Better or Worse?

The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights

Author(s): Dursun Peksen
Source: Journal of Peace Research , Jan., 2009, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Jan., 2009), pp. 59-77
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

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 ? 2009 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 46, no. 1, 2009, pp. 59-77

/H ?2 /H f^ ?^ Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London,

Jr^rMiViK
New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC)
http://jpr.sagepub. com
DOI 10.1177/0022343308098404

Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions

on Human Rights*
DURSUN PEKSEN
Department of Political Science, East Carolina University

Does economic coercion increase or decrease government respect for human rights in countries target
with economic sanctions? If economic sanctions weaken the target regime's coercive capacity, huma
rights violations by the government should be less likely. If, on the conttary, sanctions fail to attenuat
the coercive capacity of the target elites and create more economic difficulties and political violence
among ordinary citizens, the government will likely commit more human rights violations. Focusin
on competing views of why sanctions might improve or detetiotate human rights conditions, this articl
offers an empirical examination of the effect sanctions have on the physical integrity fights of citizens
in tatget countries. Utilizing time-series, cross-national data for the period 1981-2000, the finding
suggest that economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights, including
freedom from disappearances, extra-judicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment. The result
also show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions
Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool, even when sanctions are specificall
imposed with the goal of improving human rights. Finally, multilateral sanctions have a greater overall
negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions.

Introduction imposed by sender countries with a variety of

foreign
Economie sanctions have become an increas policy goals, ranging from preventing
bloodshed between ethnic groups to punish
ingly common feature of international pol
itics. Hence, the last decade has been referred ing countries harboring terrorists, restoring
democratic regimes, or ending the use of
to as 'the sanctions decade' (Cortright &
repression by the government. Beyond the
Lopez, 2000). The ideal goal of sanctions has
intended policy goal(s), however, economic
been to apply economic and diplomatic pres
sanctions inflict significant socio-economic
sure on target countries to induce the target
and political damage in target countries. In
political leadership to comply with sender other words, economic sanctions could be a
countries' demands.1 Economic coercion is
detrimental foreign policy tool, owing to the
inadvertent destabilizing effects they create
* I would like to thank A. Cooper Drury for his valuable
in target countries. Specifically, sanctions
feedback on previous versions of this article. I also thank
Adrian Ang, Han Dorussen, Jonathan Krieckhaus,may Briancause disproportionate stress on ordin
Lai, Minion K. C. Morrison, Cameron Thies, and three
anonymous reviewers of//5/? for their helpful commentsaryoncitizens, while allowing the targeted
earlier drafts. The replication dataset is available regimes
at to avoid the cost of coercion (e.g.
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. Contact information:
peksend@ecu.edu.
Cortright & Lopez, 1995; Weiss et al., 1997;
1 Throughout the article, senders or sender countriesWeiss,
refers 1999; Gibbons, 1999).
to the countries that impose economic sanctions, while
Focusing on the possible effects sanctions
targets or target countries refers to the countries that are
subjected to economic coercion.
have on political and economic conditions of

59

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60 journal of Peace Research volume 461 number 11 January 2009
target countries, this article develops a the general hypothesis. The next two sections
oretical framework and empirically addresses present the research design and report the
the effect economic sanctions have on the findings from data analysis respectively. Pos
violation of physical integrity rights of sible implications of the findings for policy
citizens, including freedom from disappear making and scholarly research are discussed
ances, extra-judicial killings, torture, and in the conclusion.
political imprisonment. Utilizing a time
series, cross-national empirical analysis for The Relevant Literature
the period 1981-2000, the article demon
strates that economic sanctions deteriorate The research on the use and utility of eco
citizens' physical integrity rights. The results nomic coercion has largely focused on the
also point out that extensive sanctions, fundamental question of 'do economic sanc
including comprehensive trade and financial tions work?' Scholars have long claimed that
restrictions, appear to be more detrimental economic sanctions are generally ineffective
to human rights than partial/selective sanc in inducing target countries to comply with
tions. Economic coercion is still a detrimental the sender's demands (e.g. Galtung, 1967;
Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1990; Pape,
and counterproductive policy tool, even when
sanctions are imposed with the specific 1997). A growing body of literature, on the
goal of promoting human rights conditions. other hand, shifted the focus to the question
Furthermore, multilateral sanctions have a of consequences of economic sanctions on
greater overall negative impact on human target countries. The extant literature on the
rights than unilateral sanctions. Finally, consequences of sanctions has been largely
besides the immediate effect of ongoing devoted to examining the negative humani
sanctions, the findings on the duration of tarian effects of economic coercion. The
economic sanctions (number of years sanc research suggests that, owing to the dispro
tions are in place) suggest that the longer portionate economic impact on citizens, eco
sanctions are imposed, the greater accumu nomic coercion inadvertently worsens public
lating human rights cost they will inflict on health, economic conditions, the develop
target countries. ment of civil society, and education in target
Offering a cross-national, empirical analysis countries (e.g. Galtung, 1967; Weiss et al.,
of the unintended effect sanctions have 1997; Weiss, 1999; Cortright, Millar &
on human rights practices, the article Lopez, 2001; Lopez & Cortright, 1997;
complements and adds to the literature that
Cortright & Lopez, 1995). Focusing on the
explores the consequences of sanctions in effects sanctions have on political stability of
target countries. The findings also speak to target countries, Marinov (2005) finds that
the research that emphasizes the importance economic sanctions destabilize political
leaders, while Allen (2004) shows that sanc
of international factors in promoting human
rights that, so far, have overlooked the role
tions, especially in more democratic coun
that economic coercion plays in human tries, cause more political violence such as
rights violations. riots and demonstrations.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. A few studies also focus on the effect of
The next section briefly refers to the relevant sanctions on human rights (Lopez &:
literature on economic sanctions. The fol Cortright, 1997; Li & Drury, 2004; Drury &
lowing section develops a theoretical frame Li, 2006). For instance, Li & Drury (2004)
work delineating the effects of economic show that the USA's threat to remove
sanctions on human rights and derives the Chinas Most Favored Nation (MFN) status

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 Dursun Peksen ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 61

was a failed policy in promoting more respect other resources that are crucial for political
for human rights. Contrary to expectations, elites to maintain stability and order
they argue that the threat of coercion was (Galtung, 1967: 388; Kirshner, 1997: 42).
counterproductive and resulted in fewer Once target regimes are denied the access to
Chinese accommodations regarding the use external military and other resources, sanc
of repression against citizens. Using UN sanc tions should harm the coercive capacity of
tions against Iraq as a case study, Lopez & the repressive regimes and subsequently
Cortright (1997), on the other hand, lessen governmental repression (Blanton,
argue that further deterioration of human 1999; Davenport, 1995a). Furthermore,
rights conditions was an unintended conse because scarce economic resources have
quence of economic sanctions caused by dis been a key tool to reward the loyalty of the
proportionate economic hardship on Iraqi regime's supporters such as those in police,
civilians. military, and civil services (Wintrobe, 1990,
None of these studies, however, provides 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), the
a cross-national, empirical examination of lack of access to external economic and other
the extent to which economic sanctions essential, scarce resources should cause a loss
affect government respect for human rights of support among influential groups and
practices in target countries. Therefore, we subsequently further diminish the repressive
are still far from understanding the effect ness of the regimes.
economic sanctions have on human rights. As a result, once the political leadership
Starting with a theoretical framework next, loses its coercive capacity and political
this study provides a thorough examination support, the target regime will likely be chal
of the unintended effect sanctions have on lenged by opposition movements that will
human rights. consequently lead to a power shift in favor of
anti-government groups. As the anti-regime
groups become more viable in domestic pol
Sanctions?Human Rights Nexus
itics, they will have more leverage to rally
There are two likely outcomes regarding the support from citizens to eliminate the repres
impact sanctions have on human rights con sive regime and to promote more respect for
ditions in target countries. First, if economic human rights and political liberties. Put
sanctions weaken the target regime's coercive simply, economic sanctions are expected to
capacity, human rights violations by the gov improve human rights conditions by under
ernment should be less likely. Second, and on mining target governments' coercive power
the contrary, if sanctions fail to undermine and political support from elites, as well as
the coercive capacity of the target elites and public support.
lead to more economic and political disorder, Contrary to the expectation that sanc
the government will likely employ more tions improve human rights conditions sug
repression. The theoretical discussion below gested by the naive theory of sanctions, the
outlines the reasoning behind these two alternative view emphasizes the inadvertent
competing views and concludes that eco political and economic consequences of
nomic sanctions will likely worsen human sanctions and maintains that economic coer
rights conditions in target countries. cion will likely increase the use of repression
According to 'the naive theory of economic by the government. The underlying logic
sanctions', economic coercion is designed to behind this argument is that foreign eco
weaken the target regime by denying nomic pressure unintendedly permits the
them necessary economic, military, and targeted leadership to enhance their coercive

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62 journal of Peace Research volume 461 number 11 January 2009
capacity and create more opportunities to the relationship between the regime and the
violate the basic rights of average citizens. key groups, allowing him to maintain a strong
The following paragraphs outline four major repressive rule against civilians. Thus, eco
factors to account for how sanctions con nomic sanctions will likely fail to damage the
tribute to the repressive capacity of the tar coercive strength of political leadership and
geted elites and provide more reasons to instead enhance the connection between
violate human rights. authoritarian regimes and their supporters.
First, economic coercion enhances the This process results in the allocation of more
repressive capacity of the regime allowing power to the regime to employ repression
political elites to escape the cost of economic against citizens.
pressure and improving the ties between the Second, earlier research on the humani
political leadership and its constituency. tarian consequences of economic coercion
Because the target leadership controls the shows that sanctions create unintended con
supply of scarce public resources (typically sequences of greater poverty, higher levels of
made more scarce by the sanctions), political unemployment, and poor health conditions
elites will divert the cost of sanctions to for ordinary citizens (e.g. Weiss et al., 1997;
average citizens by unevenly using extant Weiss, 1999; Cortright, Millar & Lopez,
resources in their favor (Weiss et al., 1997; 2001; Cortright & Lopez, 1995, 2000). As
Weiss, 1999; Rowe, 2000; Cortright, Millar economic coercion creates more grievances
& Lopez, 2001). Political elites also avoid the among economically disadvantaged groups,
cost of sanctions by generating revenues and the target regimes face more instability
securing the supplies of scarce resources (Allen, 2004; Marinov, 2005). Increasing
through illegal smuggling and other under socio-economic need is suggested to be a
ground transnational economic channels major source of economic grievance and
(Andreas, 2005; Seiden, 1999: 75-76; political violence (Gurr, 1968, 1970), which,
Gibbons, 1999). Hence, the targeted elites in turn, increases the use of repression by
likely remain unharmed by coercion, as eco governments (Henderson, 1991; Poe &
nomic sanctions disproportionately affect T?te, 1994; Poe, T?te & Keith, 1999). Con
average citizens. Furthermore, sanctions sequently, as anti-government movements
strengthen the authoritarian regime's ties rise, especially among the economically dis
with prominent social groups because those advantaged groups following sanctions, the
groups are dependent on the regime's control target regimes will use more repression to
over the distribution of scarce resources suppress those groups to maintain the
(Gibbons, 1999; Reuther, 1995). status quo.
In the case of Iraq, for instance, it is sug Third, economic sanctions are also
gested that economic sanctions did not cause exploited by the target leadership to broaden
any major damage to the regime's stability,their legitimacy and to justify repression
but instead boosted the allegiance of prom against anti-regime movements (Galtung,
inent groups (i.e. the Sunni minority, the 1967; Miyagawa, 1992: 84-86). Specifically,
Baath Party, and military and police forces) leaders often depict economic sanctions as an
as Saddam's rule granted economic rents and external threat to national integrity and
secured access to scarce resources in return unity. As sanctions are shown as a serious
for those groups' loyalty (Reuther, 1995; external threat to national unity, political
Hoskins, 1997). Consequently, the sanctions elites justify their repression against anti
against Saddam Hussein consolidated his regime groups who are critical of the govern
repressive authoritarian rule by enhancing ment under the guise of maintaining

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 Dursun Peksen ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 63

domestic cohesion. In Cuba, for instance, the global economy and thwarting the emer
Castro depicted US sanctions as an imperial gence of strong social groups demanding
istic attempt to infringe on the independence more respect for basic rights, sanctions con
and integrity of the Cuban people. tribute to the consolidation of target's repres
Sanctions, therefore, allowed Castro to divert
sive rule, while diminishing the international
public attention from internal problems of support for pro-human rights movements in
the communist regime to the external threat targets.
posed by sanctions. Thus, as Castro became Based on the above discussion, economic
a heroic leader fighting against the imperialist sanctions will strengthen the repressive
power, economic coercion made it easier for capacity of the target regime and provide them
him to justify his oppressive regime with more opportunities to employ violent tools
(Schreiber, 1973: 404-405; Miyagawa, 1992: against citizens. I therefore hypothesize that
84-86). To sum up, where economic sanc economic coercion will likely cause the unin
tions are portrayed as an external threat to tended consequence of more human rights vio
national sovereignty, there will be more occa lations in target countries.
sions of repression, especially against anti
regime groups under the justification of
Research Design
maintain-ing domestic cohesion to fight
external challenges. Table I reports the summary statistics
Fourth and finally, economic coercion from the variables used in the analysis. To
also deteriorates human rights by isolating test the hypothesis that sanctions are detri
target countries from global economic and mental to human rights, I utilize time-series
political influences. More specifically, sanc and cross-section data delineated by years
tions - particularly comprehensive economic and countries, respectively. The time period
coercion that cuts almost all the economic 1981?2000, inclusive, is determined by the
and political ties between target countries availability of the physical integrity rights
and international actors - play a major role (available from 1981) and sanctions data
in the international isolation of target coun (available until 2000).
Using the Threat and Implementation of
tries by discouraging international trade and
investment from foreign economic agents Economic Sanctions (TIES) (Morgan,
(Hufbauer et al., 1997; Hufbauer & Oegg, Krustev & Bapat, 2006) and Hufbauer,
2003; Caruso, 2003; Yang et al., 2004). Schott & Elliott's (HSE) (1990) sanction
Economic integration through international datasets, the analysis sample is restricted to
trade and foreign investment is considered to the countries that faced the threat and/or
be essential in promoting government actual imposition of economic sanctions
respect for human rights (Mitchell & sometime during the period of the analysis.
McCormick, 1988; Meyer, 1996; Instead of including all countries for which
Goldstone, Bates & Epstein, 2000; Apodaca, the data are available, the purpose of restrict
2001; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001; ing the analysis sample to the countries
Hafner-Burton, 2005a,b). According to this threatened and/or imposed with sanctions is
line of reasoning, economic integration pro to reduce possible selection bias. Specifically,
motes the protection and advancement of given that targets might have some system
human rights by creating economic wealth, a atic attributes that already cause more
politically stable and strong middle class, and human rights violations, inclusion of the
more respect for the basic rights of citizens. countries threatened with coercion in
Thus, limiting the target's integration into addition to those facing actual sanctions will

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64 journal of Peace Research volume 461 number 1 /January 2009

Table I. Summary Statistics

Observations Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.

Disappearances 1,607 0.399 0.680 0 2

Extra-judicial killings 1,600 0.76 0.806 0 2
Political imprisonment 1,602 1.019 0.854 0 2
Torture 1,607 1.274 0.728 0 2
Physical Integrity Index 1,595 3.438 2.381 0 8
Political Terror Scale (PTS) 1,994 2.513 1.182 1 5
Economic sanctions 1,994 0.286 0.523 0 2
Human rights sanctions 1,994 0.114 0.341 0 2
Non-human-rights sanctions 1,994 0.140 0.418 0 2
Multilateral sanctions 1,994 0.074 0.299 0 2
Unilateral sanctions 1,994 0.208 0.475 0 2
Sanction years 1,994 2 5.501 0 39
GDP per capita 1,994 5,641.056 8,640.073 49.323 44,798.75
Democracy 1,994 1.291 7.471 -10 10
Civil war 1,994 0.227 0.419 0 1
Interstate war 1,994 0.043 0.202 0 1

restrict the sample to those countries withinclude murders by private grou

law. They
if human
relatively similar tendency to commit instigated by the government. Thes
rights violations. Consequently, themay result from the deliberat
killings
illegal,
restricted sample, by reducing selection and excessive use of lethal force
bias,
provides a more appropriate data analysis to security forces, or other agents of t
the police,
capture the human rights effect ofstate whether against criminal suspect
imposed
sanctions on target countries.2 Overall, the prisoners, or others.' Disapp
detainees,
sample size includes 95 countries.rances are cases in which people have di
peared, political motivation appears like
Dependent Variables and the victims have not been foun
This study particularly focuses on the Knowledge
phys of the whereabouts of the d
ical integrity rights of citizens, which is one ofis, by definition, not public know
appeared
the most essential components of human
edge. However, while there is typically
rights. Four different physical integrity
way of rights
knowing where victims are, it is ty
variables from the Cingranelli & Richards's
ically known by whom they were taken a
under
(CIRI) (2004) human rights dataset are what circumstances.' Torture is 't
used.
These variables include extrajudicial purposeful
killings, inflicting of extreme pai
disappearances, political imprisonment,
whether and
mental or physical, by governmen
torture. Extrajudicial killings are 'killings
officialsby
or by private individuals at the in
government officials without due process
gation ofof government officials. Tortur
includes the use of physical and other for
by police and prison guards that is crue
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggestinginhuman,
that only or degrading. This also includ
countries facing the threat and/or imposition deaths in custody due to negligence by g
of sanctions
be included to limit any possible selection bias. Although
ernment officials.'
not reported here, when I used a global sample (145 coun
Political imprisonment
'the incarceration
tries), the results from the data analysis largely remained the of people by governmen
same across different model specifications.
officials because of: their speech; th

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 Dursun Peksen Economic Sanctions 65

Terror Scales (PTS) (Gibney, 2005) as the

non-violent opposition to government policies or
leaders; their religious beliefs; their non alternative dependent variable, which is
violent religious practices including proselyt another widely used measure of physical
izing; or their membership in a group, integrity rights abuses.5 The PTS include
including an ethnic or racial group.'3 only two index variables providing informa
The data for the variables were originally tion regarding the magnitude and severity of
gathered from the country reports of human integrity rights abuses, including disappear
rights abuses prepared by the US State ances, torture, political imprisonment, and
Department and Amnesty International. executions. The indices range from 1 to 5,
Each of the four physical integrity variables where higher scores indicate a higher level of
is coded as an ordinal variable on a three human rights abuses (for a more detailed dis
point scale (0 = frequent violations [50 cussion of the PTS scale, see Poe, T?te &
or more incidences], 1 = some violation Keith, 1999: 297). The two indices are based
[1-49], and 2 = no violations). In addition on two separate data sources, including the
to the individual analysis of each of the four country reports on human rights by the US
indicators, the Physical Integrity Index, com State Department and Amnesty Inter
posed of these four variables, is also included national. In this article, the State Department
in the analysis. It is a nine-point scale that index was used, which covers more countries
ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum and time points to include in the analysis.
of 8, where 0 indicates no respect for phys The time period used in the PTS models is
ical integrity rights and 8 indicates full respect 1976-2000, inclusive.
for those rights (Cingranelli & Richards,
2004).4 To make the interpretation easier, in Independent Variables
this analysis all the integrity rights variables The data on economic sanctions were com
have been recoded so that higher values indi piled from TIES (Morgan, Krustev & Bapat,
cate a higher level of integrity right abuses. 2006), HSE (1990), Hufbauer et al. (1997),
To check the sensitivity of the findings to Hufbauer 6c Oegg (2003), and the website
data specifications, I also use the Political of the Institute of International Economics.6
The TIES dataset covers imposed sanctions
initiated between 1971 and 2000.7 I merged
3 The variable descriptions are as they appear in the CIRI
codebook.
5 In Gibney (2005), the data are available since 1980. Poe,
4 Some criticize the use of an index variable suggesting that T?te & Keith's (1999) data that use similar coding rules
incorporating different integrity rights abuses under a were used to include the data for the 1976-79 period. Also,
single variable might undermine the behavioral differences following the earlier practice (e.g. Poe & T?te, 1994;
behind the use of different integrity abuses (Mitchell & Davenport & Amstrong, 2004), for the countries where the
McCormick, 1988; McCormick & Mitchell, 1997). Poe, State Department data were missing but available from
T?te & Keith (1999: 298), on the other hand, note that Amnesty International, the missing values were replaced in
different kinds of integrity rights are substitutable policy the State Department indicator by using the index for
choices. That is, the choice to violate one type of integrity Amnesty International data.
right may make unnecessary the violation of another 6 The full list of the sanction cases compiled by Gary
integrity right. Fortunately, Cingranelli & Richards's Hufbauer and his colleagues is available at http://www
(2004) dataset uniquely provides data to accommodate .iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctions-timeline.htm.
both of the reasonable concerns. Thus, in this study, the 7 The TIES dataset does not provide the actual date of
individual analysis of four major physical integrity rights imposition for the imposed sanction cases followed by a
allows examining the effect economic coercion has on each threat stage. Hence, I am unable to include those cases
of the four integrity rights abuses, while the use of the index unless the data for the imposition date for the same
variable offers an analysis of how sanctions affect integrity episodes are available in the HSE's data. I also exclude the
rights abuses in general. For some of the earlier research TIES sanction cases over environmental policy and trade
using the Cingranelli & Richards's (2004) dataset, see, for practice disputes, because those cases do not lead to any
example, Richards, Gelleny & Sacko (2001); Abouharb & substantial political and economic consequences for target
Cingranelli (2006); Sobek, Abouharb & Ingram (2006). countries. It is also worthwhile noting that for the

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66 journal of Peace Research volume 461 number 11 January 2009
the data from Hufbauer and his colleagues dual-use technologies, constraints on military
for all the imposed sanction cases missing in and other sorts of aid, and travel restrictions.
the TIES dataset or implemented before The purpose of using an ordinal sanction
1971 and continued during the 1981-2000 variable is to account for the severity of eco
period (e.g. sanctions against South Africa nomic sanctions. Earlier research on the
and Cuba). Economic sanctions refer to humanitarian consequences of economic
trade and financial coercion such as export sanctions emphasizes that extensive eco
restrictions, investment bans, asset freezes, nomic sanctions cause more economic hard
reduction or suspension of military aid, ship and political strain on target regimes
restrictions on limited dual-use technologies, than partial sanctions (e.g. Weiss et al., 1997;
and travel bans on target countries' officials Weiss, 1999; Cortright, Millar & Lopez,
(HSE, 1990: 2). The data analysis focuses 2001). The impact of extensive sanctions is
only on imposed economic sanctions. The suggested to be detrimental, as illustrated by
compiled data include unilateral sanctions unilateral US sanctions against Cuba, as well
initiated by individual countries, such as the as multilateral sanctions against Iraq and
United States, as well as multilateral sanc Yugoslavia. It is expected that, owing to the
tions imposed by multiple countries under complete or nearly complete cut of economic
the auspices of the United Nations (UN) or ties, extensive sanctions are more detrimen
regional intergovernmental organizations, tal to civilians and the general economic
such as the European Union (EU) and the and political stability of target countries.
Organization of African Unity (OAU). As opposed to extensive sanctions, limited/
All the sanction variables discussed below selective sanctions that aim at partial
are ordinal variables (0?2) indicating whether financial and trade restrictions are expected
a country in a given year is under no sanction to be less harmful to target countries.
(0), partial sanctions (1), or extensive sanc Therefore, the expected human rights effects
tions (2).8 The extensive sanctions category of sanctions should be more salient in coun
includes comprehensive sanctions that cut tries under extensive sanctions, owing to
any economic and financial transactions their harsher political and socio-economic
between the sender and target countries, such consequences on target countries.
as those sanctions in place against Cuba, The economic sanctions (0?2) variable
North Korea, and Yugoslavia (Hufbauer et includes all imposed sanctions and indicates
al., 1997).9 Partial sanctions, on the other whether or not a country is facing extensive
hand, refer to limited trade and financial (2), partial (1), or no sanctions in a given
sanctions, such as investment bans or asset year.10 In addition to the sanctions variable
freezes and partial export restrictions, reduc
tion or suspension of arms exports or limited 10 Some scholars prefer dividing the list of sanctions into the
categories of limited, moderate, and extensive sanctions to
determine the severity of sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 1997;
countries facing more than one sanction in a given year, the Hufbauer & Oegg, 2003). Yet, the data for limited and
sanction case with more severe consequences and/or with moderate sanctions are not available in the existing data
multiple senders was taken as the basis to code the eco sources for the sanction episodes not involving the United
nomic sanctions (all) variable. States and the United Nations. Furthermore, although
8 When I use dummy variables for all sanction indicators extensive sanctions are straightforward to determine, owing
(i.e. economic sanctions (all), extensive vs. partial sanc to the almost complete cut of economic ties between the
tions, human rights vs. non-human-rights sanctions), parties, determining the differences between limited and
instead of the ordinal measure, the findings largely moderate sanctions appears to be vague. Therefore, owing
remained significant across the models. to data limitations and to minimize any subjective judg
9 Extensive sanctions have become a rarer sanction type ment, I divide sanctions into two categories including
since the late 1990s, especially because the UN and EU extensive and partial sanctions (for a similar operationaliza
mostly impose limited/partial sanctions. tion, see also Caruso, 2003; Yang et al., 2004).

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 Dursun Peksen ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 67

including all imposed sanction episodes, util Finally, the natural log of the sanction
izing the same ordinal seventy scale, I also years variable indicates how long imposed
extend the analysis examining whether the economic coercion has been in place in a
objective of sanctions and number of actors given year. The log form of the variable is
involved in the imposition process have any used to account for the data's curvilinearity.
particular impact on physical integrity right The goal of looking at the number of sanc
abuses in target countries. The human rights tion years is to investigate to what extent eco
sanctions variable indicates whether a nomic sanctions' negative effects persist in
country faces extensive or partial imposed the long term. The sanction years variable
sanctions with the goal of preventing human therefore helps empirically observe the
rights violations committed by target expected negative effect of sanctions over
regimes, or otherwise, while the non-human time, in addition to the immediate effect
rights sanctions variable takes the value of 1 captured by the other sanction variables dis
(partial) or 2 (extensive) when sanctions are cussed above.
imposed with non-human-rights policy goals,
and 0 otherwise. The data regarding the sanc Control Variables
tion objectives are taken from the HSE and I include four additional variables to control
TIES dataseis, which provide information for the other independent factors on human
about the issues involved in each sanction rights suggested by the earlier research.
episode. To determine the policy goal of sanc A democracy variable is included in the
tion imposer(s) in each case, I also consulted models to control for the influence of the
the studies (Ang & Peksen, 2007; Li, 1993) regime type on human rights abuses.
that specifically investigate the role of issue Specifically, the expectation is that democra
types on sanction outcomes. Thus, focusing tic states tend to commit fewer human rights
on the objectives of economic coercion abuses, because democratic governments are
allows us to examine whether economic sanc more constrained through numerous institu
tions imposed with the explicit goal of tional mechanisms, such as removal of the
improving human rights conditions are more government by the popular vote and the exis
or less detrimental to integrity rights com tence of an effective checks and balances
pared with sanctions with other objectives. system (e.g. Mitchell &C McCormick, 1988;
To determine whether the number of Henderson, 1991; Davenport, 1995b, 1999;
actors involved (multilateral vs. unilateral) Poe & T?te, 1994; Krain, 1997; Poe, T?te &
during the imposition stage has any particu Keith, 1999; Zanger, 2000). The democracy
lar impact, the variable multilateral sanctions variable is taken from the Polity IV dataset
accounts for only extensive and partial sanc (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000); each country's
tions imposed by the UN or major regional democracy score ranges from -10 to 10,
intergovernmental organizations, while uni where 10 represents the highest level of
lateral sanctions includes only extensive and democracy. The natural log of GDP per
partial sanctions imposed by individual coun capita income level (in 1995 constant US
tries without any involvement of international dollars) is used to control for the effects of
organizations. It is likely that sanctions will be developmental differences across countries.
more harmful under multilateral sanctions, Theoretically, countries mired in poverty
since multiple countries are putting pressure that lack economic resources are more likely
on target countries and leading to more eco to experience political instability and vio
nomic damage and isolation of the target lence. To maintain stability and order,
from global economic and political forces. regimes in underdeveloped states more likely

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68 journal of Peace Research volume 46/ number 1 /January 2009
conditions, given that the change in state
use repressive measures against citizens (e.g.
Mitchell & McCormick, 1988; Henderson, practices towards human rights is a slow
1991; Poe & T?te, 1994; Poe, T?te & Keith, process (e.g. Poe & T?te, 1994; Poe, Tafte &
1999; Zanger, 2000; Keith, 2002). The data Keith, 1999). Because all the dependent vari
for economic development are from the ables utilized in the analysis are ordinal vari
World Bank (2004). ables with three or more categories, all the
Previous research also points out that pres models are reported using ordered probit
ence of a civil war in a country will increase regression (Long, 1997). The Huber/White
human right violations (e.g. Mitchell &C sandwich estimator of variance clustered on
McCormick, 1988; Davenport, 1995b, country code is included in each model in
1999; Poe & T?te, 1994; Poe, T?te & Keith, order to obtain robust standard errors,
1999; Zanger, 2000). As governments face which assumes non-independence within
internal challenge from anti-government clusters.
armed forces, governments become more
repressive to maintain control over the
society. Similarly, involvement in an interstate
Findings
war has been claimed to be positively associ Table II reports the findings from the models
ated with greater incidences of human rights using disappearances and extra-judicial
abuses (Davenport, 1995b, 1999; Poe & killings as the dependent variables. Table III
T?te, 1994; Poe, T?te & Keith, 1999; Zanger, includes the models only for political impris
2000). It is expected that during international onment and torture, and Table IV contains
warfare, governments tend to be more repres the models for Physical Integrity Index and
sive over their citizens to maintain domestic the Political Terror Scale indices. Four
cohesion in the face of a foreign threat. The models are used for each of the dependent
civil war variable is coded as 1 if a country is variables. The first model reports the find
under a civil war with at least 25 battle-related ings from the ordinal economic sanctions
deaths per year, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, variable as the main independent variable
the interstate war variable takes the value of 1 that merely indicates whether a country is
if a country is under a minor, intermediate, or under limited, extensive, or no economic
extensive interstate armed conflict, and 0 coercion in a given year. The second model
otherwise. The data for civil and interstate for each of the dependent variables reports
wars are from the Armed Conflict Dataset the effect of sanction objectives ? human
(Strand et al., 2005) of the International rights vs. non-human-rights. The third
Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). To min model only includes multilateral and unilat
imize the simultaneity bias, I use a one-year eral sanctions variables, and the fourth model
lag of all independent variables. examines the effect of sanction duration
Each model also includes the past practice (number of years sanctions in place).11
variable, which is a one-year lag of the dependThe results for the economic sanctions
ent variable to control for autocorrelation (all) variable across the models suggest that
that is a common issue when cross-sectional economic sanctions, in general, lead to
time-series data are utilized (Beck & Katz, higher human rights abuses in the target
1995). Theoretically, lagging the dependent
variable is also suggested, to control for the
assumption that the previous year's human
11 Diagnostic tests revealed that there was no issue with
rights practices in a country is a significant multicolinearity and serial autocorrelation in any of the
estimations.
predictor of the current year's human rights

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 Dursun Peksen ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 69

countries. The suggested negative effect of rights abuses? In order to answer this ques
sanctions is supported in the individual tion, using the models in Tables II and III,
analysis of the each of the dependent vari Table V displays estimates of how much the
ables in Tables II and III, as well as in the probability of integrity abuses would change
in a country moving from being under no
analysis of the composite indices of Physical
Integrity and the PTS in Table IV Therefore,economic sanctions to becoming a target of
the findings from the sanctions variable either extensive or partial economic sanc
support the hypothesis that economic coer tions, while holding all other variables at
cion deteriorates the respect for integrity their mean values.13 In the interest of space,
rights in target countries. In the models Table V provides the change in probabilities
examining the sanction objectives, we for the 'frequent violations' category of the
observe that, except for extra-judicial killing dependent variables.14
under non-human-rights sanctions and For each of the integrity rights variables,
political imprisonment under human rights it appears that extensive coercion is more
sanctions, sanctions with the objective of detrimental than partial sanctions.
promoting human rights as well as with other According to the results for the economic
policy objectives will likely deteriorate sanctions (all) variable, moving from no sanc
integrity rights. tion to extensive sanctions leads to a 115%
In all three tables, findings on the number increase in the predicted probability of fre
of actors involved in the imposition process quent violations of disappearances, while it
(excluding extra-judicial killings during uni becomes 50% more likely when targets are
lateral sanctions and political imprisonment facing partial sanctions. In the case of extra
during multilateral sanctions) demonstrate judicial killings, frequent violations become
that economic sanctions imposed by both 64% and 29% more likely under extensive
individual countries and international organ and partial sanctions, respectively. Similarly,
izations deteriorate human rights condi moving from no sanctions to extensive sanc
tions in target countries. Finally, across all of tions increases the predicted probability of
the models, the sanction years variable shows frequent integrity right abuses by 57% for
that economic coercion continues to have a political imprisonment and 61 % for torture,
negative impact in the long term. The extent while frequent violations become 27% more
of that negative impact, however, diminishes likely for political imprisonment and 30%
over time. Therefore, the longer the eco for torture under partial sanctions.
nomic sanctions are in place, the more accu Therefore, the predicted probabilities
mulating negative impact they will inflict on reported in Table V confirm the expectation
target countries.12 that extensive sanctions generally trigger a
How large is the effect of economic sanc
tions in increasing the likelihood of physical
integrity abuses for each of the four integrity with the dependent variables, confirming the absence of
any strong curvilinear association between the number of
sanction years and the dependent variables.
13 SPost (Long & Freese, 2001) is used for the post
12 I also included a squared term of sanction years in the estimation interpretation of regression models for categorical
same models with the sanction years variable to check for outcomes.
a possible curvilinear relationship. That is, while economic 14 In the other categories of the dependent variable, 'some
sanctions are detrimental to human rights during the early violation and no violation', the predicted value changes are
years of imposition, they might become more destabilizing consistent with the hypothesis. That is, economic sanctions
for the target leadership and eventually contribute to significantly reduce the occurrence of no or some violation
improvement of human rights conditions in the long term. of integrity rights abuses, while making the emergence of
The squared term did not produce a significant relationship frequent violations more likely.

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o rn>Om??tuCO > nX fr
ON 1

0 14*** 0.68*** 1,110.693

Model 8
0.003 611.75 1,600
(0.04) (0.006) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08)
0.03 1.08*** 0.34
(0.05)

-0.19***

0.26*** 0.68*** 1.08***

Model 7 672.27 1,600
(0.10) (0.006) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08)
0.13 0.003 0.08 0.34
(0.09) (0.04)

-0.19***
-1,113.252
* at 5%, * at 10%. All independent variables are lagged at t-\.

Extra-judicial killings

0.27*** 0.69***
Model 6
(0.11) _Q JO***(0.04)0.003 (0.14) 1,600
-1,113.674
(0.006) (0.10) 1.08***(0.08)
0.14 648.880.34
(0.09) 0.07

0.69*** 1.09***
Model 5 0.16** 0.003
(0.08) (0.04) (0.006) (0.10) (0.14) 610.02 1,600
0.06
(0.08)

-1,115.324
0.34
-0.19***

0.76*** 0.97*** 400.39

Model 4
(0.04) (0.008) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08)
1,607
0.32
(0.04)

-0.002 -0.04 -868.281

0.75*** 0.96***
Model 3 0.13t (0.008) 414.15
-868.629 1,607
(0.04) (0.11) (0.14)
0.32
(0.09) (0.08) -0.009 (0.09)

0.21**
-0.14*** -0.002

Disappearances

0.76*** 0.96*** 439.51

Model 2 (0.078) 1,607
(0.11) (0.04) (0.008) (0.11)
0.32
Table I . Ordered Probit Models for the Human Rights Effects of Economic Sanctions (1981-2000) (0.14) (0.09)

0.22** 0.17**
?0.14*** -0.002 -0.04 -868.735 White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses. *** Significant at ]

0.18*** 0.76*** 0.96***

429.97
-868.977 1,607
(0.04) (0.008) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08)
0.32
(0.07)

Modell -0.14*** -0.002 -0.04

Non-human-rights sanctions

Economic sanctions (all) Human rights sanctions

Multilateral sanctions Log-pseudo likelihood

Unilateral sanctions
GDP per capita

Sanction years Democracy

Interstate war Past practice t significant at .11%.
Civil war
Chi-square

Pseudo r2 N

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 woo o CO > n oz

(0.007) -1,171.811 1,607

0.38***(0.10)
Model 8
0.17***(0.04) 0.18 1.10*** 0.29
(0.04) (0.08)
(0.19)

-0.14*** -0.006 391.03

0.40*** 0.23*** 0.36*** 1.10***

(0.007) 1,607
(0.10)
-1,170.243
Model 7 (0.10) (0.04) (0.08)
0.21
(0.07) -0.005 (0.19) 0.29

450.20
-0.14***

Torture

0.40*** 0.26*** 0.38***

Model 6 (0.007) (0.10)
-.005 -1,171.371 1,607
(0.12) (0.04)
1.10***(0.08)
0.19
(0.19) 0.29
(0.07)
401.11

?0.14***

0.37*** 1.10***
(0.007) -1,172.273 1,607
Model 5 (0.10) (0.08)
0.28***(0.06) 0.19 0.29
(0.04) (0.19)

396.83

-0.15*** -0.005

(0.007) -1,093.267
1,602
Model 4 0.17***(0.06) (0.04)
0.42***(0.12) (0.18) (0.06)
0.05
0.37

1.08*** 695.21

-0.11*** -0.035***

White robust standard errors

(0.14) adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses. *** Significant a
0.43*** -1,095.671
(0.007)
Model 3
(0.12) 1,602
0.06 1.08***
0.17 (0.01) (0.04) (0.17)
(0.06) 0.37

698.49
0.26**
-0.11*** -0.035***

Political imprisonment

0.36*** 0.45***
(0.007) -1,094.549
Model 2
(0.14) (0.10) (0.12) (0.17)
1.08***(0.06) 1,602
0.03
(0.04) 0.37

0.14 -0.035*** 692.55

Human Rights Effects of Economic Sanctions (1981-2000)

-0.11***

0.44***
(0.007)
Modell 0.20**(0.08) (0.12) j QCj***(0.06) -1,098.580
1,602
0.08
(0.04) (0.17) 0.37

695.78

-0.11*** -0.035***

Non-human-rights sanctions
Economic sanctions (all) Human rights sanctions

Log-pseudo likelihood

GDP per capita

Multilateral sanctions
Unilateral sanctions
Democracy
Interstate war Past practice

Sanction years Civil war

Chi-square
Pseudo r2 N

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N) S& >nm&m
GOW > n 1

Model 8
Mil ***
0.56*** 1.34*** -1,631.750
(0.005)
(0.14)
0.06
(0.06)
1,994
(0.04) (0.03) (0.09) 0.46

788.37
-0.017***
-0.18***

Model 7 0.56*** 1.34***

(0.005) -1,632.073
(0.11) (0.10) (0.14)
0.461,994
(0.07)
(0.06)
-0.017***
(0.03) 0.09

0.22** 0.15** -0.18*** 803.75

Political Terror Scale (1976-2000)

Model 6 0.57*** 1.34*** -1,630.978

0.14* (0.005)
0.30***(0.08) (0.08) (0.14)
1,994
(0.03) (0.09)
0.09
(0.06) 0.46

813.50
-0.017***
-0.18***

0.56*** 1.34***
Model 5 0.18** (0.005)
(0.14)
-1,632.678
(0.10)
0.06 1,994
(0.07) (0.03)
-0.017*** (0.06) 0.47
794.89

-0.18***

q 54*** 0.53***
-0.16*** (0.005)
Model ?
0.12*** (0.10) (0.11) -2,453.388

0.02 0.291,595
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)

1030.03

-0.013**
White robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. All independent variables are lagged at t-\

0.23*** f\ ?a*** 0.54***

Model 3 -0.16*** (0.005)
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) -2,455.224

0.06 0.291,595
(0.03) (0.10) (0.03)

0.10* -0.013**
1011.72

Physical Integrity Index (1981-2000)

Q 54*** 0.54***
Model 2 0.15** -0.16*** (0.005)
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10)
0.291,595
(0.03) (0.10)
0.03 (0.03)

0.15** 983.38

-0.012**
Table IV. Ordered Probit Models for the Human Rights Effects of Economic Sanctions
-2,456.654

0.13*** 0.53*** 0.54***

Modell (0.005) -2,457.208
(0.10) (0.10)
1,595
(0.05) (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.29

-0.16***
-0.013** 906.98

Non-human-rights sanctions

Economic sanctions (all) Human rights sanctions

Multilateral sanctions Log-pseudo likelihood

Unilateral sanctions
GDP per capita

Sanction years Democracy

Interstate war Past practice

Civil war
Chi-squarePseudo r2
N

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 Dursun Peksen ECONOMIC Sanctions 73

higher probability of human rights abuses less respect for human rights than non
than partial sanctions. human-rights sanctions. Therefore, the
In terms of sanction objectives, it appears comparison of the substantial impacts of
that human rights sanctions increase the these two variables suggests that the nega
likelihood of violations of integrity rights tive consequence of coercion becomes more
abuses more than non-human-rights sanc exacerbating when human rights sanctions
tions. For instance, in the case of disap are in place. Beyond the suggested eco
pearances, human rights sanctions lead to nomic and political consequences of sanc
151 % and 62% more likely integrity rights tions in general, human rights sanctions
abuses under extensive and partial sanc could be more detrimental because the tar
tions, respectively. Imposing sanctions with geted regimes will perceive the demand for
other goals leads to a lesser negative impact: better human rights as a direct threat to
97% under extensive sanctions and 46% their regime survival. They may subse
under partial sanctions,. According to Table quently react more furiously and commit
V, the findings based on the sanction objec further repression so as not to be seen con
tives in the other models also consistently ciliatory toward their domestic rivals in the
show that human rights sanctions lead to face of a foreign threat.

Table V. The Impact of Sanctions Variables on the Occurrence of Frequent Violations of the Integrity
Rights
No sanction Partial sanctions (0 to 1) Extensive sanctions (0 to 2)
Initial value New value (% change) New value (% change)
Disappeatances
Economic sanctions (all) 0.030 0.045 (50) 0.065 (115)
Human tights sanctions 0.031 0.050 (62) 0.077 (151)
Non-human-tights sanctions 0.031 0.045 (46) 0.063 (103)
Multilateral sanctions 0.031 0.049 (57) 0.074 (138)
Unilateral sanctions 0.031 0.041(32) 0.053(71)
Extra-judicial killings
Economic sanctions (all) 0.107 0.139 (29) 0.176 (64)
Human rights sanctions 0.104 0.164 (58) 0.240 (130)
Multilateral sanctions 0.107 0.161(51) 0.232(117)
Political imptisonment
Economic sanctions (all) 0.239 0.304 (27) 0.376 (57)
Non-human-rights sanctions 0.237 0.361 (52) 0.501 (111)
Unilateral sanctions 0.237 0.324 (37) 0.424 (79)
Torture
Economic sanctions (all) 0.353 0.459 (30) 0.569 (61)
Human tights sanctions 0.354 0.509 (44) 0.663 (87)
Non-human-rights sanctions 0.354 0.452 (28) 0.554 (56)
Multilateral sanctions 0.356 0.512 (44) 0.667 (88)
Unilateral sanctions 0.356 0.443 (25) 0.533 (50)
The reported probabilities are calculated by holding all control variables in the models reported in Tables II a
constant at their means, while holding the ordinal sanction variables at 0. Then, the ordinal sanction variable
consideration is altered from 0 (no sanction) to 1 (partial sanctions) and from 0 to 2 (extensive sanctions) to
the individual effect of it.

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74 journal of Peace RESEARCH volume 461 number 11January 2009
Compared with unilateral sanctions, multi the main independent variables. Thus, I am
lateral sanctions appear to inflict much unable to find robust support for the inter
more damage on integrity rights, especially state war variable.
when extensive multilateral sanctions are
imposed. The predicted probability of fre Conclusion
quent violations of disappearances, for
example, becomes 138% more likely when The underlying statement emerging from
this article is that economic sanctions inad
extensive multilateral sanctions are in place.
The effect of the same variable on frequent vertently cause further deterioration of
violations of extra-judicial killings and human rights conditions in target countries.
torture is 117% and 88%, respectively. Moreover, extensive sanctions, especially
While partial unilateral sanctions have the those imposed multilaterally, appear to
lowest substantial impact, extensive unilat trigger greater integrity rights abuses than
eral coercion leads to a slightly higher likeli limited sanctions. In terms of sanction objec
hood of integrity rights abuses than partial tives, the empirical results demonstrate that
multilateral sanctions. Specifically, extensive human rights sanctions are also counterpro
unilateral sanctions increase the probability ductive leading to a higher probability of
of frequent violations by 71 % for disappear integrity rights violations. Furthermore,
ances, 79% for political imprisonment, and besides the immediate effect of sanctions,
50% for torture incidences. To sum up, multi economic coercion continues to undermine
lateral sanctions, especially when in the human rights, the longer the sanctions stay
extensive form, cause higher integrity rights in place. This analysis has several implica
abuses than unilateral sanctions. tions for the study of economic sanctions.
Before concluding the findings section, First, it appears that economic sanctions not
among the control variables across the only fail frequently in achieving their
models, GDP per capita, civil war, and the intended policy goals (Hufbauer, Schott &
past practice of integrity abuses variables con Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997), but also lead to
sistently show a significant relationship with the unintended negative human rights
the dependent variables in the expected effects. In addition to the earlier case-study
directions. More specifically, higher GDP evidence, this study provides cross
per capita and better past integrity rights national, empirical evidence confirming the
practices lead to higher scores of integrity deleterious effect of sanctions on human
rights. Presence of a civil war, on the other rights.
hand, increases the integrity rights abuses Based on the research findings of this
across the models. Excluding the models for study, it is evident that the use of 'sticks', at
disappearances, extra-judicial killing, and least in the form of economic coercion as a
torture, the democracy variable also largely foreign policy tool, does not contribute to
confirms the expectation that the level of the advancement of human rights.
human rights abuses will be lower in demo Individual countries and intergovernmental
cratic countries. However, interstate war fails organizations imposing sanctions should be
to produce any significant association with aware of the delicate balance between using
the integrity rights variables. The alternative economic coercion to induce targets to
operationalization of the variable, including change a policy and the possible unintended
only major interstate wars, did not make any damage of worsening human rights condi
substantive change in the directions and tions. Specifically, policymakers should
levels of significance of the war variable or include in their cost-benefit calculations the

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 Dursun Peksen Economic Sanctions 75

likely repercussions of economic coercion on Legacy', International Studies Quarterly 49(3):

human rights, even under the circumstances
335-360.
where economic sanctions might attain theirAng, Adrian & Dursun Peksen, 2007. 'When Do
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International pressure through diplomatic
Political Research Quarterly 60(1): 135-145.
and economic channels has long been sug
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gested to be essential for improving the level
and Personal Integrity Rights After the Cold
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Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Alastair Smith,
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DURSUN PEKSEN, b. 1979, PhD in
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nomic statecraft, politics of international
trade, foreign policy analysis, and civil wars.