as one of the two national

languages (Art.2l5), which could hardly be considered a concession since

it was already enshrined in the 1956 Constitution, Ayub Khan, wishing to

appease the Bengalis' major grievances, included symbolic articles in the

constitution. These were, inter alia: the promotion of National

Solidarity (Art.2), parity between the provinces in all spheres of the

Central government and the Defence Services (Arts.16,17), and making Dacca

the principal seat of the National Assembly as well as the second capital

of the country (Art.2ll). These • concessions , were viewed by the Bengalis

as mere empty gestures which would be no substitute for real and

fundamental changes to the inequitable distribution of power at the

federal level.

Two and half years after the promulgation of the constitution Ayub

held the first presidential election. As opposed to the 1962

parliamentary elections, this one created a general air of excitement,

especially amongst the opposition parties which had coalesced into the

Combined Opposition Party (COP).64 COP's only programme was the defeat

of Ayub Khan, and their candidate chosen for this task was the ageing Miss

Jinnah, M.A. Jinnah's sister. Although the election was not regionally

4. COP was composed of the 'Coune I" Muslim League, the Awami League, the ~aticnal Awami Party, the
Niz~m- -Islam Party and the Jama'at-i-Is ami.
 273

divisive, in that it was essentially contested along ideological lines,

such as democracy versus autocracy, the results failed to have an

integrative impact. In West Pakistan Ayub lilian won with a decisive

majority of 73~~ but in East Pakistan he was only able to muster 53% of the

votes. Moreover, in the more modern urban areas of the centre-east region

of East Pakistan the population generally voted in favour of Miss

Jinnah. 65 These results clearly indicated that already an important

segment of the Bengali community rejected Ayub's system of government. It

was a presage of worst things to come in centre-provincial relations.

There were two fields in which the Bengalis felt most repressed and in

which they demanded immediate and radical changes: the linguistic and

cultural realm, and the development sphere. Undoubtedly, the right to use

Bengali as the vernacular of cOnllnunication and the promotion of Bengali

culture were two demands which the East Pakistanis believed were essential

pre-requisites if they wished to maintain their sense of uniqueness

vis-a-vis the West Pakistanis. Accordingly, there was deep-seated

resentment runongst students and East Pakistani society at large against

the continued use of English in all spheres of administration and

education, a policy which they perceived as favouring the Bengali urban

elite and the biharis, the two sections of the community most proficient

in English.66 Eventually, their protest sparked off a general wave of

opposition to the federal government's attitude toward the Bengalis'

cultural identity.

Governor Abdul Monem Khan's reaction to this movement was to crackdown

on all opposition, tighten the federal government's control over the

656 Jandn, CPA cit., pp. 152-1~:3.

66. H. Rashiduzzaman, "East-West C8nf iets in Pakistan: 2ngal Regionalism, 1947-1970·, in A. Wilson
and D. Dalton (eJs)! The States of South As d:Problems of Nat cnal nt23ration, (Delhi, Vikas, 1982), p.
,~~

.iL..i.
 274

press, ban the broadcast of Tagore's songs and poems, and withdraw all

government patronage from activities viewed as separatist in nature. 57

While Monem's approach to this wave of regional demands was exactly in

line with Ayub Khan's drive to downgrade regional identification, this

heavy-handed method of dealing with national integration had quite the

opposite effect, however; it merely reinforced the Bengalis' drive for

greater cultural autonomy. Ultimately the central government was obliged

to back down under pressure and make symbolic concessions, such as making

21 February a provincial holiday in commemoration of the 1952 language

riots, the use of Bengali on number plates and the gradual introduction of

Bengali as the medium of instruction at university level.

However, it was in the sphere of economlC development, and East

Pakistan's less than equal share of it, which the Bengalis felt strongest

about. Ayub Khan did acknowledge that relative to West Pakistan the

eastern wing was generally lagging behind in its standard of living and

that this economic disparity had to be corrected. Accordingly, the

Finance Commission agreed to a more equitable distribution of resources

between the centre and the provinces, particularly with regard to East

Pakistan. Moreover, as a gesture to the Bengalis, the government agreed

to transfer some federal development agencies, such as the Water and Power

Development Authority and the Pakistan Development Corporation to

Dacca. 59 But, once again, the Bengalis wanted concrete results not

merely symbolic concessions; and inprovements they did finally obtain, but

too few and too late.

the AC:'~:S :)f Ta~C!'e,

a hiQhly respec ed Bengali Nobel
~n i:;h~:;f t.h~~ ~.1::~
t.hat the Punjab s! own poet, Iqbal, was
~!ven such pr8minenc2 ~n Pa~ san. Sayee:j, Pol tics in Pa~istan, p. 67.
68. Rashiduzzaman, OP. s ~. ~. 17.
I
 275

During the period from 1959 until 1969, Ayub Khan's 'Decade of

Development', ·the overall growth per capi ta GOP for East Pakistan was 17~... ,

compared to West P3.kistan's 42?~.69 In real terms, this meant that by

1970 East Pakistan's per capita GOP was $314 versus West Pakistan's $355

in 1960 and $504 in 1970; in other words, the disparity rat io between East

and West increased from 1.32 to 1.61.70 Similarly, in the distribution

of development expenditure East Pakistan did increase its share, but

compared to its population and its greater developmental needs due to an

underdeveloped capital infrastructure it certainly was not sufficient.

From 1950/51 to 1954/55, it received 20% of the national expenditure in

development, compared to West Pakistan's 80%. However, for the period

1965/66 to 1969/70 East Pakistan had increased its share to 36% and West

Pakistan's had decreased to 64%.71

So, although there was an absolute inprovement in East Paldstan's

economic development, in relative terms it was still lagging behind West

Pakistan. Not only was this the result of the government's pursuit of an

industrial strategy which required that surplus capital, mainly extracted

from the East Pakistani jute industry, be re-invested into the industrial

sector of the economy, primarily located in West Pakistan,72 but since

the central administ.ration was dominated by West Pakistani bureaucrats the

most profitable import licenses inevitably were given to West

Pakistanis. 73

~? Planning Ccmmissicn, Government of Pakistan, Repcrt of the ?an21 of ~conomists on the 4th 5 year
?!Jn~ 1=:78-19:5, IsI;1;n3b'ld, ~'ay 1'170, ::it2d
in !bid.
70. !bid.; als;j ':22: ~ .. Anisur Rahman,
"East a d West Pakistan: A PrGb12ffi in the Political Economy
of R2gional Planning", OccasiDnal Papers in Internat Dnal Affairs, No. 20, Harvard University Center for
International Aff3ir~, JJly 1968, AHS Pr~ss, Hew Yor .

72. K.B. SaY2ed, ftDevelapmental Strat2gy under Ayub Khan Q

, Cont:"lbutians to Asian Studies, Vol. XIV,
1?79, Pp. :30-~31.
:~. Sal~'eed, PGlitics in P3kistan, p. 76.
 276

It was this domination of the civil service by Punjabis and muhajirs,

both at the federal and provincial levels, which most emb:ittered the

Bengali population. They felt that with independence they had simply

exchanged one set of rulers with another.?4 Consequently, in order to

placate Bengali demands and avoid a potentially explosive situation, Ayub

Khan made a policy decision in 1961 which stipulated that only Bengalis

were to be posted in the East Pakistan bureaucracy. Following this

decision, the number of Bengalis in the East Pakistan civil service

drastically increased to the point that by 1968 only the Chief Secretary

and the Secretary of Agriculture were West Pakistanis. 75 Similarly,

although in the Central Secretariat the number of Bengalis increased

substantially, their representation still remained below 30%. Moreover,

their share of positions was inevitably limited to the lower echelons of

the bureaucracy. By 1966, only four Bengalis were Permanent

Secretaries. 76

The turning point 1n the East Pakistanis' demand for greater autonomy

was without any doubt the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.7? Although there is

general agreement that the Bengalis were fully supportive of the war

effort, and even coined the "crush India" slogan,78 it was in the

aftermath of the war that the Bengalis' commitment to Pakistan took a turn

for the worse. The 1965 War made the Bengalis painfully aware of two

important facts. First, East Pakistan was left completely defenceless

against India during the war. There was never any attempt on the part of

the military high command to defend the East Wing; it was the army's

74. By 1954, there ~as not a single Bengali Permanent Secretary in the whcl~ of the Bengal
S2(:ret..J~·!at. ~aj':ist3n CGnst.itL:ent. Ass2mbly 1 vol. ..i.,T Hn 26, 17 July 1954, p. 1474, cited in
:1l~.

Jan an 1 np. :: it., p. 101.

75. Jah~n, Ibid.
76. Ibid., p. 100.
77. The 1°65 War ~ Ii be ana ¥sed in Part Vof the thesis.
78. Int2rview, [Ha Dr-Genera (Ret.) Fazal Muqeem Khdn, Rawalpindi, OctDber 1983]
 277

strategic doctrine that the only way to defend East Pakistan was to have a

strong West Pakistan, specifically the Punjab. 79 However logical this

military strategy may have been considering the peculiar nature of the

country's geography and the limited mill tary resources available to defend

it, the Bengalis did not like to think of their provinces as being

expendable. This policy was perceivecl as only benefitting West Pakistan.

The war brought home to the Bengalis another important reality: the

low Bengali representation in the armed forces. As previously examined,

at the time of independence the ethnic distribution in the Pakistan

military was overwhelmingly Punjabi and Pukhtun, a result of historical

and cultural factors beyond the control of the new Pakistani authorities.

After Partition, there were several attempts to increase the Bengali ratio

in the military. For example, in 1952 the government established a

pre-cadet school in Dacca. By the following year it had to be closed Que

to a lack of candidates. 3o In 1959, in a further attempt to increase

Bengali representation, Ayub Khan decided to reduce the physical standards

required for admission into the armed forces. However, even with these

policies of discrimination in favour of the East Pakistanis, the Bengalis

were not attracted to the military profession. Whether this was due to

cultural reasons or Punjabi arrogance toward the Bengali recruits, is

difficult to determine. Nevertheless, compared to their initial

representation, their numbers did increase significantly, in that, by 1964

their share in the officer ranks was: Army 5%, Air Force 16% and Navy

10%.81 Finally, by 1969, East Pakistan could claim to have four

regiments and ten battalions purely Bengali, a distinction which did not

exist in the other provinces.

79. S.P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, (Ber~eley, University of CJlifcrnia Press, 1984), p. 45.
80. Ri:vi, cpo cit., ~. ~:3.
81. Ibid., pp. 179, 182. After 1965, the gO'lernm:?nt .1gr~ed t.~ implement a qucta system, but the
br~a~dc~n 8f th2 qua~J ~as never m3!je ~ublic.
 278

So even with an incre'-:lse in Bengali representation in the armed forces

and t.he bueeaucracy, and Ayub Khan's repeated claims that "the provinces

had been handed over so much power as could never be conceived by anyone

in the past",82 the East Pakistanis' drive to have greater control over

their own provincial affairs drastically intensified. The turning point

in the movement for Bengali autonomy <;ame in February 1966 when Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, put forward his Six-Point

proposal 83 as an alternative to the existing constitutional framework.

The essential features of it were:

1. Pakistan would have a federal goverrooental system,

with election to the federal legislature on a
popubtion basis and the principle of adult and direct
franchise.
2. The Federal government would only be responsible for
defence and foreign affairs.
3. There would be two currencies, freely convertible,
or one currency coupled with the prohibition of capital
transfer from one wing to the other.
4. Fiscal policy would strictly be a provincial right;
the Federal government would be allocated revenues for
defence and foreign affairs.
5. Foreign exchange reserves would be closely watched,
and the federating units would provide for the Central
government according to a mutually agreed procedure.
6. Each federal unit would have a militia or a para-
military force of its own. 84

As proposed, Mujib's Six-Points was basically a formula for a loose

confederation, a structure of government totally anathema to Ayub's belief

in a centrally-controlled federal system. Not only was Mujib's proposal

viewed as tantamount to secession, but, more importantly, it was seen by

the Punjabis and muhajirs as a direct threat to their power at the

centre. Accordingly, rather than attempting to worli out a compromise wi th

82. Sp2cch deliv2~:i~ i~ 2acc3! 27 April 1965, :;it2d in Ayub ~hJn~ Sp~?ches ~nd Statements, p. 190.
83. AccGrdi~g to s.~. :]f.~~! Secret3ry-General of the Muslim L2ague (pJ;ara group), it was Ayub Khan
~h~) In:ti,lt:;:J :rif! :S Point-~. Alt.ar Ga!~hjr, Ayub's SeCr2rarl' :Jf Inf:)rmati::n~ :3 1/en .~dmitted having be:;n the
principal aut~Gr of ~!12 ~ Points. Int2fview, [Mahmood Ali, Federal Minister and fermer member of the
wnon-revivalist" National A~Jmi Party. Isldffiabad, January 1?84. (As J Bengali he was closely involved in
the East-West discussions.)] According to the interviewee, Ayub Khan 'plantad' the 6 Point Programme into
the East Bengali camp in order tJ contain the oPP0sitian in West Pakistan an{j have an excuse to crack down
on political act vity in East Pa~ $ta~.
84. White 30er an the Cr~s s in East Pakistan,(Government of ?3~istan? Augu~t 1971), App. C, p.36.
 279

Mujib, whose Six-Points were negotiable,85 Ayub Khan decided to opt for

confrontation instead. This approach was typical of Ayub's attitude of

contempt. toward the Dengalis whom he described as having "all the

inhibitions of down-trodden races and have not yet found it possible to

adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new-born freedom".86

Therefore, by choosing confrontation, . Ayub not only radicalized the

autonomous movement, but he also set the groundwork for his own downfall

and East Pakistan's ultimate secession.

Using the powers granted to him under the Defence of Pakistan Rules

and the State of Emergency, which still had not been lifted since the 1965

War, Ayub quickly cracked down on the leaders of the Bengali movement.

He imprisoned Mujibur Rahman and Maulana Bhashani, leader of the

pro-Peking National Awami Party (NAP), as well as Bengali civil servants

and military officers sympathetic to the Bengali cause. Instead of

subduing the movement, these arrest had the opposite effect: it

radicalized the Bengali population. Initially, the protest was largely

led by the East Pakistan Students League, unofficially the student wing of

the Awami League, but, as Ayub Khan increased political repression, the

students were joined by workers and "street mobs" 87 which resulted in

the students becoming more radical in their demands.

The counter-productive nature of these governmental tactics was

compounded by the central government's failure to negotiate with other

Bengali polical parties, of which all except one disagreed with Mujib's

Six-Points programme. S8 Nevertheless, the Pakistan Democratic movement

85. ,)dnan J ~P. ci t.. J p. 169 .

96. From Ayub's "A Short Appr2ciation cf Present and Future Problems of Pakistan" in Friends Not
Masters, p. 187 .
87. Jahan has used this ter~ to refer to rickshaw ?ullers, small shopkeepers, bus and taxi drivers
and day labourers. op. ci ., p. 169.
88. The only party n 19reement with the Awami League was the pro-MoscJw faction of NAP.
 280

(PDM) ,89 a heterogeneous coalition of politicians fonnt::~d in May 1967,

put forward an eight-point programme of their own in an attempt to resolve

the constitutional crisis. It was basically a combination of provincial

powers granted under the 1956 Constitution and Mujib's Six-Points, with

the centre allowed to control currency, federal finance and inter-wing

trade and communication. gO But to no.avail, instead of attempting to

liaise with the moderate autonomists, who could have possibly been in a

position to control, or even neutralize the increasingly radical nature of

the movement, Ayub preferred to crush all opposition.

On 7 January 1968, as a last resort, and in an attempt to reduce

Mujib's public standing and legitimize the government's approach to the

autonomous movement, Ayub had twenty-eight Bengalis arrested, including

members of the armed forces and the Civil Service of Pakistan, on charges

of having made plans for the establishment of an independent state of East

Bengal with the assistance of India. Also to stand trial in the alleged

conspiracy was Mujibur Rahman who, although still in gaol, was accused of

having participated in the plot. However, confronted with a rapidly

deteriorating political situation, coupled with a lacuna of concrete

evidence with which to sentence the accused, Ayub Khan decided to withdraw

the case and release the defendants. 91 His decision to do so was not

only perceived by the Bengalis as proof that the whole case had been a

total fabrication from the very beginning, but it also critically damaged

Ayub's credibility and legitimacy as head of state.

89. The PDM ~as composed Df the National Defficcratic Front, a grouping a politicians essentially
interested in the establishment of democratic institutions, the 'Council" Husli~ League, the rival faction
of Ayub's ~Convention~ Muslim League! the Jama'~t-i-Islalni and th2 ~fizam-i-Islam Party.
90. Janan. cpo cit., p. 17l.
91. For an account of the "Agartala Conspiracy Case" trial, see: Feldman, cpo cit., pp. 184-189.
 281

In the western wing of the country the political situation was no less

threatening for Ayub's political survival. However, there was one

fundament.al difference between the protest movement in West Pakistan and

the one in the eastern wing: whereas in East Pakistan the opposition's

primary objective was to end West Pakistani domination in the affairs of

the country, in West Pakistan the issue was the establishment of a

full-fledged democracy. Notwithstanding these different aims, the heart

of the matter is that in both cases their respective objectives required

the termination of Ayub Khan's system of government.

The rallying cry for the three smaller provinces of West Pakistan was

the demand for the abolition of the One-Unit system, a political framework

which had institutionalized Punjabi control over the whole western wing.

With the Nawab of Kalabagh as governor of West Pakistan for almost six

years, the population of that wing had had to tolerate a system

characterized by political repression, heavy-handedness against political

opponents and suppresion of provincial rights, especially with regard to

the non-Punjabi provinces. 92

It was only in 1967, when popular opposition in West Pakistan

increased and in which Bhutto's PPP undoubtedly played an important

role,93 that Ayub Khan came to realize that the anti-One-Unit movement

had reached threatening proportions. 94 Apart from Sindhi opposition to

the One-Unit, the other provinces also demonstrated their disapproval. In

Baluchistan, as examined earlier, the army had been attempting to quell a

low-intensity rebellion since 1958. In NWFP, the Wali Khan group of NAP

was spearheading the opposition. Finally, in southern Punjab and Northern

92. Ibid., pp. 201ff.

93. It is interesting to note that in Ayub Khan's political autobiography, Friends Nat Masters, Z.A.
Bhutto, who had been a federal minister for eight years in Ayub's government, was never mentioned once.
94. Fe 1dman, 00. cit., p. 204.
 282

Sind there was a movement for the establishment of Siraikistan led by the

Bahawa1pur United Front. 95 Although all these centrifugal forces were

threatening Ayub Khan's position in West Pakistan, the PPP, the most

important opposition political party in West Pakistan, was emphasizing

socio-economic issues rather than provincial rights. This, however, did

not prevent Ayub from arresting Bhutto on 13 November 1968 under the

Defence of Pakistan Rules.

Confronted with turmoil and political unrest in both wings, Ayub Khan

announced on 21 February 1969 that he would not stand for re-election at

the end of his term. Since Ayub was the foundation and linchpin of the

political system, with his decision to resign "his erstwhile powerful

system crumbled completely".96 Nevertheless, in a desperate attempt to

salvage 'his' political framework, Ayub convened a Round Table Conference

(RTC) in which all major political parties, except the PPP and the

Bhashani faction of NAP, were represented. 97 Bhut to refused to

participate because he failed to see the benefit of compromising with Ayub

when even his own generals were deserting him, and Bhashani boycotted the

talks in favour of the mass upheaval approach. 9a Mujib submitted a

proposal for the resolution of the crisis based on an amalgamation of the

1962 Constitution and the Awami League's 6 Point Formula. The salient

features were: proportional representation for the East Wing, shifting the

national capital to Dacca, the end of the One-Unit system, direct

elections on the basis of universal suffrage and a parliamentary form of

~c ~"I· 1n ~n ·jepth analysis Jf the Sar3i~i m8vement~ see: c. stldckle, "Sir~i~i: ALanguage Movement
:1 P.l~~~::t:lnl'! r1c:]ern As:an Studi2S, Vol. L~:! ~lc .1. 19i7, pp. 3?~-~Q3.

07. The pc!itical pJrties had ~8rffied the Democratic Action Cammittess (DAC) ~hich included: the
Awami League! the prc-~oscG~ faction of th~ National Awami Party, the Jami'at-Ulema-i-Islam, the National
D2ffic~r~tic Front, the Awami League(Nawabzada Nasrullah group), the "Council" Muslim League, the
J3m~'1t-i-Islami and the Nizam-i-Islam Party.
98. S.W. Ch8udh~lry, Thp ~~st Days cf United ?akist1n, (Lenden, C. Hurst, 1974), p. 36.
 283

government. 99 The leader of the Awami League was going beyond

requesting greater autonomy, he was demanding for East Pakistan a share of

central power which was proportional to its population. loo

President Ayub was willing to accede to all major demands, except one:

the alteration of the federal structure of the country. The RTC was

deadlocked, and its participants confused and divided. lol Meanwhile, 1n

the provinces, especially in East Pakistan, unrest was continuing. The

governor had fled the province and the head of the Dacca University

Central Student Union was the de facto governor of the province. 102

Therefore, given that the overall situation in the country was chaotic and

out of his political contr'ol, Ayub had no alternative left but to turn to

the army to restore law and order. However, by then Ayub Khan had already

lost the support of the army,103 and General Yahya Khan, Conunander-in-

Chief of the Army, did not wish to be identified with a discredited

political leader. Accordingly, before Yahya Khan would agree to the

imposition of Martial Law, Ayub would have to abrogate the 1962

Constitution. 104 If he agreed, Ayub's position would be identical to

President Mirza's back on 7 October 1958: he would be subservient to the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army. So, realizing the untenable situation he

was in, President Ayub reluctantly agreed to transfer power to General

Yahya Khan.

As the theoretical model indicates, instead of promoting a greater

sense of national identity and cohesion, the outcome of Ayub's

~9. Dr1ft Constitution Amendment Si]!, 1969 mMcudud Ahmed~ Bangladesh:CJfl:tituticnal Quest fer

lOu. jahlif1, 00. ~.~t., pp_ 1;~-1~5.

101. Choudhury, cpo cit., p. 37.
102. JanJn, :JP. ~!t. p. 17~
I

:03. ~he f83sons for AY~lb's ass of ]i!itary support have been analysed in Part III of the thesis.
104. Choudhury, cpo ::it, p. O.
 284

centralization policies was .to compound the centrifugal forces of the

country; for by failing to allow the Bengalis to share power at the centre

at least on an equal basis, an approach which compounded the inequitable

nature of ethnic distribution in the state institutions, Ayub alienated

the Eas t Paldstanis, forcing them to demand greater provincial autonomy.

Finally, by choosing confrontation rather than compromise, the central

government left no option for the Awami League; Mujib, for his own

political survival, had to radicalize his demands, and Ayub was offering

East Pakistan too little too late.

THE YAHYA KHAN PERIOD:1969-l97l

In his first speech as Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Yahya

Khan clearly stated his most fundamental objective:

I have no ambition other than the creation of

conditions conducive to the establishment of a
constitutional government ... and for the smooth transfer
of power to the representatives of the people elected
freely and impartially on the basis of adult
franchise. 1 0 5

Accordingly, he tool{ steps which were intended to correct the previous

government's failures and meet the two most pressing demands of the

majority: the establishment of a democratic system of government and

greater regional autonomy. On 28 November 1969, Yahya Khan announced the

dissolution of the province of West Pakistan and the re-instatement of the

four pre-existing western provinces, that is, the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and

Baluchistan. loB He also declared that the forthcoming national and

provincial elections, planned for October 1970, would be based on the

principle of one-man-one-vote. This decision not only instituted the

105. Gan2ral A.M. Vanya Khan'z first SrG.Jdc;~st to the Naticn, 26 March 196 ,!, as cited in Rizvi,
1
~
cit' Appendix
l 1PPM 326-328.
106. Prov nee of West Pakistan (Dissclut~on) Order, 1?70, President's 0rder No.1 of 1970.
 285

people's democratic right but, more importantly, it did away with the

principle of parity between the two wings, as embodied in the 1956 and

1962 Constitutions. These two decisions, which resulted in the

dismantling of two of the most important pillars of Ayub Khan's system,

not only demonstrated Yahya Khan's desire to make a radical break with the

previous regime, but also his belief that unless the people had a greater

participatory role in the administration of the country, especially East

Pakistanis, the very existence of Pakistan could be threatened.

Yahya Khan institutionalized these decisions in the Legal Framework

Order (LFO), a document approved by all major parties, including the Awami

League, which outlined the fundamental principles that were to be adhered

to in the future constitution. These guidelines included: maximum

autonomy for the provinces, full participation in all forms of national

activities by all Pakistanis, removal of economic and all other

disparities between the provinces by statutory measures, maintaining the

federal character of Pakistan, and the upholding of the country's

integrity.107 Following the scheduled National Assembly election of 5

October 1970, the elected members of parliament would be given 120 days to

frame a new constit.ution which would subsequently have to be

"authenticated" by the president before the National Assembly would be

permitted "to enter upon its function as the first Legislature of the

Federation".lo8 It was this presidential veto power which was to cause

the break-down in the post-election negotiations between the political

parties and the government.

Yahya Khan's thirty-three months in office can be divided into three

distinct stages: the preparations to the national and provincial elections

t~~ :Jh~te ?1~~r on the Crisis in East Pakista~! (Government of ?akistan, 5 Aug. 1971), pp. 3-4.
 286

(March 1969 - December 1970), the post-election negotiations (December

1970 - 25 March 1971), and the military operations (25 March - 21 December

1971).

Apart from implement.ing reforms in the administrative and economic

spheres,I09 Yahya Khan was determined to redress some of the most

glaring past inequities, specifically in the field of ethnic

repr'esentation in the national services of Pakistan. Accordingly, early

in his administration, Yahya Khan promoted six Bengali officers of the

Civil Service of Pakistan to positions in the Central Secretaries, ordered

that whenever senior posts became VRcant Bengalis should be given priority

to fill them, regardless of seniority, and doubled the Bengali quota for

recruitment in the armed forces. IIO Moreover, in his endeavour "to

reduce regional disparities and provide a greater measure of social

justice", Yahya Khan approved the 4th 5-Year Plan (1970-1975) which

allocated 60% of total resources reserved for the public sector to East

Pakistan. III Although these measures in the administrative and economic

fields were commendable, and demonstrated Yahya's concern for regional

equity, these steps were viewed by the Bengali nationalists as being too

little and too late, once again.

The election campaign, which lasted nearly one year, wa~ inherently

divisive; instead of creating an integrative mood in the country, the

electioneering compounded the existing East--West division. Although there

were parties, such as the Muslim League, the Pakistan Democratic Party and

the Jama'at-i-Islami, which did have candidates In both wings, the fact

that they could muster only very little support in East Pakistan

109. These refcr~s ~er2 GXlffiined in Part II of the thesis.

110. Choudhury, op. cit., p. 54.
Ill. Ibid. , p. 65.
 287

meant they could hardly claim to possess a national character. More

importantly, however, was the exclusive nature of the two major parties,

the PPP and the Awami League, which was responsible for the subsequent

political stalemate. Bhutto's PPP, which did not even attempt to field

any candidates in East Pakistan, was primarily concerned in increasing its

popular support in Sind and the PunjaO. It did so by appealing to the

electorate with different slogans. In Sind Bhutto emphasized the economic

aspects of his party's programme, promising the population improved

economic standards and the end of their exploitation. He even went as far

as to pledge that all new Sindhis, i . .e., muhajirs, would be driven from

their lands and their holdings would be distributed amongst the haris

(labourers; and the old Sindhis. 112 On the other hand, in the Punjab,

source of most of the army's recruitment, he emphasized "a thousand-year

war ~'li th India" and the restoration of "national honour" .113 In East

Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman was campaigning not only on the basis of his

Six-Point fOnDula but also on the promise of instituting a socialist

economic order which would remove all economic injustice. 114

The results of the national and provincial elections, held on 7 and 17

December 1970, respectively, clearly demonstrated how far apart the two

wings had grown from each other since 1947. The military government had

expected the AW3nli League to win a majority in East Pakistan not only

because Mujib's demand for greater regional autonomy was an effective

rallying cry for the Bengalis, but als9 because of the federal

government's slow response to t~e tidal wave and cyclone which killed over

a million people in East Pakistan in September and November of that year.

The central government's failure to quickly come to the rescue of the

112. Dil~~n, =1 Nvv~mb2r 1-.)70.

113_ Choudhury, GP. cit' 1 p. 7:.
l!~. ~oudud Ahilled 1 Dp. ::it., p. 1-.7
.;. ... 1 .
 288

Bengalis was perceived by the population as another proof of West

Pakistani indifference to the needs of the Bengalis, and thus further

fueled the fires of discontent in the eastern wing. IIS Out of a total

of 300 National Assembly seat.s, the Awami League won 160 seats, or 99% of

the seats reserved for East Pakistan. Moreover, in the 300 member

provincial assembly the Awami League 9btained 288 seats. ll6

In West Pakistan, on the other hand, the results, although less

overwhelming than in the eastern wing, clearly favoured the PPP, giving

them 81 out of the 138 National Assembly seats, or 59% of that Wing's

share of seats. In the four western provincial assemblies, however, the

results were less clear-cut. The PPP won a majority in the Punjab 013

out of 180 seats) but in Sind fell short of a majority (28 out of 60). As

for Baluchistan and NWFP, the PPP was only able to win 3 seats in NWFP,

with the National Awami Party (Wali group) the dominant party in both

provinces. 117

Of all the forces concerned with the election results, the military

leadership was probably the most surprised by the returns. It had agreed

to the holding of the elections, for it had expected no single party to

win a clear majority, thus forcing several parties to coalesce to form the

civilian government. A coalition government would have meant a dilution

of the parties' programmes, and would have assured a future tarbitrary'

role for the armed forces. However, once the political battle lines were

drawn after the elections, the military's worse fears appeared to have

become a reality: the elections had "crystallised the polarization between

115. L. Ziring, 't~il:t3ri3m in p~~~~ t;]fj: Th~; 'fahya Khan Interregnu;jrt, in ~LH_ t~riggings (ed.),
?akistan in Transiticn~ (U~iversity of Is amabad Press, 1975), ~p. 2!8ff. The federal government did
post~Gn2 ~h2 elec~icfls, Jriginally SCh2d~ 2d for 5 October, because of thesD natural calamities.
116. Choudhur}' 1 :JP. ~i t., ~. 12£:.
117. Ibid.
 289

East and West Pakistan".118 The stage was set for the government's

second phase, the post-election negotiations.

Soon after the elections, Yahya Khan decided to begin a series of

discussions with the two major political parties. As agreed upon by all

parties prior to the elections, Yahya Khan had made it quite clear that it

was essential that a consensus be reached prior to the first session of

the newly-elected National Assembly,119 a pre-requisite which he felt

was indispensable in order to avoid a repetition of the long and divisive

constitutional debates of the 1940s and 1950s. Unfortunately, it is at

this point that the conditions for reconciliation between the two major

political parties and the government took a turn for the worse. Not only

did Mujib refuse to show Yahya his party's draft of the constitution,

insisting instead that Yahya summon the first session of the National

Assembly as soon as possible, but he also indicated that the Awami

League's Six-Point formula was not negotiable, a stance diametrically

opposed to his pre-election promise. 120

This did not deter the president who was determined to find a solution

to the political impasse. Therefore, fearing that the political situation

in East Pakistan could rapidly deteriorate if left unresolved, he

announced on 13 February 1971 that the National Assembly's first session

would be held in Dacca on 3 March 1971. This decision, however, was

totally unacceptable to Bhutto who, with the whole-hearted support of the

hawkish Lieutenant--General S.G.M. Peerzada, Yahya Khan's Principal Staff

Officer, was demanding that the PPP be allowed to share power at the

centre with the Awami League. As he clearly indicated:

113. J.1han J 02. C~t." p. 191.

119. White PJoer en the Cri:is in East Pakistan, p. 3.
 290

no const i tut ion could be froamed, nor could any

government. at the centre be run without my party's
cooperation. 121

Moreover, he added:

... the PPP was not prepared to occupy the opposition

benches in the National Assembly. Majority alone does
not count in national politics. 122

Furthermore, the fact that Bhutto had secured a decisive political

mandate in the Pmljab gave him the political clout to declare that since

the Punjab was "the bastion of power" it could not be ignored in any

political dialogue,123 a view which was widely accepted amongst the

military hawks. The feeling amongst the generals that Bhutto was the

defender of the "national interest" and the only person with the power to

prevent a Bengali from becoming prime minister, was reinforced after the

election when Mujib increasingly made inflammatory statements viewed as

secessionist in nature.

Our people have recorded a historic verdict ... A

constitution on the basis of the Six-Point formula has
to be framed and implemented in all its aspects ... The
resounding victory of the Awami League is, in part, the
victory of ... Bangladesh. 124

Accordingly, Bhutto, who knew the hawkish generals in the government

were opposing Yahya's policies of appeasement toward the Awami League,

skilfully exploited the election results to his own advantage by refusing

to attend the opening session of the National Assembly unless there was an

understanding prior to the parliamentary meeting. Yahya Khan, outnumbered

in the ruling junta, had no other option but to postpone the National

Assembly session until 25 March 1971.

iIi:!'
..... /\.1, ci t:?d in ibid" p. 146.

123. Ibid.
12~. Sh2:~~ ~ujibur Rahman. ean1!~d2sh. ~y ~ang13dGsh:Selected Speeches and statoments, (New York,
 291

This fateful decision, which can be considered as the point of no

return for all parties concerned, was immediately followed on 2 March by

the launching of the Awami League's "non-violent non-cooperation" movement

in East Pakistan. Its programme included: the refusal to levy ta~es for

the federal government, closure of all educational institutions, total

break in inter-Wing communications, all remittances to the West to be

stopped, revolut ionary councils, "Liberation Fronts" and paramili tary

organizations to be established, and black flags to be hoisted daily on

all buildings. 125 These measures effectively established a de facto

Awami League government in East Pakistan.

On the political front, Mujibur Rahman began to exploit the

anti-Bhutto feelings in West Pakistan. There was general agreement

amongst the leaders of the smaller parties of West Pakistan that the Awami

League should be allowed to form a government at the centre. 126 Leaders

of the Jami'at-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, National Awami Party (Wali group), the

Jama' at--i - Islami and the Pakistan Democratic Party were highly critical of

Bhutto's decision to boycott the National Assembly session and supported

Mujib's legitimate political demands. 127 Although the Awami League

attempted to exploit to his advantage these parties' anti-PPP attitudes,

the fact that these small parties only had a narrow popular base of

support meant that they had very little power of influence on the issue of

the PPP's stance vis-a-vis. the Awami League.

His ba"~ining power having been strengthened with the successful

launching of the non-cooperation movement, Mujib felt secure enough to

demand on 7 March 1971 that four conditions be fulfilled before accepting

125. Awami League Directives, March 1971~ cited in White P~F2r ~1n the Crisis in East Pakistan,

126. Zir:ng, "Hi it.3rism in P3kist.an ... ·, ? 220.

 292

to attend the National Assembly session. These were: the inunediate

lifting of Martial Law, the immediate withdrawal of all military personnel

to their' barracks, an enquiroy into the loss of life in East Pakistan, and

the inunediate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the

people prior to the National Assembly session. 12S Apart from the

inherent instability involved in the immediate lifting of Martial Law

before it could be assured that an alternative civilian government was in

a position to sucessfully govern in its own right, the Awami League would

not give the assurance that it would attend the first session of the

National Assembly even if the four conditions were met. 129

In a last, desperate attempt to resolve the constitutional deadlock

through political means, Yahya flew to Dacca on 15 March 1971. However,

by then the law and order situation in East Pakistan had significantly

deteriorated. Moreover, Mujibur Rahman was making more inflanunatory

statements which did little to restrain the increasingly violent nature of

the non-cooperation movement. On the day Yahya Khan arrived in Dacca, the

leader of the Awami League declared:

The heroic struggle of the people marches forward ... The

people of Bangladesh ... have demonstrated in no
uncertain terms that they would die rather than
surrender ... the spirit of freedom in Bangladesh cannot
be extinguished ... The struggle shall, therefore,
continue with renewed vigour until our goal of
emancipation is realized. 130

If these statements were still not enough to confirm Mujib's ultimate

goal of secession, than his stance condoning India's decision to ban over

its territory all flights linking East and West Pakistan dispelled all

doubts. India's decision followed the hijacking of an Indian airliner by

Indian Kashmiris pretending to be Pakistanis. Regardless of who was

123. White Paper on the Crisis in East Pa~istan,

rtf,].
130. Bangladesh DGc~!ments, (Ministry of External AffJirs, Government of Pa~:i$tan~ n.d.), Vel. 1, pp.
, .. ; ; . 1"1
'. .. \.• , 1'"'.
ult imately responsib Ie for the hijac1dng, the fact that Muj ib welcomed the

Indian action confirmed suspicions held by the hawkish generals in the

junta that Mujib had always been an "Ind.ian agent".181 Moreover, this

further strengthened Bhutto's links with the generals since he could now

legitimately demand a share of the power at the centre on the basis that

he did not trust Mujib's intentions regarding the country's

integdty.132 So by the time Yahya Khan arrived in Dacca, where

Bangladeshi flags were already being flown allover the city, the

battlelines were clearly drawn, with the hawkish generals and the Awami

League extremists prepared for the inevitable confrontation.

After five days of negotiations Yahya rulan and Mujibur Rahman agreed

to an interim arrangement. It basically consisted of: the lifting of

Martial Law in both wings, the division of the National Assembly into two

East and West Wing committees, both recommending a new constitution, and

the integration of the two sets of recommendations to form the basis of

the future constitution guaranteeing East Pakistan autonomy. 133 As

expected, this was totally unacceptable to Bhutto who rejected it on the

basis that "if Martial Law was lifted without the approval of the National

Assembly, it would create a legal vacuum and the proclamation would be

without legal validity".134 This rejection by Bhutto did not deter

Mujib, however; instead, on 23 March 1971, he presented the Awami League

Draft Proclamation. 135 It essentially advocated the creation of a

confederation of two states: West Pakistan and Bangladesh. Accordingly,

it stated that the elected National Assembly members of both states should

be set up as two separate constituent assemblies for the purpose of

132. The Pakistln 0bs rv~r~ 6 April 1?71.

133. ~hite Paper on t e Crisis in East Pakistan, pp. 19-20.
134. Choudhury :)p. c t'J p. 169.
I

135. White P1DPf ~n Appendix E, pp. 47-59.

 294

frami ng their respective constitutions. Moreover, it granted very limited

power to the centre, such as no independent financial resources to fulfil

its responsibili ties, foreign affairs prerogatives which excluded trade

and aid, and a limited defence capaci ty both in manpower and capi tal. The

government's objection to this latest proposal was that it "was in

conflict with the LFO and the Awami League's own Six-points, both of

which specifically provided that Pakistan shall be a Federal

republic".136 However correct the generals' analysis may have been, the

fact of the matter was that this proclamation probably came closest to

reflecting the spirit of the Lahore Resolution than any other previous

constitutional document. But what 30 years before was classified as

national self-determination was today categorized as being anti-state and

secessionist in nature.

Consequently, Yahya Khan, whose duty as president was the preservation

of the country's integrity, was left with no other option but to use

military might to try to keep the country together. Moreover, Yahya was

under pressure from the hawkish generals, who had always suspected that

the Awami League's Six-Points was a veiled formula for secession, to come

down hard on the East Pakistani politicians; for he feared widespread

discontent within the military establishment, which was generally opposed

at having an East Bengali installed as prime minister of Pakistan, could

threaten his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. As Mujib

had made abundantly clear on several occasions, the military's defence

budget would be severely reduced once he came to power, since it would no

longer be able to rely on the revenue provided by East Pakistan's export

of jute to found its requirements. 137 Finally, Bhutto was also adding

fuel to the fire by crying East Pakistani "sell-out", an accusation which

136. Ibi0., p. 24.

137. Zirin:;, "Milit.ari·~m :n ?a~~istan ... n, pp. 221-222.
 295

threatened to give the armed forces an image of being soft and unpatriotic

if it gave in to Mujib's demands. This type of rhetoric was meant to

prevent any p'oilr.ib-Llity of seeing the military aligning itself with the

Awami League and excluding Bhutto from his share of power. 138

Therefore, ha.ving exhausted all poE tical options because of the

confrontationist approach taken by the hawkish generals, Bhutto and

rvlujib,139 Yahya Khan decided to send in the troops to resolve the

political deadlock. This was the last stage of his presidency.

The president's decision to ~'fully restore the authority of the

government"140 undoubtedly heralded the darkest period in Pakistan's

history. The military 'campaign' in East pakistan, which Bhutto welcomed

by stating that "by the grace of God Pakistan has at last been

saved",141 can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase,

25 March until mid-May, consisted of pre-empting the Awami League's

attempt for an armed take-over of the province. Accordingly, within two

weeks the West Pakistan Army had 'neutralized' Dacca University, and

subdued, disarmed and imprisoned the Bengali members of the East Pakistan

Rifles (EPR) , the East Bengal Regiment (EBR) and the East Pakistan police

force. 142 The Pakistan Army was also under heavy pressure to act

swiftly in order to stop the further killing of the non-Bengali elements

of the EPR.143

139. !n int2l"views 8f 8 :!aj:r-Genera!s ~r 1bQ~e ~ho ~2re either ac~ive durirlg Yahya ~han's regime or
ndd ~ust r;;c2ntlil retired, ~ !ls;~:~d t.hem ~hc th::l/ f~lt ;~3:: rcspcnsible for the loss of East Pakistan. Three
believed it Aas solely Ehut~8'S f3ul~, thr22 ~laffi2d ~a}l7a t}lan lf1j ~~C felt 9hutto and Yahya were equally
i

re~~'Jnsib12. It is int2f2sting to ncte that no one laid 1ny blaine :)n ~ujibur ~3h~an.
!·+o. ::jhi te P-10i;f 'Jil the Sr~sis in East. p·:!~!st.0.n p. -to.
1

l~l. R. Payne, Ma~~S;H~~·~:. U!ew 'fork, The ~acmillan Go.; 1973) p. 22.
1

1!~2. The tGtal B~ngali af]2 j fcrc2s at the start 8f the hostilities were: 6,000 men in the EBR,
l

!3-1~!OOO lightly Jfffied tracps in the EPR and ~S!OOO lnen in the police forc2. Alan Lindquist, -Military
and ~e~elcpment in Bangladesh", :ns Bulletin, July 977, Vol. 9, Nc. 1, p. 11.
1~3. F;)f Eastern ~ccn8mi~ Review, 24 April 11 I, cited in whit8 Paper on the Crisis in East
P::.~~:st.3n 1 i'"'. 42.
 296

By mid-May, the military had occupied all major cities, which amounted

to about one-third of the provincial population and covered approximately

one-third of the total area. By implementing a strategy of "collective

punitive action", 144 the m.ilitary unleashed a reign of terror in East

Pakis tan, indiscriminately killing civilians, murdering intellectuals and

massively bombing villages. 145 These,military 'operations' had three

consequences. First, it caused a massive nwnber of Bengali Hindus to flee

to India. 146 Second, instead of diminishing the Bengalis' will for

greater regional autonomy it had the opposite effect of increasing their

feelings of nationalism. Moreover, by using military force, the Pakistan

government had inevitably raised the stakes; the Bengalis would no longer

be content with autonomy, they now demanded independence. If before the

military crackdown the Bengalis' feelings toward the West Pakistrulis was

one of contempt, after 25 March it was one of hatred. 147 Accordingly,

as a reaction to the military's repression of Bengalis, the East

Paldstanis went. on a rampage, killing anyone remotely identified with the

West Pakistruli government. The most severely affected group was the

Urdu-speaking Bihari community which had never integrated itself with the

rest of Bengali society.148 Finally, the military operations, which

involved the imprisonment of all high-level leaders of the Awami League,

including Mujibur Rahman, forced the

: :~.~. Choudhur 8p. cit.; '! :~::-r

l/ J 1

145. J. Lunst2~d, "The Armed Forces i~ Baflg:adesh~, ~3p2r :j21~ver?!i ~~ the Ccnferenc2 on the Ro12 ~f
~n2 Ar:~e:j F8r~~~ in Csrt2m?Cr3r:! AS~Jn SC~iC~~2S! ~:aval Pastgraciuat] SC~8C!, ~8nt2}'ey; California, ~-6
August 1?82! p. 2. This was ccnfirmed in interviews I ccnducted ~ith ~~t2:1?ct~3!s and aCJd2mics duri~g
my field trip to eanglad2sh in Febr~ary 1984.
l~O. Depending n~ which S8ur~2 8ne relies an, ~h2 number of refugees vary from 2 ta 10 ~illiGn.
Cn8udhuf /! 8C. c:t..~ p~. I'?3-:r?~.
l

1~7. Int2~vi2~S [A retir2:i ~3i-Sen., Ra~alpindi, Oct~t2r 1983, and 3 retired eri~adier, !slamabad ,
8C~8b2r !?83] The ~nt2rvic~2cS f2futed the allegaticns that 8engaii: h;~1:1 bitter fcel~ngs toward the
P~~istJn Army. Si~i!~r!y, 1cccr:j~~l] ~G ~aj-Gen.(Ret.) F~~31 Muqueem Kh~n, the Bengali r~r11 ~cpulation
we!~8;~2!j ~h2 P~kistan Army. Choudhury, Dp. cit.! p. I83. Similar atti~~!~2·; ~ere canfir~e:i by other
]iiitar'y Jff~c2rs.
~4 . The ~tr8cities ~J]m~tted by the Bengalis have been ]eticulcusly f2pcrt2d ~n the Wh te Paper on
th2 Cris s ~n a:;t Pakistan (A~~E~J~~ G.~. On the other hand, none of the military's repress ve actions
are ment cned n the White ~3P2r.
 political leadership and the Bengali members of the EBR and EPR to go

underground to form the nucleus of the Mukti Behini (Freedom Army).

The second phase, which lasted from mid-May Wltil September,

essentially involved the consolidation of the military's position in the

province and, more importantly, an at~empt to re-establish a degree of

normalcy in the eastern wing. The government allowed foreign journalists

to return to Dacca with the hope that it would help improve the

government's tarnished image abroad. It also promised amnesty to all

returning "miscreants" and other Bengalis who had fled to India to prepare

themselves for an assault against the army of occupation. Needless to say

that no member of the Mukti Bahini surrendered to the authorities. Yahya

Khan also announced he would be framing his own constitution and that

within three to four months he would install civilian governments in the

provinces under the cover of Martial Law. 149 Moreover, he ordered that

arrangements be made for the holding of 78 by-elections to fill the

vacancies brought about with the disqualification of the Awami Leaguers.

There were more than enough candidates willing to participate in these

elections. ISO By the end of that period, however, Yahya Khan began to

lose the support of the PPP; for Bhutto, realizing the damage too close

identification with the military's excesses could do to his future

political standing, cried out:

o my people ! Let this long night of terror and

uncertainty come to an end. The rule of the generals
must end and the people of Pakistan must take their
destiny in their own hands. lSI

l·;q. 2~3 ,~:.ine 1971! t!h~te :>.}~J0~~ :;r! th~ r;;~isis in f:ast Pa~listan! (Appendix A; Extr~cts fr8m Policy
·:t.)t~:in2n~::. jy t.he Pr2sider;~) ~ p. 16.
150. The parti2s whc ~ish2d to field ~Jndidates were: The P~~istan Democratic Party, the
Jama'at-i-Islami, the "Conve~ti8~~ anij "Council Muslim Leag~es anli the tlizam-i-Islam Party. Siddiq
n

:'ali~~, Witnes:; to Sur 2~dI3r! U~3rachi, Oxfcrd University Press, l'~!73j, ~. 110.
151. Speech del vered on 2~ September !?71, cited in Z.A. Bhutto, If am r Assassinat2d, (Delhi,
u~ 1, ~ ...
I.i. r..... :·' 1979, 3rd. Ed. 1 ;J. 121.
 298

Meanwhile, the Bengalis were also proceeding with their own long-term

plans for the future of Bangladesh. 152 Following the military's initial

onslaught, the Bengali leadership had split into two groups: the fighting

Mukti Bahini and the Awami League politicians. The 100,000 strong Mukti

Bahini, under the leadership of the highly respected retired Colonel

Osmany, took advantage of the lull in ,fighting due to the monsoons to

train its members in camps located in East Pakistan and India. In the

meantime they continued their low intensity guerrilla warfare against the

military. This included sabotaging all lines of communication (railway,

telephone lines, roads, bridges) and disrupting the jute and tea exports,

Pakistan's most important source of foreign exchange. In the cities, the

population was sucessfully continuing its non-cooperation movement in the

factories and educational institutions. 153

On the other hand, the Awami League leaders, who had established their

Government-in-exile in Calcutta, were involved in promoting their cause at

the international level. But, more importantly, by broadcasting Radio

Free Bangladesh, they were playing a vital role in maintaining a high

moral amongst the Bengali population. 154 It was also a very important

means by which the Bengalis could be informed as to the developments

within and without their province.

The third and last phase of the military's involvement in East

Pakistan confirmed its inevitable inability to crush the Bengali

secessionist movement; Indian involvement only hastened the process of

disintegration. From October until mid-December, the Mukti Bahini

drastically increased its guerrilla activities in urban and rural areas.

152. Fer 3 discussion cf the eengalis' tactics, see Jahan, JP. cit. pp. 199-200.
J
 299

By the time Yahya was promising OIl 12 October 1971 that the armed forces

\-.Jould defend and protect every inch of East Pakistan terri tory, the army

had already lost 3000 square miles to the Bengali insurgents. I5S The

fact that the Pakistan A~~ was faced with a no-win situation, having to

conduct "search and destroy" operations in a hostile environment in which

it had virtually no popular support seriously affected the morale of the

troops. Moreover, to mah:e matters worse, all commanders from the

divisional level down to the platoons exaggerated their ability to contain

the enemy for fear of giving the impression of lacking confidence and

professional competence. 156 However, reality on the battlefield was

quite different; so much so that only three weeks after India's invasion

of East. Pakistan, Lt-Gen. Niazi, completely surrounded by Indian and Mukti

Bahini troops, decided to surrender along with 90,000 men on 16 December

1971. This came as a devastating shock to the West Pakistan population.

It shattered all pre-conceived ideas that one Muslim soldier was worth

twenty of his Hindu counterparts. Furthermore, in the context of this

Jihad (Holy War) against the Hindu infidels, as it increasingly came to be

identified,157 this battlefield debikle took the form of a religious

defeat.

Under extreme pressure not only from the population but also the

middle-ranking officers, who had borne the brunt of the fighting in the

war, President General Yahya Khan had no other option but to resign from

office and hand-over power to Z.A. Bhutto, the politician who had won 59%

of the West Pakistan votes to the National Assembly. As for Sheikh Mujib,

who had been imprisoned since the beginning of the military operations, he

was only released from jail on 8 January 1972 after Bhutto, who was now

1~5. Salik, CPo cit.~ p. 116.

1~:6. !nid. J p. 117.
157. Ho~dud Ahmed, cpo cit., p. 26~.
 300

president and Chief Martial Law Administrator, had desperately attempted

to obtain from him a promise to try to keep Pakistan united. It would now

be the task of the civilian

, government to reconcile itself with the new
reality: a truncated Pakistan and a failure in national integration.

Although Yahya Khan's initial decisions to dissolve the One-Unit

system in West Pakistan, to promise maximum regional autonomy, and to hold

elections on the basis of universal adult franchise were commendable, it

was Bhutto's obstructionist stance, and Yahya's eventual tilt toward the

ppp's position, which ultimately destroyed all possibilities for a

successful resolution of the centre-East Pakistan confrontation.

Moreover, his subsequent decision to use military might to uphold the

integrity of the country was bound to fail, not because of the principle

itself, but because of the peculiar nature of the country's internal and

external environment. The secession of East Pakistan was the ultimate

outcome of the 25-year old clash between the politics of regionalism and

the politics of national integration. iSS Thus, the 1971 crisis

demonstrates the direct link between the government's decisions and the

process of national integration, as indicated in the theoretical model.

Furthermore, the Bengalis' decision to opt for secession confirms Connors'

assertion that:

... the theory of relative economic deprivation offers

an ullsatisfatory explanation for ethnonational
dissension. The growing tendency of peoples to resent
and resist being ruled by those deemed alien appears to
operate quite independently of the economic variable.
Rich and poor states, rich and poor nations, have been
rather indiscriminately susceptible to the
ethnonational virus. ls9

lSS. R8b~rt. LaP:::rte! Jr., Pcwer '1n:~ Pr:vil~r;e: Influ2nre 3n~ DECisiGn-Ma~~inlJ in Pa~~i"3t.an, (Berkeley,
Un:v:~r::ity of allrcrr:i.J Pr:?ss, 1975) pp. 85-90.
1

~~q. ~al er Cc.nnar, ftEca- 8f Ethnc-naticnalism"! l="~hn!~ .3na Racial Studi2S, v81.7, No.3, July 1984,
 CHAPTER 9.

NEW PAKISTAN'S ETHNIC PROBLEMS (1971-1985)

THE BHUTTO PERIOD: 1971-1977

When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became president of truncated Pakistan the

country was going through several interrelated crises. First, the people
of Pakistan had to reconcile themselves with the harsh reality that with
the secession of East Pakistan the basic foundations of the country's

Islamic ideology had been dealt a devastating blow. The loss of the
eastern wing had in no uncertain terms proven the hollowness of Islam as
an integrative force. The country's identity crisis essentially involved

re-assessing Pakistan's raison d'~tre. The second crisis, directly

related to the ideological question, concerned future centre-province

relationships, an issue which had been at the heart of the East Pakistan

secession. The early resolution of these two issues, ideology and

provincial autonomy, clearly indicated how vital it was for the country to

quickly resolve a third problem: the constitutional vacuum existing since

the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution. Finally, the political crisis, a

direct consequence of the out-going generals' ineptitude as governors,

required that a consensual approach, involving all major parties, be

followed in order for the country to satisfactorily resolve the impasse in

which it found itself.

As one of the most experienced politicians, Bhutto was well aware of

these problems and the need to resolve them as quickly as possible.
However, his approach to their resolution did not always meet with the
approval of the smaller parties, especially the National Awami Party (NAP)

and the Jami'at-al-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI). Although he did insist on

following a consensual approach in the framing of the 1973 Constitution,

it was in his subsequent decisions that the true nature of his

 302

authoritarianism came through. l As will be examined, his political

strategy could be characterized as a combination of two approaches:

'divide and rule', and inducement and punishment tactics.

In constitutional terms, Bhutto's five and half years in office can be

divided into two periods. From April 1972 until August 1973, the country

was governed according to the 1972 Interim Constitution, and on 15 August

1973 Pakistan had its third constitution promulgated. The Interim

Constitution, a document based on the Government of India Act. 1935 and

the Indian Independence Act. 1947, re-established the vice-regal system as

it existed under the British Raj, and which Jinnah had so skilfully

manipulated to his advantage. The provincial politicians accepted this

return to this highly authoritarian and centre-dominated system on the

understanding that this was only an interim measure needed to deal with

the unstable period following the loss of East Pakistan.

At about the same time as the 1972 Interim Constitution was

promulgated, Bhutto nominated new provincial governors and chief ministers

in all four provinces. In the case of the Punjab and Sind, where the PPP
was in both provinces the dominant party, the choice of executives was a

relatively simple matter. Bhutto selected Malik Meraj Kha1id, a former

minister in the ppp's first central cabinet, as chief minister of the

Punjab, and M.A. Bhutto, Bhutto's cousin, as chief minister of Sind.

However, in the western provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan, where the PPP

was virtually non-existant, except for three seats in the provincial

assembly of NWFP and one seat from NWFP in the National Assembly, the

selection of chief ministers and governors was not as straightforward.

1. For a discussion of his authoritarianis., refer to Part II of the thesis.

 303

Initially Bhutto followed a conciliatory approach with the NAP

leaders. Although he had never forgotten NAP's pro-Awami League stance in

1971, within a few hours of assuming office he unconditionally withdrew

Yahya Khan's ban on NAP, declaring that he would "start with a clean

slate".2 Moreover, the NAP leadership was demanding the right to choose

its own governors and chief ministers in NWFP and Baluchistan if the PPP

government wished to have its cooperation at the centre. As Mir Ghaus

Bakhsh Bizenjo, one of Baluchistan's NAP leaders, stated:
.•. any attempt to suppress democratic and constitu-
tional methods and sentiments of the people could only
create obstacles in a way of all such good efforts. 3
Though Bhutto did reject NAP's argument that since the PPP had won in

West Pakistan on the basis of a united Pakistan it should seek a new

mandate from the people of 'new' Pakistan, he could hardly ignore NAP's

legitimate demand to form the provincial governments in the two western

provinces. Accordingly, he "conceded the right of the NAP-JUI coalition

to form governments in NWFP and Baluchistan"4 as well as the right to

choose their own governors. In strictly constitutional terms this was a

concession on the part of the central authority, having the legal right to

select the provincial governors and chief ministers; however, according to

generally accepted democratic practices, standards which Bhutto insisted

had to be followed when he was in opposition, it is expected that the

dominant party will form the provincial government. However, before

allowing the NAP and the JUI select their own governors, Bhutto, mindful

of the threat autonomous movements can have on the integrity of the

country, demanded from Bizenjo, the governor-to-be of Baluchistan, that he

ensure that "there would be no political victimisation or unfair treatment

of non-locals .•. and that fissiparous tendencies and movements, however

2. White Paper on Baluchistan, (Hain Points), (Governlent of Pakistan, October 1974), p. 3.

3. Dawn, 29 Decelber 1971.
4. White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 3.
 304

nebulous, would be put down firmly".5 Finally, having entered into a

tripartite agreement with NAP and the JUI, Bhutto agreed to allow NWFP

select Arbab Sikander Khan (NAP) as governor and Maulana Mufti Mahmud
(JUI) as chief minister, and Baluchistan choose Bizenjo (NAP) as governor

and Sardar Khan Mengal (NAP) as chief minister.

Ironically, Bhutto's first provincial crisis came from his own

province, Sind. The troubles, which started in March and April 1972 and
reached their peak in June and July, involved the deep-seated resentment
felt amongst the Sindhis against the muhajirs' domination in the economic
and bureaucratic spheres of the province. Moreover, in the major cities
of Sind their numerical strength was such that the Sindhis had become an
urban minority in their own province. s Having one of their own as

president of Pakistan, the Sindhis, especially the middle-class, believed

that their interests, such as improvements in job opportunities and the

promotion of their culture and language, would be given priority by the

central government. 7 Accordingly, the provincial assembly passed a bill

declaring Sindhi the only official language of the province, an act which

the other three provinces had decided not to follow for fear of creating

intra-provincial conflicts. Moreover, a 'non-official' resolution also

made it compulsory for government employees to learn Sindhi within a three

months period or face dismissal.

Although the muha.iir issue was, and still is, of great concern to the
Sindhis, this was merely the catalyst for airing demands that had been

latent since the days when the One-Unit Plan was implemented. The

5. Ibid., p. 4.
6. For exalple, luhajir strength in sale of the cities was as follows: Karachi (80-85%), Hyderabad
(60-65%), Sukkar (50-60%), Larkana (50%) and Hirpukhar (50-55%). Hafeez Halik, "Nationaiisl and the Ouest
for Ideology·, in L. Ziring et al. (eds.), Pakistan:The Long View, (Durhal, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1975), p. 295.
7. K.B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, (N.Y.:Praeger, 19BO), p. 154.
 305

province-wide Sindu Desh Movement (Sind for the Sindhis) which developed,
and which was spearheaded by radical student groups and politicians,s

advocated the implementation of far-reaching reforms reminiscent of the

early· days of the East Bengali autonomy movement. Using the Awami Guard

(NAP) and the Sind Sujag Jathas (Sind Awakening Squads) to popularize the
movement's ideas in the rural areas,9 the Sindhi leaders were demanding,
inter alia:
That the Urdu-speaking Biharis of East Pakistan not be
allowed to be repatriated to Sind; that besides the
Sindhi language, Pukhto, Baluchi and Punjabi languages
should be given the status of national languages and as
the only official language in their respective
provinces; that Urdu should be treated as a language of
a cultural minority and as such English should serve as
the clink' language; that a Sind regiment should be
formed in the Pakistan Army; that representation should
be given in the centre and provincial services on
population basis; that 60-75% of transmission time
should be devoted to Sindhi language programme on radio
and television stations of Sind; and, maximum
provincial autonomy for Sind. lo

Confronted with a movement that was increasingly becoming violent in

nature, which included the burning of Urdu language newspapers and attacks

against muhajir targets, Bhutto was left with no other option but to call

out the army to re-establish law and order in the province. As president
of a country which had just gone through the traumatic phase of losing its
majority province, he felt that it was essential that this autonomy

movement be arrested as quickly as possible before it spread to other

provinces. l l On the political front Bhutto was faced with an even

greater dilemma, for the PPP could hardly afford to alienate the Sindhis,

since it had barely a working majority in the provincial asssembly.

s. The most ilportant actors in this movelent were: the Jeeye Sind Students Federation, the Sind
Azad Haroora Students Federation and G.H. Syed.
9. The Horning News, 21 February 1972.
10. Dawn, 25 Harch 1972.
11. Already the Sind autonolous lovement was having its effects in other parts of the country. The
lost notable case was the demand by intellectuals for the creation of a Saraiki province consisting of
Bahawalpur, Hultan and other Saraiki areas in southern Punjab and northern Sind. Dawn, 25 Harch 1972.
 306

Therefore, as a compromise measure, Bhutto issued an ordinance which

stipulated that for a period of 12 years, as of 16 July 1972, "no person

otherwise eligible for appointment or promotion to any civil service in

Sind would be discriminated against only because of his inability to

communicate in Sindhi or in Urdu".12

As for the other demands put forward by the Sindhis, Bhutto altered

the Sindhi quota in the civil service in such a way as to take into

account the Urdu-Sindhi dichotomy present in the province; that is, urban

Sind, where mu,iahirs were concentrated, was allocated 7.6% of the total

national intake and rural Sind 11.4%. The rest of the country was given

the following distribution:Punjab (50%), NWFP (11.5%), Baluchistan (3.5%),

Northern Areas and Tribal Areas (4%), Kashmir (2%), and on merit
(10%).13 While Bhutto was willing to increase Sindhi representation in
his central cabinet, on the other issues he maintained an unyielding

position. Not only did he staunchly believe only a strong centre could

keep the country together, but also that the promotion of Urdu would

foster Pakistan nationalism. 14 Consequently, by his refusal to meet the

more extreme demands of the Sindhi radicals, Bhutto inevitably came to be

identified with the conservative waderas (large Sindhi landlords), the

rural elite despised by all other classes, muha,iirs and Sindhis alike.

However threatening the Sind situation may have appeared at the time,

compared to the subsequent events in Baluchistan, it was in relative terms

a minor issue in centre-province relations. Having the lowest per capita

12. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 155.

13. Charles H. Kennedy, "Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. XXIV, No.6,
June 1984, p. 693.
14. Halik, op. cit., p. 299.
 307

income in the country15 and the highest national illiteracy rate,lS

the NAP government of Baluchistan - representing the first elected

government of the province since independence - was determined to improve

the province's poor socio-economic standing. Although both Bhutto and

Chief Minister Mengal agreed with the dire need to improve the standard of

living, it was in their different approaches that bitter conflict arose.

Bhutto, who was a staunch advocate of having a strong centre, believed

modernization in Baluchistan, and anywhere else for that matter, should be

directed from Islamabad. His development programme not only encompassed
the economic sphere but also the social structure of the province. He had

diagnosed Baluchistan backwardness as essentially being the result of the

feudal and tribal structure existing in the province. 17 Accordingly, he

was determined to change the situation; and, it was this penetration into
the provincial arena which caused the two governments to clash.

The NAP government believed that in order for them to build up a

Baluch middle-class through the exploitation of the province's mineral

wealth it would have to eliminate all non-Baluch competition, especially

Punjabi and muha.iir, as well as the other Baluch leaders opposed to NAP's

policies. For example, they wanted to see an end to the reserves of Sui

gas and coal being extracted and exploited by non-Baluch workers and

shipped out of the province for the benefit of the rest of the

country. 18 So, in a complete reversal of the reassurance he had given

Bhutto regarding the fair treatment of non-Baluch, Governor Bizenjo

IS. Baluchistan's per capita income in 1972 was Rs 541, compared to NWFP's Rs 602, Sind's Rs 788,
and the Punjab's Rs 797. S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1971-1977, (London:The Hac.illan Press,1980),
p.94.
16. The literacy rate for Baluchistan was 10%, Sind (23%). ~.~!:~ :::./1) and NNFP (17%). Housing,
Economic and De.ographic Survey, 1973, {Isla.abad, Govern.ent of Pakistan, Vol. II, Part IV', p. 210.
17. White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 1.
18. Harrison, op. cit., pp. 162-163.
 308

decided to expel 6,000 non-Baluch government employees, of which

approximately 3,000 were Punjabis. 19 Moreover, the provincial

government condoned acts of violence perpetrated by the radical

Baluchistan Student Organization (BSO) against non-Baluch personnel of the
Pakistan Western Railways and the Punjabi settlers of the fertile Pat
Feeder Tract of Kalat. 2o Turning to Baluch opponents of the provincial

government, the NAP leadership used food distribution as a political

weapon against opponents, and the chief minister, as the sardar of the

Mengal tribe, personnaly led punitive expeditions against the rival Jamote

tribe. 21

Although this type of inter-tribal disputes was merely a continuation

of age-old tribal customs, Bhutto, fearing that these type of government-

sponsored activities had the potential of developing into large-scale

inter-tribal warfare which could make Baluchistan ungovernable, decided to

send in the army. Coupled with his decision to resort to military means

to settle the Baluchistan problem, Bhutto decided to dismiss the

Baluchistan governor and chief minister as well as the governor of NWFP on

12 February 1973. 22 The official reason for dismissing the two NAP
governors was based on the statement made by Wali Khan, national NAP

leader, declaring that his party was no longer bound by the Governors'
Agreement which established the NAP governments in the two western

provinces. 23 However, of much greater significance, and which

undoubtedly convinced Bhutto of the necessity to send in the troops, was

the discovery a few days before of a cache of 300 Soviet-made submachine

19. The Pakistan Times, 27 September 1972.

20. White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 5. The land in the Pat Feeder area had originally belonged to
the local population but had later been acquired by .ilitary and civil bureaucrats frol the Punjab.
Sayeed, op. cit., p. 115.
21. White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 6.
22. As a sign of protest, the chief linister of NWFP resigned at the sale tile.
23. White Paper on Baluchistan, p.4.
 309

guns and 48,000 rounds of ammunition in the Iraq embassy in

Islamabad. 24 The federal government had been forewarned about this
Iraqi connection by Akbar Khan Bugti, who, although a former associate of

Bizenjo and Mengal, confessed that those weapons were meant to be used to
start a separatist movement aimed at having Baluchistan secede from

Pakistan. 25 As a result of these revelations, Bhutto had Bizenjo,

Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri, president of the provincial NAP, gaoled,

and Bugti was rewarded with the governorship of Baluchistan. 26

Although the initial military intervention had been a success in that

it did re-establish a degree of normalcy in the province, troubles in

Baluchistan were far from having been eliminated. Similar to the tactics
used in the 1960s, the tribesmen took to the hills and began a guerrilla
campaign against the army. These anti-government activities were led by

two organizations: the Baluchistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF) and

the Baluch Students Organization (BSO).

The loosely-structured BPLF, which is a direct outgrowth of the

guerrilla movement of the 1960s, is based on an ideological mixture of

Baluch nationalism and independent Marxist-Leninist thought. It receives

no support from the muha,iir-dominated pro-Moscow Communist Party of

Pakistan which downgrades the ·national' question and instead emphasizes

class struggle. 27 As Sher Mohammad Marri, one of the leaders of the

Front, has stated:

24. Harrison, op. cit., p. 35. The significance of the external environlent Mill be discussed in
Part Yof the thesis.
25. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 115.
26. In a love typical of Bhutto's manipulative behaviour, once Bugti had outlived his usefulness he
was dislissed and replaced by the Khan of Kalat.
27. Harrison, op. cit., pp. 72ff.
 310

Nationality demands should be the cutting edge of

leftist strategy in Pakistan because economic
deprivation of the masses in the three minority
provinces is the result of Punjabi domination. 2s
The BPLF's demand has been the right for the different nationality groups

of Pakistan to self-determination which involves as a minimum maximum

autonomy with the ultimate goal of secession. Although the BPLF
generally had little support outside Baluchistan, it did attract young,
urban Punjabi radicals from upper middle-class families whose fathers were

often well known public figures. 29 Many of them were deeply influenced

by Mao and Debray's thinking, and naively believed that the time was right

for the overthrow of the Punjabi elite. 30

The BSO and its dissident militant faction, the BSO-Awami,31 are
independent organizations which are deeply fractionalized along

ideological lines varying from the moderate wing supporting Bizenjo's

reformist approach to the radical faction supporting the BPLF's armed

struggle. Although political activity on campus had been banned, with

Bhutto's decision to open up 27 new colleges over a 6 year period the

BSO's ideological influence greatly increased in the 1970s. 32 And

although their membership was, and still is, relatively small, they had a
large degree of sympathy amongst the university students.

By May 1973 the guerrillas had disrupted all lines of communication

and movement of goods into and within Baluchistan. 33 As a consequence
of this breakdown of law and order, Governor Bugti requested the

28. Ibid., p. 72.

29. Ibid., p. 73.
30. Interview [two former young Punjabi radicals who had joined the BPLF. Lahore, October 1983] One
of the. was incarcerated in solitary confinelent for one year.
31. The BSO-Awali was formed in 1978 as a protest to Bizenjo and Hengal's decision to negotiate with
General Zia-ul-Haq.
32. Harrison, op. cit., p. 84.
33. White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 6.
 311

intervention of the army to help restore peace in the province. The four

year war that ensued, and on which there was a total news blackout,

ultimately claimed the lives of 3,300 soldiers and 5,300 Baluch

tribesmen. 34 However, the four crack army divisions sent out to

Baluchistan were not only involved in the counter-insurgency campaign,35

but were also employed in various development schemes in order to assist

the central government in its quest to improve the general economic
standards of the province.

With the decision to use military might to "resolve' the autonomy

movement in Baluchistan, Bhutto appeared to have learnt an important

lesson from the East Pakistan episode: the need to crack down on any
potential secessionist movement as soon as possible so as to quickly

re-establish the centre's authority in the rebellious province. Moreover,

Bhutto's task was substantially easier than Yahya Khan's in East Pakistan
because of four vital factors. First, because of the low level of

political consciousness in the province as well as the unusual ethnic

composition in Baluchistan,36 the unrest was limited to specific tribal

areas and did not involve wide-scale urban uprisings as in East Pakistan.

Second, even if the population of Baluchistan had been united in their

quest for autonomy, they still would have represented only a very small

percentage of the total Pakistan population, thus making it easier to

supress than the Bengalis who then represented the majority population of

the country. Third, in purely logistical terms, the lines of

communication between the centre and Baluchistan were contiguous and safe

34. Nader Entessar, "Baluchi Nationalis.·, Asian Affairs, Vol. 7, No.2, Nov-Dec. 1979, p. 99.
35. For a detailed account of sale of the lilitary operations in Baluchistan, see: Tariq Ali, Can
Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, (Penguin, 1983), pp. 119ff.
36. According to the 1981 Census, out of 589,866 households in Baluchistan 214,208 spoke Baluchi,
147,884 Pukhto and 48,899 spoke Sindhi. In the Urban area of Quetta division, the Baluch represent an
even slaller linority. Out of 48,144 households, 20,134 speak Pukhto, 9,525 Punjabi, 5,515 Urdu and only
3,228 speak Baluchi. Census Report of the Province of Baluchistan, 1981, (Governlent of Pakistan), p. 107.
 312

from external disruption. Finally, the Baluch tribesmen were not assisted

by any eKternal powers; on the contrary, Iran was actively supporting the

central government's bid to arrest the irrendentist movement. 37

Bhutto's decision to rely heavily on the military for the resolution

of the Baluchistan crisis had two far-reaching consequences. First, after

the army's poor showing in East Pakistan, the successful repression of the
Baluch insurgency gave the military the opportunity to improve their image

and correct the generally held view that they were an inept and

ineffective institution. It confirmed the generals' feelings that without

them the civilian government would be unable to cope with the task of

"nation-building'. So although their Baluchistan operations reinforced

the population's belief that the military was merely an instrument of

state power, regardless of the type of government in office, it did give

the armed forces a renewed self-confidence in themselves as an effective

fighting machine. Second, Bhutto, who was always concerned whether or not
the Punjabis would continue to support him, believed that in his drive to

destroy NAP, which he considered the major threat to his political

survival, he would be able to use the Punjab i-dominated army to his

advantage. As Bhutto stated, barely one year after the military's

shameful performance in East Pakistan: " ••. the eKcellent performance of

the Armed Forces shall guarantee the country's security and its bright

future".38 However, instead of being able to control the military, he

ended up losing power vis-a-vis the armed forces. Having the monopoly on

intelligence sources, the army was in a position to dictate to Bhutto the

military operations that should be" followed in Baluchistan. According to

Bhutto, on several occasions he pressed the military for a withdrawal

37. Iran's involvelent"will be discussed in Part V of the thesis.

38. Address to the Joint Services Parade at Rawalpindi, 23 Harch 1973, in Speeches and Statelents by
President Z.A. Bhutto, (1 January 1973 - 31 Harch 1973), (Hinistry of Information and Broadcasting),p.145.
 313

plan, but each time it recommended a continuation of the military

operations. 39 So, ultimately, in wishing to increase the centre's

authority in Baluchistan, Bhutto ended up alienating the Baluch and losing

power to the army.

Apart from the military, Bhutto was determined to use all other state
institutions as well to try to integrate Baluchistan with the rest of the

country. On the economic front, the PPP government substantially

increased federal expenditure in the province. According to the White
Paper on Baiuchistan, government investment in the province had never

exceeded Rs 30 million in any year in the 1960s, but under Bhutto this
increased to Rs 120 million (72-73), Rs 180 million (73-74) and Rs 210
million (74-75).40 The federal government also developed the capital

infrastructure of the province. It improved and expanded ,the irrigation

system of Baluchistan, increased by five-fold power availability,

constructed new roads, and had new factories (ghee, textile, rice, paper,

ferro-chrome) installed in some of the most backward parts of the

province. 41 During 1975 and 1976, in an attempt to fulfil the "simple

aspirations of the people of Pakistan", Bhutto authorized the construction

of more than 300 health, education, water supply and housing

projects. 42 In a further attempt to increase the ppp's popularity in

Baluchistan and alter the feudal social structure of the province, Bhutto,

in May 1976, enacted an ordinance abolishing the Sardari system, the

cornerstone of Baluch society. Although this executive order did affect

the sardars' power in that it deprived them of their privy purses,

compensations, grants and lands given to them as tribal chiefs, it did not
completely destroy their hold on the population, for as large landlords in

39. Z.A. Bhutto, If I am Assassinated, (Delhi, Vikas, 1979, 3rd. ed.), p. 19.
40. White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 10.
41. Ibid., pp. 11-13.
42. Speech delivered at Sibi, Baluchistan, The Pakistan Tiles, 26 July 1976.
 \
314

their own right they were still allowed to keep large tracts of land. 43

While an age-old social system cannot be terminated overnight by the

simple enactment of an ordinance, this order, coupled with the 1972 Land
Reform, nevertheless gave the lowest social classes of Baluchistan an
opportunity to improve their economic lot vis-a-vis the sardars.44

Ironically, it was during the early days of the Baluchistan crisis

that the PPP government was involved with the other three major political

parties, i.e., NAP, JUI and the Muslim League (Qayyum group), in framing

the 1973 Constitution. Even after their ouster in the provinces, NAP and

the JUI decided to continue to cooperate in the process of constitution-

making with the hope that once the new constitution came into force their

parties would be allowed to return to power in the two western provinces;

however, this wish never came to be realized. 45 Moreover, the smaller

provinces were also hoping that this time the new constitution would

embody a truly federal structure; for now, with East Pakistan no longer
present to counter-balance the Punjab, it was essential for the survival

of the smaller provinces as cultural entities that they be granted a

higher degree of autonomy.46

Bhutto, himself from a smaller province, also felt that it was vital

that the Punjab be neutralized. His approach to the resolution of the

problem was different from the other political parties, however; instead,

he decided this would best be tackled by having a powerful centre - a

system he had already proven to be comfortable with - rather than granting

the four provinces a higher degree of autonomy. Accordingly, although the

43. Sayeed, 0p. cit., pp. 120-121.

44. For a detailed analysis of the 1972 Land Reform, see: Hahmood Hasan Khan, Underdeveloplent and
Agrarian Structure in Pakistan, (Lahore, Vanguard Publications, 1981), pp. 179-193.
45. Samuel Baid, 'Pakistan: Crisis is Inherent', Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal,
Vol. XV, No.1, July-Sept. 1982, pp. 104-105.
46. Tariq Ali, op. cit., p. 112.
 315

constitution which finally came into force on 14 August of that year was
federal in structure, for all intents and purposes it introduced a unitary
form of government. Moreover, not only was it similar to Ayub Khan's 1962
Constitution, but it actually granted the provinces less power. 47

Although the 1973 Constitution provided for a bi-cameral parliament,

with the 200-member National Assembly, divided on a population basis,
directly elected by adult franchise, and the Senate, with an equal number
of members from each province, elected by a combined session of the
national and provincial assemblies, the distribution of power was skewed
in favour of the National Assembly and the central government. For
example, the senators could only delay the passing of a bill but could not

veto its enactment (Art.70). Furthermore, the Senate had no input into
Money bills, this being lile sole prerogative of the National Assembly
(Art.73). Only with regard to matters in Part II of the Federal List or
in the Concurrent Legislative List, such as railways, industrial
development and criminal law, did the Senate have power to participate in
the final drafting of the bill, but even then only in a joint sitting of
both Houses (Art.7l). Finally, only in the amendment procedure did the
Senate have an equal voice as the National Assembly (Art.239).

Regarding the powers of the provinces, although the constitution

stipulated that all residuary powers rested with the provinces, the fact
that there was no provincial list but only a Federal List and a Concurrent
List, over which federal law superseded provincial law in the event of
conflict (Art.143), meant that the provinces were far from having been
granted the autonomy NAP had been striving to obtain. 48 Though the

47. S.W. Choudhury, "New' Pakistan's Constitution, 1973', The Hiddle East Journal, Yol 28, No. I,
Winter 1974, p. 17.
48. Craig Baxter, 'Constitution Haking: The Develop.ent of Federalisl in Pakistan', Asian Survey,
Yol XIY, No. 12, Dec. 1974, p. 1080.
 316

provincial governors were appointed by the president (Art.lOI),49 the

selection of chief ministers was nevertheless the prerogative of the

provincial assemblies; but, even then, the centre could still interfere

into provincial affairs, either by extending its federal authority into

provincial matters (Art.149) or simply using its emergency powers

(Art.232).50

Although Wali Khan, national leader of NAP, participated in the

framing of the 1973 Constitution, relations between the centre and NWFP,

Wali Khan's home province, were always tense and remained so throughout

Bhutto's term in office. Moreover, Wali Khan's links with the provincial
branches of NAP in Baluchistan and NWFP did not make matters easier,
especially after Bhutto's decision to dismiss the NAP governors of the two
western provinces. As far as Bhutto was concerned, NWFP, where the ppp's

political base was very weak, had to be subdued in the interest of a

powerful centre.

Similar to the case of Baluchistan, the NAP-JUI government of NWFP

wanted to put an end to Punjabi domination of the economic sector of the

province. 51 Therefore, in its quest to see NWFP developed by Pukhtun

professionals, the provincial government inevitably encountered the

opposition of the Punjabi and muhajir communities. This did not mean that

the NAP government was opposed to rapid economic development of the

private sector; on the contrary, it wished to attract outside capital for

that purpose, but only if it benefitted the Pukhtuns. So in many ways,

the NAP-PPP clash could not strictly be characterized as only being a

49. Since the president could only act on the advice of the prile sinister (Art. 48), this really
meant that it was the prile minister who selected the governors. Bhutto skilfully used this power to
dismiss governors whenever he felt it could assist hi. in controlling the provinces. See Part II of the
thesis for a discussion of the prile linister's excessive powers.
50. Bhutto did use these powers by imposing President's Rule in HWFP and Baluchistan in 1975.
51. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 128.
 317

centre-province dispute but should also be viewed as a conflict between

business and landowning elites of different ethnic groups competing over

the same limited resources. 52

Even though the Pukhtun competition with the Punjabis and muha.iirs
resembled what was occurring in the other two minority provinces of
Baluchistan and Sind, there was, however, a substantial difference with
NWFP in that it did have closer institutional contacts with the Punjab

than did the other two provinces, and, therefore, was generally more

Cintegrated' into the Pakistan environment. Regarding the two main state

institutions, the armed forces and the civil service, NWFP had since

independence contributed significantly to their development, albeit to a

lesser extent in the public service than in the military. Apart from
generally having made up 15 to 20 % of the total army strength, including

a high percentage of the officer corps, NWFP was also home to the Air

Force headquarters, the military academy at Kakul, the Air Force college

at Risalpur and other military institutions. 53 Over the years Pukhtuns

had also been appointed to the highest positions in the civil service and
public corporations. 54 Although NWFP's per capita income was only
slightly better than Ba1uchistan's,55 the fact that NWFP's links with

the Punjab in the fields of trade and commerce had been steadily growing

assured that the province would not be isolated from the rest of Pakistan
in terms of economic development. 56 Furthermore, by having a virtual

monopoly in the national transportation network, coupled with the presence

of Pukhtun 'enclaves in all major cities throughout Pakistan, especially in

Karachi where there are 600,000 Pukhtuns, has enabled the large Frontier

52. K.B. Sayeed, "The Historical Origins of sOle of Pakistan's Persistent Problems", in A.J. Wilson
and D. Dalton (eds.), The States of South Asia:Problels of National Integration, (Delhi, Vikas, 1982),p.37
53. Sayeed, Ope cit., p. 121.
54. Ibid., p. 122.
55. Please refer to footnote IS in this chapter.
56. S.S. Harrison, "Night.are in Baluchistan", Foreign PolicY, Vol 32, Fall 1978, p. 153.
 318

business houses to expand beyond the confines of the province and thus

become part of the national commercial elite. 57

With the aim of eliminating NAP, the only credible opposition party

left to obstruct his centralizing policies; and, to be able to achieve

this objective, Bhutto proceeded to undermine NAP's position in NWFP, the

party's stronghold in the country, and to increase his attacks against

Wali Khan, the national leader of NAP. To achieve these two objectives,

which were interconnected because of Wali Khan's charismatic appeal in

NWFP, Bhutto followed a number of tactics.

First, he attempted to co-opt Wali Khan by offering him a portfolio in

the central cabinet. The NAP leader, who remembered his uncle, Dr Khan

Sahib, who had compromised his political principles by joining the central

government in the 1950s, decided he would be more effective if he stayed

on as the leader of the opposition. 58 Having failed to persuade him to

join his cabinet, Bhutto decided instead to bring into his government Wali

Khan's arch rival, Qayyum Khan, leader of a faction of the Muslim League,

who was offered the portfolio of minister of interior. In a further

attempt to counter-balance Wali Khan's power in NWFP, Bhutto made the

para-military Federal Security Force (FSF) a direct responsibility of

Qayyum Khan, a Pukhtun who was generally despised in NWFP for his

heavy-handedness when chief minister in the late 1940s and 1950s. As

previously examined,59 the FSF quickly came to be used as an "instrument

of terror" against all political opponents. so Bhutto continued his

process of diminishing NAP's power by integrating the princely states of

57. The Hoti, Khatak and Khanzadah falilies are amongst the top 30 business houses of the country.
Urmila Phadnis, "Hisperception and Perception", in Pran Chopra (ed.), Contemporary Pakistan:New Aims and
Images, (Delhi, Vikas, 1983), p. 65.
58. l. Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Developlent,(Folkestone, W. Dawson,1980), pp.154-5.
59. Please see Part II of the thesis.
60. Interview, [high civil servant, Islamabad, November 1983]
 319

Chitral, Dir and Swat with the settled areas of NWFP. By merging these

three states with the rest of the province, Bhutto not only wished to
regularize administrative practices throughout the country61 but, more

importantly, by initiating important development schemes in these areas he

would show the local population the benefits to be gained by supporting

the PPP rather than NAP.

Even with all these measures taken by the PPP in an attempt to

diminish NAP's power in NWFP, they still did not fulfil Bhutto's ultimate
goal: the removal of Wali Khan from the position of strength. Moreover,

Wali Khan, to Bhutto's dismay, was increasing his popular appeal outside
NWFP, especially in the Punjab. Bhutto felt that if this development were
allowed to continue his own power base in the Punjab could be

threatened. 52 So, instead of allowing Wali Khan to increase NAP's

popularity outside the Frontier province, and thus give it the opportunity

to develop from a regional party into one with a national outlook, Bhutto

preferred to place his lust for power and his personal dislike of Wali

Khan before national integration. Accordingly, Bhutto had Wali Khan

arrested on several occasions on charges of sedition, including

accusations of trying to destroy the country. Because of Wali Khan's

links with the Baluchistan branch of NAP and his total and open opposition

to Bhutto's actions in that province, the PPP was convinced that Wali Khan

had joined forces with the Popular Front of Armed Resistance Against

National Oppression in Baluchistan and that he was urging young Pukhtuns

from the Pakhtoon Student Federation to join the Baluch struggle. 53

61. E.L. Tepper, "The New Pakistan:Problems and Prospects·, Pacific Affairs, Vol 47, No I, Spring
1974, p. 59.
62. Saveed, op. cit., p. 135.
63. Ziring, op. cit., p. 156.
 320

The catalyst event which convinced Bhutto that Wali Khan was simply

another Mujibur Rahman in disguise was the assassination of NWFP senior

minister Hyat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, the PPP leader in the province, on 8
February 1975. Accusing NAP of having perpetrated the murder,64 within
the neKt few days, the central government had 360 NAP officials, including

Wali Khan, arrested in the Punjab, Sind and NWFP under the Defence of

Pakistan Rules. Moreover, under an eKecutive order, NAP was banned, the

NWFP cabinet dissolved, and the province placed under President's Rule

until May 1975. After a long period of imprisonment, Wali Khan and his

party were brought to trial, charged of preaching the doctrine of four

nationalities, preparing the ground for the secession of NWFP and

Baluchistan, advocating violence, causing hatred and disaffection amongst

the various communities of Pakistan, ridiculing the concept of Pakistan

and Jinnah's "Two-Nation Theory", receiving encouragement and material

assistance from abroad, and organizing large scale terrorist and

subversive activities. 65 However, the Hyderabad Special Tribunal, as it

came to be known, never reached a judgement on the case because the trial

was still in progress when Bhutto was overthrown. Ironically, it was the

army, generally not known to be sympathetic to any autonomous movements,

which dissolved the tribunal and unconditionally released Wali Khan from

gaol in January 1978.

Having subdued the two western provinces and imprisoned the NAP

leaders, Bhutto felt sufficiently secure to call elections. While there

were allegations of widespread rigging in the Punjab and Sind in the March

1977 elections, there were no such accusations with regard to the election

64. Interview, [journalist, Peshawar, December 1983]. According to this interviewee, it was Qayyul
Khan, desperate to break Wali Khan's hold on HWFP politics, who ordered the assassination of the PPP
minister knowing that NAP would be accused of the lurder.
65. Concluding Address in the Suprele Court by Yahya Bakhtiar in Governlent's reference on HAP's
dissolution, 8 - 17 Septelber 1975, (Hinistry of Inforlation and Broadcasting), pp. 78-79.
 321

returns in NWFP and Baluchistan. 66 Surprisingly, the ppp's political

fortunes in NWFP improved significantly. Whereas in 1970 it was only able

to win one seat in the province, by 1977 it had gained 8 seats to the

National Assembly; on the other hand, NAP, which had re-organized itself

into the National Democratic Party (NDP) after having been banned by
Bhutto, and the JUI, which were both members of the 9-party Pakistan

National Alliance (PNA),67 by winning 17 seats still remained the

strongest parties in NWFP. The big loser was undoubtedly the Muslim

League (Qayyum group). Following the outlawing of NAP, not only had

Qayyum Khan lost his raison d'~tre as a counter-weight to Wali Khan, and

was promptly dismissed from Bhutto's cabinet, but as a consequence of his

close identification with the ruling party's anti-NAP policies, the
discredited Qayyum Khan was overwhelmingly rejected by the Pukhtuns, and
his party was only able to retain one seat out of the seven it had won in
1970. 68 Finally, in the tribal areas of NWFP, all 8 seats were won by

pro-PPP independent candidates, a result which was merely a continuation

of a tradition started under the British Raj when tribal leaders
customarily sided with the ruling party.69

In Baluchistan, however, the true extent of support for either the PPP

or the opposition cannot be properly assessed, since the PNA, on the

urging of the NDP, decided, as a protest to the continued military

presence in the province, not to field any candidates. Consequently, the

PPP won all seven seats to the National Assembly. Similarly, no correct

analysis of party popularity can be made regarding the provincial

66. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 127.

67. The other lembers of the PNA were: the Jala'at-i-Islali, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the
Kashmir Huslim Conference, the Khaksar Hovement, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, the Jali'at-ul-Uiama-i-Pakistan
and the Pakistan Muslim league.
68. H.G. Weinbau., "The Harch 1977 Elections in Pakistan:Where Everyone lost", Asian Survey, Vol 17,
No 7, July 1977, pp. 606-607.
69. S.J. Burki, op. cit., p. 196.
 322

elections because of the PNA's decision to boycott these polls following

their accusations of wide-scale rigging of the national elections.

Bhutto's approach to national integration, and specifically the issue

of centre-province relations, was merely a continuation of the previous

regimes' centralizing policies. With the election of Bhutto, the first

elected president and later prime minister the country had had since

independence, the smaller provinces had hoped that finally their

provincial desire for greater autonomy would be heeded; however, Bhutto's

drive to establish a highly centralized government destroyed all hopes for

a federal system as originally envisioned in the Lahore Resolution.

Consequently, the outcome of Bhutto's policies had been to further

fractionalize the country along regional lines, and to compound the

smaller provinces' distrust of the Punjab. Following the loss of East

Pakistan, the minority provinces were faced with a no-win situation; for

even if their politicians managed to coalesce they would still represent a

minority in the National Assembly. Moreover, with the 1973 Constitution

skewed in favour of the federal government and the National Assembly,

inevitably dominated by the Punjab, the three smaller provinces were bound

to be disillusioned with Bhutto's policies, as well as powerless to

counter them. Therefore, as a result of these federal policies, which

were a direct consequence of Bhutto's feeling of insecurity vis-a-vis the

Punjab, the country, by the time the military took over, was polarized

into two camps: the three smaller provinces, on the one hand, and the

Punjabis and muhajirs, on the other. Finally, one of the major outcomes

of Bhutto's rule was to destroy any possibilities of forming a broad,

inter-ethnic united front, involving all the provinces, to oppose the

subsequent military government of General Zia-ul-Haq, a vivid proof of

Bhutto's failure in the task of national integration.

 323

THE ZIA-UL-HAQ PERIOD: 1977-1985

As was the case under Bhutto's civilian government, General Zia's

major sources of ethnic unrest have similarly originated from the three

smaller provinces; and not unlike Bhutto, Zia's responses to the gamut of
ethnic demands have been characterized by a combination of rewards and

punishments. However, as opposed to the ppp's secular approach to

politics, President Zia, who has generally been successful in containing

ethnic discontent, has been using his Islamization programme as a means to

legitimize his government's drive to smother ethnic dissent. It is this

negative perception of the government's use of Islam as a centralizing

strategy which has had an adverse effect on the process of national

integration.

Accordingly, in order to demonstrate that the apparently peaceful

political environment existing today in Pakistan is not deep-seated but

actually quite fragile, three cases of centre-province relations have been

selected.

After taking over the reins of power, General Zia's initial concern in

the field of centre-province relations was the resolution of the four

year-old Baluchistan insurgency problem. Accordingly, wishing to validate

his coup d'etat by demonstrating that unlike Bhutto he was able to resolve

this conflict, General Zia adroitely followed two approaches vis-a-vis the

Baluchistan crisis: political and economic.

 324

In a press conference he held in January 1978, General Zia announced

his government's approach to the issue.

There is no doubt that there was some trouble in

Baluchistan. But the main cause of the trouble was
political •.. while efforts had been made to solve it
militarily ... the case was politically motivated to a
very large extent. This is not to say that other
factors were not involved in this issue. There were.
But keeping in view the larger interest of the unity of
our people it was decided to review the entire
situation. This review led us to the conclusion that
the Hyderabad Tribunal be abolished and general amnesty
be granted to all the persons involved in this
case. 70

Accordingly, Zia released 6,000 Baluch prisoners, including the

leaders of the insurgency.71 However, on the issues of provincial

autonomy and the withdrawal of the military from the province, two demands

considered non-negotiable as far as the Baluch opposition was concerned,

General Zia refused to yield; for, as he has stated, not only does "the

Army have to be housed somewhere",72 but "we are one nation",73

meaning demands for provincial autonomy are anathema to the whole concept

of "Pakistan Ideology".

It is this clash between the Baluch opposition and the central

authorities over the fundamental issue of the division of power between

the centre and the provinces which has hindered the resolution of the

Baluch problem. However, as opposed to the federal authorities who are

essentially united over this issue, the Baluch leadership is deeply

divided in its approach to the matter, a weakness Zia has exploited to its

fullest. Already during their tenure in office the three National Awami

Party (NAP) leaders, Khair Bux Marri, Ghaus Bux Bizenjo and Attaullah

70. General Hohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Press Conference, Rawalpindi, 1 January 1978, (Hinistry of
Information and Broadcasting, February 1978), p. 21.
71. S.S. Harrison, In Afghanistan'S Shadow:Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, (N.Y.:Carnegie
Endownments for International Peace, 1981), p. 40.
72. Ibid., p. 154.
73. Press Conference, op. cit., p. 21.
 325

Mengal, disagreed as to the best means to attain a higher degree of

provincial autonomy; and since their ouster from their position of power

their differences have further increased, thus weakening their bargaining

power vis-a-vis the central government. At one end of the political

spectrum there is Marri, the former chairman of NAP in Baluchistan, who is

not only deeply nationalistic, believing that the Baluch as a nationality

group should strive for independence, but whose fundamental philosophy is

Marxism-Leninism. 74 Not surprisingly, Marri is linked to the

Afghanistan-based Baluch People's Liberation Front, an organization whose

aim is the establishment of an independent Baluchistan. 75 Mengal, the

second member of the triumvirate, who until recently was also advocating
an independent Baluchistan,76 has come to the conclusion that only a

confederation, in which each of the four constituent units would have an

equal voice, is a viable alternative; for a federal set-up would always be

numerically and institutionally dominated by Punjabis. 77 Finally,

Bizenjo, former NAP governor of Baluchistan, is, relatively speaking,

moderate in his approach to the resolution of the disagreement with

Islamabad. Although he is no less critical of Punjabi attitude toward the

smaller provinces, he still believes that a solution can be found within a

loose federal system, but only if all provinces are granted full autonomy

and the centre's powers are limited to defence, foreign affairs, currency,

communications and taxation (limited to what would be considered necessary

to fulfil these responsibilities).78

Apart from the divisions these political differences have created

amongst the Baluch, they have also had a spill-over effect into

74. Harrison, op. cit., pp. 42ff.

75. The ethnic links with the external environment will be analysed in Part V of the thesis.
76. Far Eastern Econolic Review, 30 June 1983, pp. 16-17.
77. Harrison, op. cit., pp. 61ff.
78. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
 326

Baluch-Pukhtun relations. Although both groups had suffered under the

Bhutto government, the Pukhtuns, however, with their greater degree of

representation in the armed forces and the bureaucracy had more to lose

than the Baluch if they opposed the new military government. Moreover,
the Pukhtuns' more moderate approach to the 'nationality' question

eventually resulted in Bizenjo breaking away from the National Democratic

Party, the successor party to the banned NAP, and forming his own party,

the Pakistan National Party, in 1979. 79 These conflicting views

re-inforced Baluch resentment against the Pukhtuns' increasing political

assertiveness, often at variance with Baluch political positions, and

their domination of lucrative jobs in Baluchistan at the expense of the

Baluch. 80 Both these developments have not only weakened the political

power base of the Baluch leadership, but it has also locked the Pukhtuns
in Baluchistan into a closer relationship with the Punjabi-dominated state

institutions. 81 Moreover, the growing number of migrant Pukhtuns to

Baluchistan has not only diluted the ethnic ·purity' of Baluchistan,

adversely affecting the 'radicals' province-wide power base, but it has

facilitated the central government's drive to integrate the province into

mainstream Pakistan politics.

Accordingly, in order to isolate the 'radical' politicians, General

Zia co-opted moderate Baluch leaders willing to cooperate with his
government's programme. As a reward for their pro-government stance these

politicians were either selected to the Federal Councilor included in the

federal cabinet. Coupled with this political co-optation, General Zia has

drastically increased development funds for Baluchistan, a strategy aimed

79. Opposing views toward the 1978 Revolution in Afghanistan were also decisive in the eventual
split. This will be examined in Part Vof the thesis.
80. Trade. commerce and the civil services are controlled by the Pukhtuns. Viewpoint (Lahore
Weekly). 27 Decelber 1984, p. 25.
81. Interview, [High-ranking Baluch civil servant, Quetta, January 1984.]
 327

at demonstrating to the Baluch population that it can only benefit by

cooperating with the central authorities. The second reason for making

Baluchistan the major focus of the government's development programme is

to prove to the people that Islamabad is in a better position than the

sardars to deliver to the people the services and capital infrastructures

which they desperately need to improve their living standards. 82 The

direct consequence of this governmental penetration into the peripheral

regions of the country is the demythification of the sardars as being the

only possible provider of social goods, resulting in their loss of

political credibility and social stature in Baluch society. This drive to

break the sardars' hold on a largely illiterate population, a policy

started under Bhutto, can only benefit the central government; for the

sardars have always been the main obstacle to the province integrating
with the rest of the country, either by keeping the population
economically and politically repressed or by being the 'vanguard' of a

nationalistic movement aimed at opposing the central government's

integrative policies.

In the 6th Five-Year Plan (1983-1988) the government has earmarked for

Baluchistan alone a public sector development programme of Rs 21 billion

which is roughly 250% higher than the amount allocated in the Fifth

Plan. 83 Most of these funds are channelled into irrigation,

road-building and power generation. 84 Also of top priority in the

development programme of the province is the educational sector,8S an

32. For example, in 1984 the Annual Development Plan for Baluchistan was Rs 710 million as against
Rs 140 million in the 1970s. Siddiq Baluch, ·Share in Developlent Outlays·, Dawn(Suppl.), 29 Hay 1984,p.1.
33. The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-1988), (Planning Comlission, Government of Pakistan, October
1983), p. 198.
84. Dawn, 27 December 1983. For the 1983-34 financial year Rs 1,680 million had been allocated for
the developlent of capital infrastructure in agriculture, education, transportation, cOllunications,
housing and rural develoPlent. The Huslim, 21 Septelber 1983.
85. The Plan's target is to increase the nUlber of primary schools frol the present level of 3,096
(2626 for boys and 470 for girls) to 5,500 by 1988. The Huslim, 31 October 1983.
 328

emphasis which takes on an added degree of urgency when viewed in relation

to the low level of literacy in the province. 8s As indicated in Table

9.1, although the literacy ratio in 1981 had improved slightly since 1972,

when the last census was taken, it was still less than half the national

standard, and appallingly low for women.

TABLE 9.1 LITERACY RATIO

Sex Baluchistan Pakistan

Both Sexes 10.32 26.17

Rural 6.18 17.33
Urban 32.16 47.12

Male 15.20 35.05

Rural 9.82 26.24
Urban 42.42 55.32

Female 4.32 15.99

Rural 1.75 7.33
Urban 18.54 37.27

Source: Main Findings of 1981 Population Census, (Population Census

Organization, Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, 1983), p. 11.

Although there has been a massive influx of development capital into

Baluchistan since President Zia came into office,87 there is still a

substantial degree of suspicion amongst sections of the Baluch

intelligentsia, however; for the government's emphasis on developing the

province's capital infrastructure, especially roads, airports and

communication lines, has brought about accusations that Islamabad is only

doing this in order to have a better control over the province and more

easily exploit its resources for the benefit of Punjabis and

muha.iirs.88. Certainly such charges are often levelled at central

86. The governlent intends to spend close to Rs 1 billion in the educational sector of Baluchistan
alone during this Five-Year Plan period. Ibid.
87. Foreign countries, financial institutions and lultilateral donor agencies have co•• itted Rs 2
billion of development funds for Baluchistan for the Sixth S-Year Plan. The Huslil, 30 October 1983.
88. For example, foreign exchange savings fro. Baluchistan gas fields amount to almost Rs 8 billion
a year as against Rs 600 lillion paid in royalties to Baluchistan. Viewpoint, 27 Decelber 1984, p. 26.
 329

governments, and are often difficult to dispute; however, the fact of the

matter is that these projects, which are part and parcel of the process of

state-building, are essential and indispensable if the country is to make

any headway in the process of national integration. Policy-makers cannot

hope to integrate 'empty territories' into mainstream national life if the

basic infrastructures are lacking. Nevertheless, there is some validity

in the scepticism emanating from the Baluch, for their representation in

national and provincial institutions is extremely low and not justifiable

considering the high number of unemployed university graduates. 89

Therefore, it is not surprising that when Bizenjo states that "even if the

government turns Baluchistan into a paradise, is the price of freedom

worth it?"90 that such statements fall upon very receptive ears amongst

a large section of the Baluch population.

If the Baluchistan issue appeared to be a grave problem in

centre-provincial relations, the Sind unrest, which developed into a

full-scale rural uprising in some parts of the province in Autumn 1983,

was decidely a major threat to the survival of President Zia's regime.

Undoubtedly, the "precipitant" to the "internal war"91 was Zia's speech

of 12 August 1983 in which he outlined the government's plan to proceed

with non-party legislative elections. 92 However, more important to the

analysis of the movement were the existing pre-conditions which gave the

Sindhis objective reasons to rebel against the Martial Law government.

89. For example, there are no Baluch on the Railway Board, Pakistan International Airlines, Water
and Power Development Authority, Pakistan Steel Mills and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. The
Muslim, 15 Hay 1985. In Baluchistan, of the 830 higher civil service posts, only 181 were held by Baluch
in 1979, and most were minor posts. Horeover, there are only a few dozen Baluch in the armed forces.
Harrison, op. cit., p. 164. Interview, [Hir Khuda Bakhsh Harri, former Chief Justice of the Baluchistan
High Court, Karachi, January 1984.]
90. The Economist, 12 June 1982, p.44.
91. Harry Eikstein has defined "precipitant" as an event which actually starts the war, and
'internal war" as "any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers or
policies'. 'On the etiology of Internal Wars', History and Theory, Yolo IY, No.2, 1965, pp. 133,140.
92. Political Plan Announced, Address by President Zia-ul-Haq to the Seventh Session of the Federal
Council, Islamabad, 12 August 1983. (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting)
 330

The unrest, which was mainly restricted to specific areas in the

interior of Sind, such as Dadu, Hala, Nawabshah, Khairpur and Larkana,

Bhutto's home town, essentially involved unauthorized mass demonstrations

and the destruction of any symbol of government authority, for example,

police stations, post offices, railway lines and government buildings.

Initially the central government left.it to the provincial police to deal

with the unrest; however, once the movement developed into a large-scale

uprising, and threatened the economic prosperity of the Punjab,93 Zia

decided it was time to take sterner measures. Two crack army divisions
disarmed the unreliable and ineffective Sindhi constables,94 and quickly

quashed the uprising. According to independent sources, the army followed

typical anti-guerrilla warfare tactics; that is, surrounding a village or

a town with troops and conducting house to house searches to flush out

what the government referred to as "dacoits" and "miscreants".9s

Although the introduction of army personnel proved to be an effective

means to ending the disturbances, the casualties were relatively

high.96 Nevertheless, by mid-November 1983 the government was

sufficiently confident to declare that "the Sind situation was well under

control".97 So, even though General Zia was able to contain the

potentially explosive situation and survive the crisis with only minor

consequences, such as the Sindhi boycott of the local elections,98 the

basic causes of the unrest were not, and still have not been, corrected.

93. According to the sketchy newspaper reports on the unrest, the burning, looting and blockading of
the national highway and railroad lines connecting Karachi with the Punjab caused a 30% drop of goods
being delivered to the Punjab. The Huslim, 3 October 19B3~
94. The Sydney Horning Herald, 19 August 1983.
95. Interview, [Journalist for Dawn, Lahore, Deceaber 1983.]
96. According to governlent sources, of the 61 people who died and 200 who were injured, 20-25% were
law enforcement agents. The Huslia, 11 November 1983. According to unofficial sources, the actual nUlber
of people killed rose to 150. The Sydney Horning Herald, 1 october 1983. It is interesting to note that
throughout this whole period of unrest there was never any aention of these disturbances on the
govern.ent-controlled television and radio; the population listened to sse reports to obtain news about
the unrest.
97. The Pakistan Times, 14 November 1983.
98. The Economist, 8 October 1983, p. 41.
 331

As previously examined, widespead and deep-seated discontent amongst

the Sindhis, especially in the rural areas, has been a fact of life in

Pakistan virtually since the days of Partition. Therefore, the unrest

which developed in Autumn 1983 should have come as no surprise to Zia;

nevertheless, the intensity of the movement was quite unexpected. Apart

from the fact that the Sindhi unrest a decade earlier was basically

confined to Karachi and Hyderabad, two urban centres with strong muha.iir

components, as opposed to the latest movement which was wholly confined to

the rural areas, the causes for the unrest remained the same.

First, Sindhi representation in the bureaucracy and the military,

already low under Bhutto, further deteriorated since his ouster. For

example, rural Sindhis in the central administrative Secretariat are,

according to the established quota, allowed to have 11.4% of the

positions. However, their actual representation is substantially lower,

with 5.0% (grades 16-22) and 3.7% (grades 20-22). On the other hand,

urban Sind, which essentially refers to muhajirs, is allowed 7.6% of the

national quota; but, their numbers in the Secretariat are grossly

over-represented, with 23.2% (grades 16-22) and 21.8% (grades 20-22).

Similarly, in government controlled corporations, rural Sindhis only have

3.6% of the positions, compared to urban Sind's 47%.99 Moreover, these

figures do not reflect the true extent of the discrimination against the

Sindhis, since muhajirs and Punjabis who live in rural Sind declare

themselves as Sindhis. Similarly, Sindhi representation in the armed

forces, altough impossible to determine precisely because of security

reasons, is known to be well below their ratio in society.100

99. Charles H. Kennedy, 'Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. XXIV, No.6,
June 1984, p. 698.
100. Interview, [A Wester. military attache, Islamabad, November 1983.] I was told there were no
Sindhis above the rank of colonel.
 332

Secondly, the poor socio-economic conditions of rural Sindhis, of

which, according to the latest statistics, 65% live below the poverty

line, has created a deep sense of frustration, a fact which the former
governor of Sind, Lieutenant-General S.M. Abbasi, acknowledged to be the
main reason for the unrest. 101 The economic deprivation started back in
the late 1940s when the federal government decided to allocate
approximately 40% of the evacuee property left behind by the out-going
Hindu farmers to the in-coming muhajirs. This resulted in a massive

eviction of Sindhi tenants from land which they had been cultivating for

generations. To compound this situation, the majority of the new land

brought under cultivation with the construction of the new barrages were

alloted to muhajirs, Punjabis, Pukhtuns and defence personnel, leaving

only a small proportion for the Sindhi farmers to purchase. 102

Moreover, of the four provinces, the general pattern of land tenure in

Sind is the most skewed in favour of the large landlords who own 79% of

the total arable land, making Sind the province with the lowest number of

small farmers. 103 Finally, as demonstrated in the following table,

rural Sind's general economic development is clearly lagging behind,

compared to the rest of the country.

TABLE 9.2 RANKING OF DISTRICTS OF PROVINCES

ACCORDING TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA

PWJAB SIND NWFP BALUCHISTAN

Most developed 12
Intermediate 9 1 5
Least Developed 12 2 9

Source: The Muslim, 30 October 1983.

101. Dawn, 31 December 19B3.

102. Viewpoint, 27 December 1984, p. 25.
103. The Pakistan Times, 15 September 1983. For a detailed study of land tenure in Pakistan, see:
Pakistan: Census of Agriculture, 1980, Agricultural Census Organization, Statistic Division, Government of
Pakistan, Lahore, n.d.
 333

Thirdly, because of the rapid expansion of educational institutions

during the Bhutto period, there has been a dramatic increase in graduates

seeking employment. However, unlike the non-Sindhis who have had better

job opportunities in the urban centre, where most of the productive assets

are located, the rural Sindhis have had great difficulties finding

employment in their area of residence. Moreover, the few industries that

do exist in the interior of the province, and which are generally owned by

non-Sindhis, prefer to employ members of their own ethnic group.104

Ironically, while there has been an increase in unemployed graduates as a

result of the educational expansion of the 1970s there has been, according

to the latest census, a decrease in the literacy rate in rural Sind from

17.5% in 1972 down to 15.57% in 1981, and an increase from 47.43% up to

50.77% in urban Sind. lOS While these figures may be damaging to

President Zia's image and re-inforce the negative perception the Sindhis

have of his policies, the fact that there was no census during Bhutto's

regime (1972 being too soon after Yahya's departure to have any meaning)

makes it impossible to determine whether the downward trend only began

under Zia or whether it was already beginning under Bhutto.

Although there was a specific "precipitant" to the unrest and most of

the grievances already existed under previous governments, there was one

important factor which brought an added dimension to the 1983 movement:

not only was Bhutto, the only Sindhi prime minister the country had ever

had, no longer in power, but he had been sentenced and executed by

Punjabis and muhajirs. So even though Bhutto did not significantly

improve the lot of the Sindhis, and was accused of being a Punjabi puppet,

he did raise the hopes for a better future for the majority of the people

104. Viewpoint, 12 September 1985. p.30.

lOS. 1981 Census Report of Sind Province, (Population Census Organization, Statistics division,
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Decelber 1984), p. 14.
 334

at the bottom echelon of the socio-economic hierarchy. At least he

appeared to care about the condition of the peasants and workers. But in

1983, with the Punjabis and muha,iirs in control of a non-elected

government the Sindhis' only means of outlet left to air their

frustrations was open revolt, regardless of the cost.

This political awakening was fully exploited by the Maoist-oriented

Sind Awami Tehrik (SAT) which in those days was not a member of the

Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MHO), then a 9-party opposition

coalition. lOS Although SAT, which spearheaded the 1983 unrest, was

demanding greater provincial autonomy, a more equitable share of power at

the centre,107 and an increase in resources allocated for rural Sindhis,

it was not secessionist in character. This political platform made it

possible for virtually all members of the Sind community, to participate

in the unrest. The movement had such a Sindhi fervour that even the all

powerful waderas (large landlords), generally supporters of the government

in power, were forced to join the bandwagon for fear that if they did not

their political position would seriously be threatened in the future,

especially if President Zia's government were to be toppled by this

unrest. loa

However, not all residents of Sind were supporters of the movement.

The most important group which almost to the very end refused to join the

movement was the muhajir community. Not only was this because they were

urban-based and had little empathy for the rural Sindhis' grievances, but

106. Please see Footnote No. 141 in Part II of the Thesis for the list of HRD melbers.
107. At the time of the uprising, there were only two Sindhis included in the federal cabinet: Hir
Ali Ahmad Talpur (Defence) and Elahi Bakhsh Soolro (Industry). During an interview I had with Talpur, one
of the original founders of the PPP, it quickly became obvious that the interviewee was only nOlinally in
control of his department, and that his inclusion in the cabinet was only meant to placate Sindhi
discontent. He was subsequently defeated at the non-party-based elections of February 1985.
103. Interview, [A former PPP linister, Islamabad, October 1983.1
 335

also because they had no valid reason to oppose the government. They were

in influential positions in the civilian and military bureaucracies. they

had important portfolios in the central cabinet. and they were prospering

under Zia's free market economy. However, as was the case of the waderas,

the muhajirs felt that their long-term interests warranted that they at

least give token support to the movement lest the Sindhis may decide to

turn their frustration against them. Accordingly, a New Sindhi National

Front was formed, emphasizing the solidarity between old and new Sindhis,

viz, muhajirs. 109

Meanwhile, the MRD felt this was the perfect occasion to demand the

lifting of Martial Law and the restoration of democracy. It believed, and

correctly so, that if it could get the movement to spill into the other

provinces, especially in the Punjab, it would finally be able to topple

Zia's military government. However, this is where the leadership of the

MRD made a grave tactical mistake: it did not objectively assess the

political situation in the rest of the country, believing that the three

other provinces would automatically come to the support of an issue which

was largely provincial in character.

Ultimately the Punjabis failed to respond to the MRD's call for a

popular uprising against the government. There were several reasons for

this. First, the level of political consciousness amongst the population

of the Punjab is relatively low compared to the Sindhis'. Consequently,

Punjabis only tend to become mobilized over emotional issues, and the

MRD's political slogans had very little appeal to the average Punjabi.

Secondly, compounding the Punjabis' general apathy toward the MRD's call

was the absence of well organized grassroot political infrastructures like

109. Dawn, 8 Noveaber 1983.

 336

the ones existing in Sind. This lack of developed political organizations

in the Punjab was mainly the result of the PPP's failure, after gaining

power in 1971, systematically to mobilize and channel the Punjabi

electorate into an organized political force. 110 Thirdly, as opposed to

the poor economic conditions of the rural Sindhis, the Punjabis have fared

very well for the last decade. Apart from the fact that there are better

employment opportunities for Punjabis either in the private or public

sectors, the single most important factor which has contributed to the

improvement of their living standards are the remittances that migrants to

the Middle-East have sent back to their families. Since the beginning of

the movement of migrant workers to the Middle-East in the mid-1970s, the

Punjabis have been by far the most dominant ethnic group to take advantage

of this economic cbonanza'.lll Therefore, considering the favourable

economic conditions the Punjabis had been enjoying under Zia's government,

it is not surprising that they were not responsive to the MRD's drive to

topple the government; for not only were the political slogans coming from

Sind increasingly loaded with secessionist overtones, thus weakening the

MRD's credibility as a force wishing to restore democracy, but the

Punjabis were certainly not interested in loosing thousands of rupees

worth of Middle-East employment in exchange for imprisonment, fines and

floggings. 112

As with the Punjab, NWFP was at best lukewarm in its endorsement of

the MRD movement. Similar factors which had inhibited the Punjabis from

joining the unrest were present in NWFP: an ineffective PPP organization

in the province; favourable economic conditions as a result of the large

110. Interview, [Mazhar Ali Khan, Editor of Viewpoint, Lahore, 11 November 1983.]
111. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see: Ijaz Gilani, M. Fahil Khan and Hunawar Iqbal,
"Labour Migration fro. Pakistan to the Hiddle-East and its Impact on the Domestic EconolY", Research
Report Series, no. 126, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, June 1981, p. 10.
112. K.B. Sayeed, 'Pakistan in 1983: Internal Stresses more Serious than External Proble.s", Asian
Survey, Vol. XXIV, No.2, February 1984, p. 223.
 337

influx of remittances from the Middle-East,113 the booming heroin trade,

and the profitable commerce in smuggled goods; a monopoly in the national

transportation industry which has had a beneficial effect in the Pukhtuns'

integration in the national economy; large business interests in Karachi,

where approximately one million Pukhtun reside, which the large NWFP

trading houses did not wish to jeopardize; influential positions in the

civilian and military bureaucracies; and, a satisfactory modus vivendi

with the Punjabi elite who generally allowed them to have control over

their own provincial affairs. 114

Similarly, the Baluch, who generally sympathized with the Sindhis'

plight, were also reluctant to join the movement against the government;

however, this was not so much because they were ambivalent toward the

government as they were suspicious of the MRD, and especially the PPP

leadership. The Baluch had not forgotten that it was a PPP administration

which had dismissed their elected provincial government and had sent the

army into their province to crush the rebellious tribesmen. Although

Bizenjo's PNP had joined the MRD after General Zia's August speech, what

guarantee could the Baluch leader be given that if and when the PPP formed

the next government the provinces would be granted provincial autonomy;

for regardless of the type of government at the centre, the Punjabis would

always be the dominant national force. Finally, the massive increase in

development capital being spent in Baluchistan to improve the econo~:c

standards of the Baluch was an important inhibiting factor to the Baluch

joining the 1982 unrest.

113. In 1984 there were over 300,000 Pukhtuns in the Hiddle-East. Viewpoint, 27 Dec. 1984. p. 25.
114. This was often repeated during interviews I had with Pukhtuns. Interview, [Hian Hoha •• ad
Iqbal, President Frontier Province Huslim league, Pagara Group, Peshawar, December 1983.]
 338

Therefore, as a consequence of the MRD's failure to muster the support

of the other provinces, especially the Punjab's, for the overthrow of the

central government, the MRD-led movement was bound to collapse; for,

historically, it has been demonstrated that unless Lahore, the largest

city of the Punjab, joins an anti-government uprising, as it did when Ayub

Khan and Bhutto were toppled, all opposition movements will falter and
fail to achieve their objective. Moreover, on the military side, unlike

the case of East Pakistan, it was relatively easy for the army to contain

the Sind uprising because the geographical position of the province was

such that the military logistics of the Coperations' could easily be met

without fear of external disruption.

Complementing the military approach to the termination of the Sind

crisis, President Zia also pursued political and economic means for the

resolution of the unrest. On the political front, Zia who repeatedly

stressed the need to find a political solution to the problem, decided to

hold talks with the leaders of the banned political parties. However, Zia

was very selective with whom he was ready to negotiate a settlement of the

crisis; since he emphasized his willingness to find a solution to the Sind

situation only in cooperation with the "patriotic" elements, for all other

poli ticians, according to him, "were neither political nor patriotic, and

subversion is their business" .115 This meant that the government only

had discussions with the Jama'at-i-Islami, the Muslim League and other

political parties which had very little appeal in rural Sind. All other
elements directly involved in the unrest, such as the PPP and SAT, were

not consulted; and, although a high-level committee of enquiry was

established to investigate the reasons for the unrest, the consequence of

the government's selective approach to negotiations was to further

115. The Huslim, 7 October 1983.

 339

radicalize the Sind movement, and to reinforce the Sindhis' feeling of

having no institutional lines of communication open to them to let the

government know their needs and wants.

Even though the government may have been unwilling to have direct
discussions with the Sindhi politicians, it was well aware of the economic

plight of rural Sindhis. Accordingly, it decided to significantly

increase development funds to be allocated to the interior of the

province. During the height of the unrest the federal minister for

Planning and Development declared that with the development funds Sind had

been receiving since 1977 there was no validity in the Sindhis'

accusations that their province was being neglected, for they were

receiving more than their fair share, as calculated according to its ratio

of the national population. lls He stated that in 1982 the government

had opened 2,500 primary schools which was significantly more than what

had been done in the last 30 years. He also added that Rs 5.5 billion had
been spent in the Sind provincial budget during the last five years which

was twice as much as in the previous Five-Year Plan. ll7 Moreover, in

the Sixth Five-Year Plan over Rs 15 billion, of which 2/3 would be

directed to the rural areas, would be allocated to the development of

Sind, which was six times as much as the pre-1977 level. llB Finally,

the government decided to authorize the disbursement of Rs 270 million

worth of loans for the farmers of the Larkana region, the heartland of

Bhutto support in Sind. 119

So even though the government increased development funds for the

interior of the province, most Sindhis still felt that their grievances

116. The Pakistan Tiles, 14 November 1983.

117. Ibid.
118. The Husli., 28 December 1983.
119. Dawn, 22 December 1983.
 340

had fallen on deaf ears. For the 1983 unrest had not only been a matter

of economics, but also one of political representation at the centre.

This feeling of not having a voice in Islamabad was further compounded by

the heavy presence of non-Sindhis not only in the urban areas but also in

the interior. This fact of life, however, could not be corrected,

regardless of the government in power, for it would mean having to evict

non-Sindhi agriculturalists for the sake of assuaging Sindhi feelings, a
political price no federal government could be expected to pay.

The third case of centre-province relations involves Islamabad's

interactions with the NWFP. Since independence the federal government and

the Pukhtuns have had a tacit agreement that the inhabitants of the tribal
areas, as opposed to the ones from the 'settled' areas, would be allowed

to govern their lifes according to their tribal laws and customs without

any interference from the federal government. However, since the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent influx of over 3 million

Afghan refugees into Pakistan, the situation in the Frontier province, in

both the tribal and 'settled' areas, has increasingly witnessed

instability as a result of the inevitable clash between the local

residents and the refugees. Nevertheless, until recently most disputes

between these two groups were satisfactorily handled by the Jirgas

(council of elders), since the refugees, at least the ethnic Pukhtuns, and

the local residents were often of the same tribes and had inter-acted with
one another for generations. However, these amicable arrangements
between, on the one hand, the federal government and NWFP and, on the

other hand, the local Pukhtuns and the refugees are on the verge of being
jeopardized with the introduction of a new element: the thriving heroin

trade.
 341

In 1980, there was virtually no heroin problem, since there were only
an estimated 5,000 heroin users in the whole country; however, by 1983,

according to the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, their number had

increased to over 100,000. 120 If this problem were confined to Pakistan

only, the eradication of this drug trade could conceivebly be quickly

achieved. Unfortunately, this highly lucrative business has ramifications

well beyond the national borders of Pakistan, for it alone provides 80% of
all heroin sold in the United States, Europe and Britain,121 a record

the government is certainly not proud of holding. Consequently, there has

been increasing pressure from the Western drug enforcement authorities to

have the Pakistan government take severe measures to try to arrest this

illicit trade, such as halting the cultivation of the poppies and

eliminating the laboratories which transform the opium into heroin.

Therefore, for fear of jeopardizing the massive amount of economic and

military aid it receives from the U.S.,122 and in a bid to improve their

image abroad, the Pakistan authorities have finally decided to take stern
measures to try to halt the flow of heroin.

It is at this juncture that the federal authorities encountered

problems, because the most important tribe involved in this trade, the

Afridi, whose members straddle the Durant Line that marks the border

between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is supported by the Soviet-backed Afghan

government in its total opposition to the Afghan Mujahideen's struggle.

This Afghan assistance has come in the form of financial rewards, guns

and, of course, moral support. President Babrak Karmal promised them an

increase in this caid' if the Afridis actively stopped the crossing of

120. tar Eastern Economic Review, 13 June 1985, p. 98. There are also an estimated 300,000 opium
addicts in Pakistan. The Australian, 6-7 April 1985.
121. The Australian, 25 Harch 1985.
122. Ibid.
 342

anti-Afghan government guerrillas into Pakistan. 123

Undetered, however, the government has taken steps to try to stop the

heroin trade. General Zia has promised to introduce the death penalty for

drug trafficking but only on the condition that Western countries also
introduce harsher penalties for drug ~muggling.124 The federal

government's drive to have farmers grow alternative crops to poppies, such

as tobacco and sugar-cane, has only met with mixed results. 125 Thus,

having failed through peaceful means to stop the heroin trade, in November

1985 para-military forces were sent into the Khyber Agency, and within a

six weeks period, during which the agency was virtually cut-off from the

rest of the province, the authorities demolished over 100 houses belonging

to heroin traders as well as an unspecified number of laboratories. 126

Finally, with the aim of preventing a resurgence of the elicit trade and

check arms smuggling, the government decided to permanently station law

enforcement agents in the agency and build fortified posts in strategic

10cations. 127

Although conducted by provincial forces under the directions of the

NWFP government, the Pukhtuns viewed the operations as central

interference in provincial matters. However, this does not mean that the

majority was against the action; on the contrary, public opinion was quite

polarized over the issue. Some religious leaders, including the

Jama'at-i-Islami secretary in Baluchistan, felt that this operation

against these "anti-nationals" and enemies of Islam was a necessary

123. The Guardian Weekly, 10 November 1985. An in-depth analysis of this issue will be exa.ined in
Part Yof the thesis.
124. The New York Times, 12 August 1984.
125. Far Eastern Econolic Review, 13 June 1985. p. 39.
126. The Huslil, 31 Decelber 1935.
127. The Husli., 6 Dece.ber 1935.
 343

measure if the government wished to avoid another Lebanon,l28 implying

that there was a direct linkage between the increasing number of refugees

and the worsening problem of law and order in NWFP and Baluchistan.

On the other hand, the government critics argued for a peaceful

solution to the problem rather than an armed confrontation which could

compel the rebellious tribesmen to seek Afghan assistance in their

opposition to the government. l29 The Pakistan National Party argued

that the reason there was a problem in the agency was because the

government had yet to abolish the archaic social and political system

existing in the tribal areas, and integrate these areas into the national

environment. l3o Its major areas of criticism were: the continuation of

the Frontier Crimes Regulation, a colonial set-up which essentially allows

tribal elders to judge criminal cases according to their laws and customs;

the lack of universal adult franchise, granting only 2,700 people out of

600,000 in the Khyber Agency the right to vote; and, the low level of

development which only benefits a few maliks (chiefs).l3l

In sum, by trying to implement federal law in a tribal agency - an

unprecedented decision by a central government - President Zia may have

temporarily crushed the heroin trade, but the long-term effects may be

very costly; for in this region three unpredictable factors interact: a

hostile external environment, a volatile ethnic group and an uneven

Islamic fervour. Consequently, it takes political skill to properly

128. Viewpoint, 12 December 1985, p. 8.

129. The Huslim, 4 December 1985.
130. Other opponents to the operations were: the HRD, the Terik-i-Istiqlal, the
Tehrik-i-Ittehad-i-Qabail (progressive organization of tribesmen belonging to all seven agencies), The
Educated Tribals Organization (body representing tribal intelligentsia), and the HDP.
131. The Huslim, 4 December 1985. The average literacy rate for the 7 tribal agencies is 5.141.
Census Reports of the Federally Administers Tribal Areas, (Census Organization, Islamabad, Government of
Pakistan, 1979), p. 110. living standards in the tribal belt is the lowest in the country. There are
only 6 industrial units in the region and four of them are idle. Out of a population of 4 lillion there
are only 1,442 industrial workers. Viewpoint, 9 January 1986, p.13.
 344

manage these three variables, because interference in one will inevitably

affect the other two.

Having analysed the centre's relations vis-a-vis the three smaller

provinces in the context of specific case studies, it would be appropriate
to briefly examine the federal government's general political approach to

centre-province relations.

As examined in Part II of the thesis, the government's most important

institutional contribution has been the promulgation of the Revival of the

Constitution of 1973 Order. 1985 (RCO) , subsequently amended by the

newly-elected parliament. Although in the context of the role of Islam in

the administration of the country and the increased powers of the

president the RCO instituted major changes, in the field of

centre-province relations it merely re-inforced two political trends which

have existed since independence: a further restriction on the provinces'

autonomy and a continuation of the Punjab's domination at the centre.

TABLE 9.3 DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE

MAJLIS-I-SHOORA

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SENATE TOTAL

PUNJAB 128 19 147

SIND 50 19 69
NWFP 28 19 47
BALUCHISTAN 13 19 32
F.A.T.A.* 8 8 16
ISLAMABAD 3 3
MINORITIES 10 10
-------- ----- --------
237 87 324

* Federally Administered Tribal Areas

The above table demonstrates what an impregnable position the Punjab

has in the Parliament. In the National Assembly alone, it has an absolute

 345

majority. As for its numbers in the Majlis-i-Shoora, only relevant in a

joint sitting of both houses, it would only need 16 votes to be able to

defeat a bill; and since there are 29 'floating' votes available, it would

not be too difficult to achieve a majority. Therefore, regardless of the

type of bill presented, the Punjab will ultimately determine whether it

will be passed, amended, or defeated.. Bills relating to the Federal

Legislative List, such as defence, external affairs, currency, federal

public service, customs, national planning, and the Concurrent Legislative

List, which includes, inter alia: criminal law, contracts, law and order,

population planning, may originate in either houses. Once the bill is

passed by the house in which it originated, it is transmitted to the other

house, and if it is passed without amendment by the second house it will

be presented to the president for assent. However, if the second house

rejects or passes the bill with amendments, then the bill will be

considered at a joint sitting (Arts.70 & 71). On the other hand, all

money bills may only originate in the National Assembly, and need not be

transmitted to the Senate before being presented to the president for his

assent (Art.73). This legislative procedure, which undoubtedly favours

the Punjab, already existed in the unaltered version of the 1973

Constitution.

Apart from federal legislative procedures, there are other important

sections in the RCO which directly affect the provinces. First, after the

end of President Zia's term of office in 1990, the president is to be

elected by the members of an electoral college consisting of the members

of the Majlis-i-Shoora and the members of the provincial assemblies

(Art.41(3»; and the fact that the Punjab has such great numbers of

parliamentarians will mean that it will have a dominant position in the

 346

selection of the chief executive. 132 Secondly, as with the above case,

the selection of the prime minister, a procedure which will only come into

force in March 1990, will be wholly determined by the Punjabi

parliamentarians if they decided to vote en masse, since he will be

elected by the majority of the Nationa~ Assembly (Art.9l(3)). However,

this procedure already existed prior to the amendment of the

constitution. Thirdly, the governor of each province is to be appointed

by the president in consultation with his prime minister (Art.lOl(l)).

This is quite significantly different from the method of appointment which

existed in the original 1973 Constitution; for previously it was the

president who selected the governors, but "in accordance with the advice

of the prime minister and such advice shall be binding on him" (Art.48).
Nevertheless, in both cases it is the centre which determines the

selection of the governors. Fourthly, the governor will, subject to the

president's approval, appoint the chief minister, dismiss the provincial

cabinet which has lost the confidence of the provincial assembly, and

dissolve the provincial assembly when an appeal to the electorate is

necessary (Art.l05(1)(a)(b)(c)). This is probably the only important

change in centre-province relations which the RCO introduced; since in the

original 1973 Constitution the chief minister was elected by a majority of

the provincial assembly (Art.13l(3)), could not be dismissed by the

governor (Art.134), and advised the governor as to when to dissolve the

provincial assembly (Art.112). Finally, if there is disagreement over a

matter which is enunciated in the Concurrent Legislative List, the federal

parliament's authority will supersede provincial legislation (Art.143), a

procedure which already existed in the unaltered version of the 1973

Constitution.

132. The number of seats in the four provincial parliaments are: Punjab:240, Sind:lOO, NWFP:80,
Baluchistan:40. Also, each assembly has 5 seats reserved for women and seats reserved for linorities,
i.e., Punjab:8, Sind:9, NWFP:3, Baluchistan:3.
 347

In sum, in the field of centre-province relations the RCO further

strengthened the position of the Punjab vis-a-vis the other provinces, and

increased the centre's powers to intervene in provincial affairs. These

are certainly the most important criticisms which the provinces,

especially the smaller ones, have of the RCO; for they feel this is merely

another step in reinforcing the de-facto unitary system of government

Pakistan has had since 1947.

As a result of the government's economic and political policies, the

extra-parliamentary political parties have become divided, confused and

ineffective in their opposition to Zia's government. A vivid proof of

their ineffectiveness was exemplified not only in the failed 1983 uprising

and in the population's rejection of the MRD's call for a massive boycott

of the non-party-based legislative elections of 1985, but in the

willingness of middle and lower-ranking PPP members to participate in the

1985 elections. As well as co-opting ex-PPP politicians to its side,133

the government applied punitive actions against politicians who refused to

abide by its directives. These included: the imprisonment and flogging of

political leaders, restrictions on politicians' inter-provincial

movements, and the 'voluntary' exile of the most troublesome opponents.

By following such tactics, the government did indeed manage to divide the

opposition, but it also regionalized the political focus of the parties.

The net effect of these tactics, coupled with President Zia's enactment of

the RCO, has been a fractionalization of political views regarding the

future political structure of Pakistan.

133. Some of the most important of these PPP members included in the cabinets were: Ali Ahmad
Talpur, Minister for Defence (23 Aug. 1978 - 26 Feb. 1985); Al-Haj Abbas Khan Abbasi, Hinister for
Religious and Minority Affairs (9 Harch 1981 - 15 March 1984); Raja Tridev Roy, Adviser for Minority
Affairs (9 Harch 1981 - 26 Feb. 1985); and, Halik Noor Hayat Khan Noon, Minister for Health, Special
Education and Social Welfare (10 April 1985 - 28 Jan. 1986).
 348

The majority of opposition parties, including the PPP, want to see a

restoration of the 1973 Constitution as it stood before President Zia

altered it by passing the RCO. The PPP leadership, especially Benazir

Bhutto, believes that the 1973 Constitution adequately guarantees

provincial rights. 134 In other words, it believes in a strong centre

and a system of government which is f?r all intents and purposes unitary.

It is this unyielding attitude regarding possible modification of the

constitution in the field of provincial autonomy, coupled with the former

PPP government's poor record in the realm of centre-province relations,

which has caused some members of the PPP and the MRD to question whether

the original 1973 Constitution is still an appropriate document for the

effective and equitable management of the country's ethnic problems.

The range of constitutional proposals emanating from the opposition

has virtually been as varied as there are political parties. Air Marshal

(ret.) Asghar Khan, leader of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI) has stated that

full and complete provincial autonomy must be granted otherwise the

country would continue to be plagued by centrifugal forces. 135 Mir

Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the Baluch leader of the Pakistan National Party

(PNP), has gone a step further by promoting the idea of a "loose'

federation which he feels would come closest to the spirit of the 1940

Lahore Resolution. 136 His political arguments for demanding a loose

federation are based on his belief that there is no such thing as a

Pakistan nation, but instead there exists four nationalities. The leaders

of the Seraiki Province Front have demanded the creation of a Seraiki

province, consisting of 30 million Seraiki-speaking people living in the

134. Benazir Bh~tto, Pakistan: The .Gathering Storm, Dhaka, University Press, 1983. In this small
book, in which she outlines the PPP's future programme if and when it comes to power, there is only one
non-committal statement regarding the "nationality question" and no mention of Z.A. Bhutto's military
response to Baluchistan's and HWFP's demand for greater provincial autonomy.
135. The Husli., 13 July 1985.
136. Harrison, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
 349

southern Punjab divisions of Multan, Bahawalpur, D.G. Khan and Dera Ismail

Khan, which would "eliminate the sense of deprivation between small

provinces by reducing the size of the Punjab".137

Yet another serious development which the MRD, and especially the PPP,
has been confronted with is the formation of the london-based

Sindhi-Baluch-Pashtun-Front (SBPF), which was launched on 18 April 1985.

Believing that the PPP leadership has an identical "hostile disposition"

toward the question of nationalities as do the military authorities,138

the leaders of the Front have advocated the establishment of a totally

decentralized confederation in which each nationality, i.e., the Sindhis,

Baluch, Pukhtuns and Punjabis, would be equally represented at the

centre. 139 Moreover, the centre, or the Republic as they call it, would

only have authority over defence, foreign affairs, communications,

currency, and arbitration powers in disputes between the States.

Considering his preference for a highly centralized system of

government, a view which was made clear with the enactment of the RCO,

President Zia has been less than receptive to these constitutional

suggestions. As he has stated on so many occasions:

We are one nation. People live in four provinces of

our country and speak different languages in their
provinces. But these differences have been exaggerated
and blown out of all proportions so much so that people
have even questioned whether we are one nation or four
nations. 140

Ironically, President Zia has suggested that one way to eradicate

ethnic identification would be to abolish the existing four provinces and

replace them with fifty-three small provinces. 141

137. The Muslim, 31 October 1935.

138. The Muslim, 2 October 1985.
139. Viewpoint, a August 1935, pp. 15-16.
140. Press Conference, op. cit., p. 21.
 350

As outlined in the Introduction, the outcome of the government's

decisions regarding ethnic demands will have a direct bearing on the

process of national integration. The general thrust of President Zia's

policies has been to maintain a tight control over provincial affairs, an

approach Bhutto also followed during his tenure in office. Consequently,

this unitary approach to federalism, which was institutionalized with the
promulgation of the RCO, instead of promoting national integration has

increased the smaller provinces' demand for autonomy. However, the major

factor that has intensified the centrifugal tendencies of the provinces is

the nature of the central government. Zia's government, although

Ccivilianized' through non-party legislative elections, is still

essentially a military-supported regime, and therefore its centralizing

policies are even less acceptable to the smaller provinces. Moreover, the

minority provinces do not appreciate President Zia's blatant use of

Islamic slogans to legitimize his policy of smothering ethnic dissent;

they perceive the Islamization programme as amounting to the

cPunjabization' of Pakistan society. Consequently, by failing to respond

to the demands from the non-Punjabi ethnic groups and increasing the

centre's powers, the government has increased the centrifugal pull of the

smaller provinces, and reinforced the ethnic polarization between, on the

one hand, the Baluch, Sindhis and Pukhtuns, and, on the other hand, the

Punjabis and muhajirs. However, this dichotomy must be qualified, for as

the examination of the ethnic case studies indicated, the various ethnic

groups are far from being homogeneous in their approach to centre-province

relations. Intra-ethnic divisions were deep-seated in the cases of the

Baluchistan problem and the NWFP heroin case, but absent in the case of

the Sind uprising. Similarly, one can witness inter-ethnic rivalry in

141. Harrison, ~~, p. 151. This is not a novel idea, and one which was often suggested by
high-ranking military officers. Interview, [Lt-Gen. (Ret.) Attiqur Reahman, Chairman of the Federal Public
Service Co •• ission, Islalabad, October 19831.
 351

Baluchistan between the Baluch and the Pukhtuns, two minority ethnic
groups, and in Sind between Sindhis and the economically dominant ethnic
groups, i.e., the muha.iirs, Punjab is , and Pukhtuns. Finally, regarding
the status of the 1973 Constitution, every ethnic configuration could be
found, from inter-ethnic cooperation to ethnic rivalry. These various
ethnic behaviours confirm the point made in the theoretical chapter; that
is, although one can generally predict an ethnic group's reaction,
nevertheless an ethnic group's response will essentially be determined
according to the issue under consideration. Notwithstanding these
reservations, the centralizing policies of President Zia do reaffirm the
basic premise of the theoretical model; that is, the direct linkage
between the centre's refusal to meet the ethnic groups demands for greater
regional autonomy and the negative feedback effect this has on the process
of national integration.
 PART v.

THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

 CHAPTER 10.

THE SEARCH FOR FRIENDS (1947-1971)

 This third part of the thesis will focus on the impact the external
environment has had on the process of national integration in Pakistan.
As indicated in the theoretical model, the leaders of a country, whether
industrialized or developing, will have to take into account the influence
the external environment has in the domestic arena. Normally, outside
forces have an even greater impact upon multi-ethnic and heterogeneous
developing countries which are still going through the process of national
integration, since the non-integrated nature of their polity is bound to
make them more susceptible to external forces.

However, just as the pressures of the external environment can

adversely affect a developing country's process of national integration, a
leader can manipulate the country's foreign policy in such a way as to

benefit himself and the state. As Robert Good stated:

Rather than attempt to manipulate the external
environment in ways suitable to the nation's interests,
the foreign policy of a n~ state seeks to affect its
internal environment in ways favorable to the building
of the state and to the maintenance of the regime in
power. 1
Although the new leaders will use foreign policy to legitimize their
rule,2 the use of external threats, real or imagined, usually does have
integrative power, since domestic issues either divide or have little
appeal to the ethnic groups which have yet to identify themselves as part
of the Cnation'. Therefore, the "foreign policies of the new nations,

like their domestic policies, reflect their preoccupation with

nation-building"3, or, as Good indicated, in "new states, foreign policy

is domestic policy pursued by other means; it is domestic policy carried

beyond the boundaries of the state". 4

1. Robert 'c. Sood, ·State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States·, in
Lawrence N. Hartin (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment, (NY: Praeger, 1962), p. 11.
2. N.H. Nriggins, The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa, (NY:
Colulbia University Press, 1979), pp. 221-238.
3. John Spanier ,-Sales Nations Play, (NY: Praeger, 1972), p. 386.
4. Robert C. Sood, ·Changing Patterns of African International Relations·, Alerican Political
Science Review, Vol. 58, No.3, Septelber 1964, p. 638, cited in Ibid.
 353

In the case of Pakistan, the external environment has not only had a
direct bearing on the country's ethnic and religious groups, but also on
other internal factors, such as the country's economic development, the
armed forces, and political parties. Ultimately this influence has
resulted in the central governments having to take into account the
pressures emanating from beyond its borders. Conversely, Pakistan's
domestic polities, especially the ones affecting the various ethnic and
religious groups, have influenced other countries' perceptions and
attitudes toward Pakistan.

Accordingly, in the next two chapters will be examined the impact the
external environment has had in the national integration process of
Pakistan, as well as the influence the Pakistani leaders' foreign and
domestic policies have had on other countries' relationship with
Pakistan. However, as with the analysis of any non-quantifiable variable,
determining the influence the external environment has in the domestic

sphere and vice versa is difficult to ascertain, since causal

relationships between two factors or events can not always be fully
proven. The thrust of the analysis will be limited to the most
significant foreign policy decisions and regional events which have had a
direct bearing on Pakistan's 'nation-building' process.

THE BARLY YEARS: 1947-1958

Undoubtedly, the establishment of Pakistan was an historical watershed

for the Muslim world in general, since this was the first country to be
founded strictly on the basis of the Islamic faith.s Partition on 15
August 1947, however, also introduced a destabilizing element in South

5. w.e. Slith, Pakistan as an Islamic State, (Lahore, Sh. Muhamlad Ashraf, 1951), p. 51.
 354

Asian politics: the transfer of the pre-Partition Muslim League-Congress

Party clash from the domestic to the international level. Not
surprisingly, these political-cum-religious differences have not only been
the most important determinants in Pakistan's foreign policy but, as will
be argued here, they have adversely affected Pakistan's national
integration process.

Unfortunately for the Pakistanis, their enthusiasm and jubilation for

their newly created country was not shared by the members of the
international community; rather, Pakistan was either perceived as an
aberration, considering its unique geographical features, or, even worse,
an illegitimate creation as a result of Britain's strategy of 'divide and
rule'.6 This negative perception of Pakistan was clearly demonstrated
in the manner in which the international community welcomed these two
newly-independent countries. While India's diplomatic credentials were
automatically accepted at the United Nations and in foreign capitals even
before it was granted independence, Pakistan, on the other hand, had to
apply for membership to the U.N. as a 'new' country, and wait until after
15 August 1947 to have its ambassadors accredited to foreign countries.
This d~plomatic differentiation between Pakistan and India proved beyond
any doubt that the world viewed India as the natural successor to British
India and Pakistan as a country which had 'seceded' from the former
British possession. This double standard was a continuation of the West's
perception of the Indian actors involved in the pre-Partition debate.

Mahatma Gandhi was viewed as a man of peace and non-violence, and

Jinnah was perceived as a Muslim politician who was determined to break up
Bri tish India for the sake of fulfilling his ambition of becoming head of

6. This is the thrust of a Soviet view of the creation of Pakistan, see: Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R.
Gordon Polonskaya, AHistory of Pakistan: 1947-1958, (Lahore, People's Publishing House, n.d.), pp.8Sff.
 355

state of a Muslim country. These two simplistic interpretations of what

these two statesmen believed in, for which the departing British
administrators were largely responsible in view of the Lord Mountbatten's
less that impartial approach to the Muslim-Hindu differences, has
continued to influence the West's perceptions of Pakistan and India. 7

Therefore, as a consequence of the international community's

diplomatic decisions and 'moral' judgements of the two antagonists, not
only did this enable "India to exploit the already existing conception of
itself as potentially one of the world's leading powers",8 but,
conversely, it essentially meant that Pakistan had to prove to the world
that it had a legitimate right to exist. It is therefore not surprising
that during the first few years of its existence "Pakistan could find no
single country which could be counted as an unfailing friend and ally
willing to lend aid and comfort in time of need". 9

The deep-seated distrust between the Hindus and Muslims did not end
with Partition, however; rather, this mutual hatred intensified in the
decade that followed independence, and, except for a few occasions when
there was a thaw in the relationship, has consolidated itself ever since.
There were several major events in the post-Partition period which
justified Pakistani suspicion of Indian intentions. First, apart from the
exchange of millions of Hindu and Muslim refugees and the massacres that
accompanied it,. events which did nothing to improve relations between the
two countries, there was the thorny question of the distribution of public

7. The West's negative perception of Jinnah and the Huslil league continues to be reinforced with
such productions as the pro-Indian Oscar-winning fill Gandhi.
S. S.H. Burke, "The Hanage.ent of Pakistan's Foreign .Policy", in l. Ziring et al. (eds.), Pakistan:
The long View, (Durhal, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977), p. 347.
9. Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, (NY:Institute of Pacific·Relations,
1957), p. 303.
 356

assets. Undoubtedly, the most important of these was the division of the
former British Indian Army. Whereas dividing up the manpower along
religious lines was a relatively easy task, the distribution of fixed
assets was quite another matter. According to an agreed quota set by the
Partition Council, all assets were to be divided between India and
Pakistan on the basis of 64% for the former and 36% for the latter. The
problem, however, was that the bulk of stores, depots, ordnance factories
and training institutions were located in India, and this required their
dismantling and transfer to Pakistan. It soon became obvious that the
Indians were not interested in meeting their obligations. As Field
Marshal Auchinleck, former Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian Army,
reported to the British government, "the present India Cabinet are
implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the
establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis" .10
Consequently, under pressure from. the Indians and with the tacit approval
of Lord Mountbatten, Governor-General of India, Auchinleck accepted the
abolition of the Supreme Command on 30 November 1947, six months earlier
than originally agreed to. Thus, with the departure of Auchinleck
Pakistan's worst fears became reality: India was no longer under any

pressure to fulfil its part of the bargain and, as expected, Pakistan only
received a fraction of its legitimate share of military assets. l l While
the equitable division of Army assets was never realized, India did
however give Pakistan its share of the cash balance of undivided India,
but only after its attempt to link the distribution of these financial
assets with the resolution of the Kashmir problem had failed. 12

10. John ,Connell, Auchinleck, (London: Cassell, 1959), p. 921, cited in S.H. Burke, Pakistan's
Foreign Policy: An Historical AnalYsis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 10.
11. For a detailed account of what Pakistan was due and what it actually received, see:
Major-General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Ar.y, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963),
pp. 21-40. '.
12. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 13.
 357

A second area of confrontation between the two countries arose after

India's unilateral decision to stop the flow of the rivers crossing into

Pakistan. This action, which was taken even though the Indian government
had promised it would not interfere with the natural flow of irrigation
water,13 was a direct threat to West Pakistan's agricultural sector. It
was only after a Pakistani delegation'travelled to India, and refuted
India's assertion that Pakistan had no right to the water flowing through
India, that a temporary settlement was agreed upon between the two
parties. 14 However, it was only in September 1960, when President Ayub
Khan and Prime Minister Nehru signed the Indus Waters Treaty, that this
potentially life-threatenening issue for Pakistan was finally resolved.

A third area of conflict involved the status of the four princely

states of Junagadh, Hyderabad, Johpur and Kashmir whose accession to one
of the two dominions had yet to be- determined at the time of Partition.
Except for Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim state ruled by a Hindu
maharajah, the three other states were essentially composed of Hindus
under the control of Muslim rulers. Soon after Partition, the Maharajah
of Junagadh offered to accede to Pakistan, a proposal Jinnah accepted on 5
September 1947, but which India rejected outright. In strictly legal
terms, the Governor-General of India was correct when he indicated that
"this action ••• is in utter violation of principles on which Partition was
agreed upon, ••• for the principle of Partition stipulated "that contiguous

, Muslim majority areas should be separated from contiguous non-Muslim areas

to form the two Dominions" .15 With the aim of resolving' the issue as
C

quickly as possible, the Indian government first imposed an economic

blockade around Junagadh which was soon followed by the Indian Army's

13. Chaudhri Huhal.ad Ali, The Elergence of Pakistan, (Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, 1973),
p. 320.
14. Ibid., p. 321.
15. Ibid., pp. 276-277.
 358

invasion of the state. Once in control, India held a referendum under its
onw supervision; not surprisingly, the majority favoured integration with
India.

A similar course of events was repeated in the case of Hyderabad,

where the Maharajah demanded either full Dominion status or integration
with Pakistan. The Pakistan authorities felt quite strongly about the
future of that state because not only was Hyderabad closely associated
with the past glory of the Moghul Empire, but, more importantly, the
Maharajah had donated millions of rupees to Pakistan to help it through
the first few months of independence. ls However, since the state was
landlocked within India, the Maharajah's case was rather hopeless, a
situation which the Indians did not fail to appreciate. Accordingly, the
Indian government followed the same tactics as with Junagadh, and on 13
September 1948, one day after the ~eath of Jinnah, Indian troops took
control of the state. Finally, the case of Jodhpur was resolved rather
quickly; for after Mountbatten warned the Maharajah that his desire to
accede to Pakistan would be in violation of the principles of Partition,
the Maharajah decided to integrate his state into India.

Just as the cases of the three Hindu states were in terms of the
principles of Partition relatively straightforward, the case of Kashmir
should have also been an easy matter to resolve; since it was 70% Muslim
in composition and contiguous to Pakistan, it appeared obvious that
Kashmir would have to accede to Pakistan. However, events were to take a
different turn. By the time Partition came into effect, the Maharajah of
Kashmir, who was a Hindu, had yet to accede his state to one of the two
dominions. If this was not yet enough cause for dissatisfaction amongst

16. Interview, [Srig.(red.) HUltaz Alvie, Forler Albassador to China, Islalabad, October 1983.]
 359

Pakistanis, the fact that Mountbatten appeared to be following a

pro-Congress approach to the issue17 inflamed public opinion in
Pakistan. Accordingly, militant Pukhtun tribesmen from neighbouring NWFP,
angered by the massacre of Muslims in East Punjab and the Maharajah's
failure to accede to Pakistan, decided to go on a jihad to cliberate'
their Muslim brethren in Kashmir. Fearing that the tribesmen could
eventually capture Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, the Maharajah decided

to appeal to India for help. In order to avoid accusations of foreign

interference, India requested the ruler to first sign the Instrument of
Accession to India, which he did on 27 October 1947. Moreover, Nehru
repeatedly promised that a referendum would be held in Kashmir, under
international supervision, once peace was restored in the state. 18
However, by Spring 1948 Indian troops had launched an offensive in Kashmir
which directly threatened the frontier area of Pakistan. Consequently, in
a move aimed at pre-empting possib~e Indian attacks on Pakistan, the
Pakistan Army crossed into Kashmir in May 1948, and engaged Indian troops.
With the hope of containing the conflict two U.N. resolutions were passed
on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The first resolution directed that
all Pakistani troops and non-Kashmiri tribesmen withdraw from the state,
followed by the evacuation of Indian troops from Kashmir. The second
resolution spelled out the format of the referendum to be held once the
two parties had complied with the conditions of the first resolution.
Although on 27 July 1949 both governments agreed to a 470-mile long
-cease-fire line, the two U.N. resolutions produced irreconciliable
interpretations regarding the holding of the plebiscite. Moreover, India,
whose prestige abroad was high because of its non-aligned posture and its
seemingly stable political system, felt secure enough to be able to renege
on its previous promises of holding a referendum without fearing adverse

17. Chaudhri, op-: cit., p. 286.

18. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 27.
 360

consequences from the international community. It argued that, since

India had ratified the state's accession and that Kashmir now fell under
Indian jurisdiction, there was no reason why a referendum should be
held. 19 Finally, occupying two-thirds of Kashmir and having Soviet
support in the UN Security Council, India had no incentive to propose a
plebiscite to the Kashmiris. It is therefore not surprising that India's
double standards regarding the status of the princely states, its failure
to deliver Pakistan's share of Army material, and threatening statements

by Gandhi, such as
If Pakistan persistently refuses to see its proved
error, and continues to minimize it, the Indian
government would have to go to war against it,20

that Pakistan could not trust Indian designs.

A second external problem Pakistan had to deal with was Afghanistan.

The main point of contention between the two countries concerned the
validity of the Durand Line, the official border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan which was established in 1893. 21 Afghanistan had always
questioned the legitimacy of the Durand Line, arguing that it had been
forced into the bo~der agreement under British duress. However, following
Britain's withdrawal from India, Afghanistan went a step further,
contending that this border de-limitation had become invalid. Pakistan,
on the other hand, argued that as successor to Britain it had inherited
all rights and obligations from its former colonial ruler. To complicate
matters, Afghanistan was also promoting the idea of an independent
Pukhtunistan which would comprise Pakistan's NWFP and parts of
Ba1uchistan~22 The fact that this scheme was ostensibly meant to be a

19. W. Norman Brown, The United States and India. Pakistan. Bangladesh, (Harvard University Press,
1972), p. 196.
20. Cited in Alan Campbell-Johnson, Hission with Hountbatten, (London: Robert Hale, 1951), p. 206.
21. For an histQrical discussion about the origins of the Durand Line, see: Alastair La.b, Asian
Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem, (Melbourne: F.N. Cheschire, 1968), pp. 86-93.
22. Nader Entessar, ·Baluchi Nationalism·, Asian Affairs, Vol. 7, No.2, Nov/Dec. 1979, pp.95-104.
 361

homeland for the Pukhtuns but failed to include the Pukhtuns of

Afghanistan, while at the same time it took in the Baluch, an ethnic group
known to have serious differences with the Pukhtuns, raised serious doubts
as to what were Afghanistan's real motives in vrom~tin~ such a scheme.

Pakistan's sensitivity to the whole issue was understandable, for it

had domestic ramifications which had the potential to threaten the
integrity of the country. As previously examined, Congress-supported Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, leader of the Khudai Khidmatgars, had been an ardent
advocate of the establishment of Pukhtunistan, and had boycotted the
referendum which offered the Pukhtuns the choice of either joining
Pakistan or India. Moreover, Dr. Khan Sahib, the Congress Party Chief
Minister of NWFP, had also been a supporter of the idea of having the
Frontier province join India. The fact that both these men had the full
support of the Indian government merely confirmed Pakistan's fears that
India had never entirely accepted the idea of an independent Muslim
homeland; and, if given the opportunity, it would attempt to dismantle
Pakistan.

Feeling threatened by India and Afghanistan,23 Pakistan turned to

the Muslim community for support, naively believing that its "Two-Nation
Theory", i.e., the concept of a Muslim nation, was a principle which could
lead to the unification of all Muslim countries irrespective of their
national interests. This idealism was summed up in one of Prime Minister
Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches when he stated:
Pakistan has one and only one ambition - to serve Islam
and humanity ••• We all belong to the great brotherhood
of Islam. Islam alone can solve some of the problems
facing the world today.24

23. Afghanistan-was the only country that voted· against Pakistan's adlission into the UN.
24. Dawn, 26 November 1949, cited in Sisis Gupta, "Isla. as a Factor in Pakistan's Foreign Policy·,
in D.E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and Religion, (Princeton University Press, 1966), p.436.
 362

In the period between 1949 and 1954 Pakistan sponsored three series of
non-governmental conferences25 all aimed at establishing a commonwealth
of Islamic countries under the leadership of Pakistan, the largest Muslim
nation in the area. Not surprisingly, Pakistan's belief that ttas the

leader of the Muslim world stretching from Pakistan to Egypt, she could be
a great power",26 was not well received amongst other Muslim countries,
especially Egypt which felt that Pakistan's scheme was an attempt to
undermine the Arab League. 27

Thus, Pakistan's attempt to project its own Muslim ideal into the

international arena was not only a failure, but it also shattered the
Pakistani leaders' belief in Muslim solidarity; and, as it would be
further demonstrated in later years, it proved that national pride and
power politics always superseded any feelings of religious sentimentality.

The high pitch of pan-Islamism was directly linked with the Muslim
League's fortunes at home; and, accordingly, in 1954, after the dismissal
of the Nazimuddin Cabinet by the governor-general and the massive defeat
of the Muslim League in the provincial elections of East Pakistan, two
events which facilitated the rise of military and bureaucratic influence
in the political sphere, enthusiasm for the establishment of an Islamistan
quickly faded away.28

Having been rebutted by the Muslim community, feeling threatened by

India and Afghanistan, and perceiving the security problems of a

geographical1y divided country, Pakistan had no other option but to turn

25. The Huslia World Conference (1949 and 1951), the International Islaaic Econoaic Conference (1949
and 1954), and the Huslil People's Organization (1952). .
26. D.P. Singhal, Pakistan, (Englewoods Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 146.
27. Ibid. _
28. Gupta, op. cit., pp. 438-439.
 363

to the United States for support.

With the demise of the Muslim League and the commensurate rise in
importance of the staunchly pro-Western bureaucratic and military
elite,29 Pakistan became favourably inclined to accept membership in a
number of regional security organizations, and to participate in the
United States' "containment" strategy. Accordingly, in February 1954,
after having negotiated with the US administration for the supply of
desperately needed arms, negotiations in which Commander-in-Chief of the
Army General Ayub Khan, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed and Interior
Minister Major-General Iskander Mirza were the chief participants,30

Pakistan was given American military aid under the US Military Security
Act. This was formalized in May 1954 with the Mutual Defence Assistance
Agreement under which the u.s. agreed to train and equip the Pakistan
armed forces. 31 This was closely followed in September 1954 with
Pakistan's decision to join the Manila Pact (known as South-East Asian
Treaty Organization (SEATO) as of 1954).32 However, as opposed to the

bilateral agreements for which the Pakistani leaders were most

enthusiastic, Ayub Khan and his colleagues were not the least interested
in joining a regional organization which committed Pakistan to an area
which they felt did not directly concern the country's security
interests. Nevertheless, the foreign minister, Sir Zafrullah Khan, who
knew his cabinet position was at an end because of the violent
anti-Abmadiyah riots, decided to ignore his government's disapproval of
participating in this organization, and signed the Manila Pact
29. The IIOSt. important lIellbers of the sllall group of len who squarely aligned Pakistan with the US
were: Governor-General Ghulall Mohallllad, Foreign Minister Sir Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Secretary Sir
Mohaillad Ikrallullah, Defence Secretary Major-General Iskander Mirza, and COlllander-in-Chief of the Arty,
General Ayub Khan.
30. G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,and the Major Powers, (NY:The Free Press,1975) , p.85
31. For the conditions attached to this agreellent, see: Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy,·p. 165.
32. Apart froll Pakistan and the US, SEATO also included: the UK, France, Australia, New Zealand,
Thailand and the Philippines.
 364

anyhow. 33 Sir Zafrullah argued that, apart from having been pressured
by Secretary of State Dulles to sign the agreement,34 he committed his
country to SEATO in order to ensure the continuation of US military and
economic aid. Consequently, faced with a fait accompli, and not wishing
to fall in disfavour with the Americans, the Pakistan government had no
other option but to ratify the agreement. 35

Finally, in February 1955 Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact (later
to be called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)) .36 As opposed to

SEATO, CENTO appealed to the Pakistani leaders for they felt that this
organization fulfilled their earlier objectives of having close relations
with other Muslim countries,37 even though Iraq, Iran and Turkey had
vastly different Islamic sentiments to the ones existing in Pakistan.

The 1950s being the Cold War era, Pakistan ostensibly participated in

these organizations and accepted US military ties in order to contain

Communism, but in reality Pakistan agreed to come under the US umbrella
solely with the objective of countering the Indian threat; and, although
all these pacts quite clearly stipulated that the collective self-defence
arrangements did not cover non-Communist aggression, the Pakistan
government still believed it was in the country's best interest to be a
party to these pacts, for even if the other countries did not support

Pakistan in its opposition to India at least it was recipient of vast

amounts of military and economic aid. Notwithstanding the material

advantages of these links, Pakistan's close association wi th Western

powers adversely affected its relations with the Muslim countries and
33. Choudhury, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
34. Interview, [A former Ambassador to several Western countries, Rawalpindi, October 1983.]
35. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 168.
36. Hembers of lhe Pact were: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq (until 1958) and the UK. The US was only
an associated ·.ember.
37. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 170.
 365

India, as well as its national integration process.

While the Muslim countries, especially Nasser's Egypt, accused

Pakistan of having joined an imperialist pact,38 and India used
Pakistan's links with the West as an excuse to repudiate the Nehru-Bogra
Agreement aimed at settling the Kashmir issue through peaceful means,
within Pakistan disapproval of these pacts was taking an increasingly East
Wing-West Wing configuration. In West Pakistan, except for a few radical
politicians, there was widespread support for the security links with the
West. On the other hand, in East Pakistan, especially amongst the Awami
Leaguers, Hindus and leftists, membership in these pacts was opposed not
so much on the basis of their foreign policy repercussions as on the
effect this would have on the country's internal developments, their major
criticism being that since the Pakistan armed forces were so
overwhelmingly West Pakistani in composition military aid would only
benefit West Pakistan. 39 Moreover, given that the bureaucracy was

controlled by Punjabis and muha.iirs, most of the economic assistance would

undoubtedly be channelled to development projects in West Pakistan, and
thus increase the disparity between the two wings. 4o

Opposition to the pacts intensified quite dramatically with the events

leading to the 1956 Suez crisis. Being a member of the Baghdad Pact in
which the Britain was a major partner, placed Pakistan in an akward
position, for it had to choose between-either supporting Britain or
backing Egypt, a co-Muslim country. In view of Nasser's previous attacks

against Pakistan, President Mirza decided to support Britain, stating that

38. Ibid., pp. 201-204.
39. N.H. Nriggins, ·The Balancing Process in Pakistan's Foreign Policy·, in L. Ziring et al. (eds.),
op. cit., pp. 315-316.
40. For an extensive coverage of the heated debate on this issue in the National Asselbly, see:
The Pakistan Tiles, 23-Harch 1956.
 366

Pakistan cannot live in isolation. The phrase dynamic

neutrality means nothing. The membership of SEATO and
Baghdad Pact was in fulfilment of Pakistan's desire to
help in a practical way in the maintenance of world
peace. Big Muslim countries like Turkey, Iraq, and
Iran are members of the Baghdad Pact and it cannot,
therefore, be said that the Pact is in any way directed
against the interests of the Middle East or
Muslims. 41
The government's stance, however, clashed with the views of the
general public which felt Pakistan was betraying its Muslim brothers. 42
There was such an outrage after the Anglo-French-Israeli attack against
Egypt that opponents to the government were able to organize a mass rally
in Lahore, the largest ever held since Partition, demanding that Pakistan
leave the Baghdad Pact and the Commonwealth.43 Only after the US
criticized the British and French actions did Prime Minister Suhrawardy
radically modify his government's position, describing the events in Egypt
as constituting a threat to the entire Muslim world. 44 However, it was
obvious this was only rhetoric aimed at placating public opinion, for he
refused to withdraw the country from the Baghdad Pact, stressing that in
view of "Pakistan's economic conditions and its being India's neighbour,
it was necessary for Pakistan to enter into alliances with friendly
countries··. 45

Therefore, as a consequence of Pakistan's close ties with the West the

process of national integration was adversely affected; for not only did
membership in the alliances exacerbate the latent tension between the two
wings, but issues which appeared to threaten the Muslim world compounded
the vertical cleavage between the Westernized elite and the majority of
the pOPulati'~n. However, discontent with the Western alliances did not
41. The Pakistan Tiles, 7 October 1956.
42. The Pakistan Tiles, (Editorial), 23 Septelber 1956.
43. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign PolicY, p.' 186.
44. The Pakistan Tiles, 4 Novelber 1956.
45. The Pakistan Tiles, 10 Decelber 1956.
 367

limit itself to the general population, but increasingly it characterized

the way the foreign policy makers viewed their relationship with the
United States.

Although Pakistan received substantial amount of American military aid

between 1954 and 1956, from 1957 onwards, however, the "ratio of u.s. aid
to India and Pakistan was greatly altered to the advantage of India".46
This stark reality brought home several important points: first, that
membership in Western alliances did not favour Pakistan over India as they

expected it would; instead, it demonstrated to the Pakistani leadership

that Western links had actually been counter-productive in their drive to
improve their sense of security vis-a-vis India. Secondly, their hopes
for Western support in their diplomatic battle to have the Kashmir issue
settled in their favour had not materialized; while, on the other hand,
the.Soviet Union had openly declared that Kashmir rightfully belonged to
India. Thirdly, although the armed forces' share of the budget had
decreased over the years, membership in CENTO and SEATO had not brought
about a substantial decrease in capital spent on defence. 47 Finally, by
joining CENTO, which Pakistan's leaders believed would strengthen its
Muslim ties, Pakistan ended up isolating itself from mainstream Muslim
thinking; for under the leadership of Nasser the main concern of Islamic
countries was not the crusade against Communism but rather the struggle
against colonialism. This fact alone endeared India in the eyes of the
Arab League and destroyed Pakistan's credibility as a reliable Muslim
country, a point Nasser made abundantly clear when he stated that the

46. Burke" Pakistan's Foreign Policy, pp. 255-257. In 1956 Pakistan received $162.5 lillian and
India $92.8 lillian. However, by 1957, India was getting $364.8 lillian, cOlpared to Pakistan's $170.7
lillian.
47. The governlent still spent on average 60% of its total expenditure on defence. For a yearly
account of defence speQding, see: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, (Lahore,
Progressive Publishers, 1976, 2nd. ed.), p. 56.
 368

"Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India". 48 Pakistan's failure

to have Egypt sympathize with its interests was not only due to its
membership in Western military pacts, but also as a result of India's

successful strategy of developing close relationships with 'radical' Arab

states to counter Pakistan's own objective of wooing Muslim states to its
side in the on-going Indo-Pakistani enmity.49 Considering all these
misgivings the Pakistani leaders were having about their affiliation with
the West, it is not surprising that in March 1958 Prime Minister Malik
Feroz Khan Noon criticized the Western allies' "lack of sympathy and
understanding of Pakistan's difficulties", adding "if the people of
Pakistan found their freedom in jeopardy, they would break all the pacts
and would go and shake hands with those they made their enemies for the
sake of others" .50

A direct consequence of Pakistan's real or perceived threats from

India and Afghanistan, coupled with the fact that its two wings were
separated from one another by over 1000 kilometres of hostile Indian
territory, was the implementation of a highly centralized system of
government. This process of centralization began quite innocuously with
the need for the federal government to control and manage the influx of
millin~~ vf refugees, inevitably leading to central government

interference into provincial matters, and this continued unabated with the
federal cabinet's decision to implement the One-Unit Plan which merged all
four West Pakistani provinces into one province. Apart from facilitating
control over a heterogeneous western wing which had the potential of being
exploited by Pakistan's neighbours, the One-Unit Plan was also a means to
48. Cited 'in G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India: 1947-1966, (London, Pall Hall Press,
1963), p. 245.
49. Leo E. Rose, ·South Asia and the Outside World·, in A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton (eds.), The States
of South Asia: Problels of National Integration, (Delhi, Vikas, 1982), p. 325.
50. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 93.
 369

counter-balance the majority province of East Bengal. The fact that a

significant minority of East Pakistan's population was Hindu, always
suspected of being India's fifth column, made the federal authorities feel
quite uneasy. This doubt about the loyalty of East Pakistanis led to
repeated central intervention into strictly East Bengali affairs.

The Pakistani leaders' partiality for a centralization approach to

politics was reinforced with the influence of the armed forces' in the
political affairs of the country, a situation which had existed virtually
since independence. However, it was following Pakistan's decision to
enter into an alliance with the US that the military substantially
increased its involvement in the national policy-making arena; for with
the large influx of military aid the armed forces increased their share of
the national budget, thus strengthening their position vis-a-vis the
civilians. And, since the generals favoured a centralization strategy for
meeting the twin demands of state-building and the defence of the
country's integrity, this gave added impetus to the politicians'
proclivity for a centralized approach to politics.

in light of the military's increased domestic influence and its strong

support for the pacts with the west, and the American policy-makers'
generally held belief that in Third World countries the armed forces were
the only organized national institution capable of dealing with internal
instability, it is not surprising that the Pakistani public believed the

Americans to have had prior knowledge of the 1958 coup d'etat. And this
perception that the US had been instrumental in the military take-over was
certainly reinforced when General Ayub, after toppling President Mirza,
. tersely stated: "I only recognize one embassy: the U.S. one".51

51. Interview, [A retired Chief Harshal, Islalabad, October 1983.]

 370

THE AYUB KHAN PERIOD: 1958-1969

In his political autobiography, President Ayub Khan indicated that

"the principal objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy are security and
development".52 Accordingly, as one of the main architects of

Pakistan's alliance with the West, Ayub Khan was determined to rejuvenate
his country's military links with the US, for he felt that it was only
through close cooperation with the Americans that Pakistan would be able
to meet its twin foreign policy objectives. Thus, in order to reverse the
anti -American feelings which had been growing before he took over, Ayub
Khan agreed to sign in 1959 the Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation with
the United States, an agreement which basically stated that the US would
protect Pakistan against any aggression. 53 Since it did not stipulate
that the aggression had to be of a Communist nature, Pakistan assumed that
this accord, as opposed to the previous arrangements with the US,
automatically insured American assistance in case of an Indian attack.
However, this was not to be the case, Nehru having obtained an American
assurance that this agreement would not be used against India. 54

Even with this lack of full-fledged US support for Pakistan's regional

concerns, Ayub persisted with the alliance, for he felt there was no other
power which had the potential to assist Pakistan with its development and
security needs. This almost blind belief in US protection started to
change, however, after the May 1960 U-2 incident in which an American spy

plane that had taken off from Peshawar was shot down over the Soviet
Union.

52. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Hasters, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 114.
53. For the text of Art. 1 of the agree.ent, see: Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 195.
54. Ayub, op. cil. p. 130.
I
 371

The Soviet Union's reaction to this incident was bound to worry

Pakistan, especially after Khrushchev declared that "Peshawar had now been
marked on a map and a ring made around it by Soviet defence forces". He
further added that "in the future if Peshawar was used as a base for
action against the Soviet Union then immediate retaliatory measures would
be taken" .55 The most important aspect of this affair in relation to
the US-Pakistan alliance was the Americans' failure to tell the Pakistani
authorities of these secret spy flights. Ayub's displeasure with his
ally's blatant disregard of the consequences these flights could have for
Pakistan's security was spelled out when he stated that "we were clearly
at fault, but the whole thing has been as much a shock to us as it was to
the Soviet Union" .56 Ayub was willing to have his country "shoulder her
responsibility as a SEATO member" ,57 but in return he rightfully
expected that "America will not do anything which might imperil our
security or increase our military commitments" .58 This military quid
pro quo Ayub iterated on several occasions during his Washington trip in
July 1961, and even went as far as to say that Pakistan was re-examining

its membership in SEATO and CENTO.59 However, by then US-Pakistan

relations were already rapidly deteriorating following Ayub's decision to
sign an oil agreement with the USSR, an arrangement which led to a
reduction of American aid previously earmarked for Pakistan's Second
Five-Year Plan. 60 Nevertheless, for fear of pushing Pakistan into the
arms of the Soviet Union, Kennedy not only assured Ayub that India would
only receive military aid in case the security of the sub-continent was
threatened, but he also promised the Pakistani president that if India

55. Dawn, ll.May 1960.

56. Ayub, np. cit., p. 171.
57. Dawn, 15 December 1960.
58. Moha.lad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, (Governlent of Pakistan), Yolo IY, 1961, p. 5.
59. Dawn, 7 July 1961.
60. H. Feldlan, Frol Crisis to Crisis. Pakistan. 1962-1969, (london, Oxford University Press, 1972),
p. 111.
 372

were to receive such aid Pakistan would be consulted in advance. 6l

These solemn pledges were soon to be broken following the outbreak of the
1962 Sino-Indian border conflict.62

Although the war itself was relatively short, its repercussions were
to have far-reaching consequences for· the countries of the region and
great power interaction on the sub-continent. China's decisive victory
over the Indian Army not only confirmed its status as a major Asian nation
to be reckoned with but, as far as the Americans were concerned, it also
validated their perception of Communism as being the major threat to
regional stability, if not world peace. Accordingly, in an attempt to
prevent any further Chinese drive southward, the US and the UK agreed to
an Indian request for military aid. 63 This decision by the Western
powers to assist India in strengthening its military power was a major
turning point in Pakistan's foreign policy formulation.

As far as Ayub was concerned, American and British reassurances that

the arms supplied to India would only be used against the Chinese, and if
they were used against Pakistan the US would "thwart such aggression",64
were of little value; for the bottom line was that Pakistan's major allies
had assisted in re-arming India, a country which not only professed to be
non-aligned but which was virulently opposed to Pakistan's security links
with the West. Moreover, not only had the US rescinded on its promise to
first consult Pakistan before giving military aid to India,65 but it had

61. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh ... , p. 105.

62. For a detailed account of this border war, see: Neville Maxwell, India's China War, NY: Anchor
Books, 1972.
63. President Kennedy and Prime Minister Hacmillan agreed to send $120 million worth of 'emergency'
military aid to India. By Septelber 1965 US economic aid to India amounted to $6 billion, co.pared to
Pakistan's $3 billion. As for military aid, Pakistan had by 1965 received about $1.5 billion worth of
weapons and India $84.5 .illion. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, pp. 277-278.
64. State Depart~ent Release, 17 Nove.ber 1962, cited in Ayub, Friends not Hasters, p. 148.
65. Ibid., p. 145.
 373

failed to link the delivery of arms with a permanent and acceptable

resolution of the Kashmir problem; instead, Kennedy suggested to Ayub that
he reassure Nehru that Pakistan would not exploit India's present
vulnerability to resolve the Kashmir issue by force of arms. 66

Confronted with a situation in which the US had at best only a

lukewarm interest in Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India, Ayub's
government began to look elsewhere for international support. Ayub's
decision to end Pakistan's past reliance on essentially one country for
its security was also a means for him to send a clear message To
Washington that Pakistan was becoming increasingly disenchanted with
America's poor treatment of its loyal ally and its lack of support for
Pakistan's stance on Kashmir. Even Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra,
traditionally a staunch advocate of US ties, declared that "there could be
no eternal friends nor could there be eternal enemies; the only thing
eternal was national interest".67 Thus, with the dual objective of
placating the opposition's criticism of Pakistan's lack of independent
foreign policy68 and increasing Pakistan's security by diversifying its
external links, Ayub decided to pursue a policy of "Bilateralism"; that
is, having Pakistan "establish normal relations with the three major
powers involved in Asia without antagonizing any of them".69

While Pakistan's decision to initiate a rapprochement with China

introduced a major new element in inter-state relations on the
sub-continent, the fact that this re-alignment took place under Ayub was
even more su~prising; since in 1959, following China's decision to absorb
Tibet by force, Ayub had indicated that the major threat to the

66. Ibid., p. 141.

67. National Assembly Debates, 22 Nov. 1962, as cited in Burke, Pakistan's Foreign PolicYi p. 288.
68. Feldlan, op.-cit., p. 87.
69. Ayub, Friends not Hasters, p. 118. These three powers were: the US, the USSR and the PRe.
 374

sub-continent would come from China. 7o His genuine fear of a Communist

threat even led him to suggest to Nehru that their two countries enter
into a joint defence arrangement in order to more effectively counter the
common Communist danger. However, it is difficult to imagine that Ayub
genuinely believed India would accept such an offer, since it had signed
with the PRC the 1954 Tibet Agreement on the basis of the doctrine of
Panchsheel, that is, respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence. 71 Therefore, not surprisingly, Nehru rejected Ayub's
proposal by asking: "I do not understand against whom people talk about
common defence policies ••• ".72 However, this Indian attitude did not
prevent the outbreak of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, nor the subsequent
Sino-Pakistan rapprochement.

C
Even with this less than friendly attitude toward China, coupled with
Pakistan's membership in the anti-Communist alliances, China never
appeared to have any hostile designs against Pakistan. This could be
attributed to the fact that while it was critical of SEATO, it understood
Pakistan's need to fulfil its security requirements. However, more
importantly, China appreciated Pakistan's refusal to blindly endorse
America's policy vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China (PRe); for even
during the height of the Cold War era, Prime Minister Suhrawardy stated:
I seek the friendship of China. I feel perfectly
certain that when the crucial time comes, China will
come to our assistance. 73

70. Dawn, 19 June 1960.

71. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 157.
72. Ayub, Friends not Hasters, p. 127.
73. Gupta, op. cit., p. 433.
 375

In return for Pakistan's early recognition of the new Communist

government in Peking and its support for the PRe's membership in the
United Nations, at least until 1955 when it was forced to reverse its
stand due to US pressure, the Chinese leadership refused to recognize the
accession of Kashmir to India, advocating a resolution of the problem
through direct bilateral talks. 74 Ayub removed the major obstacle to a
full-fledged rapprochement when he decided to slowly disengage Pakistan
from SEATO and CENTO.75 Accordingly, within a nine-month period
(January-September 1963) the two countries reached an agreement on the
de-limitation of their common border,76 signed trade and barter
agreements, and concluded an air transport agreement. Moreover,
Pakistan's decision to once again support the seating of the PRe in the UN
led to China's decision to back Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite in
Kashmir. Chou En-Lai even went as far as to declare that his country
"would defend Pakistan throughout the world".77 Thus, by the time the

1965 Indo-Pakistan War erupted, Pakistani-Chinese relations were well

established, not on the basis of friendship, but rather because both

countries' national interests coincided.

While this Pakistani and Chinese convergence of interests had been

developing over several years, it was in the aftermath of the 1962
Sino-Indian War that their relationship strengthened. Although for
different reasons, both countries strongly disapproved of the increased

American and Soviet military aid to India during and after the 1962 border
clash. On the one hand, China correctly assessed this support for India
as an effort, by the US and the USSR to contain the PRe; and, on the other

74. Dawn, 25 December 1956, cited in Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 215.
75. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , pp. 176-177.
76. For the full text of the Pakistan-China Boundary Agreement (22 February 1963) see: K. Sarwar
Hasan (ed.), China. India. Pakistan, (Doculents of the Foreign Relations of Pakistan), (Karachi; Pakistan
Institute of International Affairs, 1966), pp. 377-383.
77. Dawn, 18 June 1963,·cited in Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 293.
 376

hand, Pakistan considered this development not only as an American

betrayal of its past assurances regarding the supply of weapons to India,

but it also viewed the delivery of weapons to India as strengthening

India's military position vis-a-vis Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan's

and China's peripheral positions on the sub-continent and their mutual

antagonism against India facilitated their rapprochement. Moreover, they

could each henefit from closer ties with one another. China was seen as

an alternative source of military and diplomatic support, and Pakistan was

a potential outlet for Chinese desire to improve relations with Asia and

the Muslim World. 78

Included in Ayub's "Bilateralism" was also a desire to improve

relations with the Soviet Union. However, according to Choudhury, it was

not Pakistan which initiated the thawing in Pakistan-USSR relations but

rather the Soviet Union; for it was in Moscow's interest to try to arrest

the Pakistan-PRe rapprochement as well as attempt to improve relations

between India and Pakistan. 79 However, relations were slow to improve;

and, because of the USSR's continued military and diplomatic support of

India, its endorsement of Afghanistan's demand for Pukhtunistan,80 and

its criticism of Pakistan's membership in Western alliance, the

relationship was to remain limited to "non-sensitive" areas: the two

countries only managed to reach a series of agreements in the fields of

trade, aid, aviation and culture.

Undoubtedly, the most important event in the improvement of relations

with the USSR was Ayub's trip to Moscow in April 1965, one month after his

Peking trip. While the welcome he received was not comparable to the one

7a. Interview, [Afzal Iqbal, former Ambassador, Rawalpindi, October 1983.]

79. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , pp. 35-36.
80. The Pakistan Times, 6 Harch 1960.
 377

he was given in China, he did not leave empty-handed. Apart from the

various agreements they signed, Ayub's greatest satisfaction was with the
Joint Communique which stated, inter alia:
••• resolute support for the peoples who are waging a
struggle for their national liberation and independence
and for the people who are fighting for the right to
. determine their future in accordance with their own
will. .• 81

As with any diplomatic document a country's interpretation will vary

according to how it best suits its interests; so that while Pakistan
viewed the Communique as relating to the Kashmiris, the Soviet Union could
easily apply these principles of self-determination to the Pukhtuns, since
an identical paragraph would be included in a Joint Communique at the end
of King Zahir's visit to MoSCOW. 82

Consequently, no rhetoric could alter the fact that the main stumbling
blocks to a fundamental improvement in Pakistan-USSR relations, including
the removal of mutually deep-seated suspicions, were: Pakistan's continued
membership in SEATO and CENTO, and the Soviet Union's public refusal to
accept Pakistani displeasure with the USSR's continued sale of arms to
India. Nevertheless, even if the two countries' interests did not

coincide, the fact that they had held a series of top-level meetings was
by itself a significant development; it proved to the Soviet Union that
not only did Pakistan wish to gradually disengage itself from total
reliance on the West for its security, but that it was also determined to
implement its policy of "Bilateralism" .83

As was t,o be expected, the United States viewed Pakistan's

rapprochement with China and the USSR with great displeasure. Within one

81. Cited in Feld.an, cp. cit., p. 107.

82. Ibid. _
83. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 44.
 378

week of the Pakistan-China aviation agreement Undersecretary of State

George Ball warned Ayub that any rapprochement wi th the PRe would "nullify
the sense of alliance between Pakistan and the US" ,84 and as a warning
in case the Pakistani leadership had any plans to enter into a military
alliance with China, the U.S. decided to cancel credit for the improvement
of Dacca airport. Nevertheless, not wishing to alienate Pakistan, the US
gave an unequivocal reassurance that if India violated Pakistan's
international border it would constitute aggression and "there would be
immediate US response".85

These American promises, however, did little to dampen Pakistan's

desire to continue its policy of "Bilateralism", especially in the face of
continued US sale of weapons to India. Apparently, the United States
expected Pakistan to remain a staunch ally of the West while it persisted
in arming its avowed enemy. Relations were bound to deteriorate, for this
was a typical case of a clash between a small country's regional concerns
~d a superpower's global commitments; and the more the US put pressure on
Pakistan, such as President Johnson's decision to postpone Ayub's trip to
Washington and deferring the meeting of the "Aid to Pakistan Consortium",
the more it was determined to pursue its new foreign policy. Moreover,
having just won the 1965 presidential election and pleased with the
country's rate of economic development, Ayub felt sufficiently secure at
home to bluntly declare that "people in developing countries seek
assistance, but on the basis of mutual respect; they want-to have friends
not masters".86

84. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fuicrul of Asia, (NY: Pegasus, 1970), p. 185.
85. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 112.
86. Ayub, Friends not Hasters, p. 159.
 379

Thus, while Pakistan-American relations had reached their nadir by the

time the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War broke out, other external factors gave
Ayub an exaggerated sense of security. First, there was the newly
established Chinese link which had strengthened his hand domestically and
internationally. Not only did the Chinese praise Ayub's Basic
Democracies, comparing them with their own people's communes,87 but Chou
En-Lai had urged Ma~lana Bhashani, leader of the East Pakistani
(pro-Peking) National Awami Party, to support Ayub's bid for the
presidency. By agreeing to such a request, Bhashani divided the forces of

the left and increased Ayub's election fortunes in East Pakistan. 88 The
Chinese factor also resulted in Pakistan performing a volte face in
foreign policy, as the Joint Communique at the end of Ayub's trip to

Peking in March 1965 clearly indicated with statements such as the need to
"liquidate" imperialism and colonialism, opposition to the presence of US
forces in the Indian Ocean, and support for the PRC's admission into the
UN.89 . In return, the Chinese leaders promised Ayub that "if India
commits aggression into Pakistan territory, China would definitively
support Pakistan". 90 It was clear that Ayub had decided that China

would be a more reliable ally than the United States.

Secondly, India's December 1964 decision to move a step closer to

integrating Kashmir into the Indian union, a move which caused a popular
uproar amongst the local Muslim population of Kashmir, not only indicated
that Delhi was no longer interested in resolving the issue either through
negotiation or a plebiscite,91 but it also gave Ayub the impression that

given the right opportunity the Kashmiris would rise against the state

87. Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive?, (Penguin, 1983), p. 75.

8S. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
89. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh, p. 185.
90. Ibid., p. lSJ.
91. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, p. 286.
 380

government. Ayub felt that this internal weakness in Kashmir was

compounded by what he perceived to be an ineffective Indian Army. India's
defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the Pakistan Army's relatively good
performance in the brief Indo-Pakistani clash in the Rann of Kutch in
Spring 196592 had given him the impression that his army would be able
to stand up to India's military forces. Moreover, this perception was
shared by the Pakistani generals whose morale was at an all time high as a
result of continued high expenditure on military hardware. 93 This
widespread trust in the superiority of the Pakistan Army was reinforced by
the almost religious belief that a Muslim soldier is worth ten of his
Hindu counterparts.

Consequently, taking into account these external and internal factors,

including the knowledge that Kashmir was a highly emotional issue in West

Pakistan, Ayub decided that only armed confrontation would resolve the
Kashmir problem once and for allj since the only result of the many years
of negotiations was Kashmir's progressive integration into India.
Moreover, Ayub believed the confrontation could be limited to the Kashmir
theatre without the international border ever being violatedj94 and, if
India did cross it, then the Americans would be obliged to come to
Pakistan's assistance as stipulated in the 1959 bilateral agreement.
However, as subsequent events were to demonstrate, Ayub was wrong on

virtually everyone of these assessments.

92. The Rann of Kutch clash, which only lasted a few days, was the result of a territorial dispute
over a desolate and barren area straddling the Indo-Pakistani border. After the loss of a dozen len on
each side, both ~ountries agreed to a British offer to resolve the dispute through arbitration. Feldlan,
op. cit., pp. 133-137.
93. For a detailed exalination of defence spending, see: Rizvi, op. cit., p. 162.
94. Feldlan, op. cit., pp. 149-150. Ayub clearly differentiated between the Kashlir "line of
Delarcation" and the "International Boundary" between West Pakistan and India, the crossing of which he
considered aggression. --"riggins, "The Balancing Process in Pakistan's Foreign Policy", p. 325.
 381

The events that took place in Kashmir were not only confusing, but by
their very nature made it difficult to determine who was the aggressor.

Needless to say that each country accused the other of having started the
hostilities. What has been proven beyond any doubt, however, is that a

force of 20,000 Azad (free) Kashmiri armed men, which infiltrated into

Indian-held Kashmir on 5 August 1965,.were directly trained and armed by

the Pakistan Army.95 This resulted in Indian Army troops launching a

major offensive into Azad Kashmir on 30 August 1965. 96 Accusing India

of imperialism and colonialism, Ayub declared that

We are doing no more than what we have always pledged

to do, which is to support the people of Kashmir in
exercising their right of self-determination as pledged
to them by the United Nations, Pakistan, as well as
India. 97

Accordingly, on 1 September 1965, Ayub, believing that India would

never expand the conflict along the international border, decided to send

the Pakistan Army across the 1949 Cease-fire Line. 98 Within five days

India retaliated by crossing the Punjab border and launching a

three-pronged attack against Lahore. On 23 September, seventeen days

after the beginning of the latest hostilities, the two countries agreed to

a United-Nations cease-fire. 99

Undoubtedly, the Chinese were the most supportive of the Pakistani

position; for not only had they criticized the Indians for expanding the

hostilities into the Punjab, but on 16 September they delivered an

ultimatum to the Indians, giving them three days to dismantle all their

military works on the Chinese side of the Sikkim-Chinese boundary or else

"bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising

95. Feldman, op. cit., p. 141.

96. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 329.
97. Ayub, Speeches and Statements, Vol. VIII, 1965, p. 21.
93. G.W. Choudhury, The last Days of United Pakistan, (london: C. Hurst, 1974), pp. 20-21.
99. For a detailed account of the 1965 war by the then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Husa
Khan, see: Hy Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, lahore: Wajidalis, 1983.
 382

therefrom". 100 Whether this was a determining factor in India's

decision to accept a cease-fire is difficult to asseSSj however, the fact
of the matter is that China was the only country which had been willing to
commit troops to come to the assistance of Pakistan. 10l

On the other hand, the United States, instead of assisting Pakistan as

it was legally bound to do in case it was the victim of an aggression,
reacted by terminating all military aid to both Pakistan and India. It
justified its failure to meet its treaty commitment by stating that the
"US view is that the situation is somewhat confused and belligerence is
not justified on either side".102 The American ambassador to Pakistan
added that the conflict had to be "viewed in an overall content - that
immediate crisis began with a substantial infiltration of armed men from
the Pakistan side to the Indian part of Kashmir".103 Thus, in order to
avoid having to face the possibility of fighting alongside the Chinese
against the Indians, a prospect the Americans would certainly consider an
unacceptable turn of events, they, along with the Soviet Union, supported
a UN resolution calling on "all states to refrain from any action which
might aggravate the situation in the area".104 On the other hand, while

the USSR was following a neutral position in the diplomatic arena and
urging a cessation of hostilities for fear that it could weaken India's
position vis-a-vis China, it did not stop the shipment of weapons to India
during or after the 1965 war. Needless to say that the Americans' failure
to support their ally, compared to the Soviet Union's continued assistance

100. For the complete text of China's uitiiatul to India, see: "Notes Exchanged between the
government of the People's Republic of China and India, September 1965", in K. Sarwar Khan, op. cit, pp.
353-356.
101. Apa~t frol China, all Huslim countries, except Yemen, the UAR and Halaysia, supported
Pakistan. Iran and Turkey, both CENTO lelbers, sent arls and am.unition to Pakistan. Burke, Pakistan's
Foreign Policy, pp. 353-355.
102. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 120.
103. Ibid., p. 121.
104. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 340.
 383

to India, caused a great public outcry in Pakistan.

The United States' decision to treat equally India and Pakistan with
respect to the termination of military aid was a devastating blow for
Pakistan, since it waa virtually totally dependent on American weapons for
its defence. Accordingly, it seriously limited Pakistan's potential to
sustain a prolonged war. Therefore, taking into account these factors,
Ayub agreed to a cease-fire and accepted the Soviet Union's offer of
mediation.

The resulting Tashkent Agreement of January 1966 did not resolve the
basic cause of the conflict between the two countries; Ayub insisted that
peace could only come to the sub-continent once the Kashmir issue had
been peacefully resolved, and India stressed that Kashmir was not
negotiable. lOS The only tangible ,achievement of the agreement was the
withdrawal of troops back to the positions they held before 5 August 1965.
The end result of the agreement was that neither of the two major parties
obtained what they wanted; instead, the Soviet Union emerged from the
conference with enhanced prestige in the Afro-Asian world and "proved
itself a major factor in the power politics of South Asia".l 06

While the signing of the Tashkent Agreement may not have helped
Pakistan achieve its objectives, at least with regard to the Kashmir
issue, the post-Tashkent period did enable Pakistan to fully implement its
policy of "Bilateralism". Although the Chinese did not welcome the

Tashkent A~eement, seeing it as a "US-Soviet-Indian collusion against

China",107 relations with the Chinese continued to be strengthened. Not

105. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, p. 301.

106. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 352.
107. S.D. Huni, -'South Asia', in Hohammad Ayoob (ed.), Conflict and Intervention in the Third World,
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1980}, ~. 62.
 384

only in the fields of aid and trade was there an increase in Sino-Pakistan
interaction, but China became Pakistan's main supplier of arms. loa
However, toward the end of his rule, Ayub, sensing that Pakistan was once
again becoming over-reliant on one country, and fearing the loss of
continued US economic aid, decided that for reasons of national interest
it was best that Pakistan follow a more "balanced' approach in its
relations with the PRC.109

Similarly, relations with the Soviet Union improved quite

significantly. Economic assistance flowed into the country, trade
agreements were signed, and the USSR stopped supporting the Pukhtunistan

scheme. Moreover, following Ayub's decision to terminate the lease of the

American communication base near Peshawar in July 1968, the Soviet Union
agreed to sell arms to Pakistan. 110

Finally, as expected, relations with the US were never to be the same

again following the 1965 war. Nevertheless, economic aid did resume in
February 1966, albeit on a much more limited scale. As for the resumption
of military assistance to Pakistan and India, it was to be contingent upon
an improvement of bilateral relations between the two sub-continental
neighbours; meanwhile, only spare parts for previously supplied equipment
would be sold to the two countries. lll The foreign minister, Arshad
Husain, in a speech in June 1968, clearly spelled out Pakistan's

disaffected feelings about its alliance with the West.

With a change in the world situation these pacts have
lost a good deal of their importance. Our own
disenchantment with them was completed by the failure

108. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 193.

109. Feldlan, op. cit., pp. 116-117.
110. Burke, j)akistan's Foreign Policy, p. 365.
111. Ibid., p. 369.
 385

of some of our allies to assist at the time of Indian

aggression in September 1965 ... Our interest is
confined to their cultural and economic activities with
which there are some beneficial and useful projects.
If we are continuing our membership of the pact, it is
out of deference to the wishes of other members,
especially Iran and Turkey.112

In the field of foreign policy the post-Taskhent period may have been
beneficial to Ayub, but in the domestic arena the signing of the agreement
was the catalyst event which gave the opposition the political ammunition
it needed to force Ayub ultimately out of office. Whether Ayub's decision
to go to war with India was an attempt to deflect public opposition to his
regime, as Marxist analysts would claim,l13 is a moot point; for the
fact of the matter is that regardless of Ayub's motives the whole exercise
failed to achieve the desired objectives. Not only was Pakistan unable to
'liberate' Kashmir, but the Tashkent Agreement was perceived by the public
and sections of the armed forces as a 'sell-out' to India. It was this
perception, coupled with the United States' equal treatment of Pakistan

and India, which caused a major backlash against the government.

There is general agreement within Pakistan that the war itself was an

integrative event which united East and West Pakistan in their common
hatred of India. 114 However, it was in the period following the end of
the hostilities that discontent with the war and the Tashkent Agreement
emerged in both wings, albeit for different reasons.

In East Pakistan disaffection with the war quickly grew when the

Bengalis came to realize that their province had been left completely
isolated an~ defenceless in the face of a potential Indian attack. While
Ayub may have warned them about this lack of protection when he declared

112. The Pakistan Tiles, 29 June 1968, ci ted in Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh ... , pp.138-9.
Ill. Ali, op. cit., p. 74.
114. Interview, tDr. Rafiq Afzal, Dept. History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, October 1983]
 386

that East Pakistan could only be defended from West Pakistan,115 it was
of little comfort to them; it only strengthened their belief that the
Punjabi generals perceived East Pakistan as peripheral and expendable in
their overall strategic planning. Not only was the Pakistan Army not
fulfilling its national responsibility of defending all Pakistani
territory, but the fact that, according to Bhutto, East Pakistan had not
been attacked because of Chinese threats of intervention if India did
attack East Pakistan, did not appease them; rather it made them question
the raison d'~tre for their continued inclusion in Pakistan. 116

It is as result of this lack of protection and the perception that

West Pakistan cared little about the fate of the eastern wing of the
country that there were not only increasing demands within East Pakistan
for self-sufficiency in defence, but also the on-going demand for
provincial autonomy gained momemtum. Ironically, it is because the
initial motive for the war, i.e., the "liberation' of Kashmir, was of
little relevance to the Bengalis that Mujib's Awami League welcomed the
Tashkent Agreement. 117

As opposed to East Pakistan, where discontent centred around the

motives and conduct of the war, in West Pakistan disatisfaction was
focused on the aftermath of the war and the subsequent Tashkent accord.
The fundamental reason there was such widespread opposition to the
agreement resides in the fact that in West Pakistan Kashmir was, and still
is, an emotional issue. Moreover, resentment against Ayub turned into
anger when Bhutto, who had subsequently been dismissed as foreign minister
for opposing the agreement, accused Ayub of having sacrificed the national

115. Ayub, Speeches and Statements, Vol. V, 1962, p. 81.

116. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 338.
117. Feldlan, op. cit., pp. 159-160.
 387

honour which the soldiers had valiantly defended with their lives. 118
Bhutto not only continued his attacks against Ayub, but he threatened to
publicly divulge the "secret clauses" in the Tashkent Agreement. 119
These political tactics could not have been more successful than in the
Punjab where, as the main recruiting area for the armed forces, there was
overwhelming opposition to the agreement. This was reinforced by the
general belief that Pakistan had actually won the war, and that by going
to Tashkent Ayub had rendered the lost lives of brave soldiers
meaningless. 120 Furthermore, since this feeling of having been betrayed
was also present amongst some of the high-ranking officers, Ayub's promise
that the Kashmir issue would be resolved through the Tashkent Agreement
inevitably fell on deaf ears. Thus, the signing of the Tashkent Agreement
was a major turning point in Ayub's political life;121 it was only a

matter of time before he would be toppled by a disaffected army.

Undoubtedly, the single most important external factor which continued

to influence domestic politics under Ayub was India; and even with the
president's decision to first strengthen the country's links with the
West, subsequently followed by the application of "Bilateralism" as a
foreign policy framework, Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India did not
improve. Ayub's failure to alter the status guo in Kashmir was a decisive
factor in his downfall; for just as foreign policy "provides opportunities
for heading off domestic opposition to a regime",122 an ineffective
foreign policy decision can be the catalyst for the strenghtening of an
opposition movement. In this case, the domestic repercussions of the 1965
war reinforced the latent east-west cleavage which Ayub had been able to
/

118. Choudhury, The last Days of United Pakistan, pp. 31-32.

119. Ayub persistently denied the existence of these "secret clauses"; and, it they did exist,
Bhutto never revealed them, even after he became prime minister. Ibid., p. 32.
120. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 191.
121. Interview, TA former National Awali Party leader, Islamabad, January 19841
122. Good, 'State-Building as a Deterlinant of Foreign Policy in the New states', p. 9.
 388

control until then by means of a highly centralized and authoritarian

system of government. Thus, by the time Ayub was forced out of office in
1969, the external environment was just as hostile as when he took over
and the domestic situation had seriously deteriorated along East Wing-West
Wing lines, two factors which had the potential to threaten the integrity
of the country. Ironically, this is a situation which Ayub had warned
against but which he failed to resolve, for, as he wrote in his political
autobiography, "without complete unity the security of the country would
always remain vulnerable".123

THE YAHYA KHAN PERIOD: 1969-1971

It is ironic that, except for the successive civilian governments

which existed during the first ten years following independence, Yahya
Khan's regime was one of the most short lived government's in Pakistan's
political historyj but it was under his leadership that the external
environment had the greatest impact upon the national integration process

of the country. His decision to resort to force to re-establish

government writ in East Pakistan was, according to Burke, "a disastrous
error domestically and a foreign policy blunder of the first
magnitude"j124 because the East Pakistan crisis was one area where a
strictly domestic policy could not, and would not, be isolated from the
external environment. As will be examined, Yahya Khan's attempt to keep

East Pakistan within the country at all cost and India's long-term desire
to dismember Pakistan were two irreconciliable objectives. While the
Indian invasion was certainly an important external factor in the eventual
secession of the East Wing, India's objective of dismembering Pakistan
123. Ayub, Friends not Masters, p. 114.
124. Burke, "The Manageaent of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", p. 361.
 389

would not have succeeded if it had not been for the configuration of

internal forces, howerver; for, as previously examined, general Bengali

dissatisfaction with the central authorities' persistent rejection of

granting East Pakistan provincial autonomy had been present virtually

since independence.

Since Yahya's desperate attempt to halt East Pakistan's drive to

secede from Pakistan was of such vital importance to the country's

national integrity, all external influences not directly related to the

issue faded into insignificance. Accordingly, the analysis in this

section will be limited to the external forces which influenced the

ultimate outcome of the crisis. This examination will be divided into

three parts: the major outside participants', i.e., the US, the USSR and

the PRe, relations with Pakistan prior to the the government's decision to

crack down on the East Pakistanis on 25 March 1971; their responses to the

military action; and, their reactions to India's invasion of Pakistan.

During the first two years of Yahya's regime, the government paid

little attention to foreign policy matters. According to G.W. Choudhury,

Yahya's Minister for Communications, this was probably due to the junta's

"lack of understanding of international issues".125 Moreover, to make

matters worse, the government did not even have anyone officially

designated as foreign minister; either foreign matters were taken over by

Lieutenant-General Peerzada, Yahya's Principal Staff Officer, who had no

qualifications to handle such an important responsibility,126 or they

were directly dealt with by Yahya Khan himself. Eventually this lack of

interest for foreign affairs and the lacuna of qualified individuals in

that field would have dire consequences for the country's future.

125. Choudhury, lhe Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 119.

126. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 194.
 390

With the election of Nixon to the White House, US-Pakistan relations

improved. In August 1969 President Nixon paid an official visit to
Pakistan, during which he not only approved of Pakistan's China policy,
but, since Pakistan was the PRe's most important non-Communist outlet to
the outside world, he asked Yahya to act as courier between Washington and
Peking to examine the possibilities of direct talks between the two major
,
powers. Undoubtedly, Yahya's willingness to use his good offices to
accommodate America's request was an important factor in Nixon's decision
to lift, in October 1970, the embargo on sales of weapons to Pakistan.
While Nixon's ostensible reason for resuming the sale of arms was that the
withholding of military supplies had not brought peace to the
sub-continent,12~ the real reason was the United States' desire to
counter the USSR's massive shipment of arms to India. As one observer
correctly noted, it is ironic that it was Pakistan's close ties with the
PRC which led to a rejuvenation of the US-Pakistan alliance which
initially had been designed to contain China. 12s

As previously noted, relations with the PRC, following Pakistan's

participation in the Soviet-sponsored Tashkent talks and its rapprochement
with the USSR, were decisively less cordial than in the early days of the
newly established relationship. HoWever, once the Chinese leadership was
reassured that Pakistan would not be joining any Soviet regional system
aimed at countering China's foreign policy objectives and would continue

to adhere to Ayub's "Bilateralism", the relationship, especially after

Yahya became courier between the US and the PRC, was re-established as it
stood before/January 1966. Thus, with Yahya's unequivocal declaration
that "friendly relations with China were the cornerstone of Pakistani

127. Ibid., p. 2[2.

128. Ibid.
 391

policy",129 Pakistan easily secured $200 million worth of economic

assistance for its Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-1975) as well as military
aid. Similarly, trade between the two countries increased and China
agreed to sponsor various capital intensive projects. 130

Soviet-Pakistan relations, while still cordial under Yahya, in that

the USSR agreed to provide economic assistance for Pakistan's Five-Year

Plan, financial support for the construction of a steel mill in Karachi,
and expand trade with Pakistan, definitely deteriorated after Yahya
rejected the Soviet Union's "Constructive Co-operation" scheme involving
Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iran and the USSR. As with the previous
Asian Collective Security System proposal, Pakistan refused to partake in
such a plan on the grounds that it would be impossible to have any sort of
regional cooperation in which India was a member. Moreover, as this
Soviet scheme appeared to be anti-Chinese it was automatically
rejected. 131 As a result of this rebuttal the Soviet Union decided to

halt the shipment of arms to Pakistan. 132

In view of the international political alignments on the

sub-continent, "it was to be expected that the US and the PRe would
essentially support Yahya's actions in East Pakistan, albeit in qualified
terms, and the USSR and India would be highly critical of the Pakistan
Army's repression in its eastern wing. These two 'camps' were not equally
balanced, however; for Yahya's supporters were never as committed to the

defence of Pakistan's integrity as his detractors were determined to

dismember Pakistan. This was mainly due to the fact that "the struggle in

129. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 362.

130. Ibid., p. 363.
131. Ibid., pp. 366-367.
132. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 68.
 392

East Pakistan, being essentially a civil war, was not the kind of
confrontation in which outside powers would normally wish to take a direct
hand".133 Consequently, this attitude allowed India a free hand in

determining the political outcome of Pakistan's internal confrontation.

As soon as Yahya sent the army into East Pakistan the United States,
disapproving Islamabad's actions, stopped all shipment of military
supplies to Pakistan, a move reminiscent of its similar decision at the
outbreak of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. Although Nixon considered the
events in East Pakistan as an internal matter,134 he did plead with
Yahya to end the army's repression, emphasizing that "a lasting political
solution could be found only on the basis of some form of autonomy for
East Pakistan".135 At the same time as the us was urging the Pakistan

government to negotiate a settlement, Mr. A. Blood, the American Consul

General in Dacca, without prior consultation with Washington, was not only
having secret discussions with the Awami League leaders in exile, but he
was covertly giving them financial support as well. 136 These secret
American overtures were not only criticized in Pakistani government
circles as being blatant interference in the country's domestic affairs, a
criticism which had often been levelled at the us when it stressed the
need to increase development funds for East Pakistan,137 but, by
supporting Mujib as an alternative leader, the us was legitimizing the
Awami League's 6 Points and, consequently, undermining Yahya's own
position at home. Unfortunately, the damage had already been done by the
time the Consul General was recalled, for now Mujib, not aware of the
Americans' pro-Yahya stance, believed Blood's personal undertaking had

133. Ibid., p. 404.

134. The Pakistan Observer, 3 April 1971.
135. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 405.
136. Interview, [A former Pakistani Ambassador, Rawalpindi, October 1933.]
137. Choudhury, India. Pakistan, Bangladesh ... , p. 207.
 393

been sanctioned by Washington. 138 Nevertheless, it was as result of

direct US pressure upon Yahya that Mujib, who had been emprisoned in a
West Pakistani gaol, was saved from a summary execution, a line of action
which the hawkish generals and Bhutto were partial to. 139

Even though the PRC was not sympathetic to Mujib's Awami League,
viewing it not as a truly national liberation movement but rather as a
Soviet and Indian supported Cbourgeois' movement,140 the Chinese

leadership would not have been too displeased if the United States'
attempt to find a peaceful solution, through negotiation with the Awami
League, had succeeded, since it would have prevented India from striking a
military victory.141

China's favoured scenario, however, would have been to see the

ascendency of Bhashani's (pro-Peking) National Awami Party (NAP) at the
expense of Mujib's Awami League; but, as a result of the Pakistani
leaders' blunders, naivete and lack of understanding of the East Pakistani
political equation, this was not to happen. 142 Not realizing, or
failing to acknowledge the links Bhashani had with the PRe, General Ahsan,
Governor of East Pakistan, decided to severely crack down on the NAP
leaders, perceiving them to be the greatest threat to Pakistan's integrity
because of their Communist ideology. This had the dual effect of
facilitating the rise of the Awami League and annoying the Chinese
leaders. Undoubtedly, this must have been an important factor in China's
decision not to come to Pakistan's rescuej for by essentially eliminating
NAP, which was only advocating provincial autonomy, Pakistan had simply

133. Choudhury, The last Days of United Pakistan, p. 120.

139. Ibid., p. 196.
140. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 211.
141. Choudhury, The last Days of United Pakistan, p. 198.
142. Ibid.
 394

made it easier for the Awami League to monopolize the East Pakistan
political scene and attain its secessionist goal. Nevertheless, even with
this set-back in the domestic politics of East Pakistan, China, fearing
increasing Indian interference in the crisis, sent a highly supportive
message to Yahya, stating that
The Chinese government holds-that what is happening in
Pakistan is purely the internal affair of Pakistan
which can only be settled by the Pakistan people
themselves and which brooks no foreign intervention
whatsoever. Your excellency may rest assured that
should Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression
against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people
will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan government
and people in their just struggle to safequard state
sovereignty and national independence. 143

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, reacted quite differently to the
military operations, appealing to Yahya "to take most immediate measures
so as to put an end to bloodshed and repression against the population of
East Pakistan and take measures for a peaceful political settlement".144
Just as China supported Bhashani's NAP, the USSR was backing the Awami
League not only because it considered it the "vanguard of left-wing
forces",145 but also a result of Mujib's close ties with India, a
country with which the Soviet Union had a converging outlook.

Following the Chinese-American rapprochement, coupled with Pakistan's

rejection of military cooperation with the USSR, Moscow and Delhi had a
common interest in strengthening their relationship. This led to the
signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two
countries in August 1971. With this agreement, which was essentially a
military pact since three of the twelve articles dealt with their

143. The Pakistan Times, 13 April 1971.

144. Rizvi, op._cit., p. 250.
145. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 120.
 395

respective security needs,146 India, assured of Soviet help in case the

Chinese intervened on the side of Pakistan, could safely proceed with its
objective of dismembering Pakistan.

Six days after Yahya decided to restore claw and order' in East,

Pakistan, Indira Gandhi moved a resolution in the Indian parliament which

unequivocally supported the Awami League. It stated, inter alia:
••• situated as India is and bound as the peoples of the
sub-continent are by the century old ties of history,
culture, and tradition, this House cannot remain
indifferent to the macabre tragedy being executed so
close to our border •••
Bearing in mind the permanent interest which India has
in peace, and committed as we are to uphold and defend
human rights, this House demands immediate cessation of
the use of force and the massacre of defenceless
people.
This House records its profound conviction that the
historic upsurge of the 75 million people of East
Bengal will triumph. The House wishes to assure them
that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the
wholehearted sympathy and support of the people of
India. 147
India's decision to intervene in the domestic affairs of East
Pakistan, initially by political means followed by a military invasion,
was based on several considerations. First, there were, as the resolution
correctly indicated, the cultural and religious links between the East
Bengalis and their brethren across the border. Even after almost 25 years
of Pakistani independence, and many failed attempts to integrate the
Bengalis into the Pakistan polity, the East Pakistanis, through their
language, script and literary backgound, persistently identified
culturally with their West Bengali counterparts rather than with their
co-Pakistanis in the West. 14S This cultural link was reinforced by the

146. Hasan Askari Rizvi, Internal Strife and External Intervention, (Lahore, Progressive Publishers,
1981), pp. 230-231.
147. Ibid., (Appendix), pp. 270-271.
143. Ibid., pp. 121-123.
 396

presence of a substantial number of Hindus in East Pakistan. 149 While

most of them were better educated than the East Bengali Muslims and were
concentrated in middle-class professions, such as teaching, business and
banking, they never felt comfortable in the Muslim environment of
Pakistan. Second, Indira Gandhi's Congress Party ideologically identified
with the Awami League's avowed adherence to secularism, socialism and
non-alignment in foreign affairs,150 policies similar to India's and
diametrically contrary to Pakistan's.

A third important factor which influenced India's decision to

eventually invade East Pakistan was the growing refugee problem. Although
figures regarding the number of refugees varied widely according to the
source of information,151 it is certain that the large influx of~ast

Bengalis placed a great burden on India's resources. However, India's

main concern was not so much the number of refugees as it was the
political orientation_of the East Bengalis crossing into West Bengal.
While India was highly supportive of the Awami League's cause, and
provided military assistance for their guerrilla group, the Mukti
Bahini,152 it was hostile to the followers of Bhashani's (pro-Peking)
NAP. Accordingly, it gave Mujib's fighters a free hand in their
insurgency training and placed Bhashani under protective custody.153
Indira Gandhi's decision to militarily and diplomatically support the
Awami League was directly linked to India's own domestic problems in West

149. According to the 1961 census, 8.6% of the population of East Pakistan was Hindu, down frol 10%
in 1951. If these figures are accurate than there is a wide discrepancy between the census and the popular
belief that 20% of the population was Hindu. 1961 Census of Pakistan, (Governlent of Pakistan), p. II-58.
ISO. Rizvi~ Internal Strife and External Intervention. p. 119.
151. According to Pakistani sources, there were about 2 lillion Bengali refugees, cOlpared to
India's estimate of 10 lillian refugees. Ibid., p. 137.
152. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 248. For a Pakistan governlent account of
'Indian support for the insurgents, see: White Paper on Crisis in East Pakistan, (Government of Pakistan,
August 1971), pp. 45-14.
153. Rizvi, Internal Strife and External Intervention, p. 171.
 397

Bengal, where it had to deal with urban guerrilla activities in Calcutta

as well as cases of rural insurgency.154 The compounding element in
this situation was China's military and ideological support for the West
Bengali insurgency movement. 155 Thus, India's greatest fear was that
its Maoist Naxalites and Bhashani's NAP would combine their forces and
threaten the Awami League's monopoly of insurgency power. 156 This

scenario not only had the potential to destroy India's plans for the

establishment of an independent Bangladesh ruled by the Awami League, but

it also brought closer the possibility of the creation of a socialist
(Maoist) United Bengal republic which would be allied with China.
Ironically, the latter contingency was viewed by both Washington and Delhi
with the greatest alarm. 1S7

Therefore, just as Pakistani domestic politics affected the external

environment, India's own internal interests influenced its foreign policy

equation; and it was the combination of these two developments in East and
West Bengal which determined India's decision to invade East Pakistan on
21 November 1971. India's military intervention enabled it to kill two
birds with one stone: dismember Pakistan and resolve its West Bengali
insurgency problem. As indicated by Subrahmanyam, director of the
influential Indian Institute for Defence Studies that generally reflects
government thinking, "the break-up of Pakistan is in our interest and we
have an opportunity the like of which will never come again".158

154. For a discussion of this West Bengal. insurgency problel, see: E.A.J. Duyker, Tribal Guerrillas:
West Bengal's santals. and the Naxalite Hovelent, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Helbourne University, 19B1.
155. Rose, OQ. cit., p. 322.
156. Kalil Siddiqui, Conflict. Crisis and War in Pakistan, (NY: Haclillan Press, 1972), p. 166.
157. Ali, op. cit., p. 95. Washington and Delhi were not the only ones whose interests at tiles
converged. While India and Pakistan were both repressing their respective insurgents, according to Ceylon
Air Force sources,S Indian and 2 Pakistani ~elicopters manned by Indian and Pakistani crews were flying
cOlbat lissions against insurgents in Sri Lanka. The Pakistan Observer, 21 April 1971.
ISS. Dawn, 9 April 1971, cited in Rizvi, The Hilitary and Politics in Pakistan, p. 24B.
 398

India's full scale invasion, which it justified as an act of

"self-defence",159 was severely criticized by Pakistan's allies, the
United States and China. The Americans suggested there be an immediate
cease-fire and withdrawal of troops. As expected this proposal was
accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India. Washington reacted to India's
unwillingness to cease hostilities by bluntly stating:
We believe that since the beginning of the crisis
Indian policy in a systematic way has led to the
perpetuation of the crisis, deepening of the crisis,
and that India bears the major responsibility for the
broader.hostilities which have ensued. 160
While Pakistan never envisioned more than rhetorical support from the
Americans, it did expect more concrete assistance from the PRC. In many
ways this expectation was partly justified in view of China's strong
statements during the whole crisis; however, the Chinese leaders had never
categorically promised military intevention in case of an Indian attack.
Nevertheless, even after Bhutto and the three chiefs of services went to
China and only received vague support in their "struggle to defend their
state sovereignty and independence", Yahya continued to interpret these
statements in different terms, declaring that "if India attacked Pakistan,
China will, of course, intervene".16l But, instead of intervening in

the war, China limited its contribution to the delivery of military

hardware, which was quite substantial, and to the dispatch of 200 military
instructors specialized in counter-insurgency warfare. 162

Although China was, and still is, Pakistan's closest ally, the Chinese
leadership was not naive. It was well aware of what was in China's
interest. The PRC clearly differentiated between its strategic and

159. Choudhury, India! Pakistan! Bangladesh ... , p. 209.

160. The Pakistan Observer, 6 December 1971.
161. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 251.
162. Mohammad Habib Sisky, ·Chinese World Strategy and South Asia: The China Factor in
Indo-Pa~istani Relations', Asian Survey, Vol. XVI, No. 10, Oct. 1976, pp. 973-974.
 399

non-strategic policiesjlS3 that is, it could safely support Yahya when

the crisis was still only a domestic issue, but when India invaded East

Pakistan the matter became a strategic problem, and thus the stakes were

much greater. The great power equation on the sub-continent had radically

changed since the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, and with the Indo-Soviet

treaty, China could no longer assume that the USSR would remain neutral in

case it decided to intervene militarily to assist Pakistan. Moreover, as

long as the fighting was confined to East Pakistan China was willing to

allow India achieve its objective. The mountain passes being snow-bound,

it was in no position to send troopsj and even if it could, it probably

would not have acted, since it realized that East Pakistan was no longer

salvageable. However, when the war spread to West Pakistan and Kashmir on

3 December, and the Pakistan Army was incurring heavy losses,lS4 then

China's attitude changed. It denounced India's aggression against

Pakistan and pledged "resolute support" for Pakistan. 1S5 Fearing that

Peking would not allow India to hit the Pakistan heartland, and therefore

there was a likelihood that it would intervene, Washington asked Moscow to

pressure the Indians to cease the hostilities on the western front.1S6

Since none of the major powers wanted to see an expansion of the war,

India had no choice but to offer a cease-fire in the West on 17 December,

one day after General Niazi and his 90,000 men had surrendered in Dacca.

Still, the Indian government had achieved its objectives: Pakistan had

been dismembered and Bangladesh was now a reality.

The 1971 war and t~e subsequent secession of East Pakistan saw

Pakistan's worst fears come true: a full scale intervention of India into

163. Interview, [Ashrif Qazi, Director-General of Policy Planning, Department of Foreign Affairs,
Islamabad, October 1983.1
164. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 250.
165. The Pakistan Observer, 5 December 1971.
166. K.B. Sayeed, "The Historical Origins of Some of Pakistan's Persistent Political Problems·, in
A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton (eds.), op. cit.! p. 40.
 400

the domestic affairs of Pakistan with the objective of dismembering the

country. It proves beyond doubt the validity of the theoretical model;
that is, the decisive influence the external environment can have on a
country's process of national integration.

In the case of Pakistan this reality was reinforced by several

important factors which together facilitated India's penetration of the
East Pakistan domestic arena. First, there were the historical, cultural
and religious links between the two Bengals. Second, the continued
dissatisfaction of the East Bengalis made them more susceptible to outside
interference. In this case the internal polities had a feed-back effect
upon India's perception of the situation. Finally, the sui generis nature
of the country's geographic character, the unwillingness on the part of
Pakistan's allies to commit themselves to its defence, and the Pakistani
leaders' decision to give priority to the defence of West Pakistan,
facilitated India's military intervention. Consequently, these
opportunities for intervention, coupled with India's disposition to do so,
were internal and external forces which facilitated the secession of East
Pakistan. However, while India's intervention was ultimately decisive, it
was Bhutto's refusal to accept the election results, followed by Yahya's
decision to send in the army which made the final outcome inevitable.
While many observers will argue that the dismemberment of Pakistan was a
major disaster for the country's process of ~ation-building', it could be
argued that the Closs' of East Pakistan removed the major obstacle for the
national integration of (West) Pakistan.
 CHAPTER 11.

THE MIDDLE-EAST ATTRACTION (1971-1985)

THE BBUTTO PBRIOD:1971-1977

With the loss of East Pakistan and the defeat in the 1971 war, the

leaders of truncated Pakistan were confronted with the task of re-defining

the country's foreign policy according to the new geo-po1itica1 reality of

South Asia. While there was disagreement amongst Western analysts about

the success and failure of Pakistan's foreign policy since

independence,l it is certain that with regard to the resolution of the

Kashmir issue, Pakistan's fundamental national objective, the successive

leaders' foreign policy approach had been a failure. Moreover, Pakistan's

close ties with the West had not only compounded the vertical cleavage

between the leaders and the public, but on the external front it had

isolated Pakistan from the Third World, in general, and the Muslim World,

in particular.

Determined to end this isolation, Bhutto adroitely turned an

apparently weakened national stature into a source of strength; for now

with the loss of its eastern wing Pakistan was not only more easily

defendable as a result of its more compact characteristics,2 but its

essentially homogeneous religious composition facilitated the

implementation of a new foreign policy approach: the close identification

of Pakistan with the Muslim World. Moreover, the desire to turn away from

South Asia, and make the Middle-East the focus of the country's foreign

policy, was given impetus with the new power equation on the

sub-continent.

1. For two'opposing views about Pakistan's foreign policy achievements, see: William J. Barnds,
'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Shifting Opportunities and Constraints·, in lawrence Ziring et al. (eds.),
Pakistan:The long View, (Durham, N.C.:Duke University Press, 1977), p. 372; and, W. Wilcox, "Pakistan·, in
w. Wilcox et al. (eds.), Asia and the International System, (Cambridge, "ass.: Winthrop, 1972), .pp. 113-4.
2. "ohammad Ayoo~- "India, Pakistan and Super-Power Rivalry·, The World Today, Vol. 38, NO.5, Hay
1982, pp. 194ff.
 402

Barely six months after the end of the hostilities, India and Pakistan
signed the Simla Agreement on 2 July 1972. 3 It stated, inter alia:
1) The principles and purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations shall govern the relations between the
two countries. 2) The two countries are resolved to
settle their differences by peaceful means through
bilateral negotiations. 3) They shall always respect
each other's national unity, territorial integrity,
political independence and sovereign equality. 4) Both
governments will take steps within their power to
prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other.
5) In order to progressively restore and normalise
relations between the two countries steps shall be
taken to resume postal, telegraphic, sea, and air
links; trade and co-operation in economic and other
agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible; and,
exchange in the fields of science and culture will be
promoted. 4
While the accord was ostensibly aimed at "the promotion of a friendly
and har.onious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the
sub-continent", India's real objective was to have Pakistan acknowledge
the new South Asian reality: a weakened Pakistan and the emergence of

India as the dominant power in the area. Recognizing its diminished

military power was in a sense unavoidable, but having to acquiesce to
Indian demand that it accept India's new stature in the region was quite
unacceptable to Bhutto, even if Nixon publicly acknowledged India's newly
found status. 5 Furthermore, to add insult to injury, India was not only
demanding that Pakistan "not rearm to the point of being able to threaten
India",6 but it was trying to direct Pakistan's foreign policy by

arguing that Pakistan should identify with the Indian sub-continent and
not attempt to forge new links with countries outside the region. 7

3. It is interesting to note that the USSR once again offered to mediate between the two parties.
However, in this case India rejected the offer for fear of losing the opportunity to once and for all
establish its dominant position on the sub-continent. Leo E. Rose, ·The Superpowers in South Asia: A
Geostrategir Analysis·, Orbis, Yolo 22, No.2, Summer 1978, p. 398.
4. Agreement' on Bilateral Relations between the Government of Pakistan and the Governlent of India,
Simla, July 1972. (Hinistry of Foreign Affairs, Governlent of Pakistan).
5. Rose, op. cit., p. 399.
6. An.c r H. Syed, ·Pakistan's Security Problem: ABill of Constraints', in W.H. Wriggins (ed.),
Pakistan in Transition, tUniversity of Islalabad Press, 1975), p. 249.
7. Ibid.
 403

Understandably, Bhutto was not going to accept these Indian demands,

for he knew only too well how tenuous his domestic position would be if he
appeared to submit to Indian intransigence. He had not forgotten that it
was in the Punjab, the cornerstone of his power base, that he had
advocated during the 1970 election campaign a 1000-year war with India.
He had to ensure that, on the one hand, his foreign policy did not
alienate the Punjab while, on the other hand, it did not provoke India
into another conflict.B Thus, Bhutto, astute politician as he was, knew
that by delivering speeches which accused India of aggressive behaviour
and of interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs he would continue to
have the military's support. 9 Similarly, while Pakistan generally

downgraded its stance on the Kashmir issue, as a result of its military

defeat,lO Bhutto could, however, not afford to completely ignore the

issue. As he would state:

.•. No settlement which compromises the principle of
self-determination can be of any lasting benefit to
them (Kashmiris). At best, it can lead only to a
temporary superficial amelioration of their condition
but at the grievous cost of the consolidation of the
alien stranglehold. 11

It is therefore not surprising that with mutual accusations of

violations of the agreement, the 'spirit' of the accord quickly
vanished. 12 Bhutto used alleged Indian breaches of the cease-fire
agreement and Indian schemes to forment dissatisfaction within the smaller
provinces of Pakistan as a means to delay the lifting of Martial Law. 13

8. S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto:1971-1977, (London, The Hac.ilIan Press, 1980), p. 74.
9. For exa.pIe,his speech on 29 January 1973, in President Z.A. Bhutto, Speeches and State.ents
(1 Jan.- 31 Harch 1973), (Hinistry of Infor.ation and Broadcasting, Govern.ent of Pakistan, 1973), p. 55.
10. Pervaiz'Iqbal Cheela, "The Imperatives of National Security:A Case Study of Pakistan", Asian
Defence Journal, Novelber 1983, p. 54.
11. Speeches and Statements, p. 134.
12. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Hilitary and Politics in Pakistan, (Lahore, Progressive Publishers,
1976), pp. 273-274.
13. The Horning News (Karachi), 9 February 1972.
 404

Although relations remained strained between the two countries, India

and Pakistan did manage to reach an agreement regarding the release of
90,000 Indian-held Pakistani prisoners; they began to be transferred back
to Pakistan on 19 September 1973. However, India held back 195 of these
prisoners until Pakistan recognized Bangladesh, which Bhutto did on the
eve of the Second Islamic Summit Conference in February 1974. Officially
recognizing Bangladesh was a difficult task to ask from any Pakistani
leader, for it involved acknowledging the failure of 25 years of Pakistani

domestic polities. Nevertheless, Bhutto tactfully crossed this

psychological barrier by placing the whole issue into the greater context
of international Muslim politics. As he stated:
Pakistan was created to safeguard the interests of the
Muslims of the world, and if Bangladesh is not
recognized, the Pakistanis will be answerable to God as
to why the Muslims of East Pakistan were left in
misery.l4

The recognition of Bangladesh, however, did not resolve the thorny

question of the future status of 600,000 to one million Biharis
(Urdu-speaking non-Bengalis) residing in Bangladesh: Pakistan considered

them now Bangladeshi nationals, and Bangladesh saw them as the

responsibility of Pakistan, since they had fully supported the military's

actions in East Pakistan. ls

If the normalization of relations with India - already difficult

enough because of its demands for tacit recognition of its dominant
position in South Asia - was threatened as a result of India's increase in
its military budget and its opposition to the sale of arms to Pakistan,
India's 'p~~ceful' nuclear explosion in May 1974 certainly did little to
improve bilateral relations; rather it reinforced Pakistan's deep-seated
mistrust of Indian designs. India's introduction of the nuclear factor to

14. Speeches and Statelents, p. 9.

15. Barnds, op. cit., p. 379.
 405

the sub-continent not only brought a qualitative change to Indo-Pakistani

relations, but it also decisively altered the power equation in favour of
India. However, instead of forcing Pakistan into a state of psychological

and military submission, this nuclear explosion intensified Bhutto's

resolve to oppose Indian domination. As he stated in unequivocal terms:
We will never surrender our rights or claims because of
India's nuclear status ... we will not be deflected from
our policies by this fateful development. In concrete
terms, we will not compromise the rights of
self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.
Nor will we accept Indian hegemony or domination over
the subcontinent ... ls

Bhutto even went a step further by declaring that Pakistan would seek

nuclear protection from the five nuclear powers; however, his attempt to
internationalize the issue received little attention from the members of
the nuclear t club', with only the PRe promising "full and absolute support
to Pakistan against foreign aggression and interference including nuclear
blackmail" .17

If the 'normalization' of relations, including a reduction of mutual

mistrust, had been a remote possibility prior to the nuclear explosion,
following the event any idea of rapprochement with India had become
politically untenable, especially in the Punjab. Conversely, in the

smaller provinces of Pakistan continued confrontation with India was not

as enthusistica1ly accepted, for it only gave more political clout to the
essentially Punjabi army.18 Nevertheless, Bhutto must not have been too

displeased with this deterioration in Indo-Pakistan relations, for it

undoubtedly strengthened his argument for closer links with the Muslim
world. Mor~~ver, these were ties which would not only be politically

acceptable, but which economically were sure to be beneficial to Pakistan,

16. Far Eastern Economic Review. 3 June 1974, cited in ibid., p. 399.
17. G. II. Choudhury, India Pakistan, Bangladesh! and the Ha JOY Powers. (NY: The Free Press, 1975),
I

p. 240.
lB. Barnds, op. cit., p. 390.
 406

and especially the Punjab.

The loss of Pakistan's eastern wing had two far-reaching consequences:

a reassessment of the country's raison d'~tre, and a re-examination of

Pakistan's foreign relations. In re-evaluating the role Islam should have
in the public domain, the general feeling was that Pakistan had departed
from its original Islamic enthusiasm and had progressively failed to live
up to the Islamic ideal. As Tahir-Kheli correctly indicated, "the
rediscovery of Islamic roots offered the Pakistani elite a chance of
moving nearer a public that had always remained closer to Islam than had
the leadership".19 While this internal re-evaluation did not
automatically lead to the implementation of Islamic tenets in public
policy - the PPP government would only introduce fundamental changes at

the height of the unrest in 1977 - it did involve a basic re-orientation

of Pakistan's foreign policy. This shift in emphasis from looking toward

South Asia as the focus of external interest to one directed toward

Southwest Asia and the Middle-East was facilitated by several internal and
external factors.

First, with only the western wing of the country remaining, the
Pakistani leaders no longer had to worry about a significant section of
the population being opposed to a Muslim orientation of the country's
foreign policy. Since Islam had been the basis for the creation of
Pakistan, it was only normal that Pakistan sought to have closer ties with
its Muslim tbrothers' rather than with the Hindu neighbour. 2o Second,

19. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "In Search of an Identity:lslal and Pakistan's Foreign Policy", in Adeed
Dawisha (ed.), Islam in Foreign Policy, (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 71.
20. It is interesting to note that while the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions also had articles referring
to the State's "endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations along Huslil countries based on
Islamic unity", it was only under the 1973 Constitution that there was an attelPt to prolote unity amongst
Huslil countries. G.W~Choudhury, "'New' Pakistan's Constitution, 1973", The Middle-East Journal, Vol.
28, No. I, Winter 1974, p. 13.
 407

after 1973 the oil-rich states of the Middle-East were flooded with
massive amounts of capital which they wished to use to develop their
countries' infrastructure. In this field Pakistan could contribute
significantly, having a highly-skilled professional class and an over
abundance of semi-skilled workers. Moreover, being unable to absorb all
their petro-dollars for their own needs, Saudi Arabia and the other

Persian Gulf states could assist Pakistan with its development plans.
Finally, India having dismembered Pakistan, reinforced Pakistan's need to

tilt toward friendly Muslim countries. Thus, in post-197l Pakistan Islam

became an essential factor in Bhutto's foreign policy,21 and its
manifestation, through close links with Muslim countries, was going to be

the means by which Pakistan would re-assert its Muslim identity.

Undoubtedly, the apogee of Bhutto's efforts to have the Muslim World

recognize "the importance and value of Pakistan"22 was his hosting of

the second meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in
Lahore in May 1974. The attendance of heads of state and heads of
government from 37 Muslim countries clearly bolstered Bhutto's image at
home and abroad; he managed to have both the foreign dignitaries and his
domestic critics praise his new foreign policy approach. 23 He confirmed

his credentials as a respected Muslim leader by focusing more than half of

his opening speech on the Arab-Israeli conflict24 and the desperate

plight of the Palestinians. He also used this occasion to officially

recognize Bangladesh, stating that he had taken the decision on the advice
of leaders of the Muslim World who are "certainly the well-wishers of

21. John L~ Esposito, ·Pakistan:Quest for Islamic Identity·, in J. Esposito (ed.), Islal and
Development, (Syracuse University Press, 1980), p. 151.
22. Weekly Commentary and Pakistan News Digest, 11 January 1974, p. 5, cited in: Norman D. Paller,
·Pakistan:The Long Search for Foreign Policy·, in Lawrence Ziring et al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 417.
23. Burki, op. cit., p. 179.
24. Bhutto was ready to go to extremes to identify with the Huslil World. For exalple, in an
interview he had with the editor of the influential Egyptian newspaper AI-Ahram, he stated that ·Israel
had actually lasterlinded the dislemberlent campaign against Pakistan". Speeches and Statelents, p. 110.
 408

I
Pakistan".25 This was an astute way to deflect potential opposition at
home by implying that with the 'blessing' of other Muslim countries
Bhutto's decision must be morally correct.

It is important to realize that Bhutto did not only wish to have his
country fully accepted by the Muslim World, but he also wanted to have

Pakistan welcomed into the Third World arena from which it had been
ostracized because of its membership in CENTO and SEATO. For a man like
Bhutto, who had delusions of grandeur, it was unacceptable to have
Pakistan refused full status at the Third World Summit held in Colombo in
1976 while India, which had close military ties with the USSR, was
welcomed with open arms. Consequently, he was highly critical of the
non-alignment movement, stating that
•.• when a country enters into closer relations with one
great power and still professes to be non-aligned in
order to be better able to establish its political
domination over a neighbouring country than what we
witness is alignment masquerading as non-alignment. 26
Accordingly, as a means to counter the discredited non-alignment

movement and promote himself as a genuine and credible Third World leader,
Bhutto suggested in September 1976 the holding of a Third World
summit.27 Needless to say that this suggestion was never implemented.
Finally, Bhutto also had another grandiose idea of promoting Third World
unity by planning to hold a number of Third World athletic and sports
events. As the government pamphlets clearly indicated, these events
"would underline the central role that Pakistan was playing under Prime

Minister Bhutto for bringing together the countries of the 3rd World".28

25. SJL Burk,e,' ·The Hanagelent of Pakistan's Foreign Policy·, in Lawrence Ziring et al (eds.), ~
ci t., p. 366.
26. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, New Directions, (London, Nalara Publications, 19BO), p. 39.
27. Lawrence Ziring, ·Pakistan and India:Politics, Personalities, and Foreign Policies·, Asian
Survey, Yolo 1B, No.7, July 1978, p. 711.
28. Promotion of Sports and Culture:A Programme of Action, (Hinistry of Education, Sovernment of
Pakistan, 1976), p. 14.
 409

While Bhutto's bid to be recognized as a Third World leader l.ay have

failed, his drive to expand Pakistan's links with the Muslim countries did
succeed. However, Bhutto, well aware that the Muslim World was far from
being an homogeneous entity, was very careful when developing his Islamic

ties for fear of offending the sensitivity of certain Muslim countries.

Thus, he carefully applied his "Bilateralism" approach to his relations
with the three most important "target' countries: Saudi Arabia, Libya and
Iran. 29

Certainly the countries with which Pakistan hoped to develop the

strongest ties, because of the potential economic benefits that could

accrue to Pakistan, were Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Strong
religious links had always existed between Pakistan and Saudia Arabia as a
result of the latter's guardian role of two of the holiest places in
Islam. So although these ties were essentially limited to the
non-tangible realm, they were however given a major psychological boost

when Saudi Arabia lent Pakistan 75 war planes during the 1971
conflict.30 As of 1974, economic ties between Pakistan and the

countries of the Arabian peninsula grew quickly because of a mutuality of

interests in developing these links. On the one hand, Pakistan, having

lost its' captured' market with the secession of East Pakistan,
desperately needed to find a new outlet for its goods, and, on the other

hand, the Gulf countries, recipient of vast amounts of capital, needed to

satisfy the consumer demands of their population. Moreover, lacking an
educated professional class and only having a small pool of manual and

semi-skillec;l~orkers, the oil-rich countries required readily available

manpower to assist them in developing their capital infrastruture.

29. Tahir-Kheli, op. cit., p. 73.
30. S.H. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, (london, Oxford University Press,
1973), p. 407.
 410

Therefore. as a result of these complementary needs. and the ability to

meet them. Pakistan's and the Persian Gulf countries' interests converged.

By 1973-74 Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Libya and
Indonesia accounted for 24.8% of Pakistan's export market, compared to
only 6.6% in 1969-1970. 31 Similarly, the number of Pakistanis working
in the Middle-East. mainly on the Arabian peninsula,32 quickly grew from

approximately 170,000 in 197633 to an estimated 750,000 to 1.25 million

in 1979. 34 These Pakistani expatriates sent back home more than $2

billion in annual remittances,35 an amount which by 1982 represented the

largest single item of foreign exchange earning for Pakistan. 36

Finally, Saudi Arabia contributed massively to Pakistan's development

needs. In 1976 alone its financial assistance to Islamabad, its largest

to any single country, amounted to more than $500 million, that is, 24.8%

of total Saudi aid. 37

Bhutto also established close relations with Libya. It is not

surprising that after having had Pakistani pilots fly military missions

during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war on behalf of Libya and Syria/Colonel

Gaddafi told Bhutto at the OIC meeting in Lahore that "our strength is
your strength, our resources are your resources".38 This 'brotherly'

solidarity was given concrete form when Libya provided $133 million in

loans and investment funds for Pakistan in 1976. 39

31. Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive?, (London, Penguin,19B3), p. 125.

32. For a highly perceptive article on the socio-cultural effects of Pakistan-United Arab Elirates
interaction, see: Akbar S. Ahled, ·'Dubai-Chalo':Problels in the Ethnic Encounter between Hiddle-Eastern
and South Asian Huslil Societies·, Asian Affairs, Yo. XY, Part III, October 19B4, pp. 262-276.
33. Zubeida Husta fa, ·Recen t Trends in Pakistan's Policy Towards the Middle-East· Pakistan Hori zon,
Yo. 2B, No.4, 1975"p. 16.
34. Robert LaPorte Jr., ·The Ability of South and East Asia to leet the Labor Demands of the Middle
East and North Africa·, The Hiddle East Journal, Yo. 38, No.4, Autuln 19B4, p. 702.
35. Tahir-Kheli, op. cit., p. 74.
36. Dawn (WeeklY), 15 January 1982.
37. Shirin Tahir-Kheli and William o. Staudenlaier, ·The Saudi-Pakistani Military Relationship:
Ilplications for US Policy', Orbis, Yo. 26, No. I, Spring 1982, p. 15B.
38. Sheikh R. Ali, ·Pakistan's Islalic BOlb·, Asia Pacific COllunity, No. 16, Spring 1982, p. 77.
39. Ibid.
 411

The advantages of these rapidly developing Muslim links were given

increased importance when in May 1974, less than two months after Bhutto's
successful OIC meeting, India tested its first nuclear 'device'.

Ironically, this nuclear explosion could not have come at a more opportune

time for Bhutto. The Muslim World was united, at least in rhetoric, it
had emerged as a significant force in the sphere of international finance,
and they generally supported Pakistan's new Muslim foreign policy; and
Bhutto realized that this was the ideal time for him to exploit all these
elements in order to obtain support for the construction of Pakistan's own
nuclear bomb. 40 Bhutto's desire to have Pakistan possess its own
nuclear weapons was not a recent development, for already in 1965 he
stated: "If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go
hungry, but we will get one of our own".41 However, Bhutto realized

that his country would never be able to afford to finance on its own a
nuclear project; therefore, with the aim of mustering financial support
for his scheme, Bhutto appealed to the religious feelings of the Muslim

community, declaring:
\
The Christians, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have \ v/
this capability. The Communist powers also possess it.
Only the Islamic civilization was without it ••• 42 )
Thus, by placing his nuclear idea within the larger context of Islamic

politics Bhutto managed to don it with a certain aura of 'legitimacy',

since it could then be viewed as a weapon to counter Israeli and Indian

nuclear capability. Moreover, it would strengthen Pakistan's drive to
become a major and credible leader of the Muslim World. 43 Finally,
Bhutto's Islamic nuclear programme could only enhance his domestic

40. For an Indian view of Bhutto's opportunistic use of of the Huslia connection to promote the idea
of an 'Islalic' bOlb, see: D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Nalboodiri, Pakistan's Islalic BOlb, Delhi, Yikas, 1979.
41. Sheikh R. Ali, op. cit., p. 80.
42. Z.A. Bhutto, If I al assassinated, (Delhi, Yikas, 1982, 3rd ed.), p. lIB.
43. Sheikh R. Ali, op. cit., pp. 79-80. For an investigative, although sOlewhat sensational,
account by two journaliSts of how Bhutto obtained his nuclear bOlb, see: Steve Weissman and Herbert
Krosney, The Islamic BOlb, Delhi, Orient paperbacks, 1983.
 412

stature, for it would demonstrate his resolve to stand up to India as well

as be a proof that his Muslim credentials were genuine.

While economic and political ties with the Arab countries of the

Middle-East may have been developing satisfactorily, relations with Iran,

although a member of the Regional Cooperation for Development and CENTO

along with Pakistan and Turkey, took a different turn. Iran, as the

undisputed • policeman , of the area, was concerned with regional stability

and the maintenance of the status guo. Consequently, the Shah of Iran

viewed Bhutto's Islamic rhetoric and his growing ties with Libya and Saudi

Arabia as at best a nuisance and at worst a threat to his established

regional leadership; and he unequivocally showed his displeasure with

Bhutto's attempt to carve himself a role as a Muslim leader by refusing to

attend the OIC meeting in Lahore. 44 So as to indicate to the countries

of the region that Iran was undeniably the dominant power in the region,

the Shah bluntly stated that tfhe regarded Pakistani Baluchistan as falling

within Iran's defence perimeter".45 During Bhutto's visit to Iran in

1973, the Shah elaborated this point, when he declared:

What happens in Pakistan is vitally important to us.

The reason for this is not only our fraternal affection
for you as a Muslim nation, but because of Iranian
interests, we would not be able to tolerate other
changes or difficulties in Pakistan. 46

This statement was a clear message to Bhutto that Iran was displeased

as well as alarmed with the establishment of the National Awami Party

(NAP)-dominated provincial governments of Baluchistan and NWFP. Moreover,

when armed hostilities broke out in Baluchistan after Bhutto dismissed the

provincial government for reneging on its promise not to discriminate

against non-Baluch, the Shah pressured the Pakistani central government to

44. Choudhury. India. Pakistan, Bangladesh ...• p. 245.

45. S.S. Harrison;~In Afghanistan's Shadow:Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, (NY: Carnegie
Endowment fer International Peace, 1981), p. 97.
46. Middle East Monitor, 1 June 1973, cited in ibid.
 413

act swiftly and unrelentlessly against the Baluch tribesmen. Bhutto was
only too well aware that if he was unable to control the situation the
Shah would decide to unilaterally intervene in the crisis;47 instead, he
accepted Iranian-manned air force planes to assist the Pakistani forces to
repress the uprising. 48

As with India, Iran had a direct interest in the internal developments

of Pakistan. However, as opposed to Indira Gandhi, the Shah had a
'supportive' role rather than a 'destructive' one in the context of
Pakistan's national integration process; for he did not wish to see the
dismemberment of its eastern neighbour, since this scenario could only

benefit India and the Soviet Union. Moreover, as was the case with East
Pakistan, the troubles in Pakistani Baluchistan had the potential to have
a spill-over effect into Iranian Baluchistan where the Shah had to contend

with Iraqi-supported Baluch rebels. 49 This connection was proven beyond

any doubt when the Pakistani authorilies discovered a large cache of
weapons in the Iraq embassy in Islamabad which were destined for the
Baluch guerrillas in Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan's 'nation-building' process
was once again not completely under Islamabad's control, but rather it was
also being determined by outside forces.

While Bhutto may have been annoyed with Iran's interference in

Pakistan's domestic affairs, at least it was not aimed at subverting the

state of Pakistan. Decisively more worrisome for the Pakistani

authorities, however, was the rhetoric emanating from Afghanistan, so much

so that as ot 1973 "Afghanistan replaced India more and more as the major

47. Tariq Ali, op. cit., p. 114.

48. LB. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan:The Nature and Direction of Change, (NY:Praeger, 19S0),P.llB.
The Shah also provided $200 million in emergency military and financial aid. Harrison, op. cit., .pp. 35-6.
49. For an in-depth analysis of Iranian Baluchistan and its ethnic linkage with Pakistan, see:
Harrison, ibid., pp. 93-126.
 414

perceived threat to Pakistan's national integrity, as the main focus of

dissent in Pakistan shifted .•• to Baluchistan and NWFP".50 Considering
that Afghanistan and Pakistan had had troublesome bilateral relations ever

since 1947, Islamabad had every reason to be on its guards when dealing
with the Kabul authorities. Some of the major issues over which the two
countries had clashed in the past were: the legitimacy of the Durand Line,

the promotion of the Pukhtunistan issue, Afghanistan's criticism of

Pakistan's decision to establish the One-Unit Plan in 1955, the repeated
severance of diplomatic relations and the closure of their borders, and
the allegation that the Afghan government had considered sending its army
to capture Peshawar during the 1971 War. 51

In view of this stormy background, it is understandable why in

September 1974 Islamabad did not take lightly Kabul's latest threats,
indicating that "the long-smoldering border dispute with Pakistan [WOUld]
erupt into a full-scale war in less than a month".52 Although Bhutto

was aware that this declaration was also meant to bolster the government's

legitimacy at home, since Sardar Daud had only recently usurped power from

King Zahir Shah, he was nevertheless careful not to dismiss it outright.

It is not that Pakistan expected an Afghan invasion, but rather an
intensification of its military support for the Pukhtun and Baluch rebels
in Pakistan. Already Pakistan was accusing the Afghan government of
inciting the Pukhtuns to acts of violence and of harbouring and training
15,000 guerrillas to start a "people's war" against the Pakistan
government. 53

50. Ataur Rahman, ·Pakistan:Unity or Further Divisions", in A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton (eds.), The
States of South Asia:Problems of National Integration, (Delhi, Vikas, 1982), p. 213.
51. Richard l. Betts, "Incentives for Nuclear Neapons:India, Pakistan, Iran", Asian Survey, Vol.
XIX, No. 11, November 1979, p. 1060.
52. Choudhury, Inoia. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 242.
53. Rahman, op. cit., p. 213.
 415

Wishing to resolve the growing differences between the two countries,

Bhutto and Daud held a series of talks in Kabul in June 1976. The Afghan
government's position was that it would only recognize the validity of the
Durand Line after the Pukhtun and Baluch NAP leaders, held prisoner by the
Pakistani authorities, had been released. While Bhutto would only agree
to simultaneous action on both sides, the fact that he even discussed the
matter of the release of the NAP leaders proved in stark terms how
external forces could so decisively influence domestic politics. 54
Under intense pressure from the Shah of Iran, Daud finally accepted
Bhutto's original conditions in August 1976. However, this agreement was

never signed, for in March 1978, without first negotiating with the Afghan
government, General Zia released all NAP leaders emprisoned. 55
Consequently, Kabul no longer had any incentive to discuss the status of

the Durand Line.

While the strengthening of links with the Muslim World were

essentially being conducted on an ad-hoc basis because of the novelty of
the exercise, relations with the PRe were already well established and
continued to expand progressively under Bhutto. Nevertheless, the period
immediately following the 1971 war did witness a certain degree of strain
in the relationship, and this was mainly caused by Pakistani displeasure
at China's apparently lack of strong support during the last war.
However, Bhutto, the main initiator of Pakistan's China policy, did not
wish to jeopardize the relationship by entering into a series of pointless

recriminations; he was only too well aware that Pakistan had no other
major power, upon which it could safely rely for external support. 56

54. According to Ajlal Khattak, a Kabul-based Pukhtun leader with a hard core group of arled len
deterlined to fight the central governlent, Bhutto had no intention of releasing the NAP leaders. The
Huslil, 18 October 1985.
55. Bhutto, If I Alii Assassinated, pp. 107-108.
56. Barnds, op. cit., p. 396.
 416

Accordingly, Bhutto cleared China of any blame when he stated:

••• within the limitations China did what she could ••• a
series of successive blunders were committed by the
Yahya regime ••• You have to take all these factors into
consideration ••• but whatever China's participation, we
have not lost confidence in China's friendship or
China's words. 57
Thus; following the resolution of this 'misunderstanding', and
Bhutto's rejection of the USSR's plan for a regional security pact, the
relationship returned to normal. By May 1974, the PRe had sent Pakistan

60 Mig 19, 150 tanks and other weapons as part of a $300 million economic
and military aid agreement. Moreover, because of Pakistan's financial
difficulties, China either changed existing loans into grants or eased the

repayment conditions. 58 Since this was a relationship which was popular

at home and advantageous to both countries, it was only to be expected
that these ties would continue to be strengthened under Bhutto. 59

The fact that the Soviet Union had been a tacit participant in the
dismemberment of Pakistan, having signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty which had
essentially given India the military security it needed to proceed with
its objective, it was to be expected that Pakistan-Soviet relations would
be less than cordial after the war. Moreover, the Soviet leadership

certainly did not seem to wish to improve bilateral relations; for during
Bhutto's state visit to Moscow in March 1972 his hosts bluntly told him:
If history were to repeat itself we would again take
the same position (in the Bangladesh crisis) because we
are convinced that it was correct.so
Considering the problems Bhutto was going to have subsequently in
Baluchistan and
I
NWFP with the indirectly Soviet-supported guerrillas, it
was little wonder that Pakistan could hardly afford to trust Soviet

57. Dawn, 20 February 1972, cited in Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 404.
58. Ibid., p. 405.
59. Shirin Tahir-Kneli, 'Chinese Objectives in South Asia:'Anti-Hegemony' vs. 'Collective
Security'·, Asian Survey, Yolo XYIII, No. 10, October 1978, pp. 1007-1008.
60. Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh ... , p. 227.
 417

designs in South Asia. Nevertheless, the USSR persisted with its idea of
establishing an Asian Security Pact in which Pakistan would be a member.
Bhutto's response permanently put to rest any suggestion of Pakistani
participation in a Soviet-sponsored pact.

Pakistan was not going to succumb to it. Pakistan had

suffered a lot from pacts. They were supposed to give
security but Pakistan lost half of the country while a
member of two pacts. Pakistan was therefore allergic
to pacts and did not want to get involved in another
pact. Moreover, the deeper question is: Asian security
against whom?61

This statement is not quite a true reflection of Bhutto's views about

military alliances, but only an indication of his adversity to
Soviet-sponsored pacts; since in 1972 he suggested to China that both
countries enter into a formal defence arrangement, and in 1977 he
suggested the establishment of a mutual defence treaty encompassing all
Muslim countries. 62 Both suggestions were rejected.

As indicated in Bhutto's statement regarding pacts, the fact that the

US did virtually nothing to prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan, even
though it was a member of SEA~3 and CENTO, did little to endear the US

in the eyes of the Pakistan government. Even Nixon's declaration that the
"independence and integrity of Pakistan is a cornerstone of American
foreign policy"64 meant little to Pakistanis; they had heard it all

before. Nevertheless, Pakistan did agree to host the largest ever CENTO

military exercises in December 1974. The decision to do so did have its

advantages, for two months later the US agreed to lift its arms embargo to
Pakistan and India. However, since military equipment could only be

61. Speeches ~nd Statements, p. 227.

62. Ziring, OP. cit., p. 726.
63. In Hovember 1972 Pakistan withdrew from SEATO by virtue of the fact that by having lost East
Pakistan it no longer had any reason to be part of a military pact whose area of concern was Southeast
Asia. In January 1972 Bhuttc withdrew Pakistan from the Commonwealth upon the UE's recognition of
Bangladesh.
64. Barnds, op. cit., p. 413.
 418

bought on a cash basis, and Pakistan was in a poor financial state, the US

decision did not significantly affect Pakistan's military position.

Nevertheless, India, which was recipient of large amounts of Soviet arms,

protested to Washington over its lifting of the embargo.

An issue decidedly more troublesome for the future of US-Pakistan

relations and which was going to affect Bhutto's tenure in office, was

Pakistan's decision to proceed with its nuclear programme. Washington was

willing to allow Pakistan build nuclear power plants - Pakistan already

having one operational in Karachi - but when France agreed to construct a

nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan, the US unequivocally indicated its

total opposition to the agreement. Bhutto insisted the reprocessing plant

was only for peaceful purposes to help the country meet its ever

increasing energy demands. However, the US refused to trust Bhutto's

motives because the reprocessing plant would have the capacity to

reprocess six times the amount of spent fuel from the Karachi plant,

believing instead that the construction of the plant was an integral part

of Pakistan's drive to build an 'Islamic' bomb. At the same time as these

discussions were proceeding, the US agreed to sell India over 5,000 pounds

of uranium to refuel an Indian nuclear power reactor, the only condition

being that it return to the US all spent fuel containing the plutonium,

the essential material required for the manufacture of nuclear

weapons. 55

Confronted with what he considered double standards, since India had,

like Pakistan, refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

Bhutto was determined, even with American threats of terminating economic

and military aid if it proceeded with the French deal, not to yield to US

65. 2iring, op. cit., p. 723.

 419

pressure. 66 Bhutto had no optionj he had staked his personal reputation

and the country's image upon acquiring an 'Islamic' bomb.

According to Bhutto, it was this unyielding stance which caused his

downfall. In his book, If I am Assassinated, which he wrote from his
death cell, he accused the Americans of having been the main driving force
behind the 1977 COUp.57 His interpretation of the events which led to

his ouster is that following the March 1977 elections, in which the

opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) lost, "foreign powers"

supported the PNA with "colossal funds" with the objective of
destabilizing the governmentj58 and the spearhead of the opposition

movement was led by the Saudi-supported fundamentalist Jama'at-i-Islami

(JI)59 which had been instrumental in forcing Bhutto to select the then
'junior Lieutenant-General Zia-ul-Haq as the new Chief of Army Staff. 70
It is important to note that while Saudi Arabia had always supported the
JI on the basis of their religious affinity, it was only during the 1977
unrest that it actively backed the JI's drive to topple Bhutto. Although

the exact reasons for the Saudi's decision to oppose Bhutto's government
with which they had had good bilateral relations is difficult to
determine, it is nevertheless certain that the Saudis felt they had
nothing to lose with the prospect of dealing with General Zia, a man known
to be a devout Muslim, rather than continuing with Bhutto whose
'un-Islamic' domestic policies were impalatable to the Saudi monarchy.
Lastly, it is also quite possible that the US used its Saudi ties to have
the JI increase its opposition to Bhutto. Thus, according to Bhutto, the

Americans' ,d~termination to have Bhutto cancel the construction of the

66. Ibid., p. 724.

67. Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated, pp. 146ff.
68. According to a high US Embassy official, the us was not backing the Jama'at-i-Islami, and as a
general policy it never-supports political parties. Interview [Islamabad, Novelber 1983]
69. Tariq Ali, op. cit., p. 127.
70. Interview [A Forler PPP linister, Islamabad, October 1983J
 420

reprocessing plant and the Saudi support for the fundamentalists'

deep-seated opposition to Bhutto's 'un-Islamic' policies at home were the

two forces which forced him out of office.

In sum, the national integration process of the 'new' Pakistan was

just as severely under the influence of the external environment as

before. Bhutto's links with the Muslim countries encouraged the religious

elements to demand greater Islamic content in public policies, and since

the desire to have a more Islamic'society was not shared unanimously,

this created greater societal divisions. Similarly, Iranian and Afghan

interference in the two western provinces had a direct bearing on the

government's national integration process. While Iran was supportive of

Islamabad's centralizing policies, Kabul was highly critical of them.

Finally, direct American pressure upon Bhutto and Saudi support for the

Fundamentalists had a major influence on Pakistan's national integration

process, for it facilitated the ouster of Bhutto and the rise of a

military regime totally committed to an Islamic system of government.

 421

THE ZIA-UL-BAQ PERIOD: 1977-1985

When examining Pakistan's foreign policy under President Zia-ul-Haq,

one can confidently assert that Afghanistan, especially since the Soviet
intervention in December 1979, has not only been the single most important
element that has influenced virtually all aspects of the government's
foreign relations, but it has also been the external issue which has had
the greatest impact upon Pakistan's internal affairs. Accordingly, the
analysis of the external environment will be divided into two parts: the
effect the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has had on Pakistan's

interactions with the Muslim World, the United States, China, the Soviet

Union and India, and the internal consequences the Soviet invasion has had
on the Pakistani domestic scene.

Within one month of the Soviet intervention, Pakistan managed to have

the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) hold an extraordinary session
in Islamabad. In his opening speech, Zia stressed that the recent events

in Afghanistan were not to be viewed as "a matter of concern for Pakistan

alone but for all Muslim nations"; and to insure that the case of the
Afghans would be heard, he compared their situation with the Palestinians
who were "yearning for the restoration of their rights".71 In the

short-term Zia urged the Muslim community to take effective "steps to

restore the sovereign rights of a brotherly Muslim country";72 however,

as a long-term objective aimed at preventing the recurrence of a Muslim

'defeat', the president, like Bhutto in 1977, advocated the establishment
of a syst~ of collective defence for the Islamic community, a suggestion
71. President Zia-ul-Haq, Inaugural Address, Extraordinary Session, Islamic Foreign Hinisters'
Conference, Islamabad, 27 January 1980, (Hinistry of Information and Broadcasting, Govern.ent of Pakistan,
1980), pp. 4,7. It is rather ironic that Zia would emphasize the desperate state of the Palestinians
considering that he was~military adviser to King Hussein in 1970, the period during which the king
expelled the PLO from Jordan. Sheikh R. Ali, op. cit., p. 77.
72. Inaugural Address, p. 6.
 422

which he had already advanced at an international conference on the

"Defence of the Muslim World" held in London in 1979. 73 While Zia
acknowledged that such a scheme would be the ideal solution, he was also
aware of the inherent divisions which existed in the Muslim Wor1dj74
instead, as "a true soldier of Islam", General Zia believed that the only
effective defence against anti-Muslim forces was genuine adherence to
Islamic values. As he declared:
••• let us first arid foremost strengthen our faith and
shape our actions in accordance with Sharia, create
unity in our ranks, and resolve today that we shall
dedicate ourselves totally to the glory of Islam and
the defence of the Umma. 7S
Ostensibly this resolution was directed at the Ole members, but there can

be no doubt that his real 'target' audience were his critics at home; this
was the ideal forum from which he could legitimize his domestic policies
and attempt to rally the population to his Islamization programme.

While "Moscow now has to its credit a rather remarkable achievement -

namely, eliciting a nearly united76 response from the Islamic states on
something other than an anti-Israeli issue", 77 of all the Muslim
countries only Saudi Arabia has consistently contributed funds to the
Afghan resistance movement. 78 Although this unflinching support for the

Mu.iahedeen (Freedom fighters)79 must be viewed in the wider context of

73. For the proposals put forward at this conference, see: Sheikh R. Ali, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
74. For an interesting article discussing the divisions within the OIC, see: Zubeida Hustafa, "The
Islamic Conference and Afghanistan', Asia Pacific COllunity, No. 14, Fall 1981, pp. 26-40.
75. Inaugural Address, p. B.
76. Only four OIC lelbers have persistently refused to condeln Soviet action in Afghanistan, i.e.,
South Yeten, Syria, Libya and the PLO.
77. Leo E. Rose, 'Pakistan's Role and Interests in South and Southwest Asia', Asian Affairs, Vol.9,
No. I, Septelber-Oct~ber 1981, p. 58.
78. Together, with the PRC, Saudi Arabia contributed $250 million in lilitary aid for the Afghan
rebels. The Economist, 11 Hay 19B5, p. lB.
79. Interview [A Retired Air Chief Harshal, Islamabad, October 19B3] According to the interviewee,
it .was quite farcical to call the"Hujahedeen freedom fighters when they were involved in heroin and arms
smuggling.
 423

Middle-East politics, it is nevertheless an integral part of

Saudi-Pakistani relations, a fundamental ingredient of Pakistan's foreign
policy. There are three elements to this relationship: ideology,
economics, and military. Even though these were already present when
Bhutto initiated the rapprochement, it is really only with Zia that this
relationship was consolidated.

Undoubtedly, ideology has been the legitimizing factor which has given
added iapetus to the relationship. As the self-proclaimed
"standard-bearer of Islamic brotherhood",80 and Islam being the
cornerstone of its foreign policy,81 Pakistan was naturally attracted to
the Saudi kingdom. Moreover, with the leaders of both countries being
staunch adherents to Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Communist philosophy,
it was almost inevitable that Saudi Arabia would become Pakistan's main
ideological pertner. 82 This mutual compatibility in the religious realm

has been strengthened by the ever-increasing military ties which have

developed in the last ten years.

Saudi-Pakistani military relations were given added importance with

the events in Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution and the beginning of
hostilities between Iran and Iraq in Autumn 1980. These three
developments have been of major concern to Saudi Arabia, for it not only
threatened the stability of the whole Middle-East region, including the
unhampered flow of oil to the West, but it also posed a direct threat to
the Saudi monarchy, as the take-over of the Mecca Grand Mosque by Shi'a

fundamental~~ts clearly demonstrated. Saudi Arabia has attempted to

80. President Zia-ul-Haq, Address to the Nation (Advent of 15th Century Hijra), Islamabad, 9
November 1980, (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1980), p. 6.
81. Foreign Minister Aga Shahi, Address to Hajlis-i-Shura, Islalabad, 12 January 1982, (Hinistry of
Inforlation and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1982), p. 15.
82. Dieter Braun, 'Constants and Variables in Pakistan's External Relations', Journal of South Asian
and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. V, No.3, Spring 1982, p. 38.
 424

counter these potential threats by purchasing vast amounts of

sophisticated weapons and establishing the Gulf Cooperation Council.

However, these measures could not compensate for the major weakness of the

Saudi military establishment: its small size, and its lack of experience
in battle. 83 Saudi-Pakistani ties have, therefore, become crucial to
the maintenance of the status guo in the region.

The Saudi leadership unequivocally demonstrated the importance it

attached to Pakistan's integrity, when Crown Prince Fahd stated in

December 1980 that

Any interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan

would be considered interference or injury to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 84

In return for this diplomatic and political support Pakistan has most

willingly obliged the Saudis by assisting them in strengthening their

internal and external defences. Exact figures as to the number of

Pakistani troops actually stationed in Saudi Arabia are, of course,

unavailable; but the general consensus is that there are probably around

20,000 men based in the kingdom. 8s Pakistan's involvement in the

protection of Saudi Arabia was given added significance, when in 1981

there were rumours that the two countries were on the verge of concluding

an agreement on the formation of a Pakistani Rapid Deployment Force which

would stand-by in Pakistan ready to go to the kingdom's aid in case of

internal or external threats. 8s The other unknown factor in the

equation is the primary role these Pakistani troops are supposed to

83. The Saudi ar.y has 31,000 .en and the National Guard 20,000, co.pared to Pakistan's .ore than·
400,000 .en under arl. Tahir-Kheli and Staudenmaier, op. cit., p. 160.
34. The New Y·ork Ti.es, 11 Dece.ber 1980, cited in ibid., p. 159.
35. Pakistan also has approxi.ately 10,000 troops in the Gulf states. The Military Balance
(1933-1984), (london, The Institute of Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 97, cited in K.B. Sayeed, 'Pakistan in
..
1983:Internal Stresses More Serious than External Problems', Asian Survey, Vol. XXIV, No.2, February
1984, p. 228. It is interesting to note that the Co•• ander-in-Chief of the Air Force of the United Arab \
Emirates is a Pakistani~Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 269.
86. The Christian Science Monitor,S March 1981.
 425

perfora; that is, are they there mainly to defend the kingdom against
external threats, or to protect the monarchy against internal
subversion?87 In either case the Pakistan government is aware of the
possible domestic backlash. A military confrontation with Iran to protect
Saudi territorial integrity could not only threaten Pakistan's own border
with Iran, but it would undoubtedly create turmoil within Pakistan's own
Shi'a community; and involvement in the protection of the Saudi monarchy
against a mass uprising would probably be widedy opposed in Pakistan,

since it would be seen as "mercenary' troops defending a corrupt monarchy.

Regardless of their specific function, the Saudis value Pakistan's

military commitment because of the advantageous character of their
troops. Not only is the Pakistan Army efficient, disciplined and
well-organized,88 but it is a non-Arab Muslim army. The significance of

this is that, on the one hand, these men are ideologically committed to
the defence of Saudi Arabia and, on the other hand, not speaking the local
vernacular; they are culturally isolated from the domestic environment,
thus preventing them from taking sides in strictly Saudi issues. As a
reward for their military ties with the Saudis, the Pakistanis are very
well remunerated for their services, so much so that competition to go to
Saudi Arabia is very keen amongst the officers and the men.

The economic ties are the third major pillar of the Saudi-Pakistani

relationship. These links, which already existed under Bhutto, have

continued to develop under Zia. Not only have the remittances of
Pakistani ~xpatriates working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states
contributed to the country's foreign exchange needs,89 but Saudi

87. A~cording to some sources, 15,000 Pakistani troops are specifically used as a 'Praetorian guard'
for the Sa~di lonarchy;-'The Observer, 3 June 1984.
88. Ir.terview [A High US Embassy official, Islalabad, Novelber 1983] According to the interviewee,
after NATO's and Israel's, Pakistan's armed forces were the best in the world.
 426

Arabia's financial assistance, such as its contribution to the Zakat fund

and its decision to subsidize Pakistan's purchase of 40 Fl6s, has greatly

assisted Pakistan in alleviating some of its financial problems.

Nevertheless, even with these close Muslim ties, Zia does not see
Islamic solidarity as a viable alternative to an alliance with the West.
As he has stated,

The Islamic block should supplement the Islamic World's

affinity to the advanced countries, especially the
Western countries. It is a supplementary effort,
rather than an alternative. 90

When General Zia took over, and until the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, US-Pakistan relations were at their nadir; for, even with the
removal of Bhutto, Pakistan's drive to proceed with its nuclear programme
remained the most contentious issue between the two countries, so much so
that in 1979 Washington decided to -terminate all economic and military aid
to Pakistan. It was only after the 'loss' of Iran and the Soviet

intervention in Afghanistan that President Carter saw Pakistan in a

different light. Having established the Carter doctrine, which included
amongst other things that the violation of Pakistan's integrity would not

be tolerated, the US offered Pakistan $400 million in military aid. 91

Zia rejected the offer on the grounds that since this low level of
assistance would bring more trouble than benefits there was no incentive

for him to accept it.

This inadequate response to a severe crisis which had the potential to

threaten Pakistan's integrity confirmed once again to the Pakistani
89. In 1980, 90% of the total foreign lanpower requirelent of Saudi Arabia was being let frol
Pakistan. The New York Tiles, 6 February 1981, cited in Robert G. Wirsing and Jales H. Roherty, "The
United States and Pakistan", InternationaJ Affairs, Yolo 58, No.4, Autumn 1982, p. 597.
90. The Econolist,-26 January 1980, p. 45.
91. Haya Chadda, "Reagan's Strategy in South Asia", India Quarterly, Yol XXXYIII, Nos. 3-4, July -
Decelber 1982, p. 321.
 427

leaders the unreliability of military ties with the us. Furthermore, it

also reaffirmed, especially after Reagan came into office, that

US-Pakistan relations were very much dependent on a Republican

administration. 92 The new Republican government followed a very

different approach with regard to the delicate question of Pakistan's

nuclear programme. Instead of cutting off aid, it believed that a much

more fruitful means to induce Pakistan to end its nuclear programme would

be to offer it massive military and economic assistance. Notwithstanding

tha fact that India certainly did not share the American view, President

Reagan managed to have Congress accept his six-year $3.2 billion military

and economic aid package; however, if Pakistan detonated a nuclear device,

tpeaceful' or otherwise, the aid would be immediately terminated. 93

Even though this aid package, equally divided between the military and

economic components, increased Pakistan's external debts, since it had to

borrow from Saudi Arabia to be able to cover the interest payments, it was

nevertheless enthusiastically accepted in Islamabad.

During his highly successful trip to Washington in December 1982, Zia

reaffirmed that the aid package had "laid the foundation for a credible

and enduring relationship". Furthermore, reminiscent of similar

statements made by the Shah of Iran, he added:

At the periphery of a highly volatile region, Pakistan

serves as a bastion of stability, and offers the best
hope for the restoration of a measure of tranquility.

Finally, determined to once and for all put to rest any doubts about his

country's nuclear programme, he declared that Pakistan had "neither the

means nor, ~rideed, any desire to manufacture a nuclear device".94

Moreover, he would sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty once India

92. Salman A. Ali, 'Alternative Futures for US-Pakistani Relations', Asian Affairs, Yolo 9; Nos 5-6,
Hay-August 1932, p; 281~
93. The New York Times, 19 Novelber 1981.
94. The New York Tiles, 10 Decelber 1932.
 428

did likewise. 95 However, in 1984, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's

leading and most respected nuclear scientist, openly acknowledged a long
suspected fact: Pakistan's ability to build nuclear devices. 96

Publicly the US has not demanded anything in return for this aid
package, nor for the $4.02 billion one (1987-1993) presently being debated
in Congress, but it is well known that the US would like as a quid pro
quo: a base where to pre-position vast stockpiles of military equipment

for its Rapid Deployment Force, air-base facilities in Karachi or along

the Baluch coastal area, or re-open electronic surveillance bases in
Peshawar. The Americans' plans are not only to use Pakistan as a
convenient channel to financially and militarily support the
mujahedeen,97 but to build up Pakistan militarily in order for it to

form, along with Saudi Arabia, the southwest pillar of its strategic

scheme. 98 It is in this context that Saudi-Pakistani ties become so

vital to US interests. Moreover, Washington has clearly indicated the
importance it attaches to Pakistan, when Under-Secretary of State James
Buckley stated that ttPakistan is an essential anchor of the entire

Southwest Asian region tt •99

While these military ties with the US, Saudi Arabia and the other
Muslim countries, for example, Egypt and Turkey, appear to return Pakistan
to the heydays of CENTO,lOO the Americans are eager to reassure Pakistan

that they are a reliable ally not only against Soviet aggression but also

95. The Huslim, 25 October 19B5.

96. A.G. Khan, 'Sole Reflections on Pakistan's Peaceful Enrichlent Progral.e", Defence Journal
(Karachi), Vol. X, No.4, April 1934, p. 5.
97. In 19B5 the US earmarked $250 lillion for its 'covert' support of the Afghan rebels. The
Australian, 22 April 1985.
98. Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 Decelber 1934, p. 13.
99. Itid.
100. Pakistan withdr~w frol CENTO in February 1979, and the organization was officially dissolved in
Septelber of that year.
 429

in the case of an Indian attack. 101 As expected, the Indians reacted

sharply at the suggestion that they may be contemplating an attack against
Pakistan, thus giving them the image of being the aggressor and Pakistan
the innocent victim. Notwithstanding India's customary opposition to
Pakistan's military modernization, US-Pakistan relations have expanded to
the satisfaction of both parties. Moreover, the Americans have been

rather pleased with President Zia's decision to hold elections, albeit on

a non-party basis, and to lift Martial Law as promised, for these two
internal developments somewhat improved Zia's international image.

As opposed to US-Pakistan relations which underwent a significant

improvement, Sino-Pakistan ties continued on their steady course.
Nevertheless, in the early years of Zia's regime the Chinese leadership
did not view kindly his attempt to include the pro-Moscow NAP leader Wali
Khan in the government, nor his suggestion that he may consider striking a
deal with the Soviet Union on the issue of Afghanistan. However, their
relationship, especially after Pakistan decided not to negotiate with the
Soviet-:-supported Afghan government and instead allow the Mu.iahedeen use

Pakistan territory as a base for their insurgency operations in

Afghanistan, quickly stabilized. This has been evident not only in the
field of trade,102 in the opening of the Khunjerab Pass on the Korakoram

highway, and in the PRC's financial and military support for the Afghan
rebels,103 but also in the expansion of nuclear collaboration between

the two countries. It is this cooperation in the nuclear field which has
had the US and India worried. According to Senator Cranston, China has
helped Pakistan ,"acquire all the capability necessary to produce nuclear

101. Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 Novelber 1984, p. 44.

102. The level of bilateral trade is quite low actually, alounting to only $200 lillion annually .
Their objective is to have it expand to $500 million within two years. Far Eastern Economic Review,
12 December 1985, pp. 24-25. -
103. The PRe and Saudi Arabia have together earlarked $250 lillion for the Hujahedeen.
The Econolist, 11 Hay 1985, p. 18.
 430

weapons". 104 Undoubtedly, this has strained US-Pakistan relations and

dampened the Americans' initial enthusiasm for close military
collaboration with the Chinese.

While Pakistan and China have both benefitted from past and present
cooperation in the military, economic and nuclear fields, the relationship
has stagnated in the last few years. This is essentially the result of
the two countries having expanded diplomatic links with other states and

having diversified the source of their military needs; they are no longer
as indispensable to one another as in the earlier years of their

relationship. Moreover, the Pakistani military planners have come to

realize the danger of depending too heavily on one ally for the safeguard
of their country's territorial integrity. This more realistic approach to
miltary strategy was made abundantly clear when Zia, remembering the
events of 1971, declared:

We are deeply grateful to China for their support but

we feel that in the hour of need, it would be the
people and Armed Forces of Pakistan who will have to
defend national independence and integrity. lOS

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, relations with the USSR have
seriously been strained. By having the unenviable position of sharing a
long and virtually indefensible border with Afghanistan, which has
resulted in Pakistan being host to 3 million refugees and Mu.iahedeen,
Pakistan has unwillingly become a 'front line' state. Initially,
Pakistan, faced with a massive Soviet presence in Afghanistan, was
considering some sort of accommodation with the USSR; and, although this
I

approach would have been welcomed by large sections of the population, Zia

104. The New York Tiles, 21 June 1984.

105. President Zia~ul-Haq, Address to the Nation, Rawalpindi, 24 December 1981, (Ministry of
Inforlation and Broadcasting, Governlent of Pakistan, 1981), p. 18.
 431

realized that this would have meant the automatic loss of American,
Chinese and Saudi friendship and virtual subordination to Soviet and
Indian power, a scenario which in the long-term could potentially herald
the demise of Pakistan.

Instead Zia has chosen to align Pakistan with the anti-Soviet forces,
modernize its armed forces, and allow 'covert' military assitance to be
funnelled to the Mu.iahedeen. However, even with this diplomatic and
military support, Zia still fears the worse. As he put it: "once the

Russians have fully consolidated their position in Afghanistan, Pakistan

will be their next target - and they will devour Pakistan in one big
bite".106 Of course, the government's ultimate scenario is a
coordinated attack by Soviet and Indian forces, resulting in the
dismemberment of Pakistan and its subsequent absorption by its two
neighbours. While this may appear quite plausible from a Pakistani
perspective, considering India's close military ties with the Soviet Union
and its persistant desire to dominate Pakistan, this is a most unlikely
eventuality; for it may be comforting to be allied with the USSR, but it
is quite another matter to have a common border with it. Thus, it is

certainly not in India's interest to see the destruction of Pakistan as an

i'ndependent nation-state, or even the 'Finlandization' of its foreign
policy. It would much rather prefer to maintain the status guo and have
Pakistan act as a buffer state between itself and the Soviet Union. 107
Moreover, in view of India's already troublesome ethnic and religious

problems, it is unlikely that it would wish to absorb another 80 million

Muslims wit~i~ its borders. los Interestingly, even with their
incompatible views over the Afghan issue, Pakistan-USSR relations,
106. The Sydney Horning Herald, 21 Hay 1984.
107. Interview [AShrif Qazi, Director-General, Policy Planning, Hinistry of Foreign Affairs,
Islamabad, October 1983]
108. Rose, "Pakistan's Role and Interests in South and Southwest Asia", p. 63.
 432

especially in the field of economic assistance, have continued to

develop. 109 Apart from its continued assistance in the construction of

the Karachi steel mill, the Soviet Union has been eager to expand its

economic aid to Pakistan, focussing primarily on the country's energy

sector. Moreover, Soviet assistance is not only provided on "soft' terms,
but is repayable in the form of Pakistani goodS. 110

So while Pakistan has locked itself into a difficult and

uncompromising stance by clearly identifying with the anti-Soviet camp, it

would like a return to the status guo ante. As Zia has stated, and which
has had his allies worry about his reliability,
It (Soviet Union) is our neighbouring country; it is a
world power; geographical location has brought us
shoulder to shoulder with one another. We want to
transform this geographical closeness into closeness of
friendship. We want understanding with Russia on the
basis of principles and want a peaceful solution of the
Afghanistan problem in the same climate of
understanding. 111

Just as the Soviet intervention affected USSR-Pakistan relations, the

invasion also had a negative spill-over effect on Indo-Pakistan relations,
mainly because of India's persistent apologist approach to Soviet
actions. Its views regarding the invasion were virtually identical to the

Soviet Union's; that it, it was "a reaction to the deterioration of

conditions both within Afghanistan (due to the resistance supported from

outside) and the "encirclement' by Sino-American cooperation".112
Similarly, India expects Pakistan to recognize the Afghan government,

terminate its support for the Afghan rebels, and distance itself from the
US and the ~us1im countries. It is therefore not surprising that India's

"109. Dawn, 3 February 1984.

110. A.T. Chaudhri, "Roubles for the Sixth Plan", Dawn, 31 December 1983.
111. President Zia-ul-Haq, Address to the Hation, 24 December 1981, p.l?
112. Dieter Braun;"The Afghanistan Conflict as a Regional Problem", Journal of South Asian and
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. VI, No.4, Sumler 1983, p. 35.
 433

attitude toward the conflict and its relentless drive to dominate the
sub-continent have done little to establish an atmosphere of trust between
the two countries. This mutual animosity was soon compounded with
Pakistan's $3.2 billion aid package from the US; and although India had
already negotiated before the Soviet invasion the purchase of 150
Mirage-2000 and 75 Mig 23, both equivalent or better than Pakistan's
F16s,113 Indian leaders claimed that "arming Pakistan was not only a

threat to India but to the Soviet Union and its other allies".114

However, inflammatory statements have not only originated from India.

Already in September 1979, at the Sixth Non-Aligned summit in Havana,
President Zia was not only emphasizing the need to oppose "hegemony or
domination in any guise or form", but he also reiterated Pakistan's

determination "to seek the resolution of the dispute regarding the future

of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the relevant United Nations

resolutions and the spirit of the Simla agreement".115 Both these

remarks certainly annoyed India, for it insinuated that India was a

hegemonistic power and it refuted India's position that the Kashmir issue
be resolved on a strictly bilateral basis. 1l6 Clearly, the leaders'
stances on bilateral issues and the Afghanistan conflict were virtually
irreconciliable; however, there was an awareness that this situation was
in no one's interest. Thus, while acknowledging that "foreign military

intervention in Afghanistan had exerted a negative influence on the

climate of bilateral relations", the Pakistan government realized that
"obsolete and rigid moulds of thinking must be discarded", and instead
suggested tllE{ negotiation of a non-aggression treaty with India. 1l7

113. The Economist, 26 Septelber 1981, p. 20.

114. Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 Hovelber 1984, p. 45.
115. President Zia-ul-Haq, Address to the Sixth Non-Aligned Summit, Havana, 6 Septelber 1979,
(Ministry of Infor.atio~and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1979), pp. 6,10.
116. Interview [S.K. Delvi, Head of India Desk, Min. of Foreign Affairs, Islalabad, Decelber 1983]
117. Foreign Minister Aga Shahi, op. cit., pp. 10,12.
 434

Unfortunately this Pakistani proposal, which was welcomed by the US,

since it had the potential to reduce tensions on the sub-continent,118
was initially rejected by India. Apart from having been taken by surprise
by Zia's proposal, the main reason for Indira Gandhi's rejection of the
no-war pact offer was inherent suspicion of Pakistan's motives and
designs.119 Not only was there the persistent Kashmir problem,120

Pakistan's growing ties with the US, but, more recently, Pakistan's

alleged training of militant Sikhs seeking the establishment of an

independent Khalistan. 121 Similarly, Pakistan was dubious of India's
own behaviour, and of its commitment not to once again attack Pakistan.

As Harrison indicated, India's de jure recognition of the Durand Line as

the official Afghanistan-Pakistan border would go a long way in appeasing

Pakistani fears about Indian designs.122 Until it does, it will always
worry about the possibility of covert collusion with Afghanistan and the
Soviet Union to dismember Pakistan: These suspicions were definitively
reinforced when Indira Gandhi, at the height of the Sind unrest in Autumn
1983, inaugurated the World Sindhi Conference. At this gathering it was
declared that "the time was ripe for this part of Pakistan (Sind) to
become a part of India so that Sindhis of both Pakistan and India could
co-habit and work for their common good".123 On a separate occasion the

Indian prime minister stressed that "India could not keep its eyes closed
since the developments in Pakistan could have repercussions in
India".124 These were statements which the Pakistani leaders did not

take too lightly; they were aware that Indira Gandhi had used the same

lIB. Chadda, op. cit., p. 329.

119. India's deep-seated suspicion of Pakistan's proposals, such as the no-war pact and lutual
inspection of nu~l~r facilities, is regularly reflected in articles in Strategic Analysis, a journal
published by the 'highly influential Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
120. The Kashlir issue was cOlplicated with Zia's decision to allow Gilgit, Hunza and Skardu to send
representatives to his newly-forled Federal Council. Far Eastern Econolic Review, 2 July 19B2, p. 32.
121. The Economist, 17 Novelber 19B4, p. 26.
122. Selig Harrison, "Tensions in South Asia", The New York Tiles, 11 Decelber 1981.
123. The Indian Express, IB October 1933.
124. Far Eastern Econolic Review, 6 October 1933, p. 25.
 435

argument before India intervened in the East Pakistan civil war.

While these inflammatory declarations were being made in public, the

two countries maintained high level contacts, trying to establish a

framework which would be conducive to the improvement of relations.

Surprisingly, these negotiations proved to be successful. In November

1982, the two countries agreed to establish a joint commission which would

periodically meet to review economic, technological and cultural

issues. 125 While this joint commission has not met very often and the

results of their deliberations have fallen short of everyone's

expectations, the mere fact that this commission has been established has

had a positive effect on bilateral relations. For example, during the

storming of the Sikhs' Golden Temple by the Indian Army in June 1984 and

just after the assassination of Indira Gandhi in November of that same

year, Zia immediately reassured the Indian leaders that Pakistan would not
take advantage of the situation,126 an undertaking which Ayub refused to

give when India was preoccupied with the border clash with China.

Similarly, Rajiv Gandhi and Zia met on 17 December 1985, and, although

they avoided discussing the Kashmir issue, they were able to agree to

refrain from attacking each other's nuclear facilities, to curb

cross-border terrorism, to aim for closer economic relations, and to

attempt to merge Pakistan's no-war propoz31 with India's own Peace and

Friendship Treaty suggestion. 127

Although these diplomatic developments would not appear to be very

substantial,·· on the sub-continent these are considered major achievements,

so much so that the improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations has enabled the

125. Dawn (Weekly), 11-17 November 1982.

126. Williams L. lRichter, "Pakistan in 1984:Digging in", Asian Survey, Vol. XXV, No.2, February
1935, p. 153.
127. The Huslia, 13 December 1935.
 436

establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC) to become a reality.128 This association, officially launched

in Dhaka in December 1985, has identified nine areas of cooperation, all

of which are non-political. 129 While the objectives of SAARC are to

remain open-ended, decisions are to be unanimous so that India does not

feel threatened by the other six members and the smaller countries do not
have to fear Indian domination. So even though "bilateral and contentious

issues" are not to be discussed, at least the establishment of SAARC will

have helped diminish the Indian threat, not only for Pakistan but for all

the small countries of the region. Thus, as Rose indicated, perhaps Zia

has come to realize that greater involvement in South Asia may be more

beneficial to Pakistan at the present time. 130

Having examined Pakistan's relations with the external actors as they

relate to the Afghanistan crisis, we may now proceed with the analysis of

the internal consequences of the Soviet intervention. 131 It is

essential to remember that the Pakistan government's demands for an

acceptable resolution of the conflict, as reflected in the resolutions

adopted by the OlC, the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement, are: a Soviet

withdrawal from Afghanistan, the establishment of Afghanistan as a

Non-Aligned Muslim country, the re-affirmation of the right of the Afghan

people to determine their own political and socio-economic system free

from outside interference, and the return of the Afghan refugees to their
homes in safety and honour. Although this unyielding stance by Pakistan

is highly commendable in view of the military threat it is confronted

128. SAARC jncludes: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Haldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
129. The areas of cooperation are inter alia: postal services, telecommunications, science &
technology, health and population planning, rural development and sports. The Huslim, 9 December 1985.
130. Rose, "Pakistan's Role and Interests in South and Southwest Asia", p. 52.
131. Fer a brief summary of the factors which r justified' the Soviet Union's invasion of
Afghanistan, see: Pervaiz Iqbal Cheella, "The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Securi ty Dilemma" Asian
Survey, Vol. XXIII, No.3, Harch 1983, pp. 228-230.
 437

with,132 by adopting such a position, however, it has locked itself into

a situation in which it has virtually no room to manoeuvrej133 and it is

this diplomatic deadlock in which it presently finds itself which has

resulted in the Zia government having to face growing opposition to its
Afghan policy.

Initially the refugees were warmly welcomed by the local Pakistani

population, for these were Muslim brothers and, especially in the case of
NWFP where the majority settled, members of the same Pukhtun ethnic

group. However, when the number of refugees swelled from 18,000 in

December 1979 to close to 3,000,000 in 1985134 Pakistani hospitality was

being stretched beyond reasonable expectation. The inevitable tension

that has arisen between the refugees and the local population has been
caused by several factors. First, although the refugees are certainly a
minority relative to the overall Pakistan population, it has become
increasingly common in some areas of NWFP and Baluchistan to have an equal
number of Afghans and Pakistanis, and sometimes the refugees actually
outnumber the hostS. 135 Secondly, while in NWFP this skewed ratio in
favour of the refugees is still tolerable because of the ethnic
affinities, in Baluchistan, where Baluch-Pukhtun animosity is still
deep-seated, this situation has become unacceptable to the Baluch who feel

they are quickly becoming a minority in their own province. The social
tensions which have arisen from this imbalance has even led the provincial

Jama'at-i-Islami (J1), in a radical departure from the its traditional

132. The Pak~stan Foreign Affairs Minister has persistently repeated the government's determination
not to recognize/the Afghan government. The Huslim, 23 December 1985.
133. Hustafa, "The Islamic Conference and Afghanistan", p. 40.
134. According to Pakistan government records, there were 2,800,000 registered Afghan refugees in
Pakistan. The Huslim, 7 August 1985. Interview, [Brig. (Red.) Said Azhar, Pakistan High Commissioner for
Refugees,. Islamabad, October 1983] According to the interviewee there were already 3,000,000 refugees
(registered and non-registeredj in Pakistan in 1983.
135. Interview, ibid.; The Huslim, 20 October 1985.
 438

support for the government, to criticize Zia's refugee policy.136

Thirdly, because registered refugees are fed, sheltered and clothed, they

have been willing to accept lower wages for their labour, thus creating

unemployment amongst the local population. Furthermore, the refugees have

seriously threatened the (Pakistani) Pukhtuns' hold on the transport

industry, since the trucks the Afghans brought with them have a greater

loading capacity. Fourthly, since these refugees brought along with them

their grazing animals, all pasture lands around the refugee camps have

been overused. Moreover, the trees have not been spared either because of

the refugees' energy requirements. Finally, although it is illegal for

the Afghans to own immovable property, their purchase of homes, land and

commercial properties have caused prices to soar.

Of course, if these were the only issues which the government had to

deal with the refuge~ problem would certainly be manageable, since it

would essentially be a humanitarian issue. However, because the

Mujahedeen use Pakistani territory as a base from which to launch their

attacks against the Soviet and Afghan forces,137 the presence of the

refugees has become a military problem. 138 While Soviet response to

these offensives has been limited to the occasional strafing of border

camps suspected of harbouring rebels,139 the Pakistani military has

become increasingly worried that Soviet reaction may not remain as

restrained in the future. Moreover, the Pakistan government appears to

have virtually no control over the activities of these insurgents, and

when it does attempt to restrict their movements it is warned by the rebel

136. The Muslim, 5 December 1985.

137. I~terview [Brig.(Red} Said Azhar], op. cit., The interviewee categorically denied that the
Huiahedeen ~ere using Pakistan territory as a base for guerrilla attacks into Afghanistan.
138. According to General Nabi Azeemi, Deputy Defence Minister of Afghanistan, there are 120
training cal?S in Pakistan, with each camp nUlbering 3000 insurgents. Viewpoint, 24 October 1985" p. 15.
139. Er April 1995, Pakistani territory had been bOlbed 61 tiles, cOIPared to 81 tiles in all of
1984. The Australian, 22 April 1985.
 439

leaders not to block the guerrillas from re-entering Pakistan. 140

Finally, the Mujahedeen, who are deeply divided along ideological

lines,141 have started to fight amongst each other on Pakistani soil.
With the hope of isolating these differences from the local population,

the Pakistani authorities have had the refugees leave Peshawar. 142

These developments have led to the worriesome situation where these

political-cum-military groups are quickly evolving into a quasi-government

a 1a PLO.143

Apart from his government officials, the majority of the military

establishment and the J1, Zia's Afghanistan policy is increasingly being

opposed by large sections of the population. The most vocal critics of

the government's policy are undoubtedly the political parties of the

opposition alliance, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).

They point out that Zia's policy is bankrupt and counter-productive; that

the Geneva "proximity talks" between Afghanistan and Pakistan have failed

to resolve the crisis; and, that the continuation of this policy can only

but strengthen the influence of the Kabul-supported Baluch guerrillas

opposed to Islamabad. 144 Moreover, the MRD is highly critical of Zia's

Afghan policies because allegedly the refugees have increasingly been used

as quislings of the J1 in suppressing Pukhtun opposition to the

government's Islamization programme. 145 Consequently, the MRD, and

specifically the PPP, advocates an immediate recognition of the Kabul

government and the return of the refugees after having come to an

140. Viewpoint, 16 January 1986, p. 8.

141. For a brjef examination of the various insurgent groups, see: N.P. Newell and R.S. Newell, The
Struggle for Afghanistan, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 91-106.
142. The Huslia, 9 August 1984.
143. Hafeez Halik, "The Afghan Crisis and its Impact on Pakistan", The Journal of South Asian and
Hiddle Eastern Studies, Vol. V, No.3, Spring 1982, p. 46.
144. There are 7,500 Baluch attached to the Baluchistan People's liberation Front, of which 2,700
are based in southern Afghanistan. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 75.
145. While this is an accusation hard to substantiate, it was nevertheless often mentioned in
interviews with journalists.
 440

acceptable arrangement with the Afghan authorities. 146 If these views

were restricted to the main opposition parties, Zia could always claim

that this position was to be expected from them, since they automatically
criticize the president's policies. However, this is not the case; for
even the Jami'at-ul Ulama-e-Pakistan, a Karachi-based religious
party,147 influential members of the new parliament,l48 and the Jirga

elders of the Tribal Agencies and Frontier Regions have demanded the same

measures. l49 The result of this accommodation with the Soviet Union

would, according to Rose, probably result in the "Afghanization tt of

Pakistan; that is, the minority ethnic groups would compete with one

another for Soviet support in their struggle to counter Punjabi

domination, leading to the eventual break-up of Pakistan. lso

In sum, Zia's foreign policy, which has essentially been a

continuation of Bhutto's emphasis on relations with the Muslim states, has

had two far-reaching effects. First, by forging intimate relations with

the conservative states of the Middle-East and by having entered into a de

facto alliance with the US, Pakistan has virtually eliminated any
possibility of initiating direct bilateral relations with the Afghan

governaent and concluding a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The

potential consequences of these self-imposed limitations are sombre.

First, the Soviet and Afghan forces could launch a massive attack against

Pakistan's western provinces. While this is an unlikely scenario because

of the international ramifications this action would have on US-USSR

relations, it is an option the Soviet Union could always envisage if it

146. 7he Huslfm, 21 October 1935; Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan:The Gathering Storm, (Dhaka, University
Press, 19B:, p. 64; and, Interview [A high-ranking member of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (HRD), lahore,
December 19~3] The interviewee believed the refugees would never return, but would eventually be absorbed
into Pakist2n.
147. The Huslim, 19 April 1985.
148. The Husli., 27 December 1985.
149. Viewppoint, 17 October 1985, p. 17.
150. £Dse, "Pakistan's Role and Interests in South and Southwest Asia", p. 60.
 «1

felt it was an indispensable move in order to consolidate its hold in

Afghanistan. Second, with the objective of destabilizing the Zia
government, the Soviet Union could decide to ere-activate' the latent

Pukhtunistan issue by giving substantial military and ideological support

to the Pukhtuns and the Afghan-based Baluch rebels. Finally, the
government's Afghan policy could generate sufficient dissatisfaction

amongst the Pukhtuns and Baluch so as to create enough domestic turmoil to

destabilize the present government. In this case the Sindhis would most
likely join this movement which would certainly have anti-Punjabi

overtones.

The second effect of the government's close alliance with Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf states has been to strengthen Zia's determination to proceed
with his government's Islamization programme. Although Zia may sincerely
believe this to be the only means to integrating Pakistani society, the
result, however, has been to further increase the smaller ethnic groups'
feeling of alienation vis-a-vis the Punjab i-dominated central government.
This could eventually lead to a further radicalization of these minority

ethnic groups, thus threatening the stability of the state.

Therefore, Zia's Afghanistan policy and his Islamization programme,

both directly influenced by Pakistan's close ties with the conservative
monarchies of the Arabian peninsula, have the potential to cause the
destabilization of the state, especially if both issues continue to

develop simultaneously.

As indicated in the theoretical model, and which has been confirmed in

the analysis of the Bhutto and Zia regimes, the external environment has
continued to have a direct impact upon Pakistan's national integration
 442

process, and, convertly, domestic politics have influenced the two

governments' foreign policy as well as the external actors' perception of

Pakistan. Thus, the external and internal environments having been so

closely interconnected with one another, it would be correct to state that
these two forces have been involved in a circular relationship.

Although Bhutto was already favourably inclined toward the development

of close links with the Muslim World, mainly because of 'new' Pakistan's
relatively homogeneous religious composition, it was the resurgence of
Islam as a potent force in world politics, especially after the 1973 oil

crisis, which gave Pakistan the added impetus to forge ahead with the new

Muslim ties. The external environment further strengthened the influence

of fundamentalism in Pakistan and legitimized Zia's Islamization programme
following the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
These resulting internal developments have in turn consolidated Pakistan's
multi-faceted relationship with Saudi Arabia and reinforced the Pakistan
government's drive for closer identification with the Muslim World.

While the Islamization programme was welcomed in the conservative Arab

states, India was highly critical of this policy, for it meant closer

Pakistani identification with the Middle-East which threatened India's

desire to maintain Pakistan within its orbit. Similarly, ethnic-oriented
policies affected the perception and behaviour of Pakistan's neighbours,
such as Iran's involvement in Baluchistan, Afghanistan's support for
Pukhtun and Baluch rebels and India's • concern' for Sind. Finally, the
growing eth9ic and religious friction between the Afghan refugees and the
local population has the potential to destabilize the present government,
which in the long-term could have far-reaching repercussions on Pakistan's

external environment.
 PART VI.

CONCLUSIONS
 This study examined the role of ethnicity, religion and the external

euvironment in the process of national integration in Pakistan from 15

August 1947, the date of independence, until the lifting of Martial Law on
31 December 1985. The analysis of national integration in Pakistan has

been limited to the three aforementioned variables for the following

reasons: first, religion was the legitimizing factor which led to the

creation of Pakistan, and has remained the state's raison d'@tre; second,

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic society in which the centrifugal influence of

the ethnic groups has had a divisive impact upon the process of

'nation-building'; and, third, the external environment has been of

considerable importance in a country which consisted of two wings

separated by a much larger hostile power and, with traditional enemies on

its other borders, faced greater external threats than most newly-created

states. While there have obviously been other internal factors involved
in the country's integrative process, such as the role of political

leaders and parties, the legislature and the judiciary, the satisfactory

accommodation of these three variables is a minimum pre-requisite if

Pakistan is successfully to proceed with national integration.

Before analysing the combined impact these three independent variables

have had on Pakistan, I shall briefly examine the relevance of the major

theoretical concepts to the study of national integration in Pakistan;

second, I will discuss the effect each variable has had on the political

developments of Pakistan; and, third, I will analyse how the interaction

of these three variables has adversely affected the process of

'nation-building' in Pakistan. It will be argued that while the

I

combination of religion, ethnicity, the external environment has surely

impaired the process of national integration in Pakistan, they are not a

sufficient force in themselves to result in the disintegration of the

state.
 444

As examined in the theoretical chapter, there is a large body of

l i terature dealing wi th national integration j however, while many

approaches are applicable in part to this study, for example,

Emerson'sl, Horowitz's2, Kuper's3 and Smith's4, only a few, such

as Connor'ss, Deutsch's6, Enloe's7 and Wriggins'sB, can be wholly

applied in the Pakistan context.

Although the theories of pluralism, as advanced by Kuper,9 SmithlO

and Van Den Berghe,ll have selectively been appropriate in the Pakistan
context, the application of the tequilibrium'l2 and tconflict'l3

approaches have been less helpful in analysing Pakistani society. This is

mainly due to the fact that in Pakistan inter-ethnic relations have not

been uniform and have varied according to the contextual nature of their

interactionj14 thus, one would not be able to definitively apply one of

these two approaches to Pakistani society in exclusive terms. Rather, it

is a hybrid of the two. For example, Punjabi-Pukhtun relations have

1. R. Emerson, From E.eire to Nation:The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African People,
{Cambridge University Press, 1960}, pp. 95-96.
2. D.l. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Seperatism", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.
23, 1981, pp. 165-195.
3. l. Kuper, 'Plural Societies:Perspectives and Problems", in l. Kuper and H.G. Smith (eds.},
Pluralism in Africa, (los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969), pp. 7-26.
4. H.G. Smith, "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism", in l. Kuper and H.G. Smith
(eds.), ibid., pp. 27-65.
5. W. Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying", World Politics, Vol. 24, No.3, April 1972,
pp. 319-355.
6. K.W. Deutsch, Tides Among Nations, (NY:The Free Press, 1979), p. 279.
7. C.H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers:State Security in Divided Societies, Athens:University of Georgia
Press, 1980.
3. N.H. Wriggins, The Rulers' Imperative:Strategies of Political Survival in Asia and Africa,
NY:Columbia University Press, 1969.
9. Kuper, ,op. cit., pp. 7-26.
10. Smith, op. cit., pp. 27-65.
11. P.l. Van Den Berghe, "Pluralism and the Polity:A Theoretical Exploration", in l. Kuper amd H.S.
Smith (eds.), op. cit., pp. 67-81.
12. Kuper, op. cit., pp. 8-10.
13. J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, (Cambridge University Press, 194B}, pp. 304ff.
14. J. Rothschild, Ethnopolitics:A Conceptual Framework, (Colu.bia University Press, 19B1), p.130.
generally been cooperative in the field of military affairs, but have
increasingly been conflictual over the Afghanistan refugees issue.

Similarly, Bengalis and muha,iirs may have had a common approach toward
India, but had fundamental disagreements regarding the national language
question. This variation would appropriately complement the dynamic
approach to the study of ethnicity in Pakistan where, as a result of

increased inter-ethnic interaction, ethnic boundaries are fluid and ethnic

values are constantly changing. 15

However, although there may be increasing interaction between the

various ethnic groups, leading to a gradual breakdown of ethnic

boundaries, Pakistan is still highly stratified regarding the allocation

of resources. While Horowitz's theoretical identification of vertical and

horizontal stratification is generally relevant to this study,16 a

combination of these two categories would more correctly define the

economic and political status of the various Pakistani ethnic groups; that

is, a hybrid model where the presence of the vertical and horizontal

systems of stratification reflect the importance of ethnicity in the

country's hierarchy of power. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that ethnic

interaction is by its very nature dynamic and varies according to the

context, the two-tier categorization of ethnic groups discussed in the

Theoretical chapter, that is, Punjabis and muha,iirs in the upper tier and

the Baluch, Pukhtun, Sindhis and Bengalis {until 1971) in the lower tier,

remains a valid and useful model for ranking ethnic groups in Pakistani

society.

15. Enloe, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

16. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 232.
 446

Similarly, the theories defining the stages reached in

inter-ethnic17 and centre-peripheryls interaction have generally been

useful analytical tools in the study of national integration in Pakistan.

However, as with the dichotomous models of pluralism, these approaches

were most suitable when not applied in exclusive terms, but adapted

according to the contextual environment. Deutsch19 believes this to be

the most appropriate approach to the study of any country's process of

national integration.

When attempting to determine whether the Muslim Indians actually

constituted a <nation', as proclaimed by the Muslim League, there are

initial difficulties in applying to them the standard definition of a

'nation' as advanced by Smith20 and Emerson. 21 However, while the

Indian Muslims displayed virtually none of the customary subjective and

objective pre-requisites to form a <nation', they did have a 'national'

feeling based on what Renan called tla soul, a spiritual principle tl . 22

But while this 'spirit' was given concrete form in the Indian Muslims'

separate social and religious identity from the Hindus, this was not a

powerful enough criteria to unite them into a cohesive 'nation'; and this

was made abundantly clear in the subsequent confrontation between the

different ethnic groups.

17. A.A. Hazrui, 'Pluralism and National Integration', in l. Kuper and H.S. Smith (eds.), op. cit.,
pp. 334-336.
lB. D. lerner, ·Some Comments on Centre-Periphery Relations', in R.l. Herritt and Stein Rokkan
(eds.), Comparing Nations, '(Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 265-295.
19. Deut.sc,h,' op. cit.., p. 279.
20. Smith defined a 'nation' as being ·a single inclusive corporate group whose members - or the
majority of them - share sOle cOlmon traditions, institutions, history, and ethnic identity'. op. cit.,
p. 32.
21. Emerson, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
22. Ernest Renan, Discours' et Conferences,{1BS7), pp. 306-307, cited in Alfred Cobban, The Nation
State and National Self Determination, (NY:Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), p. 122.
 447

Directly related to the study of Muslims as a "nation', is the lacuna

in the national integration literature of theoretical models specifically

dealing with Muslim groups, such as the Modernists, the Traditionalists

and the Fundamentalists, as there exists for ethnic groups. So while

there is an abundance of empirical studies on Muslim religious groups both

in Pakistan and elsewhere, the lack of a general theory in this field
presents opportunities for future study.

Certainly one of the most interesting and useful analytical approaches

for examining 'nation-building' in this case study has been the body of

theory dealing with 'state-building' as developed by Huntington. 23 As

indicated in the model representing the sequential stages of national

integration, this is an integral facet of the 'nation-building' process.

Since the feeling of nationhood has at best been ephemeral in Pakistan, it

was necessary for the leaders to ensure that powerful state institutions

were established in order adequately to deal with the dual problems of

ethnicity and religion. This perceived need for newly-independent

countries to establish a powerful state apparatus so as to successfully

counter ethnic-based dissent against the centre is most clearly developed

by Connor.24 As discussed in the Theoretical chapter, his argument is

that while national self-determination was a legitimate claim under

colonial rule, after independence such similar demands from ethnic or

religious groups are no longer acceptable political practices, and are

viewed as rebellious behaviour. Accordingly, the state, seeking to

legitimize its raison d'@tre, will unrelentingly repress all ethnic or

religious-~a~ed dissent, for example, the Sikhs in India and the Tamils in

Sri Lanka. In the case of Pakistan, where Muslim identity was the basis
for the creation of a state, all ethnic-based sentiments which question

23. S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 1-92.
24. Connor, op. cit., p. 279.
 448

the religious foundation of the state have been systematically repressed

by the central authorities. Moreover, since the successive civilian wld

military leaders have repeatedly stressed that Pakistan was a cohesive and

united 'nation' because of its Muslim identity, demands for provincial

autonomy have been perceived as a potential threat to the proclaimed

indivisibility of the Pakistani 'nation' and a rejection of Islam as an

integrative force. Accordingly, the central governments have used these

raisons d'etat to legitimize their continued opposition to provincial

autonomy, whether in Baluchistan in the 1960s and 1970s, in East Pakistan

in 1971, or Sind in 1983.

Finally, directly related to the process of state-building is the

applicability of Enloe's ethnic state security map2S which I believe has

been most appropriate in understanding ethnic stratification in the

Pakistani context. It demonstrates how the central Pakistani authorities'

ethnic ranking of society according to their perception of the component

groups' loyalty to the state has had two adverse consequences upon the

process of national integration in Pakistan. First, it has reinforced the

dominant position Punjabis and muhajirs, and to a lesser extent Pukhtuns,

have in the national institutions; and, second, it has reinforced the

'peripheral' ethnic groups' feeling of alienation toward the state.

As clearly outlined by Wriggins,26 the drive to consolidate state

power is directly related to the rulers' need to legitimize their

position, and this has been pursued through various strategies, for

example, Ayub's economic development, Bhutto's Islamic Socialism, and

Zia's Islamization programme. However, regardless of the means followed,

25. Enloe, op. cit., pp. 12-29.

26. Wriggins, op. cit.
 449

the rulers' quest for legitimacy will only be attained if the population

perceives the government's policies as being genuinely concerned with the

ultimate objective of the national good, and not only with regime

survival. Furthermore, as with the analysis of the strategies used by the

rulers, there is the need to examine a government's success in pursuing a

process of national integration not on the basis as to whether it is a

civilian or a military regime, but rather on its effectiveness or

otherwise in establishing state institutions conducive to national

integration. 27 And as examined in this study, civilian and military

rulers are equally at fault in failing to weld the disparate groups of

Pakistani society into a -nation'.

Finally, while several studies have addressed the influence the

external environment has on a country's political development

(Horowitz,28 Rose2 9 and Weiner3° have made some of the most

perceptive contributions to this field), there has been either a general

tendency to downplay the influence that the external environment has on

the process of national integration, or to focus attention on the

country's foreign policy. The weakness with the latter approach is that

it tends to emphasize the government's output rather than the external

environment's input into the process of national integration. Therefore,

because the external environment has had such a fundamental impact upon

the process of national integration in Pakistan, it was vital that the

influence of the external environment be examined in combination with

ethnicity and religion.

27. Huntin~ton, op. cit., pp. 1-92.

2B. Harowitz, op. cit.
29. Leo E. Rose, 'South Asia and the Outside World", in A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton (eds.), The States
of South Asia:Problels of National Integration, (Delhi, Vikas, 19B2), pp. 313-327.
30. Myron Weiner,_"The Hacedonian Syndrome:An Historical Hodel of International Relations and
Political Development", World Politics, Vol. 23, N8. 4, July 1971, pp. 665-683.
 450

Consideration of the relevant literature on national integration and

its applicability to the Pakistani context led to the development of the
three hypotheses on which this study is based. As stated in the

Introduction, these are:

1. ·In a multi-ethnic state the domination of all major

'national' institutions by one or two ethnic groups
compounds the heterogeneous and fractured nature of the
state, and thus impedes the national integration
process.
2. In an ideological and multi-ethnic state the failure to
reach a consensus with regard to the role the national
ideology should have in the administration of the
country re-inforces the centrifugal forces of ethnicity
which, in turn, facilitates the establishment of
authoritarian regimes, both civilian and military.

3. In a multi-ethnic and fractured state the external

environment may have an important impact upon the
process of national integration of that state.

While these hypotheses respectively deal with ethnicity, religion and

the external environment, these three independent variables, as indicated

in. the theoretical model outlined in the Introduction, are closely

inter-linked with one another. In other words, the demands made upon the

central government by the ethnic and religious groups and the influence of

the external environment on the central government will individually and

collectively have a major effect upon the national integration process.

This will, in turn, have a feedback effect on these independent

variables. However, regardless of the outcome of the governments'

decisions, and its positive or negative effects on the process of national

integration, this model not only demonstrates the dynamic nature of this

process, but it also indicates the causal relationship that exists between
/

these independent variables and the national integration process, the

dependent variable.
 451

This causal relationship has been demonstrated in the ethnic field by

the examination of the dominant role Punjabis and muha,iirs have had in the

national institutions and the adverse effect this has had on the process

of national integration in Pakistan. By jointly controlling the major

national institutions, such as the bureaucracy, the armed forces, the

business sector and the Muslim League, these two groups quickly

established themselves on the upper tier of the vertical stratification

model of Pakistan. From this position they were able to implement a

policy of centralization which enabled them to dominate economically and

politically the rest of the country.

In the religious sphere, the federal authorities legitimized their

centralization policy by emphasizing the political philosophy of the

"Two-Nation Theory", later re-named the "Pakistan Ideology". They

essentially argued that since the Indian Muslims had obtained a separate

homeland on the basis of religion, Pakistan was now a "nation' and that

all other affective values, especially those that were ethnic-based, were

considered destructive and anti-national. Instead of unifying Pakistan,

this centralization policy, perceived by the ethnic groups at the bottom

tier of the vertical stratification (the Baluch, the Sindhis, the Pukhtuns

and the Bengalis, until 1971) as the "Punjabizat ion , of Pakistan, had the

opposite effect. It strengthened demands for provincial autonomy which

had been promised in the Lahore Resolution. Thus, the successive

Punjabi-dominated central governments' persistent strategy of pursuing a

policy of repressing provincial demands for greater autonomy and a more

equitable ~hare of state resources, whether by a majority ethnic group,

for example, the Bengalis in 1971, or minority ethnic groups, such as the

Baluch in 1972-1975 and the Sindhis in 1983, has not only impeded the

peaceful resolution of centre-periphery differences, but it has also

 452

compounded the plural nature of Pakistani society.

Therefore, it can be maintained that the domination of "national'

institutions by Punjabis and muhajirs has not only reinforced vertical

ethnic stratification, but it has compounded the heterogeneous and

fractured nature of the state.

In this thesis I have stressed that the inability of religious and lay
leaders to resolve satisfactorily the question of the role that Islam

should have in the admin'istration of the country has certainly been a

major reason for Pakistan's poor level of national integration. This lack

of consensus was a continuation of the pre-Partition debate between the

various Muslim groups of India. However, once Pakistan became a political

entity these differences took on added importance. The leaders, then, had

to try to reconcile these differerit religious approaches in order to write

a constitution which would determine the role Islam would have in

Pakistan.

During the first 30 years of Pakistan's existence, before the

introduction of Zia's Islamization programme, there were essentially two

schools of thought on the role of religion in society: on the one hand,

the Western-oriented Modernists, essentially the bureaucrats and the

military, wished to establish a system of government in which Islam would

remain a private matter outside governmental interference; while, on the

other hand, the Traditionalists and Fundamentalists were advocating a

political system in which religion would be of paramount importance in
both private and public spheres. However, the debate was complicated by
the fact that the religious groups were themselves divided and unable to
agree as to which tenets of Islam should be the standard to follow in
 453

matters of public policy. Although these opposing groups were able to

reach a compromise by inserting the 1949 Objectives Resolution, which was

vague and open to various interpretations, into the 1956, 1962 and 1973

Constitutions this resolution did not lead to agreement on the fundamental

points of difference.

These religious differences had a spill-over effect into the ethnic

sphere, for this acrimonious debate diminished the power of Islam as the
most important locus for affective identity and, accordingly, strengthened

the affective loyalty for ethnic groups. Thus, while Islam had been the

rallying cry for the creation of Pakistan, and had temporarily taken
precedence over ethnic identification, the subsequent failure by the

leaders to resolve the religious issue made their repeated assertions that

Pakistan was a 'nation', because of its Muslim composition, sound rather

hollow.

Consequently, the inability of Islam to act as a centripetal force to

counter the centrifugal pull of ethnicity facilitated the establishment of
highly centralized authoritarian governments, both civilian and military.

There was a belief that unless a strong government led the country the

divisive influences of religion and ethnicity would lead to the

destruction of Pakistan. Except for Zia's regime, which has followed a

Traditionalist-Fundamentalist approach, the successive governments have

applied a Modernist interpretation to the role that Islam should have in

Pakistani society. HoWever, regardless of the leaders' religious school

of thought, these governments' policies have failed on both counts: they

did not resolve the religious differences, nor arrest the demand for

provincial autonomy.
 454

It has been argued in this study that because Pakistan has had to deal

with a hostile external environment since its inception, this has had a

direct and often compounding effect on the country's inherent internal

weaknesses. Faced with persistent demands for greater provincial

autonomy, continued religious differences and a country whose two wings

were physically seperated by over 1000 kilometres of Indian territory, the

national leaders decided that the most effective means to counter

potential threats from a hostile external environment would be to follow a

policy of centralization. However, as previously discussed, this had the

opposite result. Instead of smothering regionalism, centralization has

increased demands for provincial autonomy.

However, a hostile environment has not been the only external

influence which has affected the country's national integration process.

Pakistan's friendly relations with the US and Muslim countries have also

had an impact upon the country's political development. By participating

in Western security organizations, not only was the Pakistani military

able to increase its forces, but by absorbing a significant share of the

national budget it also strengthened its corporate power vis-a-vis the

bureaucracy and the civilians. Furthermore, Punjabi dominance of the army

has been perceived by other ethnic groups as another step in the

"domination of the Punjab over the rest of the country. Similarly,

Pakistan's increasingly close ties with Muslim states assisted and

legitimized the religious leaders' drive to have an Islamic system of

government implemented in the country. Also, Pakistan's problems are

compounded by the fact that none of the ethnic groups in Pakistan are

wholly confined within the country, but straddle the country's

international borders. This has facilitated the exploitation of

dissension and irrendentist movements by Pakistan's hostile neighbours,

 455

thus hindering the process of national integration.

Therefore, while many countries have had to deal with an unhospitable

external environment, the divisive effects of ethnic and religious

differences in Pakistan have accelerated the penetration of foreign

influences. Thus, outside forces, both hostile, for example, India and

Afghanistan, and friendly, such as the US and the Muslim countries, have

had a direct impact upon the country's national integration process.

As previously indicated, since the effect of one of these independent

variables would already be a substantial obstacle for the process of

national integration, the fact that these three factors have constantly

existed and interacted has further compounded the problem of

"nation-building' in Pakistan. While many countries have had to contend

with the same problem of reconciling the three factors of religion,

ethnicity and the external environment, for example, Sri Lanka, India,

Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, the effect of these three influences in Pakistan

has generally been more problematic to the country's political

development, since it has had to accommodate these three forces ever since

its inception.

The fact that Pakistan was an artificial creation and that the areas

later to be incorporated as part of the country had only been politically

united under Moghul administration as part of a greater political system,

reinforced the need to have a powerful unifying ideology that would keep

the disparate groups of society together. As an ideology Islam was

certainly a powerful rallying cry for the Indian Muslims who believed in

the creation of a separate homeland; however, the various religious

groups' inability to agree amongst themselves as to the role Islam should
 456

have in the public and private spheres of society, introduced into

Pakistani politics a. extremely destabilizing element. While this failure

to reach a religious consensus is not unique to Pakistan, but is evident

in many Muslim countries where Modernists and Traditionalists-

Fundamentalists are constantly opposing one another over this issue, for

example, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Malaysia, the fact that Pakistan was

created uniquely on the basis of Islam reinforced its destructive

potential. It put into doubt the very raison d'~tre of Pakistan.

Compounding this divisive religious debate has been the fundamental

contradiction between, on the one hand, the "Two-Nation Theory", that is,

the concept which outlined the religious justification for a separate

Muslim state as the basis of national self-determination, and, on the

other hand, the Lahore Resolution, the document which essentially assured

the future provinces of Pakistan full provincial autonomy. The political

philosophies of these two documents came to be seen as irreconciliable,

and thus compounded the problem of national integration. The "Two-Nation

Theory" assumed that Muslim loyalty would supersede all the ethnic

identities that existed in the areas to be included in Pakistan. This

meant that since Pakistan was now a "nation' based on Islam, all other

affective loyalties had to be submerged, for if they were allowed to

compete with Islam as a focus of affective loyalty it could and, indeed

did, question the validity of the quasi-sacred "Two-Nation Theory". It is

this exclusiveness and the subsequent centralized approach to

nation-building, which clashed with the demands for provincial autonomy,

as outlined in the Lahore Resolution.

 457

The approach the government of Pakistan decided to pursue to resolve

these opposing views regarding centre-periphery relations was revealed

soon after independence. It chose to ignore the promises made in the

Lahore Resolution, and within a few months imposed a highly centralized

system of government; however, this should not have come as a surprise,

since it was merely a continuation of the Muslim League's pre-Partition

policy of interfering in strictly provincial Muslim League matters.

Therefore, not only was this centralization policy a de facto repeal of

the League's fundamental document, but it also revealed the party's

contradictions concerning centre-province relations. This contradiction

was displayed during the debates prior to the decision to partition

British India, when Jinnah had unrelently demanded autonomy for the

provinces in a united independent India. Finally, this centralization

approach was facilitated by the Punjabis' and muha.iirs' domination of all

major 'national' institutions. Furthermore, the ethnic stratification

which was soon established in Pakistan made it possible for these two

groups to impose policies which suited the centre and ignored the

aspirations of •peripheral , ethnic groups.

While other developing countries have also had to accommodate the

nefarious influences of ethnicity, religion and a hostile external

environment, it is the persistent convergence of these three factors since

the creation of Pakistan which has made this case unique. For example, it

is the only state where an ethnic-based secessionist movement, supported

by an external power, succeeded in attaining its ultimate objective of

independenge. Thus, confronted with the centrifugal forces of ethnicity,

the inability of religious leaders to reach a consensus, the sui generis

nature of the country's geographical character (until 1971), and a hostile

external environment, the country's leaders implemented a highly

 458

centralized system of government, an approach which appeared to them to be

the only sensible and safe policy which would ensure the survival of the

state against the destructive combination of internal and external forces.

Whether pursuing a Modernist or a Traditionalist-Fundamentalist

approach, the successive civilian and military leaders have failed to make

substantial progress in 'nation-building'. Critics of military regimes

will point out that only a democratic government will be able to integrate

Pakistani society. This is a moot point, since Pakistan is yet to enjoy a

democratically elected government which maintains democratic norms of

conduct once in office. Not only has the lack of democratic standards

been a permanent feature of Pakistani politics, but even Bhutto, who

constantly emphasized his democratic credentials when opposing Ayub Khan,

ultimately established an authoritarian system of government. Thus, while

Pakistan's civilian and military regimes are to be equally blamed for

their failure to integrate society, the presence of these un-democratic

governments is not the cause of Pakistan's malaises, rather, it is the

symptom of a more fundamental problem: the failure of national integration

at the ideological and ethnic levels. And what is certain is that until

the two indispensable ingredients for a spirit of compromise Arc

developed, that is, that the Punjabis' and muhajirs' domination of

national institutions is diminished and the religious debate is

permanently resolved, democracy has no chance to succeed, and the cycle of

authoritarian regimes will continue. However, the process of national

integration in Pakistan would improve decisively if, and when, sound

leadership, which has the political will and the national support to take
steps that will meet the 'peripheral' ethnic groups' demands for

de-centralization, emerges.
 459

Nevertheless, even if these internal developments do not evolve, and

this would not appear likely for the foreseeable future, whether under a

government headed by Zia or Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan will survive as a

state. There are three objective reasons for this: first, Pakistan is

unlikely to disintegrate as a result of the configuration of internal

forces, since these political, religious and ethnic forces are generally

divided and ineffective; second, because of the more compact nature of

post-1971 Pakistan, the Punjab i-dominated armed forces can more easily

suppress any ethnic-based uprisings which have the potential to threaten

the integrity of the state, as was clearly demonstrated in Baluchistan in

the early 1970s and in Sind in 1983; and, third, it is not in the national

interests of the Soviet Union and India, the only two external powers

which could potentially threaten the integrity of the country, to

dismember Pakistan, for it would eliminate a vital and mutually beneficial

tbuffer' state separating them from one another. Thus, this study has

demonstrated that until the adverse effects of ethnicity and religion can

be satisfactorily resolved, Pakistan will remain characterized by

tnegative' political stability; that is, order will be maintained through

coercive means, and the process of national integration will continue to

stagnate.
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Unpublished Material

Husain, Syed Baqar,

Development of Pakistan: A Critical Analysis of the Roles of Politics
and Administration, University of Cincinnati, Ph.D. Dissertation,1979.

Mazaffar, Shaheen,
The Politics of Cabinet Formation in Pakistan: A Study of Recruitment
to the Central Cabinet. 1947-1977, Miami University, Ohio, Ph.D.
Dissertation, 1980.