PHILIPPINE CHIRISTIAN UNIVERSITY-DASMARINAS

COLLEGE OF LAW

Assignment # 3 || Legal Technique & Logic

Edson L. Vicente April 21, 2021

A. Legal Opinion

To McBee Food Corporation

Greetings!

This legal opinion seeks to answer on whether or not McBee-

Metropark Branch is liable to pay Judy Ann Sanchez the amount of
P100,000.00 for the injuries sustained to her due to accident happened
on October 18, 2010.

In the interview with the Mara, Judy Ann’s daughter who was
with her at the time of the accident, the following are the relevant
facts:

On October 18, 2010, the complainant, Judy Ann together with

her daughter was at McBee-Metropark Branch. After they had their
order, they decided to consume their meal at the second floor after
they noticed that the ground floor was already filled with customers.
While in the staircase, they found out that there was an ongoing event,
and it was closed to the public. Mara approached one of your crew
members to assist them and find a table for them. In response, the
crew advised them that they can consume their meal at the second
floor because the birthday party was about over. Judy Ann proceeded
unfortunately on her way up, she met the huge McBee mascot who
was hurrying down with another crew member. The mascot hit the
shoulder of the complainant that resulted to lost her balance and
missed four steps of the stairs. Judy Ann’s head, shoulder, back, and
buttocks hit on each steps of the stairs. After temporary shock, Mara
immediately rushed to her mother and asked the crew to call an
ambulance. Judy Ann complained her extreme back pain and she
could not stand up. After you learned about the accident, you
approached the complaint and offered your car to send Judy Ann to
hospital. With the help of your two crew members Judy Ann was
brought to the nearest hospital for treatment.

Subsequently, Judy Ann sent a letter to McBee management

asking to pay her the amount of P100,000.00 in damages for pain and
great inconvenience by weekly physical therapy. The said amount for
damages is excluded form the payment of hospital bills the
management took care off. In response, you sent a letter to Judy Ann
saying that the management will assure that they will continue to
shoulder all expenses related to her weekly physical therapy until such
time that she is fully recover.

On this event, the accident was caused by the negligence of the

Ms. Batungbacal, the branch manager, and other crew members of
McBee-Metropark Branch. In Child Learning Center Inc., v Tagorio
(G.R. no. 150920, November 25, 2005), the Supreme Court asserted
that in every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or
some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the
damages incurred. The Court in the same case, referred negligence as
the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand. On this face, it shows that the cause of
the distress Judy Ann Sanchez was the the series of negligence on the
part of the branch manager and her crew members for several
instance: (a) the crew member who did not get their costomers a table,
(b) the mascot rushing down in the staircase and, (c) the manager
together with other crew members who transport Judy Ann to the
hospital despite of their lack of knowledge and skills required for a
paramedic. The Article 2180 Paragraph 4 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 2180 (par. 4) The owners and managers of an

establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions.

Therefore, as the employer of the Ms. Batungbakal and other

crew members of McBee-Metropark branch, your management is
liable to to the damages incurred because of the negligence of the
former.

Nevertheless, the maagement may invoke Article 2179 of Civil

Code to lessen your legal obligation and liability to the complainant.
Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code “When the plaintiff’s own
negligence as the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the court shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded”. Contributory negligence as the
Supreme Court stressed out in PNCC v Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
159270, August 22, 2005) is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. As stated, the approval of Mara to transfer her mother to
the hospital without the aid of qualified paramedic.

Based on the given circumstances, it is to recommend

negotiating with Mrs. Sanchez to lessen their demand for the payment
for the damages. Otherwise, considering the contributory negligence
of Mara to the suffering of her mother, the management may opt to
file a motion to mitigate the damages to be rewarded to the latter.
B. Legal Document
Judy Ann Sanchez
911 Bluewhale Street
Palanan, Makati City

Re: P 100,000.00 demand payment for damages

Madame:

We write on behalf of our client McBee Food Corp., in reference

to your demand letter dated 18 October 2010.
It was settled based on the correspondence with you on December
15, 2010 that the management of McBee Food Corp., will shoulder
all the expenses related to your weekly physical therapy. However,
we will refuse to pay P100,000.00 as payment for damages
incurred to you due the accident happened in McBee-Metropark
Branch. Respectfully, we therefore request that you lessen your
demand payment for damages otherwise we will invoke the
provision of Article 2179 before the court to mitigate the sum for
damages.

Sincerely,
(Sgd) Counsel of McBee Food Corp

C. Case Digests

JARCO MARKETING CORP. v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129792 || December 21, 1999

Facts:

On May 9, 1983 at the 2nd floor of Syvel’s Department Store

owned by Jarko Marketing Corp., the young body of Zieneth was
pinned by a bulk store’s gift-wrapping structure while her mother
named Criselda, one of the private respondents, signing credit card
slip at the payment and verification counter. The child was
immediately sent to Makati Medical Center but died 14 days after the
incident at the age of 6.

After burial, the private respondents demanded the petitioners

for reimbursement of hospitalization, medical expenses, wake, and
funeral expenses but the latter refused to pay. The private respondent
filed a complaint before the trial court praying for the payment of
P157, 522.86 for actual damages, P 300,000 for moral damages,
P20,000 for attorney’s fees and an unspecified amount for loss of
income and exemplary damages. The trial court absolved the
petitioner from any liabilities because (a) it was the act of the child
that caused the fall of the counter, (b) the private respondents failed to
present witnesses that can testified how the counter fell and, (c) it was
Criselda’s negligence that contribute to the accident.

Subsequently, the private respondent filed an appeal before the

Court of Appeals. The appellant court decided in favor of private
respondents. The COA found that the counter was defective, unstable,
and dangerous; the structure of the counter could cause its fall; the
management ignored the report of the former employees on danger the
counter could cause. Moreover, the appellant court asserted that a
child under 9 years old is incapable of negligence or other tort and it
also absolved Criselda of any negligence since nothing wrong for
allowing her child to walk nearby counter while she signed the
document. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of trial court
and ordered the appellant to pay the private respondents of P50,000
for compensatory damages for the death of Zhieneth with legal
interest of 6%, P99,420.86 as hospitalization expenses with legal
interest of 6%, moral and exemplary damages worth P100,000, and
attorney’s fees of P20,000. The petitioners filed a petition before the
Supreme Court for the reversal of COA’s decision.

Issues:

1. Whether Zhienete’s death was accidental or attributable to

negligence.
2. Whether the negligence was attributable to petitioners or to
private respondents.

Ruling:

1. Attributable to negligence.
The Court stressed the comparisons of accident and negligence. An
accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
negligence attaches to the defendant. Negligence on the other hand, is
the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. Similarly, it is a failure to observe, for
the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. In line with this definition,
the Supreme Court found that the tragedy was not an accident but
attributed to negligence of the petitioners based on the statement of
the deceased child during her interview with the attending doctor as
related by the former employee Gonzales. It was made part of the res
gaste since her statement was made while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof. It is axiomatic that matters relating to
declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician
are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is
required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be
made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the
declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed
by the person who testified in court. The Court asserted that it is
unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme
pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life.
2. Fault of petitioners.

Based on the corroborated testimonies of Gonzales and Guevarra,

both were former employees of the petitioners the Court found that
the latter were aware of the danger posed by the unstable counter yet
did not initiate any remedy to ensure the safety of their customers.
The petitioners failed to establish that the testimonies of the former
were biased and tainted with partiality. The court reiterated the
statement of former Judge Sangco that “a person under nine years of
age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and
is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a
case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is
shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a
felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of
liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by
analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and
that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of
age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a
child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.” Therefore,
the Court asserted that the deceased child who was 6 years old at the
time of tragedy was incapable of contributory negligence.
Furthermore, the Court believed that Criselda should be absolved
from any contributory negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision made by the appellate court.

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC., and SPOUSES EDGARDO

L. LIMON AND SYLVIA S. LIMON v TIMOTHY TAGORIO
 assisted by his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA
TAGORIO

G.R No. 150920 || November 25, 2005

Facts

One afternoon of March 5, 1991, Timothy, a Grade IV student

at Marymount school owned by Child Learning Center Inc. (CLC)
was trapped in the comfort room at the 3rd floor of the school building
due to the defect of locking mechanism of the door. To call the
attention for help, he banged and kicked the door and yelled for
several times. When no help arrived, he decided to open the window
to call for help but unfortunately, he fell three stories. He was
hospitalized and treated for serious multiple physical injuries.

The respondent filed a case against the CLC and its Board of
Directors, namely Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo
Narciso, and Luningning Salvador, and the school administrative
officer, Ricardo Pilao. The petitioners denied the allegations of the
respondents on its negligence that caused the accident. The trial court
found the CLC guilty of negligence and ordered the latter to pay the
respondents for compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fee, and costs of the suit. Subsequently, the petitioners filed
a petition before the Court of Appeals but later affirmed the decision
in toto of lower court.

Issue: Whether the school was negligent for Timothy’s accidental fall.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court found no reason to reverse the

decision of the lower court.

The Court asserted that in every tort case filed under Art. 2176
of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he
must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the damages incurred. The current tort case,
respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary
measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances: (1)
failure to fix a defective doorknob despite having been notified of the
problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window where
Timothy fell from. The petitioners failed to prove that the doorknob
was indeed not defective. The Court asserted that the fact that
Timothy fell out through the window implied that the door could not
be opened from inside. Under the principle of res ipsa liquitor, it is
fair to say that there is something wrong either with the door or the
doorknob. As to the absence of grills on the window, the petitioners
asserted that the former is not requirement under the Building code,
however the fact that the petitioners were aware that the window was
with the reach of the children, they should anticipate that the latter
could use the window if the door is not functioning. Thus, there is
sufficient basis to sustain the findings of liability of the petitioners.
Furthermore, the petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being
held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180
of the Civil Code.12 In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not
ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.

JOSEPH SALUDAGA v FEU and EDILBERTO DE JESUS in his

capacity as President of FEU

G.R. No. 179337 || April 30, 2008

Facts:
 On August 18, 1996, Joseph Saludaga, a sophomore law
student of the Far Eastern University, was shot by security guard
Rosete. The latter was under the supervision of Galaxy Development
and Management (Galaxy). The petitioner filed a complaint for
damages before the trial court against the respondent. The respondent
on the other hand, filed a Third-Party complaint against the Galaxy
and its president Imperial to reimburse whatever would be awarded to
the petitioner. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner as follow:

“1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his capacity as president of

FEU to pay jointly and severally Joseph Saludaga the amount
of P35,298.25 for actual damages with 12% interest per annum
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; moral
damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of P500,000.00,
attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and cost of the suit;

“2. Galaxy Management and Development Corp. and its

president, Col. Mariano Imperial to indemnify jointly and
severally 3rd party plaintiffs (FEU and Edilberto de Jesus in
his capacity as President of FEU) for the above-mentioned
amounts.

Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition before the Court

of Appeals which later assailed Decision in favor of the respondent.
Consequently, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it
was denied.

Issues:

1. Whether there is a contractual obligation between Saludaga and

FEU.
2. Whether the force majeure may absolve the respondent from
liability.
 3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to indemnification for
damages.
4. Whether the respondent De Jesus solidarily liable with the
respondent FEU.
5. Whether the respondent vicariously liable under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code.
6. Whether galaxy is liable to respondent.

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court reiterate its Decision in

Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply
with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student
with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to
abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its
rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the
realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the
school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily,
the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.
 The fact that the petitioner was enrolled in FEU at the time
when the former was shot, there was contracted obligation between
them. It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justifies,
prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. Wherefore, there is prima
facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to
provide a safe and secure environment to its students.
2. No. The Court asserted that in order for force majeure to
be considered, respondents must show that no negligence or
misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the loss. An act
of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take
steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss.
When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's
participation - whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act
- the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.
3. Yes. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those
who are negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for
damages. Therefore, due to the negligence, the FEU is liable to
petitioner for the damages.
4. No. The Court reiterate its assailed decision in Powton
Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol:

[A] corporation is invested by law with a personality separate

and distinct from those of the persons composing it, such that,
save for certain exceptions, corporate officers who entered into
contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held
personally liable for the liabilities of the latter. Personal
liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along
(although not necessarily) with the corporation may so validly
attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he assents to a patently
unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad
faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there
 is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation,
its stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the
issuance of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge
thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his
written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself
personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he
is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable
for his corporate action.

In the case at bar, none of the above-mentioned exceptions was

established, hence, De Jesus is not solidarily liable with FEU.

5. No. Art. 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The Court affirmed the findings of the appellate court that the
respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete.
Moreover, the Court reiterated its Decision in Mercury Drug
Corporation v. Libunao:
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,30 we held that where the security
agency recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or
security guards to a client, the employer of such guards or
 watchmen is such agency, and not the client, since the latter has
no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be
demanded from the said client:
… [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the security
agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its
watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of
such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful
acts committed by the security guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security
agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of
security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall
be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the
ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client
whose premises or property are protected by the security
guards.
xxxx
The fact that a client company may give instructions or
directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by
itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the
security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or
omissions.
6. Yes. It was promulgated by the Court in Firestone Tire
and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempengko that:
The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device
whereby a 'third party' who is neither a party nor privy to the
act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into
the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as
third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party
defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
 any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim. The third-
party complaint is actually independent of and separate and
distinct from the plaintiff's complaint. Were it not for this
provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed
independently and separately from the original complaint by
the defendant against the third-party. But the Rules permit
defendant to bring in a third-party defendant or so to speak, to
litigate his separate cause of action in respect of plaintiff's
claim against a third-party in the original and principal case
with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessary
proliferation of lawsuits and of disposing expeditiously in one
litigation the entire subject matter arising from one particular
set of facts.
For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent
FEU with an unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter's
breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to
respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned
amounts awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily
liable with Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs
of the security agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that his
medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but said
representations were not fulfilled because they presumed that
petitioner and his family were no longer interested in filing a formal
complaint against them.

NORMA MANGALIAG AND NARCISO SOLANO v HON.

EDELWINA CATUBIG-PASTORAL, JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 1ST JUDICIAL REGION, SAN
CARLOS CITY, (PANGASINAN), BRANCH 56 AND
APOLINARIO SERQUINA, JR.

G.R. No. 143951 || October 25, 2005

Facts:

On January 21, 1999, a dumped truck owned by the petitioner

Mangaliag and driven by Solano encroached and sideswipe the
tricycle riden by the private respondent Serquina. The gross
negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners sustained
to serious injuries and permanent deformities of the respondent.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint before the RTC
praying for damages. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint that was files by the private respondents for the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. The RTC
denied the said motion.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitioners are barred from raising the defense of

the RTC’s lack of jurisprudence?
2. Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses,
excluding moral, nominal damages, and attorney’s fee which
determined jurisdiction hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction?

Ruling:

1. No. Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of

jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in
the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best
characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only
after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already
been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because
of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. In the existing
controversy, the RTC is not yet assailing its decision. The petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss right after they discovered the alleged
jurisdictional defect. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to
be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present
controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction
of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply.
Therefore, petitioners are not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
2. No. The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein. In the case at bar, the allegations in
the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to recover
not only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for
physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial
deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed as
an action for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the
purview of Article 2219 (2), which provides for the payment of moral
damages in cases of quasi-delict causing physical injuries.

Private respondent’s claim for moral damages of ₱500,000.00

cannot be considered as merely incidental to or a consequence of the
claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action
or an independent actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person
to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is
violated, damages are due and assessable. Hence, the demand for
moral damages must be considered as a separate cause of action,
independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in
determining the jurisdictional amount, in clear consonance with
paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
 If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction in a case
of quasi-delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the
claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can
only award moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional
limitations, a situation not intended by the framers of the law.

B.F. METAL (CORPORATION) v SPS. ROLANDO M.

LOMOTAN and LINAFLOR LOMOTAN and RICO UMUYON

G.R. No. 170813 || April 16, 2008

Facts:

One morning of May 3, 1989, while cruising along Felix Ave.,

Rizal, the owner type jeep owned by Rolando and Linaflor and driven
by Umoyon, the private respondents, a speeding ten-wheeler truck
traversed by the former and rammed into the said jeep. Umoyon,
suffered "blunt thoracic injury with multiple rib fracture, fractured
scapula (L), with pneumohemothorax," from vehicular accident that
took him 19 days in the hospital. As a result, the former could no
longer drive.

Subsequently, the respondent filed a separate and independent

civil action for damages against the petitioner before the RTC of
Antipolo, Rizal prayed for the award of actual damages. Despite of
the petitioner’s denial and claim that the cause of the accident is the
negligence Umoyon, the trial court ordered the former to pay jointly
and severally the respondents. In the appeal filed by the petitioners,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court with modification in its
decision.

Issue:

1. Whether the amount of actual damages based only on a job

estimate should be lowered.
2. Whether Spouses Lomotan are also entitled to moral damages.
 3. Whether the award of exemplary damages and attorneys is
warranted.

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court found the argument of the petitioners was

partly meritorious that the alleged amount for the repair of the jeep
has not been sustained but a mere estimation hence the amount of
damages ordered by the lower courts should be modified. The Court
expound that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that
will put the injured party in the position in which he had been before
he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually
sustained and susceptible of measurement. To justify an award of
actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount
of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly
supported by receipts. The Court recapitulated its decision in Viron
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos that disallowed the award of
actual damages, considering that the actual damages suffered by
private respondents therein were based only on a job estimate.
Likewise, in the case at bar, the respondents failed to present evidence
that can show actual expenses of repair or replacement of the vehicle
thus following Viron, neither estimate is competent to prove actual
damages.
2. No. The Court asserted that In order that an award of
moral damages can be aptly justified, the claimant must be able to
satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such damages and that the
injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles
2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Then, too, the damages must be
shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The
claimant must establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal
tie with the acts of the defendant. In fine, an award of moral damages
would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical,
mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly,
a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of
the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article
2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Based on either criminal
culpa or quasi delict, the petitioner is liable to the moral damages
suffered by Umuyon, however there is no legal basis in awarding
moral damages to Spouses Lomotan whether arising from the criminal
negligence committed by Rivera or based on the negligence of
petitioner under Article 2180. Article 2219 speaks of recovery of
moral damages in case of a criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries or quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, the two instances
where Rivera and petitioner are liable for moral damages to
respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral
damages where there is injury to property, but the injury must be
willful and the circumstances show that such damages are justly due.
There being no proof that the accident was willful, Article 2220 does
not apply.
3. Yes. The Court reiterate that exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence. While the amount of the exemplary
damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded. Thus, the Court affirmed the award of exemplary damages
ordered by the appellate court since the respondents Spouses Lomotan
have shown that they are entitled to compensatory damages while
respondent Umuyon can recover both compensatory and moral
damages.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v

JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO

G.R. No. 175587 || September 21, 2007

Facts:

The petitioner, PCIB filed a complaint against the respondent

Alejandro for sum of money on October 23, 1992. The petitioner
alleged the respondent that he executed a promissory note obliging
himself to pay P249, 828, 588.90 with an interest but due to variation
on the foreign exchange, the deposits assigned by the respondent
became insufficient to secure the loan consequently the former
requested for additional security for the loan. The respondent sought
reconsideration and alleging the petitioner of mishandling of his
account due.

In praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment

under Section 1 paragraphs (e) and (f) of Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner alleged that (1) respondent fraudulently withdrew his
unassigned deposits notwithstanding his verbal promise to PCIB
Assistant Vice President Corazon B. Nepomuceno not to withdraw the
same prior to their assignment as security for the loan; and (2) that
respondent is not a resident of the Philippines. The application for the
issuance of a writ was supported with the affidavit of Nepomuceno.

the respondent filed a motion to quash the motion filed by the

petitioner which later affirmed by the trial court. Subsequently, the
petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court affirmed the decision rendered by the trial court.
Issue: Whether petitioner bank is liable for damages for the improper
issuance of the writ of attachment against respondent.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court found that plaintiff was knowledgeable from

the beginning on the deficiency of its second ground for attachment
[i.e.,] disposing properties with intent to defraud his creditors, and
therefore plaintiff had to resort to this misrepresentation that
defendant was residing out of the Philippines and suppressed the fact
that defendant’s permanent residence is in METRO MANILA where
he could be served with summons hence the defendant has duly
proven its grounds in the motion and that plaintiff is not entitled to the
attachment.

Corollarily, in actions in personam, such as the instant case for

collection of sum of money, summons must be served by personal or
substituted service, otherwise the court will not acquire jurisdiction
over the defendant. In case the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines (and hence personal and substituted service
cannot be effected), the remedy of the plaintiff in order for the court to
acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert the action into a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the property of the
defendant. Thus, in order to acquire jurisdiction in actions in
personam where defendant resides out of and is not found in the
Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for the court to convert the
action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the
defendant’s property. The service of summons in this case (which
may be by publication coupled with the sending by registered mail of
the copy of the summons and the court order to the last known address
of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction
but for compliance with the requirements of due process.

However, where the defendant is a resident who is temporarily

out of the Philippines, attachment of his/her property in an action in
personam, is not always necessary in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction to hear the case.

The Court reiterate the provision of Sec. 16. Residents

temporarily out of the Philippines. – When an action is commenced
against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but
who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also
effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.

The preceding section referred to in the above provision is

Section 15 which provides for extraterritorial service – (a) personal
service out of the Philippines, (b) publication coupled with the
sending by registered mail of the copy of the summons and the court
order to the last known address of the defendant; or (c) in any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient.

In Montalban v. Maximo, however, the Court held that

substituted service of summons (under the present Section 7, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court) is the normal mode of service of summons that
will confer jurisdiction on the court over the person of residents
temporarily out of the Philippines. Meaning, service of summons may
be effected by (a) leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable discretion residing therein, or
(b) by leaving copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof. Hence, the
court may acquire jurisdiction over an action in personam by mere
substituted service without need of attaching the property of the
defendant.

It is clear from the foregoing that even on the allegation that

respondent is a resident temporarily out of the Philippines, petitioner
is still not entitled to a writ of attachment because the trial court could
acquire jurisdiction over the case by substituted service instead of
attaching the property of the defendant. The misrepresentation of
petitioner that respondent does not reside in the Philippines and its
omission of his local addresses was thus a deliberate move to ensure
that the application for the writ will be granted.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

v HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA
LATAGAN, RICARDO GENERALAO and PAMPANGA
SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., CORPORATION

Facts:

Due to the eruption of the Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 the national

bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang,
Pampanga. It resulted to PASUDECO to send a request to Toll
Regulatory Board to let their trucks carrying sugarcane pass the
NLEX. The request was granted and TRB and PASUDECO entered in
a memorandum of agreement.

On January 23, 1993 around 2:30 AM, Sendin, the PNCC

security supervisor together with other employees noticed a pile of
sugarcane scattered in the middle portion of north and southbound
lane in km. 72. The former manned the traffic and upon his request,
PASUDECO sent 5 men to clear the highway. Around 5:40 AM when
PASUDECO employees leave the area with few sugarcanes left
scattered in the road likewise, the group of Sendin removed the
lighted cans and lane dividers.

At 6:30 AM, while passing NLEX, the vehicle driven by Arnaiz

together with his sister Latagan, and a friend Generalao, ran over the
scattered sugarcane that resulted to accident. The mishap sustained
physical injury to Latagan and damages to the vehicle of Aranaiz.
Consequently, the respondents filed a complaint against PASUDECO
and PNCC for damages. In response of PNCC to the said complaint, it
pointed out the gross negligence of PADUSECO as proximate cause
of the mishap while the unreasonable speed of Arnaiz was
contributory negligence. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of
Litagan but it dismissed the complaint of Arnaiz, Generalao, and
PNCC. Subsequently, Litagan, Arnaiz, Generalao, and PNCC filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals. The appeallant court affirmed the
trial court decision with modification. They held PNCC and
PADUSECO jointly and solidarily liable to the damages of Litagan.

Issue: Whether the COA erred in modifying the decision of the trial
court and making petitioner PNCC, jointly and [solidarily],
liable with private respondent PASUDECO.

Ruling:

No. Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee

PNCC, should be held liable.

The Court explained that There are three elements of a quasi-

delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
As Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code provides Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In the present case, the Court found that the petitioner failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for
motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were
removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The
highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened
sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition
of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the
wee hours of the morning.
 Thus, PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes
without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the
emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts
which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries. As
such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. As the
Court held in the vintage case of Sabido v. Custodio:

According to the great weight of authority, where the

concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or
more persons, although acting independently of each other,
are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone
might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage
might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. ...

In addition, the Court reiterate its decision in Far Eastern

Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to

render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It
is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because
he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that
the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as
great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent
tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of
the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the
injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery
may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that
one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them
to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence
ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts
were the sole cause of the injury.