LEAZ LUMAYAG CLEMEÑA JD1C

Case No. and G.R. No. 104269

Title
Date November 11, 1993
Ponente VITUG, J.
Facts  April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture (DoA) office in Cagayan de
Oro and Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract where the
latter was to provide security services to the former.
 September 13, 1990, several guards from SSA filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, as well as for
damages, against DoA and SSA. Both the DoA and SSA were subsequently
found guilty by the Executive Labor Arbiter, which also held both of
them liable for the payment of money claims amounting to P266,483.91.
 July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. As a
response, the DoA filed a petition for injunction, prohibition, and
mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction, before the
NLRC. The DoA's petition was dismissed.
 Following the dismissal of its petition before the NLRC, DoA filed a
petition before the SC arguing that:
 (a) it was COA, not NLRC, that was supposed to have jurisdiction over
money claims against the Government pursuant to Commonwealth Act
No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445; and
 (b) that NLRC had disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of
the State.
Issues 1. Whether or not it was COA that has exclusive jurisdiction over money
claims against the Government.
2. Whether or not DoA, as an agency of the State, is covered by the principle
of the non-suability of the State.
Ruling 1. Yes, the Court ruled that money claims against the Government should be
filed before the Commission on Audit pursuant to CA Act No. 327 as amended
by PD No. 1445. In the instant case, underpayment of wages, holiday pay,
overtime pay, and other similar items arising from the Contract for Service
clearly constitute money claims. As such, the writ of execution issued by the
Labor Arbiter and the resolution issued by NLRC were reversed by the Court
in favor of DoA.

2. No, DoA cannot use the principle of non-suability of the State as an

excuse not to be sued.

Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that "the State may not be
sued without its consent." This principle reflects a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten
rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts. As per
Justice Holmes, a sovereign State is exempt from suits "not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November

1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed
against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the
public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and
implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision
 rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.
Case No. and G.R. No. L-25916. Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila Date
Title Begosa v. PVA (1970)
Date April 30, 1970
Ponente FERNANDO, J
Facts • Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he
believed he was entitled under the Veterans' Bill of Rights.
• He filed his claim for disability pension on March 4, 1955 but was
erroneously disapproved on June 21, 1955 due to his dishonorable discharge
from the army.
• The Board of Administrators of PVA finally approved his claim on
September 2, 1964, entitling him with a pension of P30 a month, to take
effect on October 5 of that year.
• Believing that his pension should have taken effect back in 1955 when
his claim was disapproved, and that he is entitled to a higher pension
of P50 (RA No. 1362 amending Section 9 of RA No. 65) as a permanently
incapacitated person, which was increased to P100 a month when RP 1362
was amended by RA No. 1920 on June 22, 1957, Begosa filed a case
against PVA in the Court of First Instance.
• CFI ruled in favor plaintiff.
• Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative
remedies before resorting to court action and that the plaintiff's claim
is in reality a suit against the Government which cannot be entertained
by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the Government has not given
its consent,
Issues WON the SC can entertain the suit against PVA.
Ruling Yes.
• Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury,
whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public
official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then
the doctrine of non-suitability may appropriately be invoked.
• However, it has no application where the suit against such a
functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with
the duty imposed by statue appropriating public funds for the benefit of
plaintiff.
• Also, where there is a stipulation of facts, the question before the lower
court being solely one of law and on the face of the decision, the actuation
of appellants being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies certainly does not come into play.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the then Judge Edilberto Soriano of the Court

of First Instance of Manila promulgated on January 22, 1966, is
affirmed.  Without pronouncement as to costs.
Case No. and Title G.R. No. L-41299

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DAVID B. CRUZ, SOCORRO CONCIO CRUZ,
and LORNA C. CRUZ,
Date February 21, 1983
Ponente MELENCIO-HERRERA, J
Facts  Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro C. Cruz applied for and were
granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located
at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal.
 From the proceeds of the real estate loan the mortgagors constructed
their residential house on the mortgaged property and were furnished
by the SSS with a passbook to record the monthly payments of their
amortizations.
 Complied with their monthly payments although there were times
when delays were incurred in their monthly payments.
 Claiming that the conditions of mortgage have been broken, SSS filed
an application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
 July 14, 1968 Pursuant to this application for foreclosure, the notice of
the Sheriff’s Sale of the mortgaged property was initially published in
the Sunday Chronicle in its issue of announcing the sale at public
auction of the said mortgaged property.
 After the first publication, herein petitioners, through counsel notified
respondent to withdraw the foreclosure and discontinue the
publication. Respondents failed to heed the request and proceeded
with the second and third publication of the foreclosure against the
properties of petitioners hence the latter were forced to institute and
action for damages against SSS.
 The Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz,
instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for
damages and attorney’s fees against the Social Security System (SSS)
and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things, that
they had fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had
not defaulted in any payment.
 SSS claims and it stressed its right to foreclose the mortgage executed
in its favor by private respondents by virtue of the automatic
acceleration clause provided in the mortgage contract, even after
private respondents had paid their amortization installments. And that
it cannot be held liable for damages not being a profit-oriented
governmental institution but one performing governmental functions.
Issues Whether or not respondent SSS can be held liable for its wrongful initiation
of foreclosure proceedings against petitioners?
Ruling  YES. There should be no question on this score considering that the SSS
is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate
powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS’ own organic
act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court.

These words “sue and be sued” embrace all civil process incident to a legal
action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity
from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the
explicit provision of the afore cited enabling law, the Government must be
deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does
not thereby concede its liability.

That statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the
 enforcement and protection of his rights. Whether the SSS performs
governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to
belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for
varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages
arising from contract, and even for tort.

Case No. and Title G.R. No. 173034            

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOC.OF THE PHILIPPINES vs

HEALTH SEC. DUQUE III and et al
Date October 9, 2007
Ponente AUSTRIA-MARTINES,J
Facts  Under the Incorporation Clause, generally accepted principles of
international law are those customary rules accepted as binding and
established in different jurisdictions. They are not recommendatory
but are part of the general and consistent practice of states from a
sense of obligation.
 Petitioner Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the
Philippines sought to nullify Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Executive Order No.
51 or the Milk Code (RIRR). The Petitioner alleged that the RIRR is
invalid because it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go
beyond the law it is supposed to implement. Specifically, the RIRR
prohibits advertising, promotion, sponsorships, or marketing breastmilk
substitutes for infants and young children. Through the RIRR, the
Respondents Department of Health officials amended and expanded
the Milk Code.
 In its defense, the Respondents countered that the RIRR implements
not only the Milk Code, but also various international agreements and
instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition, specifically
Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS) adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). For
them, these international agreements are deemed part of the law of
the land under the Doctrine of Incorporation as provided by the
Constitution, and therefore must be implemented through the RIRR.

Issues Whether or not the international agreements as mentioned by the

Respondents are part of the law of the land and may be implemented
through the RIRR.
Ruling  No. The Supreme Court held that international law could become part
of the law of the land either by transformation  or incorporation. In the
transformation method, an international law can be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as legislation.
An enabling law is required in order for international law to become
effective. In the incorporation method, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law. Thus, under the Constitution, treaties or
international agreements shall become valid and effective upon
concurrence of two-thirds of all members of the Senate.
 Treaties become part of the law of the land
through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or
conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by
the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can
be applied to domestic conflicts.
 The Court held that under the Incorporation Clause, generally accepted
principles of international law are those customary rules accepted as
binding and established in different jurisdictions. They are not
recommendatory but are part of the general and consistent practice of
states from a sense of obligation. If they are recommendatory, these
international laws are called soft law or non-binding norms, principals,
and practices that influence state behavior, as opposed to hard law
which are binding rules of international law.
 The ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been
transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code.
Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law
in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.

The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well
to emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in
the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion
to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS.
Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion,
or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

 In the present case, the ICMBS and subsequent resolutions are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding because the WHA Regulations
provides that recommendations of the assembly do not come into force
for members, unlike conventions, agreements, or regulations as they
may be deemed as such. In fact, the WHA recommendations are
generally not binding but merely carry moral and political weight on
certain health issues, according to the World Health Organization
(WHO).
 The ICMBS itself provides that the code on the marketing of breastmilk
substitutes was adopted in the form of recommendation rather than a
regulation. Thus, though the Milk Code adopted most of the provisions
under the ICMBS, the subsequent WHA resolutions, which includes the
non-promotion or advertisement of breastmilk substitutes, have not
been adopted as a domestic law, and cannot be considered as part of
the law of the land.
 The WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as customary international
law because the Respondents have not presented evidence that the
said resolutions were enforced or adopted by at least a majority of the
members-states. They also failed to prove that any compliance by
member-states was obligatory in nature.
 Hence, they cannot be considered as generally accepted principles of
international law which shall form part of the law of the land through
the Doctrine of Incorporation, and may not be used by the Respondents
as basis for the RIRR.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Case No. and Title G.R. No. L-45081            

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and
DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.
Date July 15, 1936
Ponente LAUREL, J
Facts  Election of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and
the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly
for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.

 The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner Jose A.

Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district,
for having received the most number of votes.

 November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office.

 Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a

“Motion of Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district
of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified/

 Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid

protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion to Dismiss the
Protest”, alleging
 (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the
period during which protests against the election of its members should
be presented;
 (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted
formula for, the limitation of said period; and
 (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period

 Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “Answer to the Motion of Dismissal”

alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the
National Assembly after confirmation.

 The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23,

1936, denying herein petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest.
Issues 1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related
facts, and if in the affirmative

2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its

jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election
of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly
Ruling The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of check
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.

1. Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer

hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely
to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is
not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting
claims of authority under the fundamental law between department
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the
judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a
final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly
of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as
“the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

2. No. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of

the Constitution which provides:

“SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice

of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the
party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having
the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that

the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of
its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much
the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people,
acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite
body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created,
and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership
three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the

necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and
specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a
power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any
other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled “Legislative Department” of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it
is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body
separate from and independent of the legislature.

conceding the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said
body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off
the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be
ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with
the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all
times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the
purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority
would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time
to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases
referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that
authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has
chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the
framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

As suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may

abuse its regulatory authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable
time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the
members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not
argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is
not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been
committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it
with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes
of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended
to be corrected by the judiciary. The believe, however, that the people in
creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body
in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they
have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for
decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the
Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ
working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be
deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing
the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the
actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired
in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In
the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
 interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow
that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in
appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming

the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the
time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a
limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there
might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to
decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation
alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be
“the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly”, to fix the time
for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National
Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests
have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the
Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not
required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such
member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board
of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the
national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No.
1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

The Court hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within
the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the
time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest
within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by the Court relative to the character of

the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope
and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we
deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an
inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of
sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is

hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner.

Case No. and Title Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738,

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

Date March 2 2001
Ponente PUNO, J
Facts  It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving
bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were
made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

 November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on

December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate
 during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada  were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when
11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada.

 As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the

entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

 January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap
presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and
local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election.

 January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying
that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took
her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th
President.

 Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall,
filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings
in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also
prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office.

Issues 1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.
Ruling Political Question/Justiciable Controversy

1. The Court held that the cases at bar do not involve a political question
and therefore falls within the ambit of judicial scrutiny pursuant to the
doctrine of separation of powers of coordinate branches of government.

2. Political question refers to those questions which, under our

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government. It is concerned with the
issues dependent on the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

3. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.

EDSA 1 vs EDSA 2

4. EDSA People Power I involves the exercise of the people power of

revolution which overthrew the whole government while EDSA People
Power II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom
of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which
only affected the office of the President.

5. EDSA I is extra constitutional but EDSA II is intra

6. EDSA I presented a political question constitutional . while EDSA II

involved legal questions Resignation .

7. Using the totality test, the Supreme Court held that petitioner resigned
as President – which was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.

8. Facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January 20,
2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or
not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing
a material relevance on the issue.

9. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) He acknowledged

the oath-taking of Arroyo as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality; (2) He emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) He expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt,
he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) He called on his supporters to join
him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity
could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.

10. Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble:
(1) there must be an intent to resign and (2) the intent must be coupled by
acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect.

11. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or
resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is
facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such
resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him . He cannot use his resignation or
retirement to avoid prosecution.

Recognition of Presidency of Arroyo

12. The issue whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the
claim of temporary inability of former President Estrada and thereafter
revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing Arroyo as
President is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat—it is a political issue which cannot be decided by the
Supreme Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
13. Implicitly clear in the recognition by both houses of Congress of Arroyo
as President is the premise that the inability of former President Estrada is
no longer temporary.

14. Former President Estrada cannot successfully claim that he is a

President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily since such claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that President Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Conviction by Impeachment as a Bar to Prosecution

15. The Supreme Court rejects former President Estrada’s argument that
he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in
the impeachment proceedings. His impeachment trial was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and
then convicted before he can be prosecuted The plea if granted, would put
a perpetual bar against his prosecution. It will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal
prosecution.

Presidential Immunity from Suit

16. Estrada does NOT enjoy immunity from suit. Incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure but not beyond with the ruling in In Re: Saturnino
Bermudez.

17. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character
(plunder, bribery and graft and corruption). Estrada cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as
any other trespasser .

Public Office is a Public Trust

18. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office
is a public trust. It declared as a state policy that “(t)he State shall
maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.” It ordained that “(p)ublic
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.” It set the rule that
“(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.” It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. It created the office
of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is
to “(investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” The
Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.
Theory of Derivative Prejudice

19. The Court cannot adopt former President Estrada’s prejudice of the
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. theory of derivative prejudice , i.e.,
that the 20. Our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure give investigating
prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can
be reversed but they cannot be compelled to change their
recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they
believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should
not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and petitioner
believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias,
he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.