Beyond Cooperative Federalism:

Telangana government’s policy response to COVID-19 Pandemic

The subject of Public health has important bearing on Federalism, Rights and
State responsibility in India. Historically, the Motilal Nehru Report, 1928
mentioned the ‘health and fitness for work of all citizens’ as a fundamental
right, and deemed it to be a provincial subject. In the Constituent Assembly
debates H V Kamath and Brajeshwar Prasad of the Congress party contrarily
argued for Public Health to be made a Concurrent Subject. Kamath argued that
public health had historically been a ‘Cinderella of portfolios’ and only by
including it in the Union List can adequate and uniform standards be developed
(CAD IX 2014: 878). On the other hand, Naziruddin Ahmed argued that the
‘removal of (non-narcotic drugs) would rob the Provinces of a subject and
unnecessarily burden the already overloaded duties of the Centre… Rather than
reducing the Provinces to… a state resembling the District Boards and
Municipalities, I think it would be far better to abolish the provinces
altogether…’ (CAD IX 2014: 838).

In Post-Independent India public health has been seen as central to the

realization of the constitutional promise of equality and right to life. The
Judiciary has taken suo moto cognizance of violations of Article 21 in the past
and directed the state to fulfil its constitutional responsibilities, leading to
demands for ‘Right to Health’ to be declared a Fundamental Right. However,
the lack of political will to realize this constitutional promise requires us to
place public health within two related discourses of Federalism and
Liberalization in India. First, with public health and sanitation, hospitals and
dispensaries being part of the state list proponents of decentralization have
argued that it enables greater accountability of state governments who are also
more informed about local health care needs. Contrarily, others have argued that
decentralization has led to local level capture by dominant elites. The recent
debates around a common National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET)
reflect this debate. Second, since economic liberalization public health has been
associated with a discourse of good governance and reforms by greater
involvement of the private sector in health care provision. Liberalization has
also been argued to shift the focus from vertical relations between the Centre
and States to horizontal relations between states marked by greater competition
for private and foreign direct investment (Saez 2002: 158).

Centralized Decision Making, Decentralized Risk?

In the new context of Coronavirus public health emergency, the

invocation of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, in tandem with the Epidemic
Diseases Act, 1897, by the Union government brought to fore the changing
relations between public health, federalism and governance reforms. The
Disaster Management Act was used to empower a centralized administrative
setup comprising the Union Home and Health Ministries. Containment
measures such as Lockdown, punishments for violations etc. were then ordered
in a top-down manner as State governments were only entrusted with enforcing
these measures or further tightening them. The State governments were to
enforce containment measures by invoking the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897.
The use of the two laws in tandem to enforce a top-down approach to the
Pandemic has severely tested India’s federal structure. The Executive powers of
the Central and State governments are no longer co-extensive with their
Legislative powers, as all decision making has been centralized in the Union.
The centralized approach followed by the Union BJP government has had the
effect of viewing a public health crisis from a command-and-control perspective
(Ragini Agarwal 2020), leading to a securitized or law and order approach to
curb spread of the pandemic. As states’ legislative functions were curtailed,
cooperative federalism was replaced by a lack of financial and other assistance
to the states, fear of central government penalties, or of politicizing a crisis to
the Central government’s advantage.

Telangana’s relations with the Centre were markedly different from those
of West Bengal or Kerala which openly differed with the Centre over
designation of containment zones or re-opening of the economy. Telangana
government’s response was, on the whole, non-confrontational ranging from the
CM KCR threatening to arrest people critical of the PM Modi’s ‘Janata Curfew’
to sparring with the Union Health Minister over diversion of testing kits meant
for Telangana and low testing rates. The state government sought to maintain
some autonomy from the Centre by other means such as refusing to be a part of
the Ayushman Bharat PM-JAY scheme, and instead relying upon the state
government’s own welfare policies to cover treatment of patients. The central
government has since before the Pandemic used social policy as a tool to
centralize power, including in the implementation of such innocuous schemes as
the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan to diminish autonomy of the states (Kailash 2019).
However, the BJP led Union government’s cynical exploitation of the pandemic
also led the TRS to treat the public health crisis as primarily a problem of
perception or image management. This was reflected in the comparatively low
testing in the state, fudging of data on infections and deaths in the state, and
singling out returnees from the Nizamuddin Markaz in New Delhi for the spike
in the state’s cases. The procurement of safety gear like Personal Protective
Equipment (PPEs), gloves, masks and testing kits etc. was another point of
conflict between Central and State governments. As per the Disaster
Management Act procurement of all safety and testing kits was to be done by
the Central government alone. As late as June, doctors at the Gandhi and
Niloufer Hospitals striked to protest shortage in PPEs, gloves and masks leading
to rising infections among medical staff. Facing criticism over shortage of PPEs
and low testing the state government went on to allege that its share of safety
equipment was diverted to other states by the Union government.

Can States fight the Pandemic alone? A view from Telangana

The COVID-19 pandemic requires us to revisit the idea of co-operative

federalism to address the changing balance of powers, responsibility and
accountability between the Centre and states and between the states. A study of
the policy response of the Telangana government brings out the role of regional
factors such as reliance on welfare regimes, contestations over credit claiming
between Centre and States, and ‘vernacularisation’ of economic reforms,
including health care reforms. State level factors such as the privatization of
health care and the use of health care as a means of patronage has delinked
policy making from the wider democratic processes and people’s demands as
raised in civil society (Haragopal 2010: 58). Even as the state government
blamed ‘outsiders’ from the Markaz in their official health bulletins and press
conferences, it was lax in testing, quarantining and monitoring returnees from
high-risk countries such as Canada, the United States or the Gulf countries.
Stigmatization of the Markaz returnees continued well into the lockdown till
late April. In the Unlock Phase too, the Government was not transparent about
designation of containment zones and this information was not easily available
to the public. The state government also did not involve voluntary associations
who were active and had a presence on the ground to help spread awareness. In
June and July, when cases of infection peaked, the government’s centralized
response created fear, panic and confusion among the people. The government’s
messaging was mixed, and people did not have information on number of
hospital beds available, testing centres, designated hospitals etc. Mixed
messaging and lack of transparency proved fatal in many cases.

Changing Centre-State dynamics also explain the TRS government’s

refusal to join the Ayushman Bharat PM-JAY scheme, as such a scheme
disrupts local patronage networks centred on the Chief Minister or the ruling
party. While state governments have claimed that their health policies have
better reach or coverage than the central government scheme, the fact that all
state governments who have resisted this scheme – Delhi, Telangana, Odisha,
West Bengal and Kerala – are all run by non-BJP governments points to the role
of a new federal balance and regional politics in shaping response to COVID-
19. The TRS’ Arogyasri program, together with other health related welfare
schemes such as KCR Kit, Kanti Velugu is an important part of the TRS’
populist strategy based on centralized clientelism. Carolyn Elliott describes
centralized clientelism as an important strategy to win elections in the former
Andhra Pradesh as political leaders sought centralized control over public
resources such as public contracts, sale of public lands, licences, as well as
private funding to cover the high costs of election campaigning (Elliott 2016:
24). Clientelist exchanges of welfare for electoral support from voters has
weakened local party organization and elected MLAs, while being more
amenable to highly personalized and centralized leadership. Despite being a
revenue surplus state, governments have not shown the political will to make
long-term investments in public health. Instead, the TRS’ relief measures in the
initial phase of the outbreak showed the government’s reliance on ad-hoc
measures or welfare schemes, many of who were outsourced or contracted to
private hospitals, to combat the COVID-19 pandemic in particular, and the
approach to public health in general.

The first COVID-19 casualty was recorded in Telangana on 28 March

2020. The Telangana government had announced measures to contain the
spread of COVID-19 on March 14, i.e. at least 10 days before the imposition of
the national lockdown. By a Cabinet decision on 14 March the state
Government decided to shut down cinema halls, swimming pools, gyms and
museums until March 21 which was later extended to March 31. The TRS
government decided to start many relief measures in the early phase of the
lockdown. On 23 March the state government decided to give 12 kgs of rice for
free to all food security card holders, along with a one-time support of Rs. 1500
to buy essential commodities. To extend relief measures to migrant workers the
government provided 12 kg of rice or atta and a one-time payment of 500
rupees to all migrants. Relief measures also included government instructions to
all factories to pay wages during lockdown period, regulation of private school
fees and deferment of rent collection. The TRS government also instructed
factories not to deny wages to workers during the lockdown, private schools to
charge only the tuition fees, and landlords not to force rent payments upon
tenants. However, these instructions were not backed up by any legislation or
executive order such that aggrieved workers, students or tenants may receive
legal remedy. Therefore, these instructions were often overlooked. Similarly,
while the state government did provide relief measures for migrant workers, it
failed to hold the managements legally responsible for evicting or firing
workers during the lockdown period. As a special initiative, employees of the
Medical, Health and Police departments were given an additional 10% of their
salary for the month of March and April. Similarly, sanitation personnel were
given an additional payment of 7500 rupees as incentive in March and April.
However, the state government also decided to defer salary payments to other
government employees citing shortfall in state revenues during lockdown.
While the shortfall in GST revenues has been held as one reason for shortage of
state revenue the TRS government, has been spending, on an average, no more
than 3.5% of its total expenditure on health since state formation in Budget
2020-21 (Telangana State Budget 2020-21).

Public Health care at a Private Hospital:

Besides the reliance on a variant of patron-client relations, the

privatization of basic services, including health care, is a common feature of
state politics in India since economic liberalization. This requires us to
understand Federalism as fostering a ‘horizontal’ competition between states for
private investment. However, in addition to such horizontal competition a
political driver of privatization has been the perception that state services had
been captured by Andhraite elites in the former state, and the desire to bypass
them by fostering a crony capitalism led by the local elite. The state government
has devised a type of Public-Private Partnership by schemes such as Arogyasri
health insurance scheme where in the private sector provided the hospital
infrastructure, doctors etc. while the government subsidised them for treating
poor patients. Such a scheme allowed the government, especially the CM, to
claim credit for health welfare, while mostly bypassing the public health care
sector (Vemula 2016: 158). As a result, the state already suffered from a
weakened health infrastructure, especially in primary and secondary health care,
before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.

Compounding the lack of health infrastructure, the state government had

not recruited medical staff, forcing it to hire doctors, nurses and lab technicians
on a contract basis in April, 2020. Even during the peak of the Covid-19
infections the Gandhi hospital in Hyderabad remained the only public hospital
for treatments, while Osmania General Hospital was restricted to non-COVID
cases only. Ostensibly, this was done to prevent confirmed Covid-19 patients in
these hospitals from infecting other patients. The government relied on three
separate public hospitals i.e., Fever hospital, Nallakunta, Chest hospital,
Erragadda and District Hospital, King Koti, while Gandhi Hospital could only
treat infected patients but not test for infections! Even if people showed
symptoms like breathlessness, body temperature etc. they were not admitted
until they could get tested at another hospital. The government’s response
during the peak showed up an anaemic and skeletal health care sector in the
state. Faced with the COVID-19 pandemic KCR conceded that scaling up the
health care sector was not a priority. In April the CM belatedly announced the
opening of a new Telangana Institute of Medical Sciences (TIMS) and the
recruitment of 6000 medical staff on contractual basis. However, TIMS started
accepting patients only since June. Public sector hospitals thus had to work
overtime and in dangerous circumstances to meet the rising number of
infections.

Private hospitals were involved only in a limited manner in the first phase
of Lockdown. While a small number of private hospitals were included initially,
they proved apprehensive and reluctant in admitting or treating patients with
COVID symptoms. By late July none of the 98 designated private hospitals had
treated any Corona patients, in a context where private health sector otherwise
provides 82% of inpatient beds and 76% of outpatient services in the state.
Private hospitals at large were only allowed to test and treat patients in the first
phase of Unlock, in June. Given the state’s reliance on private hospitals the
government did try to regulate them. According to the provisions of the
Epidemic Diseases Act the Telangana govt took over 50% of beds in the private
hospitals, and fixed rates to be charged. However, this measure did not prove
very effective as private hospitals mostly chose to fill up their quotas with
moderately affected patients, from well to do backgrounds who could afford to
pay much more than the stipulated fees. Private hospitals bypassed the
government order capping treatment charges by charging patients under various
other heads. The government received hundreds of complaints against private
hospitals, but only two small hospitals were penalized. Given the sharply rising
cases in June, the private sector resisted any regulation given the state
government’s over-reliance on them. By November the government strategy of
subsidizing treatment in private hospitals came undone. Private hospitals have
since refused to admit patients under the Arogyasri scheme citing unpaid dues
from the state government.

Privatization of health care services and a hollowing out of the public

health sector is a common feature of many states in India. However, the
weakened public health sector in Telangana requires us to understand debates
on public health within the larger ‘vernacularisation’ of economic reforms
(Upadhyay 1997: 169). Both in former Andhra Pradesh and Telangana
economic reforms were represented as an integral part of regional identity, state
autonomy, and changing federal relations with the centre. In the state
government’s imagination Hyderabad was projected as a ‘Biopharma’ and
‘Lifesciences’ hub that generated more than $12 billion in revenues. The
establishment of pharmaceutical and bulk drug industries is associated with a
romanticized image of an Andhraite entrepreneurial class, which learnt the trade
in their migration to the West and came back to pioneer the field in A.P
(Damodaran 2008: 131). However, even as the pharmaceutical and bulk drug
sector has received governmental support, health care sector remains lop-sided
in the state. Almost all tertiary care such as super-speciality hospitals has been
centred in Hyderabad, while primary and secondary health care sector in the
countryside has been left to decay, such that Telangana inherited a crumbling
health care sector upon state-formation. Upon assuming power in 2014 the TRS
government promised to construct a super-speciality hospital in every district of
the state, as part of CM KCR’s vision of ‘Bangaru Telangana’ or Golden
Telangana (TRS Manifesto 2014: 13). However, this poll promise betrayed a
populist approach without an understanding of problems facing health-care such
as shortage of medical staff to operate existing hospitals, or the priority needed
for primary and secondary health care in the districts. However, by early 2020
when the pandemic struck the TRS government had not built any new hospitals
in the state. The A.P. Reorganisation Act, 2014 awarded an AIIMS type super-
speciality hospital to Telangana, dependent on the state government identifying
land for the hospital. However, construction of the super speciality hospital has
been erratic, with both State and Centre blaming each other for the delay. The
TRS government has also not fulfilled its promise of building a super-speciality
hospital in each district of the state, nor has it recruited any new medical staff
since 2014.

Can Democracy avert a Pandemic? The problem of ‘Information Deficit’

The economist Amartya Sen argued that democracies are more likely to
avert famines than totalitarian regimes, because an independent press and free
flow of information would make widespread hunger a matter of public concern
and demand accountability from the government (Sen 1981: 195). However,
apart from a weakened Public Health sector, the TRS’ response also suffered
from a highly centralized approach to the crisis, leading in turn to an
‘information deficit.’ Initially, a centralized response helped as the CM
addressed press conferences to dispel rumours. In a press conference the CM
argued that eating chicken or eggs did not play any role in spreading infections,
but would strengthen immunity. However, the centralization of decision making
in the CM also quickly showed up in lack of a co-ordinated response from the
government. While the CM held as many as seven press conferences in the
month of March alone, these press conferences became fewer and far between
as the lockdown progressed. In the Unlock phase the discussion of state
responsibility came to be framed as balancing the need to prevent further spread
of Covid-19 with ensuring the recovery of the economy. However, a look at the
state government’s priorities since June shows that questions of livelihood or
employment were not central to political discussion. Beginning from March 25
the national lockdown came into effect in all states, including in Telangana.
While the Central Government began giving some relaxations in less affected
areas from April 20, the Telangana state government instead chose not to give
any relaxations till May 7, which was further extended until May 31.
Restrictions remained in place in containment zones till 30 June. Since the
Unlock phase began in June political discussion shifted away to completely
unrelated issues such as building of a new secretariat complex etc.

Centralization of response also led to an ‘information deficit’ i.e. of

deficit of information flowing from the public to the government, as local
channels of information from elected representatives, MLAs, Panchayat bodies
were either blocked or non-existent. The perception that the TRS government,
especially the CM KCR, were not actively monitoring the COVID situation
gained ground especially in the Unlock phase as the CM did not make any
public appearance in late June and July. The public perception that the CM was
not active at the helm led to panic and confusion, especially on important
measures such as the re-imposition of lockdown in view of the rising number of
cases in the Unlock One phase. In a context where democratic processes were
unable to transmit information and demands upwards, other institutions such as
the Telangana High Court had to repeatedly step in to hold the state government
accountable. Hearing a Public Interest Litigation during the peak of infections in
June the High Court observed that the Gandhi Hospital in Hyderabad was the
sole hospital for COVID treatment and asked the government’s response on
designating government hospitals as COVID-19 treatment centres in all the
districts. Telangana Governor Tamilsai Soundararajan’s proactive approach of
meeting COVID patients and holding Janata darbars was part of a larger turf
war between Governor and Non-BJP CMs, her accessibility was markedly in
contrast to the remoteness of the TRS leadership. Apart from the State High
Court, Central Medical Teams visiting Telangana in April and June repeatedly
asked the state government to increase testing.

However, a lack of information about the situation on the ground was

only partly responsible for the lack of co-ordinated response from the
government. The state government set up its own helpline to address queries
from the public. In case a person was infected with the virus, the helpline could
also record the address, movement and other details. In order to monitor an
infected patient’s quarantine many state departments including the Police
department were also involved. The lack of information stemmed from a
centralized party organization and the weakened role of TRS’ MLAs, Panchyati
raj members etc. to transmit their constituencies demands to the government.
More importantly, the state’s single party dominant system worsened the
centralized decision making in the state. First, the TRS’ Populist style has led it
to disregard or stifle alternative voices in civil society. In the early phase of the
lockdown, civil society organizations demanded that the government expand
coverage of ration supplies to all people, such that needy without ration card
were not excluded. While the Government did not accept this suggestion, it did
increase food supply marginally to holders of ‘Antyodaya National Food
Security Cards’. However, this measure was less effective because the state
government had delinked ration-cards from welfare schemes for B.P.L families
and now referred to such ration-cards as food security cards. While the
delinking of ration cards from welfare measures was promoted as a means of
reducing bogus beneficiaries, it has left the government without a credible
source of information about B.P.L families, and exclusion of deserving
beneficiaries. Requests from various Citizen’s groups and NGOs to setup
helpdesks and isolation wards were turned down, even as the Government
helpline proved ineffective. As a result, not only Civil Society organizations but
the public at large suffered from a crucial information deficit about government
initiatives, or even the basic steps to be taken in case of symptoms, or infection.
This necessitated Civil Society organizations to approach the state High Court
even for some basic information such as the number of tests, available beds and
ICUs, or containment centres in the state.

Telangana’s Single-party dominant system also contributed to a

centralization of decision making and information-deficit in the state. Since
state formation the regional TRS party has remained the single dominant party
with an absolute control over the state legislature. However, Opposition parties
or factions have not been able to emerge as pressure groups within the party
system. As a result, provision of public health and basic services has dropped
out of the realm of electoral competition. The TRS manifesto for the 2018
Assembly elections did not mention any major new initiatives in the public
health sector. Given that the state’s expenditure on health care has remained
constant at a low 3.5% the starting of any new welfare measures has meant that
existing medical needs or new infrastructure development has been curtailed.
Instead, as Opposition MLAs were co-opted into the TRS the democratic choice
and information deficit has further widened in the state. In this context of
weakening of party competition as an institutional channel to convey people’s
demands and grievances the state has witnessed a re-emergence of a
personalized, strongman leadership style centred on patron-client linkages.
Failure of Co-operative Federalism:
The Migrant Workers’ Crisis in Telangana

Unlike state level factors such as privatization of health care, welfare

regimes and single dominant party, the lockdown’s debilitating impact on
migrant workers mobility and health revealed the changing Centre-State
relations to the advantage of the Centre. Telangana faced a similarly daunting
challenge of identifying, lodging and assisting in home-bound travel for
migrants as other states. Given the Centre’s hurried declaration of a nation-wide
lockdown without prior preparation the state government was faced with the
task of identifying both inter-state and intra-state migrants in Telangana. A
week into the national lockdown CM KCR said that there were 3.5 lakh migrant
workers in the state, which proved to be a gross underestimation. Arguably, this
estimate only included workers registered by contractors in the large Real Estate
and Construction industry. Like many other states Telangana government did
not have correct information on the number of migrant workers in the state, both
from within and beyond Telangana. This proved to be a major lacuna in
providing even the meagre support of 1500 rupees cash and 15 kgs of rice
announced by the Centre. A small fraction of intra-state migrants had ration
cards, while no inter-state migrants had any ration cards. Also, many migrant
workers did not have any zero-balance bank accounts, or such accounts were
inoperative. Therefore, help from the Central government could reach only a
small fraction of registered voters. On its part the state government announced
Rs 500 and 12 Kgs of rice to migrant workers in the state. However, the initial
phase of the lockdown showed that neither the Labour nor the Health and Social
Welfare department had the required information on the number of migrant
workers in Telangana.

Unlike the Central Government and other states, the TRS government did
take relief measures for migrant workers in the early phase of the Lockdown.
Apart from the relief package, CM KCR announced the running of Shramik
trains to ferry migrants to their home states including in Chattisgarh, Bihar and
West Bengal states. While the 40 Shramik trains announced per day for a week
was more than other states’ it still proved to be short of the requirement. The
government also decided to bear the travel expenses for the migrants’ travel.
However, while the government showed the political will there was an utter
lack of co-ordination between the Public Transport, Police, Social Welfare
departments and the Railways initially. Because the Labour or Social Welfare
departments did not have the staff necessary to register all the migrants
boarding Shramik trains, this responsibility fell on the Police department apart
from enforcing the Lockdown. Migrant workers who were without employment
or lodging were sheltered in many temporary places such as function halls,
stadiums etc. Pushed to desperation, many migrant workers chose to escape
from them and set off home by any means available to them. Relevant
information about Shramik trains such as time and place of departure, number
etc. were maintained in utmost secrecy such that even the local police, welfare
departments did not have the necessary information. Due to a lack of co-
ordination between various state institutions many Shramik trains are reported
to have returned empty in the initial few days. Later in May and April the state
government’s initiative proved useful. However, the impaired mobility of
migrant workers, many of who were forced to walk hundreds of kilometres back
to their home states, showed the fault lines and fractures within India’s federal
system. India’s federal system which clearly includes railways and road
transport in the Union and Concurrent List respectively, should have provided a
clear road map to address migrant workers’ crisis. Ironically, in practise,
overburdened state governments were left with the onerous task of arranging
migrant workers’ return to their native states. Institutional infrastructure for co-
ordination and communication between states had to be built so that both host
states and native states agreed on running the Shramik trains. Stranded workers
from Chattisgarh were caught in a no-man’s land as the native state was slow to
agree to Shramik train services due to rising infections in that state. Many
migrant workers were thus forced to take dangerous journeys on foot, road,
private vehicles etc. and some of them perished on the way. While Railways
and Road transport were Union subjects even under normal times, the Central
government refused to even pay for migrant workers’ journey back home.
Migrants who could not return home striked in many places in Telangana. Two
months into the lockdown Hyderabad witnessed a series of protests in April and
May at the construction sites in IIIT, Sangareddy, Tolichowki and Tellapur
demanding to be sent home. Relative to other states, the TRS government
showed prompt and quick action in the initial phase of the Lockdown, with the
CM announcing that migrants were ‘our people’ and extending relief to them.
Once the Shramik trains began the government did provide food, water and
other relief to departing migrants. Yet faced with a Pandemic that was national
in scale, the state government’s initiatives proved limited.

Towards a Federalism without States?

‘Federalism without a Centre’ was a defiant political statement given by a group

of Chief Ministers who met in Hyderabad in 1996 (Saez 2002: 12). It indicated
a paradigmatic shift in Centre-State relations in the 1990s with liberalization
and multi-party competition leading to devolution of unprecedented political
and economic power to the states and regional parties. It marked the high point
of rise of regional parties at least since 1967 as a reaction to the centralization of
political power and authority by the Indira Gandhi led Congress party.
However, the Pandemic has revealed a decisive shift in federal or centre-state
balance in favour of the Centre. A number of new factors, which are not in
continuity with earlier patterns of Centre-State relations, such as centralization
of tax revenue collections through GST, Direct Benefit Transfer from Centre to
beneficiaries linked to Aadhar, demand for One Nation-One Ration Card, seem
to have undermined the gains in decentralization due to Liberalization and
Multi-Party competition. The invocation of the Disaster Management Act, 2005
has further allowed the Union executive to bypass state executive. While the
DMA gives District Magistrates to implement both Central and State
government directives, this provision has been used to completely bypass
elected state governments. Measures such as the national lockdown were taken
without consultation with any state governments, even though it was the states
who had to implement the restrictions, and later balance the need to curb
infections with need to reopen the economy. By the Unlock phase when
numbers of infections started rising state governments were almost broke due to
non-payment of GST dues, inability to collect donations from the private sector
as CSR etc. In a situation where states are unable to spend any money on relief
the Central government also has acted in a fiscally conservative manner. The
Fifteenth Finance Commission must award greater share to the states to offset
this imbalance. However, political institutions such as Finance Commissions,
Inter-State Council, Zonal Councils have proven ineffective in addressing
imbalances in Centre-State relations. Therefore, the current pandemic may be
argued to have led to centralization of powers in the Union government, which
is only allowed in a national Emergency.
 Changing balance of Centre-State relations also impacts state level
factors such as the scope of economic reforms within states. The history of
economic reforms and liberalization in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana shows us
that Privatization of basic services and instituting a welfare regime may not be
mutually exclusive. However, Centre-State relations do play an important role
in deciding economic reforms as State governments may advance or recede
economic reforms depending on their ability to claim credit and advance
autonomy from the Centre. While Federalism has been held to result in political
fragmentation and thus impede the spread of a uniform welfare policy in India
(Rajaraman 2010: 57), federalism may be argued to have strengthened welfare
regimes as state governments seek and corner credit for these welfare measures,
even though the policies may have been started or financed by the Centre (Tillin
2017: 341). The expansion of welfare policies in the 2000s may be explained by
increasing competition in credit claiming between Central and State
governments. During the Pandemic the opposition to Ayushman Bharat scheme
and other Central initiatives may be explained by the Centre’s efforts to claim
all the benefit while pushing much of the responsibility and risk onto States.

The Pandemic has also required us to reimagine the State in India, its role
and capacities in a federal spirit. The Union Government’s proposals in the
wake of the COVID-19 crisis such as One Nation, One Ration Card was meant
to allow for portability of documents between states but has been opposed by
the states who believe that it will like GST lead to loss of state revenues.
Similarly, the demand for political representation for migrant workers must
balance responsibility of host states towards migrants with the rising ethnic or
nativist sentiment in these states. In short, the coronavirus public health crisis
cannot be addressed without addressing the crisis in cooperative federalism.

References:

Agarwal, Ragini. ‘Achieving Coordinated Action Through Inter-State

Cooperation’, Law School Policy Review,
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