(Caucasus Region Political, Economic and Security Issues) Va'Za Lortkipanize - The Population of The Caucasus-Nova Science Publishers (2010)

CAUCASUS REGION POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES
THE POPULATION
OF THE CAUCASUS
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CAUCASUS REGION POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES
The Population of the Caucasus

Vazha Lordkipanidze and Anzor Totadze
2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-016-9
CAUCASUS REGION POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES
THE POPULATION
OF THE CAUCASUS
VAZHA LORDKIPANIDZE
AND
ANZOR TOTADZE
Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

New York
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA
Lort'k'ip'anize, Važa.
The population of the Caucasus / Vazha Lordkipanidze.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN H%RRN
1. Caucasus--Population--History--20th century. 2. Caucasus--Population--History--21st
century. I. Title.
HB3633.315.A3L67 2009
304.609475--dc22
2009049809
Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York

CONTENTS
Preface vii
Chapter 1 Population of the Caucasus from
Ancient Times to the XX Century 1
Chapter 2 Deportations of the Caucasian Peoples
and Ethno-Political Conflicts in Caucasus
in the XX Century 49
Chapter 3 Demographic Situation in the
Post-Soviet Space 109
Chapter 4 Size and Structure of the Population
of Caucasus in the XX Century and the
Beginning of the XXI Century 123
Chapter 5 Natural Movement of the Population
of the Caucasus in the XX Century
and the Beginning of the XXI Century 181
Chapter 6 Population of the South Caucasian
Countries in the XX Century and the
Beginning of the XXI Century 201
Chapter 7 Population of the North Caucasus in the
XX Century and the Beginning
of the XXI Century 253
Index 275
PREFACE
In this monograph, the population issues of the Caucasus are discussed for the
first time from the ancient period till the beginning of the 21st century; and this
fully defines the essence of this work. There is shown the ethno-genesis process of
the population of the Caucasus as one of the oldest and multiethnic people in the
world; analyzed their demographic development in the long historical period and
the demographic situation of the contemporary Caucasus. Special attention is paid
to the issues of the population of the Caucasus in the 19th and 20th centuries. There
are stressed the exile process of hundreds of thousands of representatives of the
North Caucasus people to Turkey, that was covertly organized by the Russian
Empire in order to settle the Cossak-Russians in newly offered places. Russia‘s
plans as regards the colonization of the Caucasus, although partly implemented
have been fully highlighted in the monograph. All these processes have
significantly impeded the natural demographic development of the population of
the Caucasus.
There are widely reflected total deportations implemented according to ethnic
belonging mostly in the first part of the 1940s that sacrificed hundreds of
thousands of people. According to ethnic belonging the Karachais, the Chechens,
the Ingush, the Balkars were totally exiled forcedly from the North Caucasus and
Muslim population from the historical places of Georgia, Meskheti, to the
republics of Far Middle Asia and Kazakhstan, where special settlements, in fact
reservations were formed.
Along with such great injustice, the work pays particular attention to the
armed ethno-political conflicts in the Caucasus, actually stirred by Russia itself in
the last years, which impeded natural demographic processes, for instance the
birth rate has reduced. There is discussed the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, also the conflicts in the former South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Chechnya. The work analyses the anatomy of the above-mentioned conflicts.
viii Vazha Lordkipanidze and Anzor Totadze
In order to study demographic events and processes in the Caucasus and for
their qualitative evaluation, in the work there is denoted a special unit to the
demographic situation in the Post Soviet area.
The main task of the given research is the evaluation of the structure and
dynamics of the population number of the Caucasus. For this purpose there are
analyzed the issues of population number, ethnical composition and territorial
disposition, natural movement, language and sexual-age structure, urban and rural
population.
The central question of the research is the evaluation of the current
demographic situation in the Caucasus. For a clear picture of the latest
demographic events and processes, proper attention is paid to retrospective
reviews. In this aspect there are discussed the population of Southern Caucasus:
republics of Adygei, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, the North
Ossetia–Alanya, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan.
The presented work covers a quite broad spectrum of issues, herewith it is the
first attempt of the systematic research of the demographic development problems
of the Caucasus. For this reason, the authors have no claims on the work‘s
perfection and will greatly appreciate any comments or remarks.
The book is intended for the wide range of readers interested in the subject.
Chapter 1
POPULATION OF THE CAUCASUS FROM

ANCIENT TIMES TO THE XX CENTURY
The Caucasus is one of the oldest historical and cultural regions. It is located
between the Black and Caspian Seas, at the crossroad of Europe and Asia. The
Caucasus is divided into two parts–North and South–by the Main Kavkasioni (the
Caucasus) Ridge, which spreads uninterrupted from one end of the system to the
other. It is a straight mountain system, stretching from Taman to Apsheron
peninsulas.
Historically, three ethnic groups in lived the South Caucasus: Georgians,
Armenians, and Azerbaijanians.
The peoples living in the South Caucasus managed to form a great
civilization, statehood, and national written language. From the 14 written
languages known in the world, two are formed in the South Caucasus: Georgian
and Armenian. It was just in the Georgian and Armenian languages that the
hagiographic, historical, and secular literature of the mankind was created,
originating in the V century.
The North Caucasus was distinguished by the most variegated ethnic
composition. They did not form any civilization, in fact. According to the
evidence preserved in the written sources, here the ethnic groups used to change
frequently and many of them even were annihilated, although major ethnic groups
still live mostly in the highland regions.
The relief of the present-day Caucasus started formation 10 million years ago.
Initially, Great Caucasus was a vast island, which had mostly flat relief. Later, as
a result of volcanic activity, a mountainous relief appeared. The summits on the
Central Kavkasioni (the Caucasus) reached two to two-and-a-half kilometers.
Through gradual rising of the mountains, resulting from strong volcano outburst,
the relief of the Caucasus took the present-day form. Now, more than half of the
2 Vazha Lordkipanidze and Anzor Totadze
Caucasian territory is occupied by mountains and plateaus. Six summits of the

Kavkasioni exceed five thousand meters (the highest among them being Ialbuzi–
5, 642 meters), and seven are more than four thousand meters. East and West
Caucasus differ from each other by natural conditions.
West Caucasus involves the basins of the Azov and Black Seas, and East
Caucasus involves the basin of the Caspian Sea.
The Main Kavkasioni Ridge forms a historical-ethnographic boundary
between the peoples of the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus, and, due to
its height, it performs the function of climate-divider; it protects the South
Caucasus from cold air masses coming from the North Caucasus. That‘s why it is
three degrees warmer in the South Caucasus than in the North Caucasus.
By the population of the Caucasus, we mean the population of independent
countries of the South Caucasus–Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan–and of the
republics of the North Caucasus–Adygeya, Karachaev-Circassia, Kabardian-
Balkaria, North Ossetia, Alania, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, which are
mostly populated by Caucasian peoples. It should be mentioned that before 1991,
South Caucasian countries were within the Soviet Union as the Soviet Republics,
and it was just in 1991 that they gained independence. As for the North Caucasian
Republics, before 1991, they were autonomous units, namely, Adygeya and
Karachaev-Circassia were autonomous areas and the rest were autonomous
republics. From 1991 to 1992, North Caucasian autonomous units received the
status of a republic (North Ossetia–Alania received it in December 1990) and are
the subjects of the Russian Federation. The area of the territory populated mostly
by Caucasian peoples occupies 297.2 thousand square kilometers, among them,
the South Caucasus,185.9 thousand square kilometres and the North Caucasus,
11.3-thousand-square kilometers. Different ethnic groups that came in different
periods live in the Caucasus along with autochthonous population. They are
Russians, Ukrainians, Kurds, Greeks, Tatars, and representatives of other nations.
Historically, due to geopolitical location, the Caucasus, especially its southern
part, had been the arena of military activities. In their flourishing periods, the
neighboring empires tried to rule in the Caucasus, to own it, but before the XIX
century, the Caucasus had never been within any separate empire. From time
immemorial, the struggle of Persians or Romans, Arabs or Byzantines, Iranians or
Turks used to finish in redistribution of the spheres of influence. In the Middle
Ages, from the Caucasian countries, only Georgia succeeded in preserving
independence the longest of all, and in a certain period, it managed to establish the
name of the most powerful state in entire Near East. But later, Georgia had to
fight against neighboring empires, both as united or separate kingdoms, to gain
and preserve independence. Most frequently, Georgia managed to achieve this.
Population of the Caucasus from Ancient Times to the XX Century 3
Mostly from the beginning of the XIX century, all of the Caucasus, for a 200-
year period, happened to be within Russia. It may be said that the year of 1800
was one of the most important periods and, at the same time full of dramatic
events, an initial date of the new epoch beginning. From that time, not simply the
new century starts, but the deepest political and socio-economic changes begin,
which these peoples have never experienced within their rich centuries-old
history; it was full of cataclysms. The rule of Russia‘s tsarism in all of the
Caucasus starts from that epoch and transition to new social, capitalist relations.1
The Caucasus and, especially, the South Caucasus, was widely populated
with primitive men, as the archaeological data show. Natural environment there
was favorable for formation of modern men. If we share the ideas of some
scholars on the man of modern type to be formed there, where no sharp changes
took place in the climate, then the South Caucasus may be considered to be
mostly such region.
I.I. ANCIENT POPULATION OF THE CAUCASUS,

FORMATION OF THE CAUCASIAN PEOPLES
AND ANNEXATION OF THE CAUCASUS BY RUSSIA
The territory of the present-day GEORGIA was mastered by man some ten
thousand years ago. The footstep of the oldest man had been known from the
Stone Age. The European people were recently disputing for the name of ―First
European,‖ but after famous Georgian, American, French, German, and other
foreign scholars established, based on the archaeological excavations conducted in
Dmanisi, Georgia, that an ancestor of man lived in Georgia from time
immemorial, much had immediately changed in the issue of human settlement.
Namely, according to the hypothesis recognized in science, our biological
ancestor–the first Homo sapiens–originated in Africa about 2.5 million years ago;
he lived there for quite a long time and about one million year before, spread
throughout Eurasia. Dmanisi paleo-anthropologic discoveries essentially changed
the hypothesis and raised the problem of early human evolution, time and ways of
spreading from a new aspect. It causes no dispute today that the first hominid in
Eurasia lived on the territory of South Georgia already 1.81 million years ago.2
1
P. Gugushvili. Economic development of Georgia and Transcaucasus in the XIX-XX centuries, vol.
I, Tbilisi, 1949, p 665.
2
Leo Gabunia, Abesalom Vekua, Davud Lordkipanidze, Carl C. Swisher III, Reid Ferring, Antje
Justus, Medea Nioradze, Merab Tvalchrelidze, Susan C. Anton, Gerhard Bosinski, Olaf Joris,
Man of the Old Stone Age should have been widely settled on the territory of
present-day Georgia, which is witnessed by already revealed abundance of
monuments of the Paleolith epoch. There are more than 400 monuments of that
epoch recorded in total in Georgia, from which about 280 are dated by the Lower
Paleolith epoch. They are spread on quite a vast territory. According to the
location of these monuments, we can consider that in Lower Paleolith, in Ashel
and Mustie cultures, man was widely settled on the entire territory of Georgia.
They had lived in highland regions as well and had mastered all the landscape
zones. Their dwellings were located both in caves and ―open‖ places. This process
was caused by most favorable climatic conditions, rich fauna and eatable flora,
raw material useful for making stone tools, and an abundance of natural shelters.
The material discovered in Georgia in the epoch of Mesolith shows the
process of gradual development of tools production. Chronological succession of
the Mesolith monuments vividly witnesses that ―Mesolith is not faceless or
transplanted from another place culture of people that came there by chance, that
it is originated from the local Upper Paleolith and reflects comparatively long and
uninterrupted life of these Paleolithic men.‖3
We come across rather powerful open-dwelling remains of Neolith epoch in
Georgia, which sometimes occupied the area of several hectares. The type of
settlement in that epoch takes a form of a village. From the demographic
viewpoint, it is most interesting, not only formation of villages, but also the fact of
the population density in some micro-regions, determination of which can be
made through topography of the settlements. ―Settlements,‖ or villages, are more
or less compactly grouped in 10- to 15-km distances from one another. Each such
group involves several (three to five) villages. Such villages are located in 0.5 to
five-km distances from one another. Several settlements of such type have been
discovered and studied in Georgia. It is too difficult to convincingly discuss the
area and size of population in each concrete settlement. It is supposed that the
settlement located on the Shulaveri mountain occupied a one-hectare area and
consisted of about 60 houses, in each of which five to eight persons lived. So, the
total amount of the population reached about 400 to 500 persons. The amount of
the Imiri mountain population, calculated in the same way, can be determined as
300 persons, and of the entire Shulaveri group consisting of four villages, as about
1,200 to 1,300 persons. The total area occupied by these four villages, i.e., one
group, is determined as about 500 hectares, from which only two-thirds could be
Marie-A.-de Lumley, Majsuradze, Aleksander Mouskhelishvili. Earliest Pleistocene Hominid

Cranial Remains from Dmanisi, Republic of Georgia: Taxonomy, Geological Setting, and Age.
Science, vol. 288, 12 May 2000, pp 1019-1025.
3
Archaeology of Georgia, vol. I, Tbilisi, 1991, p 219.
used as ploughing and sowing, and the rest was occupied by forests.4 All of the
above-mentioned give us a basis for making conclusion that in Georgia, we deal
with established dweller society, where high-level agriculture and cattle-breeding
are main branches of the economy.
The Stone Age was replaced by the Metal Age–first, Bronze, and then Iron.
From that time on, the development of society and its progress becomes unusually
accelerated. There are formed most-favorable conditions for the population
reproduction. The living terms become stable. A plough appears.
Special agricultural culture was formed in that period, which was the culture
of the Bronze Age, in fact, and is now known under the name of the Mtkvari-Arax
culture. This culture was spread in the space between the rivers Mtkvari and Arax
and mostly continued traditions of the previous period, but was at far higher stage
as compared to the previous culture. The Mtkvari-Arax culture spread about a
quite vast territory—in the South Caucasus, East Anatolia and in North-West,
Iran. Its elements are seen in Syria-Palestine and East Mediterranean Sea region.
Advance of agriculture and cattle-breeding is characterized to this culture, also
development of copper metallurgy, quite different ceramics. Main ethnic groups
of the population of the Caucasus were finally formed in that period, in the III
millennium.
The Mtkvari-Arax culture reached extraordinary heights in that period.
Formation and spreading of such culture was certainly possible on that territory
only in conditions of densely populated populations. Many, often-contradictory
considerations exist on the ethnic origin of the peoples of the Mkvari-Arax
culture, but the discovered material, which enables us to penetrate into the far
past, points that the Kartvelian tribes largely contributed to formation and
development of the Mtkvari-Arax culture. However, Hurite-speaking tribes have
also played an important role in the development of this culture.
The Trialeti culture is an heir of the Mtkvari-Arax culture. The burial mound
culture is mostly considered to be the monuments of this culture. It is the culture
of the Bronze Age. Migration processes were ongoing in that period in the South
Caucasus and, namely, in Georgia, along with the appearance of new waves of
population; but there were no global ethnic changes or important changes in life.
Finally, everything was determined by the rule of life of the local population and
regularities of its development.
Existence of the highly developed Mtkvari-Arax cultures was impossible
without most densely populated population. This was demanded, namely, by
building of many burial mounds existing on the territory of Georgia, to say
4
O. Lordkipanidze. Origins of the Old Georgian civilization. Tbilisi, 2002, pp 56-57.
nothing about others, even dwellings for living. For example, the biggest burial
mounds of Zurtaketi (Trialeti) had 100-meter diameters and eight-meter heights,
interiors were of a funeral hall, 150 square meters, and the height of walls was
four to six meters. To build such burial mounds required hard work. Namely,
22,000 man/days were required for building the Tsnori big burial mound,5 i.e., 60
men would have worked every day within a year to build such a burial mound.
The cultures on the territory of Georgia were being developed incessantly,
especially, and no essential ethnic changes took place either. The ethnic unity
having common Kartvelian languages was established on South Caucasian plateau
from the V to III millennia B.C.
Since ancient times, the territory of the present-day Georgia and its southern
part, especially the territory adjacent to southeast of the Black Sea region, was
populated with the Georgian tribes. Ancient evidences on the Georgian tribes have
been preserved in the works of old Greek authors. Namely, in Argonautics of
Apollonius of Rhodes, which presents details and episodes of the society and
everyday life, not of the period the work was created (the III century B.C.), but of
the Late Bronze Age (the XIV to XIII cc B.C.), of the epoch when the Argonauts
arranged their campaign to Colchis. These evidences were obtained by Apolonius
of Rhodes in the sources of old Greek writers, and he used them while working on
his Argonautics. In this work, the author names the Georgian tribes living on the
Black Sea coast according to the places of their settlements. The Colchian tribe
(―many thousands of Colchian people,‖ ―Numerous army of Colchians‖)6 was the
most numerous in number among the Georgian tribes characterized by him
(Khalibs, Tiberans, Mossiniks, Makrons, Sapirs, Colchians), as well as Mossinics.
As for Khalibs, their country is vast. Valuable evidence is given on the settlement
of the Georgian tribes in the second half of the V century B.C., by the Greek
authors Herodotus, Xenophon, and others. According to Xenophon, the Georgian
tribes, Khalibs, Makrons, Colchians, Taokhs, etc., are settled on the Black Sea
coast. The amount of population of the country of Mossinics was 30,000,
according to the evidence preserved in Anabasis of Xenophon.7 There lived
numerous Georgian tribes on the Black Sea coast.
The evidence is also preserved in the works of old Greek writers on the
Georgian tribe of Meskhs, which formed a powerful political unity in ancient
times. Starting from the XI century B.C., Musks, Tabals, and Kasks, being
ancestor Georgian tribes of further Meskhs, Ibers, and Colchians, are already seen
5
O. Japaridze. Ethnic history of the Kartvelian tribes. Tbilisi, 1976, p 177.
6
Apollonius of Rhodes. Argonautics, Tbilisi, 1975, pp 113, 122, 183.
7
T. Mikeladze. Anabasis by Xenophon, the Greek and Georgian texts, Tbilisi, 1967, pp 104-105.
on the political arena.8 Powerful strength of just this very tribe of Meskhs is
witnessed by the Assyrian inscription, dated by 1100 B.C. It is mentioned in this
inscription about the country of Subars and ―its proud and ungovernable people.‖
Georgian historian S. Janashia points that Musks, further Meskhs, were more
powerful than the Khet-Subar tribes; they, themselves, often attacked Assyria and
conquered their communities.9 This idea is developed by famous English
Kartvelologist David Lang: ―Mushks (present Meskhs) settled on the mouth of the
Euphrates in ca. 1165 B.C. … In the same period a part of them lived in south-
west Georgia and was a numerous and influential tribe of Meskhs (Moskh, about
which the Greek geographers write). The province of Samtskhe, established by
them, has preserved its peculiarity until the present day.‖10 In his opinion, the
classic state of Iberia, which was united by common Georgian language, was
replaced by the ethnic group of Meskhs.11
A large unity of the west Kartvelian-Colchian tribe is known from the XII
century B.C. under the name of Diaokh. It was the most powerful among the
―Nairi countries‖ located to the north of Assyria, and its influence spread from the
XIII to XII cc B.C., over the unity of Colchian tribes living on the Black Sea
coast. Diaokh was a powerful state formation from the XII to VIII cc B.C. In the
VIII century B.C., Urartu and Colcha destroyed Diaokh and stopped its existence.
A new powerful kingdom of Colchis was founded from the VII to VI cc B.C.
on the territory of West Georgia, which was famous in the entire ancient world.
The Kingdom of Egrisi was formed in the first century A.D. in West Georgia,
which was called Lazika in ancient sources. Colchians were direct ancestors of
Lazs. According to the Byzantine writer of the XII-century Ioanne Tsetse
Colchians ―were called Lazs as well,‖ ―Colchians are Laz tribe.‖12 According to
the evidence of the earlier, fifth-century anonym Greek geographer: ―People,
living on the territory starting from Dioskuria, i.e., Sebastopol (present Sokhumi–
authors) until Apsaros, were called Colchians, later Lazs.‖ The sixth-century
Byzantine writer also says: ―Lazs were numerous in number and warrior people.
They rule over many other tribes. Lazs are proud of the old name of Colchians
and boast very much, though their pride is grounded.‖13 Thus, ―the sources
unanimously point to the genetic relation of Lazs and Colchians. Lazs have
8
Iv. Javakhishvili. Works. vol. I, 1979, p 43.
9
S. Janashia. Works. vol. V, Tbilisi, 1987, p 30.
10
David M. Lang. The Georgians. Moscow, 2004, p 58.
11
Ibid., p 82.
12
Georgika, vol. II, the Greek and Georgian text. Tbilisi, 1967, pp 32, 37.
13
Cited from: O. Lordkipanidze. The culture of Old Colchis. Tbilisi, 1972, p 26.
preserved their language even up today, which is western Georgian (along with
Laz-Megrelian).‖14
The old Colchis, and later Egrisi (Lazika) kingdom, involved nearly the entire
territory of present Abkhazia. Thus, this territory was populated by Georgian,
namely, Colchian tribes. For example, in the works of Hecatios of Milet (the sixth
century B.C.) and pseudo-Skilax of Karian (the fourth century B.C.) the evidence
has been preserved, according to which the territory located north-west of
Dioskuria was occupied by the Colchian tribes–Kols and Koraxes. The majority
of scholars consider Kols and Koraxes to be Georgian tribes.
It should be mentioned that Dioskuria–Sokhuni, in that period–were
northwards neighbors of the Georgian tribe of Svans, which in ancient times
occupied a considerable part of Abkhazian territory. Such evidence is informed by
the famous geographer Claudius Ptolemaeus (Ptolemy). Even more, Svans
occupied large territory from the coastline to the lowland of the Caucasus.
According to the characteristics of Strabo, the tribe of Svans is best known
from the viewpoint of bravery and strength, owning everything around them. All
of them are good warriors and have 200,000 people during the war. They occupy
the Kavkasioni summits, above Dioskuria.15
As G. Melikishvili mentions, in East Georgia, namely, in its northern part, in
the period of Kingdom of Colchis, statehood formations existed, which stopped
northward expansion of Urartu first and then of Median and Akamenian Iran. In
that period, several Georgian tribes lived in South Georgia–Meskhs being most
powerful. The united oriental-Georgian state–Kingdom of Kartli (Iberia)–was
formed from the IV to III cc B.C.16 The following information of Strabo is
interesting from the viewpoint of the amount of the population of Iberia: ―Iberia is
mostly well-populated in cities and villages so that there are tiled roofs, houses are
architecturally arranged, markets and other public establishments there.‖17 Strabo
also informs that the tribes of Ibers have a rich country and ―especially convenient
for settlement,‖ when ―there are poor living nearby, having small land.‖
Therefore, the country of Ibers is rich and well-populated, and they can have
many thousand warriors to be used in the war. We can say, in general, that the
population of Iberia was numerous in number.
14
O. Lordkipanidze. Georgian civilization: where does its history start? See: The scientific
Kartvelologian symposium on Georgia, bulletin #3, 1994, p 26.
15
T. Qaukhchishvili. Geography of Strabo. The Greek and Georgian text. Tbilisi, 1957, p 126.
16
History of Georgia. vol. I, Tbilisi, 2006, pp 50-51.
17
T. Qaukhchishvili. Op. cit, p 127.
The amount of the population of Georgia in different periods of B.C. can be

determined only approximately. It is generally very difficult to determine the
number of people in different periods of Stone, Bronze, and Iron ages. If we
analyse the facts mentioned above and discuss them in regard to the world
population size growth, then we can discuss approximate amount of the
population living in those epochs.
At present, according to the hypothesis shared by majority of scholars, the
pre-home country of the mankind was Africa. The amount of primitive men
settled there in the period of Lower Paleolith, i.e., one million years ago, was
determined as 125,000. The population increased too slowly in that period and
reached one million only 700 thousand years after, i.e., 300 thousand years ago.
This means that per each thousand years, the amount of population increased by
average 1,250, and by 1.25 per each one year. Ten to twenty-five thousand years
ago, 3.3 and 5.3 million people lived in the world, respectively. It seems that such
an amount of people was enough to guarantee formation of the civilization in the
narrow sense of the concept.18
While determining the size of the population of Georgia in separate sections
of history, we take into consideration the amount of remains of settlements,
natural-climatic conditions, and scales of agriculture spreading. For example, it
has been known that during farming, 20 to 30 times more people may be fed from
the same area than during cattle-breeding, and 20 to 30 times more during cattle-
breeding than hunting.19 A certain level of farming development is possible only
in conditions of some density of the population. In 1883, French scholar P.E.
Levaser put forward a diagram of relation between the population density and the
level of farming development. According to it, during hunting, fishing, and
collecting, the population density per one-square kilometer is 0.002 men less,
during cattle-breeding it equals 0.02 to 2.7 men, and during farming, 2.7 to 40
men.20
While determining the amount of population, we also take into consideration
the existence of high-developed cultures, general evidences preserved on the
number of the Georgian tribes, conditions of living level of development of
cultures, the amount of warriors to be used in war-time, etc. For example, as
Strabo mentions, the Georgian tribe of Sbans could bring out 200,000 warriors. In
such a case, the amount of Svans equaled at least one million. Surely, this
18
Ancient civilizations. Moscow, 1989, pp 20-21.
19
Averbuch M. Laws of population of pre-capitalistic formations. Moscow, 1967, p 42.
20
Cited from: I. Saushkin. Introduction to economic geography. Tbilisi, 1978, p 191.
evidence is exaggerated in our opinion, but it witnesses that Svans were one of the
most multi-numbered tribes in the Caucasus.
There are registered about 280 monuments of Lower Paleolith era on the
territory of Georgia. Of course, not all the monuments have been discovered yet,
and many others probably won‘t be discovered. We know that in that period,
people were settled on the entire territory of Georgia and in the highlands as well,
where they had mastered all the landscape zones. But we should not understand
this as if people were settled evenly on the entire territory. People used only
natural caves, convenient ―open‖ places for living in highlands and lowlands. That
is why people lived for thousands of years in the same places. They lived in
groups of 10 to 30 people. If we take into consideration other factors mentioned
above, then by the end of Ashel culture of Lower Paleolith, which is the longest
period in the history of the Stone Age and involves thousands of centuries, there
should have lived 20,000 people in Georgia.
By the end of the Mustie culture of Lower Paleolith, which encompasses
more than 60,000 years and finished 40 to 35 thousand years ago, there should
have lived 30,000 people on the territory of Georgia. Many changes took place
and the technique of making tools developed in that period. We should suppose
that in each century, the population used to increase at least by 20. During in
Upper Paleolith, Mezolith and, especially, Neolith, the population kept increasing
quickly. If we take into consideration the progress of Mezolith and Neolith epochs
in all the spheres of public life, formation of rural settlements, etc., then in the
beginning of the X and III millennia B.C., the population of the then Georgia was
60,000 and 100,000 correspondingly, i.e., the population in Upper Paleolith and
partially in Mezolith epochs (within 30 thousand years) increased by average one
man annually and by six men in Mezolith and Neolith (within seven thousand
years).
The population kept increasing quickly in the Bronze and Iron ages. In those
periods, the conditions were more convenient for the population reproduction. It
seems that in the beginning of the I millennium B.C., the population of Georgia
increased considerably, and it was 400 thousand at least, and annual increase was
an average of 150 men. By the beginning of our era, there might have lived about
one to 1.5 million people in that period in Georgia.
The population censuses give exact data on the amount of the population.
According to the evidences preserved in the Georgian written sources, the
population census—through accounting of the results of which we can determine
the amount of the population of Georgia in mid-XIII century—was conducted by
Mongols in 1254. According to the evidences of the literary sources, the censuses
in Georgia were conducted earlier as well (the VI and XI centuries), but their
materials were lost.
In Kartlis Tskhovreba (History of Georgia), written by the old Georgian
chroniclers, detailed results of the census of 1254 have been preserved. Based on
accounting of these data, it becomes clear that about eight million people lived in
Georgia in that period. Though Mongols ruled in Georgia by that time, in the first
quarter of the XII century, Georgia achieved the summit of its political, military,
and economic development and was the greatest state in the Near and Middle
East.
The rule of Mongols has left heavy trace on the country, which was expressed
by reduction in the population as well—as a result of the raids of Mongols and
rule, hundreds of thousands of Georgians have died. Mongols forced the
population of Georgia to fight together with the army of Mongols. Thus,
Georgians took part in the predatory wars of Mongols and shed much blood in
them.
In the thirties of the XIV century, King Giorgi Brtskinvale The Glorious
(1314-1346) managed to get rid of the Mongols‘ domination and to restore unity
of Georgia; but soon the country faced great tragedy—in 1386-1403, Tamerlane
(Timur Lenk) attacked Georgia eight times, and the country was emptied of its
blood.
According to Persian historians, Tamerlane expressed great surprise at how
Georgia managed to preserve its Christian religion, given the conditions of being
surrounded with Muslim countries. He threatened to correct the mistake of his
ancestors, saying that Georgia should immediately be brought into the Islam
sphere to calm their high minds.21 But he failed to realize his dream, and his raids
took away countless lives. Just from that very period, the Georgian people used to
apply the following terms: ruins of houses, of villages, of cities, etc. By the
evidence of foreign writers, the amount of ruined villages in West Georgia
exceeded 700.22 In the first third of the XVII century, the population of Georgia
was reduced considerably due to the invasions of Shah Abas I of Iran.
As a result of his four raids, more than 200,000 were deported to Persia and
100,000 died in the armed raids. By the beginning of the XVII century, the
population of Georgia was about 2.5 million.
21
Cited from: K. Tabatadze. The terms designating Georgia and Georgians according to the Persian
sources of the X-XV centuries. See collection: Foreign and Georgian terminology designating
Georgia and Georgians. Tb., 1993, p 249.
22
N. Berdzenishvili, V. Dondua, M. Dumbadze, G. Melikishvili. History of Georgia. vol. I, Tb.,
1958, p 255.
From the XVI to XVII centuries, considerable reduction of the population of

Georgia was caused by trade in people. ―Selling of people‖ was widely spread in
West Georgia. The representatives of all the strata of society used to sell people.
In East Georgia, people were kidnapped by the representatives of the foreign,
mostly neighboring, tribe of Dagestan and then sold by them. This is known as
―Lekianoba.‖ This ugly event became so wide scale that in broke the Georgian
statehood to the bone. The Georgian people then were forced to hold a sword in
one hand and to work with a plough with the other to retaliate for the kidnappings.
Russian captain N. Yazikov, who witnessed this event himself, mentioned in
1771, ―Georgians live in such a great fright that they are afraid to conduct
agricultural works within 100-meter distance from their houses without arms.‖23
Selling of people was the greatest tragedy for Georgians. As a result of this
process, the population of Georgia catastrophically reduced in number, childbirth
also reduced, mortality increased, sex-age structure of the population experienced
deformation, childbearing contingent reduced, cultural and economic life was
destroyed, its economy and combat ability lowered, and advance of the country
and its development were much suspended. Permanent fear of attack on lives
promoted the formation of feeble psyche of the population, the genofund of the
Georgian nation faced jeopardy of annihilation. The representatives of mostly the
elite—the most beautiful and physically strong young generation—were
kidnapped, which uprooted the basis for the nation‘s reproduction. To the
contrary, Georgians became the source of reproduction for the enemies. Due to
this event great, the English naturalist Charles Darwin mentioned, based on the
evidences of an old traveler, ―The Persian blood has become nobler by infusion of
the blood of two nations—Georgians and Circassians, which are more beautiful
than all the other nations. There is not a single nobleman in Persia, whose mother
is not a descendant of Georgians or Circassians.‖24
The demographic losses were very considerable due to the events mentioned
above. Within 300 years—in 1550 to 1850—all of Georgia lost at least 1350
thousand people due to trade with people. This trade was largely promoted by the
Ottoman Empire. The kidnapped people were mostly sold at Istanbul market.
Still, in 1753, King of Kartli Teimuraz II appealed to Russia with the request to
force the Ottoman Empire to suspend raids of Lezghins, which were mercilessly
worrying East Georgia. Analysis of the written sources shows that the
demographic losses were entirely experienced by the Georgian people and,
23
V. Macharadze. Materials on the history of Russia-Georgia relations in the second half of the
XVIII century. Part III, section II, Tbilisi, p 523.
24
Cited from: Mikheil Rekhviashvili. Imeret in the XVIII century. Tbilisi, 1982, p 312.
therefore, their share in the entire population gradually reduced, but deplorable
results of the trade in people were not only this—generations also lost the
potentials of reproduction of their own nation, which is determined by several
million Georgians. The population of Georgia in the period of trade in people was
so reduced that only 761 thousand lived in the country in 1770. Proceeding from
the most aggravated political, economic, and demographic conditions, King of
Kartli-Kakheti Erekle II saw the way out only in Russia‘s protection. In 1783, an
agreement was concluded in the North Caucasus, in the Georgievski fortress
between the Russian Empire and Kartli-Kakheti kingdom. It was a voluntary act
of a weak state expressed in entering the protection of a strong state. By this
treatise, King Erekle II refused subjection to Iran or other states and recognized
supreme protection of the Emperor of Russia. In return, the Emperor of Russia
gave promise to protect the kings of Kartlli-Kakheti, to preserve the throne for
King Erekle and his heirs, and to restore Georgia and its domains within its
historical borders.
The viewpoint has been spread in the West that Georgia, when it joined
Russia, did not make any terms. Spreading of this opinion was promoted by
biased reading of the Georgievski treatise dominated in the Russian historical
science. Luigi Magarotto, famous Kartvelologist (expert in Georgian studies) and
professor of Venice Ka-Foscar University, turned attention to this fact. From this
viewpoint, he mentions, among other books, the book of well-known Russian
historian Vassil Kliuchevski, Course in History of Russia, where we read that
―Still in 1783, King of Georgia Erekle II, oppressed by Persia, received protection
of Russia. Ekaterina was forced to send the Russian regiment to Tbilisi, beyond
the Kavkasioni ridge. After her death, Russians left Georgia, which was attacked
by Persians and was destroyed by them. Emperor Pavel was forced to assist
Georgians, and in 1799, he recognized Giorgi XII, Erekle‘s heir, as King of
Georgia. Before his death, King Giorgi, in his will, presented Georgia to Russia
and the Emperor of Russia was obliged to observe this will in 1801. Georgians
tried hard to receive protection of the Emperor of Russia.‖25 First of all,
Magarotto turned his attention to Kliuchevski‘s quotation that, according to the
treatise the Emperor of Russia, shouldered obligations for Kartli-Kakheti kingdom
to have two infantry battalions with four guns, which Russians did not fulfill.
Factually and legally, Russia thus abolished the treatise. As professor Magarotto
mentions, this text of Kliuchevski was an apparent mystification of the events and
dates. In reality, the Russian soldiers left Georgia not after the death of Empress
25
L. Magarotto. Annexation of Georgia by Russia. (1783-1801). Tbilisi, 2008, p 12; Kliuchevski V.
Collection of works in ten volumes, Course in history of Russia, part V, Moscow, p 178.
Ekaterina (1796), but in 1787, and it was just due to this that Persians managed to
invade and ruin Kartli-Kakheti in 1795, when Ekaterina was still alive and felt
fine.
It is also a lie to prove that in his will, made before his death, King Giorgi
presented Georgia to Emperor of Russia Pavel, who was forced to receive this gift
against his wish.26
Giorgi XII, who was enthroned after the death of his father, King Erekle II
(11 January 1798), reigned only three years; he died on 28 December 1800. But
Emperor of Russia Pavel had already decided to abolish the Kingdom of Kartli-
Kakheti before that; on 18 December 1800, he signed the manifesto on joining the
Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti to Russia, though this document was kept secret. The
manifesto, in fact, meant annexation of Georgia by Russia. The authorities of
Russia, on receiving information about death of Giorgi XII, published the
manifesto, signed by Emperor Pavel a month prior, in St Petersburg and Moscow
on January 18, and in Tbilisi on 16 or 17 February. People were most dissatisfied
with the manifesto.
In that period, namely, on 12 March, 1801, as a result of palace revolution,
Emperor Pavel was murdered. Hope appeared in Tbilisi that the new emperor
would restore the succession to the royal throne of Kartli-Kakheti, and they
appealed to Emperor Alexander with this request. The new emperor charged the
state council with the task of discussing once more the issue of annexation of
Georgia by Russia. But, in fact, everything has already been decided, and on 11
and 15 April 1801, the state council adopted a decision on Kartli-Kakheti
Kingdom joining Russia without preserving any self-governance. Thus, the royal
dynasty of the Bagrationi family was finally abolished. On 12 September 1801
Emperor Alexander published the manifesto on Kartli-Kakheti kingdom joining
Russia. The Emperor informed the Georgian people and the world community that
―We are undertaking heavy burden of governing the Kingdom of Georgia not for
strengthening the forces, not for self-interest, not for expanding the borders of the
biggest empire, but only dignity, honesty, and humaneness dictate us to observe
our divine obligation, to take into consideration the entreaty of the distressed . . .‖
This pseudo- propagandist statement of justifying themselves showed that Russia
joined Georgia to itself in 1801, only because of such request from the Georgian
king and authorities.
Later, the Russian historians tried, instead of making unbiased analysis of the
documents, to show the real condition of Georgia joining Russia, to strengthen the
wrong and premeditated viewpoint of Emperor Alexander. V. Kliuchevski
26
L. Magarotto. Op.cit., p 13.
mentioned that ―The will of Georgian King Giorgi XII, caused a whole number of
complicated events. The Russian authorities quite sincerely and more than once
recognized that they saw no need for expanding their borders to the southeast and
had no profit from it.‖27
In reality, just due to the expected benefit, Emperor Pavel I ordered his
representatives in Georgia to occupy Georgia and to join it to the Russian Empire
through the Russian army located in Georgia in that period. It is justly mentioned
that ―the aim of Pavel I was beyond the relations stipulated by the Treatise; this
aim was to destroy the statehood of Georgia and to merge it to Russia, because the
Petersburg authorities considered it was the only way to make Georgia reliable
and convenient military-strategic base in the South Caucasus.‖ 28
As for the benefit of Russia with regard to joining of Georgia, this issue was
perfectly analyzed by one of the Russian officials, I. Kanadpev, who had lived for
20 years in the Caucasus. ―Joining of Georgia … brought great benefit to Russia
from the viewpoint that its borders came to direct relation with Turkey and Persia,
which enabled the government of Russia to exercise direct influence on both
states. In addition, by joining of Georgia, the Caucasian highlanders turned to be
surrounded on all sides, which inevitably caused their subjection… We should
pay attention to the condition that Russia obtained the country, in person of
Georgia, which was unusually rich in natural resources and which might have
served to the interests of the Russian people.‖29
The population of Georgia was most dissatisfied with the abolishment of the
statehood of Georgia and the establishment of military-occupation regime of
Russia. Anti-Russian sentiments were growing among the population, which
turned into apparent political actions. The population demanded restoration of the
1783 Georgievski Treatise terms and of the Bagrationi royal dynasty. In 1802, in
Kakheti; in 1804, in Kartli highlands; in 1812, in Kakheti, again, political actions
and revolts started, which Russians suppressed mercilessly. They put to death a
great amount of rebels, deported many of them to Siberia, and burned down
villages. It should be specially mentioned that the plot of 1832, which was not
spontaneous, but well-organized and the result of long-time consideration,
foresaw restoration of statehood of Georgia. Three forms of state arrangement
were outlined among the plot makers: monarchy, constitutional monarchy, and
republic. The majority of the plot makers supported the idea of monarchy.
Unfortunately, they failed to fulfill their idea. One of the plot makers betrayed
27
Kliuchevski. Op.cit, p 179.
28
R. Lominadze. Establishment of Russian rule in Georgia. Tbilisi, 2000, p 108.
29
Kanadpev Y. Essays on Transcaucasian life. Baku, 1990, pp 80-81.
them. They were arrested. The most active members, being noblemen, were
sentenced to death, but later the Russian imperial court mitigated the sentence—
the plot makers were exiled to Gubernias and various parts of the Russian Empire.
Through this humane act, the Emperor of Russia wanted to gain the heart of the
Georgian aristocracy.
We have talked so extensively about the Georgievski Treatise of 1783, and
annexation of Georgia by Russia because Georgia was the centre of the Caucasus,
and, by occupying it, Russia could have easily ruled over the entire the Caucasus.
The Georgian people faced the jeopardy of annihilating their own features, and
the nation was on the verge of losing expression of vital energy. The intensive
policy of ―Russification‖ of the Caucasian peoples started. Despite of all this,
peaceful life within the Russian Empire promoted population-stablizing
reproduction, and this was most important. If in 1800, the population of Georgia
was 675 thousand, in 1897, it was already 2,109 thousand, and 1,336 thousand of
them were Georgians. Despite the considerable reduction in the amount of
Georgians, in quantity, Georgians exceeded all the Caucasian peoples taken
separately.
The population of Georgia was 1.7% of the Russian Empire in 1897. The
population lived nearly in equal amount in Tbilisi and Kutaisi Gubernias, though
Georgians, living in West Georgia, were 401 thousand more than in East Georgia.
It is known that in the first years of the Soviet power establishment (1921) in
Georgia, the Soviet power alienated a part of the Georgian territory without any
permit of the Georgian people. That was why 1919 thousand lived within the
borders of the present-day Georgia in 1897, i.e., 190 thousand less, as compared
to the amount of Georgians living on the territory of the then-Georgia.
The land of AZERBAIJAN is divided into northern and southern parts. The
border between them is the Mtkvari-Arax flow. The present-day Azerbaijan
involves the northern regions and a part of southern regions, and the greatest part
of the southern regions is within the possession of Iran.30
The territory of the present-day Azerbaijan, due to favorable natural-
geographic conditions, has been the place of settlement of men since ancient
times. Some work tools, discovered on the territory of Azerbaijan, witness that
men lived there still in the Old Stone Age-Paleolith epoch. This is clearly
witnessed by the stone tools of primitive men discovered in the ruins of dwellings
of Paleolith, especially Azikh. From the viewpoint of the formation and
development of primitive society, the richest material, discovered in the unique
30
V. Kopaliani. From the history of relations between the peoples of Transcaucasus. Tbilisi. 1962. p
16.
dwelling of a man in an Azikh cave, is of special importance. More than 300

different stone tools were discovered in the cave, the total length of which was
more than 200 meters, and the area was 1,250-square meters. Men of Azikh
mastered the art of fire very early—the remains of several too-big bonfires of
different periods were discovered in the cave, which continuously burned 700
thousand years ago.
In the epoch of Neolith, men studied to produce more perfect and firm stone
tools, which made their lives and work easier. Chisels, hammers, and even dishes
made of stone, were found in archaeological excavations. A stone hoe was used
for soil cultivation.31 By the end of this epoch, they started to make things from
metal, and a copper foundry furnace was found in Dashkesan and Kedabeck. The
Mtkvari-Arax culture spread in Azerbaijan in Early Bronze Age. Numerous
settlements were found, which occupied one to two, and sometimes ten, hectares.
The dwellings were round and square, with the diameter of three to five, and
sometimes even ten, meters.32 In the epoch of Mtkvari-Arax culture, the amount
of settlements considerably grew as compared with the Eneolith epoch, which
points that the population, living on the territory of Azerbaijan in that period, was
of sufficient amount. This is also witnessed by existence of numerous burial
monuments.
On the territory of the present-day Azerbaijan, serfdom state Mana was
founded in the IX century B.C., which played a great role for political, economic,
and cultural consolidation of old Azerbaijanian tribes.
Median tribes lived to the east and southeast of the Mana state; the first
political union was formed from the IX to VIII centuries. As the ―Median State,‖
it is first mentioned between 672 to 669 B.C. It put an end to the rule of Scythians
(652 to 625) in Media—by that time, it seems, the majority of Scythians migrated
to the North Caucasus—then it occupied the Mana state, overthrew many-century
hegemony of Assyria, and invaded powerful state of Urartu. But Persia, being
within Media, revolted against it in 553 B.C., and put an end to the independence
of Media. Media regained its independence after Alexander of Macedon
overthrew the state of Persia. A new state of Media involved only part of old state
of Media, which is known in the history under the name of Media-Atropatena or
Atropatena. Media-Atropatena occupied southern territory of modern Azerbaijan
and neighbored Caucasian Albania.
31
History of Azerbaijan. vol. I, Baku, 1958, p 7.
32
History of Azerbaiojan from the ancient times to the beginning of the XX century. Baku, 1995, p
52.
Atropatena is the oldest name of Azerbaijan known in science, which has

been preserved in Greek sources. Persians gave it the form of ―Ader-baidagan;‖
Armenians gave it ―Ater-patakan‖ and ―Atr-patakan;‖ Arabs named it
―Aderbaijan‖ and ―Azerbaijan,‖ which means ―the country of fire‖ and is
connected with fire-worship widely spread there.33 In Georgian sources, it is
known under the name of ―Adurbadagan.‖
The northern part of the territory of modern Azerbaijan was called Albania in
the past. It also involved the southern part of the present-day Dagestan. It is
mentioned in Strabo‘s Geography that Albanians ―lived between Iberians and the
Caspian Sea; in the east they neighbored the sea, and in the west—Iberians. As for
the rest parts, in the north there are the mountains of the Kavkasioni (the
Caucasus)… to the south—neighboring Armenia.‖34 Albanians adopted
Christianity in the IV century. The Albanian written language was formed in the
V century. Sassanid Iran subordinated Albania in the III century and finally
abolished the royal power in the VI century and turned it into Iran‘s province. In
mid-VII century, Albania was occupied by Arabs, then in the XI century, by Turk-
Seljuks, who settled in great amounts on the territory of Albania. That‘s why a
great part of Albanians took direct part in the formation of Azerbaijanian people.
In general, the formation of Turkish-speaking people of Azerbaijan causes
special interest. As we have seen, it was historically arranged that before the
formation of single Turkish-speaking union, in both parts of Azerbaijan located in
its south and north, Adurbadagan, and Albania, ethno-genetic processes were
ongoing in different ways. From the XI to XII centuries, South Azerbaijan,
Albania, and Shirvan are occupied by the Turkish-speaking tribes, Oghuzs, which
lived in Central and Middle Asia. In the XX century, the state of Oghuzs was
formed in lower part of Sardaria, which was destroyed by Qipchaks, who came
there in the XI century from the East. A part of Oghuzs went to the west and
settled in the steppes of South Russia. The other part occupied Anterior Asia.
Naturally, in the southern and northern parts of Azerbaijan, before the political
rule of Oghuzs was established, there were no common integration processes
between these two parts of Azerbaijan. However, historically similar processes
were ongoing in both parts. For example, after the occupation by Arabs, Islam and
the Arabian language are spread in both parts. This, undoubtedly, played its role
in rapprochement of both parts of Azerbaijan and promoted the process of
uprooting the ethno-cultural and language differences. But before the Arabs‘
domination, it is difficult to find vivid examples of their union, which was caused
33
History of Azerbaijan. vol. I, Baku, 1958, p 44.
34
T.Qaukhchishvili. Strabo’s Geography. The Greek and Georgian texts. Tbilisi, 1957, p 130.
by their own ways of ethno-genetic and ethno-cultural development in both parts.

Naturally, here are firstly meant different statehood and religious and language
differences. Namely, Adurbadagan (Media minor) and Albania are quite different
state formations, with their own royal dynasties and principals. Despite cultural
and economic relations, they did not represent single political, economic, and
territorial organisms. Thus, the attributes that were required for the establishment
of single nations did not exist there. Religious differences were also big among
them. The local pagan cultures were mostly spread between Albania and
Christianity from the IV century, while in Adurbadagan, Zoroastrianism.
The language difference between Adurbadagan and Albania was also
apparent. They spoke Albanian in Albania, national (Albanian) written language
was created, accelerating the process of merging of different ethnic, language, and
religious groups and the final formation of Albanian union. But in South
Azerbaijan, they spoke their own languages (Khuritan, Kasitian-Elamian, and
other languages are considered), different from the Albanian language. Here, after
domination of Medians and the Median language, the area of using local
languages was limited, and then these languages disappeared completely.
Therefore, before the raids of the Arabs, two ethnic unions existed on the
historical territory of Azerbaijan. After Arabs occupied them, Islam and Arabian,
as the state religion official language, started spreading gradually; this process
resulted in full Islamization of both parts of Azerbaijan and transfer to the Arabian
and Persian languages. Albanians were forced to transfer to the language of Koran
and to adopt the written language of the occupants. Albanians lost the native
language and, correspondingly, their written language. The Arab authors already
mention that the languages of Azerbaijan and Aran (Albania) were Persian and
Arabian. The analogous processes were developed in Adurbadagan (Azerbaijan in
Arabian), but less painfully than in Albania. Islamization here took a massive
form, and establishment of the Arabian language started. All of this formed firm
preconditions for the unification of both parts of Azerbaijan in the future and for
establishment of single nation.
Quite a new era started in the life of Azerbaijan from the XI century. In the
second half of this century, Azerbaijan, Aran (Albania), Shirvan, and other
countries were invaded by Turkish-speaking Oghuz tribes. The Turkish tribes,
with their families, settled in great amounts forever there and mastered the new
lands. Azerbaijan became their new homeland. Azerbaijanian scholars discuss the
problem of establishment of the Azerbaianian people just from this viewpoint.35
35
History of Azerbaijan from the ancient times to the beginning of the XX century. Baku, 1995, pp
394-408.
As they point out, ―Attacks of Oghuz tribes promoted beginning of the most
important stage of developing of ethno-linguistic unions in both parts of historical
Azerbaijan and determined stable condition of ethno-genetic processes on its
entire territory, on the whole being developed within the united state system,
which finished in formation of Selevkids Azerbaijanian state in the XVI
century…Thus, the basis of Azerbaijanians, as special Turkish-speaking people,
and ethnic unions within it are connected with their roots with the local
Caucasian-Anterior Asian ethnic environment and have thousand-year-long
cultural-historical traditions.‖36
It should be mentioned that in the fifties of the XII century, when the dynasty
of Ildeghizids ascended to the throne in Azerbaijan, which involved South
Azerbaijan, Aran, and Nakhichevan, also western regions of Iran, achieved full
independence.37 Later, it lost independence again and several Azerbaijanian
khanates were formed on its territory. From the XVII to XVIII centuries,
economic and political relations were established with Russia, which finished in
occupation of Azerbaijanian territories—khanates and Ordubad region, which
became an integral part of the Russian Empire, in 1803 to 1809, and As a result of
Russia-Iran War of 1826 to 1828.
The written sources of ancient and later periods preserve no information on
the size of the population of Azerbaijan. We can discuss this issue only
approximately. For example, Strabo mentions that before 66 B.C., Albanians
armed 60,000 infantry and 22,000 horsemen to fight against Pompey. The
geographer also mentions about Atropaten that the Media of Atropaten . . . is not
small by its power . . . They can bring to arms 10,000 horsemen and 40,000
infantry.38 Despite the temporal distance between these evidences, we can say that
both parts of Azerbaijan could gather 132 thousand warriors to fight. Taking into
consideration this and other factors, it can be said that the population of
Azerbaijan at the turn of the B.C. and A.D. and the centuries near this boundary
equaled approximately one to 1.2 million people.
The highlands of ARMENIA represent the one of the oldest cradles of the
world civilization. Armenia has a rich historical past. It had the periods of state
flourishing, when it created important values of mankind, but, at the same time,
Armenia also experienced quite long periods of losing its independence, raids, and
troubles.
36
Ibid., pp 406,408.
37
Georgian State Encyclopedia. vol. I, 1975, p 189.
38
T. Qaukhchishvili. Strabo’s Geography. Greek and Georgian texts. Tbilisi, 1957, pp 133, 177.
Primitive men lived in the highlands of Armenia in the first half of the
Quaternary period. In the Neolith era, the population started their land cultivation.
In the Neolith and Early Bronze era, the cattle-breeding developed. Metal
processing started on the territory of Armenia very early, from the V to VI
millennia B.C. Iron processing on the territory of Armenia belongs to the early
period. Iron smelting begins circa 1400 B.C., in Asia Minor. Export of the iron-
finished products to Babylon was conducted from there. In the letter of the King
of Khets to the King of Assyria, written in about 1275 B.C., he informed him
about the iron dagger, as a special present. The center of Kheta iron production
was Kitsuvatna region in Cilicia. This territory later entered the Kingdom of
Lesser Armenia.39
At the turn of the I millennium B.C., unification of tribes, living in the
highlands of Armenia, was promoted by jeopardy expected from Assyrians. On
the basis of this, there was formed the state of Urartu in the IX century B.C. In the
first half of the same millennium, the union was formed of the aboriginal tribes.
They were Urartuans, Haiasa tribal union, etc. In the scholars‘ opinion, the name
of Armenian people, ―Hai,‖ comes from Haiasa tribe. Armen is also the eponym
of Armenians. Except Georgians, all the other peoples know them under the name
of ―Armens,‖ which we come across in Akkadian and Greek sources of the VI
century B.C.
Armenia was gathered around the Mount Ararat, the name of which is
connected with the state of Urartu. The problem of ethno-genesis of Armenians
has not been finally decided yet. According to the most widespread theory,
Armenians are either comers or of local origin. Considerations reconciling these
are expressed in the science. In the end, the last stage of the Armenian people
formation coincides with the formation of the state of Armenia—the VI century
B.C.
According to one of the considerations spread in science, the people of
Armenia appeared on the historical arena only in the VIII century B.C., as a result
of pressure of Assyrians after the fall of the state of Urartu. Armenians may be,
probably, Phrygians by origin, who came from the west. From this viewpoint, it is
interesting to know Herodotus‘ consideration on the ethno-genesis of Armenians:
―Phrygians, as Macedonians say, were called Brigs, within entire period when
Europeans lived in the neighborhood of Macedonians, and when they went to
Asia, they changed their name along with the land; they named themselves
Phrygians. Armenians, which come from Phrygians, were armed like
39
David M.Lang. Armenia. Moscow, 2005, p 88.
Phrygians.‖40 In any case, if we judge by the language, Armenians are Indo-

European people. The territory of the river Arax mountainous valley occupied by
them was the province of Assyrians, and then of Media; later, after the overthrow
of Iran by Alexander of Macedon, it was Greek. Armenia was ruled by Selevkides
after the death of Alexander of Macedon (323).41 Indeed, after this, the Empire of
Alexander of Macedon started destruction. Finally, the fight for power ended in
301, by division of the entire empire among the three commanders of Alexander
of Macedon. Anterior Asia, with vast territory of Iran, came into possession of
Selevk, one of the commanders of Alexander of Macedon. Vast domain of
Selevkides lasted for about two and half centuries. In this period, Armenia was
not one entire political organism. Still in 331 B.C., after Alexander of Macedon
destroyed the Akkadian Empire, the state of Armenia revived and united a
considerable part of highlands, though soon the south-west regions—Komagene
and Sopena—were separated from it and were united within the Selevkides
domain under the name of Great Armenia. The local governor, Artashes I,
appointed by Selevkides, got use of Selevkides defeat by Romans, and, in 189
B.C., Great Armenia and Sopena were declared independent kingdoms. It should
be mentioned that in the period of Selevkides rule, though Armenia was not one
entire political unit, three big political unions were established on the land
populated by Armenians: Lesser Armenia, Great Armenia, and Sopone. Great
Armenia got this name with the aim of differing from Lesser Armenia in the III
century B.C.42
Great Armenia became powerful in the period of the rule of Tigran II Great
(from 95 to 56 B.C.). It united entire Armenia and joined Sopena to its kingdom.
It also possessed Komagene, Atropatena, West Media, Phinikia, a part of Cilicia,
Antioch, and other countries. Armenia possessed many lands and became a strong
political unit. Later, Armenia was never as powerful. In the same period, the
Kingdom of Pontus became strong; the King of which, Mithridates VI, concluded
a secret agreement with Tigran on invasion and distribution of neighboring
countries. Their agreement, first of all, was directed mostly against Romans and
Parthia.
The amount of population of Great Armenia in the period of Tigran II is of
special interest. We have no reliable evidence of the amount of the population in
that period or generally in ancient times. But if we take into consideration that
40
T. Qaukhchishvili. Herodotuson Georgia. The Greek and Georghian texts. Tbilisi, 1960, pp 111-
112.
41
George de Molevil. Armenian Tragedy of 1915. Baku, 1990, p 15.
42
V. Kopaliani. From the past of the relations of Transcaucasian peoples. Tbilisi. 1962, p 21.
Armenia was the most powerful state with quite a vast territory that could gather
numerous warriors, we won‘t be mistaken in saying that its population was also
numerous.
In 1829, Russian general Count Paskevich ordered ―statski sovetnik‖ I.
Chopin to conduct cameral census of the Armenian region. He started to diligently
conduct his task and studied numerous materials on Armenia. With regard to the
amount of the population in Great Armenia, he mentioned that ―The amount of the
population of old Armenia is described in one of the Armenian geographies.
There are 258 okrugs (areas) in Great and Lesser Armenia, Cilicia, Komagen and
Mesopotamian Armenia. There should be about 300 villages, settlements, and
towns in each of them—in total 77,400 (258x300). At least 50 families lived in
each town, village, and settlement, which makes up 464,4000 families
(77400x60). We should calculate an average six persons in each family. Thus, the
population of old Armenia equaled 27,874,000 (4,644,000x6).‖ I. Chopin
considers this figure to be exaggerated quite justly, and he suggests his variant for
calculation of the amount of population: ―It is quite enough to calculate 100
villages in each okrug, 50 families in each town and village, and five persons in
each family, which makes up 6,450,000—the amount of the population of old
Armenia… We should not mean that the number of Armenians, even in the period
of flourishing of the Kingdom of Armenia, exceeded six million.‖43
It is clear, even without comments, that in both cases, such primitive
determination of the amount of population, surely, is impossible. It is also
impossible that 27 million people could have lived in the period of the history of
Armenia, even in the period of its flourishing, at least due to the simple reason
that in such a case, there should have lived 13.5% of the world population in
Armenia. (In the beginning of the A.D., the world population was 200 million.
The most populated was China with 50 million, and the subcontinent of South-
east Asia, 35 million). I. Chopin‘s calculation is also far from reality, according to
which if we mean 100 villages in the region instead of 300 and etc., then the
population of Armenia would not be more than six million, he said. We should
also take into consideration the condition that old Armenian chronicler mostly
calculates the amount of population in Armenia proper (Great and Lesser
Armenia, Cilicia, Komagene, and Mesopotamia Armenia) and not together with
joined and occupied countries. In this case, as well, we consider impossible that
3.0% of the world population could have lived in Armenia. For example, it is
mentioned in the preamble to the materials published on the Armenian population
43
I. Chopin. Historical monument of condition of Armenian region in the epoch of its joining to the
Russian Empire. St Petersburg, 1852, p 18.
census of 2001 that ―More or less reliable data on the amount of population of
Armenia are dated by the years of Tigran the Great reign in the mid-I century
before B.C. The Armenian chronicler assumes that among the indigenous
population living on the oldest historical territory of Armenia, the amount of
Armenians was about five to six million.‖44
The amount of the army gives us a certain impression on the amount of the
population. In the period of war with Romans, Tigran the Great had an enormous
army. Greek historian Plutarch (46 to 120) says, ―Tigran took to the war 20
thousand archers, 55 thousand horsemen…and 150 thousand heavily armed
infantry arranged in cohorts and flanks. In addition, about 35 thousand builders of
roads and bridges were in Tigran‘s army.‖45 Therefore, Tigran‘s army involved
260 thousand. But a great part of his army involved warriors of other countries.
As Plutarch says, ―Medians and the army of Adiabenians came to assist Tigran
and were headed by their kings…Innumerable hordes of Arabs from the
Babylonian Sea, numerous Albanians and Ibers living near Albanians, the armies
of free tribes living in great amounts on the banks of Arax coastline, gathered
around him.‖46 Therefore, in this case, the amount of the army tells us anything
about the number of Armenians. We should take into consideration the most
essential circumstance, as well, when the historians and chroniclers made
mistakes in calculating the number of the parties participating in the armed
clashes. For example, Plutarch informs about the results of Romans‘ fight in 69
B.C. against Tigran, headed by Lukulus, ―As they say in this fight, the enemy lost
more than 100,000 infantry soldiers and nearly no one was saved from his
horsemen. As for Romans, they had about 100 wounded, five warriors were
killed.‖47 Plutarch lives without any comments this illogical data. English scholar
D. Lang mentions that these data should be tackled cautiously. It is the result of
Rome‘s propaganda, which could have so masterly falsified the facts and formed
statistics, that it can have been done by modern totalitarian information agency.48
German military historian Delbruke, on the basis of analyzing enormous
materials, showed the senselessness of the data of ―modernity‖ and ―witnesses‖ on
the amount of the army of the ancient era and mid-medieval period. For example,
by Herodotus‘ information, the army of Xerxes of the King of Persia, which was
going to Greece, involved 4,200 thousand. By Delbruke‘s calculation, if the army
44
The results of 2001 census of the Republic of Armenia. Yerevan, 2003, p 54.
45
Plutarch. Selected parallel biographies. I. Tbilisi, 1957, p 83.
46
Ibid, p 82.
47
Ibid., p 84.
48
David M. Lang. Armenia. Moscow, p 159.
of Xerxes has had so many warriors, then his army would have been spread for
kilometers. This means that when the avant-garde part of the army had been
fighting, its last part could have been spread in Persia. That‘s why it is still
doubtful whether Tigran really had 260 thousand warriors in reality or not. Due to
all mentioned above, it is difficult to say that the amount of Armenians was six
million in the period of Tigran the Great. We consider this amount is two or three
times exaggerated.
In the war against Romans, Tigran was defeated, losing joined lands and
preserving only ethnic borders. Romans‘ rule dominated over Armenia. After that,
Armenia failed to regain strength. It became a battlefield first of Rome and Persia
and then from the second half of the III century, was under the influence of Iran.
In 387, Armenia was divided by Iran and Byzantium, and Iran released all
Armenians off all the official posts, and the country was ruled by a Persian
governor. In the second half of the VII century, Armenia was invaded by Arabs.
Due to strict oppression in that period, Armenians kept leaving their home
country. With the aim of regaining their statehood, Armenians arranged several
revolts against the occupants, but all was in vain. In the end of the IX century,
they managed to get free from the Arabs‘ burden and to restore the state, but in
the XI century, Byzantium gradually started to occupy Armenia‘s lands and, in
1054, occupied its capital, Anis. Armenia again lost its independence.
In the mid-XI century, Selchuks occupied Armenia. In the forties of the XI
century, when Selchuks started to fight for Armenia, there was no longer an
independent state of Armenia on the political map of the South Caucasus—the
Armenian lands were in the possession of Byzantium. Byzantium oppression on
Armenia before the attacks of Selchuks weakened considerably the ability of
resistance among the South Caucasian countries.49 In the XII century, with the
assistance of the Kingdom of Georgia, Armenia became free. The raids of first
Tatar-Mongols and then of Tamerlane in the XIII-XIV centuries were especially
difficult for Armenia; the wars were followed by destruction and mass
annihilation of the population. Migration of Armenians abroad became most
intensive in that period. The majority of Armenians migrated to the Gold Horde,
Crimea, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, Byzantium, Syria, and Lebanon. Armenian
settlements appeared in Bukovina, Galicia, and Transylvania.
From the XVI to XVIII centuries, Armenia became a battlefield between the
Ottoman Empire and Iran. Finally, the fight for hegemony between them ended in
West Armenia; they became possessed by the Ottoman Empire and East Armenia
was subject to Iran. This situation continued until the beginning of the XIX
49
Georghian Soviet Encyclopedia. vol. 9, Tbilisi 1985, pp 463-464.
century. A considerable part of the population of Armenia was sacrificed to

permanent predatory wars on the territory of Armenia. It seems that childbirth and
the natural increase of the population of Armenia were very high, otherwise the
nation would not manage to withstand so much destruction, annihilation of the
population, difficulties connected with intensive emigration processes, permanent
revolts at the expense of great sacrifice, and care for independence of the country.
The years from 1915 to 1916 were the most tragic for Armenia, when the effort of
gaining independence and restoration of the statehood ―took away more than 1.5
million lives from about three million Armenians living in Turkey.‖50 In that
period, about 300 thousand Armenians were forcibly displaced to the
Mesopotamia desert, where the majority of them perished. Armenians who
escaped from Turkey were scattered in the world, mostly in the Near East,
Europe, and America; they founded Armenian settlements in different countries,
which are called Armenian diasporas.
It is impossible to determine the amount of Armenians in the Middle Ages
because they were scattered in different countries of the world; though wherever
they settled, they observed their native language, culture, traditions; they had
close contacts with one another and never suspended their fight for independence.
They, more than once, appealed for assistance in their fight for independence to
the ruling circles of the European countries and Vatican, but in vain. From the
second half of the XVII century, Armenians took orientation to Russia. In the XIX
century, when the interests of Russia became more intensive in the Caucasus and
when Russia strove to exercise control over the trade routes directed towards India
and other countries of the East, it started to care for expansion of territories to the
south and to join historical territories of the Caucasian countries to the Russian
Empire.
NORTH CAUCASUS, with its ethnic diversity, has no analogue in the world.
North Caucasian peoples, who have lived here from ancient times, make a main
mass of the population of this historical-ethnographic region. The monuments of
the Stone Age on the territory of the North Caucasus, namely, the monuments of
pre-Ashel and early-Ashel periods, have not been discovered. The oldest
archaeological monuments belong only to late-Ashel period—200 to 100 years
ago. The technique of making stone tools becomes comparatively developed in
the Mustic epoch. The settlement of the men of that period is comparatively wide
presented. In that epoch, the men probably started settled life. Along with hunting,
development of accumulative homesteads was of great importance. Indeed, the
monuments of Upper Paleolith are found in small amounts, but the dwellings of
50
David M. Lang. Armenia. Moscow, p 339.
Mezolith era are widely presented on the territory of the North Caucasus,
especially in Dagestan. Hunting still played an important role in the everyday life
of men, but it seems far more developed as compared with the previous period; in
this epoch, the ground was laid for agriculture.
The stage of Neolith in the North Caucasus is well presented in Dagestan. The
ruins of this epoch are also discovered in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardian-
Balkaria, and Karachaev-Circassia. The walls of huts used for dwelling were
erected with double-tight wicker, in which earth was put. People already knew to
make earthenware, to pierce stones, to tame wild animals–to a certain extent, the
basis was laid for cattle-breeding. It should be mentioned that ―In the Caucasus,
Eneolith monuments form some circle, which clearly shows original culture of the
Caucasian region, involving all of the Caucasus. It seems that this culture is
spread from the south to the north, and the Caucasian circle is tied.‖51
In the second half of the III millennium B.C., Maikop culture was spread in
the anterior highlands of the Caucasus. On the basis of this culture, the bronze
culture is formed, known as ―North Caucasian culture.‖ This culture existed from
1700 to 1100 B.C. Maikop culture is represented by numerous hill-burial grounds,
in some cases by fortified ruins of dwellings. There appear stone burial-vaults,
copper axes, hoes, knives, chisels, spears, and decorated vessels. The population
was already engaged in cattle-breeding and agriculture. Property inequality can be
seen in the burial-grounds. In the period of Maikop culture, in the dwelling ruins
we come across the walls of square huts plastered with clay; the floors are pressed
with clay.
In the first half of the first millennium B.C, Koban culture was spread in the
central part of the North Caucasus. It is characterized with bronze axes, buckles,
bracelets, etc. There exist different opinions on the origin of Koban culture. It is
mentioned that Colchian and Koban culture are uniform; the center of Koban
culture is Colchis, and Colchian and Koban cultures are two independent,
different cultures.
In the end of Late Bronze Age, there appeared iron articles, first in the form
of decorations and then, of tools. Iron articles entered the North Caucasus from
the South Caucasus and Urartu. Local iron production started there from the VII
to VI centuries B.C., and it played a leading role in making labor and war tools.
All of this promoted further development of agriculture, considerable increase of
production efficiency, and, evidently, reproduction of population.
51
G. Gasviani, T. Gasviani. North Caucasian peoples from the ancient times to the XX century.
Tbilisi, 2006, p 16.
The first alien people to invade the North Caucasus were Kumerians, who
lived from the VIII to VII centuries B.C. in the northeast of the Black Sea
coastline. Scythians involved different ethnic groups. It is believed that ancestors
of Adygeis were among them. Another alien people to occupy North Caucasian
valleys and the territory at the mountain bottom were Scythians. They lived in the
north of the Black Sea coastline. In the VII century B.C., they ousted Kimerians
and occupied their territory. Scythians created high military techniques and
incurred greatest losses of the population of the North Caucasus.
In the ancient period, big ethnic units were not established on the territory of
the North Caucasus, yet. In general, the population moved too frequently in the
North Caucasus, different tribes mixed between one another, and they failed to
form single mass.
Northwest of the Caucasus was occupied by the present-day Adygeya and
Circassian tribes. Authors of ancient times know them under the name of Meots.
Direct ancestors of Veinahs (Chechens and Ingushs) lived in the central part, and
in the east—the ancestors of Dagestanians.
On the territory of the North Caucasus, mostly in the steppes, along with the
indigenous population there lived Turkish-speaking comer tribes. They spread
widely from the III to II centuries B.C., which is connected with entering of
Sarmats. They mastered the North Caucasus and invaded many local tribes.
Diodore of Sicily informs (in the I century B.C.) that ―Sarmats turned the major
part of the country into a desert by destroying the defeated.‖52
In the I century A.D., the tribe of Alans, one of the direct ancestors of the
present-day Ossetian people, became promoted from the Aors tribe from one of
the political unions of Sarmats in the North Caucasus. In the end of ancient times,
Turkish-speaking tribes appeared on the territory of the North Caucasus. They
were remote ancestors of modern Karachaev-Balkars and Kumyks. Thus, in that
period, there already lived in the North Caucasus direct ancestors of modern the
North Caucasian peoples.
Until the XIX century, there are no reliable statistical data on the amount of
the North Caucasian peoples. Local feudals never conducted the population
censuses. Normal growth of the population of the North Caucasus and the South
Caucasus, as well, was impeded by intra-feudal fights, especially the destructive
raids of foreign occupants (Mongols, Tamerlane, etc), and trade with men. The
Russian Empire dominated most of all in the XIX century in the North Caucasus,
but their expansionist and colonial policy impeded much more natural
demographic development of the population. Due to this, there were arranged
52
Cited from: Essays on the history of North Caucasian peoples.,” section I, Tbilisi, 1969, p 28.
many actions against the Russian tsarism, which were most mercilessly
suppressed. We should especially mention the fight for independence of 1834 to
1859 of the Caucasian highland peoples, which was headed by Shamil. He
reached splendid victory in the fight against tsarism, formed military-theocratic
state, Imamate (1841) in the North Caucasus, but finally his resistance was
suppressed in blood by the military force of the Russian tsarism.
I.II. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF THE

CAUCASUS BY RUSSIA
After occupation of the Caucasus, the Russian imperial court started division
of occupied territories and arrangement of the management issues both in the
North and the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus was called ―Zakavkazie‖ by
Russians, which implied the territories, which for Russians were beyond the
Caucasus (za kavkazom); while for Georgians, Azerbaijanians and Armenians
living in the South Caucasus, they were on this side of Kavkasioni (the Caucasus);
for Georgians it was Amierkavkasia. We use the South Caucasus, instead of the
toponym Amierkavkasia (―zakavkazie‖), as more a correct and justified toponym.
In 1801, after occupying East Georgia (Kartli and Kakheti), Russia started
elaboration of the system of governing. In 1802, according to the regulations
proved by the Emperor of Russia (―on governing of Georgia‖) supreme power of
Kartli-Kakheti was called ―governing of Georgia,‖ headed by ―commander-in-
chief of Georgia‖ (chief governor). The entire Kartli-Kakheti was divided into
five mazras (regions): Gori, Lore, Dusheti, Telavi and Sighnaghi, which were
headed by Russian military officials, captain-ispravniks. With this, Russians
abolished traditional Georgian administrative division and governing systems.
After Russia abolished the Kingdom of Imereti in West Georgia, Russians
established interim governance, the governor of which was officially called
―governor of Imereti, Guria, Samegrelo and Abkhazia.‖ The territory of Imereti
was divided into okrugs (areas) of Kutaisi, Vani, Shorapani, and Racha. Of
course, abolishment of the Kingdom of Imereti (1810) and later of principalities
of Samegrelo, Guria, and Abkhazia was not conducted painlessly; the population
arranged actions, revolts, which were mercilessly suppressed by Russia.
In 1829, Russia and Turkey concluded the Adrianopolis treaty, according to
which the old Georgian province of Samtskhe-Javakheti (seized by Turkey for
300 years) joined Russia. A part of the indigenous Georgian population living
there preserved Christianity, but another part recognized Muslim religion. What is
most important, Georgian Muslims preserved the Georgian language and customs
and traditions. For political considerations, Russians formed unbearable life
conditions for Georgian Muslims; they were granted heavy taxes and many
villages were completely burned down. Because of this, a great majority of
Georgian Muslims—70 to 75 thousand—migrated to Turkey; 21 thousand were
killed in the war. The representatives of the Georgian community asked General
Count Paskevich to emigrate Georgians from West Georgia to Samtskhe-
Javakheti but received a negative answer. In return, the general settled on the
territory, abandoned by the population, with 30 thousand Armenians, who came
from Turkey and who supported Russia in the war with Turkey.53 It should be
mentioned that by 1880, in the villages of Akhalkalaki mazra, where church or
mosque functioned, the registration showed that in these villages lived 3,532
Georgians, who were all orthodox (8.9% of the mazra entire population). From
17,300 Georgians (55.5% of the mazra entire population) living in Akhaltsikhe
mazra, 4,337 were orthodox (25.1% of Georgians, 13.9% of the mazra entire
population), and 12,963 were Muslims (74.9% of Georgians, and 41.6% of the
mazra entire population).
Russians formed Akhaltsikhe oblast (region) on the territory of South
Georgia, which was joined As a result of Russia-Turkey war of 1828 to 1829.
Later, this territory joined first Kutaisi and then Tbilisi gubernias in the form of
Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki mazras.
Tsarist Russia gradually refined the colonial governing system in Georgia and
all of the Caucasus, which foresaw acceleration of assimilation of the Caucasian
peoples, the turning of the Caucasus into an integral part of the Russian Empire.
In 1841, all of the Caucasus was divided into two administration units: Georgia-
Imereti gubernia and Kaspi oblast. Gubernia is the highest unit of an
administrative division in Russia. In the end of the XVIII century, two or three
gubernias were united under the power of vice-regent. Georgia-Imereti gubernia
involved Georgia and West Georgia without Samegrelo, Abkhazia, and Svaneti
principalities, which preserved limited autonomous governance before their
abolishment (The royal power of Russia abolished the principality of Samegrelo
in 1857, the principality of Svaneti, in 1858, and the principality of Abkhazia, in
1864). Georgia-Imereti gubernia also involved the territory of Armenia. The
gubernia included 11 mazras in total, the territory of Georgia proper, seven
mazras.
In 1844, the post of chief governor was abolished in the Caucasus, and the
administration of the Caucasus was headed by deputy emperor, vice-regent
53
M. Vachnadze, G. Guruli. History of Georgia. Tbilisi, 2004, p 31.
(―namestnik‖). Prince Mikhail Vorontsov (1844-1854) was the first who was
appointed on this post. Renowned military-political figures, sometimes members
of the royal family, were usually appointed to this post, including Mikhail
Romanov (1862 to 1882) and Nikolai Romanov (1915 to 1917). The vice-regent
had unlimited civil governor‘s rights and was commander of the Caucasian army.
From the Caucasian inhabitants only infantry general-lieutenant Grigol Orbeliani,
a famous Georgian poet and public figure, was fulfilling the obligations of the
vicegerent.
Tbilisi was the center of vice-regency in the Caucasus, which from 1801—the
period of joining of East Georgia by Russia—gradually became the military-
political and economic-cultural center of all of the Caucasus. That was why K.
Marx wrote in 1855: ―Georgia is Russia‘s Poland in the Caucasus,‖ and ―Tbilisi in
Asia is the center of Russia‘s rule.‖54 Vice-regents of the Caucasus mentioned in
their addresses to the emperors that among the autochthons the Georgian
aristocracy of the highest culture did great services to both civil and military
arena.55
In 1846, Tbilisi and Kutaisi gubernias are formed. Tbilisi gubernia first
involved Tbilisi, Gori, Sighnaghi, Telavi, Elizavetpol, Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and
Alexandropol mazras and three okrugs. Later, Elizavetpol and Yerevan mazras
separated from Tbilisi gubernia and became their own gubernias. In return, the
newly formed Akhalkalaki, Akhaltsikhe, Borchalo, and Tianeti mazras and the
Zakatala okrug joined it.
Russia divided the Georgian territory received from Turkey as a result of
Russia-Turkey war into Kars, and Artaani oblastsand subjected them to Kutaisi
gubernia.
Administrative arrangement of the North Caucasus also corresponded to the
colonization policy of tsarist Russia. Vice-regent Baryatanski openly said that
civil arrangement of the highlanders should be apprehended as continuation of
their occupation.56
In the 1860s, as a result of implemented administration reform, Kuban, Tergi,
and Dagestan oblasts were formed (Dagestan oblast during the entire XIX century
was within the South Caucasus, though territorially it was located in the North
Caucasus). Adygeis–Circassians and Karachaevs entered Kuban oblast, and
Kabardinians, Balkars, Ossets, Chechen-Ingushs, the Tergi okrug. In 1867, the
Tergi oblast was divided into eight okrugs: Kabardinia, Ossetia, Ingushetia,
54
Cited from: P. Gugushvili. Population. Family. Fertility. Tbilisi, 1985, p 25.
55
Ibid., pp 24-25.
56
Cited from: Essays on the history of North Caucasian peoples. Tbilisi, 1978, p 142.
Chechnya, Ichkeria, Arghun, Kumyk, and mountainous okrugs. Each okrug, in its
turn, was divided into districts, for example, Ossetia okrug involved Tagaur-
Kurtati, Alagir, and Didgori districts.57
Kuban oblast administrative division was a bit later. In 1868, it was divided
into five military departments (otdels): Psekups, Laba, Urup, Zelenchuk, and
Elbrus. Two years after, the military departments were abolished and civil
governance was introduced, though no public governance was felt. The population
of Adygeya united into Maikop, Batalpashinsk, and Ekaterinograd mazras.
Ingushetia was established as Nazran okrug in 1866. Administrative divisions in
the North Caucasus frequently changed. As for Dagestan oblast, it was divided
into four military departments: north, west, middle, and south Dagestan.
The Russian Empire, by unusual division of the North Caucasus, made the
colonization of the region considerably easy. Frequent changes of administrative
division served this goal. Colonization took so wide-scale a form that the amount
of colonists in Kuban oblast made up more than half of the local population, and
in the Tergi oblast, nearly half. All of this was only one rough expression of the
national policy of Russia. It did not avoid anything to implement such policy; it
forced the local population to know the Russian language, the Russian habits and
customs, and promoted in every way their migration from their native places to
Turkey forever and assimilation of local and settled population. Implementation
of such policy was made easy by a high share of Russians in the entire population.
The main aim of the Russian Empire was domination in the Caucasus, which had
become the source of bloodshedding conflicts and contradictions and which,
unfortunately, continues to this day.
I. III. COLONIZATION OF THE CAUCASUS BY RUSSIA

I. III.I. Deportation of North Caucasian Peoples to Turkey
The wars in the Caucasus ended on 24 May 1864, when the Russian army
occupied the last centre of the highlanders‘ struggle at the mouth of the river
Mzimti—Kbaada. Victory in the war finally strengthened the tsarism‘s positions
in the Caucasus. All of this made it easy for the tsarist government to launch a
wide-scale process of colonization of the Caucasus. This was possible by
resettlement of the Caucasian highlanders in great amounts to Turkey in that
period.
57
Collection of statistical data on Caucasus. vol. I, Tiflis, 1869, pp 30-31.
The process of highlanders‘ resettlement to Turkey was named as

―muhajiroba‖ (the term is of Arabic origin and means resettlement, emigration). It
started mostly in 1858 to 1859, and reached the top in 1863 to 1864. In this issue,
the interests of Russia and Turkey thoroughly coincided. So, it was not by chance
that since 1858 the resettlement of Caucasian highlanders had become the most
important issue in the diplomatic correspondence of Russia and Turkey.58
Both Russia and Turkey had their own definite goals in the issue of
resettlement of Caucasian highlanders from their dwellings to Turkey. Russia was
interested in settling Cossacks and Russians in the emptied places. The
correspondence of the then-high-ranking officials openly reveals this wish and
outlines the measures required for this. In 1861, Vicegerent of the Caucasus,
Prince Baryatinski, wrote that ―We should liberate the Caucasian plateau from the
population … and we should form the Cossacks‘ settlements in these fine and
fruitful places.‖ Emperor Alexander II was informed in the letter of congratulation
after the end of the Caucasian war that ―without losing time and as far as it is
possible we should resettle the highlanders to Turkey, and, after the country is
emptied, we should establish there our rule forever.‖59
Turkey had its interests in a positive solution of the issue concerning
resettlement of the Caucasian highlanders to Turkey. The government of Turkey
wished to settle the highlanders from the Caucasus in empty and less-populated
places of the empire. Sultan Dovlet-girvi wrote about this: ―The government of
Turkey welcomes the resettled with pleasure as it needs them for filling empty
places of European and Asian gubernias.‖ As a result of long wars, the population
of Turkey considerably reduced. According to the statistical data of that period,
Turkey lost a hundred thousand soldiers every year in continuous battles.60 Turkey
was right. It was favorable for it to fill up its population with the people grown up
on the traditions of bravery, nobleness, and selfless devotion. Thus, Turkey
resolved the military-political tasks, provided its economy with cheap labor force,
and, by settling muhajirs in the important strategic places, strengthened defense
ability of the country, and also acquired the image of patron of all Muslims in the
Muslim world.
Both Turkey and Russia widely popularized resettlement to Turkey among
the highlanders. First of all, it should be mentioned that the Muslim religion
played a great role in voluntary resettlement of highlanders to Turkey. For
58
Acts of Caucasian archeographic commission. Tiflis, vol. XII, part II, p 1011, N 890.
59
Cited from: Dzidzaria G. Mahajiroba and problem of history of the XIX century Abkhazia.
Sokhumi, 1982, pp 198-199.
60
G. Dzidzaria. Op.cit., p 201.
example, Abkhazs resettled to Turkey mostly from the villages, where the Muslim
religion had great influence. At the same time, the propaganda of Turks also
played no less important role in resettlement. They promised them life in paradise,
told them about much gold in Turkey, saying that even the donkeys were
decorated with gold, and fed them with rice only. They used to tell of pumpkins
growing very large, even of the enormous size that an ox could sit in it and about
―honey flowing like a river.‖ They pushed an idea into them that they would get
everything in Turkey, in that ―fantastic country.‖ When people, charmed with
these stories, headed to Sokhumi, they saw a Turkish ship decorated with flags
and ribbons and hear gay music playing. Looking at all this, people, especially
young people, were sure they would live happily in Turkey.61 That such
propaganda was so popular among Abkhazs in that period can be explained by
having no educational centers, raids of Turks, secluded life, etc. P. Brockhaus and
R. Effron encyclopedia mentions: ―The Abkhaz people have no written language,
and they are culturally very backward.‖62 Even in 1926, only 6,100 Abkhazs, i.e.,
11.8%, could read or write, and only 485 Abkhazs managed to read and write in
their native language; 395 of them being men and ninety were women.63
There were widespread rumors in Turkey with regard to the highlanders‘
resettlement, according to which Russians planned to christen the Muslims, to
make them serve in the army, etc. One more important reason of resettlement was
that in that period, peasant reform was being prepared in Russia (serfdom was to
be abolished). High-ranking highlanders, fearing the peasant reform would
deprive them of their privileges, decided to move to Turkey together with their
peasants.
In the process of resettlement to Turkey, the highlanders experienced the
greatest tragedy. The tsarist army behaved brutally towards them. The highlanders
left all their property and headed towards seaports to leave for Turkey. But neither
the Turkish nor the tsarist fleet that came to assist could take aboard such a great
amount of people simultaneously. They had to wait for months for the ship,
hungry and thirsty. The northeast coastline of the Black Sea was covered with the
dead and with dying people. Still alive, but exhausted, people became victims of
hungry dogs; children were sucking the breasts of their dead mothers. Epidemic
added to all this, which was raging among Adygeis, Circassians, and their
neighboring peoples in the period of departure and after it, and which took away
lives of many peoples (about one-third of the refugees) in the places of
61
Ibid., p 369.
62
Encyclopedic dictionary, vol. I, Petersburg, 1890, p 49.
63
All-union population census in 1926. Section I, Tpilisi, 1929, pp 37, 60.
resettlement, on the way, and in Turkey.64 At even a small sign of illness, people
were thrown out overboard. Turks took everybody on board the ship—both old
and young, but as soon as the ship was in the middle of the sea, they used to start
selecting them; they threw overboard into the sea old men who could not carry
arms, old women who could not satisfy their lust, and small children who required
care of their parents. Turks were collecting young, healthy girls for filling up their
harems.
The highlanders were in far worse condition after arriving in Turkey,
especially to Trebzond and Samsung. A great amount of resettled highlanders
gathered there. Tens of thousands of people died from hunger. Streets, gardens,
and squares were covered with the corpses. Every day, 180 to 250 people died in
Trebzond, and 200 in Samsung. There were registered 50 thousand corpses and 60
thousand alive simultaneously in Samsung in the beginning of September, 1964.65
The Turk authorities made use of the desperate condition of these people and
sold them, forming regiment of ―Circassian‖ cavalry, sultan‘s ―Circassian guard.‖
They took only unmarried into the army; many highlanders sold their wives and
children. One of the highlanders expressed their common grief and wrote in 1872,
in Constantinople: ―Eight years have passed since we moved to Turkey; we have
no freedom, no family, and no property. We are deprived of everything every day,
even whatever we earn. But they are not satisfied with all this; they take our
children, boys and girls, from us by force and sell them as slaves.‖66
Tsarist Russia aimed at full resettlement of Circassians, Kabardinians, Ossets,
Ubikhs, Abkhazs, and other North Caucasian peoples. Circassians, Kabardinians,
and Nogaians were resettled in the greatest amounts. Especially intensive was the
resettlement of Shapsugs, Natukhians, Bzhedukhs, Sadzs, Abazins, Ubikhs, and
other tribes living in the places close to the Black Sea. Ubikhs were nearly
completely resettled to Turkey (only few families were left in the Caucasus).
Dagestans, Ossets, Chechens, and other highlanders of the North-East Caucasus
also resettled, but in fewer amounts, which mostly is explained by their distance
from Turkey; and as for Ossets, they were mainly Christians, and the Ossetian
intellectuals impeded the process of their resettlement.
It should be mentioned that the Russian ruling authorities turned special
attention to intensification and strengthening of their presence in Abkhazia for
domination in the Caucasus. That was why within the entire XIX century, they did
64
G. Gasviani, T. Gasviani. North Caucasian peoples from the ancient times to the XX century.
Tbilisi, 2006, p 303.
65
G. Dzidzaria. Op.cit., p 239.
66
G. Dzidzaria. Op.cit. p 234.
their best to drive away and resettle the local population and to settle Cossacks
and Russians in their places. In the 1820s, the Consul of France to Georgia
Jacques Francois Gamba recommended the government of Russia to fully occupy
Abkhazia and to dominate there. He wrote: ―Gagra location is most convenient
and the government of Russia should pay attention to this place and it should set
the first and foremost task to occupy this place if Russia wants to calm and to
enslave them.‖67
The Russian officials used to pay attention to this place without such
recommendations of Gamba. In the same period, General Paskevich tried to
convince Nikolai I that final occupation of the Caucasus was possible only
through occupation and colonization of the Black Sea coasts.68 The letter of A.
Ermolov, ―dictator of the Caucasus,‖ sent to the minister of foreign affairs of
Russia in 1820, is most interesting from this viewpoint. In that period, due to
diplomatic problems and the high level of mortality in the Russian garrison, the
issue was raised in the foreign ministry of Russia on returning Sokhumi and
Abkhazia to Turkey. A. Ermolov wrote to the minister that Sokhumi was the
support of Russia on the Black Sea eastern coastline. He threatened with
resignation in case Sokuni would be returned to Turkey. His demand was satisfied
by the ministry.69
The ruling authorities of the Russian Empire soon started to act. Their plan
was to arrange Cossacks stanitsas (villages) on the Black Sea eastern coastline—
namely, from the mouth of the river Kuban to the river Bzipi. In their opinion,
Gagra Ridge should have been the border between the Kuban region and Kutaisi
gubernia. Later, this plan was more expanded, and they decided to settle Cossacks
and Russians until the mouth of the river Enguri, i.e., nearly half of the territory of
West Georgia. But they required free territories for fulfilling their plans—that is,
to free the settled places from their real owners. Through direct participation and
promotion of Tsarist Russia, thousands of Abkhazs were forced to leave their
native places and to resettle to Turkey. A. Mirski, governor-general of Kutaisi,
mentioned about this: ―If a part of Abkhazs will wish to resettle to Ottoman
empire, we should not impede them. We should buy their estates in Abkhazia,
which are vast and we should start colonization of Abkhazia through the
assistance of Cossacks and Russians.‖
67
J.F. Gamba. Travel to Georgia. vol. I, Tbilisis, 1987, p 78.
68
P .Gugushvili. Economic development of Georgia and Transcaucasus in the XIX-XX cc. vol. I, Tb.,
1949, p 727.
69
A.N. Dyachkov-Tarasov. Abkhazia and Sokhumi in the XIX century. Proceedings of the Caucasian
department of the imperial Russian geographic society. vol. XX (1909-1910), N 2, Tiflis, pp
154-155.
Russia intensively settled Russians on the lands designated for colonization in

Abkhazia. They also did not refuse any other wishers and gave the right to settle,
though in comparatively less amount, to Greeks, Armenians, Estonians, Germans,
and Moldavians. In the 1870s, invitation applications were sent to inner gubernias
of Russia, suggesting Abkhazia for living there. For example, Market-gardeners
were expected from the Yaroslavl gubernia, as it was considered there were most
favorable conditions for development of vegetable growing in Tsebelda.70 Only
landless Georgian peasants of neighboring mazras of Georgia were refused the
right to settle there. For example, a hundred Georgian peasant families appealed
with request to the government in the end of the XIX century for the right to settle
in Abkhazia, but they were refused on the motive that ―all the empty land plots in
Sokhumi area were designated for the Russian colonizers.‖71
An exact number of North Caucasian ethnicities, which were resettled to
Turkey from 1859 to 1864, is not known. The majority of authors considers that
their total amount was 750 to 900 thousands in that period. At the same time,
resettlement to Turkey took place before the Caucasian war, as well, and this
process continued in smaller scales after the end of the Caucasian war until the
beginning of the XX century. For example, after North Caucasian peoples were
joined to Russia, there were separate efforts of these peoples to gain
independence. Namely, the revolt of 1877 to 1878 ended in great losses,
deportations to Siberia, and resettlement of part of the population to Turkey. In
addition, according to the official data, 13,586 people resettled to Turkey from
only the Kuban region in 1871 to 1884, mostly Adygeis (Circassians), Azegs
(Abkhazian tribe), and Turkish tribes.72 We cannot determine exactly the amount
of North Caucasian ethnicities resettled to Turkey, due to scarce information. We
share the opinion of many scholars that the amount of North Caucasian ethnicities
resettled to Turkey in the XIX century exceeded one million. In any case, the
majority of scholars considers this amount to be an upper limit of the amount of
the resettled.73 All this radically changed the demographic situation in the North
Caucasus and impeded the natural course of its development.
Tsarist authorities encouraged the resettlement of North Caucasian ethnicities
to Turkey, and this gave its results. Wide settlement of Russians, Ukrainians, and
other migrants started on the emptied land plots. The regulations ―on settlement in
70
A.N. Dyachkov-Tarasov. Op.cit., p 196.
71
P. Gugushvili. Economic development of Georgia and Transcaucasus in the XIX-XX cc. vol. I, Tb.,
1949, p 732.
72
Collection of evidences on Caucasus. vol. IX, Tiflis, 1885, pp 98-99.
73
G. Gasviani, T. Gasviani. Op. cit., p 302; Gadjiev K. Geopolitics of Caucasus. Moscow, 2003, p
35, etc.
the Black Sea.‖ adopted on 10 March 1866, granted privileges and different
advantages to those settled in new place. The citizens of the so-called other cities,
Armenians and Greeks migrated from Turkey, Germans migrated from Germany,
etc., received the rights to found new settlements, khutors (villages), and colonies.
Still, in the mid-XIX century, the tsarist authorities drove away Ingushs from
the territory, which is now within the Prigorodni region; in fact, they destroyed
the Ingushs‘ settlement southwards to Vladikavkaz and founded the Cossacks‘
stanitsas instead. A part of Ingushs was forced to move to the mountains, another
part to Turkey. After the October revolution, the Bolsheviks gave Ingushs a
permit to return to their places and drove out Cossacks from there.74
The factor of demographic mastering of the Caucasus was of great
importance from the viewpoint of not only domineering in that region, but also of
final de jure formation of the territories joined in the XIX century. In the period of
wars for the Caucasus and after them, Russia‘s rival big states always tried to
separate these territories from Russia. For example, in the Crimean war, which
essentially influenced the course of events in the Caucasus, English military
circles tried to separate from Russia the Crimea and the Caucasus, namely,
transfer of Crimea, Circassia, and Georgia to Turkey. More far-sighted plans
foresaw the separation of Caucasian provinces from Russia, division of Georgia
into separate parts, formation of principalities of Georgia, Samegrelo, Imereti,
Guria, and Armenia under the protection of Ottoman Empire or Great Britain, to
return those territories to Iran and Ottoman Empire, which were transferred to
Russia by the Gulistan and Adrianopolis peace treaties. These plans were openly
sounded by the newspaper Times, which wrote: ―The Russia‘s border in the
Caucasus should pass northwards of the Tergi (Terek) and Kuban.‖75
I.III.II. Colonization of the Caucasus
With the aim of strengthening its position in the Caucasus, tsarist Russia
started colonization of this region at a quick rate and set a wide program of
activities. In the first third of the XIX century, there were no Russian colonies in
the South Caucasus, unless we take into consideration small military settlements.
In 1827, the tsarist power decided to resettle 80 thousand from Ukraine to the
South Caucasus along the border with Iran. In their opinion, this would mostly
provide security of the borders and ―calm and curb the Asian tribes,‖ to occupy
74
Gadjiev K. Op cit., pp 35-36.
75
Cited from: Gadjiev K. Op cit., pp 33-34.
and join the provinces of the South Caucasus. In the opinion of General
Paskevich, who was charged with the task of preparing Cossacks‘ resettlement, it
was too difficult to find land plots required for 80 thousand settlers. Other
problems appeared, as well. Armenians and Greeks were forced to leave Iran and
Turkey for the places, which were designated for Cossacks, etc. A strategic aim of
the Russian Empire was to form the Christian area by resettling the Armenian and
Greek refugees. Thus, colonization of the South Caucasus started with this
measure. A bit earlier, about 500 families of German colonists were settled in
1817 to 1818 in the South Caucasus, namely, in Georgia. They were German
sectarians from Stuttgart. Finally, arrangement of military colonies were
considerably delayed, and only 10 years after only 10 military colonies were
arranged in the points of strategic importance in the Caucasus.
Before the peasants‘ reform (before abolition of serfdom) in the Russian
Empire, colonization of the Caucasus with the Russian population was not
exhausted only with the formation of military colonies. For example, in 1830,
heretic-raskolniks were given a permit to resettle to the South Caucasus by the
law of 1830. Their resettlement was based on the court decision as a punishment
measure, as well as on their own wishes. It should be mentioned that settlement of
the Russian sectarians in Georgia took place also in the 1820s. In 1836, there were
2,048 sectarians living in the Shirvan province, and 780 were living in Karabakh
in 1837. Resettlement of dukhobors to the South Caucasus started in 1841. By
1863, the amount of Russian colonists in the South Caucasus already was
28,676.76
Prince Vorontsov, vicegerent in the Caucasus, laid the basis for settlement of
Russians in the Caucasus. Vorontsov formed a whole number of Russian
settlements in the mid-XIX century, within ten years of his activities (1844 to
1854). Later, this process was somehow suspended. The Russian authorities
expressed worry, saying that the second half of the XIX century was lost for the
Russian settlements in the Caucasus.77 This dissatisfaction was expressed in the
period when there were already formed many villages in the Caucasus populated
with Russians. The tsarist Russia‘s authorities set far broader goals in that period.
They wanted colonization of the Caucasus to form a firm support for exercising
their rule there and for ―Russification‖ of the local population. That‘s why they
completely changed colonization tactics of the Caucasus and tried to conduct
colonization only by resettlement of Russians to the Caucasus. Each free land was
76
P. Gugushvili. Economic development of Georgia and Transcaucasus in the XIX-XX centuries. vol.
I, Tbilisi, 1949, p 642.
77
Review of resettlement in Caucasus. St. Petersburg, p 1.
declared as Russian-populated territory. The banks received orders to sell land

plots only to Russians. It was not by chance that in 1898, chief governor of the
Caucasus, Prince Golitsin, raised once more the issue of colonization of the
Caucasus but this time, only with settlement of Russians. The tsarist government
considered it a great shortcoming of the colonization that it had no planned
character and that only comparatively small formal land plots were used for
settlement. At the same time, they considered the successful settlement in the
Mughan steppe; the positive results of which were later determined, namely, on
the border with Persia, formation of Russian settlements in eastern steppes of the
South Caucasus, namely, on the border with Persia.
In 1905, when the post of vicegerent was restored, colonization of the
Caucasus was considered to be the main task of the state arrangement of this
region. By 1913, the total area of the fields, considered for colonization in the
eastern steppes of the South Caucasus, was 1.5 million desyatina (land measure
unit in Russia, in 1753, by boundary instruction, formal desyatina was determined
as 2,400 square sajens—1.0925 hectares). In that period, the researched Mughan
(324,303 desyatina) and Mili (318,869 desyatina) fields were considered the first
order colonization fund. In addition, 800 thousand desyatina, being under
research, were considered to be the colonization places of the second order; they
were located in Baku, Elizavetpol, Tbilisi, and Yerevan gubernias.
After the eastern steppes of the South Caucasus, great interest for colonization
was caused by the Black Sea coastline places, located in the zone of subtropical
climate. Settlement on the Black Sea coastline began earlier than in the steppes of
the South Caucasus. From the total area of the Black Sea gubernia (743,214
desyatina), there were allocated 100 thousand desyatina of land plots for the
Russian colonists in 193, and soon 150 thousand more were expected to be
allocated. The Black Sea gubernia possessed up to 350 thousand desyatna more at
its disposal. Such were the land reserves for settlement of Russians in the
Caucasus. Only within five years, in 1908 to 1912, more than 55 thousand were
settled in the Caucasus.78
The tsarist Russia allocated a great amount of sums for upgrading the Russian
settlements in the Caucasus and improvement of life conditions. Otherwise, the
final establishment of the Russian population there and turning of these places
into the reliable support for the imperial intentions would have been difficult.
Construction of irrigation canal started still in 1901, to irrigate Mughan. Irrigation
canals were constructed and new Russian villages were formed. Special attention
on the Black Sea coastline was turned to construction of main roads along the
78
Review of resettlement in Caucasus. pp 3-6.
coastlines, which considerably assisted in forming settlements there. Great

attention was also turned to medical assistance. It is known that in the previous
period, the tsarist government failed to conduct colonization in a great part of
Kutaisi gubernia, the reason being widespread cases of malaria. A great many
settlers fell victim to this disease. Medical and second-order medical points were
being formed. In 1909 to 1912, these points were visited by the patients 413
times, among them, those with malaria disease visited 171 times.79
In the process of colonization, they did not take into consideration the local
population, which experienced lack of land plots. The tsarist government acted in
disguise, trying to force the local population leave these places for other places or
Turkey and assisting settlement of Russians and Cossacks instead.80 The places
emptied by the local population were immediately given Russian names. They
used to say directly: ―The issue of naming the free, abandoned land plots is not
only of local or private, but also of state importance.‖ In the second half of the last
century, new settlements were founded in Abkhazia with the Russian names:
Baklanka, Petropavlovskoe, Mikhailovskoe, Poltavskoe, Chernogovskoe,
Vesiolaya, Oervinka, Visokaya, etc. Russian names were also given to the newly
formed Russian villages: Alexeevka, Pokrovka, Mikhailovka, Nikolaevka,
Alexandrovka, etc.81 Russia was preparing firm ground for final domineering in
the Caucasus and for ―Russification‖ of the region. Teaching in Russian at
schools; persecution of indigenous populations; giving awards, medals, and ranks
to loyal persons, who served them; absolutely ignoring of the considerations of
local ethnicities; disguised and often open restrictions of their rights; disrespect of
local traditions and customs, etc., served the same goal.
The tsarist Russia failed to finally implement its plan on full colonization of
the Caucasus. It should be mentioned that malaria took away the lives of an
important part of Russians and Cossacks, as they were not used to local conditions
and, in some cases, were settled on the wrong-chosen places. Colonization of the
Caucasus required enormous sums, the allocation of which was connected with
great problems. For example, the projects were elaborated and approved by the
road movement ministry for construction of main roads in the Black Sea gubernia,
which were necessary for settlement of Russians; but due to problems in the Far
East and war with Japan, the state failed to allocate the sums.82
79
Ibid., p 14.
80
Cited from: G. Dzidzaria. Op cit., p 435.
81
Review of settlement in Caucasus. pp 7-8
82
Ibid., p 9.
Despite all mentioned above, colonization of the Caucasus was conducted.

After joining of the Caucasus to the Russian Empire, the size and structure of the
Caucasian population considerably changed due to revolts of the local population,
the Caucasian war, migration of a great amount of indigenous population of the
Caucasus to Turkey, and settlement of a whole number of territories in the South
Caucasus with Cossacks and Russians and other colonists; demographic
development of the North Caucasian ethnicities was especially impeded. We shall
analyze the size and national structure of the population in the XIX century in the
following chapters to have a clear idea on the present situation in dynamics. At
present, we shall discuss the issues of natural movement of the Caucasian
population in the XIX century, based on the possibility given by the existing
demographic and statistical data.
I.IV. Natural Movement of the Population of the

Caucasus in the XIX Century
Before the XIX century, we come across discussion on childbirth and directly
on the demographic issues only in the Georgian written sources. For example, in
the work Life of Giorgi Mtatsmindeli, by Girogi Mtsire, the XI-century writer, we
see discussion on having seven and eight children in the family being very many
and that main attention should be turned on educating the young generation, i.e.,
to use modern terminology, the level of education is main thing in bringing up the
children. The Georgian folklore considered most desirable to have four children in
the family. The folk poem, written probably in the XIX century, concerns
reduction in childbirth: ―Our women give birth to one son and bring him up
grumbling.‖83
The issues of reduction in childbirth in Georgia seemed to worry already in
the XVIII century. The work Teaching for the Sake of Nation’s Benefit, by an
anonymous author, dated by 1782, points just to this. The author names the
factors of reduction in childbirth: a wish to live better, a reduction in marriages,
the spreading of urban way of life, late marriages, hard work of women, and bad
living conditions in home delivery of the first child and in the period following it,
which caused infertility. We don‘t know profession and level of education of the
unknown author, but he gives fine analysis of the reasons causing reduction in
83
Folk wisdom. vol. IV, Tbilisi, 1965, p 431.
childbirth. His aim is to assist the nation in apprehending these issues and to take
care for eradicating the problems, which ―impede reproduction of the nation.‖84
The data on the population movement in the Caucasus appears only from the
second half of the XIX century, but it is too scarce and mostly imperfect. The first
studies on the population movement research were conducted on the basis of birth
certificate books in Perovsk stanitsa (Cossacks village) in the Kuban region and
the village Gurjaani of Tbilisi gubernia. Later, namely in 1875 to 1879, detailed
and rich statistical information was obtained on the basis of birth certificate notes
on Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Elizavetpol, Yerevan, and Baku gubernias.85 Before that, the
first material on childbirth and mortality is dated by 1847, but the data recorded in
this material are clearly inexact and give no opportunity to establish any
regularity.
The data on childbirth of 1875 to 1879 witness that families with many
children were spread less in Georgia, especially among Georgians, as compared
with other countries. To analyze the data existing on the then-childbirth rates
clarifies a low level of childbirth as compared both with the representatives of
other nations living in Georgia and Russia and European countries. The following
nations differed, with the highest intensity of childbirth in rural population of
Tbilisi gubernia villages: Russians (55.4 promile), Greeks (47.4 promile) and
Armenians (42.9 promile). The analogous indicator in Georgians was only 36.3
promile. It is interesting to point out that the childbirth level in this period was far
higher in Russia and Ukraine. For example, in Kiev gubernia in 1885, sixty-one
children were born per each thousand population. In gubernia cities, this indicator
was 37.2 promile, and in mazras it was 65.1 promile. In 1867 to 1887, the
orthodox Christians did not have less than five to six children from one marriage
in 50 gubernias of the Russian European part, which was quite a high indicator.
Sometimes, in gubernias, this indicator was nine children, and Orthodox
Christians made up 82,1% of the entire population.86
In Tbilisi gubernia, the lowest level of childbirth was in the mazras populated
by Georgians, the highest in Akhalkalaki mazra (46,1 promile), in which
Armenians formed a major part of the population. There is one important issue is
also interesting in regard to childbirth. The level of marriages was the highest
among Georgians, but the childbirth rate was the lowest, which is explained by
weak fertility of their marriages.
84
Cited from: M. Shelia. The population aging in Georgia. Tbilisi, 1999, pp 30-31.
85
Collection of evidences on Caucasus. vol. IX, Tiflis, 1885.
86
Movement of population in the European part of Russia for 1887. St Petersburg, 1891, pp 2-30.
In the XIX century, the public opinion was especially strict towards children
born out-of-wedlock. The share of such children in Tbilisi in 1875 to 1879, of the
total amount of born children was 3.9%. We should take into consideration that
the extramarital children were not always registered. Only two such children were
registered in mazra cities of Tbilisi gubernia in five years, and several cases in
rural regions. Sons are far less (231) than girls (300), with 77 sons per 100 girls
among the children born out-of-wedlock.
In the same period, the share of extramarital children was far higher in Russia
and, especially, in gubernia cities than in Tbilisi gubernia and its cities. For
example, in Moscow and Petersburg it was 37.5% and 20.5%, respectively.87
In 1875 to 1879, in Tbilisi, the amount of extramarital children was average
106 per year, but this figure cannot be real and is probably reduced. We can prove
this by the fact that only in 1875 and 1877, according to the police official data,
the amount of children left by their parents was 127 and 145, respectively.88 Such
children, as a rule, were born out-of-wedlock. Thus, the amount of left children
considerably exceeded the amount of extramarital children, which is impossible.
We should take into consideration that some of children born out-of-wedlock
remained with their parents, and another part were destined to death. Namely, as it
was mentioned, there were cases in Tbilisi when the extramarital children were
murdered. Court-medical expertise reveals that among the children‘s corpses
found in 1872 to 1877, some were obviously murdered.89 In the XIX century,
murder of extramarital children was not rare for the European countries, either.
For example, in France, murder of children was punished by putting to death and,
at the same time, there were establishments for raising extramarital children.
Despite this, from the 929 babies‘ corpses bought to the morgue in Paris in 1851
to 1866, the dissections of 791 corpses showed that in 566 cases, the children
were murdered.
In the XIX century, we have more extended data on mortality in Georgia than
on childbirth. First of all, we mean here the scientific articles, which analyzed the
reasons of mortality. Especially rich material exists on the population mortality in
Tbilisi.
From 1875 to 1979, in Tbilisi, 12.7 thousand persons died, and the mortality
rate was 30.0 promile. It should be mentioned that only 15.5% of those who died
visited a doctor and observed the doctor‘s recommendations during their
87
Ibid, pp 28-29.
88
Medical collection. N 27, Tiflis, 1878, p 13.
89
Ibid, p 27.
illnesses.90 The mortality rate was especially high among children from 1875 to
1879. The number of children who died at the age of up to 10 was 54.7% in the
total amount. This indicator among Russians was 63.3%, among Georgians,
56.2%, and among Armenians, 53.2%. Of those children who were born, 43.5%
died at the age of up to five, and 18%, at the age of one year.91 Far fewer children
reached their full age. A main reason causing high mortality rate of children was
the lowest level of medical services and hygiene. In conditions of such correlation
between childbirth and mortality, the generation replacement was ongoing
comparatively rapidly.
As a result of high mortality rate among children in Tbilisi, an average age of
dead was the lowest at 21. Infant mortality rate was 188, 2 promile within five
year period (1875 to 1879), i.e., 188 children died per each 1,000 born. In fifty
gubernias of Russia‘s European part, this indicator in 1871 was 271.3, and in
1872 it was 294.8 promile.92 At the same time, the mortality rate was low both in
Tbilisi gubernia mazra cities and especially gubernia villages, as compared with
Tbilisi. The reason was widespread infectious diseases in Tbilisi. In 1876, in
Tbilisi, 1,348 persons died as a result of infectious diseases, i.e., 57.3% of the
total amount of dead. It was too of a high rate. From 1862 to 1871, in Berlin 30%
of the dead died from infectious diseases, and the fact caused panic among the
German scientists. It was pointed out that in that period, more than half of the
mortality cases in Tbilisi were the result of poor sanitary conditions, which could
have been avoided.93 It can be also said here that the situation was worse from this
viewpoint in other cities and villages of the Caucasus, because Tbilisi was the
centre of the Caucasus in the XIX century, and medical services or sanitary-
hygienic conditions were comparatively better here.
Finally, as a result of analyzing the natural movement indicators, the most
disadvantageous situation was among the Georgian population. This is clearly
witnessed by the natural increase of Tbilisi gubernia population from 1875 to
1879. The situation was then explained by the fact that the ethnic minorities in
Tbilisi gubernia lived on better land plots than Georgians, which was reality.
90
Medical collection. N 27, Tiflis, 1878, p 27.
91
Collection of evidences on Caucasus. vol. IX, Tiflis, 1885, p 53.
92
Statistical time-book of the Russian Empire, series II. St Petersburg, 1882, p 6.
93
N. Totadze. Sanitary-hugienic condition in Tbilisi in the XIX century. Jrnl. Demography.,” Tbilisi,
N 1, 2000, p 66
Table 1. Population Natural Increase in Tbilisi Gubernia from 1875 to 1879
Nationality Absolute Nationality per 1000

Georgian 21,605 12
Russian 1,211 28
German 337 27
Greek 1,563 23
Osset 5,286 23
Armenian 6,923 15
Total 38,354 15
Source: Collection of statistical evidences on the Caucasus. vol. IX, Tiflis, 1.
As we have mentioned above, in the XIX century, the data on the population
natural movement were published only on Tbilisi gubernia, though at the end of
the century, such data were published about entire the South Caucasus (see table
2).
Table 2. Population Natural Movement in the South Caucasus

from 1894 to 1898 average per year Per 1000 population
Gubernias and cities Childbirth Mortality Natural increase

Tbilisi gubernia 34.5 21.8 12.7
Kutaisi gubernia 27.8 16.5 11.3
Baku gubernia 23.6 17.3 6.3
Elizavetpol Gubernia 24.6 15.4 9.2
Yerevan gubernia 37.3 20.6 16.7
Dagestan area 24.4 20.8 3.8
The South Caucasus total 26.9 20.1 6.8
Source: Collection of statistical evidences on the Transcaucasian region, Part I. Tiflis,
1902, pp 25-40.
The analysis of the population natural movement from 1894 to 1898 shows
that the childbirth and mortality indicators considerably differ according to the
gubernias. For example, in Tbilisi and Yerevan gubernias, the level of childbirth
is 1.5 times higher than in Baku and Elizavetpol gubernias and Dagestan region. It
is clear that in the gubernias (Baku and Elizavetpol gubernias, Dagestan region),
where nearly entire population observes Muslim religion, the childbirth was far
lower than in the gubernias (Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Yerevan), where a great majority of
the population were Christians. At present, the situation is quite different in the
Caucasus and the world. Attention was paid to the low childbirth among the
Muslim population still in the mid-XIX century, and the right conclusion was
made: low childbirth among Muslims was caused by marriages of women at a

very early age, which caused infertility and, on the other part, easy divorce
procedure, which also reduced childbirth. The mortality rate was high among
women during childbearing at an early age.94 Indeed, pregnancy and childbearing
at an early age often caused serious complications, in which women failed to give
birth to more than one child. Woman‘s body in the early age is not ready for
childbearing, which often results in serious consequences. During childbearing,
women often faced jeopardy to their lives, as such the cases of infertility and
children mortality increased. It is justly mentioned in the specialist literature that
prohibition of marriages at an early age (before 18) not mostly reduced the
children mortality, but also preserved the fertility ability of women for a long time
and, on the whole, promoted an increase of fertility.
In the end, extended reproduction of the population took place in the XIX
century in the Caucasus. Mortality rate was considerably affected by exogenous
factors (especially infectious and parasite diseases), therefore, it was high. The
factors influencing fertility and mortality were quite different according to
gubernias, which was displayed in a noticeable difference of the population
natural increase.
94
Code of statistical data on Caucasus. vol. I, Tiflis, 1869, p 37..
Chapter 2
DEPORTATIONS OF THE CAUCASIAN PEOPLES

AND ETHNO-POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN
CAUCASUS IN THE XX CENTURY
In the XX, as well as the XIX century, the size and structure of the Caucasian
population experienced considerable changes. These changes were mostly caused
by political, military, and socio-economic factors, which were quite changeable in
the XX century.
The Caucasus has always been the region facing jeopardy of explosion and, in
fact, never had long periods of peaceful development. In different periods of its
history, the Caucasus, or some of its regions, were governed by various empires,
namely, of Rome, Iran, Byzantium, Turkey, and, within last 200 years, of the
Soviet Empire. This interest in the Caucasus was caused by its special geo-
strategic location, unique natural conditions, and human resources. The Caucasus
has been the most convenient foothold for implementation of geopolitical and
economic interests of the invaders. Naturally, the countries of the Caucasus,
surrounded by big empires, always kept searching for political partners as
protectors to get guarantees for preserving their security and independence.
At the turn of the II and III millenniums, after dissolution of the Soviet Union,
the Caucasus again became the centre of the world attention. Russia did not
weaken its interest in the states formed after the break of the Soviet Union—
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. There were rather bloodshedding ethnic
conflicts conducted in the South Caucasus, which were evidently promoted by
Russia. To maintain its influence in the Caucasus, Russia stirred up ethno-political
conflicts, the basis for which it laid still at the dawn of the Soviet power
establishment. Therefore, when it became necessary for Russia to again fulfill its
wish and will in the countries, embarking on the path of their independence, it
immediately used ―delayed-action bombs.‖ A clear example of this is Nagorny
Karabakh, Abkhazia, the former South Ossetian autonomous region and other
small bloodshedding attacks provoked by Russia. Such actions of Russia
sacrificed tens of thousands of human lives and forced some hundred thousand
people to become refugees and homeless. As a result, Russia again tried to get
hold of both the key for the settlement of the conflicts and the levers of political
and economic influence on the independent states of the South Caucasus.
Russia tries to impede geopolitical influence of any other country on the
Caucasus by any means. The Caucasus is one of the priorities of its home and
foreign policy. But the West thinks otherwise. In their opinion, influential
gamblers, first of all the USA and EU, should be intensively involved in the
processes ongoing in the Caucasus, because Russia cannot play a cardinal role in
those processes any longer. Even more, the western experts believe that the North
Caucasus has never been an organic part of Russia at all and, thus, doubt existence
of the North Caucasus within the space of the Russian Federation.1 Russia is well
aware of this, but it is also clear for it that it cannot be a big state unless it settles a
main political task—to provide influence in the Caucasian region. To achieve this,
Russia artificially formed centers of tension in the region, as well as ethnic
conflicts, and masterfully used economic levers.
The western states preferred to keep full silence at the initial stages of bloody
ethnic conflicts and confrontations in the Caucasian states. Later, when Russia
gradually started strengthening its positions in the South Caucasus through
political and economic levers, the western states began to involve themselves in
the processes ongoing in the South Caucasus, along with the biggest companies
interested in geo-strategic location of this region, rich in energy resources and raw
material sources. They are searching for the ways and means to involve the region
into the world political and economic processes; they seem to start search for new
forms and models to use for settlement of the conflicts, but in vain. The
population has been forced to live in the hardest conditions for already twenty
years. All mentioned above worsened demographic conditions in the South
Caucasus, especially in Georgia.
Under the influence of political and socio-economic factors, in the
background of general growth of the Caucasian population, in some periods, there
took place reduction of population and considerable change of its structure. The
greatest cataclysms that took place in the world in the XX century directly
1
Samedov A. Mechanisms of influence of the Russian Federation of conflicts in Caucasus. Baku,
207, pp 27, 30.
Deportations of the Caucasian Peoples and Ethno-Political Conflicts… 51
touched the Russian Empire and, consequently, the Caucasian peoples, namely:
World War I; the October Revolution of 1917; merciless repressions that started
in the 1920s, which reached its acme in 1937 and took away millions of human
lives; World War II, the hardest aftermaths of which were experienced mostly by
the peoples living in the Soviet Union; mass deportations of peoples, mostly, of
autochthonous population of the Caucasus; authoritarian regime of governing;
and, finally, dissolution of the Soviet Union with the lightning speed, break of
economic and other, no less important, relations within one functioning space. On
the other hand, search for other—mostly, export spaces—theheaviest reduction of
economy and increase of unemployment caused important changes in the
demographic processes. In all the countries of the post-Soviet space, the
demographic indicators became at once worse, however, not equally. Birth rate
and natural growth of population reduced everywhere, though in Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Middle East countries, both birthrate and natural growth were still
high mostly caused by a religious factor. Just due to this very factor, earlier,
before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the birthrate differed considerably
according to the republics. In the countries, where the population was devoted to
Christian religion, namely, a great part of Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and partly Armenia and Moldova, the birthrate was
considerably low as compared with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and, especially,
Middle Asian republics, in which the population is of Muslim religion.
In the XX century, the demographic development of the Caucasian peoples
was negatively influenced by mass deportations of these peoples and ethno-
political conflicts that took place after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These
and other factors considerably impeded demographic development of the
Caucasian peoples.
II.I. DEPORTATIONS OF THE CAUCASIAN PEOPLES

Forced migration, or deportations of people, was wide scale in the Soviet
Union. These deportations were held on the political and economic motives—to
make wide masses of people obedient, to avoid uprisings, to throw cheap labor
force in the place and in the time, which was considered necessary. This resulted
in forming some tens of diasporas of repressed people within the country. The
deportations were held according to the ethnic and social signs. First was based on
the motive of cleansing from criminal people and protecting the borders from
unreliable population. The other was in the form of deportation of kulaks. Such
wide scale, forced migration impeded natural demographic development of the

entire ethnic group.
Deportation, or forced migration, is one of the forms of political repression
implemented by a state against its citizens or the subjects of another state by using
force or compulsion. Deportations in the Soviet Union from 1920 to 1952 were
conducted without court, through administration means. The decisions on
deportation were made by heads of party and state on the initiative of USSR state
security committee, commissariat of internal affairs, and the USSR united chief
political service bodies. Eviction of masses of peoples was conducted into most
the risky—alien for them—living conditions in several thousand kilometer
distance. Their adaptation to a new dwelling place was ongoing rather hard, not
only in sharply different natural and climatic conditions, but also in terms of
varied economic life terms. It was rather complicated to organize settlements of
millions of people in a new place, to say nothing about the lack of elementary
infrastructure.
Forced migration of millions of the Soviet people was followed by the
heaviest demographic results in the regions of both their eviction and settlement.
Some ten thousand people‘s lives were sacrificed to numerous deportations,
birthrate fell and death rate increased, health conditions of deported people
worsened, estimated life expectancy of the deported reduced, and all the
demographic indicators worsened. Worsening of the demographic events and
processes finally caused the reduction in the amount of individual nationalities.
Deportations in the Soviet Union were of mass character, but forced
migration was conducted most heavily in the Caucasus, especially in the North
Caucasus. Pre-war ethnic deportations, first of all, were fulfilled as if for strategic
goals to clear the frontiers of socially unreliable elements. The first such
deportations were from 1928 to 1932; namely, preparation for deportation of
Koreans started. In 1928, the state migration committee prepared a document
substantiating expediency of deporting Koreans, Poles, and Finns from the
borderline zone. As an example, we can cite the first cleansing of the borderline
zone from Koreans and the rest of the deportations in the Soviet Union were
conducted analogous to it.
At the turn of the XIX to XX centuries, economic life in the Far East was
flourishing, which was followed by intensification of the migration processes,
among them of Koreans, as well. From 1897 to 1914, the amount of Koreans in
the south of the coastline increased by 61.7 thousand, nearly by three times. In
some regions, their share was one-fourth. After 1914, Koreans settled in Amur
and Usuriisk regions in great amounts.2 In 1922, as a result of the Russia‘s

annexation of the Far East republic, all those living in it were declared Soviet
citizens, and their amount was increased by the Korean, Chinese, and Japanese
nationalities. The conflicts were usual between Koreans and Russians, the reason
being agricultural lands. According to the census in 1926, there lived 84.9
thousand Koreans and 3.8 thousand Chinese in the Far East. The same census
showed that 167.4 thousand considered Korean their native language, 71.6
thousand named Chinese. It seems that ten thousand Koreans and Chinese
recognized themselves Russians in this census. By 1931, the amount of exiled
Koreans reached 2.5 thousand. But deportation of Koreans did not end by that. In
1937, the deportation operations were mostly conducted at the border of the Far
East, and Koreans were the first ethnic group in the Soviet Union, who were
deported. The authorities considered that Koreans, living in the Soviet Far East,
were support of the Japanese spies, and it was high time to deport them. The
Japanese also started deportation of Koreans, considering they could have assisted
the Soviet spies. The Japanese forced Koreans to settle on the Sakhalin Island and
deep in the Korean peninsula. It was decided, with the aim of suspending the
Japanese spies from entering the territory, to deport the entire Korean population
from the Far East region mostly to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan from September to
December of 1937. By 25 October, 171,781 Koreans were deported. Only 700
Koreans were left for some time. Deportation of Koreans and their concentration
in Central Asia continued during the war and after it. Only Sakhalinian Koreans
survived re-deportation. After Sakhalin was transferred to the Soviet Union
Koreans, deported to Sakhalin by the Japanese, were left alone.
In the pre-war period, ethnic deportations were conducted of Poles, Germans,
Finns, and other nationalities. Their deportations were also made in the same
inhuman way as of Koreans. These people were transported in the echelons, and
in the places of their new settlements, they experienced deficit of dwellings,
water, bread, and medical supplies. They faced great problems in finding jobs. In
the same period, the deportations were conducted of kulaks, counter-
revolutionaries and socially dangerous elements from Ukraine, Belarus, and
border regions of the western part of the country. In the end of 1934, and the
beginning of 1935, the repressions became intensive, which was formally
connected with the murder of a famous Soviet state figure, Sergei Kirov, on 1
December 1934.
2
Population census of 17 December 1926, IV. People and native languages of the USSR population.
Moscow, 1928, pp 134, 136.
The first deportations in the Caucasus were connected with eviction of kulaks
in 1935. The majority of kulaks did not differ much from peasants with the level
of their life and culture. Kulaks, in fact, were hard-working peasants who lived
well. In conditions of expanded collectivization in the Soviet Union, the issue
appeared on the agenda of kulaks liquidation as if for their anti-Soviet activities.
On the instructions and decrees of the party and government, a permit was given
for confiscation of the kulaks‘ property and their exile; 240.7 thousand families
were deported in the remote parts of the country—one-fourth of the total amount
of kulaks. By the beginning of 1941, there were 930,000 former kulaks in the
places of exile. The deported kulaks were gradually given back their civil rights
(the right to vote, etc.). After the war, the former kulaks regained fully their civil
rights.3
Deportations of kulaks in the North Caucasus were conducted from March 1
through 8, 1935. Each deportation was usually deliberately prepared, in the
shortest possible time without any noise and panic. But in case of anti-Soviet
actions or armed clashes, the decisive measures were taken to liquidate them. In
this period, 1,553 kulak families (7,857 people) were deported. Deportations were
executed from Chechnya (2,112 people), Ossetia (1,110), Dagestan (2,147),
Kabardian (1,201) and Karachaev and Circassian republics (1,287). They were
mostly settled in special settlements in Uzbekistan (4,560) and South Kazakhstan
(3,287). On April 6 of the same year, 72 families (273 people) of kulaks and
Germans hostile to the Soviet Union were deported from Azerbaijan.
One of the first deportations in the Caucasus was connected with exile of
Kurds, Iranians, and Armenians from the borderline of Azerbaijan and Armenia
from 1937 to 1938. In 1937, on the government decision, special restricted areas,
or borderline zones, were formed along the entire Soviet Union border, and
deportations of unreliable people started from there. Kurds, Muslim Armenians
(Khemshins and Turks), were deported from the borderline zones of Azerbaijan
and Armenia. They were settled in Alma-Ata and South Kazakhstan regions
(3,101 Kurds and 2,788 Armenians and Turks; a total of 5,889).4 In 1938,
Iranians, 6.7 thousand, were deported from Azerbaijan to the same regions.5
The II World War (1939-1845) had the greatest negative influence on the fate
of the mankind. From the demographic, and not only from this, viewpoint, it was
the hardest and most brutal war in the mankind‘s history. Seventy-two states
participated in this war (80% of the global population), the fights were ongoing on
3
Georgian Soviet Encyclopedia. vol. 6, Tbilisi, 1983, p 64.
4
Deportations of Stalin period. Ed, acad. A.N. Yakovlecv, Moscow, 2005, p 77.
5
Tsutsiev A. Atlas of ethnological history of Caucasus (1774-2004). Moscow, 2006, p 77.
the territory of forty states. There were 110 million people mobilized in this war,
and it took the lives of 50 to 55 million people. Far more people were injured and
morally damaged. The war was followed by awful destruction, and some ten
thousand towns and villages were razed to the ground.
As soon as the Fascist Germany got hold of power (1933), it started to
prepare for the war. It considered occupation of the Soviet Union to be a crucial
stage in the fight for the world rule. The plan of the Fascist Germany implied
occupation of the Soviet Union territory, physical annihilation of the people living
on this territory and their enslavement, and full change of the world demographic
picture. According to this plan, 50 million Poles, Ukrainians, Byelorussians,
Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians had to be deported within 30 years to West
Siberia, the North Caucasus, South America, and Africa; a remaining part of the
population should be Germanized. The plan also aimed at physical annihilation of
the intellectuals, abolishing of secondary and higher education, and artificial
restriction of abortion. The entire ideological machine was put into operation to
reach this plan, the basis of which was extreme chauvinism— ―supremacy‖ of
Aryan race, ―justice of seizing the space vital for Germany,‖ utter hatred towards
―lower races,‖ etc. In the period of war, the enemy destroyed the Soviet Union
and demolished hundreds of cities, more than 70 villages. The Soviet Union lost
in the war 20 million people, which was 40% of the entire II World War victims.
Various administrative measures were being executed in the Soviet Union in
the period of war, and it was rather hard to observe justice in such a hard situation,
even in case of wish. But it was completely unjustified to conduct total
deportations of people. In the period of Great Patriotic War, the deportation
operations expanded more, and ten thousands of servicemen took part in it. Very
soon after the war started, on July 4, 1941, the government issued a directive on
the measures for deportation of socially dangerous persons and their families from
the territories where the martial law was declared. Declaration of the martial law
got a wide scale character. In the Caucasus, the martial law was declared in
Chechen-Ingush, Kabardian-Balkar, and North Ossetian autonomous republics
and union republics of the South Caucasus. This was used to justify deportation of
peoples. At the same time, in the Soviet Union in the period of Great Patriotic
War, the people were most mobilized and their death-and-life fight against
German Fascism, the most powerful aggressor, ended in great victory through the
powerful international support. Unfortunately, these years were also the years of
the whole series of unjust, discriminative, and repressive acts against a great part
of its own population. A classic example of this event is the so-called
―punishment of peoples.‖ Preventive deportations were conducted not so much for
expected, potential betrayal, as for belonging to those foreign nationalities with
which the war was ongoing or could be ongoing. This concerned not only the
Soviet Union, but the United States of America, as well.6
However, heroism and devotion to the country, as well as cowardice and
relations with the occupants, were expressed in any way by the representatives of
all the peoples of the Soviet Union. So it is not justified to blame all the peoples
for betrayal. It is enough to say that in the very first months of the war, 17
thousand Chechens and Ingushs were mobilized into the Red Army. Forty-six
thousand men went to the war from the historical province of Georgia—Meskheti
(nearly the entire grown up population, from which 26 thousand died. Ten
Chechens and Ingushs, nine Germans, and one Balkar were awarded the title of
the Soviet Union Hero, etc.). To use ethnic principle for collective accusation and
collective punishment was great injustice. Despite this, in the war years in the
Soviet Union, forced migration on ethnic principle became a main basis of
deportation. Surely, there was betrayal as well, but to punish the entire people was
no less unjustified measure. For example, on August 3, 1941, commanders of the
southern front sent a telegram to Stalin, which said: ―The armed hostilities on the
Dniester showed that the population of German nationality was firing from the
windows and vegetable gardens at our retreating army. It was also stated that on
August 1, 1941, the population of the German village welcomed the German-
Fascist army with bread and salt. There are numerous points settled with German
population on the territory of the front. Please, give your instructions to the local
governing bodies on immediate deportation of unreliable elements.‖ But it was
unjustified to take such measures against all Germans.
In the period of war, the first forced deportation was conducted just against
Germans living in the Soviet Union, which were considered to be potential allies
to the Fascist occupants. There were 1.2 million Germans from 1.5 million Soviet
Germans subject to displacement of any form.
By the data of the census of 1939, of the Soviet Union population, there were
registered 1,427.2 million Germans living in the Soviet Union. The biggest
German colonies were in Russia (862.5 thousand people), Ukraine (392.7
thousand), Kazakhstan (92.7 thousand), Azerbaijan (23.1 thousand), and Georgia
(20.5 thousand). Deportations of Germans started in August, 1941 (Crimean
Germans), and ended by January 1, 1942. Mass forced displacement of Germans
was conducted in September, and especially in October. By December 25, 1941,
from 904,255 Germans subject to deportation, there were displaced 856,168,
among them, 446.5 thousand from the German autonomous republic. In the
beginning of September, 1941, the German autonomous republic on the river
6
Deportations of Stalin Period, p 275.
Volga was liquidated and was divided between Saratov and Stalingrad regions.
On Stalin‘s decree of September 8, 1941, the servicemen of German nationality
were removed from the field forces, the amount of which by the beginning of the
war was 35,000. They seemed to be called up to the army services from the
German autonomous republic on the Volga, because from October, 1939,
Germans were no longer called up to the army from other regions anymore.
In the same period (October 15 to 30, 1941), Germans were displaced from
the Caucasus. There were 46,533 Germans deported from the South Caucasus into
Kazakhstan and Novosibirsk region, among them 23,580 were from Georgia,
22,741 were from Azerbaijan, and 212 from Armenia. A bit earlier, from
September 25 until October 10, there were 5,327 Germans deported from
Kabardian-Balkar republic; 2,929 from North Ossetia; and 7,306 from Dagestan
and Chechen-Ingushetia.
From 1943 to 1944, total deportations of North Caucasian people were
conducted, which were not of preventive character, but were the acts of collective
revenge. Revenge became of total character and the whole nationalities were
displaced from their home countries, namely, Karachayevs, Chechens, Ingushs,
and Balkars. If we remember the earlier history, Russians always faced problem in
implementing their policies among North Caucasian people, especially in
Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan. It is true they quite successfully and
masterfully used the Russian orientation of Ossets, but only this was not enough
to reach their goals there. In the twenty-year-long period of Communist rule in the
North Caucasus (1920-1940), ethnic, chauvinistic, and religious confrontations
somehow hushed down. This was promoted first by formation of the soviet
socialist republic of mountain people and, in the years that followed, by the
foundation of autonomous republics and regions instead of it. In conditions of
total rule, the Kremlin did not forgive deviation from the ―principles of socialist
internationalism‖ and most strictly punished all those who tried to even slightly
deviate from the established norm of ―socialist co-living of nations.‖
The thirties, when the soviet state, without any grounds, used arrests, exiles,
and executions against its own people, were most tragic. It took some tens of
years to ease the pain of this period. Hatred towards the communists and hostile
attitude towards Russians appeared again after the Soviet Union-Germany war
started and became even far wider. Next generations kept in mind the greatness of
the XIX century fight of the mountain people, headed by Imam Shamil, for
freedom, and the separate heroic episodes of this fight—the fight that ended in
their defeat and victory of Russians. This fight took away lives of many people.
In summer of 1842, the German army approached the Caucasus. They
occupied Karachaev-Circassian and Kabardian-Balkar regions. A part of the
population of these territories positively met Germans. Anti-soviet armed groups

were formed. After these territories were set free from the German occupants by
the Soviet Army, the population was declared traitors. Bodies of the commissariat
of internal affairs accused the entire peoples and severe repressions started—
arrests, executions, exiles, and some autonomous regions were abolished. It was
surely a great injustice to blame all the peoples. The first total deportation in the
North Caucasus touched Karachayevs.
According to the census in 1939, there lived 75,763 Karachayevs in
Karachaev autonomous region. From August of 1942 to the end of January of
1943 it was occupied by Germans. The so-called Karachaev national committee
intensively cooperated with the occupants. In August of 1943, total deportation of
Karachayevs was decided to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. On October 12, the
presidium of the Soviet Union supreme council issued a decree on liquidation of
Karachaev autonomous region and its administrative order. The decree said the
following:
―In connection with the fact that many Karachayevs acted as traitors in the
period of Karachaev autonomous region occupation by the German fascists,
joined the groups organized for the fight against the soviet power, informed
Germans against honest soviet people, accompanied the German army heading to
Transcaucasus to show them the way over the ridges, impede and oppose the
measures undertaken by the soviet power after driving the German fascists away,
hide bandits and agents left by Germans from the state bodies, assist them
intensively—the presidium of the USSR supreme council resolves:
1. All Karachayevs, living on the territory of the autonomous region, have

to be deported to other regions of the USSR and the Karachaev
autonomous region should be abolished.
2. Due to liquidation of Karachaec autonomous region …
Uchkulan region of Karachaev autonomous region, also a part of Mikoian

region should be transferred to Georgian SSR, a new-Klukhori region should be
formed from the regions mentioned above with the centre Mikoian-Shakhari. The
present city should change its name and be called Klukhori.7
The main territory of the region was divided between Stavropol and
Krasnodar regions.
Deportation of Karachayevs to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan ended on
November 23, 1943. A total amount of deported Karachayevs made up 68,614,
7
Deportations of Stalin Period. p 393.
among them 12,500 men, 19,444 women, and 36,670 children. ―We have driven
Karachayevs from the mountain gorges, now we have to drive out their souls from
there.‖8 Those fatal words about Karachayevs are ascribed to M. Suslov, the then-
first secretary of the communist party (of Bolsheviks) of Stavropol regional
committee, future famous ideologist of the communist party, and secretary of the
communist party central committee, who said this in November, 1944.
In February, 1944, a total deportation was conducted against Vainahs—
Chechens and Ingushs. Unlike Karachayevs, Vainahs were accused of
gangsterism on the home front and even in the pre-war period, though Chechen-
Ingushetia was not occupied by Germans.
Deportation of Vainahs was deliberately prepared. It seemed their deportation
involved some jeopardy. On the one hand, they were too many in number; on the
other hand, historically Chechens and Ingushs never surrendered to Russians
without fight, and they did not concede their freedom and independence easily.
That was why the issue of their deportation was the subject of special discussion
at the politburo of the USSR communist party central committee. Only the terms
of conducting the operation caused difference in opinions: some thought the
operation should have to be immediately conducted (Molotov, Zhdanov and
others), and some others suggested to wait until Germans would be ousted from
the Soviet Union (Beria, Khrushchev and others). The final decision was made by
Stalin. It was not by chance that the deportation was directly headed by Beria,
public commissar of internal affairs, and, during the entire process of deportation,
he was in the North Caucasus together with his three deputies. On February 17,
1944, Beria asked Stalin: ―Considering the operation being serious, I appeal to
you with the request to give me a permit to stay here until the operation ends, at
least until February 26-27.‖ The fact should be also taken into account that this
operation was followed with excesses unlike deportations conducted before. There
were 20,072 arms withdrawn; Vainahs resisted with arms the army of the public
commissariats; 2,016 people were arrested during the operation, etc.
Unusual amount of armed forces was gathered to conduct this operation—
19,000 operative workers and 100,000 soldiers of the internal affairs public
commissariat—in total about 120,000, i.e., seven times more than during the
deportation of Germans on the river Volga. This displayed special attitude to
Vainahs; Beria personally headed the entire process of deportation together with
his three deputies, while on the Volga, the operation was guided by his deputy.
The following may be said about the motives of the Vainahs deportation. In
1934, Chechnya autonomous region and Ingushetia autonomous region were
8
Ibid., p 390.
united into one—Chechen-Ingush region, which in 1936, was changed into

Chechen-Ingush soviet socialist autonomous republic. Vainahs‘ problem with the
Soviet authorities was their mobilization into the Red Army of peasants and
workers—they hardly managed to mobilize 300 to 400 persons annually. During
the war, the mobilization nearly failed; mullahs and other authoritative persons
called the youth for avoiding service in the army.
In the summer of 1941, the plan was worked out to annihilate the groups of
Chechen-Ingushs on the territory of Georgia as well. In August of 1941, two
revolts took place, which involved five regions of Chechnya-Ingushetia.
In the summer of 1942, Germans invaded the North Caucasus, but no
occupation of Chechen-Ingush territory was, in fact, conducted. Official
accusation of Vainahs was based on the motive that nearly all of them acted
against the soviet power and the Red Army. By the official version in 1942, anti-
soviet forces intensified their activities at the front-line of Chechnya-Ingushetia
border. From August to September, 1942, collective farms were abolished in all
the mountain regions of Chechnya, and revolt started, which was joined by
thousands of people, among them tens of soviet functionaries. On the basis of this
and other accusations (treachery, cooperation with the Fascist occupants,
formation of armed bands on the order from Germans against the soviet power,
etc.), after all Chechens and Ingushs were deported from their native places, on
March 7, 1944, USSR supreme council presidium adopted a decree on deportation
of all Chechens and Ingushs living in Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic and
the regions bordering it and on abolishing the Chechen-Ingush autonomous
republic. Separate items of the decree dealt with formation of Grozni region
within Stavropol region and division of Chechnya-Ingushetia territory between
North Ossetia and Dagestan. A small part of the territory was joined to Georgia,
as well, along with the southeastern part of Gizeldon region of North Ossetia.
Deportation of Vainahs started on February 22, 1944. A day before, Beria
informed Stalin on the process of preparing the operation: ―For success of the
operation I have called Molaev, chairman of the local public commissariat and
familiarized him with the decision of the government on deportation of Chechens
and Ingushs and the motives this decision was based on. Tears appeared in
Molaev‘s eyes, but he controlled himself and promised to fulfill all the tasks
connected with deportation. I held analogous meetings with nine officials. I talked
with the most influential clergymen in Chechnya-Ingushetia and after relevant
work, I proposed them to explain to the population the motives of the operation
through mullahs and local authorities. I promised these party and soviet figures
and clergymen some concessions during deportation (to increase the norm of the
freight permitted to take). Deportation will start early in the morning on February
23. At two o‘clock at night, all the settlements will be surrounded. Operative
groups will occupy the places of control, to impede the population leave the
dwelling places. At dawn, the men will be gathered by our operative workers and
will be familiarized with the government decision on deportation of Chechens and
Ingushs in their native language.‖9
The next day, on February 23, Beria sent a telegram informing Stalin that
94,754 people had already been removed from the settlements by 11 o‘clock in
the morning. The deportation operation was finished within six days, except
mountainous regions, where deportation faced problems due to heavy snowfall.
There also were minor problems during the operation.
There were 493,269 Chechens and Ingushs sent to Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan in 180 echelons (each echelon having 65 carriages). Only 491,571
reached the place of their destination: 402,922 in Kazakhstan, and 88,649 in
Kyrgyzstan. Echelons started on February 23, 1944, and the process finished on
March 20. It took the echelons nine to twenty-three days (average, 16 days) to
reach the place of destination. Fifty-six children were born in this period; 285
needed medical aid and 1,272 died, i.e., 2.6 per each 1,000 deported. General-
major Bochkov mentioned in the report sent to Beria that according to the data of
the Russian statistics department, the death rate in Chechnya-Ingushetia
autonomous republic made up 13.2 per 1,000 of the population in 1943. Bochkov
cited this information to show that the death rate on the way was not so high. But
it should be mentioned that 1,272 died in 16 days and not in a year. If we take this
fact into consideration, then the death rate of the deported during their
transportation was 4.5 times higher than compared with the data cited by
Bochkov.
During the process of deportation, the facts of illegal acts were frequent. In
the report sent by Colonel Granski to deputy public commissar of state security
services, Kobulov, there were brutal facts of shooting peaceful Vainahs. For
example, in one settlement of the Galanchoj region, on the order of senior
officers, a soldier shot ill and invalid old men, who were unable to follow the
deported, and one eight-year-old boy. In the same region, the soldiers shot about
60 ill and disabled persons. The facts exist that people were arrested for the
simple suspect of their relations with the bandits, and these people were shot
without any trial.
On February 29, 1944, Beria informed Stalin by the telegram that the
operation of deporting Chechens and Ingushs was finished. He also informed him
of some problems impeding deportation from mountainous places due to heavy
9
snowfalls and promised to finish it in two days. At the same time, Beria informed
Stalin about measures taken for successful operation on deporting Balkars. In his
words, the preparation works would be finished March 10, and deportation would
be held from March 10 through 15. ―I am finishing work here today and leaving
for Kabardian-Balkar territory and from there to Moscow,‖ was said in the
telegram.
After deportation of Chechens and Ingushs, it was the turn of Kabardian-
Balkar territory, namely, the mountainous southern part, where Balkars lived.
From August of 1942 to January 11, 1943, a part of Kabardian-Balkar territory
was occupied by Germans. Beria substantiated expediency of deporting Balkars
by their warm welcome to occupation of their territory by Germans. Germans
intensively used them in the fight against partisans and as guides for the Fascist
army in the highland regions. Balkars were also accused of hostile activities in the
home front against the Red Army, forming the bandit-rebel groups, attacks against
the Red Army, etc. On February 24, 1944, Beria suggested that Stalin deport
Balkars, and on February 26, he already issued an order on the measures for
deporting Balkar population from Kabardian-Balkar autonomous republic. To
conduct the operation, 17,000 servicemen and 4,000 operative workers were
mobilized from the public commissariat of public affairs. March 10 was
determined the day of starting the operation, but deportation started on March 8,
and ended on March 9.
There were 37,103 people deported to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In
October the same year, their amount was 33,100. The difference was caused not
only by increase in death rate of Balkars, but by the reason that there were many
Kabardians among Balkars, which appeared among the deported by carelessness.
They were brought back.
On April 8, 1944, the Supreme Soviet presidium issued a decree on
deportation of Balkars and transformation of Kabardian-Balkar autonomous
region into Kabardian autonomous republic. The collective farmers from small-
land places had to be settled on the vacant lands, i.e., Kabardians. The
southwestern part of the republic (two thousand-square kilometers, i.e., 16% of
the entire area) was transferred to the Republic of Georgia.
After deportation of Balkars, the issue put on the agenda was deportation of
Muslim Turks from Meskheti—the oldest Georgian province of Stalin‘s home
country Georgia. At present, the population deported from Meskheti is being
referred to by the term ―Turk-Meskhs‖ deliberately established in the international
usage. Some separatist and reactionary forces attached political burden to this
term. The term has not been seen anywhere before, which witnesses that it was
deliberately introduced. Nationality ―Turk-Meskhs‖ does not exist. Muslim
population living in the historical province of Georgia should be either Turks or

Georgians living in Meskheti. In reality, a great majority of the population
deported from Meskheti are Muslim Georgians. After Turkey invaded this
province and ruled 300 years there, Christian Georgians living there by and by
adopted Muslim religion. However, they did not lose their native language and
general self-consciousness in general. Despite this, for the provocation reasons,
they are sometimes called ―Turks.‖
Deportation of Muslim population from Meskheti was conducted the same
way as the North Caucasian people. In this case, it was also based on the
documents fabricated by the Soviet Union party authorities and law enforcement
structures, namely, the decree adopted on July 31, 1944, by the Defense State
Committee and the order of September 20, 1944, by the public committee of
internal affairs. It was mentioned in this and other documents that Muslim
population of Meskheti, which had relatives in Turkey, was conducting
smuggling, expressed emigration sentiments, represented a source of winning
over spying elements for the Turkish intelligence services, and was forming
gangster groups. Based on the decree mentioned above, Turks, Kurds, and
Khemshin population of Akhaltsikhe, Adigeni, Aspindza, Akhalkalaki, and
Bogdanovka regions and Adjara autonomous republic had to be deported from the
Georgia‘s borderline zone with the aim of improving the conditions of defending
the Georgia‘s state border with Turkey. It should be mentioned that during the war
Turkey, had 30 divisions near the Soviet Union border and was considered a
potential aggressor. But by the end of the war, this jeopardy was brought to
minimum. At the same time, it seemed that in the near future the problem of
returning back the Georgian territories seized by Turkey could have been raised.
This is surely witnessed by the letter written by renowned Georgian scholars,
academicians S. Janashia and N. Berdzenishvili and published on December 14,
1945, in the Georgian newspaper Komunisti and the next day, on December 15, in
the Russian newspaper Zaria Vostoka. The same year, on December 20, it was
published in the union newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia. The letter was titled thus:
On our legal claims to Turkey. It discussed the issues of occupying the Georgian
historical territories and their returns. Namely, the letter said: ―The Georgian
people, which largely contributed to the victory over Fascism, had justly the right
to present their legal claims.
We appeal to the public opinion in regard to our ancient lands occupied by
Turkey. Our claims refer not to the minor territory, but to the cradle of our
people‘s individuality seized from us, to the crime, which cut in two our live
national organism. These claims refer to the subject of Georgian people‘s century-
old struggle—return of their ancient lands…
The West should be thankful to remember that strong Russia in the north and
then-powerful Georgia in the south were just the main barriers, which somehow
weakened a terrible wave of nomad invaders (Mongols are meant, auth.) and
which incurred enormous losses to the Georgian people. Georgia met the XV
century, which is known to the mankind with important events, devastated and
bloodless. It was the moment, when in the Near East new nomad invaders,
Osmanli Turks, replaced Tatars.
In the XV century, Turks approached Georgia. The principality of Samtskhe
in South Georgia, the territory of which was spread up to Erzinjanam and
Trebzond approaches, heroically resisted the attacks of deadly enemy. Even more,
to apprehend that danger correctly, this threatened the entire cultural world,
formed single foreign political line of the Georgian kings and princes, who twice
tried to arrange a wide coalition of the states of Europe and Near East against
Ottoman Turks. These efforts failed, but did not weaken the energy of Georgians.
They retaliated against the attacks of the enemy intensively more than once. For
example, in 1545, Georgians won a brilliant victory over the multi-numbered
army of Turks in Basiani (near Erzerum).
Turks, which by that time occupied a great part of Near East and Balkan
Peninsula, intended to invade all of Georgia, but Georgians resisted them
violently. Turks, driven out of the central and western regions of Georgia,
managed to be reinforced in South Georgia and to cut it from the home country.
The letter ended in categorical demand to return the seized territory: ―In the
period of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Fascist Germany,
Turkey, remaining in fact on the side of German occupants, still watched with
envy our territories. The Turkish press wrote openly about it. Turkey once more
voluntarily served Imperialistic Germany and incurred damage to the anti-Hitler
coalition.‖
The Georgian people should be given back their territories…We mean
Artaani (Ardagani), Artvini, Altvisi, Tortum, Ispiri, Baiburti, Giunushkhane
regions and East Lazistan, Trebzond and Giresun regions as well.‖
In the period of totalitarian regime, no one could have dared to publish such a
letter. Undoubtedly, the famous scholars were commissioned to write this letter
directly by Stalin‘s interference—to be more exact, on his task.
It was not by chance that the letter was published in the central official
newspaper of Georgia in the Georgian and Russian languages, and in four days, it
was published in the central newspapers of the Soviet Union Pravda and Izvestia.
No doubt that in the period of the most severe censorship, the letter could not have
appeared in press. Otherwise, not only the authors of this letter but the newspapers
editors, as well, would have been arrested.
In that period, Stalin‘s reputation was the highest, and each of his sayings was
taken into consideration by the world public opinion. After the war ended, several
socialist states in East Europe were formed, and the political and economic
influence of the Soviet Union over them was enormously high. Naturally, return
of the Georgian territories meant far more extension of the Soviet Union territory
and in the spheres of its influence. That was why it was violently resisted by the
West European countries and authorities of America. At the same time, as a result
of successful military operations conducted by America, the situation changed in
favor of Turkey, and the issue was removed from the agenda.
It seemed that deportation of Muslim population from Georgia-Turkey
borderline was caused by this factor as well. It was already thought then that
claims would be presented to Turkey in the near future on return of the seized
territories, and so a decision was adopted on deportation of the entire Muslim
population, which was most unjust. The scholars, working on this issue, pointed
that the Soviet Union was preparing to introduce its armed forces into Turkey,
and, in compliance with the then military-strategic rules, it was clearing the border
corridor from the Turkish fifth column. It was thus thought about the Muslim
population of southern region of Georgia—Meskheti—by historical or
contemporary data. There exists another version as well. Stalin considered that
jeopardy of implementing the so-called pan-Turkish aims was still too great, i.e.,
Turkey could use intensive participation of the Soviet Union in the world war,
great problems, which the soviet country and Georgia too, were facing then and
would start to realize the idea of founding the so-called Great Turan Muslim state.
It is known that pan-Turkism implied unification of the places settled with the
Turkish race into one state, namely, Central Asia; Asia Minor, Syberia, the river
Volga banks, the Black Sea coastline, the Caucasus and both Azerbaijan. The
initiator of this idea was Zia Gekalp, who formulated his conception in his book
Fundamentals of Turkism (1923). First of all, he points to joining of the Caucasus.
Surely, the enclave of South Georgia, populated with the Muslim population, was
considered the best outpost for implementation of the goal. According to some
scholars, Stalin also used this argument for assuring the Politbureau.10
The issue of deportation of the population from the border zone with Turkey
was put forward in spring of 1944, while the decision was adopted in mid-
summer, probably, with the aim to finish this before winter. But execution of this
decision faced problems due to poor roads. Construction of Borjomi-Vale railway,
which later was finally the road for deportation of the population, required
additional time. In the end, the operation was conducted late in autumn. It started
10
Alexandre Tsomaya. Turkish Ideas. jrnl. Akhali Iveria. Paris, 11, September 1938.
in the morning of November 15, 1944, and continued for three days. According to
the rule of operation, the settlements were surrounded, and grown men were
gathered and familiarized with the decision of the Soviet government. With the
aim of improving the protection of the border in view, these people were deported
into the southern regions of Middle Asia. After people were gathered, the district
authorities sent operation groups to their houses and suggested the heads of
families to hand over the arms, after which they searched the dwellings. The
people were allowed to take with them precious things—money, clothes, shoes,
dishes, agricultural, and domestic articles and food supplies in the amount of
1,000 kg per each family. In case any member of the family, subject to
deportation, was not at home, the operation worker determined his whereabouts
and made relevant notes in the identification card, and all the suspects were to be
arrested. The district governor was obliged to be ready for any excess and to adopt
necessary measures to liquidate any disorders, even using arms. The carting
transport of collective farms should have been used to carry the deported to the
place of meeting, especially, in the highland regions, along with trucks. Five to six
families and their luggage had to be placed in one carriage. This rule of
deportation operation was the same for all.
Deportation in Meskheti touched 89 village councils and 220 settlements.
Families of 7,000 peasants from small-earth regions were settled in the place of
deported people.
The way from Georgia to Middle Asia took two to three weeks and
transportation of the deported population from Meskheti was mainly finished in
December. There were 695 families who remained due to some reasons and the
last echelon with the deported left Georgia on January 31, 1945. The deported
faced unusual conditions, poor water and typhus in the place of their destination.
High death rate of this contingent was much influenced by the factor of
deportation being held in winter. By unofficial data, death rate made up one-third
(as of June 1948 condition). 11Their transportation was held in the most difficult
conditions. Georgian writer Revaz Japaridze, a direct witness of the tragedy of
Muslim population deportation one frosty November night of 1944, mentioned:
―It was awful to watch emptied villages, hauling of homeless dogs, huts
with open doors, cackling of frightened hens.
It was one more tragic moment in the life of Meskhs, the same Muslim
Georgians and Turks, descendants of the occupants living there, the deportation of
11
Deportations of Stalin Period. pp 522-524, 531-532.
which into the interior regions of the big country, was decided in the top and even
God himself could not have changed it. It took one dark night to drive away
thousands of people from their dwellings and to deport them.
Maybe it is not necessary to remember here that how many children, disabled
old people and pregnant women died on the way from the river Mtkvari gorge to
the deserts of Kazakhstan and Middle Asia, how they were not allowed to bury
their dead, how the new dead were gathered in the stations and their corpses were
thrown into one hole to be buried together.‖12
Total amount of deported from Meskheti made up 92307, half of them being
children up to 16 years of age. More than half were deported to Uzbekistan, the
rest—to South Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Their amount kept reducing by the
end of the 40s,13 which was caused along with hard conditions of living by the
deformed sex-age structure. More than 20,000 Muslim Meskhs died in the war.
There were 413 workers of public commissariat of internal affairs and State
Security bodies who were given orders and awards for successful operation of
Meskhs deportation and also other operations of deportation.
On November 25 to 26 of 1944 there were deported 113 families from the
Adjara autonomous republic. An unprecedented case happened in regard to
Lazs—deported Georgian ethnographic group. On the basis of an application of
Adjarian minister M. Vanilish and on the instructions of Beria all the Lazs were
searched (32 of them were deported to Kyrgyzstan, 29, to Uzbekistan, and seven,
to Kazakhstan) and were brought back to their dwellings in their native villages.
Servicemen of the deported families in case of their demobilization were sent
to the places of their families and relatives settlement. Due to the lack of
information on the families of the demobilized they were given the permit to live
in the cities: Alma-Ata, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk and Tashkent. It was strictly
determined where the representatives of which nationality could live. Analogous
situation was in case the prisoners were set free.
We consider it necessary to mention here that the cases of ethnic deportation
were fulfilled from Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia even after the war. Namely,
on May 17 of 1949 on the decision of the Soviet Union Communist Party (of
Bolsheviks) politburo and on the order of the Soviet Union State Security
minister, the former citizens of Turkey, which received the soviet citizenship, the
former subjects of Greece, which received the soviet citizenship and Dashnaks
with their families were deported for permanent residence to Altai region, Tomsk,
Jambul and South Kazakhstan regions with the aim of clearing Georgia,
12
R. Japaridze. What if a jug may break at the spring...The newsp. Komunisti,‖ 25 June 1989.
13
Azerbaijan and Armenia off the politically unreliable elements. Dashnaks were
members of ―Dashnaktsutiun,‖ the bourgeois-national counter-revolutionary party
of Armenia. The party was founded in 1890 in Tbilisi. It has its organizations in
the United States of America, France, Greece, Iran and other countries and was
conducting intensive anti-soviet activities. 13,000 Dashnaks were subject to
deportation to Altai region, 5,400 Turks—to Tomsk region and 21,600 and 5,400
Greeks—to Jambul and South Kazakhstan regions respectively (this amount also
involves Turks and Greeks subject to deportation to Krasnodar and Crimea
regions). In this case also, the deportation instructions were analogous to the
instructions of the previous deportations. Special attention was turned to strict
provision of placement of the deported in the carriages according to the
contingent, i.e., not to allow placement of Greeks, Turks and Dashnaks into one
carriage, their mixing.14 It was caused by tense relations between Turks and
Dashnaks. Dashnaks demanded formation of an autonomous republic within the
Osman territory, because of which much blood was shed among them. The
relations were also tense between Turks and Greeks.
On August 10, 1951 The Soviet Union council of ministers adopted a decree
on deportation of 69 persons—Iranians, Greeks, Turks and Dashnaks from the
territory of Georgia, those who were not in their dwelling places in the moment of
deportation from Georgia according to the May 29, 1949 decree of the USSR
cabinet of ministers.15
So, the entire Muslim population was deported from the historical Georgian
province—Meskheti. Those, who by chance escaped deportation on November 14
to 16, 1944, were searched and found one by one and were sent to the far-off way
of Middle Asia.
National composition of the Muslim population deported from Meskheti was
mostly uniform. More than 90% of the deported were ethnic Georgians, the rest—
Turkish-speaking Tarakams—an ethnic group of Turkman generation, which
entered Javakheti in the end of the XVIII century and Khemshins (Islamized
Armenians).
Those deported to the remote regions of the Soviet Union had to live in the
most severe regime. They were not allowed to leave the place of their special
settlements. In fact, these were reservations of special settlements. Despite this,
there were cases of escape of the deported from the places of their settlements.
According to some evidence concerning the fight against the escaped from the
places of settlement, by November 15, 1948, the amount of those escaped, from
14
Deportations of Stalin Period. pp 665-666, 670-672, 679.
15
Ibid, p 757.
the moment of settlement, made up 77,541 with 18,302 of them being deported
from Caucasus.16 To suspend the cases of escape from the places of special
settlements, on November 26 of 1948, the Supreme Council presidium issued a
decree, according to which severe punishment was introduced on escape. A 20-
year penal servitude was foreseen for the punishment. The persons who assisted
the deported in escaping or gave permits to the deported to return to their native
places, had to be punished as well. For this, a five-year-long detainment was used.
According to the decree, to intensify the control over the deported settled in the
special places during the war and because the term of their exile was not
determined then, they all were considered to be exiled forever and they were
deprived of the right to return to their former dwellings. As of July 15, 1949, the
amount of those settled in special places and IDPs living in special places, who
were registered, made up 2,552,037; from this amount 209,545 served before that
in the Red Army as officers, sergeants (28,001) and soldiers (173,201).17
The deported had to live in the hardest economic and social terms. By and by,
the need appeared to solve the urgent issues, accumulated in special places of
settlements, to remove the strict regime for the deported. On May 12, 1953, the
Soviet Union Ministry of Internal Affairs prepared the draft report for the USSR
authorities ―on conditions in the special settlements and the measures for their
arrangement.‖ The draft report expressed hard conditions in the special
settlements and involved the proposals required for liberalization of these
conditions of IDPs. Namely, it was said that in the war and postwar period, the
special settlements of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs increased three times,
and the amount of IDPs made up total 2,819,776. Pre-war contingent of deported
977,110 was completely changed. Of the specially deported, 888,449, i.e., 90.9 %,
were kulaks and members of their families. The rest were those deported from
Ukraine and Belarus border regions—Poles, etc. From 1946 to 1952, on the
application of the local party and soviet bodies, kulaks were set free from the
special settlements into 28 republics and regions. There were 24,686 former
kulaks, among them 8 914 children, who were left under supervision. The former
kulaks left in the special settlements served honestly and did not represent any
jeopardy.
With the aim of prevention measures connected mostly with the war
condition, in terms of having no compromising materials, 1,124,645 people were
deported and registered at different times.
16
17
Ibid, pp 760, 762, 766.
The birthrate considerably increased in recent years among the deported as

well as the amount of children being on family and personal registration. From
1945 to 1952, the family registration comprised 360,545 born children; the
personal registration of children up to 16 years of age made up 332,739. Thus,
despite annual reductions in settlements of new contingents in special places, the
amount of specially settled was artificially increasing due to the high birthrate.
It was mentioned in the report that the legal condition of the settled was
violated, as they should have had equal rights with the citizens of the Soviet
Union except living the places designated for their living. Despite this, the local
bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs often were extremely strict against the
deported, did not permit them to freely move around the places designated for
their living, and formed barriers in case they wanted to go to other places for
treatment, study, and business leave. The children were not given the right to go
to republic and regional centers for getting higher education, etc. Due to reduction
in cases of escape, a 20-year penal servitude was considered to be very strict
punishment.
The proposal was raised in the draft report of the USSR Ministry of Internal
Affairs on the need for liquidation of the permanent settlements and reduction in
the amount of special settlements. It was considered possible to immediately
release from supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs all the Germans being
in the special settlements. At the same time, it was considered too early to remove
supervision off some contingent and persons. Namely, there should be left in
special settlements the deported from Crimea (Tatars, Bulgarians, Greeks and
Armenians), from the North Caucasus (Chechens, Ingushs, Karachayevs and
Balkars), from Georgia (Muslim population of Meskheti), and from other
territories of the country, those who behaved badly during the war and especially
dangerous state criminals (Trotskists, spies, etc.), who could damage the state
interests. The contingent to be left in the special settlements made up 1,100,630. It
was considered possible to mitigate the regime in these settlements. In particular,
the deported should have been given the right of free movement within the region
and the autonomous republic, and within the administration region, they could
have moved at any time and in any direction. They should have had the right to
change the places of their residences without any problem within the
administrative region borders, etc.18 What is most important, there should have
been prepared a new provision on the deported placed in special settlements. In
1956, the party-state bodies started to review the decisions on the deportations of
different categories of population. At first, the restrictions were removed off of the
18
Deportations of Stalin Period. pp 767-772.
deported, though the rehabilitation did not foresee their return to their home
country. For example, the issue of forming Chechen-Ingushetia autonomy was
being discussed in Kazakhstan. They abstained from Germans‘ return, and the
restriction was removed from the selection of dwelling places for Germans only in
1972.
In 1957, on the order of the Soviet Union Supreme Council Presidium, the
deported were given the right to live in any soviet republic, any region, except
Georgia and Crimea. The territorial rehabilitation was not removed only off
Crimean Tatars and Muslim Georgians of Meskheti. The restoration of liquidated
autonomies started, namely, the Chechnya-Ingushetia and Kabardian-Balkar
autonomous republics were restored, the Circassian autonomous region was
transformed into the Karachaev-Circassian autonomous region. But restoration of
the autonomies was not conducted within the borders of the territory from 1943 to
1944, which later caused armed conflicts. For example, when the Chechnya-
Ingushetia autonomy was restored, a part of suburban region was not joined to it,
which before 1944, was within the Chechnya-Ingushetia borders. This part, which
borders North Ossetian capital Ordjonikidze, remained within North Ossetia.
Within North Ossetia, there also remained a narrow strip connecting its main
territory with the Mozdok region.
According to 1939 census data, there lived 33.8 thousand people in the
suburban region, among them 28.1 thousand Ingushs, i.e., 33.6 % of the entire
population of the republic; 3.5 thousand Russians; and 0.4 thousand Chechens. In
this period, the region territory was 977-square kilometers (34% of five Ingusheti
regions of Chechnya-Ingushetia). After the deportations of Ingushs, these lands
were transferred to North Ossetia along with the territories of other Ingush
territories. After the restoration of the Chechnya-Ingushetia autonomy (1957),
76% of the suburban region (742-square kilometers) was left to North Ossetia. In
1989, the national movement of Ingushetia raised the issue before the Soviet
Union and Chechnya-Ingushetia authorities on the restoration of national
territories lost in 1934, which was settled positively in 1992. Since then, the
national movement had intensified pressure on the federal center and North
Ossetian authorities with the aim of returning the territory, but the Ossetian side is
not going to settle the issue of territorial rehabilitation. Finally, on October 31,
1992, a wide-scale armed conflict started, which sacrificed 618 people; 950
people were wounded and more than 40,000 became IDPs. As a result of the
conflict, 12-billion ruble damage was incurred to North Ossetia (by 1992 prices).
As a result of exact data, later the amount of lost made up increased by 340 and of
wounded by 390. In addition, in the zone of conflict among the Russian soldiers,
66 were lost and 130 were wounded, which took part in separation of the sides in
conflict and protecting security regime.19
The first positive steps for the conflict settlement were adopted on June 26,
1994, when the Presidents of Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed an agreement
on return of IDP Ingushs to their former dwellings—settlements of North Ossetian
suburban region. The schedule of the IDPs return was compiled. After that, many
documents were signed without any visible results. Within these years, the Ingush
side used to raise before Russia the issue of operating articles three and six of the
law ―on rehabilitation of repressed people‖ adopted by the Russian Supreme
Council in 1991. This law foresaw restoration of their territory. Ingushs consider a
part of North Ossetia suburban region as their ethnic territory, as the cradle of
Ingush people. There is located the village Angushti on the territory of the
suburban territory, from the name of which there was generated ethnonym
―Ingush.‖20 For their part, the North Ossetia authorities tried their best to remove
the articles on the territorial rehabilitation from the law mentioned above.
Naturally, both sides gave different politico-legal evaluation to the conflict. Still,
on November 10, 1992, Supreme Council of North Ossetia evaluated the events of
October 31 to November 1, 1992 as a treacherous aggression of Ingush national-
extremists against North Ossetia with the aim of seizing a part of the republic
territory by force. Diametrically different evaluation of these events was
expressed by People‘s Assembly of Ingushetia (September 21, 1994): ―A strict
form of genocide policy was expressed in physical annihilation of a part of the
Ingush people and ethnic cleansing of those left alive on the territory.‖21
The Russian Federation authorities have not given politico-legal evaluation of
the armed conflict between the autonomies within the Russian Federation as of
yet, which might have promoted political settlement of the Ossetia-Ingushetia
problem.
The process of repatriation of the Muslim population, deported from
Meskheti, also faced great problems, which were caused by a number of
subjective and objective factors. In the XV century, Meskheti was one-third of the
entire territory and population of Georgia, and its area comprised 34.2 thousand
square kilometers.
In the second half of the XVI century, politically strengthened Turks made
use of weakened condition of the then-Georgia and started to gradually occupy the
19
Dzadziev A., Ossetian-Ingush conflict: present state of the problem. Jrnl. Central Asia and
Caucasus, N 6, 2003, pp 97-98.
20
Markedonov S. Caucasus in search of “its land.” Problem of legitimacy and security in the
region. Jrnl. Central Asia and Caucasus. N 2, 2004, p 63.
21
Dzadziev A., op. cit., pp 102-103.
Meskheti Principality, which was completed in 1578. They abolished the

Georgian state power and called Meskheti ―Gurjistan Wilayat,‖ i.e., ―Province of
Georgia.‖ From that very period, they started intensively to ―Islamize‖ the local
population. According to the Turkish laws, land could be owned only by those
serving in the Turkish army. But only Muslims could serve in the Turkish army.
So a magic circle was formed. The Georgian peasants were forced to adopt Islam.
A Georgian feudal could have preserved a land plot only if he would recognize
Muslim belief. Due to this insidious law, the feudal class adopted Islam in the end
of the XVI century, the peasants, in the beginning of the XVII century.
Turks used different ways for forcing the Christian population to adopt Islam.
First of all, they used force to make Christians become Muslims. Muslims had
more rights and paid less taxes than Christians. Material aspects forced Christian
peasants to change beliefs. Turks used a flexible policy, and when a Christian
feudal adopted Islam, he became governor of the region and forced his subjects to
adopt Islam as well. There are numerous examples of this in the history of
Georgia.
The Georgian political circles always tried to return Meskheti, seized by
Turks, but in vain. Erekle II was the last king who tried to set Meskheti free with
the help of the Russian army. To arrange this issue was one of the main conditions
put forward by Georgia that had to be taken into consideration in the process of
establishing new relations between Georgia and Russia. This was clearly
expressed in the famous Georgievsk Treaty of 1783, as well. He tried to convince
Petersburg that Meskheti was Georgia‘s territory and that there lived the Georgian
population there. In 1770, the Russian authorities sent General Totleben to the
Caucasian front. The Russian general was inefficient, betrayed the Georgian
people; and so the issue of Akhaltsikhe pasha domain joining to Georgia still
remained unsettled. The Russian diplomacy expressed interest in this issue only
when in 1801, Georgia joined Russia. After the Russia-Turkey war of 1828 to
1829, only a part of Akhaltsikhe pasha domain was released from Turks, namely
Samtskhe-Javakheti.
The entire population of Meskheti was nearly all Georgians. This is especially
clear from the materials of the census conducted in the southern province of
Georgia by the Turk authorities with the aim of taxing the population. A
manuscript, into which the information was introduced required for taxing the
population, is called ―great davtar of Gurjistan wilayat.‖ It becomes clear from
onomastic study that nearly the entire population of Meskheti (95%) were
Christian Georgians.
Georgians, who adopted Islam, were called ―Tatars,‖ as Muslims in general.
Unlike other Muslims, Georgian Muslims called themselves ―Ierls,‖ i.e., locals.
In the beginning of the XIX century, a great majority of Samtskhe-Javakheti

(Meskheti) population was Georgians, but a great part of Georgians had already
adopted Islam, though they knew their native language well. At the same time, a
part of Samtskhe-Javakheti Georgian orthodox and catholic population, in some
places the entire villages hardly managed to protect Christianity and Georgian
nationality. That part of the population was preserved the Georgian language and
national self-consciousness.
After Georgia was joined to Russia, Tsarism tried both in different regions of
Georgia and Samtskhe-Javakheti to settle Russians there and for this to gather free
public lands into its hands. For this, it largely promoted migration of Muslim
Georgians from their native lands to Turkey.
The plan of settling Russians in Santskhe-Javakheti failed. But instead, they
started to settle Armenians there. Only from 1829 to 1831, there were 25,000
Armenians who came to Samtskhe-Javakheti from Turkey for permanent
residence. It was caused by defeat of Turkey in the Russia-Turkey war of 1828 to
1829. By Adrianopol peace treaty, old Georgian territories—Samtskhe and
Javakheti—were joined to Russia. Armenians, living in Turkey, were on the
Russian side in the war. According to the treaty results, the territories where
Armenians lived were left to Turkey. Fearing for revenge, Armenians left mostly
for Georgia. As Wheaton College (in the USA) professor A. Kochakian mentions,
if a majority of Armenians, who came to Georgia before the Russia-Turkey war of
1828 to 1829, lived in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, now many Armenians who
migrated from Ottoman Empire settled in Samtskhe and Javakheti, where they
gradually made a majority of the population. At present, a great part of the
inhabitants living on these territories are descendants of those Armenians, who
after the Russia-Turkey war of 1828 to 1829 left Erzerum.22 This condition had
largely contributed to spreading of the Turkish language in Samtskhe-Javakheti,
as the Turkish language was the only means of communication for Erzerum
Armenians with the local population. Muslim Georgians preserved the Georgian
language, but along with the Georgian language, they started using Turkish in
their everyday lives.
The Georgian society was too cautious of the Muslim Meskhs‘ return to
Georgia to live there. The situation seemed more tense, because Georgia itself
already had about 300,000 IDPs as a result of armed conflicts in Abkhazia and
South Ossetian autonomous region; about 100,000 people, damaged As a result of
natural catastrophes starting from 1987, left without rehabilitation; the political
22
Kochikian A. Past and present condition of the Georgian-Armenian relations. Jrnl. Central Asia
and Caucasus. N 6, 2003, p 147.
and socio-economic situation in the country is the most difficult. In Meskheti, the
houses of Muslim population now were mostly occupied by the population
migrated from different regions of Georgia. To make these people leave their
present dwellings and to form basis for the new tragedy would be a great injustice.
We should also take into consideration that in Meskheti, there lived Armenians in
great amounts, and to bring deported Meskhs to settle there could form a new
tragedy. The problem could have been settled rather easily in its time, in case of
full rehabilitation of Muslim Meskhs.
Restrictions towards Muslim population of Meskheti, deported to the special
settlements from agricultural regions of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,
were removed in 1956. They got back the right for free movement, but with one
condition: deported Meskhs could have left the places of their settlements, in fact,
reservations, and could live in any republic of the Soviet Union, except Georgia,
i.e., no territorial rehabilitation was conducted towards them. It seems such a
condition was also caused by the fact that the territories where they lived before
belonged to the ―border zone,‖ where only local population had the right of free
movement.
A special permit was required for coming to Meskheti. The population,
deported from Meskheti, was not given such a permit. It was impossible to enter
the ―border zone‖ without a permit. This zone was so well protected by the Soviet
border guards that even a bird could not have flown over the border. Therefore,
Muslim Meskhs had no opportunity to simply visit their former dwellings.
The process of Muslim Meskhs‘ return to Georgia started at the end of the
1970s, but it was not massive. In general, registration of applications submitted by
the deported Muslims wishing to return to Georgia to live started in 1975, in the
then-Labor State Committee. Eighteen families came to live in Kobuleti region
from1966 to 1972, of which six went back. By 1990, a total number of those
which settled there was 380 families (1,973 persons), but 150 families returned
back (818 persons). Later, due to reasons mostly connected with the break of the
Soviet Union and, naturally, due to some uncertainty in ideological sphere and
radical considerations spreading domineering in the society, a part of them left
Georgia. One of the major reasons of this being that they were not integrated in
the Georgian culture.
The problem of re-emigration became most tense after serial massacre of
Muslim Meskhs started in Uzbekistan, namely, in the part of densely populated
Fergana valley and Tashkent. It was conducted through deliberate support to the
extremists by some forces. The hostile attitude reached its summit in May, 1989,
when in Fergana, about 100 people died as a result of mass disorders. Finally,
according to different data, 60 to 70 thousand Muslim Meskhs were evacuated to
Azerbaijan (at that time, there lived 106.3 thousand Muslim Meskhs in
Uzbekistan). The rest were deported to different regions of Russia, especially to
Krasnodar region, also Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. There exist three compact
settlements of Muslim Meskhs in Georgia now, a total amount of which does not
exceed 1,000. So, it may be said there were conducted two deportations of
Muslim Meskhs. At some point, the tragedy in Uzbekistan was manipulated by
the special services of the Soviet Union and were aimed at causing disorder in
Georgia and turning attention of the Georgian population off the anti-Soviet
demonstrations (the April 9 tragedy in Tbilisi in 1989 became known to all, when
the Soviet Army units suppressed in blood the anti-Soviet actions).
The present condition of Muslim Meskhs in many new settlements is very
hard, especially in Krasnodar region. It should be mentioned that in the end of the
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, heads of the Krasnodar collective and
soviet farms appealed to Uzbekistan with the proposal to deport Muslim Meskhs
to Kuban, to make them work in plant and tobacco growing spheres. It was the
irony of the fate that their deportation to Kuban generated ethnic tensions and
conflicts.23
The rights of Muslim Meskhs settled in Kransodar region were formally and
non-formally extremely restricted. Since the 1930s, it has been obligatory ―to be
registered,‖ i.e., citizens should have been officially registered according to their
places of residence (addresses). From 1991 to 1992, this obligatory registration
was considered to be anti-constitutional, but to some extent, it still exists even
now. Muslim Meskhs have no right to be registered; therefore, they are not
considered citizens of Russia. Special taxes (approximately a 30-dollar equivalent
sum) were imposed on them every 45 days; they are demanded to prolong their
temporary stay per each 45 days (a 30-dollar equivalent sum). As they have no
registration, they are not permitted to have permanent work or pension; they are
not allowed to sell the produce they have grown on their land plots, to enter
educational institutions, and sometimes they are not given certificates on finishing
secondary school, etc. Cossacks (special paramilitary rank until 1917, were
mercilessly persecuted in the period of the Soviet regime) are most active in this
respect. P. Gupta, research-worker of the migration policy, research and
communication department of the Migration International Organization (Geneva,
23
Markedonov S. Ethno political processes in Rostov, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions: problems,
contradictions, prospects. Jrnl. Central Asia and Caucasus. N 2, 2005, p 166.
Switzerland) points out that ―there can be found no other example of more racist
actions than those of Cossacks in Krasnodar region.24
The Cossack movement revived from 1989 to 1990, when the Soviet Union
was counting its last days of existence. Its leaders were trying to implement
Russian nationalism, a cult of force. Supported by local governing bodies, they
used to often conduct illegal patrolling and checking of passports with the aim of
scaring and beating of the ethnic minorities. They mostly checked and fined only
Muslim Meskhs and Kurds. Their illegal activities were also supported by the
mass media, which used to release false information, to publish articles in the
newspapers instigating hostile attitudes of the Russian population against ethnic
minorities and, particularly, Muslim Meskhs. TV channels allowed Cossacks to
talk about all Muslim Meskhs being thieves and criminals. Mass media pointed to
the cases of stealing and violence on children as if conducted by Muslim Meskhs,
the cases of arms and drugs, illegal trade, and non-payment of taxes, as if
conducted by the leaders of Muslim Meskhs, etc.25
From 1989 to 2003, there took place more than 50 conflicts with the
participation of Muslim Meskhs. The Cossack movement leaders considered
impossible co-living of Muslim Meskhs and Cossacks. They said, ―We should
protect our native land and local population… This is Cossacks‘ land and all
should know this. It is our prerogative to determine the rules of game.‖26 There
were frequent cases of raids by ethnic signs. One can come across humiliating and
insulting inscriptions on the walls: ―The black should live on Mars,‖ ―Russia for
Russians,‖ etc.27 The local authorities did not pay attention to all this, nor did they
respond to it.
The Muslim population deported from Meskheti over 60 years ago had to live
in quite an alien environment in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, in Russia and other
former Soviet republics. The Russian and Turkish languages became their means
of communication with the outside world. In such conditions, their national
consciousness had considerably declined in the background of excessive
misinformation; there appeared opposite views among the deported themselves in
the attitudes towards national values, which complicated the problems of
repatriation.
24
Gupta P. Krasnodar region of the Russian Federation: Turk-Meslhs – actual apartheid. Jrnl.
Central Asia and Caucasus. N 5, 2006, p 151.
25
Gupta P. Op. cit., pp 151-152
26
Markdonov S. Op. cit., pp 167-168.
27
Savva M. Conflict potential of interethnic relations in the North Caucasus. Jrnl. Central Asia and
the Caucasus. N 3, 2004, p 81.
The process of political intensification among the Muslim Meskhs started

after some administrative restrictions were removed from them. In the end of the
1950s, there was held a constituent meeting of Muslim Meskhs in Middle Asia.
An interim organizing committee was formed at this meeting for their return to
their native places. Two directions were outlined. Supporters of one of them
demanded return to Georgia and, by all means, to their historical homeland—
Meskheti. They were a small part of Turks by generation and Muslim Georgians,
which had mostly lost their native language and national consciousness, though
they were well aware of their Georgian origin. The head of this public
organization, ―Vatan‖ (―homeland‖ in Turkish), was I. Sarvarov, Georgian by
origin. They identified themselves with Turks and wished to form autonomy in
perspective, to open Russian schools with obligatory study of the Turkish
language, press and TV in the Turkish language, development of the Turkish
culture, etc. ―Vatan‖ positions kept becoming weaker. At present, the organization
leaders don‘t have broad support. Their influence in the process of talks is not
strong. Supporters of the other direction, ―Rescue,‖ are Muslim Georgians. They
consider themselves ―Islamized‖ Georgians. They have not lost their national
consciousness; they remember their Georgian names, and the old people know
Georgian. A great many of them want to return to Meskheti, though they agree to
live in other parts of Georgia as well. Unfortunately, there exists no exact amount
of those wishing to return to Georgia.
We may add to ethno-genesis of Muslim population living in Meskheti
mentioned above that the Muslim population living in Meskheti, except only a
small part of them, were always considered to be Georgians. Still in 1769,
―councilor of state‖ prince Amilakhori, who visited the estates of Akhaltsikhe
pasha, wrote: ―The population and the Pasha himself, speak Georgian now as well
using Georgian equally with Turkish.‖28 In 1846, the Russian newspaper
published in Tbilisi, Kavkaz pointed out that ―All those who sow and plough are
Georgians, which accepted Muslim law … Despite changing their religion, they
preserved and observe some traditions and habits and customs of their ancestors—
Georgians.‖ Famous Russian scholar, ethnographer L. Zagurski, who had traveled
in Akhaltsikhe in the 70s of the XIX century, asked in surprise: ―who called
Georgians living there Turks and Tatars, as we come across in the official lists of
the settlements?‖ 29
The specialist literature published by the Russian officials in the previous
centuries adhered to the idea that the Muslim population of Samtskhe-Javakheti
28
Tsagareli A. Deeds …,” vol. I, 1881, p 33
29
The newsp. Kavkaz, N 39, 1846.
was Georgian.30 An Analogous idea was expressed in the works of the statistical
committee of Tbilisi gubernia.31
It should be mentioned that Turks did not conduct any important demographic
changes in Samtskhe-Javakheti after they occupied it. By the time this territory
joined Georgia in the end of the 1820s, a major part of the local population of
Samtskhe-Javakheti spoke Georgian. That witnessed domination of genetically
Georgians (Sh. Lomsadze). The analysis of the population census data conducted
in the XIX century points to reliable facts that a majority of Muslim population in
Samtskhe-Javakheti was Georgian.
The return of deported Meskhs to Georgia should be evaluated as the most
complicated, non-uniform process accompanied with obstacles. If we take into
consideration the facts and considerations mentioned above, then the purpose and
the final result of the return should be gradual adaptation of Muslim Meskhs
(those who wish to return) to the local ethno-lingual and cultural environment and
restoration of their cultural-value orientation.
On April 27, 1999, Georgia joined the Council of Europe. In connection with
this COE, Parliamentary Assembly adopted a recommendation on the basis of
which repatriation of the population deported from Meskheti should have finished
within 12 years from the membership, i.e., in April 2011. Deported should regain
citizenship of Georgia. Substantiated doubts are expressed in regard to
recommendations being fulfilled in the fixed term. It is pointed that ―this is caused
by the most difficult economic condition of Georgia, first of all, and also, unstable
situation in the Caucasus due to the results of the conflict in Nagorni Karabakh.
Georgia is also involved in internal conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.‖32
To take into account the factors cited above, the difficulties in the problem
settlement have real basis.
In our opinion, the evaluations and recommendations adopted by the
international organizations are often superficial, without any deep and concrete
analysis. For example, no exact data exist on the amount of Islamized Meskhs
living beyond Georgia. Even more, no one has determined how many of them
want to return to Georgia. The present, quite-new generations have not preserved
the Georgian language at all, nor everyday habits, traditions, customs, and, in
general, the feeling of apprehending Georgia as their homeland, as there are
generations living in and adapted to the new environment. They were born there,
study and work there, feeling comfortable in this native-to-them environment.
30
Collection of statistical data on the Caucasus. vol. I, Tiflis, 1869, p 23.
31
Works of Tiflis gubernia committee. I, Tiflis, 1886, pp III-IV.
32
Gupta P. Op.cit. p 154.
Unfortunately, no one has asked them whether they want to return to and live in
Georgia, namely, in its small-earth part, or not. Unfortunately, no one has
analyzed these problems, at least superficially, in this way. Therefore, how COE
can determine the terms for return of deported or the time period, having no idea
about the number of those really wishing to return (as this can be only voluntary
process), what their structure is according to their age, sex, education, economic
condition, and social interests is not possible. It is impossible to make any
decision without knowing and considering all this.
II.II. ETHNO-POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS

II.II.I. Anatomy of Conflicts in the Caucasus
Armed conflicts in the Caucasus are often mentioned as ethnic conflicts,

which doesn‘t fully express the nature of these conflicts. The character of these
conflicts has shown vividly that an important factor of the conflicts origin and
their unsettlement by now is Russia‘s political, economic, demographic, and other
interests. That‘s why Russia has been striving, and keeps striving even now, to
attach completely ethnic nuance to the conflicts and succeeds in this in any way.
Thus, the conflicts are of ethno-political character. An exception is a conflict in
Chechnya, which is mainly connected with the fight of Chechen people for
freedom and independence; however, ethnic elements are still characteristic to this
conflict as well.
Immediately after dissolution of the Soviet Union, some big or small conflicts
took place in the former Soviet republics on the ethnic ground. This was expected,
because in condition of totalitarian regime and dominating soviet ideology, it was
most dangerous to openly express opposing idea on national problems. The
Communist Party possessed a system of opinions considered eternal, among them
in the sphere of national relations as well, which was strictly revealed mostly in
the political form of public consciousness. But the national problems experienced
development, ripening, and required relevant settlement. The real situation was
not taken into consideration in the process of forming the autonomies; everything
was being personally decided in the Kremlin. But this was not the only factor of
the ethnic conflicts origin. Russia had indefinite influence on the former soviet
republics, and the heads of some of these republics couldn‘t dare to protect
national interests of their countries. Suddenly, Russia found out that nothing was
left from her unprecedented influence. Officially, it was impossible to regain the
former influence in the post-soviet space. The bipolar world, in which Russia and
the USA were super-states, became unipolar. To restore its influence in the post-
soviet space, Russia supported the separatist forces in separate republics and
especially in the geopolitical and geo-economic regions. Sometimes, still in the
period of the Soviet Union dissolution, Russia itself took care of forming such
forces and then did its best to widely stir up ethno-conflicts, which took away the
lives of some tens of thousands of people. For example, it can be said for sure that
without Russia‘s support, there wouldn‘t have been Georgian-Abkhazian and
Georgian-Ossetian conflicts in Georgia, or, in any case, they could have been
hushed without such bloodshed. Russia can, even now, immediately settle these
conflicts, if it makes the separatists understand they won‘t get any military or
economic assistance from Russia and if it honestly conducts its peacekeeping
mission. But to fulfill its imperial intentions and to preserve former positions in
the post-soviet countries, Russia, wherever it can or sees such need, artificially
stirs up or promotes ethnic conflicts, impedes these conflicts deliberately to finally
reach its influence again. These conflicts exist through support of Russia and the
following conditions witness this.
Striving for independence in the former soviet republics coincides with the
conflicts between nationalities, which is not casual. Proceeding from its interests,
Russia cannot get used to loss of the spheres of its influence. Close relationship of
the events distanced from one another in time and space was not casual either.
The events ongoing in Tridnestrian region, Abkhazia, and ―South Ossetia‖ were
governed from Moscow. The models of armed situations were prepared
beforehand. It was so in Abkhazia, ―South Ossetia,‖ etc.
Specific features of ethno-territorial conflicts were not casual either. The
conflicts in Georgia are of vivid geographical expression—they are along the
Russia-Georgia border. There live in Georgia far more multi-numbered national
minorities, the amount of which is far more than that of Abkhazs and Ossets. But
Georgia has far fewer problems. They live in a distance from the Russia‘s border,
and it is far easier and convenient for Russia to form ethnic conflicts in its
neighboring Abkhazs (the amount of which in Abkhazia at present equals 42,000)
and Ossets (46,000). Consequently, Abkhazia and ―South Ossetia‖ have become
for Russia a lever for influencing Georgia, just as Russia used for influencing
other former soviet republics, different levers, but mostly those of violating the
territorial integrity.
Russia‘s influence on Georgia makes it easier for Russia to implement its
interests in entire Transcaucasus, which is promoted by Georgia‘s geopolitical
position. Russia‘s main political task is to provide its influence in the Caucasian
region. Without solving it, Russia cannot be a great state. That‘s why it does its
best not to allow some other influence upon the South Caucasus. However, the
USA and western states think otherwise. As it is mentioned, Russia cannot now
and won‘t be able in the near future to play a decisive role in the Caucasus, and so
influential gamblers should intensively participate in the ―common Caucasian
processes,‖ first of all the USA and EU.
New redistribution of spheres of influence in the Caucasus may become a
source of serious conflicts. This is rather important, as by authoritative expert
evaluations, the Caucasian region will be one of the most important suppliers of
oil and gas in the world market in the XXI century. Therefore, the factor of energy
resources considerably determines the USA-Russia relations in the region, which
sometimes is of open confrontation and, unfortunately, shades the interests of the
Caucasian region.
Georgia, for the United States, is a sphere of real interests, because important
transportation junction and oil pipelines pass its territory, as the Eurasian corridor,
through which oil and gas extracted in Central Asia and Azerbaijan by the
American companies is transported to the Black Sea and then to the western
market. Azerbaijan is also of great importance for America in the Caspian region,
as oil and gas is mostly extracted there.
The pro-western strategy of Georgia and Azerbaijan considerably restricted
Russia‘s role in the region. Georgia and Azerbaijan not only separated from
Russia, but together with the USA and Turkey, in fact, block the routes favorable
for Russia. On September 18, 2002, a ceremony of the symbolic opening of Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was held. Russia considers this route to be a serious rival
for its oil pipelines strategy. Armenia is also left out of gambling, and, despite
more than one proposal, it refused to take part together with Azerbaijan in the
projects mentioned above. In the implementation of these projects, Armenia sees
possible strategic alliance of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey that, in its opinion,
may oppose the interests of Armenia in the future. That‘s why Russia and
Armenia, as if strengthened, return military partnership.
By the evaluation of the US Ministry of Energy, there are located in the
Caspian Sea region the greatest supplies of hydrocarbons in the world. The
prospected supply comprises from 17 to 33 billion barrels of oil and about 232
trillion square feet of natural gas. Potential supply may be about 200 billion
barrels of oil and 35 trillion square feet of natural gas.
Mostly these factors determine significance of the region and its being the
sphere of interests not only for Russia, but for the only super-state now in the
world—the USA. These riches were completely governed as if by Russia before,
which is now forced to balance its interests with the world and regional states. For
this it should first of all restore its influence in the South Caucasian region to
make the states of this region not only consider, but consider by all means its
interests. Thus Russia can gain certain priority in the sphere of balancing the
interests of the world leading countries in the region. Russia‘s energy security
depends on this. All this is most important because the Caspian region countries—
Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan—have not agreed on the
legal status of the Caspian Sea as of yet. They have failed to agree on the right for
exploiting the Caspian Sea bio-resources either.
Unlike the middle, especially, southern part of the Caspian Sea, its northern
part has already been divided. Three Caspian states have officially announced that
19% of the Caspian bottom belongs to Russia, 29% to Kazakhstan and within
19% to Azerbaijan. As for Turkmenistan and Iran, they were suggested such a
variant—either they agreed to the elaborated terms for dividing the Caspian Sea or
if they doubted the deposits existing in the central and south parts of the Caspian,
they could scare foreign investors for working out prospective structures.
As soon as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project started in the Caucasian region,
destructive forces tried to use the national separatist forces to stir up political and
religious extremism to frustrate the project. In the background of these events,
Azerbaijan expressed readiness to locate NATO and Turkey military bases on the
Apsheron.33 The USA have already started work to form the future of this region.
First of all, the USA considers it necessary to fight for the Caspian oil and its
transportation to Europe. The suggested Caspian oil pipeline, in the USA opinion,
should bypass the territories of Iran, Armenia and Russia and should compete
with Russia in forming alternative trans-Siberian ways for transit goods from
Europe to Asia and back. In 1998, Washington invited the Presidents of
Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the American side signed some hope-giving
documents. These documents attach great importance not only to oil and gas
transportation, but to the transport corridor in general, restoration of the Silk Road
and, thus, pass to the Black Sea, which increases Georgia‘s authority and makes
its direct participation necessary in the work of the trans-national companies, in
elaboration of different beneficial programs. This is most essential, even after the
oil and gas supplies are exhausted, because the Silk Road functioning will never
stop, as the demand for freights transportation from the East to the West and back
will grow more in the future. Practical steps in this direction have already been
made—construction of the Turkish section of Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku
railway line started. This line will connect the East and the West, bypassing
Russia, and in the future, through the Black Sea Georgian section, the railway
goods turnover between the East and the West will considerably grow. Russia
33
Ahmedov S. Foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan within the context of transnational
companies. Baku-Elm, 2006, pp 87, 90-91.
considers that in this case, this will cause the greatest economic losses for Russia
in the short and long perspectives and will considerably weaken its political
influence on the Caucasus and Central Asia. That‘s why Russia strives for
exercising control over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. One of the main
reasons for extremely tense relations between Russia and Georgia is the problem
of Russia‘s passage to the Black Sea. Russia has a pass to the Black Sea in
Sebastopol, but for a certain period of time. Sebastopol is the Ukrainian port;
Ukraine already demands to reconsider this term for reducing it. The Russian port
of Novorosiisk is closed for four months in a year; this explains Russia‘s interest
in Abkhazia.
At the same time, the USA and western countries keep growing their capital
investments in the Caucasus and Middle Asia for developing other prospective
branches of economy. Mastering of gold, chrome, nickel and other mineral
deposits in Middle Asia and the Caucasus should be mentioned here, as their
supplies in the world are being exhausted, which makes these mineral wealth
indispensable and invaluable in the XXI century.
The ethnic conflicts considerably impeded development of the Caucasus,
especially of the South Caucasus. At the initial stage of the conflicts, the economy
was completely broken. The armed clashes sacrificed many thousands of people‘s
lives; some hundred thousands of people became refugees and IDPs. Deportations
during the Armenia-Azerbaijan war for Nagorny Karabakh were of a gigantic
scale. As a result of armed conflicts, in which modern military technique was
used, 160,000 Azerbaijanians were driven out of Armenia and 250,000 Armenians
from Azerbaijan. The amount of refugees from ―South Ossetia‖ reached 110,000.
Still in 1992, the amount of refugees in the South Caucasus on their own countries
and beyond the borders of the South Caucasus, by different evaluations, made up
500,000 to 700,000.34 During the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the amount of
refugees was 300,000, and merciless and complete ethnic cleansing of the
Georgian population of Abkhazia was conducted. The fact of such ethnic
cleansing was more than once recognized and condemned by OSCE, the Council
of Europe, EU and the UN in many resolutions and statements made by them.
The ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus have fully changed the natural
demographic development of population. Both absolute and relative indicators of
the birthrate are largely reduced. Even in the Republic of Azerbaijan, where
comparatively high levels of the birthrate were preserved, from 1981 to 1990, i.e.,
in 10 years, there were born 1,765,904 babies, and from 1996 to 2005, again in 10
years, 1,227,875 babies, i.e., 538,029 less. In some years, the level of the birthrate
34
Samedov A. Op.cit., p 67.
decreased by half. For example, in 1992, the general birthrate ratio in Azerbaijan
was 26.6 promile, and 10 years after, in 2001—13.8 promile. Far worse was the
situation in Georgia and Armenia. The indicator of population morbidity
increased; in Georgia the death rate especially increased. The population sex-age
structure has been so violated that, even in case of improved economic conditions,
in the nearest perspective, the birthrate will reduce. In the Caucasus, as well as in
entire post-soviet space, the ethnic conflicts in the poorest economic conditions,
facilitated the growth of murders and suicides and increases in the number of
dipsomaniacs and drug-addicts. As a result of spreading of bad habits and
irrational, unbalanced nourishment of the pregnant women, the cases of
pathological childbirths and pathologies in newborns increased. The refugees and
IDPs, which make up 10% of the entire population in the Caucasus, were in
especially hard conditions. The situation is most alarming in psycho-social
condition of the refugees. Post-traumatic disorders, elements of socio-apathy, and
panic attacks are noticed among both grown ups and children. Along with terrible
distress experienced by the refugees, such conditions of theirs are caused also by
their extremely poor socio-economic terms of living. Unemployment is their
major problem. According to the sociological questioning, in Tbilisi, where 32%
of the refugees live, 40.7% of them are unemployed, and nearly half of them live
in bad housing conditions, in their evaluation.35 The most difficult material
condition of the refugees, regular worsening of their health condition, and scanty
social protection from the state determined their demographic behavior. Birthrate
among the refugees is low. Finally, it may be said that ethno-political conflicts
considerably impeded natural demographic development of the population and
worsened all demographic indicators. Unfortunately, despite the fact that official
Baku and Tbilisi have more than once mentioned a decisive role of Russia in the
settlement of the conflicts, and Russia has several times pointed to the need for
solving this problem on the basis of the international law, none of the ethno-
political conflicts seem to be settled in the South Caucasus, and in the end, Russia
has adopted most unwise and unjust steps. By violating the principles recognized
by the international law, the UN and the world community, and even the laws
operating in Russia, Russia officially recognized independence of Abkhazia and
the so-called ―South Ossetia.‖ Automatically, Russia lost the status of promoter of
the conflicts settlement and turned into one side of the conflict. In addition, this is
a bad precedent for Russia itself, and it may return back to it like a boomerang.
This act considerably aggravated the settlement of conflict in Abkhazia and the
35
M. Khmaladze, Socio-economic condition and problems of TDPs from Abkhazia in Tbilisi. Jrnl.
Demography. N 1(6), 2004, pp 27-28.
former ―South Ossetia.‖ Imperial interests are far higher than justice in the
Russian foreign policy and the realities, in which we have to live, remain
unconsidered. That‘s why no high-level meetings, adopted decisions, or made
statements in regard to this problem yield any results. This considerably decreases
the demographic potential of refugees and, in general, proceeding from ethno-
political results, worsens demographic situations, especially in the South
Caucasian countries.
II.II.II. Armenian-Azerbaijanian Conflict
The Nagorny Karabakh conflict, with its results, is most devastating in the
CIS countries. The conflicts generated still in the Soviet power period and,
therefore, the international community, could not have any influence on the events
ongoing in Karabakh, so it was considered to be a home problem of the Soviet
Union. In fact, the conflict began as soon as Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in
the Soviet Union. The Armenian population of Nagorny Karabakh demanded
from the Soviet government to transfer Nagorny Karabakh region, then being
within Azerbaijan, under Armenia‘s jurisdiction.
The Nagorny Karabakh autonomous region was formed on July 7, 1923,
within Azerbaijan. According to the population census of 1989, the region
population was 162,181: among them Azerbaijanian were 37,264 (23%);
Armenians were 123,076 (75.8%); and Russians were 1,265 (0. 8%). Historically,
the Nagorny Karabakh territory was a part of the Caucasian Albania. Feudal
relations were established there from the III to IV centuries, and Christianity was
spread. In the VIII centuries, Arabs invaded the Artsah province formed in
Nagorny Karabakh and started the spreading of Islam. From the IX to X centuries,
Artsah was within the Kingdom of Albania. In the XI century, Artsah was
occupied by Turk-Seljuk invaders; and in the 30s of the XIII century, Mongol rule
was established in Artsah and a great part of this territory was called Karabakh by
them. Karabakh khanate was founded in the XVIII century. In 1805, an agreement
was concluded on Karabakh khanate joining Russia, which was confirmed by the
1813 Gulistan truce. In 1822, the Karabakh khanate was abolished and a province
was formed, which finally joined Elizavetpol gubernia (formed in 1868), Shusha
and Zangezur mazras. In that period, namely, in 1886, the amount of population in
these mazras was 223,460, among them, Armenians were 115,318 (51.6%) and
Azerbaijani were 78,945 (35.3%).
In 1918, the power in Nagorny Karabakh was seized by Mussavatians and
Dashnaks. In May of 1920, the Soviet power was established in Karabakh.
In the end of the 80s of last century, when the Soviet Union faced most acute
problems, which were impossible to be solved, and the signs of the Soviet Union
dissolution appeared, Armenia demanded Nagorny Karabakh to be joined to it. In
December of 1989, the Supreme Council of Armenia adopted a well-known
resolution on joining of Nagorny Karabakh to the Republic of Armenia.
The Karabakh conflict started between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1988, on
the ethnic ground and, in fact, from 1991 to 1994, it assumed a wide-scale form.
In January 1990, disorders started in Baku due to the conflict caused by
Armenians in Karabakh. The Soviet army entered the capital of Azerbaijan.
Overnight, from January 19 to 20, the Soviet army committed factually a military
crime—the armed forces killed and crushed by tanks about 150 Azerbaijanians. It
was officially declared that the action was directed against ―Islam
Fundamentalism,‖ which as if wanted to take power in the republic in its hands.
Namely, M. Gorbachev, in his appeal to the soviet people, pointed out that an
attempt was made in Azerbaijan to found the Islamic order and it was his personal
sanction given to the armed forces action in Baku, which was followed by
numerous human victims.36
On November 26, 1991, the liquidation of Nagorny Karabakh was
announced, and the region was directly subject to Baku. But the referendum held
in December of the same year confirmed decision of the Karabakh population on
their independence.
Wide-scale armed activities in the zone of Armenian-Azerbaijanian conflict
started in the end of 1991. The armed formations of Armenia, equipped with the
latest techniques, conducted armed activities along the entire border of Armenia
and Azerbaijan and in the Nagorny Karabakh region. They were supported by the
Russian army motor-infantry regiment 366, with the help of which Armenians
occupied some Azerbaijanian settlements. In May of the same year, the armed
forces of Armenia occupied Shusha region and drove out some ten thousands of
Azerbaijanians from there. Also in May, the Karabakh forces occupied
Azerbaijanian regional centre Lachin. Thus, Lachin corridor was formed, which
reliably connected the Nagorni Karabakh republic and Armenia. It became
possible, through this corridor, to introduce humanitarian assistance and military
technique into Nagorny Karabakh. In September and December of 1994,
merciless fights were ongoing between the opposing sides, in which tanks,
helicopters, and aviation participated. Armenians gained the final victory. It may
be said that the ethnic cleansing of Nagorny Karabakh thus ended completely,
36
Shishov A. Military conflicts of the XX century, From South Africa to Chechnya. Moscow, 2006, p
521. Efendiev O. op. cit., pp 178-179; The newsp. Bakinski Rabochii. 25 January 1990.
though armed clashes did not finish. From May of 1992 through October of 1993,
Armenians occupied seven regions of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani population was
fully driven out of these regions. On May 12, 1994, the Azerbaijan-Armenia
agreement on ceasefire was in effect, which put an end to occupation of new
territories of Azerbaijan. Within four years, as a result of attacks, the Armenian
side drove about one million Azerbaijanians out of their dwelling places and
occupied about one-fifth of the Azerbaijanian territory.
At the same time, the Azerbaijanian armed forces tried their best to block land
movement between Karabakh and Armenia. In response, the concept of forming
security around Nagorny Karabakh was elaborated in Stepanakert, the capital of
Nagorny Karabakh. Armenians managed to reach success in a whole number of
fights, and it was a fact that there existed a single defense space of Armenia and
Nagorny Karabakh.
During the entire period of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in Nagorny
Karabakh, there were held different high-level talks, but they yielded no essential
results. Russia, as if seeming to be interested in settlement of the conflict, felt that
the opposing sides wouldn‘t make any concession. For Armenians, the main thing
is independence of ―Nagorny Karabakh Republic‖ and removal of economic
blockade for Nagorny Karabakh—equal right participation in the talks; for
Azerbaijan, return of the territories occupied by Armenia and solution of the
refugees problem, which actually means restoration of status-quo were important
factors.
On the other part, Russia is well aware of the decisive role of Azerbaijan now
and in the future in the Caucasus and, generally, in the Caspian region from the
economic viewpoint and in arrangement of geopolitical forces. That‘s why Russia
is interested in disposition of its peacekeeping forces in the region of conflict.
The authorities of Azerbaijan consider it necessary for the conflict settlement
to remove the Armenian forces form the territory of Azerbaijan and to give ―the
widest autonomy‖ to Nagorny Karabakh within Azerbaijan. The Georgian
authorities have nearly analogous scheme of conflicts settlement—both Abkhazia
and ―South Ossetia‖ are to be given the widest autonomy within Georgia.
At present, there is illusionary calm in the zones of conflicts in the South
Caucasus. Unless the separatist forces make just concessions and great states,
especially Russia, evaluate the events with common sense, the renewed conflicts
may bring far more bloodshed and damage, thus incurring irreparable losses to all
of the Caucasus, and neither the countries interested in the Caucasus will be left
aside
II.II.III. Conflict in the Former South Ossetia
No less acute is the conflict situation in the former South Ossetian autonomous
region, which was within Georgia. In connection with formation of this region, we
should remember some issues from the history. Ossets are of Indo-European origin.
They have their historical home country and historically dwelling territory. This
territory was only in the North Caucasus, the territory of present-day North Ossetia.
We should stress once more that their historical home country and the place for
living is in the North Caucasus, beyond the Kavkasioni ridge. The first appearance
of Ossets in Georgia is fixed by the chroniclers in the second half of the XIII
century, when due to Mongols‘ raids and rule of Georgia, the most powerful state of
the Near East, became very weak. In Georgia, namely, in its historical province of
Kartli, this formed terms favorable for appearance of armed formations of Ossets,
which was also in the interests of Mongols for whom Ossets were forced in Georgia
for implementation of their expansionist policy. Ossets stayed in Kartli for 30 years.
After King of Georgia Giorgi Brtskinvale (the Glorious), who reigned in 1314 to
1346, completely cleared Georgia off Mongols, he also annihilated the raiding
groupings of Ossets and drove them out of Georgia. This is mentioned by the old
chroniclers and, namely, the XIV century anonym Georgian historian-chronicler,37
who wrote the history of Georgia from the 10s of the XIII century until the 10s of
the XIV century, and the XVIII century Georgian geographer, historian and
cartographer Vakhushti Batonishvili.38 After that, for two centuries, nothing is
mentioned in the Georgian sources about Ossets being in Georgia.
As it becomes clear from the written literary sources, new settlements of Ossets
were formed in Kartli highlands from the mid-XVII century. This is witnessed by
the Russian Ambassador, who visited Georgia. According to his statement, about
200 Ossets lived there. Immigration of Ossets from their homeland, Ossetia to
Georgia, was caused by the most difficult conditions of Ossets in the North
Caucasus. The raids of Mongols and Tatars and of Tamrlane forced Ossets to seek
shelter in the northern gorges of the Caucasus Mountain. Then, the lowlands
abandoned by Ossets were occupied by Kabardinians, and, after that, Ossets turned
out to be caught in the small-earth mountains. Kabardinians worsened the condition
of Ossets. This was noticed by the European travelers. For example, Jacob Reinegs
(1744 to 1793) said that ― Kabardinians force Ossets to work as slaves and sold
them as soon as they got hold of them on their coming down from the mountains.
There still live old Ossets who are afraid of this and never came down from the
37
Kartlis Tskhovreba. vol. II, Tbilsi, 1959, p 296.
38
Kartli Tskhovreba. vol. IV, 1973, p 256
mountains and never troubled themselves with thinking whether any other worlds or
peoples existed except Caucasus.‖39 As a result, Ossets were forced to live in small-
earth mountains, where the Ossets communities were formed. K. Khjetagurov,
founder of the Ossetian literature, points out that these communities had so many
restricted relations that they failed to communicate.40 Ossets, driven in difficult-to-
access gorges of the North Kavkasioni Ridge, due to permanent fear and hard
conditions, moved to live to southern slopes of the Caucasus ridge and Kartli
highlands. Then, for improving living conditions, they gradually moved to the
lowlands and settled on the lands of the Georgian feudals as migrants. So no talk is
possible about South Ossetia existing in East Georgia, namely, in Kartli. Georgian,
Ossetian, Russian, and other foreign scholars unanimously mention the Ossets‘
migration from the North Caucasus to Georgia, especially in the XIX century. For
example, Andrew Andersen, an American professor of history and politologist,
expert in the Caucasian issues, representative of Calgary University military-
strategic research centre, observes: ―There exists no ‗mythical single Ossetia‘ or any
other Ossetia on the territory of Georgia.‖41
Well-known Russian scholars G. Chursin, V. Pfaf, N. Dubrovin, L. Zagurski,
and others expressed analogous consideration and consider Ossets to be migrants
from North Ossetia to Shida (Inner) Kartli. In G. Chursin‘s opinion, ―On the
territory of South Ossetia, Ossets are comparative newcomers. There lived other
peoples (Georgians are implied here, the authors) there, which preserved
memories about themselves in geographic names of many places.‖42 This opinion
is also shared by Prof. V. Pfaf: ―All the Transcaucausian Ossets remember that
they migrated from the north.‖43 Both G. Chursin and V. Pfaf consider Ossets to
be newcomers to Georgia, who migrated there mostly in the XIX century. As for
the opinion of Acad. N. Dubrovin, he is well aware that there existed no South
Ossetia, and he mentions about Southern Ossets as ―the so-called.‖ He writes:
―Due to lack of agricultural land plots, part of Ossets migrated to the southern
slopes of the Main Kavkasioni Ridge … Occupying the gorges of the rivers of
Didi and Mtsire Liakhvi, Ksani and its tributaries ( i.e., the territories of Georgia,
authors), Ossets became serfs to the princes Eristavis and Mchabelis. Just these
migrants are the so-called South Ossetian population.‖44 It is clear for an expert in
39
J. Rainegs, Travel to Georgia. Tbilisi, 2002, pp 208-209
40
Khetagurov K., Collection of works in V volumes. vol. IV, Moscow, 1960, p 235.
41
The newsp. Sakartvelos Respublika. translated from Russian, 7 April 2006.
42
G. Chursin, Ossets, coll. South Ossetia, 1924, p 133.
43
V. Pfaf, Ethnological research on Ossets, collection of evidences on the Caucasus. N 2.
44
N. Dubrovin, History of the war and rule of Russians in the Caucasus. 1871.
the Caucasian studies that North Ossetia is a historical home country of Ossets:
―Autochtonic Ossetia is located on the northern slopes of the Kaukasus Ridge.‖45
In the opinion of the Ossetian scholars themselves, Ossets came to live in the
regions of Georgia within the XIX century. In the beginning of the XX century,
more than 30 Ossetian settlements were formed on the territory of Georgia. Ossets
settled on the lands of Georgian princes.46
After all said above, the term ―South Ossetia,‖ naturally, has not existed
before. There is no evidence about usage of this term either in the Georgian or in
foreign written sources nearly before the 60s of the XIX century. In the then just
understanding, Ossetia, which was located in North Ossetia, is the country of
Ossets. The written sources give no evidence even on a single fact of using any
determinant to Ossetia—―North‖ or ―South.‖ Neither foreign scholars nor
travelers know the term ―South Ossetia.‖ Only in the second half of the XIX
century do we come across this term, but very rarely. In the 12 volumes of Acts of
Caucasian Archaeological Commission, which deals with 1864 to 1917, and
involves more than 10,000 historical documents in the Georgian, Russian,
Persian, and Turkish languages, the term ―South Ossetia‖ is fixed, but only once.
In the Georgian periodical press of 1852 to 1915, namely, in the journals and
newspapers of more than 30 designations, the term ―South Ossetia‖ is used only
twice. Appearance of the terms ―South Ossetia‖ and ―North Ossetia,‖ along with
the intensive efforts of the Russian imperial forces, was caused by the situation
that Shida Kartli was directly bordered from the north, across the Caucasus Ridge,
by historical Ossetia. This term further prepared fruitful ground for separatist
Ossets‘ territorial claims on the Georgian land and for the idea of unification of
non-existent two Ossetias.
From the XVII to XVIII centuries and the first half of the XIX century,
Ossets lived in Georgia in small amounts. In 1833, the amount of Ossets in
Georgia was 14,000.47 Migration of Ossets to Georgia from North Ossetia, their
historical homeland, was of mass character from 1860. Trustworthy evidence on
this, based on the reliable sources, is given in the Brokgaus and Efron
Encyclopedias. Namely, in 1860, the amount of Ossets living in North Ossetia
was 46,802, and in Georgia—19,324. Twenty years after, in 1880, by the data of
the Caucasus statistics committee, 58,926 lived in North Ossetia, and 51,988 in
45
D. Zagurski, Administrative departments of the Caucasian region, Information of the Caucasian
department. Tbilisi, 1877-78, p 118.
46
B. Kaloev, Ossets. Moscow, 1967, p 61.
47
The newsp. Tifliskie Vedomosti. N 72, 1830
Georgia.48 Such unequal growth points that in that period, Ossets came to live in
Georgia in great amounts. On the basis of the analysis of population natural
movement (birthrate and death rate),49 the amount of Ossets that moved to
Georgia to live made up 18,000. Ossetian scholar B. Kabulov says that Ossets
migrated to Georgia from the North Caucasus and settled first in Kartli highlands,
then gradually moved to Kartli lowlands and all of Georgia.50 Just due to this, if in
1926, in Georgia the number of Ossets was 113,000 and 60,000 of them lived on
the territory of the former South Ossetian autonomous region, 53,000 beyond its
borders, in the pre-conflict period, then in 1989, the amount of Ossets in Georgia
was already 164,000, among them 65,000 in the former region and nearly 100,000
lived beyond its borders, mostly in the regions of East Georgia. Attention should
be paid to little growth, by 4.9 thousand (8%) in the number of Ossets in the
autonomous region from 1926 to 1989, and beyond its borders, by 47,000 (87%).
After dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia failed to reconcile with the loss
of its influence in the former allied republics and tried to restore it with all
possible ways and measures. The Russian reactionary forces facilitated the
Ossetian separatists to create a false past by rewriting the history anew, thus
turning upside down a true history of the relations between the Georgian and
Ossetian peoples. Formation of the South Ossetian autonomous region on the
territory of Georgia, on the historically and culturally Georgian land, was dictated
then by the Russian imperial forces. Ossets started fighting for appropriation of
the Georgian territories. This process finally ended in formation of the South
Ossetian autonomous region on the Shida Kartli territory.
Before that, when Georgia declared its independence and was a democratic
republic from 1918 to 1921, three revolts were organized, dictated by Bolshevik
Russia, to overthrow independent republic of Georgia, on the Shida Kartli
territory settled by Ossets. Despite the fact that, according to the agreement
concluded on May 7, 1920, between Georgia and Russia, the latter recognized
Georgia‘s state independence and shouldered the obligation not to interfere into
the internal affairs of Georgia; before and after that, Russia kept undermining the
foundations of Georgia‘s independence. In such a tense situation, chairman of the
government of Georgia N. Zhordania appealed to representatives of England,
France, the USA, and Italy in Tbilisi with the following statement: ―We have
received de facto recognition, for which we express our deep gratitude, but …
only mere recognition gave us no advantage for final preserving of our freedom
48
Encyclopedic Dictionary. vol. XXII, St Petersburg, 1897, p 263.
49
Collection of evidences on the Caucasus. vol. IX, Tiflis, 1885, pp 238, 267.
50
Demographic encyclopedic dictionary. Moscow, 1985, p 545.
and state existence … The attitude of our allied countries in protecting our
northern borders was especially a heavy blow for us, as Bolsheviks try to dissolve
our state from there. We have more than once raised the petition for assistance
with ammunition and food in this struggle. We were promised this assistance …
but have received by now no bullets, no bread from you … Time has come when
we cannot wait any more and cannot be satisfied with promises only … We are
left alone again, probably, because your governments are unaware of the situation,
or of the efforts to dissolve our republic by the Bolshevik Russia are not
considered to be violation of your interests. In such a situation, supreme interests
of our people dictate the government of Georgia to immediately find the ways for
salvation without your assistance, without taking your interests into
consideration.‖51
In such a difficult situation, when the Russian Red Army units were
approaching Georgia‘s borders, Ossets in Shida Kartli arranged several uprisings.
The commanders of the Russian 11th army put hopes on the revolted Ossets with the
aim of attacking Georgia and expanding Soviet power in it. In the memorandum
adopted by the revolted Ossets, they supported the ―communist revolts started in
South Ossetia, in Tbilisi and Kutaisi gubernias, where everything was matured and
even over-matured for an upheaval.‖52 The revolted Ossets demanded autonomy
and integration into the Soviet Russia. The Bolshevik Russia annexed Georgia in
1921, and on February 25, declared it to be the Soviet republic. For their assistance
in this, Ossets received autonomy in 1922, with the status of an autonomous region
on the historical Shida Kartli territory. It should be mentioned that a part of Shida
Kartli northern territory settled with Ossets was so small that there existed no
ground for an autonomous formation. Thus, to justify formation of an autonomous
region, they joined to it the lands settled with Georgians, among them Tskhinvali,
which became the capital. Ossets have never lived either on these lands or in
Tskhinvali. The name ―Tskhinvli‖ is of Georgian origin and means ―hornbeam,‖ a
species of tree. Tskhinvali has been for centuries an important trade centre of
Georgia, settled with Georgians.
Thus, the ―South Ossetian autonomous region‖ was artificially formed on the
Shida Kartli territory, while it has been a centre of consolidation of historically
Kartvelian tribes of Shida Kartli. By forming an autonomous district, a delayed-
action bomb was laid for pressing Georgia in an analogous situation, which was
successfully used by the Russian reactionary forces after the dissolution of the
51
A. Mentheshashvili, Ossetian separatism in 1918-1920. Appendix see: The Ossetian Issue. Tb.,
1996, pp 308-309.
52
Ibid., p 304.
Soviet Union and the declaration of Georgia‘s independence in 1991. These forces
take no heed of regular processes of historical development and try to return the
processes back to former space. That‘s why they aspire to expand, deepen, and
prolong the conflict as much as they can and thus to press Georgia, as the country
is located in such geopolitical and geo-economic space, where the interests of big
countries are crossed. It‘s clear that this conflict is inspired by the Russian
reactionary forces and a handful of local separatists. It needs no proof that self-
proclaimed republic of South Ossetia, the population of which does not reach
even 50,000 by now, will fail to maintain a sufficient amount of armed forces to
equip them with latest expensive combat technique and to blackmail Georgia. So
the present conflict is a political conflict between Russia and Georgia; Russia
keeps trying to turn it into an ethnic conflict between Georgians and Ossets and
succeeded in this. These conflicts took away numerous lives of both Georgians
and Ossets.
To make the course of events clear, the following should be mentioned. On
September 20, 1990, ―South Ossetia‖ was declared an independent republic of
South Ossetia. On December 10, of the same year, the Supreme Council of
Georgia abolished the South Ossetian autonomy. Both of these resolutions were
abolished by the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union.
On January 5 to 6, 1991, for protecting the population of the region and
putting order there, the authorities of Georgia introduced the militia and Guards
units, which were opposed by the local and the North Caucasian forces. The latter
were backed by the Russian combat technique and Russian servicemen. Nearly
the entire Georgian population and 30,000 Ossets left the region.
Armed clashes in ―South Ossetia‖ mostly ended on July 14, 1992, when heads
of states of Georgia and Russia signed an agreement on the principles for peaceful
settlement of the conflicts in ―South Ossetia.‖ In compliance with the agreement,
mixed forces of Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian battalions were introduced into
the zone of Georgian-Ossetian conflict to defend peace. Comparative calm was
established. The autonomy of ―South Ossetia,‖ using this calm, is adopting a
whole number of illegal decisions as dictated by Russia. In December of 1997,
despite the protest of official Tbilisi, the autonomy parliament, within the CIS,
voted for independence of the republic of South Ossetia. On April 8, 2001, the
constitution of the republic of ―South Ossetia‖ was adopted, the first article of
which says: ―The republic of ‗South Ossetia‘ is an independent, sovereign,
democratic state.‖ This means that de-facto authorities of ―South Ossetia‖ did not
want a constructive dialogue for settlement of the conflict. At the same time,
Russia did everything to retain its influence on at least at the part of the territory
of Georgia. Russia simplified the procedure of receiving Russian passports for the
citizens of ―South Ossetia.‖ As a result, a great majority of ―South Ossetia‖

residents received Russian citizenship. This is the reason why Russia turns no
attention to permanent armed incidents arranged by ―South Ossetia‖ de-facto
authorities against Georgia and openly declares it will defend the rights of its
citizens in ―South Ossetia.‖ Thus, Russia strives to annex the territory of Georgia.
If we take into consideration the events and processes developed around the
present conflict within last century, we may say that history is repeated. From
1918 to 1920, when Georgia got rid of the Russian Empire and gained
independence, the present-day events were as like as two peas. Dictated by the
Russian reactionary forces, the present Ossetian separatists, like those in the past,
demand the status of ―independent republic‖ on the territory of central part of
Georgia and integration into Russia.
This groundless, unsubstantiated demand was responded to by a renowned
scholar, head of the ethnography department of the Caucasian peoples, the
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Academy of Science of Russia, S.
Arutinov. Answering the correspondent‘s question: ―Remember how this terrible
fire burst out in South Ossetia only because Ossetia declared itself a state
independent from Georgia,‖ he wrote in the journal Rodina (#1, 1992, p 71): ―The
conflict was unavoidable, if we take into consideration that it is not Ossetia at all,
but the central part of Georgia from time immemorial, where the Ossetian
population settled in abundance within last centuries. Ossets, surely, have the
right to live there, but they have no right to declare their independent state on the
mentioned territory. North Ossetia is a different case.‖53
That‘s true; North Ossetia is a different case. To take no care of past mistakes
may result in the jeopardy of repeating a greater tragedy. The majority of thinking
and the sensible part of the Ossetian people feel this and condemn this senseless
and groundless act of a small group of the Ossetian separatists. World-renowned
Ossetian scholar V. Abaev, who worked in Moscow, published an article The
Tragedy of South Ossetia. Based on the historical realities, he objectively
evaluated the processes ongoing in ―South Ossetia‖ in the beginning of the 1990s.
He wrote: ―I would like to be unbiased and clear up whether there were some
hasty, senseless activities of Ossets, who intensified the contradictions through
provocation. I would like also to say that such events took place then. I mean
declaration of sovereignty, which was fully orientated to Moscow with the
prospect of uniting South and North Ossetia in the future. Aspirations of South
Ossetians to join their Northern tribesmen can be understood from the human
53
Cited: A. Mentheshashvili. Ossetian separatism in 1918-1920. See the book: The Ossetian Issue. p
297.
viewpoint. However, from the geopolitical viewpoint it is a mistake. The Main

Caucasus Ridge is a natural border between Georgia and Ossetia, and any efforts
of removing this border will cause permanent conflicting situation between
Georgians and Ossets. To restore traditional friendly relations, first of all, the talk
should stop on separation of Ossetia from Georgia. No authorities of Georgia will
agree with this. And they will be right.‖ In his opinion, South Ossetia should free
itself from this showing ―sovereignty.‖54
On August 7, 2008, the conflict in ―South Ossetia‖ resumed. However great the
mistakes of the authorities of Georgia are in the conflict, however unconsidered and
unforeseen is the start of the armed clashes in Tskhinvali on the side of Georgian
authorities (in case this is confirmed by the unbiased international commission), we
consider that, globally, it was entirely provoked by Russia. For years, by ignoring
Georgia‘s state interests and elementary international norms, Russia granted the
citizens of Georgia living in the Tskhinvali region the citizenship of Russia and
distributed Russian passports; later, on the pretext of protecting its citizens,
launched the attack, long-term military activities in Central and West Georgia and
Abkhazia, violating the principle of proportion along with the principles of the
international law and Council of Europe, which the Russian Federation was
committed to observe as one of its members. It is directly mentioned in the
resolution adopted by Council of Europe on Georgia: according to the norms of the
international law, to protect the citizens abroad is unacceptable and depends on the
political activities of Russia in regard to the countries, in which a great amount of its
citizens live. Russia tries to justify its intervention into Georgia by the need of
protecting ―South Ossetia‖ from the Georgian army, but the western countries
consider that, along with dominance in the Caucasian region, Russia‘s aim in the
war against Georgia was to deprive NATO of the possibility of expanding in this
region.
Russia annexed an important part of the territory of Georgia, which was
preceded by bombing of the territory of the sovereign country by the aggressor,
the most serious crimes against the Georgian military units and unprotected,
peaceful population: murders, robbing, marauding and insults. Twenty-two
villages were fully left by their Georgian citizens; numerous houses and material
property and historical monuments were destroyed and ruined in the Georgian
cities and villages. According to the resolution of Council of Europe, as a result of
the war, there were 192,000 internally displaced persons (IDP); 300 people died
and about 500 were wounded on the side of ―South Ossetia‖ and Russia, and 364
54
V. Abaev. Tragedy of South Ossetia: the way to accord. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 January 1992, N
13.
died and 2,234 were wounded on the side of Georgia.55 At the same time, Russia
recognized unilateral independence of Abkhazia and ―South Ossetia‖ as two
integral parts of Georgia. The resolution of the Council of Europe states that ―the
Assembly demands Russia to acknowledge that recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia by it is violation of the principles of the international law and Council
of Europe. The Assembly considers this step of Russia to be violation of the
borders of Georgia and occupation of its territory. That‘s why the Assembly
demands from Russia to abolish recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.‖ The
Assembly appeals to all the members of the organization and the states with the
status of observers not to recognize independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
to acknowledge ethnic cleansing on the territory controlled by Russia or South
Ossetia de-facto power. The Assembly especially stresses the examples of ethnic
cleansing in ―South Ossetia,‖ the Georgian villages and the so-called buffer zones,
conducted by regular militaries and separate groupings and being conducted even
after the agreement on a cease-fire. The fact is of special mention that Russia
observed only partially the agreement, concluded through the mediation of the
Council of Europe, on removing its armed units from the so-called buffer zones.
For example, Russian regular armed units occupied the Akhalgori region and did
not leave this territory; it was controlled by the central authorities of Georgia, and
there have never been any conflicts between the Georgian and the Ossetian
population there. Russia did not remove its armed forces from Zemo Abkhazeti
(Upper Abkhazia), Sachkhere region, etc. Russia did not return to the initial pre-
conflict stage, as it was determined by the agreement. At the same time, Russia
increased its army contingent in Abkhazia and ―South Ossetia.‖ By recognizing
independence of Abkhazia and ―South Ossetia,‖ Russia violated all the
fundamental norms and resolutions of the UN Security Council, in which Russia
itself fixed support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia. All of
this requires more intensive efforts for settlement of the conflicts.
II.II.IV. Conflict in Abkhazia
Abkhazia was within Georgia with the status of an autonomous republic.

According to the population census of 1989, its population was 525,000. The
majority of its population was Georgians—240,000 (45.7%); there were also
55
The resolution adopted by Council of Europe on the Georgia-Russia war. The newsp. Sakartvelos
Republika. 7 October 2008.
Abkhazs—93,000 (17.8%); Armenians—77,000 (14.6%); and Russians—75,000

(14.3%).
The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict officially started in August of 1992, when
on the decision of the Georgian authorities, the armed units of interior ministry,
and defence ministry moved from Tbilisi to Abkhazia. This was really caused by
regular robbing of freight railway carriages on the Abkhazian section of the
Georgian railway and the kidnapping of Georgian officials. The losses reached
billions of Russian rubles. The armed forces that came to put order were violently
resisted in Abkhazia. Finally, the Georgian army was forced to leave Abkhazia,
because the fight was, in fact, between Russia and Georgia. The plan was also
worked out in Russia. The Georgian armed forces had to fight against Abkhaz
separatists, well-equipped by Russia, Russian military technique and, to some
extent, Russian citizens and disguised Russian servicemen. This resulted in a
complete change of demographic conditions in Abkhazia. Russians and
Armenians became a majority of the population, while Georgians were
completely driven out of this territory. This was a merciless and full ethnic
cleansing.
The beginning of the conflict was preceded by extreme intensification of the
separatist forces, which was organized by Russia. Dictated by the Russian
reactionary forces, the separatist forces tried to mislead their compatriots, as if
Georgians were persecuting their language, literature; and the Abkhazian culture
in general, blocked development of Abkhazian schools. They also tried to
persuade their people that historically only Abkhazs lived in Abkhazia, and
Georgians kept impeding socio-economic development of Abkhazia. But real
history is not such.
Abkhazia was always an indivisible, organic, integral part of Georgia. The
Kartvelian tribes have lived here from time immemorial. Numerous materials are
preserved about it in old Greek and Georgian sources. A bit later, in addition to
Greek, other foreign sources mostly confirm this, as well. Abkhazia always
belonged to the Georgian world from political, economic, and cultural viewpoints
and was the same historical-geographic part of Georgia as Kartli, Kakheti,
Samtskhe, Egrisi, etc. A prominent Abkhaz scholar H. Bghazhba points out that
―Intensive cultural closeness of Abkhazia with Georgia, first of all, is expressed in
that the Georgian language is the language of writing, state office work, and
church service in that period.‖56 If the local population did not understand the
Georgian language, then it could not have fulfilled the function of literary, state
office work, and church service language. The spread of the Georgian written
56
Bgazhba X. From the history of written language in Abkhazia. Tbilisi, 1968, p 12.
language in Abkhazia is witnessed by the Georgian inscriptions on the walls of

the old churches, dated by the X century and the further period. H. Bghazhba
states that the epigraphic monuments of the XI to XIV centuries found on the
territory of Abkhazia are done in Georgian and Georgian, and written language
was spread in Abkhazia until the XX century.57 It was quite natural, because the
Kartvelian tribes have lived in Abkhazia since ancient times. This is surely
witnessed by old Georgian and later by other foreign sources, as well. Abkhazia,
along with other parts of Georgia, intensively acted for establishment of the
Georgian statehood.
From the XVI to XVII centuries, single Georgia weakened politically and
economically from the numerous permanent invasions of foreign occupants,
divided into separate principalities. According to the widely spread theory on
Abkhazs ethno-genesis, just in that period, on the territory of present-day
Abkhazia, there is formed a new ethnic unit, which generated As a result of
merging of Georgians and Abazs (Abasa) tribes mostly migrated from the North
Caucasus through the Bzipi gorge. They called themselves Apsuas, and then
adopted the name of the local, ancient ethnic tribe, ―Abkhaz.‖ The famous linguist
B. Unbegaun mentions: ―The Abkhazian language, along with Circassian and
Kabardinian, belong to different, North Caucasian groups. But from geographical,
political, and economic viewpoints, Abkhazia always belonged to Georgia and
was its northeastern province.‖58
It should be mentioned that in old Georgian sources, Abkhaz had the same
content as the representatives of Megrelian, Svan, and other Kartvelian tribes. The
fact of Apsuas‘ migration from the North Caucasus was clearly confirmed by
linguistic material, toponyms, anthropology, names, and folklore. For example,
Turk traveler Evlia Cheleb, who was in Abkhazia in 1641, wrote that the Chach
tribe living there spoke Megrelian among themselves.59 Megrelian is one of the
dialects of the group of Kartvelian languages. Englishman Belly observed in the
30s of the XIX century, that Abkhazs living in the surroundings of Likhni spoke
Megrelian.60 Likhni was an important cultural centre in the Middle Ages, and, in
the later period, was the residence of the Abkhaz rulers. Many such examples may
be cited.
57
Ibid., pp 25, 30
58
Unbegaun B. Russian Surnames. Translated from English. Moscow, 1989, p 291. Unbegaun B.O.
Russian Surnames. Oxford University Press, London, 1972.
59
The Book of Evlia Cheleb travels. Section I, Tbilisi, 1971, p 100.
60
Dyachkov-Tarasov A. Gagra and its surroundings. Tiflis, 1903, pp 36-37.
Numerous toponyms of Georgian origin, especially oiconyms (names of

settlements) and hydronyms, namely potamonyms (names of rivers) are
trustworthy facts witnessing the fact of Kartvelian tribes living in Abkhazia from
time immemorial. A great amount of toponyms are of Georgian origin and involve
many centuries. It is known that the name of Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, is
of Georgian origin, and it is mentioned in the Georgian sources from the VIII
century. The names of other settlements, slopes, mountains, and ridges on the
territory of present-day Abkhazia are also explained on the basis of the Kartvelian
languages. Thirty rivers flow on the territory of Abkhazia between the rivers of
Enguri and Gumista, and 28 of them are of Georgian origin. Toponyms of
Georgian origin on the territory of Abkhazia point to the fact that Abkhazia was
settled with the Kartvelian tribes.
It is of great importance that anthropologically Abkhazs reveal far more
closeness with Georgians than with Circassians. Abkhaz professor Sh. Inal-ipa,
who in many cases is biased in analyzing the issues of history and population of
Abkhazia, is forced to talk about this reliable fact: ―Anthropologically, the
present-day Abkhazs belong to one west Caucasian type, express closeness with,
on the one part, west Kartvelian and, on the other, the Circassian population.
However, anthropological likeness is more expressed with west Georgians than
with Circassians, despite the fact that the latter, together with Abkhazs,
linguistically belong to one special group of Abkhaz-Adygeian family. The
specialists consider proved Abkhazs‘ anthropological likeness with Megrelians,
also Gurian and Adjarian groups, in conditions of comparatively big separation
from Adygeis.‖61 Therefore, anthropologically, Abkhazs are far closer to
Georgians (Megrelians, Gurians, Adjarians) than to Circassians and, all the more,
to other peoples living in the North Caucasus.
Far more interesting and scientifically acceptable is the conclusion made by
Russian anthropologist and expert in Caucasian studies Acad. V. Alexeev on
Abkhazs, as compared with Adygeis. Being anthropologically closer to the
Georgian world, he says they joined the group of Adygei families later. Namely,
he says the following: ―Anthropological evidences witness historical relations of
Abkhazs more with Georgian than Adygei world. Abkhazs joined the family of
Adygei people languages later and in any case it is a secondary event in their
ethnic history.‖62 From the quotation cited by Acad. V. Alexeev, only one
conclusion can be made: Abkhazs belong to the Georgian world, and their joining
to the group of Adygei families was conducted after Apsuas migrated to the
61
Inal-Ipa. Sh. Abkhazs. Sukhumi, 1965, p 50.
62
Alexeev V. Origin of peoples of Caucasus. Moscow, 1974, p 194.
territory of present-day Abkhazia. The same is proved by the Abkhaz surnames of

Georgian origin.
Prof. T. Mibchuani grouped Abkhazs according to the origin of names.63 It
turned out that 72.7% of Abkhaz names were Georgian, 23.5% were Adygei-
Circassian-Abazin, and 3.8% were mostly of Turkish, Persian, and Russian origin.
In total, 303 of 4,127 Abkhaz names are Georgian.
If we make proportional division of the amount of present-day Abkhazs
according to the origin of Abkhaz names, then from the total amount (93,267
Abkhazs lived in Abkhazia in 1989) of Abkhazs, 67,805 are genetically of
Georgian origin; 21,917 of Adygei-Circassian-Abazin origin, and 3,544 were
mostly Turkish, Persian, and Russian. Certainly, here, the talk is only about
genetic origin.
Georgian origin of the tribes living in Abkhazia is witnessed by Abkhazian
folklore; for example, first of all by an ancient epos of Narts.
The epos describes events taking place beyond the ridge in the North
Caucasus, on the river Kuban bank. The people living there always wanted to go
beyond the ridge, to Abkhazia. This is expressed in The Legend of the Abkhaz
Prince. The legend tells about Achba, who while hunting ―saw the sea beyond the
ridge.‖ According to the legend, people‘s memory kept migration of the North
Caucasian tribes to Abkhazia. Namely, Achba and his brothers wanted to settle on
the Abkhaz land, and, when they got such a permit, they stuck four arrows in the
place they wanted to live and thus settled in Abkhazia.64
Analogous examples may be cited in abundance, but what was said witnesses
clearly that Apsuas migrated to the present-day territory of Abkhazia from the
North Caucasus and got ancient ethnic name of Abkhaz. Within a period of time,
Apsuas merged with the native Georgian population. The first stage for those who
came was to master local agricultural activities. This promoted the development
of ethnic processes with local indigenous populations. The process of merging
was more intensive in the northern part of historical Abkhazia than in the south.
Abkhazs have lived peacefully with Georgians for centuries. The relations
were fine, and they respected each other. However, the Russian imperial
intentions and aggressive colonization policy, starting from the tsarist period, split
these relations. Especially from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian
reactionary circles tried their best to influence Georgia through Abkhazia to
preserve their rule there. The Russian government considered Sokhumi their
63
T. Mibchuani. Along the bloody traces of the Abkhaz separatism. Tbilisi, 1994. pp 15, 82-88.
64
S. Zuhba. Abkhazian folklore. Tbilisi, 1988, pp 365-366.
support in the Black Sea region still in the 1820s, and thought final occupation of
the Caucasus was in invasion and colonization of the Black Sea coastline.65
The Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia had extremely privileged conditions
as compared with other national-state formations in the former Soviet Union.
Abkhazia was the only republic among the Soviet Union autonomies, the
constitution of which recognized Abkhazian as the state language, and its social,
economic, and cultural development was ongoing at high speed. A few examples
are enough to illustrate this.
It‘s impossible to talk about any pressure on the Abkhazian literature and
language. The Abkhazia literature was published in far greater numbers than the
literature of any other ethnic group living in the Soviet Union. In 1988, before the
Soviet Union dissolution, there were published fiction of 4.3 designation per each
10,000 Abkhazs, nearly 15 times more than the Russian literature per each 10,000
Russians in the Soviet Union, 21.5 times more than Ukrainian, 43 times more than
Uzbek, etc. This refers not only to 1988. Within tens of years, the Abkhazian
literature was always in the first place.66 It should be mentioned that when, in all
of the North Caucasus, there was not a single school where teaching was in the
languages of native ethnic groups, in 1989 to 1990 academic year there functioned
73 Abkhazian schools in Abkhazia.
The Abkhaz separatists declare that Georgians should be ashamed that in
entire Abkhazia the native population, Abkhazs, is 17%. There is no such
precedent all over the world that the indigenous population is less than one-fifth
of the entire population. They say this is the result of not Georgians‘ natural, but
of their intensive, migration processes. They seem ―to forget‖ that Georgians
living in Abkhazia are the native population, and together with Abkhazs, they
make up 62% of the entire population of Abkhazia. The Georgian population in
Abkhazia increased mostly as result of natural growth. For example, from 1926 to
1979, the amount of Georgians in Abkhazia increased from 72,000 to 213,000,
i.e., 2.9 times (as compared with 1886, which was 7.5 times. In 1886, the amount
and composition of the population in the South Caucasus were established
according to some demographic signs based on the family lists). Armenians
increased from 25,000 to 73,000, i.e., 2.9 times (as compared with 1886, which
was 67 times); Russians in 1926 to 1970, increased from 12,000 to 93,000, i.e.,
65
Dyachkov-Tarasov A. Abkhazia and Sukhum in the XIX century. Proceedings of the Caucasian
department of the Imperial Russian geographic society, vol. XX (1909-1910), N 2, Tiflis, pp
154-155.
66
UEER press in 1988. Moscow, 1989, pp 100, 128-131.
7.8 times (as compared with 1886, which was 76.4 times).67 As we see, nothing
special and unusual happened with regard to Georgians, but the Abkhaz
separatists considered that a low share of Abkhazs in the population of Abkhazia
was caused by migration of Georgians there, which is not true. This is also proved
by the following fact. Even if the Georgian population had not lived in Abkhazia
in 1989, at all, the share of the Abkhaz population in the entire population of
Abkhazia would have been 32%. This is because the positive balance of migration
and indicators of natural growth in Abkhazia are far higher in other nationalities
living in Abkhazia.
It should be also mentioned in this regard that the population of the cities in
Abkhazia kept growing mostly at the expense of the population coming there from
other republics. It is interesting from this viewpoint, to examine the census data of
the city population in 1922. According to the census data, of the 4,992 Greeks
living in Sokhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, 3,381 were born beyond the borders
of Georgia; of the 4,467 Russians, 3,400 were born beyond the borders of
Georgia, and of the 1,889 Armenians, 1,123 were born beyond the borders of
Georgia. Analogous data are on the Gudauta population. More than half of its
population was born beyond the borders of Georgia (mostly Russians, Greeks, and
Armenians). In 1922, Abkhazs living both in Sokhumi and Gudauta were in a
small number. They were 2.4% and 6.5% of the entire population, respectively.68
In 1886, by the Russian state census, only three Abkhazs lived in Sokhumi: one
man and two women. The main population of Sokhumi was Georgians.
Formally, Russia always recognized that Abkhazia was an organic and
integral part of Georgia. It was the same in the period of tsarist Russia, when in
1864, the principality of Abkhazia was abolished and that historically important
part (province) of Georgia with great traditions was turned into one ordinary
military department. The thing is that this military department was also joined to
Georgia, namely, it was introduced within Kutaisi (the second most important city
in Georgia) gubernia.
Abkhazia has been within Georgia in the entire XX century. This was
preserved even in the 10s and 20s of last century, in the period of hard political
processes and revolutions.
The act of Georgia‘s independence of May 26, 1918, was signed by Abkhazs
as well. Still, on May 7, 1920, by the agreement between Russia and Georgia,
signed by Vladimir Lenin, Russia recognized Abkhazia within Georgia, as its
67
Code of statistical data on the population of Transcaucasus extracted from the family lists of 1886.
Tiflis, 1893, Size and structure of the USSR population. Moscow, 1985, p 124..
indispensable part. In the constitution of 1924, of the Soviet Union and in all the
following soviet constitutions, Abkhazia is mentioned as an autonomous republic
within Georgia. Unlike Georgia, Abkhazia has never been a subject of
international law and has never concluded any international agreements, even
with Russia. In December of 1922, when the Soviet Union was formed, Georgia,
and not Abkhazia, entered it as a separate republic. Abkhazia then was also
recognized as an integral part of Georgia.
It may be surely concluded that the conflict in Abkhazia is neither ethnic nor
ethno-demographic, but it is an artificially organized military-political conflict.
Therefore, all of this should be taken into consideration while settling it. The
conflict settlement should be guided only with the principle of Georgia‘s
territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders, and also with the
principle that all possible conditions should be formed for Abkhazia for its
political, socio-economic, and cultural development. The single state of Georgia
should be the guarantor of this. Guarantees for institutional strengthening of the
Abkhaz people‘s rights should be expressed in the constitutions of both Georgia
and Abkhazia. So, Abkhazia should be one such subject within Georgia, which
has the especially high status of state-territorial formation. Abkhazia, being within
the single state of Georgia, should have its constitution, legislative and executive
power, and other attributes of the statehood.
Such are the visions and proposals to Abkhazia for the settlement of the
conflict made by Georgia starting from 1993. These proposals of Georgia are
supported and shared by the UN, OSCE, EU, the western states, and the USA.
Unfortunately, under the influence of the Russian aggressive circles, the Abkhaz
separatists do not accept them. Like in South Ossetia, settlement of the conflict in
Abkhazia becomes very difficult, as Russia roughly violated both the international
norms and the legislation of Russia itself.
II.2.5. Conflict in Chechnya
The Caucasian peoples living in the North Caucasus had state formations and
were within the Russian Federation. Namely, Kabardian-Balkaria, North Ossetia,
Chechen-Ingushetia, and Dagestan were autonomous republics, and Adygeya and
Karachaev-Circassia were autonomous areas. Adygeya and Karachaev-Circassia,
correspondingly, were within the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories of the
68
Results of 30 November 1922 census of the urban population of all Georgia. Part I. Demography.
Section 2, Tpilisi, 1924, p 14.
Russian Federation. At present, 89 regions are subjects of the Russian Federation..

They belong to two categories. The first category involves 32 national-territorial
formations, among them: 21 republics, 10 autonomous areas, and one autonomous
region. The other category includes 57 territorial formations settled mostly with
Russians. The term ―federation subjects‖ is used after spring of 1992, when they
heads of these formations, except Chechnya and Tatarstan, signed an agreement
on division of powers between the regions and the federal power. All the
autonomous formations of the Caucasian peoples mentioned above received the
status of a republic. The above-mentioned, so-called federal agreement was
preceded by tension in the national relations, including armed ethnic conflicts in
the territory of the former Soviet Union in the end of the 1980s, and the beginning
of the 1990s. After dissolution of the Soviet Union, several long-armed conflicts
took place in the post-soviet space, which sacrificed tens of thousands of human
lives. There was a confrontation in the Russian Federation between the federal
and republican powers on the issues of sovereignty of republics, territorial
problems between the federal subjects, etc.
According to the level and character of ethnic confrontation on the territory of
Russia, there are three main zones distinguished. All these zones are within the
area of the North Caucasus. The zones of armed regional and ethnic conflicts are
those regions in which armed activities were ongoing and now spontaneous
attacks took place. Such zones are the suburban territories of the Republic of
Chechnya and the Republic of North Ossetia—Alania. Dagestan and Karachaev-
Circassian territories belong to the zone of ethno-political tension. The third
ethno-political tension potential zone involves Kabardian-Balkar, southern regions
of Stavropol and Krasnodar areas, also Tatarstan, Bashkiria, and Tuva.69 Though
there are no vividly expressed ideological and political conflicts in this zone, there
are open confrontations between different ethnic groups, which may turn into
acute armed conflicts in certain conditions. So, the ethnic conflicts in the Russian
Federation are mostly concentrated in the North Caucasus and are promoted by
ethnic diversity of this region, territorial claims and experience in historical
struggle for independence.
Influence of the Soviet Union‘s dissolution on Russia‘s internal situation most
of all was expressed in Chechnya, where on October 27, 1991, the presidential
elections were held. The elections were won by major-general Johar Dudaev,
commander of heavy bomber division located in Estonia, head of Tartu garrison,
who resigned from military service in 1990. On November 1, J. Dudaev issued an
order ―on declaring sovereignty of Republic of Chechnya.‖ At the same time, an
69
Report on human potential development in the Russian Federation. Moscow, 1997, p 75.
organization of Chechen armed formations was started. The amount of regular

Chechen army reached 15,000. The army was equipped with the latest techniques.
Dudaev‘s formations received the armaments free of charge after the Russian
military divisions were removed from Chechnya.
The same day, when J. Dudaev declared sovereignty of the Republic of
Chechnya, the V congress of the Russian Federation public deputies recognized
the presidential elections in Chechnya as illegitimate, as an act opposing the
Constitution of Russia. In such conditions, tension kept growing at the border
with Chechnya. In 1992, the Russian army entered the zone of Ossetian-Ingush
conflict. The Chechen armed formations moved to meet it. Long talks began
between official Moscow and Dudaev‘s power. Such talks were held more than
once during the conflict, but yielded no results. The capital of Chechnya, Grozny,
As a result of bloodshedding struggles, time and again changed ownership and,
finally, was ruined. The federal forces had to occupy one and the same settlement
for several times. The area and scales of the battles kept expanding, and in 1995,
the armed clashes were already ongoing everywhere. All the types of latest
armament were used in the battle: planes, tanks, armored carriers, anti-aircraft
guns, guns, automatic rifles, etc. On April 22, 1996, Johar Dudaev was shot from
the combat helicopter as a result of a rocket attack—an aviation rocket was
directed at the signal of his cell-phone. The obligations of head of the republic
were undertaken by Vice-president Zelimkhan Yandarbiev. He left for Moscow to
hold talks. In June, the local parliamentary elections were held in Chechnya, but
the armed forces were against such peaceful process. They attacked Grozny, and,
as a result of bloodshedding battles, the federal forces were defeated, which was
publicly recognized by President Boris Yeltsin of Russia. A decision was adopted
to start a decisive attack on Grozny, but General Alexandr Lebed, Russian
Security Council secretary, achieved abolishment of this decision. But such
measures did not change events. Though General Lebed signed an agreement with
the Chechen authorities on removal of the federal forces from Chechnya, this did
not suspend the armed clashes. Only temporary peace settled.
After the federal forces left, the former Soviet colonel A. Maskhadov won in
Chechnya. President B. Yeltsin and he signed a peace treaty between Chechnya
and Russia. The sides shouldered the obligations not to use any force against each
other. Legally this meant de-facto recognition of Chechnya by the Russian
Federation. Thus, the I War in Chechnya ended. As military historian A. Shishov
points, ―Russia has lost nearly 6,000 dead and missing servicemen, border guards,
militiamen and security service employees. This war in Chechnya, by some
evaluations took away 70 to 80,000 human lives. Most of them were peaceful
citizens, a major part of which died As a result of artillery fire and bombing.‖70
Russia failed to agree with Chechnya‘s independence, be it even de-facto. It
was clear Russia wouldn‘t permit such a precedent, as it could be followed by the
struggle of the North Caucasian republics for independence and later by
disintegration of the Russian Federation according to the ethnic-territorial signs.
They were well aware of such a situation in Chechnya. So the sides were
preparing for new armed clashes. The number of the Chechen formations
increased with foreign, especially Arab, mercenaries. Among them was Arab
Khatab, who trained saboteurs and headed financing of terrorist acts.
Confrontation was strengthening, and, in August of 1999, the II War started in
Chechnya. The Chechen detachments, headed by General Shamil Bassaev and
Arab Khatab, attacked neighboring Dagestan to expand the front of resistance
against Russia. They hoped for support of Vahabists, which then formed
―independent territories‖ in Dagestan. But the Dagestan population did not
support them, and they were finally forced to find shelter in Chechnya. In
September of 1999, the federal forces attacked Chechnya, and in February of
2000, occupied Grozny. In the end, the federal army established control over
some regions of Chechnya and formed a system of block-posts over the entire
territory. After that, Maskhadov‘s forces abstained from directly attacking the
federal forces and started partisan movement and terrorist acts. In the following
years, the federal forces managed to either annihilate the big Chechen formations
or to disintegrate them into small groups for better conducting the armed clashes.
After Khatab died, foreign mercenaries started to leave Chechnya. Chechens
continued their fight for independence through arranging the terrorist acts. During
one such terrorist act, President Ahmad Kadirov of Chechnya died; he had
conducted loyal policies with Russia.71 Though there are not wide-scale attacks
taking place now, neither was peace established finally in Chechnya, which kept
fighting for its independence and freedom.
70
Shishov A. Military conflicts of the XX century. From South Africa to Chechnya. Moscow, 2006, p
562.
71
Shishov A. Op.cit., pp 560-564.
Chapter 3
DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION
IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
Perfect highlighting of modern demographic conditions in the Caucasus, its

qualitative evaluation, and consideration of long-term tendencies of the population
reproduction all require at least general analysis of the demographic situation in
the post-soviet space.
Though the countries of the South Caucasus—Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia—achieved independence and got rid of the Russian Empire dominance,
and though they should decide the problems of their demographic development,
the republics of the North Caucasus—Adygeya, Karachaev-Circassia, Kabardian-
Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan—are
subjects of the Russian Federation, and their demographic events and processes
are inter-related among themselves to a certain extent. The laws issued by the
central authorities, among them directly in demographic sphere, give milestones
of conducting single demographic policy and common demographic development
and should not be limited by research of demographic development of only the
North Caucasian peoples. To better comprehend the demographic events and
processes of the South Caucasian countries and also the North Caucasian
republics, the need arises for studying the demographic condition in the post-
soviet space, revealing the common regularities of development and better insight
into the future. It should be mentioned that from the specific factors influencing
the demographic conditions in the South Caucasus, the major generalizing
determinant of the demographic development—birthrate—is still decisively
influenced by the religious factor. In Georgia and Armenia, the population of
which is mostly Christian, the birthrate is nearly twice and, in some cases, far less
than in Azerbaijan, Middle Asian countries, and the North Caucasian peoples,
where Muslim religion is dominant. Thus, despite the fact that after dissolution of
the Soviet Union, the influence of socio-economic factors on the demographic
condition in the post-soviet space was equal, the religious factor turned out to be
decisive. We can conclude that in the future this factor would play a priority role.
Statistic-demographic data and some research works bring to light that the
difference of the Soviet Union republics according to the birthrate was
considerably determined by the ethnic aspect. Still, in the 20s of the XX century,
there was a noticeable difference in birthrates of separate peoples, though this
difference then was weakly expressed. Later, ethnic peculiarities of reproductive
behavior, family habits, and customs and traditions, religious beliefs have become
one of the determinant factors of birthrate. In the general background of birthrate
reduction, the factors mentioned above caused visible difference in the birthrate in
separate republics and regions.
In the first half of last century, family reproductive behavior was determined
to some extent by striving for an increase in the amount of children. Then, the
global factors influencing reduction of birthrate ―started operation,‖ social,
economic, and cultural. These factors acted in complexity and were in close
relations with one another. Gradually, there were clearly outlined such factors,
concrete and personal determinants, influencing birthrate, such as urbanization,
increase in territorial and social mobility of the population, family income,
housing terms, education, employment, etc. In the former Soviet Union, the
influence of the factors said above on the birthrate reduced, and ethnic
peculiarities and religious belief became the main determinants, which caused the
difference existing in the birthrates of separate republics.
The new type of the population reproduction is characterized with
apprehended reproduction behavior, which is determined by disposition, which in
its turn, is being formed under the influence of economic, social, national and
family traditions, religious, and other factors. In an ideal case, disposition is fully
realized in behavior, but demographic behavior is not formed only by the
viewpoints—concrete terms of living introduce certain corrections, on the basis of
already formed disposition, into full revealing of demographic behavior, though
sometimes its realization is doubted. This happens only in case, when, for
example, the health condition of an individual does not answer the reproduction
disposition, or in the life of the country there suddenly appear economic and
social cataclysms, etc. Naturally, during formation of the disposition, these factors
―do not work,‖ i.e., we have certain a disposition, but it cannot be realized. Just
such a very condition was formed in the post-soviet space, which was caused by
hard political, social, and economic processes. At once, the demographic
Demographic Situation in the Post-Soviet Space 111
indicators extremely worsened and, what is most important, the birthrate in many
former republics fell below the critical limit.
After dissolution of the Soviet Union, transformation of the economic system
and economic problems characteristic to the transitional period somehow
neutralized the influence of many traditional factors acting on the birthrate.
Though they promoted rapprochement of the demographic development
indicators, in some countries of the post-soviet space, ethnic peculiarities and
religious belief of the population still turned out to be decisive factors in
preserving high birthrates in these countries. As a result of large differences in the
birthrates and death rates in the former Soviet Union republics, the natural
increase of the population was too unequal. For example, in 1989, in the 51-
million Ukraine population, with the same reasons, natural increase was only
90,000 people, when in the 19-million Uzbekistan population, the natural increase
made up 542. The same reason caused an increase in the 3,000,000 population of
Armenia by 54,000; in the 5,000,000 population of Georgia, natural increase was
only 44,000 men. The natural increase of Georgians in Georgia was 29,000, of
Armenians in Armenia, it was 52,000 men. The share of Georgians in the entire
population of Georgia was 70.1%; the share of natural growth was 65.3%, i.e., it
did not exceed 28.8 thousand men.
In conditions of the totalitarian regime, traditionally established quantitative
balance of the nations co-living was extremely violated. The terms were formed
when the interests of republics for regulation of migration processes were fully
neglected, For example, in Latvia, as a result of intensive migration, the share of
the indigenous population considerably reduced. If, in 1959, Latvians comprised
62% of the entire population of the republic, in 1989, their amount was only 52%.
In the same period, the amount of Latvians in their republic increased by 90,000,
and of others, mostly, Russian-speaking populations, by 573,000. Naturally, when
the share of indigenous nations catastrophically reduces, their national appearance
faces jeopardy, and the reality of their degeneration becomes evident. In such
cases, another nation forces its traditions, habits and customs, and national values
upon them. It is apparent that quantitative misbalance between indigenous and
non-native population inevitably causes tension between the nations. Each nation
takes care of its being a majority in its country, and this national feeling of
preserving its distinctiveness is not alien for anyone. It is enough to mention that
the natural increase of the Georgian population in the same 1989, was 44,000.
Among them, the natural growth of Georgians, as was mentioned above, was
65.3%, when in the entire population, the share of Georgians was 70.1% (in the
Soviet Union, national belonging of the personality was noted in the passport,
now citizenship is pointed instead of it, and the demographic indicators are no
longer marked by a national sign). In Latvia, only 34.4% of the entire natural
increase came on Latvians, while for Azerbaijani and Armenians in their
republics, this indicator was extremely high and equaled 97.4% and 95.4%,
respectively. In the republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Middle Asia, the
share of indigenous nations is far lower in the entire population than the share of
their natural increase, which is explained by the religious factor. For example, in
Kazakhstan in 1989, there lived 6,534 thousand Kazakhs and the same amount of
Russians (6,227 thousand). The share of Kazakhs in the entire population was
39.7%, in natural increase, 63.5%, that was caused by the highest level of birthrate
among the Kazakh population. The most difficult situation was, from this
viewpoint, in Russia. Russians made up 81.5% of the country population, while
their share in the entire natural increase was only 50.2%. The problem was far
more acute in the rural regions from the viewpoint of natural increase of the
Russian population. In 1989, the natural increase of rural population of Russia
made up 145,00, from which Russians equaled only 3,500, i.e., 2.4%. This
indicator was most disadvantageous for Georgia, either, in which the natural
increase of rural population was 18,681, and only half of this were Georgians at
9,300. Such an indicator points to the most difficult demographic situation in the
countries mentioned above.
Quantitative increase or decrease of a nation considerably depends on the
natural movement of the population, which mostly means birthrate, death rate, and
marriages and divorces. If, in the economically developed countries, the most
acute problem is essential worsening in the indicators of the population‘s natural
movement, the situation in the developing countries is quite opposite. In the
modern world, general demographic background and the new demographic
situation is being vividly outlined: in numerous developed countries, the birthrate
keeps decreasing and, consequently, the population‘s natural increase reduces. But
the globe population still speedily grows, and the world ―demographic climate‖ is
mostly determined by the developing countries.
At present, one of the main conditions of economic rise and improvement of
life standards in many countries is considered to be birthrate decrease, but despite
wide use of administrative, legal, and economic measures in this direction, a
desirable effect is not achieved, and the following words of Mephistopheles still
remain in effect: ―But what can be done with this damned ability of reproduction
in human beings and animals?‖ If these words are quite unacceptable for renewal
of the human generation, the truth is that each human being born in this world
requires his share of land—which will feed him—dwelling, clothes, and his share
of public infrastructure. But only this is not a main thing.
Table 3. Size of the Population and Natural Growth in the Indigenous

Nationalities in the Former Soviet Union Republics According to the
Population Census of 1989
Size of population Natural growth

Absolute % Absolute %
Russia 147,021,869 100.0 576,816 100.0
Involving Russians 119,865 946 81.5 289,686 50.2
Ukraine 51,452,034 100.0 90,391 100.0
Involving Ukrainians 37,419,053 72.7 60,932 67.4
Belarus 10,151,806 100.0 49,970 100.0
Involving Byelorussians 704,623 77.9 34,989 70.0
Uzbekistan 19,810,077 100.0 541,945 100.0
Involving Uzbeks 14,142,475 71.4 446,792 82.2
Kazakhstan 16,464,464 100.0 255,891 100.0
Involving Kazakhs 6,534,616 39.7 162,605 63.5
Georgia 5,400,841 100.0 44,061 100.0
Involving Georgians 3,787,393 70.1 28,788 65.3
Azerbaijan 7,021,178 100.0 137,615 100.0
Involving Azerbaijanians 5,804,980 82.7 134,050 97.4
Lithuania 3,674,802 100.0 17,632 100.0
Involving Lithuanians 2,924,251 79.6 14,991 85.0
Moldova 4,335,360 100.0 42,108 100.0
Involving Moldavians 2,794,749 64.5 33,850 79.9
Latvia 2,666,567 100.0 6,338 100.0
Involving Latvians 1,387,757 52.0 2,180 34.4
Kyrgyzstan 4,257,755 100.0 100,352 100.0
Involving Kyrgyzs 2,229,663 52.4 71,288 71.0
Tajikistan 5,092,603 100.0 167,035 100.0
Involving Tajiks 3,172,420 62.3 116,924 70.0
Armenia 3,304,776 100.0 54,397 100.0
Involving Armenians 3,083,616 93.3 51,877 95.4
Turkmenistan 3,522,717 100.0 97,383 100.0
Involving Turkmens 2,536,606 72.0 78,775 80.9
Estonia 1,565,662 100.0 5,762 100.0
Involving Estonians 963,281 61.5 2,578 44.7
Source: Demographic yearbook of the USSR. Moscow, 1990, p 181.
The problem of the population amount is not determined only by how many
people the earth can feed, but also by how people live and what the degree of their
life is like. In some European countries, care is taken not so much of the birthrate
increase, as much as forming the best terms of living for families with children,
improvement of children‘s upbringing quality, and preserving natural wealth
(resources) for the future generation, because in case of consuming natural

resources by a greater amount of people, nature fails to restore them. They
consider in the western countries that stabilization of the population amount, and
then its gradual reduction, could be the greatest treasure for general peace and
flourishing. In their opinion, unless childbirth freedom is restricted, all our
freedoms will disappear.
Two extremes are noticed in the demographic problems the modern world is
now facing. Birthrate decrease is critical in the developing countries, while in the
developing countries a fast increase in the amount of population takes place.
That‘s why it‘s of essential importance what way will be chosen for solving the
demographic problems. For example, they consider in the western countries that
to improve the demographic situation, it is far more efficient to adopt measures
for reducing the death rate than for increasing the birthrate. So these countries,
several times, increased expenses on healthcare, but the acute demographic
problems cannot be solved by how healthy the population should be and how long
the aged people should live, which itself is very important. Therefore, in the
western countries, the birthrate is extremely low and the amount of dead exceeds
the amount of born. Such a situation may end in the disappearance of the nation.
In the background of the high rates of the population growth, there are two
extremes seen in demographic problems of the post-soviet space countries. As we
have already mentioned above, birthrate essentially decreased, death rate
increased considerably, and, in the countries where the population accepts
Christian religion and in many countries, there was noticed natural reduction of
population. But in the countries of Muslim faith—despite destructive changes in
the public life, visible worsening of political and socio-economic problems, and
intensive growth of migration processes—the extremely high levels of birthrate
and natural increase of population were still preserved, which promoted fast
growth of the population amount, except the Republic of Kazakhstan. Though this
not an exception, either, as there live the same amount of Russians as of Kazakhs.
The birthrate in the Russian population is far lower and the migration processes
far more intensive than in Kazakhs. All of this worsens general demographic
indicators of the country.
Systematic reduction of birthrate in the post-Soviet space countries is more
exactly shown by the generalized demographic rates. For example, the birthrate
average level in the given calendar period is more vividly characterized by the
total fertility rate, which shows on average how many children one woman gives
birth to during her life, namely, when she can give birth to a child. Such fertile
age is considered to equal an average of 35 years. To replace generations, it is
necessary for a family to have average more than two children (some other
authors evaluate it as from 2.3 to 2.7). This means that one woman, during her
life, should give birth to 2.1 children, and a married woman—to 2.6. In such a
case, the equal reproduction of the population takes place—renewal of
generations in one and the same amount. The circumstance is taken into
consideration that death rate among children of up to one year is high, and not all
the born children reach the fertile age when they should themselves become
mothers, not all of them will marry, and a part of families remain infertile. Ten
percent of the married in many countries have no children, mostly due to
infertility.1
Table 4. Childbirth, Mortality and Natural

Growth in Some Post-Soviet Countries in 1960 to 2005
Thousand Population per 1000 capita

1960 1980 2000 2005 1960 1980 2000 2005
CHILDBIRTH
Azerbaijan 166 154 117 142 426 25.2 14.8 17.2
Belarus 200 154 94 90 24.4 16.0 9.4 9.2
Russia 2,782 2,203 1,267 1,457 23.2 15.9 8.7 10.2
Georgia 103 89 49 46 24.7 17.7 11.0 10.7
Armenia 75 70 34 37 40.1 22.7 10.6 11.7
Tajikistan 70 146 167 181 33.5 37.0 27.0 26.4
Uzbekistan 341 540 528 534 39.8 33.8 21.3 20.3
Ukraine 879 742 385 426 20.5 14.8 7.8 9.0
Kyrgyzstan 80 107 97 110 36.9 29.6 19.7 21.4
MORTALITY
Azerbaijan 26 43 47 52 6,7 7,0 5,9 6,3
Belarus 54 96 135 142 6,6 9,9 13,5 14,5
Russia 886 1,526 2,225 2,304 7,4 11,0 15,3 16,1
Georgia 27 43 47 43 6,5 8,6 10,7 9,9
Armenia 13 17 24 26 6,8 5,5 7,5 8,2
Tajikistan 11 32 29 32 5,1 8,0 4,7 4,6
Uzbekistan 52 119 136 141 6,0 7,4 5,5 5,4
Ukraine 296 568 758 782 6,9 11,4 15,4 16,6
1
A. Sinelnikov. How many children are necessary for the population not to reduce? In the book:
Fertility known and unknown. M., 1983, pp 50, 65.
Table 4. (Continued).
Thousand Population per 1000 capita

1960 1980 2000 2005 1960 1980 2000 2005
Kyrgyzstan 13 30 34 37 6,1 8,4 6,9 7,2
N A T U R A L G R O W T H (R E D U C T I O N )
Azerbaijan 140 111 70 90 35.9 18.2 8.9 10,9
Belarus 146 58 -41 -52 17.8 6.1 -4.1 -5.3
Russia 1,896 677 -958 -847 15.8 4.9 -6.6 -5.9
Georgia 76 46 1,4 3,5 18.2 9.1 0.3 0.8
Armenia 62 53 10 11 33.3 17.2 3.1 3.5
Tajikistan 59 114 138 149 28.4 29.0 22.3 21.8
Uzbekistan 289 421 392 393 33.8 26.4 15.8 14.9
Ukraine 583 174 -373 -356 13.6 3.4 -7.6 -7.6
Kyrgyzstan 67 77 63 73 30.8 21.2 12.8 14.2
Source: Population of the USSR. 1987, M., 1988, pp 112-141; Condition of the CIS
countries in 2006. Moscow, 2007, p 12.
Though in the post-soviet space, total fertility rates reduced everywhere, but
in the countries, where it was high before, even at present, it remains
comparatively high. For example, in Tajikistan in 1989, one woman gave birth to
average 5.1 children, in 2006 or 3.8 children. In Uzbekistan, total fertility rate
equaled 4.0 and 2.7, respectively. This indicator was especially reduced in
Estonia, Latvia, Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine. In
2006, the total fertility rate was 1.2 in Belarus and Ukraine; it was 1.3in Moldova
and Russia; it was 1.4 in Georgia; and 1.7 in Armenia, which is not enough for
renewal of generations in one and the same amount. If, in the beginning of the 80s
of the XX century, total fertility rate considerably reduced in the former Soviet
Union, in 1986 to 1987, it increased by 12.4%. Some explained too simply the
changes in the dynamics of the birthrate level. In their opinion, the increase in
birthrate was caused by growth of people‘s optimism, connected with positive
changes in the public life after the April (1985) plenum of the Soviet Union
Communist Party central committee.2 Surely, even if as a result of increase in
people‘s optimism this could have taken place, the birthrate cannot increase, at
least not in a year. This event was mostly connected with two factors. First of all,
we mean operation of structural-demographic factors in mid-1980s. Second, in
that period, the state conducted some measures to assist families with children,
due to which the childbirth rate increased to some extent.
At present, the total fertility rate in the world equals 2.6. According to the
data of the UN, of about 155 countries, in 2006, this indicator is less than 2.1 in
55 countries and even less than 1.3 in 18 countries. That means one woman
during her life gives birth to a bit more than one child and, in fact, one parent is
reproduced. The situation is especially hard in Europe, where the process of
depopulation is outlined in all the countries, except Albania. The situation is quite
different in the countries of Africa, where one woman gives birth to an average of
more than five children during her life in 25 countries. A sharp difference is
noticed in developed, less-developed, and the least-developed countries, in which
corresponding indicators equal 1.6; 2.8; and 4.8 children.3
In some post-Soviet space countries, too-different levels of the population‘s
natural movement, namely, of birthrate and death rate, considerably determined
also the most different scales of increase (decrease) in the amount of the
population in these countries. For example, the amount of population from 1989
to 2006 considerably reduced in Russia (by 4.7 million) and Ukraine (by 4.8
million), but essentially increased in Uzbekistan (by 6.8 million) and
Turkmenistan (by 3.2 million), etc. It is enough to say that after abolishment of
the Soviet Union, within some 14 years, from 1992 to 2005, there died 11,237
persons more than were born.4 The situation is far harder in the regions where
mostly Russians live. For example, in Tula, Tver, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, Smolensk,
Novgorod, Pskov, Ryazan, Kostroma, and some other areas there usually die 12 to
15 persons more than are born within several years; already every year as
calculated per each 1,000 men of the population. Tens of millions of Russians live
in these areas. It is clear that Russia faced great demographic jeopardy. It may be
also mentioned that birthrate is in close correlation with the ethnic composition of
the population, but in separate cases, ethnic aspects are connected with death rate.
Well-known Russian demographers consider ―if in the future birthrate is not
reduced, which cannot be supposed seriously, in present conditions of
demographic education and having no public movement for saving the Russian
nation from annihilation, depopulation will continue for an indefinite period of
time, probably until full disappearance of Russia from the political map. But the
country may perish even earlier, when the amount of population reduces to such
2
The World Population. Moscow, 1989, p 41
3
The State of World Population. 2007, United Nations Population Fund.
4
Demographic yearbook of Russia. Moscow, 1995, p 39; Russian statistical yearbook 2005,
Moscow, 2006, p 105; Socio-economic condition of the CIS countries in 2006. Moscow, 2007, p
12.
an extent that it will weaken and any of its great neighbors may join it to its
territory.‖5
Table 5. Density, Size of Permanent (de-jure)

Population and Territory of the Post-Soviet Countries *
Territory, Size of permanent (de-jure) population, Person-

1000 thousand number,
square residing per 1
kilometer square
kilometer
2007
1959 1979 1989 2007
Armenia 29.8 1,765 3,037 3,305 3,223 108
Azerbaijan 86.6 3,684 6,026 7,021 8,533 98
Belarus 207.6 8,030 9,532 10,152 9,715 47
Estonia 45.2 1,191 1,464 1,566 1,300 28.8
Georgia ** 69.7 4,044 4,993 5,401 4,395 66
Kazakhstan 2,724.9 9,298 14,684 16,464 15,397 6
Kyrgyzstan 199.9 2,065 3,523 4,258 5,190 26
Latvia 63.7 2,080 2,503 7,667 2,300 36.1
Lithuania 65.2 2,696 3,391 3,675 3,400 52.1
Moldova 33.8 2,879 3,950 4,335 3,900 115
Russia 17,075.4 117,239 137,410 147,022 142,221 8
Tajikistan 143.1 1,978 3,806 5,093 7,064 4
Turkmenistan 491.2 1,508 2,765 3,523 6,746*** 14
Ukraine 603.7 41,721 49,609 51,452 46,466 77
Uzbekistan 448.9 8,080 15,389 19,810 26,659 59
* Permanent (de-jure) population – persons, living permanently on the given territory,
among them temporarily absent.
** Without the population of Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian autonomous region.
In total the size of population by the beginning of 2006 was 4.5 million.
*** By the beginning of 2006.
Source: Socio-economic condition of the CIS countries in 2006, Moscow, 2007, p 10; CIS
statistics, N 2, 2008, p 22; Demographic yearbook of the USSR, Moscow, 1990, pp
30-69; Results of 1959 population census (summary volume), Moscow, 1962, p 17;
The State of World Population 2007, United Nations Population Fund.
5
V. Borisov. Demography. Translated from Russian. Tbilisi, 2001, p 344.
The most considerable growth of the population in the Middle Asian

republics of the Soviet Union was caused by the high level of birthrates. In some
regions of these republics, the level of birthrates is equal to physiological
birthrates. For example, in Tavildarin and Darband regions of Tajikistan in 1991,
per each 1,000 persons, 62.2 and 52.7 children were born, respectively. In the
following years, this indicator reduced, but still was too high and in 2000, was
30.9 and 412.8 promile, respectively. The natural increase of the population in
these regions still remained high. For example, in 1991, in the Tavildarin region
the natural increase made up 54.4 promile and in 2000 it was the 38.3 promile.6
Dissolution of the Soviet Union and formation of sovereign states changed
the scales of migration processes, directions, and structure. The amount of
displaced persons sharply increased, and the tendency of repatriation of Russian-
speaking and nearly all the titled nations became stronger. 7 The deported
population kept returning to their former dwelling places. A great amount of
refugees appeared as a result of ethnic conflicts. Worsening of environmental
conditions generated hundreds of thousands of ecological migrants. Illegal and
illegal transit migration increased.
The migration processes in the post-soviet space are conditioned by many
factors. First of all, it is discrimination of ethnic and religious minorities or fear of
its strengthening, which often is based on historical memory, ethnic, and other
conditions, among them, armed conflicts, essential worsening of the economic
condition, increase of unemployment, fear for tomorrow, inability to realize one‘s
own self, etc.
Historically, the foundation for emigration in Russia was laid in the process
of colonization. Within two centuries—from the beginning of the XVIII until the
beginning of the XX centuries—more than 15 million people migrated to the
outlying parts of the Russian Empire. Colonization was conducted in compliance
with the purposes of the Russian Empire—to reinforce its rule in the newly joined
territories and countries.
In the Soviet period, namely, from 1920 to 1952, fifty-two forced migrations
were conducted, which turned out to be one of the most acceptable forms of
political repressions for the authorities. As calculations show, only inner
deportations embraced more than six million men, and approximately the same
amount was subject to the external or international migration. So, in the soviet
period, the amount of forced migrants made up 12 million people.8
6
Regions of Tadjikistan. Dushanbe, 2001, pp 28, 38.
7
Titled nation – ethnic groups, which had their republics on the Soviet Union territory.
8
Deportations of Stalin period. Ed. Academician A.N. Yakovlev. Moscow, 2005, p 13.
Intensification of the migration processes in the post-soviet space was caused

by ethnic and regional conflicts. Prolonged regional conflicts took away the lives
of a great amount of peaceful populations. The opposing sides were most
merciless against the peaceful populations. In the intensive clashes, namely, in
Chechnya and Tajikistan, 80% of the losses were peaceful populations. First of all
women, children and old-aged persons were damaged. In all raids, there were
numerous cases of rape. Tens of thousands of women were victims of violence.
In the post-soviet space, the armed conflicts were mostly conducted on the
ethno-political basis. As a result of them, the ethnic composition of the population
essentially changed. For example, 390,000 Armenian community in Azerbaijan
and 84,000 Azerbaijani community in Armenia stopped existence nearly
completely. ―A major part of the Georgian population in Abkhazia ran away into
the inner regions of Georgia as a result of ethnic cleansing conducted by the
Abkhazian authorities‖ (V. Mukomeli). The Russian-speaking population
immediately left the former republics, embraced with conflicts, and mostly
migrated to Russia. Migration of Russians along with the citizens sharing the
Russian culture was apprehended as a positive phenomenon. This process
facilitated the solution of the most difficult demographic problems formed in
Russia. As it was justly pointed out, if Russia managed to attract into the country
the citizens having the Russian culture from the neighboring countries, this would
promote not only its flourishing, but would simply form necessary terms for
normal life in the near future.9
Due to political and ideological considerations, the Soviet Union was a closed
space and there were practically no cases of international migration in it. For
example, in 1980, the amount of people leaving Russia for other countries (except
the allied republics) made up 2,971, the amount of those who arrived was only
269. The analogous situation was in other years, as well. The Soviet Union, as a
single state, was characterized with inner migration processes—movement of
population between the allied republics. After dissolution of the Soviet Union, due
to the reasons mentioned above, the international migration processes increased
between the post-soviet space countries, as well, and also with the other countries
of the world. The direction of the migration streams changed—the population,
mostly of Russian nationality, left the former allied republics for Russia to live.
For example, only from 1992 to 1994 the amount of immigrants from the post-
Soviet countries to Russia made up 2,995 thousand people, and, of that, 1,934
thousand were Russians (64.6%). In the same period, 1,172 thousand people left
Russia for the post-soviet countries to live, among them 542,000 were of Russian
9
Tolz M. Suitcase-station-Russia. The newsp. Moskovskie Novosti, N 25, 2000.
nationality, but the positive balance of migration remained too high; Russia was
entered by 1,823 thousand more people than the other way. The positive balance
of Russian nationality representatives was 1,392 thousand.10
Table 6. International Migration into the

Russian Federation from 1990 to 2004
1990 to 2004 Among them

1990 to 1996 1997 to 2004
Migrants into the Russian 8,551,759 6,075,138 2,476,621
Federation
Among them from the post-Soviet 8,464,374 6,072,718 2,391,656
Countries
From other Countries 87,385 2,420 84,965
Migrants from the Russian 4,734,615 3,525,904 1,208,711
Federation
Among them into the post-Soviet 3,500,369 2,804,486 695,883
countries
Into other Countries 1,234,246 721,718 512,328
Migration balance (+, - ) 3,817,144 2,549,234 1,267,910
Among them with the post- 4,964,005 3,268,232 1,695,773
Sovietcountries
With other countries -1,146,861 -718,998 -427,863
Source: Russian statistical yearbook, 1997. M.,1997, pp 97-98; Russian statistical
yearbook, 2005. M., 2006, pp129-130.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the aspirations, objectives, and
values of people, which caused demands of migration and change of living
environments, were revealed most intensively from 1990 to 1996. In this period,
more than 6,000,000 men entered Russia from the post-Soviet space, while from
1997 to 2004, this indicator equaled only 2,500,000. It seems that the emigration
resources, filled mostly at the expense of ethnic minorities, were nearly fully
exhausted. From 1990 to 2004, the amount of immigrants from the post-soviet
countries to Russia was 8.5 million, and the amount of those who left Russia for
the post-soviet countries was 3.5 million. In the Russian Federation, a main role in
the international migration was played by migration processes from the post-
Soviet countries. In the mentioned period, the difference between the amount of
those who arrived and left, i.e., migration balance, between Russia and the post-
10
Demographic yearbook of Russia. Moscow, 1995, pp 422-423.
soviet countries, made up 4.9 million. With other countries, Russia has sharply
expressed negative balance (- 1.1 million).
Among migrants from the post-soviet countries to Russia, there considerably
prevailed Russians and, not so seldom, other ethnic minorities, which has its
objective basis. Hard economic conditions formed in the post-soviet space pushed
naturally ethnic minorities more than autochthonous population to improve their
economic conditions, to seek fate in other countries; however, in this case, the
demand to return to native ethnic environment plays no less important role. As for
the emigrated indigenous population of the post-soviet countries (surely, the
migration processes are sharply expressed not only with Russia, but between the
post-Soviet countries as well), a great majority of them will come back, but in
different periods of time, considering economic potentials and perspectives: those
engaged in profitable business, will return after a comparatively long period and
those engaged in physical work, along with economic revival and improvement of
living conditions. This process, to a comparatively lesser degree, concerns the
representatives of ethnic minorities, which migrated from the post-soviet countries
to their historical homeland, because none of the countries, however democratic
and economically strong it may be, can form terms for ethnic minorities favorable
for developing their culture, traditions, the entire national values in general, as
their historical countries can afford them.
Chapter 4
SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION OF

CAUCASUS IN THE XX CENTURY AND THE
BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY 1
IV.I. SIZE AND NATIONAL STRUCTURE

OF THE POPULATION
The population size in the XX century, despite hard conditions of some

periods, increased considerably. We have already mentioned that the deportations
of the Caucasian people and ethnic conflicts largely impeded natural demographic
development of the Caucasian people.
The aftermaths of the World Wars I and II were far more tragic in this
respect, which had greatly influenced the fate of the entire mankind. Naturally, the
Caucasian peoples failed to survive these tragic consequences, which themselves
participated in these bloodshedding battles.
The World War I (1914 to 1918) brought the mankind yet unseen in the
history losses and destruction. In the end, 33 states were involved in the war (1.5
billion people). About 74,000,000 people were called up for the military services
1
The objective of our research is the peoples of the Caucasus, the problems of their demographic
development. Within the Caucasus, we mean the republics of the South Caucasus (Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Armenia) and of the North Caucasus (Adygeya, Karachaev-Circassia, Kabardian-
Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, in which the North Caucasian
peoples live). The North Caucasian republics are subjects of the Russian Federation. In the
periods of population censuses of 1939-1989, Chechnya and Ingushetia were not separated from
one another, that‘s why the data on them are given together.
in the period of war. As a result of relevant calculations, 20,000,000 perished and

died from wounds in the World War I, of which 3,500,000 became crippled.
Among them there were tens of thousands of representatives of the Caucasian
people.
Far more were losses in the World War II. Renowned Russian demographer
B. Urlanis analyzes the data of the World War II losses, which differ considerably
from one another. This was caused by lack of exact statistical data some countries
that participants of the war possessed. In some cases, only dead were calculated,
in other cases, the data on losses involved civil population or losses as a result of
birthrate decreases, etc.2 According to tentative calculations, made in the
American Statistical Bulletin in 1946, the amount of losses and people who died
from wounds in the World War II comprised 9,500,000.3 In January 1946, the
sum total was declared in weekly Der Weg, published in Bern (Switzerland).
According to its data, 14,450,000 people died in the war. A higher figure is cited
by the Vatican, according to which 22,060,000 soldiers and officers died on the
battlefield.4 In the following years, the amount of losses was being specified, and
more often there were data that in total 50,000,000 people who died in the World
War II. The Soviet Union lost 20,000,000 in this war, which is 40% of the World
War II victims.
Among the war victims, there were hundreds of thousands of the Caucasian
people representatives. Before the war, the amount of population of Georgia was
3,700,000. Of this amount, 700,000 participated in the war against the Germans,
and 300,000 died. Decrease in the size of the population was also caused by
reduction in the birthrate. For example, if, in separate war years (1941 to 1945) in
the period of peace, there were born in Georgia the same amount of children as in
the pre-war 1940 (100,060), the demographic losses as a result of decreased
birthrate were 232,757. Mostly due to violation in the sex structure of the
population, an absolute amount of children born in the postwar period was
considerably little as compared with 1940, and only in 1959, did it reach the level
of 1940. As a result of reduction in the birthrate, there were born approximately
less than 500,000 children in Georgia from 1941 to 1958.
The size and structure of the population are analyzed in the work, mostly on
the basis of the data of the population censuses conducted in the Soviet Union in
1926, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989. After the Soviet Union republics gained
independence, the last censuses of the population were conducted in the
2
B. Urlanis. Wars and population of Europe. Moscow, 1960, p 402.
3
Statistical Bulletin Metropolitan Life Ins, Co, N 1, 1946, pp 5-8.
4
World Almanac. 1947, p 521.
Size and Structure of the Population of Caucasus in the XX Century… 125
Caucasian countries in different years, namely, in Russia and, therefore, in the

republics of the North Caucasus and Georgia they were conducted in 2002; in
Azerbaijan in 1999; and in Armenia, in 2001, which complicates analysis of
demographic processes and events in dynamics. Despite this, the demographic
indicators on the Caucasus are compared with 2002, as there was no other way
out. It may be said that, practically, these indicators can be compared and give no
great difference. For example, according to the census data of 2001, the
population of Armenia was 3123.0 thousand, and according to the registration by
the beginning of 2002, it was 3211.9 thousand, i.e., 100 persons less.5 The
population of Azerbaijan, according to the population census of 1999 was 7953.4
thousand, in 2002, it was 8141.1 thousand, i.e., 188 thousand more.6 From the
viewpoint of comparison, the situation becomes complicated also by the fact that
due to ethno-demographic conflicts, the population censuses were not held after
1989, in Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia and ―South Ossetia.‖ That‘s why, in 2002,
the indicators on the size and structure of the population of Azerbaijan and
Georgia are cited according to the territories controlled by the central authorities
of these countries. The difference in this case, as well, is not unacceptable,
especially as in 1999, the official results of 1999 census of the population of
Azerbaijan there were added the data of the census conducted in 1989, in Nagorny
Karabakh. For example, in 1989, in Nagorny Karabakh there lived 120,000
Armenians, and this amount of Armenians was added to the results of the
population census conducted in Azerbaijan in 1999. In Georgia in 2002, there
lived, according to the census data, 4,371 thousand people on the territory
controlled by the central authorities, and according to different sources, in the
same year in Abkhazia there lived 180,000 and in the Tskhinvali region there
were 50,000 people. Therefore, on the whole in Georgia, on the territory,
controlled and uncontrolled by the central authorities, there lived 4,601 thousand
people. It will be mentioned about it below more broadly. The data of 1926 census
on some national autonomies of the North Caucasus in different sources are
varied. It is also caused by change of the borders of autonomies and their
unification in the 1920s and 1930s. The present work analyzes the data of the
censuses of 1926, without any further specification, just as it is published in
official materials and is given in majority of scientific works.
Despite the existence of real factors impeding the growth of the Caucasian
population, in the XX century, its population considerably increased, which was
caused by the highest level of the birthrate and low level of the death rate. From
5
Statistical yearbook of Armenia. 2005. Yerevan, 2005, p 25.
6
Population of Azerbaijan. 2006. Baku, 2006, p 19.
1926 to 2005, the population of the Caucasus increased 3.0 times in total. The
population growth rate was especially important in the North Caucasus, where the
population in the mentioned period increased 3.8 times and in the South Caucasus
where it increased 2.7 times. The data of table 5 give a vivid picture on the
dynamics of the Caucasian population size in the XX century. In the total
background of the Caucasian population size growth, it seems apparent that the
population of Georgia grows at a very low rate as compared with other republics.
If, from 1926 to 2005, the population of Georgia increased only 1.7 times, that of
Azerbaijan and Armenia increased 3.6 times and 3.7 times, respectively. The
population considerably increased in Ingushetia (6.4 times), North Ossetia (4.6
times), Kabardian-Balkar republic (4.4 times) and in other republics. In Armenia,
the high rate of increase of the population along with the high level of natural
growth is explained by appearance of a considerably greater amount of Armenians
in the Soviet Union from Turkey and other countries. The following may be said
about low rate of growth in the Georgian population size. Despite the fact that the
Caucasus is a single, whole region, where the natural-climatic conditions did not
differ much from one another and where the traditions and customs and habits are
more or less similar, the demographic indicators in Georgia largely differ from
those of neighboring countries. Namely, the main generalizing indicator of
demographic development in Georgia—birthrate—is far lower than in Azerbaijan,
Armenia, and the North Caucasus. This can be explained by ethnic peculiarities,
historically established mode of life, traditions, the level of education and
urbanization, and especially by religion. Other factors, certainly, play an
important role as well. In Georgia, 83.0% of the population of which is Christians,
the birthrate is vividly low as compared with the neighboring republics, where
Muslim religion is domineering.
In the first half of the XX century, as well as in the entire XIX century,
Georgia differed from the Caucasus with plurality of the population. In 1926, the
share of the population of Georgia in the population of all of the Caucasus equaled
35.1%, i.e., each third person lived in Georgia. After Georgia, the population was
most numerous in Azerbaijan, the population of which was 30.4% of the entire
population of the Caucasus. The entire population of the North Caucasus did not
exceed 22.9%. By 2005, the situation cardinally changed. Mostly due to the
factors mentioned above, the share of the population of Georgia in the total
population of the Caucasus was 19.8%, instead of 35.1% of 1926. However, in the
same period, the share of the population of Azerbaijan considerably increased—
from 30.4% to 36.6%.
Table 7. Size of the Population of Caucasus in 1926 to 2005 (in thousands)
N Years 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002 2005

Countries
CAUCASUS
Absolute 7,617 10,827 12,712 16,659 18,865 2,032 22,182 22,610
% 100,.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Among them
SOUTH
CAUCASUS
Absolute 5,872 8,027 9,505 12,295 14,052 15,727 15,537 15,884
% 77.1 74.1 74.8 73.8 74.5 74.8 70.2 70.5
Among them
1 GEORGIA
Absolute 2,677 3,540 4.044 4,686 4,993 5,401 4,371 4,321
% 35.1 32.7 31.8 28.1 26.5 25.7 19.8 19.8
2 AZERBAI-
JAN
Absolute 2,315 3,205 3,698 5,117 6,028 7,021 7,953 8,347
% 30.4 29.6 29.1 30.7 31.9 33.4 35.,9 36.6
3 ARMENIA
Absoluter 881 1,282 1,763 2,492 3,031 3,305 3,213 3,216
% 11.6 11.8 13.9 15.0 16.1 15.7 14.5 14.1
NORTH
CAUCASUS
Absolute 1745 2,800 3,207 4,364 4,813 5,305 6,645 6,726
% 22.9 25.9 25.2 26.2 25.5 25.2 30.0 29.5
Among them
1 ADYGEYA
Absolute 114 242 285 386 404 432 447 445
% 1.5 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0
N Years 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002 2005

Countries
2 KARACHAEV- CIRCASSIA
Absolute 102 243 278 345 367 415 439 435
% 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9
3 KABARDIN-BALKARIA
Absolute 204 359 420 588 666 753 902 897
% 2.7 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6 4.0 3,9
4 NORTH OSSETIA-LANIA
Absolute 152 329 451 553 592 633 710 704
% 2.0 3.0 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.1
5 INGUSHETIA
Absolute 75 697 710 1,064 1,156 1,270 467 482
% 1.0 2.1 2.1
6 CHECHNYA
Absolute 310 1,104 1,141
% 4.1 6.4 5.6 6.4 6.1 6.0 4.9 5.0
7 DAGESTAN
Absolute 788 930 1,063 1,428 1,628 1,802 2,576 2,622
% 10.3 8.6 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.6 11.6 11.5
Note: Size of the population in 2005 is given according to the current registration, in other years it is according to the data of the
population censuses.
Source: General census of the population on December 17, 1926, IV, Moscow, 1928, pp 78-81, 124, 126, 128; Results of the general
population census 1970. Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p 12; Size and structure of the population of the USSR. Moscow, 1985, pp 7, 76,
80, 82, 84; Socio-economic condition in the Republic of Armenia. Yerevan, 2006, p. 144; Population of Azerbaijan, 2006, Baku,
2006, p 19; Statistical yearbook of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2005, p 33; Size and settlement of the population. Results of All- Russia
population census of 2002. Moscow, vol. I, 2004, pp 97-113; Russian statistical yearbook 2005, Moscow, 2006, p 82. The sources
mentioned above are also used in other analogous tables on the size and national structure of the population.
Vazha Lordkipanidze and Anzor Totadze 129
The population of the Caucasus in the XX century, according to the

population census, increased much from 1926 to 1970, especially from 1926 to
1939 (see table 8).
Table 8. Size of Russians in the Amount of Total Population of the Caucasus

from 1926 to 2002 (in thousands)
Years 1926 1929 1959 1970 1979 1989 202
CAUCASUS
Absolute 7,617 10,827 12,712 16,659 18,865 21,032 22,182
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
RUSSIANS
Absolute 502 1,764 2,212 2,411 2,330 2,145 1,220
% 6.6 16.3 17,4 14.5 12.3 10.2 5.6
SOUTH
CAUCASUS
Absolute 5,872 8,072 9,505 12,295 14,052 15,727 15,537
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
RUSSIANS
Absolute 336 888 965 974 917 785 225
% 5.7 11.1 10.2 7.9 6.5 5.0 1.4
NORTH
CAUCASUS
Absolute 1,745 2,800 3,207 4,364 4,813 5,305 6,645
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
RUSSIANS
Absolute 166 876 1,247 1,437 1,413 1,360 995
% 9.5 31.3 38.9 32.9 29.3 25.6 15.0
From 1979 to 2002, the growth of population was ongoing at a low rate. In
the general background of high natural growth of the population, the size of the
Caucasian population was greatly determined by the migration processes of
Russians in the Caucasus. It should be mentioned that from 1926 to 1939, the
amount of Russians in the Caucasus increased from 502 thousand to 1,764
thousand, i.e., by 1,262 thousand. If we take into account natural growth of
Russians in that period, then from 1926 to 1939 at least 1,000,000 Russians came
to the Caucasus to live. In these years, the amount of Russians increased by
251.4%, and the titled nations, only by 28.0%. In 1959, Russians already made up
17.4% of the entire population of Caucasus, but their share differed much in the
entire population of the North and the South Caucasus. Namely, if Russians made
up 10.2% of the entire population of the South Caucasus, their share in the North
Caucasus equaled 38.9%. The amount of Russians in the Caucasus was the
`greatest in size according to the data of the 1970 census. After that, their amount
reduced, and, according to the last census (2002), there lived in the Caucasus
1,220 thousand Russians, i.e., 925 thousand Russians less as compared with 1989.
The amount of Russians in the South Caucasus in 2002 was 225 thousand (1.1%
of the entire population), and in the North Caucasus it was 995 thousand (15.0%).
Thus, the rapid growth of the Caucasian population was caused by two
factors. First, it was the highest level of natural growth of the indigenous
population, characteristic to all the Caucasian peoples within the entire XX
century, except Georgians and partly Armenians. The other factor was mass
coming of Russians into then Caucasus for permanent living, especially, in the
second half of the 1920s and 1930s. To fulfill its imperial intentions, Russia then
tried to form a firm support and to settle the Russian population in the Caucasian
region. On the pretext of industrial development of the economy, a great amount
of Russians settled both in the South and, especially, in the North Caucasus for
permanent residence. In Adygeya and Circassia, Russians even were the majority
of the population and in 1939 at 71.1%.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russians started to leave the
Caucasian region in great amounts. The process was caused by existing and
supposed ethnic and political conflicts in separate regions of the Caucasus,
essential worsening of socio-economic conditions, the wish to leave for their
historical homeland, where they hoped the conditions were far better. As we have
mentioned, in 2002, the amount of Russians in all of the South Caucasus was 225
thousand, when in 1989, there lived only in Azerbaijan 39,200 Russians. In the
North Caucasus, the amount of Russians reduced, especially in Chechnya, which
was caused by the Chechen war. Mostly, this was the reason that approximately
250 thousand Russians left Chechnya and Ingushetia. In 2002, there lived 46
thousand Russians in these republics.
The Republic of Dagestan is the most numerous in the North Caucasus. Its
population in 2005 was 39.0% of the entire population of the North Caucasus.
After Dagestan, the most numerous was Chechnya (16.2%), Kabardian-Balkar
republic (13.7%), North Ossetia (10.8%), Ingushetia (6.9%), and Adygeya (6.8%).
The least amount of the population was in Karachaev-Circassian Republic (6.6%).
The share of separate republics of the North Caucasus in the entire population was
not changed much in the XX century. Changes were mostly connected with
deportations and ethno-political conflicts in the North Caucasus. This shows that
increase in the size of the population in all the republics was caused by
approximately equal (in our case, high) level of natural growth.
Exception from this general regularity is the data of the 1989 to 2002
censuses. To compare the 2002 census data on the size and national structure of
the North Caucasian population with those of 1989 census causes many questions
in particular during the period between censuses in the amount of North
Caucasian population, especially of Ingush, Chechen, Kabardian, and Dagestan
peoples (see table 9). Naturally, a question arises, as how correctly the peoples
living in Russia were calculated during 2002 census. It should be pointed out that
the population censuses were a major source for the data on the national structure
in Russia. Some time ago, it was necessary in Russia to fix ethnic belonging
(nationality), which was expressed in the natural movement—birth and death—
information. The question on ethnic belonging was present in all the censuses of
the population, exception being only the census of 1897, conducted in the Russian
Empire, during which nationality was determined on the basis of the native
language.
During the census of the Russian population conducted in 2002, the answers
of more than 800 variants were given to the question on national belonging, which
often differed from one another with the local self-name of the language dialect
and ethnic group. In the end, the data were processed according to 140
nationalities and 40 ethnic groups within them.
The external migration factor greatly influences the changes in ethnic
structure of the population now. Earlier, the Soviet Union was a closed system
and external migration factors had no impact on the dynamics of the size of
peoples. From 1989 to 2002 the 2.1 times growth of Armenians in Russia was
mostly connected with the migration processes. Due to bloodshedding conflicts in
Nagorny Karabakh, Armenians went to live for permanent residence to Russia,
and their greater amount also left their and the former USSR republics with the
same aim. Thus, in some regions of Russia, they are on the second place, for
example, in Kuban, Sochi, Tuapse, Adler, where the second place was occupied
by Ukranians before that. At the same time, when the population of Russia
decreases and this reduction is mostly determined by Russians, as they are a
majority in Russia, the size of the North Caucasian people from 1989 to 2002
increased at unusual speed, which does not fully express the tendency of natural
demographic development of these people at all, i.e., is fallen out of this tendency.
We should take into consideration that neither migration processes, nor natural
growth of the population could have caused such quick growth of the North
Caucasian peoples (Ingushs, Chechens, Dagestanians—Kumyks, Dargins,
Lesghins, etc). From the North Caucasian peoples, mostly Ossets increased in
number due to the migration processes—approximately by 60,000. At the same
time, 178,000 Lesghins live in Azerbaijan and by the official registration, 20,000
Lezgs went from Azerbaijan to Russia (mostly to the North Caucasus) for
Table 9. Size and Settlement of the Titled Nations of Caucasus in the Former
Soviet Union and Their Own Republics from 1959 to 2002 (in thousands)
1959 1970 1989 2002

permanent residence. But we cannot explain Lezgs‘ natural growth only by this.
Other peoples of the North Caucasus do not have big groups abroad.
Considerable growth of the North Caucasian peoples from 1989 to 2002 is
sometimes explained by unusual growth of the birthrate, but current registering data
point to the opposite. Though the birthrate is high among the North Caucasian
peoples, in the 1990s the amount of the birthrate reduced. Some explain this by
wrong registering. Then a question arises whether it was possible for a high
birthrate to provide far higher growth of the North Caucasian peoples, than it was in
the previous censuses period. For this, they should have had far higher birthrate in
1979 to 1988. To give an answer to the question ―Did the birthrate of the North
Caucasian peoples increase at the turn of the centuries?‖ the index of childness was
calculated on the basis of the censuses data, which is an indirect indicator of the
birthrate level of hypothetical generation. It is determined by correlation of the
amount of little-age children (mostly children aged 0 to 4 and 0 to 9) with the
amount of women, which can be mothers by their age.
Table 10 cites information on the childness index of the peoples of Russia
according to last three censuses. According to this information, it is clear that the
birthrate of the North Caucasian peoples is far higher as compared with that of the
Russian peoples. At the same time, the birthrate dynamics leave no doubt that only
the birthrate could have been the reason of quick increase of the North Caucasian
peoples‘ amount. Their birthrate kept reducing for long time already. That‘s why, in
addition to the demographic factor, those factors should be also considered, which
could have influenced change in the amount of the North Caucasian peoples from
1989 to 2002. For this, we should eliminate the birthrate, the death rate, and
migration factors.
Before 1997, nationality was marked in the document confirming identity,
and the demographic events (birthrate, death rate, etc) were being elaborated from
the national viewpoint. From 1989, national structure of emigrants and
immigrants was being worked out. According to the censuses of 1989 and 2002,
this gives an opportunity to compare the data on the population national structure
with the data on natural movement and migration. In this case, it is possible to
evaluate the influence of ―non-demographic‖ factors on the dynamics of the
population national structure.1 Thus, summing up of the 1989 census data and
balance of natural growth and migration from 1989 to 2002, enable us to evaluate
the amount of separate peoples by the beginning of 2003. It turned out that,
according to the census, the amount of none of the peoples in Russia coincided
1
htpp://demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0319/tema04.php
with the amount calculated on the basis of the current registration (birthrate, death
rate, arrival, departure) data (see table 11).
Table 10. Index of Fertility of the Peoples of Russia (amount of

children up to 10 years old per each 1,000 women of 20 to 49 years
old according to the data pf the population censuses)
Years 1979 1989 2002 Index growth %

1979 to 1989 to
Peoples 1989 2002
Ingushs 1,432 1,203 945 -16 -21
Chechens 1,400 1,267 942 -9 -26
Azerbaijanians - - 903 - -
Avars 1,496 1,291 831 -14 -36
Dargins 1,604 1,374 797 -14 -42
Kumukhs 1,302 1,227 766 -6 -38
Lezgs 1,445 1,280 710 -11 -45
Kabardians 1,029 1,014 585 -1 -42
Karachayevs 1,028 994 572 -3 -42
Armenians 764 987 543 29 -45
Ossets 795 831 524 4 -37
Adygeis 823 839 512 2 -39
Circassians 941 935 507 -1 -46
Balkars 915 924 495 1 -46
Bashkirs 858 862 474 0 -45
Russians 655 759 384 16 -49
Tatars 621 713 354 15 -48
Germans 496 588 199 19 -49
Koreans 274 372 199 36 -46
Ukrainians 310 340 116 10 -66
Byelorussians 220 250 94 13 -62
Quantitative excess was evident received mostly as a result of 2002 census of

the North Caucasian peoples. In the periods between the censuses the amount of
Ingushs, Chechens, Kabardinians, and Dagestan peoples especially increased. For
example, the amount of Ingushs in Russia by 1989 census equaled 215,000 (in
Ingushetia, 164,000), and by 1992 census, 413,000 (in Ingushetia, 361,000). Thus,
in the period of 13 years, their amount in Russia doubled, and in Ingushetia it
increased 2.2 times. The illogic character of this event became especially vivid as
compared with the data of current registration. Namely, by the data of the current
Table 11. Comparison of Calculated number of the Peoples of Caucasus

Living in Russia with the Data of the Census (in thousands)
Evaluation (by Census Census data more (+) or

the beginning (09.10.2002) less(-) than evaluation
of 2003) Absolute In % with
data census
Avars 700.1 814.5 114.4 14.0
Aguls 22.4 28.3 5.9 21.0
Dargins 457.6 510.2 52.5 10.3
Kumukhs 345.7 422.4 76.7 18.2
Lacktsis 126.9 156.5 29.6 18.9
Lesghins 349.0 411.5 62.5 15.2
Nogaians 84.9 90.7 5.8 6.4
Rutulians 24.9 29.9 5.1 16.9
Tabassarans 127.2 131.8 4.6 3.5
Tsakhurs 8.9 10.4 1.4 13.8
Ingushs 282.1 413.0 130.9 31.7
Chechens 1,109.4 1,360.3 250.9 18.4
Balkars 87.4 108.4 21.0 19.4
Kabardinians 443.6 520.0 76.3 14.7
Ossets 468.9 514.9 46.0 8.9
Adygeis 131.2 128.5 -2.6 -2.1
Karachaevs 172.8 192.2 19.4 10.1
Circassians 55.9 60.5 4.6 7.6
Source: http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0319/tema04.php.
registration by the beginning of 2003, the amount of Ingushs in Russia was

282,000,000 and not 413,000, as it was shown by the census conducted in October
2002. As compared with the data of the current registration, the amount of the
North Caucasian peoples increased by average 15.0%, i.e., the amount of these
peoples increased nearly by one-sixth, and the increase of Ingushs made up
31.7%. Migration, ethnic processes and birthrate could not have caused such
growth in the amount of the North Caucasian peoples. Only one factor remains—
during the census of 2002, there was artificial growth in the amount of the
population (double registration, targeted population, etc). By one of the
calculations, in which the inaccuracies of the current registration are foreseen,
minimum artificial growth in the amount of the North Caucasian peoples was
820,000. In this amount, Dagestan peoples were 400,000, more than 300,000—
Chechens and Ingushs, not less than 100,000—other peoples of the North
Caucasus. As it is pointed out, this event is influenced by the factors, which are
mostly of political character. When politization of the census importance goes

very far, as the case was with the North Caucasus, this may cause distortion of
data, targeted population, i.e., falsification.2 The results of the census conducted in
1937 in the Soviet Union were rejected just for the political motives, because as a
result of political repressions of the 1930s, which took away the lives of millions
of peoples, they failed to get desirable data on the amount of the population. They
expected the census could have shown the ―sharp growth‖ in the population size.
The leading article in the newspaper Pravda talked about ―quicker increase in the
amount of the Soviet Union population than in the capitalist countries.‖ They
meant that the census results should exceed the population size cited by, J. Stalin
at the XII Congress of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)—168,000,000 by end
of 1933. As a result of prognosis, they expected that in 1937, the Soviet Union
population could have been 180,300,000. They saw in this one of the basic
advantages of Socialism as compared with Capitalism. Hypothesis on the
automatic growth of the population turned into the official conception. But the
prognosis failed. According to the preliminary results of 1937 census, there lived
162,000,000 in the Soviet Union.3 As soon as the results of 1937 census were
summed up, the data of this census were declared defective and some of its
organizers were subject to repression.
In the 1990s, tens of thousands of people died in the bloodshedding conflicts
in the North Caucasus. So, to hush this up, the census data were artificially
distorted.
We have brought above the evaluation of ―demographic‖ factors of changes
in the ethnic structure, but, in reality, we have only the results of the official
census of the population conducted in 2002.
The population of the Caucasus considerably increased in the XX century,
though there was noticed a great difference in the growth of separate peoples of
the Caucasus. As we have mentioned above, the first and last census in the tsarist
Russia was conduced in 1897. According to this census, nationality was
determined on the basis of the native language, which makes it quite complicated
to define the precise amount, especially of the peoples of the North Caucasus. For
example, it was pointed that among the Circassian tribes, which called themselves
Adygeis, the first place by the amount and culture was occupied by
Kabardinians—98,561. The amount of other Circassian tribes did not exceed
2
http:://demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0319/tema06.php
3
Polyakov Y., Zhiromskaya V., Kiselev I. Half a century of silence (all-union census of population
1937). Jrnl. Sociological studies, N 6, 1990, pp 6, 18.
46,286. Circassians are meant in the other Circassian tribes.4 Adygeis were also
ascribed to Circassians. In the XIX century, the peoples of the North Caucasus
were mostly recorded according to the then-existing administrative division in
Kuban and Tergi areas. The present area of the North Caucasian peoples
settlement less coincides with the area of their settlement in the XIX century.
Only Dagestan area is an exception, as its borders more or less coincide with the
borders of the present Dagestan Republic. That‘s why it‘s impossible to specify
how the amount of the North Caucasian population changed within last century.
The situation is quite better from this viewpoint in the South Caucasus, where
the population in the XX century, namely, from 1997 to 2005, increased from
4,816 thousand to 15,884 thousand, i.e., 3.3 times. Such an increase was mostly
caused by the most rapid reproduction among the population of the Republic of
Azerbaijan. In the same period, its population increased from 1,807 thousand to
8,347 thousand (4.6 times), the population of Georgia—from 2,109 thousand to
43,201 thousand (2.1 times), and that of Armenia—from 900 thousand to 3,216
thousand (3.6 times). Correspondingly, their share changed in the entire
population of the South Caucasus. If, in 1897, the population of Georgia was
43.8% of the entire population of the South Caucasus, of Azerbaijan it was 37.5%,
and of Armenia, it was 18.7%; in 2005, this correlation equaled 27.2%; 52.5%;
and 20.3% respectively (see table 12)
Table 12. Size of Population in Georgia,

Azerbaijan and Armenia from 1897 and 2005 (in thousands)
N years countries 1897 2005

the South Caucasus 4,816 15,884
Absolute thousand 100.0 100.0
%
4 Georgia 2,109 4,321
%
5 Azerbaijan 1,807 8,347
Absolute thousand 37.5 52,5
%
6 Armenia 900 3,216
%
4
General code on the Empire of the results of elaboration of the first population census data, vol. II,
St Petersburg, 1905, p XXVIII, 44.
Unlike the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus differs with ethnic diversity
and, it may be said that from this viewpoint, it is one of the most varied regions in
the world.
Starting from ancient times, there lived some peoples in the Caucasus that had
their own language and culture. Though many ethnic groups and languages have
disappeared and failed to reach the modern epoch, there still live many peoples in
the Caucasus who speak Caucasian, Turkish, and Indo-European languages. The
family of the Caucasian, or as they were called earlier, Iberian-Caucasian,
languages involves: in the North Caucasus—Abazs, Abkhazs, Kabardinians,
Chechens, Circassians, about 30 different peoples of Dagestan, Adygeis; and in
the South Caucasus—Udegeys and Kritsis, Hinalugs, and Bzheduhs (natives of
Azerbaijan). The Turkish group of languages involves only Azerbaijanians in the
South Caucasus, and in the North Caucasus—Balkars, Nogayevs, Karachayevs,
and Kumyks. The Armenian language belongs to the Indo-European language
group, and the Iranian group of this family involves the speech of Ossets, Tats,
and Talishs. From them, only Ossets are of the North Caucasian origin. As for
Georgians, their language was first assigned to the Indo-European group; later,
there dominated a hypothesis on common origin of the languages of Georgian and
the North Caucasian peoples, though finally there was no scientifically convincing
substantiation of their relation. Neither separate lexical coincidences nor similar
suffixes are enough to prove the relation between these languages. All this may be
or may not be the result of their genetic unity.5 It is still recognized that Georgians
have neither allied language nor ethnic group.
In the Soviet Union, the Caucasian peoples mostly lived in their republics,
with only Armenians being an exception. The amount of Armenians in the Soviet
Union in 1989 was 4,623 thousand and from them only 3,084 thousand (66.7%)
lived in Armenia. In Russia, the amount of Armenians was 532 thousand (11.5%
of the entire amount of Armenians), in Georgia there lived 437 thousand
Armenians (9.5%); in Azerbaijan, there were 391 thousand (8.4%); in Ukraine,
there were 54 thousand (1.2%); in Uzbekistan there were 51 thousand (1.1%), etc.
It should be mentioned that the same year, 95.1% of Georgians (3,981 thousand)
and 85.7% of Azerbaijanians (6,770 thousand), living in the Soviet Union, lived
in their own republics. This is explained by the fact that Armenians historically
are far more migrating nation than the other Caucasian peoples.
5
G. Melikishvili. Origin of Georgians. See: History of Georgia, vol. I, Tbilisi, 2006, p 31.
Table 13. Size of North Caucasian Peoples in Russia,
the North Caucasus and North Caucasian Republics in 2002
Russia the North Among them

Ethnicities Caucasus Adygeya Karachaev Kabardian North Chechnya Ingushetia Dagestan
-Kirkasha – Balkaria Ossetia
Abazs
Absolute 37,942 32,979 71 32,346 514 21 7 - 20
% 100.0 0.2 98.0 1.6 0.1 0.0 - 0.1
Adygeis
128,54
Absolute 109.194 108,115 309 584 81 17 20 68
2
% 100.0 99.0 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Aguls
Absolute 28,297 23,455 27 28 18 26 16 26 23,314
% 100.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.4
Balkars
108,42
Absolute 105,675 18 476 104,951 117 72 9 32
6
% 100.0 0.0 0.4 99.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Dargins
510,15
Absolute 427,560 108 290 504 401 696 35 425,526
6
% 100.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 99.6
Tabassarans
131,78
Absolute 110,877 165 58 135 237 128 2 110,152
5
% 100.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 99.4
Ingushs
413,01
Absolute 387,245 151 173 12,36 21,442 2,914 361,057 272
6
% 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 5.5 0.8 93.3 0.1
Russia the North Among them

Ethnicities Caucasus Adygeya Karachaev- Kabardian – North Chechnya Ingushetia Dagestan
Kirkasha Balkaria Ossetia
Lacktsis
Absolute 156,545 142,964 103 349 1,800 685 245 50 139,732
% 100.0 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 97.7
Lesghins
Absolute 411,535 338,978 300 29 867 848 196 40 336,698
% 100.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 99.3
Nogaians
Absolute 90,666 57,323 15 14,873 409 194 3,572 1 38,168
% 100.0 0.0 26.0 0.7 0.3 6.2 0.0 66.8
Ossets
Absolute 51,4875 46,0134 413 3,333 9,845 445,310 230 106 897
% 100.0 0.1 0.7 2.2 96.8 0.0 0.0 0.2
Rutulians
Absolute 29,929 24,374 14 21 - 18 21 2 24,298
% 100.0 0.1 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 0.0 99.6
Kabardinia
ns
Absolute 519,958 503,229 309 915 498,702 2,902 133 35 233
% 100.0 0.1 0.2 99.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Karachaev
s
192,182
Absolute 170,682 64 169,198 1,273 58 15 9 65
% 100.0 0.0 99.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Among them
Ethnicities Russia the North Adygeya Karachaev- Kabardian North Chechnya Ingushetia Dagestan
Caucasus Kirkasha – Balkaria Ossetia
Kumyks
Absolute 422,409 388,542 103 244 713 12,659 8,883 136 365,804
% 100.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 3.3 2.3 0.0 94.1
Circassians
Absolute 60,517 50,402 642 49,591 - 83 13 26 47
% 100.0 1.3 98.4 - 0.2 0.0 - 0.1
Chechens
Absolute 1,360,253 1,225,420 1122 1,757 4,241 3,383 1,031,647 95,403 87,867
% 100.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 84.2 7.8 7.2
Tsakhurs
Absolute 10,366 8,184 4 - 2 6 4 - 8,168
% 100.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 100.0
Avars
Absolute 814,473 764,186 310 207 386 610 4,133 102 75,8438
% 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.0 99.3
Total
North
Caucasian
Ethnicities 2,319,79
Absolute 6,041,827 5,331,312 112054 274,197 626,180 489,081 1,052,942 457,059 9
% 100,0 2,1 5,1 11,7 9,2 19,7 8,6 43,6
Source: 3,231 representatives of Shapsuls—the North Caucasian ethnicity—lived in Russia in 2002, and only eight—in the North
Caucasus, namely, in Adygeya.
In 2002, the total amount of the Caucasian peoples in the Caucasus equaled
20,723 thousand, i.e., 93.4% of the entire population of the Caucasus. Of the
Caucasian people living in the North Caucasus, 26.6% (5,515 thousand), and in
the South Caucasus, 73.4% (15,208 thousand). Thus, 2.8 times more amount of
the Caucasian peoples live in the South Caucasus than in the North Caucasus. In
the South Caucasus, the amount of the Caucasian peoples was 96.4% of the entire
population, the amount of the South Caucasian peoples proper was 95.7%. In the
North Caucasus, the amount of the Caucasian peoples was 83.0% of the entire
population, of the North Caucasian peoples proper was 80.2%. This indicator was
considerably low in the previous population censuses. For example, in 1989, in
the total population of the South Caucasus, the share of Caucasian peoples was
91.8% instead of 96.4% in 2002. This indicator was far lower in the North
Caucasus. Such a situation was mostly caused by hard economic conditions and
ethno-political conflicts formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as a
result of which a major part of the non-native population living in the Caucasus
left it, and, respectively, the share of autochthonic population in the entire
population of Caucasus increased.
According to the demographic data preserved in written sources and
historical-demographic sources in the South Caucasus, Georgians quantitatively
exceeded other nations considerably, especially the North Caucasian peoples. We
have talked about it in a certain extent. Now, we would like to mention that by the
data of 2002, Azerbaijanians living in the South Caucasus exceeded in a great
amount all other nations, and their share in the entire amount of the Caucasian
population was 34.3%, Georgians were16.6%, and Armenians were16.0%, i.e.,
the share of the South Caucasian titled nations in the entire population of the
South Caucasus of 66.9%. As for the share of Azerbaijanians, Georgians, and
Armenians living in the South Caucasus, in the entire population of the South
Caucasus, equals 49.0%; 23.8%; and 22.9%, respectively. The amount of
Azerbaijanians in Caucasus in 2002 equaled 7,609 thousand, Georgians—3,691
thousand and Armenians—3,560 thousand. During the population census of 1989,
Armenians occupied a second place in the Caucasus and in the South Caucasus, as
well. However, Armenians, in a great amount, moved to live to foreign countries
for permanent residence not only from their republic, but from Azerbaijan and
Georgian, which was considerably caused by the ethnic conflict in Nagorny
Karabakh.
Chechens, Avars, and Kabardinians were in the greatest amount in the
Caucasus after Azerbaijanians, Georgians, and Armenians. Naturally, they mostly
lived in the North Caucasus, where the amount of Chechens made up 1,225
thousand. Settlement of the North Caucasian peoples in Russia, the Caucasus, and
separate republics is clearly shown in table 13. However, some comments should
be made on their amount. Namely, Avars are of the greatest amount among
Dagestan peoples. By the data of 2002, their amount in Dagestan was 758
thousand, but this figure involves a majority of small-numbered people of
Dagestan. As there live many peoples in Dagestan, a majority of which is small-
numbered, they were artificially ascribed to Avars. That‘s why it is difficult to
determine precise number of this small-numbered people, especially in the second
half of the XX century, because in the population censuses they were recorded as
Avars.
A small amount of Dagestan peoples, namely, Kaitags and Kubachins, were
ascribed to Dargins. A complicated situation was formed from this viewpoint still
in the population censuses of 1897 and 1926. ―While processing the data of 1926
population census, it was mentioned: Multi-numbered mountain peoples of
Dagestan form considerable difficulty while forming comparative groups.‖
On the basis of classification adopted in 1897 census, we have made the
following grouping of the names of peoples in 1926:
groups in 1897 groups in 1926

Avars and Andians Avars, Andians, Botlihels,
Godoberians, Karataians,
Ahvahians, Bagulals,
Chamalels, Tindians,
Didoians, Khvarshiels
Dargins Dargins, Kubachians,
Khaidaks
Kiurinians Lezgs, Aghuls, Ruthuls,
Tsakhurs, Kapuchins
Kazikumyks and the rest Lacktsis, Tabassarans,
Lesghns Archibels, Khinalughs,
Jecks, Kritsis, Budukhs,
Kapuchins, Hunzibels1
Such a unification of the Dagestan peoples under the name of more multi-
numbered peoples was too artificial. Entire peoples kept disappearing from the
historical arena. Some people lived in Shah-Dag mountains of Azerbaijan,
namely, Lacktsis and Kritsis, though if in the XIX century Lacktsis were
recognized as a separate ethnic group, later they merged with Kritsis, which, in
their turn, were ascribed to Lesghins. After that, Tabassarans, Aguls, Rutuls, and
1
All-union population census of 17 December 1826, IV, Peoples and native language of the USSR
population. Moscow, 1928, pp XVI-XVII.
Tsakhurs were recognized as separate peoples; Archibels, Kapuchins, Hunzibels

were ascribed to Avars, etc. That‘s why discussion of the Dagestan people‘s
amount in dynamics is connected with some difficulties, though characterization
of their growth from 1886 to 2002 is still possible. Namely, on the decree of the
Russian Empire state council, the family lists of Transcaucasus (the South
Caucasus) were formed in 1886, on the basis of which the amount of Dagestan
population was calculated, which was within Transcaucasus by the then
administrative division. During this census, Lesghins were introduced under the
name of Kiurinians and Lacktsis, of Kazikumyks. In 1886, Dagestan peoples are
described separately, but in 1897, according to the above-mentioned enlarged
groups. After 1939, official statistics used to publish the materials of population
censuses only about ten Dagestan peoples. The remaining people were ascribed
mostly to the most multi-numbered peoples—Avarss and Dargins. Despite this,
the data of the 2002 census enable us to characterize the full spectrum of Dagestan
peoples and thus discuss dynamics of separate peoples (table 14).
Dagestan peoples grew 4.1 times in 2002, as compared with 1886. Their
amount in the entire population of Dagestan was 92.7% in 1886. This indicator
was the lowest in 1926 at 69.2%, which was caused by the growth of the Russian
population in Dagestan. In that period, the share of Russians in the entire
population increased from 0.9% to 12.5%. The share of Dagestan peoples in 2002,
in the entire population, was 86.6%. It is most essential that the small-numbered
peoples of Dagestan are on the verge of disappearing. Comparison of their amount
in 1886 and 2002 shows that the number of Archibels, Bagulals, Tindians,
Chamalels, Khvarshiels, Khaidaks, and Kubachians does not exceed 20 to 30, and
some of them are represented only in a very small amount. In 2002, there were
recorded only 16 Botlihels in the Russian Federation, from this amount not a
single Botlihel lived not only in Dagestan, but in all of the North Caucasus.
It is clear that their assimilation took place by more multi-numbered peoples,
which was promoted by gradual devaluation of the common national self-
consciousness of these peoples and their final disappearance.
At the same time, the amount of the total Dagestan population in 1897 was
45.5 thousand less as compared with 1886. If we take into account the level of
natural growth of Dagestan peoples, such an event should not have existed. But it
should also be considered that in the XIX century, hundreds of thousands the
North Caucasians migrated from the North Caucasus to Turkey. It‘s true that this
process considerably slowed down in the end of the century, but to a certain
extent it, still took place. Along with this, changes happened between the
territorial-administrative divisions in this period. The mistakes made in the
Table 14. Size of Dagestan Ethnicities in

Dagestan in 1886, 1897, 1926, and 2002
Years 1886 1897 1926 2002

Dagestan Ethnicities
Avars 119,711 158,550 138,749 758,438
Among them
Andians 7,575 7,681 21,270
Archibels 804 854 7
Akhvakhs 3,585 3,677 6,362
Bagulals 1,474 3,054 18
Kapuchians 2,330 1,447 6,184
Botlikhels 1,383 3,354 -
Godoberians 887 1,425 2
Didoians 4,844 3,276 15,176
Karatians 7,217 5,305 6,019
Tindians 3,262 3,812 33
Chamalals 3,889 3,438 3
Khvarshians 1,406 1,019 107
Hinukhs - - 525
Hunzibels 793 98 972
Aguls 6,830 7,653 23,314
Dargins 107,168 121,375 108,926 425,526
Among them
Kaidaqs 14,356 14,424 4
Kubachians 2,232 2,357 57
Lacktsis 48,316 76,381 39,878 139,732
Lesghins 103,288 94,596 90,509 336,698
Kumyks 60,836 51,209 87,960 365,804
Nogaians 2,556 1,909 26,086 38,168
Rutulians 11,985 10,333 24,298
Tabassarans 27,667 31,915 110,152
Tsakhurs 5,165 3,531 81,68
Dagestan ethnicities, total 549,559 504,020 545,540 2,230,298
Note: In 1886, Avars and Dargins are not implied in the column ―among them.‖
Source: Code of statistical data on the population of Transcaucasus from the family lists of
1886. Tiflis, 1893; General code on the Empire of the results of data elaboration of
the first population census of 1897, vol. II, St Petersburg, 1905, pp 44-45, 48-49.
censuses should not also be excluded, more because nationality in 1897 was
determined on the basis of a native language. While processing the censuses data,
the distribution of the Turkish-speaking population was conducted according to
the people that populated either territory, but thorough distribution of the Turkish
ethnic group from other Turkish-speaking population was still too difficult. For
example, Kumyks and Nogaians are Turkish-speaking peoples of the North
Caucasus. In 1897, the amount of Kumyks was 51,000, and Nogaians was 2,000.
During the census of 1926, when nationality was determined by the respondent
himself, the amount of Kumyks was 88,000, and of Nogaians, it was 13 times
more, or 26,000.
Along with the Caucasian peoples, the Caucasus was populated by peoples of
non-Caucasian origin, namely, Russians, Ukrainians, Greeks, Kurds, Assyrians,
Tatars, Jews, etc. The mentioned peoples settled in the Caucasus mostly from the
XIX to XX centuries. The reasons of Russians settlement in the Caucasus and
their recent migration from the Caucasus were mentioned above. The amount of
other peoples also reduced in 2002, as compared with the censuses conducted in
previous years. For example, at present 67,000 Ukrainians live in the Caucasus,
among them 38,000 live in the South Caucasus, and 29,000 live in the North
Caucasus. It‘s enough to say that in 1989, there lived 52.4 thousand Ukrainians
only in Georgia, i.e., 14,000 more than live in the South Caucasus now. The
amount of other peoples living in Caucasus also reduced and the amount of titled
nations in the entire population considerably increased. It‘s interesting that
according to the population census of 1897, the amount of the Caucasian peoples
in the Russian Empire was 5,616 thousand, and it may be said that they all lived
in Caucasus—5,555 thousand (98.9%). It should also be mentioned that despite
Russia‘s one-century long rule in the Caucasus, Chechens, Ingushs, Abkhazs,
Dargins, Lacktsis, Talishs, Tats, Udians in 1897 all lived in the Caucasus—not a
single man from these Caucasian peoples lived in other regions of the Russian
Empire. Others of the Caucasian peoples, with a few exceptions, all lived in the
Caucasus, the only exceptions being Circassians, Georgians, and, especially,
Armenians. Namely, the amount of Armenians in the Russian Empire was 1,173
thousand, and from this 95.3% (1,119 thousand) lived in the Caucasus; the rest,
4,7% (55,000), lived mostly in European Russia (49,000), in Middle Asia (4.9
thousand) and Siberia (0.6 thousand). In 1897, the amount of Georgians in the
Russian Empire was 1,353 thousand. From this amount, 99.8% (1,350 thousand)
lived in Caucasus and the rest 0.2% (3,000) lived mostly in European Russia (1.4
thousand), Siberia (0.6 thousand) and Middle Asia (0.2 thousand). From all the
Caucasian peoples (5,616 thousand) living in the Russian Empire only 61,000
lived beyond the borders of Caucasus, mostly in European Russia. There were
3,189 representatives of the Caucasian peoples who lived in Siberia, which is
quite a great amount for that period, if we take into account the most severe
climate of Siberia for the Caucasian peoples along with quite alien environment
and lack of economic interest. This situation was caused by the condition that the
tsarist Russia used to send politically unreliable people and different criminals to
Siberia. This is clearly witnessed by gender composition of the Caucasian peoples
living in Siberia (2,793 men and 396 women). Sometimes, the exiled were
accompanied there by their wives. The Caucasian population in Middle Asia was
mostly represented by Armenians (98.0%). A great amount of Armenians in the
Russian Empire was engaged in commercial activities. The same situation was in
Middle Asia, which is witnessed by the gender composition of Armenians living
there (3,639 men and 1,223 women).
In this paragraph, we‘ll discuss dynamics of the size of Jews in the Caucasus, as
they live in all the countries of the Caucasus. The history of their residence in the
Caucasus involves more than 26 centuries, namely, in Georgia. The volume of
historical works Kartlis Tskhovreba (Life of Kartli), where the works of the
Georgian historians tell about the adventure of the Georgian nation from ancient
times to the XVIII century, connect the appearance of Jews in Georgia with
invasion of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babel, in the VI century B.C.
The XI century Georgian chronicler Leonti Mroveli, who preserved the first
information on Jews‘ appearance in Georgia, says that Jews, ousted after destruction
of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, came to Kartli. Headman of the former capital of
Georgia, Mtskheta, settled them in Kherk, near Mtskheta.2 A renowned Georgian
historian and scholar of the XVIII century, Vakhushti Batonishvili, mentions about
the Jews‘ settlement in Georgia: ―Then again there came Hurians, refugees from
Nebuchadnezzar,‖ and heard man of Mtskheta settled them in Kherk, he also says.3
It‘s true that by both evidences, Jews were settled in Kherk, but there is seen one
essential difference between them. Vakhushti Batonishvili points that Jews ―came
again‖ to Georgia, i.e., Jews came to Georgia earlier, too. It seems that Vakhushti
Batonishvili knew about the catastrophe of the Israeli Kingdom, which took place in
722 B.C., when Assyrians invaded Israel and occupied its capital Samaria. It seems
a part of Jews came to Georgia still in the VIII century B.C. The works of Georgian
historians Leonti Mroveli and Vakhushti Batonishvili represent the tragedy held in
Judea in 586 B.C. by Nebuchadnezzar. The difference between these two evidences
is that it was known for Vakhushti Batonishvili about Jews settlement in Kartli
earlier, namely, in the VIII century B.C. That‘s why he says that Jews again came to
Kartli in 586, and were again settled in Kherk. It may be, therefore, mentioned that
Jews live in Georgia 28 centuries, at least 26 centuries.
2
Kartlis Tskhovreab, vol. I, Tbilisi, 1955, pp 15-16.
3
Kartlis Tskhovreba, vol. IV, Tbilisi, 1973, p 53.
Jews settled in Georgia later, as well. As Kartlis Tskhovreba tells us, in the
period of Caesar Vespasian, when he occupied Jerusalem, Jews came to Kartli and
settled beside those Jews that came to Mtskheta earlier.4
According to the ancient Georgian written sources, there existed in Georgia of
that period—in Mtskheta, Urbnisi, etc.—―the district of Hurians,‖ where Jews‘
religious communities lived, which had their own cult centers: ―Bagin of
Hurians,‖ synagogues.
According to the evidences preserved in Kartlis Tskhovreba, Jews have lived
in Armenia as well since ancient times. Consideration expressed in the specialist
literature says that Jews are seen in Armenia in the first raid of Arabs (the 40s of
the VII century), as well, but after Arabs invaded Armenia, the historical sources
do not mention about them in Armenia any longer.
In ancient and late feudal periods in Georgia, Jews mostly lived in Kartli, and
then they moved to all the historical parts of the country—mostly in big and small
cities. Their main activities were commerce, as well as handicraft and agriculture.
From the XIX century, Russian and European Jews, Ashkenazi start appearing in
Georgia. They were handicraftsmen and producers of European goods. It is most
important that the Georgian Jews could buy local estates and have Christian
Georgians as serfs. That could not be imagined in Europe. So, the Georgian Jews
had equal rights with the Georgian landlords. They have never been oppressed
and religiously persecuted within the whole period of the history of Georgia.
A renowned Georgian public figure of the XIX century, I. Gogebashvili,
mentioned Jews had lived in Georgia since time immemorial, but they did not
experience any persecution by Georgians even in the Middle Ages. Raids on Jews,
such as in Europe and other countries, were never conducted in Georgia.
There is no single evidence on the cases of Jews‘ persecution. That‘s why
Georgian Jews, living now in Israel, have not lost their relations with Georgia.
There are too many books in Georgia being published in Israel; some by
Georgian-Israeli organizations. Mutual support was usual between Georgians and
Jews. At present, Georgian Jews living in Israel point out that they have moved
from the home country to home country. Despite the long distance, Jews did not
suspend moving between these countries.
Jews have lived in Azerbaijan, as well, since time immemorial. Mountain
Jews have settled in North Azerbaijan. From the XVIII to XIX centuries, they
came down from the mountains to the lowlands, due to which they are called
mountain Jews. According to the consideration of the scientific literature, they are
direct descendants of old Jews, which settled in Iran after Jews persecution, from
4
Kartlis Tskhovreba, vol. I, Tbilisi, 1955, p 44.
where they further moved to Azerbaijan and Dagestan and formed an independent
ethnic group. Mountain Jews first are mentioned in the X century.
There exists scanty, often inaccurate information on the amount of Jews in the
XIX century. According to the data of the population census conducted in the
Russian Empire in 1897, there lived 5,063 thousand Jews, from which 40.5
thousand live in the Caucasus, and 17 thousand and 12.2 thousand in Azerbaijan
and Georgia, respectively.
According to 1926 census, the amount of Jews living in the Soviet Union
equaled 2,579.4 thousand. A considerable reduction of Jews, as compared with
their amount in 1897, was caused by transfer of those territories to foreign
countries, in which Jews lived in a great amount.
In 1926, the amount of Jews in Azerbaijan was 30.8 thousand, among them
10.3 thousand were mountain Jews. The same year, 30.2 thousand Jews lived in
Georgia, among them 20.6 thousand being Georgian Jews. Jews lived in the
greatest amount in Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1970, respectively, 55.4 thousand
and 41.3 thousand. From that period, Jews start to move to mostly Israel and the
USA. In the Soviet Union, which was a closed space then, free movement of Jews
was permitted from that period. As a result, the process of Jews‘ emigration was
becoming more intensive, especially in the last period. For example, if in 1989,
the amount of Jews living in Azerbaijan was 55.5 thousand, by 2002, they were
only 12.7 thousand (in Azerbaijan in 1999, there lived 8.9 thousand Jews, in
Georgia in 2002, there were 3.8 thousand). According to the census conducted in
the XX century, there have never lived more than one thousand Jews in Armenia,
and by the data of last census (2001), nearly no Jews lived in Armenia any longer.
There was considerable reduction in the amount of Jews living in the North
Caucasus as well. Namely, from 1939 to 2002, their amount reduced from 21.0
thousand to 4.7 thousand. It should be mentioned that in 1939, the amount of Jews
living in the Caucasus as 105.1 thousand, in 1989 it was 57.0 thousand, and in 2002
it was 17.4 thousand and, respectively, their share in the entire Caucasian population
was 1.0; 0. 3; and 0. 1%.
IV.II. LANGUAGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION

Language is the basis for the existence of nation. It expresses the historical
past and culture of a nation and, therefore, the richer the material and spiritual
treasure of the nation, the more diverse its language. According to the present
calculation of linguists, the amount of the world peoples‘ languages is four to five
thousand. Unfortunately, the amount of peoples and languages do not exist as of
yet. The amount of peoples in the world is approximately three thousand. As a

result of long historical development, a part of them has been developed as a
nation, some others form a nationality and the rest from a group of tribes or
separate tribes. The peoples differ considerably from one another by their amount.
Some people are of hundreds of millions, others, some hundreds, as is the case is
in the North Caucasus.
As a rule, each people speak one language, though sometimes the dialect
difference of some languages is so great that, without knowing the literary
language, they fail to communicate. In the North Caucasus, sometimes the
representatives of neighboring villages cannot understand each other.
A majority of the world countries is multinational. There live some tens of
hundreds of different people in some countries. In many of such countries,
bilingualism is spread. In such a case, a certain part of people or entire people
permanently use two languages in their everyday lives. For example, the Elsass
population, living in eastern part of France, uses the German and French
languages. A considerable part of the population in Belgium and Switzerland
speaks two or three languages. 5 In the Soviet Union, bilingualism, unfortunately,
was masterfully used for assimilation of peoples through the Russian language.
On the one part, they used to talk about the need of nation‘s self-determination
and flourishing, but, on the other, they used to advocate the theory of nation‘s
merging far more deliberately and practically. So, concealed assimilation was
successfully being conducted, and the language, as a main factor, was considered
to be of great importance. Though the Russian language was not declared a state
language by the constitution, but no such need was felt either. The Russian
language not only occupied a dominating position, but through using concealed,
forcible methods, it not only ousted languages of native population from use
through using concealed forcible measures, which was considerably caused by
sharp tension in the international relations.
Potentials for using the native languages in the republics kept gradually being
sharply limited. Wider introduction of the Russian language was being conducted
through rather masterful methods. National schools were abolished in many
autonomous formations. It became very difficult and, in many cases, even
impossible, to get work by specialty if a person did not know the Russian
language well. All this formed a firm basis for annihilation of peculiarities of
nations and nationalities, originality, traditions and habits-customs, national
degeneration. According to the sociological research, conducted in the Kuibishev
5
The World Population. M., 1989, pp 382-383.
region in 1989, 8.1% of the respondents abstained from naming their nationalities.
In some nationalities, this indicator was 41.5%. 6
All this was caused by the attack on the national languages and the efforts to
establish only the Russian language. For example, when the head of the soviet
state, N. Khrushchev, said his sacramental phrase at the stairs of the Byelorussian
University: ―The sooner we speak the Russian language, the quicker we build the
communism.‖ They started to implement this damaging statement in practice not
only in Belarus, but also in Ukraine.7 However, communism was not built, but
there was left nearly not a single school in the native language in Belarus. The
Byelorussian language had become an everyday, family language. Belarus was the
only republic in the Soviet Union where children of the indigenous nationality
studied mostly in the Russian schools. Namely, 79% of the schoolchildren were
educated in the Russian language. Byelorussian school was preserved only in the
rural area. At schools, the Byelorussian language had three times less hours than
the Russian language. Discrimination of the Byelorussian language was expressed
in the fact that the teachers of the Russian language got higher wages than those
of the Byelorussian language. The situation was no better in other republics and
autonomous formations. In many of them, the children studied the history of their
native homeland, people, traditions, habits, and customs in the Russian language,
thus they were losing love for their people, history, and home country.
Development of bilingualism in the Soviet Union caused decay of native
languages. They were no longer used. This is vividly witnessed by the
sociological research conducted in Karachaev-Circassian autonomous area.
According to it, parents did not use much the native language in the relations with
their children. Of the respondents, 37.5% shared this opinion, and 50% of them
considered they used both native and Russian languages in the relations with their
children. Of the respondents, 90% used Russian in unofficial correspondence in
urban area, 10% used both languages. Of the respondents, 45% read the fiction in
Russian only; 67% read press also in Russian; 100% used only Russian in their
public appearance. 8
In this respect, the tendency of national school development in the North
Caucasus should be mentioned. At the dawn of the soviet power establishment,
the schools were opened in the languages of nearly all small-numbered peoples.
This process finished so that in the 1970s, there actually were no schools in the
language of the North Caucasian peoples.
6
The Russian nation in the union of the USSR peoples. Kuibishev, 1990, p 7.
7
The newsp. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 13 September 1989.
8
The Russian nation in the union of the USSR peoples, p 125.
At the first stage of the soviet power, special attention was turned to opening
of the schools according to ethnic sign. It was done for propaganda purposes—to
show benefits of the soviet order. Namely, in the 1920s, schools were opened in
the native language for the North Caucasian peoples, among them, small-
numbered peoples. But then, study in the native language was suspended and
Russian was used in all schools. In 1927, a school census was conducted in the
Soviet Union, which fully embraced all types of educational establishments. In
that period, the system of schools of general education was nearly the same. The
entire course involved nine years and was divided into two stages. The first
implied four years and the second, five years. The second stage involved mostly
seven and nine years of teaching. In the areas where ethnically mixed populations
prevailed, the process of teaching was conducted in two and even three languages.
Table 15. Amount of Schools of the First State in 1927 According to the
Language of Teaching and Number of Pupils in Them in the North Caucasus
Number of schools
Language Mixed schools

Number of pupils
of teaching Teaching in two Teaching in three

languages Languages
Number Number Number Number
of schools of pupils of schools of pupils
Nogaian 1 43 4 249
Circassian 51 3,134 102 8,118 1 172
Chechen 121 6,935 9 1,062
Darginian 18 693 - -
Lacktsisian 8 375 12 1,037
Avarian 28 960 - - 1 92
Ossetian 65 5,614 30 5,630
Karachaev 28 1,920 10 1,281
Kumykian 19 809 10 1,228 2 149
Balkarian 5 283 15 930
Source: All-Union school census of 15 December 1927, part I, Moscow, 1930, pp 99-100.
In addition to schools of the first stage, there functioned seven- and nine-year
schools in the Circassian, Ossetian, and Kumyk languages. The schools of such a
type were opened in the South Caucasus. Namely, in small-numbered Georgia
from the 1926 to 1927 academic year, along with schools in the Georgian
language, there were opened 359 schools in the languages of peoples living there:
128 in Armenian, 87 in Azerbaijani, 63 in Russian, 36 in Greek, 27 in Ossetian,9

also Abkhazian, German, Jewish, Assyrian, Kurd, Estonian, Polish and Turkish
schools. 10 In the following years, some hundred schools functioned in Georgia in
the languages of peoples living in it. Namely, in the academic year of 1988 to
1989, the teaching process was in Abkhazian in 75 schools, and in Ossetian it was
98 schools.
In the postwar period, the tendency of teaching in Russian became stronger.
This was caused by wide, in most cases, artificial expansion of the Russian
language public functions. This process was ongoing most intensively in the
North Caucasus. From the 1967 to 1968 academic year, the amount of
schoolchildren in the Russian schools in Chechen-Ingushetia and Dagestan
increased eight and 12 times as compared with 1938 to 1939, and in North Ossetia
and in Kabardian-Balkar republic, it decreased four times. This ended in the fact
that the teaching process for children of indigenous nationality in Balkaria, North
Ossetia, Chechen-Ingushetia, Adygeya, and Karachaev-Circassia was ongoing in
the Russian language.11
It is impossible to characterize the language structure of the Caucasian
population in dynamics, because the official data give no possibility to compare.
In the Soviet census, the first question was only on the native language. For
example, in 1959, the interviewer fixed that a respondent considered the language
of his nationality to be his native language, Russian, or any other language. In the
following years, along with the native language, there was fixed another language
of only the Soviet Union peoples, which was fluently spoken by a respondent. In
the period of the Russian population census of 2002, the question on the language
changed. The question foresaw whether a respondent knew the Russian language
or any other language. To know the language meant speaking, reading, and
writing or only to know speaking in the given language. It was for the first time in
the 2002 population census that information was received from the entire
population on knowing the Russian language, which at present is the state
language of the country according to the Russian Federation Constitution. In
addition, each respondent had an opportunity to point to knowledge of three more
languages. As the census data showed, from the total amount of the population of
Russia, 142.6 million persons (98.2%) knew Russian, when Russians made up
79.8% of the entire population. Practically the entire population of the country
9
Contemporary ethnic processes in the USSR, Moscow, 1977, p 265.
10
All-union school census of 1927. Transcaucasian socialist federative soviet republic. Tiflis, 1930,
pp 18-19.
11
Contemporary ethnic processes in the USSR, p 273.
knew Russian. Such a situation was caused by the fact that in the postwar period,
after closing of schools in native languages, among them in the North Caucasus as
well, many generations were educated in the Russian schools. After Russian, the
most spread language is English (6.9 million people, 4.8%), Tatar (5.3 million,
3.7%), German (2.9 million, 2 %), Ukrainian (1.8 million, 1.2%), Bashkirian (1.4
million, 1 %), Chechen (1.3 million, 1 %), etc. 12
A visible difference is noticed from the viewpoint of Russian language
spreading in the North Caucasian republics. If in Adygeya 98.2% of the
population knows Russian and 96.3% in North Ossetia, this indicator in Chechnia
and Ingushetia is 81.3 and 86.7%, respectively. Such a situation was mostly
caused a high share of Russians in the population of Adygeya and North Ossetian
republics. Russians make up 64.4% of the entire population of Adygeya. If we
exclude the amount of Russians in the entire population of Adygeya and calculate
without Russians, the index of Russian language spreading in Adygyea is still too
high (95.1%); we should then take into consideration the indisputable fact that
within years in Adygyea, co-living of a great amount of Russians, Adygeis used to
influence the scales of the Russian language extension in this republic.
In the South Caucasus, unlike Russia, like the previous censuses, they fixed
the native language and the language, which was fluently spoken by a respondent.
Nearly 100% of the titled nations already considered the language of their
nationality to be their native language. However, this indicator was nearly 100%
in the previous census as well. Namely, if in Georgia, in 1989, 99.7% of
Georgians considered Georgian their native language, in 2002, this indicator made
up 99.9%. In Armenia in 2002, 99.5% of Armenians named Armenian their native
language. The Russian language in the South Caucasus as well as in entire post-
soviet space still remains a major language of relations between the nations,
though in the South Caucasus less people speak Russian fluently than in the North
Caucasus. Namely, one-third of Georgians (33.7%) can speak Russian. In
Georgia, the amount of people that know Russian is far greater among the ethnic
minorities. This language is spoken fluently by 77.2% of Ukrainians, 49.1% of
Armenians, 49.3% of Greeks, and 26.5% of Azerbaijani.
After the Georgia‘s statehood was restored, the English, German, and French
languages became far more important they are spoken by 3.8%; 1.2%; and 0.4%
of the population, respectively. Among Georgians, these languages are spoken by
94.4%; 95.4% and 94, 2%, respectively, mostly young people. Georgian, i.e., the
state language, is spoken fluently by 89.3% of the entire population of the
country, instead of the 77.1% of 1989.
12
The jrnl. Boprosi Statistiki, N 3, 2004, p 10.
It should be mentioned in general that the answers given to the question on

the native language, in our opinion, are not real. In fact, a respondent, due to
national self-respect, irresponsibility, or some other reasons, quite often
consciously gives wrong answer to the question on the national language, and so
in the censuses for 98% to 99% of the titled nations‘ representatives, the native
language was the language of their nationality. We‘ll discuss this issue in detail
below.
We required such a wide introduction with regard to the native language
because separation from the national culture and then gradual annihilation of the
national consciousness, first of all, is revealed in case of losing reading and
writing in the native language and further the native language itself. The native
language is one of the signs of national belonging. They imply in it the first
language mastered in the childhood—the language of ―a cradle,‖ i.e., mother
tongue. In some cases, the language mastered in the childhood fails to perform the
function of the native language any longer. Usually, the native language is the
language that a man uses in speech, the language he thinks and writes in . Thus,
proceeding from the life situation, the native language may be changed. So, the
native language cannot coincide with the nationality, though in a majority of
cases, they coincide. The concept of native language involved different meanings.
In the 1987 census, it was the language that respondents considered their native
language; in the 1926 census the spoken language of a respondent was considered
the native language, in further censuses again the language, which a respondent
himself considered to be his native.
To characterize the language structure of the Caucasian population, let‘s
discuss the results of the population 1926 and 1979 censuses, as there is no
essential difference from this viewpoint in the censuses of other years. Nearly
100% of the population in all the censuses names the language of their nationality
to be their native language. In the 1926 census 99.5% to 99.7% of Chechens,
Balkars, Karachayevs, Ingushs, and Kabardinians, living in the North Caucasus
consider the language of their nationality to be their native language. It was still
then pointed out that in the Caucasus ―the concept of native language is nearly
adequate to the concept of nationality.‖13 In the censuses of the following years, a
great amount of the Caucasian peoples (98.3% to 99.7%) also named the language
of their nationality as their native language.
In 1979, 97.6% of the North Caucasian titular peoples, living in Russia,
considered the language of their nationality to be their native language. This
indicator was far higher as compared with other peoples living in Russia, certainly,
13
Gozulov A. Morphology of the population. Rostov-upon-Don, 1929, p 186.
after Russians. At the same time, 98.9% of the titular peoples, living in their
autonomous formations in the North Caucasus, named the language of their
nationality to be their native language, while Russia was named by 0.8% (22,515
men). Only 0.01 (215) of 1,411 thousand Russians, living in their autonomous
formations in the North Caucasus, considered the language of the titular
nationalities as their native language. A small amount of Russians living there 1.0%
(14,375 men) spoke fluently other languages of the Soviet Union peoples as well.
Of the North Caucasian titular peoples, 72.7% (2,111 thousand men) spoke Russian
fluently.14 In the South Caucasus, 99.1% of Georgians, Azerbaijani, and Armenians,
living in their republics, considered the language of their nationality to be their
native language in 1979. The Russian language was fluently spoken by their 28.7%.
This indicator was far lower than as compared with the relevant indicator of the
North Caucasus (72.7%).
To study the Russian language was of great importance for relations, for
sharing the Russian culture, but it was most damaging as the Russian language,
through the forced methods, actually ousted the native languages of the
indigenous nations in the republics and autonomous formations. All the
documents in all the enterprises, organizations and establishments were in
Russian. The national languages were ousted from factories, mills, houses,
institutes, and schools. Even the menus and the playbills were compiled in
Russian. So, inside and outside, at work and in the streets everything ―started
speaking Russian.‖ They took only formal care of the development of national
languages. The most-renowned poet in the Soviet Union, Rassul Gamzatov
(Dagestan), wrote: ―The literature in my native Dagestan is being written in nine
languages. They prove none of these languages faces jeopardy of disappearance…
Two new literary journals were recently published in the national language. But
one question worries us: who can read these journals ten, twenty years after?
There is not a single school, kindergarten, in which the native language is being
taught in Makhachkala (capital of Dagestan—authors).‖15 The jeopardy of
language disappearance, and the lack of prospects for its development, caused
sharp tension between the nationalities. Among the Soviet Union republics, only
in Georgia the native language (Georgian) was declared the state language by the
Constitution of Georgia. In 1978, this article was removed from the new variant of
the constitution. This resulted in mass demonstrations. The population, mostly
youth, came out into the streets and the central authorities were forced to leave
this item in the constitution. Taking into consideration the said above, we consider
14
Size and structure of the USSR population. Moscow, 1985, pp 74-84.
15
The newsp. Izvestia, 29 March 1988.
that the cited indicators on the native language lack reality. As it seems, after
1926, the concept of the native language is identified with the concept of
nationality. The Russian language was native for far more amount of the peoples
living in the Soviet Union. This especially concerns the Caucasian peoples. We
don‘t think really that, for example, in 1979, the language of their nationality
could have been native for 99.0% of Karachayevs and Circassians, as there was
not a single national school in these languages and, according to the data, nearly
40% of Karachaev-Circassian population uses Russian in their relations with their
children; 50% use both languages, 45% read the fiction in Russian, 87% read the
press in Russian, 100% delivers speech in Russian. If we take into consideration
that the native language is that language, which is used in speech, writing, and
thinking, and if we are guided with these requirements, then 99% of Karachayevs
and Circassians should not have named the language of their nationality as their
native language. This, more or less, concerns all the peoples living in the Soviet
Union.
With regard to knowing the native language, also the other languages, we
mostly analyzed the data of 1926 and 1979, but analysis of the data of other
censuses gives nearly the same exact picture. The difference is in dynamics of
growth in absolute and relative indicators on those speaking Russian fluently.
IV.III. URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS

The first settlements of people have existed since time immemorial. The date
of these first settlements in the specialist literature is considered to be ca 8000
B.C. But this date may become older if we take into consideration that people left
natural shelters far earlier. People of that period used to move to far-off places,
and in their new dwelling places there were found more than one habitations.
One of the main characteristics of the population settlement is its distribution
according to cities and villages. A city is a large, settled unit with a developed
infrastructure. A considerable part of the population lives in the city, unlike the
village. The city, first of all, fulfills the functions of social production, also the
management, organizational-economic, and cultural functions.
The disposition of the population, the forms of its settlement, is considerably
connected with the development of a city, the process of urbanization. Cities
originated in ancient times. The first settlements, which can be considered the
ancestors of cities, are dated by nearly 4,000 years ago. These cities were built in
Mesopotamia, on the banks of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, and in Egypt on the
bank of the river Nile. At first, there lived about 5,000 to 10,000 people in the
cities. Development of cities in the old world is connected with the Greek-Roman
epoch. 16
Cities were of great importance for the development of the medieval
society—they facilitated formation of centralized states, development of
monetary-commodity relations and technical progress, and the advance of art and
culture. In the Middle Ages, the ethnic units of the North Caucasus were not
politically, social-economically, or culturally united organisms, or, at least, unions
of the states being on the way of unification, because there existed, in fact, no
cities in the North Caucasus then. The biggest city in medieval Europe was Paris,
in the XX century, the biggest city is already London—its population in 1900 was
4.5 million. The amount of population in big cities grows in Russia as well. In
1897, in Petersburg the population amounted to 1,265 thousand, in Moscow it was
1,039 thousand and in Kiev it was248,000.
In the XX century, the amount of populations kept growing rapidly in the
cities. In total, population in the cities increased from 220 million to 2.8 billion,
i.e., 12.7 times. In the same period, the world population increased only by 3.8
times. In the near future in the cities of the developed countries, there will be
unprecedented growth of the population. Urbanization, which means permanent
growth of the share of urban population in the total amount of population, is
inevitable. It also carries a positive factor in it. It should be mentioned that the
entire progress of the social development is nearly completely connected with the
city. However, a great amount of the population in big cities faces poverty and
unfavorable conditions, but not a single country has reached important economic
growth and technical progress without urbanization. In 2008, for the first time in
the history of mankind, more than half of the world population—3.3 billion
people—lived in the cities. It is expected that by 2030, this number will be five
billion. Thus, urbanization is a historical process; when in the development of the
society, the role increases of the cities and the rule of urban life. Urbanization is
characterized by concentration, intensification, and differentiation of activities,
and unprecedented achievements in science and technologies.
By the data of the population census in 1897, in the Russian Empire 28
million people lived in the cities, i.e., 18% of the entire population. In the Soviet
Union, the amount of urban and rural population in 1959 was equal in Russia a bit
earlier—in 1959. In Georgia, in equal amount of urban and rural population was
first in 1975, in Azerbaijan; it was 1972 and in Armenia, far earlier—1959.
16
Flanagan, William G. 1999, Urban sociology; Images and Structures. Needham Height. Allyn &
Bason. p 3.
From the viewpoint of discussing the urban population in dynamics and

comparing the share of urban population in different countries, a problem arises,
caused by existence of different criteria for determining a city in different
countries. These criteria often change within the countries themselves. Still, in a
majority of countries, a city is determined by quantity sign. A settlement may be
considered to be a city, if a certain amount of people live in it. Sometimes, a city
is determined by a share of those engaged in non-agricultural fields or according
to relevant legislative acts. In the Soviet Union, the settlements were considered to
be cities on the basis of a decree issued by the Supreme Council Presidium of a
separate republic. However, these criteria also changed. For example, before
1957, in the Russian Federation, those settlements were cities, in which not less
than 10,000 grown-up people lived, not more than 25% of whom were engaged in
agriculture. From 1957, in Russia, those settlements were cities, in which not less
than 12,000 people lived and 85% were workers and employees, including their
family members. The settlements of workers (located near industrial enterprises,
construction sites, etc.) were also considered the cities, and the resort settlement,
in case there lived 2,000 people in it, and if in summer the amount of rest-makers
was no less than 50% of the permanent population of this settlement. According
to the quantity criterion, there was an important difference according to the
republics. Thus, for example, a minimum amount of the population in Georgia
and Azerbaijan was 5,000, in Belarus it was 6,000, in Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Armenia, Turkmenistan and Estonia it was 8,000, and in other republics it was
10,000. Only in Lithuania there was no lower limit determined for the population.
Unlike the Soviet Union, in other countries, cities were determined not so
much by their industrial importance, as by administrative, trade, and banking
activities. For example, in the USA, all the settlements were considered cities, in
which more than 2,500 people lived, in Iceland there were more than 200, and in
the Netherlands there were more than 20,000. In England and Scandinavian
countries, there exist historically established ―personal‖ lists of cities, which are
sometimes filled with new settlements, etc.17
Great changes took place in the Caucasus in the XX century in civil settlements
and in the amount of their population. Sometimes, there was noticed visible jump-
like growth in the urban population, which was connected with intensive migration
processes, with granting a status of city or a small town. In the 1920s, the annual
average growth of the urban population was not big, but afterwards, namely, in the
1930s, it reached maximum. As a result of the war, in the first half of the 1940s,
there was no growth of the urban population at all, while in the second half of the
17
Kovalev S., Kovalskaya N. Geography of the USSR population. Moscow, 1980, p 162.
XX century, the increase became stable, unless we consider the period after the
Soviet Union dissolution. In the 1930s, in the Caucasus, considerable growth of the
urban population and reduction of the urban population in the beginning of the XXI
century by three points (see table 16) was mostly caused by the migration of the
Russian population—in the first case their massive coming into the Caucasus, and
in the second case by their massive departure. The Russian population in Caucasus
mostly lived in the cities.
Within the entire XX century, the share of the urban population was higher in
the population of the South Caucasus than of the North Caucasus. According to
the population census of 1926, the population of the North Caucasus was nearly
rural. The population in Adygeya and Karachaev-Circassia completely lived in the
rural places. As compared with 1897, the urban population in the North Caucasus
increased in a little amount, namely, from 0.8% to 2% 18 (in 1897 Dagestan was
an administrative unit of the South Caucasus, so we excluded its population from
comparison). It should be mentioned that in 1913, the share of the urban
population was the highest in Georgia (26%).19
Table 16. Share of Urban Population in the Population of

Caucasian Countries from 1926 to 2002 (first line - entire population—
thousand, second line—share of urban population - %)
Years 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002

countries
CAUCASUS 7,617 10,827 12,712 16,659 18,865 21,032 22,182
20 30 43 49 53 55 52
SOUTH 5,872 8,027 9,505 12,295 14,052 15,727 15,537
CAUCASUS 24 32 46 51 55 57 54
GEORGIA 2,677 3,540 4,044 4,686 4,993 5,401 4,371
22 30 42 48 51 55 52
AZERBAIJAN 2,315 3,205 3,698 5,117 6,028 7,021 7,953
28 36 48 50 53 54 51
ARMENIA 881 1,282 1,763 2,492 3,031 3,305 3,213
19 28 50 59 66 68 64
NORTH 1,745 2,800 3,207 4,364 4,813 5,305 6,645
CAUCASUS 6 26 36 42 47 49 46
ADYGEYA 114 242 285 386 404 432 447
1 23 32 40 47 52 52
18
Gozulov A. Op. cit., pp 119, 121.
19
Peoples of the world states. Moscow, 1984, p 428.
KARACHAEV- 102 243 278 345 367 415 439

CIRCASSIA - 16 27 32 43 49 44
KABARDIAN- 204 359 420 588 666 753 902
BALKARIA 6 24 39 47 58 61 57
NORTH 152 329 451 553 592 633 710
OSSETIA 1 43 52 64 68 69 65
INGUSHETIA 75 697 710 1064 1156 1270 467
1 42
CHECHNYA 310 41 41 42 42 41 1,104
1 34
DAGESTAN 788 930 1,063 1,428 1,628 1,802 2,576
11 22 29 35 38 43 43
Note: Indicators are calculated by the authors on the basis of the census data of
corresponding years. Data of 2002 on Georgia are cited according to the territory
under the control of central authorities.
The urban population of the Soviet Union and, therefore, of the Caucasus,
was being filled up by different sources, namely, as a result of natural growth of
the population, turning of rural settlements into urban, migration from villages to
cities, and coming from outside of the Caucasus border (here other territories of
the Soviet Union are implied). In the period of the Soviet Union existence, there
were formed many urban settlements and their comparatively small number was
abolished—some small towns lost the function of a city and merged with its
territory with the neighboring city. In recent years, the structure of the sources of
filling radically changed. Under the influence of different factors, absolute and
relative indicators of the sources for filling up the urban settlements changed in
space and time. Despite this, in the Soviet Union period in the Caucasus, a main
source of filling up for the urban population, except some periods, was natural
growth of the urban population. From this viewpoint, the difference between the
South and the North Caucasus is high natural growth of the urban population
nearly in all the republics of the North Caucasus, while natural growth of the
population in the South Caucasus is caused mostly by high natural growth of the
urban population in Azerbaijan. In recent years, the structure of the sources for
filling up the urban population was essentially changed, especially in Georgia and
Armenia. In these countries, in conditions of intensive immigration of the urban
population and absence of factual natural growth in Georgia, a main source for
filling up the urban population was migration from villages to cities. In the period
of the last population census in the South Caucasus, the share of the urban
population would have been reduced far more than by 3% points, unless the high
level of natural growth of the urban population in Azerbaijan, which despite
recent years reduction, remained at a high level. It is enough to mention that from
2000 to 2005 the natural growth of the urban population in Azerbaijan equaled
175,000, when in Georgia and Armenia the natural growth of the population
(urban and rural) was 65,000, i.e., 2.7 times less. If the level of the natural growth
of the urban population from 2000 to 2005 would have been the same as in
Georgia, even the natural growth of the entire population, then from 2000 to 2005
the natural growth of only the urban population of Azerbaijan could have been 7.5
thousand instead of 175,000. Thus, in Georgia, from the sources of filling up the
urban population, there was left, in fact, the only source—migration from the
villages to the cities, which was being conducted at quite high rates due to hard
economic background formed in the country. In Azerbaijan and nearly all the
republics of the North Caucasus, the demographic potential and migration from
the villages to the cities have become decisive factors for filling up the urban
population. Only in conditions of essential improvement of the economic
conditions, we can expect ―operation‖ of other factors.
According to the data of the population census of 2002 in the North Caucasus,
we see no big cities (see table 17), only in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan
there live more than half a million people—545,000. By the size of the
population, the second place is occupied by Vladikavkaz (333,000) and Nalchik
(300,000). From 1989 to 2002, the population reduced by half in Grozny, the
capital of Chechnya (reduced from 400,000 to 211,000), which was caused by the
war in Chechnya—Grozny was completely destroyed, a part of the population was
killed, and the other part left the capital.
Three cities are in the South Caucasus, the population of which separately
exceeds a million. Historically, the greatest amount of the population lived in
Tbilisi. In 1897, the population of Tbilisi equaled 160,000; in Baku it
was112,000; and in Yerevan it was about 20,000. In 1939, the quantity correlation
between them changed: in Baku it was 810,000; in Tbilisi it was 519,000; in
Yerevan, it was 189,000. The rapid growth of Baku was facilitated by oil
extraction in the Caspian Sea. At present, Tbilisi population is 1,082 thousand; in
Baku, it is 1,818 thousand; in Yerevan it is 1,103 thousand. It should be
mentioned that the data are cited in table 15 on the amount of the population in
capitals, including the settlements existing under their administrative subjection.
From this viewpoint, the Baku population differs (some cities did not have the
settlements under their administrative subjection, or their amount was not much).
If we exclude the population of the settlements under administrative subjection of
capitals, then in 1989, the population of Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan was one and
1,150 thousand, and 1,202 thousand, respectively.
Table 17. Share of Population in the Capitals of Caucasian

Countries in the Entire Population from 1979 to 2002 in %
1979 1989 2002

Absolute % Absolute % Absolute %
thousand thousand thousand
GEORGIA 4,993 100.0 5,401 100.0 4,371 100.0
Tbilisi 1,066 21.1 1,260 23.1 1,082 23,5
AZERBAIJAN 6,028 100.0 7,021 100.0 7,953 100.0
Baku 1,550 25.7 1,794 25.6 1,818 22.9
ARMENIA 3,031 100.0 3,305 100.0 3,213 100.0
Yerevan 1,019 33.6 1,202 36,4 1,103 34.3
SOUTH
CAUCASUS 14,052 100.0 15,727 100.0 15,537 100.0
Capitals 3,635 25.9 4,256 27,1 4,003 25.8
ADYGEYA 404 100.0 432 100.0 447 100.0
Maikop 128 31.7 149 34.5 175 39.1
KARACHAEV-
CIRCASSIA 367 100.0 415 100.0 439 100.0
Cherkesk 91 24, 8 113 27.2 116 26,4
KABARDIAN-
BALKARIA 666 100.0 753 100.0 902 100.0
Nalchik 207 31.1 235 31,2 300 33.3
NORTH OSSETIA-
ALANIA
Vladikavkaz 592 100.0 633 100.0 710 100.0
279 47.1 300 47.5 333 46.9
INGUSHETIA 467 100.0
Nazran 1,156 100.0 1,270 100.0 125 27,8
CHECHNYA 375 32.4 400 31.5 1,104 100.0
Grozni 211 19.1
DAGESTAn 1,628 100.0 1,802 100.0 2,576 100.0
Mahachkala 251 15.4 317 17.6 545 21.2
NORTH
CAUCASUS 4,813 100.0 5,305 100.0 6,645 100.0
Capitals 1,331 27.6 1,514 28.5 1805 25.0
CAUCASUS 18,865 100.0 21,032 100.0 22,183 100,0
capitals 4,966 26.3 5,770 27.4 5,808 26.0
Note: The population data of 2002 involves the territory under the control of the central authorities of
Georgia.
Source: The results of the I national general census of the Georgian population, vol. I, Tbilisi, 2003, p 64;
The results of the population census of the Republic of Armenia in 2001, Yerevan, 2003, p 143;
Demographic indicators of Azerbaijan. Baku, 2005, p 28; Of the USSR population, Moscow, 1990, pp
20, 21, 25; Size and settlement of the population. The results of all-union population census of 2002,
vol. I, Moscow, 2004, pp 97-113.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the process of socio-economic and
political changes in the Caucasus continued more than ten years, and in total, it
may be said, have not been suspended as of yet. Economic hardships, caused by
the results of reforms, increased the processes of migration, especially in the
South Caucasus, and it first touched the urban population. Due to this, despite
considerably increased migration processes from the villages to the cities, in the
capitals of the South Caucasian countries as compared with 1989, the population
reduced in Tbilisi by 178,000; in Yerevan it reduced by 99,000; while in Baku it
grew a little, by 24,000. Absolute growth of the Baku population would have been
far more, except for the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, as a result of which a great
majority of the Armenian population left Baku.
It should be finally said about the population of the Caucasian cities: in 2002,
the population of the Caucasian cities was 11,493 thousand and from this amount
5,808 thousand, i.e., 50.5% of the urban population lived in the capitals. In the
South Caucasus this indicator was 47.6% and in the North Caucasus—58.6%.
IV.IV. SEX-AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION

Sex-age structure of the population is an important determinant. The
population is divided into men and women, and the correlation between them
forms a sex structure. The population is also divided according to the age groups,
which gives an opportunity to study demographic and socio-economic processes.
Correlation of the population age groups forms the age structure. Proceeding from
the events and processes to be studied, the population can be divided according to
different age intervals. For example, in the 1990s, in a great part of the post-soviet
space not only political and socio-economic factors caused reduction in the
childbirth. The process was promoted by other factors, as well. It is known that at
present 65% to 70% of the total number of children born in different regions of
the Caucasus come to women of the age of 20 to 29. Namely, in Azerbaijan, in
2004, this indicator was 69%. In 1989, the number of women of this age in
Azerbaijan was 727,000, and in 2005, it was 724,000, i.e., in fact, their number
did not change. Therefore, the age structure won‘t have essential influence on the
childbirth. But in Georgia, in 1989, the number of women of the age group of 20
to 29 was 452,000, in 2005 it was 328,000, i.e., 124,000 less. This means that in
other equal conditions in the most fertile age reduction in the absolute number of
women will also reduce total number of children born. Thus, in Georgia, the
reduction of fertility will be caused by the age structure of the population
established in the 2000s, i.e., purely demographic factors. The sex-age structure
composition of the population plays an important role in studying the problems of

the population reproduction.
Successful governing of the country and successful management of business
is impossible without consideration of demographic indicator, first of all, of the
population sex-age structure. The demographic phenomenon greatly influences
economic and social life of the country. Knowledge of demographic events and
processes is one of the, it may be said, most powerful instruments for
understanding the past and the prediction of the future. The demographic changes
supply information on which product will be in great demand in the near future,
the amount of which criminal cases will increase, when will increase or reduce the
prices on flats, what amounts of room in the flats will be in more demand, what
changes will have to be conducted in the healthcare sphere, and what amount and
which medicines will be required in the present and the future, etc. For example,
the authorities of the education sphere and business representatives in Georgia
should take into consideration in their activities the fact that from 1981 to 1990
(in a ten-year period) 939,000 children were born in the country; from 1996 to
2005 (again in a ten-year period) about half of this amount—495,000. A
businessman who neglects demographic processes, may appear in quite a different
sphere or no sphere at all. Behavior of different age groups should be taken into
consideration in the businessmen‘s activities, because behavior changes time and
again. Persons of the 30 or 40 age group may behave more differently in 2020
than they did in, let‘s say, 2000—the amount of smokers may change, etc. In
high-age groups, the amount of married and widowed may be more than in low-
age groups. In conditions of the population ageing, the number of criminal cases
should reduce, because people of the older age commit crimes less than young
people. Demography is successfully used in trade, in case the population
composition is considered, especially, according to the sex-age factor.
To know the population sex-age indicators and to make conclusions as a
result of its analysis is especially necessary in the healthcare sphere, because the
population of different age and number requires different medical services, and
different expenses are required for treatment.
All of us, during our lifetimes and before birth as well, use the healthcare
system. But individuals and the entire population require different expenses for
medical services in different periods of life. If in the first year of life medical
expenses are large, then, within nearly 30 to 40 years of age, these expenses are
minor, and they increase in the 30 to 40 years age population. In this age range,
women require more expenses for medical services than men with regard to
settlement of their reproduction problems. In the age range of 50 to 60, already
men use the healthcare system more, and over 60 and more age range, the medical
expenses increase more for both sexes. Use of hospitals at an average level
appears in from 50 years age. From the age of 70, people use hospitals five times
more than during the entire lifetime, from 80 to 2.5 times more. Thus, efficient
healthcare system is achieved only just through correct planning, which should be
based on the same correct apprehension of the demographic reality.
The population sex structure is revealed in the peculiarities of its reproduction,
namely, mostly childbirth and mortality. At every age, the number of people
depends on how many men of this age were born in their time and how many from
the born died. The age structure is influenced also by migration. At some age
(especially in the work capability age), people often change their places of
residence, than at other ages. The Soviet Union was closed, and only a few could
leave to live abroad. So, external migration did not influence the sex and age
structure in some republics. Only the internal migration processes played certain
role. After the Soviet Union disintegration, the emigration processes became most
intensive. About one million from the population of Georgia left the country from
1989 to 2002 to live in foreign countries (nearly 20.0% of the population). The
migration indicator was also very high in Armenia and Azerbaijan in that period.
The sex and age structure of the population is especially intensively
influenced by wars: the amount of victims, especially among men, is very large,
childbirth reduces among the peaceful population and mortality increases, and
internal and external migration processes become far more intensive.
Essential influence was exercised on the sex-age structure of the population in
the Caucasus by socio-economic changes that took place in the post-soviet space,
in the Caucasus as well, after the Soviet Union disintegration.
In the Caucasian countries, as well as in different countries of the world, we
can distinguish two basic types of the population according to the age-group
correlation. This is caused by the peculiarities of the population natural
movement. In the Caucasus, except Georgia and partly Armenia, childbirth is high
everywhere and the mortality is comparatively high, too. Correspondingly, the
low-age group‘s percentage here is high in the entire population and the share of
aged population is low. The childbirth is moderate in Georgia and Armenia,
unless we take into consideration the last period, and the mortality—low—and the
share of children and adults is low and of aged people—high. Low childbirth in
Georgia within years, along with other factors, caused visible aging of the
population.
The age groups of the population are of great practical importance. They form
contingents of different kinds. The age classification is, surely, conventional as
each classification is, but it still is subject to some regularity, depending on what
problem is being studied in regard to the age. During the recent population
censuses conducted in the post-soviet space for evaluating general structural

changes, as it was done earlier too, there were used three different age groups—
younger than of work capability age (of the age 0 to 15), of work capability age
(men, of the age 16 to 59 and women, of the age 16 to 54) and older than of work
capability age ( men, 60+, and women, 55+). In Georgia, the work capability age
was increased by five years both for men and women. Such a classification gives
no exact picture on the event to be studied, because the adults of 16 to 17 study at
school and at this age, only few of them work. It is far better to determine the
lower limit of the work capability age as 20, or, in the extreme case, as 18, as it is
in the European countries. Usually, in high-age groups as compared with low-age
groups, people are in small number. When these age groups approach one another
in number and become equal, this means the childbirth is very much reduced and
the population is aged.
Consequently, the population age structure mostly depends on childbirth and
mortality dynamics. If, in comparatively longer periods (10 to 15 years), high
childbirth is preserved, then the share of children and adults in the population
increases. The process is more vivid in cases when the child mortality reduces. In
the opposite situation, namely, when in the previous period childbirth reduces and
this is not compensated with children mortality reduction, then the share of
children and adults reduces in the population. The share of the population
correspondingly increases in middle and high ages, especially in conditions of
speedy reduction of childbirth. It should be mentioned that ―just the reduction of
childbirth is a major factor of the population aging and not reduction of mortality
and increase of the population life expectancy, as it may be seen at the first
sight.‖20 Along with this, when the intensive external migration influences the
population age structure, first of all, reduces the share of average age groups in the
entire population, because the migration is most intensive and the highest at these
ages. In case no migration exists, the age structure depends only on intensity of
childbirth and mortality and their change. If childbirth and mortality age intensity
does not change within certain years, the age structure does not change either, but
it is not so in reality. In the XX century in the Caucasus, the population age
structure change was influenced by all the mentioned above factors, but these
factors were especially vivid from the beginning of the 1990s.
The youngest age structure is characteristic in the Caucasus to those
republics, where a high level of childbirth is preserved. For example, in
Ingushetia, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, and Dagestan in 2002, the share of 0 to 15 age
population exceeded 30%, and correspondingly equaled 36.7; 35.0%; 37.7%; and
20
The world Population. M., 1989, p 290.
30.7% (see table 18). In Adygeya, Karachaev-Circassia, North Ossetia (Russians

live in these republics in a great amount, and their childbirth rate is very low) and
Georgia, the share of the 0 to 15 age population is within 20%. But their
population is aged. There is practically no differentiation of the work capability
population. Only in Kabardian-Balkaria, Karachaev-Circassia, and some other
republics the share of the work capability population increased a little, which
means that in the near future, the rate of aging should increase, which already
takes place now in these republics. At the same time, when the generation born in
the Caucasus in the 80s of last century (in the period of high childbirth) entered
the work-capability age, in 2002, it caused increase in the number of the work-
capability population by 1,030 men (8.9%) as compared with 1989. The structural
changes took place just within that age group itself. In 2002, in Dagestan, in the
total number of the of the work-capability age population 41.1% was made by the
persons of 35 years age and more (in 1989, it was 37.8%). In Georgia the
analogous indicator was 50.8% (in 1989, it was 46.3%).
The dynamics of the population age structure in some republics of the
Caucasus differs from the dynamics of the population age structure of the entire
population of Caucasus, which is caused by differences in the levels of childbirth
and mortality. General changes in the population age structure show gradual
reduction in the share of the population of younger-than-the-work-capability age
and increase in the share of the population of older-than-the-work-capability age
in the entire population. In all of the Caucasus from 1989 to 2002, the population
of younger-than-the-work-capability age reduced from 31.5% to 28.9%, and, of
older-than–the-work-capability age population increased from 13.2% to 14.0%. If
this latter indicator in the North Caucasus reduced by 1.2%, in the South Caucasus
it increased by 1.4%. The difference is especially great in separate regions
according to the share of the population of older-than-the-work-capability age.
For example, in 2002, this indicator in Georgia was 20.5%; in Azerbaijan it was
10.5%; Armenia it was 15.7%; Ingushetia it was 7.5%; and in Chechnya it was
8.2%, etc.
The migration processes in the Soviet Union, as in the closed space, had
sharply expressed direction—the population of mostly young age and
economically active moved from rural areas to live in the cities. This caused faster
aging of the rural population as compared to the urban and worsened the
demographic conditions of reproduction. This process took place in all the regions
of the Caucasus, though due to different levels of childbirth, it was of more or less
size. In Georgia, it acquired sharply expressed character. Namely, in the urban
Table 18. Distribution of the Population According to the

Age Groups in 1989 and 2002 (Absolute data of the republics
are given in thousands, age groups—in %)
1989 2002
Men and Among them Men and Among them
women Men Women women Men Women
GEORGIA 5,401 2,562 2,839 4,371 2,061 2,310
Younger than 26.3 28.3 24, 6 22.6 24, 6 20.9
work capable
Work capable 56.3 60.4 52.5 56.8 59.6 54.4
Older than work 17.4 11.3 22.9 20.5 15.8 24.7
capable
AZERBAIJAN 7,021 3,424 3,597 7,953 3,883 4,070
Younger than 34.6 36.5 32.9 33.7 35.6 32.0
work capable
Work capable 55.4 57.5 53.4 55.8 56.5 55.1
Older than work 10.0 6.0 13.7 10.5 7.9 12.9
capable
ARMENIA 3,305 1,619 1,686 3,213 1,542 1,671
Younger than 32.1 33.5 30.6 26.3 28.4 24.5
work capable
Work capable 56.2 58.7 53.8 58.0 59.2 56.9
Older than work 11.7 7.8 15.6 15.7 12.4 18.6
capable
SOUTH 15,727 7,605 8,122 15,537 7,486 8,051
CAUCASUS
Younger than 31.2 33.1 29.5 29.1 31.1 27.2
work capable
Work capable 55.9 58.7 53.2 56.6 57.9 55.3
Older than work 12.9 8.2 17.3 14.3 11.0 17.5
capable
ADYGEYA 432 198 234 447 208 239
Younger than 24.7 27.5 22.6 19.4 21.3 17.7
work capable
Work capable 54.2 59.5 49.6 58.1 62.4 54.3
Older than work 21.1 13.0 27.8 22.5 16.2 28.0
capable
KARACHAEV- 415 195 220 439 205 234
CIRCASSIA
Younger than 28.9 31.4 26.8 22.7 24.7 21.1
work capable
Work capable 55.1 59.1 51.7 58.9 61.5 56.5
1989 2002
Men and Among them Men and Among them
women Men Women women Men Women
Older than 16.0 9.5 21.5 18.4 13.8 22.4
work capable
KABARDIAN- 753 353 400 902 423 479
BALKARIA
Younger than 29.6 32.1 27.4 23.7 25.5 22.2
work capable
Work capable 55.9 59.5 52.8 60.7 63.2 58.4
Older than 14.5 8.4 19.8 15.6 11.3 19.4
work capable
NORTH 633 293 339 710 336 374
OSSETIA-
ALANIA
Younger than 26.7 29.3 24.5 21.3 23.1 19.8
work capable
Work capable 55.4 60.0 51.5 58.1 62.1 54.5
Older than 17.9 10.7 24.0 20.4 14.6 25.5
work capable
INGUSHETIA 1,270 597 673 467 218 249
Younger than 33.8 36.7 31.5 36.7 38.0 35.5
work capable
Work capable 52.8 55.3 50.6 55.7 56.0 55.5
Older than 13.4 8.2 17.9 7.5 5.9 8.9
work capable
CHECHNYA 1,270 597 673 1,104 533 571
Younger than 33.8 36.5 31.5 35.0 35.7 34.4
work capable
Work capable 52.8 55.3 50.6 56.7 58.0 55.5
Older than 13.4 8.2 17.9 8.2 6.3 10.0
work capable
DAGESTAN 1,802 850 952 2,576 1,242 1,334
Younger than 36.3 38.9 34.0 30.7 32.3 29.3
work capable
Work capable 51.7 54, 1 49.6 58.3 59.3 57.3
Older than 12.0 7.0 16.4 11.0 8.4 13.4
work capable
NORTH 5,305 2,486 2,820 6,645 3,165 3,480
CAUCASUS
Younger than 32.1 34, 7 29.8 28.6 30.2 27.2

work capable
Work capable 53.5 56.6 50.7 58.2 60.0 56.5
Older than 14, 4 8.7 19.5 13.2 9.7 16.3
work capable
CAUCASUS 21,032 10,091 10,941 22,182 10,651 11,531
Younger than 31.5 33.5 29.6 28.9 30.8 27.2
work capable
Work capable 55.3 58.2 52.5 57.1 58.5 55.6
Older than 13.2 8.3 17.9 14.0 10.7 17.2
work capable
Note: According to the population census, younger-than–the-work-capable population
involves children and teenagers up to 16, work capable—men of 16 to 59 and women
of 16 to 54, and older-than–the-work capable—men of 60 and over and women of 55
and over. The data on Ingushetia and Chechnya in 1989 are given together.
population the share of most active age population (20 to 49) from 1989 to 2002
rose from 43.4% to 45.2%. This share could have been far higher unless external
migration processes of recent years, in which mostly average age population
participated. Due to all said above, in the same period, the share of the population
of 60 and older age in the rural population sharply increased from 16,2% to
21.0%. The mentioned indicator is considerably high in women and equals 23.8%.
Thus, in the rural area, we have sharply expressed regressive type of the
population age structure—in the entire population, the share of the aged
population is high, to which corresponds reduced reproduction of the population.
In all the regions of the Caucasus, the share of aged men is lower than that of
aged women. This is caused by two conditions. Firstly, nearly in all the age
groups absolute and relative indicators of men mortality is higher as compared
with women; losses of men in the war and armed conflicts were important. The
processes of population aging in the Caucasus were well expressed in Georgia,
North Ossetia, and Adygeya. Namely, in 2002, the share of population older–
than-the-work-capability age in the entire population of Georgia was 20.5%; in
Adygeya it was 22.5%. But one important distinction in this similarity is clear.
Georgians are the most-aged population among the indigenous population of the
Caucasus, which make up 83% of the entire population. At the same time, in the
rest 17% of the population, the childbirth is vividly higher than among Georgians.
The situation is quite different in Adygeya. Here, Russians make up two-thirds of
the population, and the childbirth is considerably low and mortality is high among
them as compared with Adygeis. So, a high indicator of the Adygeya population
aging is caused by the Russian population. Nearly the same may be said of North
Ossetia, as well, where Russians make up nearly one-fourth of the population.
The population age structure in the Caucasus, as well as in the entire Soviet
Union, has experienced essential change. This change was mostly connected with
losses of the most active part of the population in the I and II World and Civil
wars. For example, due to the I World War and revolutions from 1914 to 1921,
the childbirth level was low and demographic losses mainly concerned men.
Those born from 1914 to 1921 were 20 to 27 years of age in 1941, in the
beginning of the war with Germany, i.e., in the most fertile age. The losses in the
war against Germans were mostly among the men of that generation. Due to this,
the age structure was considerably violated. In the war period, many families were
broken due to the losses among the men in the war; a great number of women
were left alone, without husbands. During the war, these women were at the most
active age of the population reproduction, and it was not managed to use this
potential. It should be mentioned that, according to the population census of 1959
in Russia, 8.3 million women of 30 to 35 age were never married, i.e., 37% of the
women of this age.21
Table 19. Share of Male Population in Caucasus from 1926 to 2002 (%)
1926 1959 1979 1989 2002

GEORGIA 50.5 46.1 46.8 47.4 47.1
AZERBAIJAN 52.4 47.5 48.7 48.8 48.8
ARMENIA 51.0 47.8 48.7 49.0 48.0
SOUTH CAUCASUS 51.3 47.0 48.0 48.4 48.2
ADYGEYA 49.2 44.1 45.4 45.8 46.5
KARACHAEV- 50.2 45.4 46.2 47.0 46.7
CIRCASSIA
KABARDIAN- 50.5 45.3 46.6 46.9 46.9
BALKARIA
NORTH OSSETIA 49.7 45.1 46.4 46.4 47.3
INGUSHETIA 49.9 45.8 46.9 47.0 46.7
CHECHNYA 51.4 45.8 46.9 47.0 48.3
DAGESTAN 48.6 45.9 47.0 47.2 48.2
NORTH CAUCASUS 49.6 45.5 46.7 46.9 47.6
CAUCASUS 50.9 46.6 47.7 48.0 48.0
In the entire population of the Caucasus, the share of men reduced

considerably (see table 19). According to the data of the population census of
21
Population and crises. VIII, M., 2002, p10
1926, the share of men exceeded that of women in the entire population nearly
everywhere in the Caucasus. This was most of all expressed in Azerbaijan
(52.4%). In all of the Caucasus, the share of men was 50.9%. In 1939, this
correlation was nearly the same. As a result of losses among the male population
in the war against Germany (1941 to 1945), the share of men in the entire
population of the Caucasus considerably reduced, and, in 1959, it was 46.6%
instead of the 50.9% of 1926. Especially low was the share of men in the North
Caucasus (45.5%), which, along with the war factor, was caused by deportations
of the North Caucasian people to the Middle Asian republics, during which the
losses of men were more than those of women. Just due to this, in 1959, in the
entire population of the South Caucasus, the share of men was 1.5% more as
compared with the analogous indicator of the North Caucasus. According to the
absolute data, in 1926, in all of the Caucasus women were 144,000 less than men,
and 963 women were per 1,000 men (see table 20). From this viewpoint, the
indicators of North and South Ossetia considerably differed from one another. In
the following period, due to well-known reasons, an excess of women over men
was clearly expressed. In 1959, in the Caucasus, there lived 869,000 women more
than men.
This year in the South Caucasus, there were registered 567,000 more women
and in the North Caucasus there were 293,000 more, though the comparative
indicator was quite different: in the South Caucasus, there were 1,129 women per
1,000 men, and in the North Caucasus there were 1,197 women.
According to the data of the population census of 2002, a surplus of women
number over men, characteristic for the entire post-soviet space and, among them,
the Caucasus was preserved. The number of women was 880,000 instead of
850,000 in 1989. In the same period, the sex-number correlation remained at the
same level—there were 1,082 women per 1,000 men in 2002, and that was mostly
caused by premature mortality of men and, by echo of 1941 to 1945 war and death
of men in the armed conflicts.
The age structure of the Caucasian population is influenced by reduction of
childbirth, increase of mortality, increased external migration processes, sex
disproportion, especially in older ages and the population aging.
The issue of sex correlation becomes most intensive in the Caucasus at
present, especially in the South Caucasus. The number of girls considerably
prevails over that of boys among those born in recent years. The change in the sex
correlation among the born is deliberate, causing great danger for the society. In
general, over the entire history of the mankind, an opinion dominated about
Table 20. Amount of Women (more or less) as
Compared with Men in the Caucasus from 1926 to 2002
1926 1959 1989 2002

More Women per More Women per More Women per More Women per
thousand 1,000 men Thousand 1,000 men thousand 1000 men thousand 1000 men
Georgia -29 979 313 1,168 277 1,108 249 1,121
Azerbaijan -111 908 185 1,105 174 1,051 187 1,048
Armenia -17 962 78 1,093 66 1,041 129 1,084
The South -157 948 576 1,129 517 1,068 565 1,075
Caucasus
Adygeya 2 1031 38 1,266 35 1,178 31 1,149
Karachaev- -1 982 27 1,211 25 1,130 28 1,139
Circassia
Kabardian- -2 979 38 1,199 47 1,132 56 1,133
Balkaria
North Ossetia 1 1,010 44 1,217 47 1,160 38 1,114
Ingushetia 0 1,006 58 1,177 77 1,128 31 1,142
Chechnya -9 946 58 1,177 77 1,128 38 1,072
Dagestan 22 1,057 88 1,179 102 1,120 92 1,074
The North 13 1,015 293 1,197 333 1,134 315 1,099
Caucasus
The Caucasus -144 963 869 1,146 850 1,084 880 1,082
preference of boys. If a son was born, it was considered to be great happiness.

This wish of people, along with other factors, was mostly determined by
economic conditions of family formation and existence, people‘s traditions,
customs, and habits. Birth of sons meant labor power, hence, an economically
powerful family, as well. At the same time, they were considered heirs to the
property, family support, and successors.
Despite the wish mentioned above, the nature strictly programmed the sex
correlation. In all the epochs and all the countries, 104 to 106 boys were per 100
born girls. From this viewpoint, the Caucasus was not an exception, either.
Such sex correlation among the born was first noticed still in the XIV century.
In Florence in the Middle Ages, there existed a tradition: when a girl was
christened, grains of white beans were put into the box and those of black beans
when a boy was christened. An idea came to the mind of the XIV-century famous
chronicler of Florence, Giovanni Villan, to count the correlation between the
black and white beans for different years. It turned out to be stable—105 to 106
black grains per 100 white. Thus, a fundamental fact was determined—the
stability of sex correlation among the newborns.1 There exist three kinds of the
numerical ratio of sexes: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The primary sex
correlation is called sex fecundity ratio. In this case, the numerical ratio of sexes is
about 125 to 130 masculine embryos, per 100 feminine. The secondary sex
correlation is the numerical ratio of boys and girls at the moment of birth, and the
tertiary sex correlation is determined in the fertile age period, i.e., by masculine
and feminine sex correlation in the fertile age, and it depends on male and female
mortality intensity in different age groups. The primary sex correlation is firstly
the object of research of biology and social hygiene, secondary and tertiary are the
spheres of interest of demography.
The numerical ratio of sexes among the newborns broke up in recent years.
Starting from 1995, this correlation acquired a sharply expressed anomalous
character. For example, in 1990, in Azerbaijan, there were 106 boys per each 100
born girl; in 1995 it was 110; in 2000 it was 115; in and in 1995 it was 116 boys.2
An analogous situation is in Armenia, here in 1994, there were 118 boys per 100
born girls, and in 2005 there were 117 boys.3 In Georgia, in recent years, the
number of newborn boys sharply increased per 100 born girls.
The sex correlation in the fertile period is mostly equal, because mortality is
higher among the boys of up to one year of age than among girls of the same age.
1
Jrnl. Novi Mir, N , 1978..
2
Population of Azerbaijan, 2006. Baku, 2006, p 29.
3
Socio-economic condition of the Republic of Armenia. Yerevan, 2006, p 145.
For example from 1980 to 1990, in Azerbaijan, there died 5,737 boys more than
girls at the age of up to one year; in 2005, there died 130 boys per each 100 girls
who died.4 The same situation was in all of the Caucasus. Therefore, it is clear
that the nature programmed one more basis of its harmonious development—
correlation between sexes. Though the amount of boys dying at the age of up to
one year exceeded that of girls, in return, boys are born more than girls.
Unfortunately, men roughly interfered in the process of harmonious development
endowed by the nature. Under the influence of risk-factors (traumas, car wrecks,
alcohol, smoking, and criminal activity) in average and old age groups, more men
die than women, which, in other equal conditions, reduces the level of childbirth.
The sex correlation at birth in the fauna is mostly characterized with
analogous indicators (the amount of males per each 100 females equals: in
cats,107; in hares, 105; in mice, 105; in rats, 105; in horned cattle,105; in horses,
98; in dogs, 118; in sheep, 98; in pigs, 112; and in hens, 95). However, in separate
cases, this correlation breaks up considerably and even more, we come across the
cases of reproduction without males. For example, in the mountains of Armenia,
there live lizards on the Seven Lake shores. There are no males among them. They
lay unfecundated eggs, but eggs that have ability to reproduce. Only females are
born from these eggs.5 In some cases, we do not meet two sexes, but interbreeding
still takes place. Rain worms multiply this way. Each worm is both male and
female, at the same time. Oysters also multiply so, being in the roles of both
males and females.
However, such strange cases are rare in the nature and may be a remote echo
of the evolution in the animal world. The sex correlation in animals at birth is also
characterized by a certain regularity. In general, mortality among animals of
different sexes of one and the same breed differs. Nature takes into consideration
these losses and the more males die, the more are born. There is no answer to the
reason of this, yet. In the period of sexual maturity, the number of males and
females becomes equal.
Break up of sex correlation among the newborns is followed by most
undesirable results, without regulation of which, the demographic situation
becomes heavier. Break up of secondary correlation of sexes, as a result of
reduction in the number of marriages, will considerably reduce childbirth. It is
enough to say that in recent years in the South Caucasus, there were born
thousands less women due to such reason. A sharp break up of the secondary
correlation of sexes, along with quite undesirable results in the population
4
Population of Azerbaijan, 2006. Baku, 2006, p 29.
5
Geodakian V. Two fields, What for and why. The jrnl. Nauka I Zhizn, 1966, N 3, p 99.
reproduction, is followed by the sex-age structure deformation, great deficit of

brides, aggravation of socio-economic and medical problems; the society will
become more aggressive, etc.
Attention to the explanation of regularity in sex correlation of newborns was
attached still in past centuries. Namely, the interest was expressed in why the
secondary correlation of sexes breaks up in certain situations: why boys are born
more than girls. For example, married women give birth to more boys than
unmarried women in the period of first childbearing; in the war and postwar
periods, more boys are born than girls; mothers of low age, especially up to 20
years of age, give birth to more boys than mothers of older age groups, and the
higher the order of childbearing is (the third, fourth, fifth and more childbearing),
the less boys are born.
On the basis of more reliable data received from modern studies, the scholars
came to the conclusion that the secondary correlation of sexes depends on such
factors as age of mothers, succession of births, primary correlation of sexes, etc.
For example, for women of 18 to 20 year age group, the sex secondary correlation
was 120, for 38 to 42 year age group, it was 90 boys per 100 girls.
A folk saying says that more boys are born in the period of wars and bad
harvests, which is true. According to the demographic and medical statistics, in
the war and postwar years, more boys are born. In the period of the I World War,
in European countries involved in wars, there were born 1 to 2.5% more boys as
compared with the period of peace. The maximum growth was in Germany, where
108.5 boys were born per 100 girls. During the II World War, namely, in 1943,
this correlation in England and France, as compared with the period of peace,
increased by 1.5 to 2%. To explain this phenomenon, known as ―the war-years
period,‖ numerous factors are named, the most important of them being that
during the wars, younger people are married, which increases the indicator of the
sex secondary correlation, because as we have mentioned, young women give
birth to more boys. At the same time, during the wars, the number of women with
first childbearing increases and the share of boys that they give birth to is high in
the total amount. In the period of wars, long breaks in family relations, which still
increases the sex secondary correlation, also reduces the number of pregnant
women and increases the interval between births. Worsening of economic
conditions, during which consumption of meat and albumen reduces, also
influences in this direction. At present, the sex secondary correlation, which
reached unprecedented size, increases in favor of boys. A major reason of this is
diagnostics of children during pregnancy with the aim of its regulation in view: if
the diagnostics of early period showed that the embryo is of undesirable sex, the
pregnancy is suspended by artificial abortion. Other known reasons have a minor
influence on the violation of the sex secondary correlation in our country. It is

known that young women give birth to more boys than the women of older age.
But in Georgia, for example, mothers of less than 20 years of age have the least
amount of boys. The more their age increases, the less the number of born boys is.
It is also scientifically proved that the higher the succession of births is, i.e., the
more children a woman gives birth to, average the less amount of boys are born.
This regularity is violated in Georgia. The increase of succession parallels the
amount of born boys grows. In conditions of the cult of son and mass prevalence
of families with a small number of children, it seems, abortions take place when
the embryo diagnostics shows undesirable sex (in our case, that of a girl). As a
rule, when a woman in her first pregnancy finds the embryo is a girl, she does not
apply to an abortion, as the first child, despite its sex, is ―still her child.‖ It should
also be taken into account that suspension of the first pregnancy is most
dangerous, as the woman may have no child in the future. Therefore, in the
second pregnancy, if the woman is not young and a girl is expected to be born, she
makes an abortion, more if the couple does not want to have more than two or
three children.
Historically, mankind exercised terrible violence towards women and,
unfortunately, it continues now, as well. Even now, many cultures permit violence
towards women and, however surprising it may seem, the women themselves
justify this. In the present-day world, millions of girls and women are victims of
physical, sexual, and psychological violence. Even in the United States of
America, one woman is being beaten every 15 minutes; in Russia, 12,000 women
die annually as a result of beating by husbands, and 54,000 have body damage.6 In
Sweden, 16 women become victims of their partners, which is one-sixth of
murders committed within a year. In the end of the XX century, a new misfortune
appeared—a girl, yet unborn, is deprived of her life in prenatal period, for the
only reason that a boy is wanted, not a girl. In the world, 60,000,000 girls become
victims of abortions as a result of baby-sex predetermination, infanticide, or
insufficient care. 7 According to the research conducted in Georgia, one of the
reasons for abortions was undesirable sex of an embryo. Namely, after an
undesirable sex (in our case, a girl) is determined by echoscope at the early stage
of pregnancy, it was the reason of abortions undertaken by 10.1% of respondents.8
The situation is most difficult in China from this viewpoint, where abortions are
6
Argumenti I Fakti, N 32, 2000, International publication.
7
The World Population, 2000, UN fund in population sphere, pp 12,30.
8
N. Chanturia, Influence of mode of life on demographic processes. Author’s paper, Tbilisi, 2006, p
19.
conducted on millions of girls. At present, 118 boys are born per 199 girls in
China. There are 20,000,000 men who will never marry due to an insufficient
amount of girls. This situation becomes more aggravated by strict control over the
childbirth in the country. Parents are given the right to have only one child. In
China, sons are considered to be successors of the family line and labor power.
The Chinese experts consider reduction in number of girls to be a catastrophe. In
their opinion, this promotes an increase in crime and prostitution.9
Preference to sons is expressed in the folklore of many peoples. For example,
Indians say: ―There exists no son, which is better than many daughters.‖ This idea
is expressed more distinctly in the Armenian saying: ―One blind son is better
seven healthy daughters.‖ In Ancient Greece, care was taken to have two sons in
the family. The letter of the I century B.C., sent by a certain Greek Illarion to his
wife, proves mercilessness towards daughters. The author of this letter, expressing
great care towards his little son, orders his wife, who is expecting another child:
―If a son is born, leave him alive, but if it is a daughter—throw her away.‖ The
following saying exists in many peoples, Georgians among them: ―A boy or a
girl?‖ This question is put when one wants to find out whether the things are bad
or good.
The cult of a son has been spread in Georgia, as well as in all of the Caucasus,
from time immemorial. The research we have conducted in the Palace of Marriage
in Tbilisi, showed that 80% of the newly wed couples, wishing to have three
children, wanted two sons and one daughter, and 6% wished three boys.
Proceeding from all mentioned above, unprecedented amounts of boys among
the newborns were caused by the potentials of sex diagnostics, which is followed
by the most negative aftermaths in the population reproduction and, generally, in
the development of the society. Due to this, many countries banned testing of
prenatal embryo at the early stage of pregnancy with the aim of determining its
sex. This is because women often get abortions, if they wish to have a boy and the
testing shows a girl is expected to be born.
9
The newsp. Akhali Versia, (BBC material), N 7, 2001.
Chapter 5
NATURAL MOVEMENT OF THE POPULATION

OF THE CAUCASUS IN THE XX CENTURY AND
THE BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY
Natural movement of the population is a generalized name for births and

deaths, which changes the size of the population by the natural way. The term
―natural movement of the population‖ was introduced in the second half of the
XIX century in the German statistics, differentiating with this term the population
condition and the population movement. The latter was divided into the natural
movement (births, deaths) and the mechanical movement (arrivals, departures). It
should be mentioned that at the boundary of the XIX and XX centuries, the term
―mechanical movement of the population‖ was used along with the term
―migration of the population.‖ The term ―migration of the population‖ is used, as
a rule, in the modern scientific literature instead of ―mechanical movement of the
population.‖ Marriages and divorces were meant in the content of the term
―natural movement of the population,‖ though they do not directly cause
immediate changes in the size of the population, but exercise considerable
influence, mostly the childbirth. At present, the term is mostly used in regard to
childbirth and mortality indicators.
The natural movement indicators of the Caucasian people vividly differ from
one another. This difference is especially apparent according to the demographic
processes (childbirth, mortality, marriage, and marital dissolution) of Georgians,
Armenians, and the other Caucasian people. The demographic processes are
characterized by intensity, a major determinant of which is degree of intensity of
the demographic process that is measured by frequency of the demographic
processes and is relative value of the intensity. Intensity of the demographic
processes is measured in time and, naturally, changes especially in the long

periods of time. That‘s why different demographic rates are mostly used in
practice to characterize intensity of the demographic processes.
Thus, to study the level and dynamics of the natural movement of the
population, different indicators are used. To get general view of the scales of
natural movement of the population, we may use absolute indicators. In a definite
period or interval of time (more often within one year), they are simple sum of the
demographic cases (events) and, consequently, are bearers of low information.
For comparative analysis, the absolute indicators, for example, the number of
born, dead, married, and divorced, is useless in definite moment or interval of
time, because they directly depend on the size of the population. Because in 2000,
an approximately equal amount of children was born in Kabardian-Balkaria and
Ingushetia, we cannot say that the levels of the childbirth in these republics is
equal, because the amount of population in Kabardian-Balkaria in 2000 was 2.6
times more than that in Ingushetia. Intensity of the demographic process may be
determined only by the comparison of cases, let‘s say, of the amount of born with
the amount of the population, and thus make comparable the intensity of the
demographic process.
The simplest indicator of natural movement of the population is general rates,
which form a general impression on the event to be studied. They are calculated in
definite periods of time, more often, within a year, by comparing demographic
events with the average number of the population in the same period. These rates
are calculated per 1,000 men, i.e., promile – %, in this case in 2000 in Kabardian-
Balkaria, 10.4 children were born per each 1,000 men, and in Ingushetia the
amount was 21.5 children; thus, the process of childbirth is ongoing far
intensively in Ingushetia than in Kabardin-Balkaria, where the level of childbirth
is 2.1 times lower as compared with Ingushetia.
The manifestation of the childbirth tendency is of the greatest importance for
research of regularities of natural movement and reproduction of the population.
The level of childbirth changes in time and space, and under the influence of
different factors, this change is sometimes most apparent even in the shortest
period of time. Recent well-known events that took place in the Caucasus
considerably reduced the level of childbirth, especially, in the South Caucasus.
Geopolitical space of the South Caucasus is being formed under the influence
of external and internal factors. Political interests of different countries cross here,
which is mostly expressed in holding and preserving the positions in this
strategically most important region. Internal or local factors imply political and
economic interests of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia and preservation of
independence by each of these countries, providing their statehood. Cardinal
Natural Movement of the Population of the Caucasus… 183
changes are manifested in dismantling of the entire system of economic and

political relations existing in terms of totalitarianism.
Naturally, such global changes do not take place painlessly and this,
unfortunately, was expressed in important worsening of the living conditions of
the population. In their turn, these processes considerably worsened the
demographic condition in the South Caucasus. Mortality increased, childbirth
reduced, and natural increase of the population, especially in Georgia, where the
level of childbirth as compared with Armenia and, especially Azerbaijan, was
lower earlier as well. In a short period of time, the migration processes reached
large scales.
Comparison of absolute data enables us make some conclusions on the course
of demographic processes. For example, the number of children born in the
Caucasus from 1960 to 2005, is reduced and in 2000, the number of children born
was 158,000 less than in 1960. The number of children born especially reduced in
the South Caucasus—by 144,000 (see table 21).
Table 21. Natural Movement of the Population in the

Caucasus from 1960 to 2000 (in thousands)
years Amount of Amount of Natural increase

born dead
The North Caucasus
1960 112 23 89
1980 106 38 68
2000 98 55 43
2005 103 53 50
The South Caucasus
1960 344 66 278
1980 315 104 211
2000 200 118 82
2005 226 121 105
The Caucasus
1960 456 89 367
1980 421 142 279
2000 298 173 125
2005 329 174 155
Note: The data of 2003 instead of 2000 are cited on Chechnya, because due to the armed
conflict in Chechnya from 1995 to 2002, no indicators of natural movement of the
population exist.
The amount of children born in the Caucasus after 2000, increased several
times and made up 329,000 children in 2005, though as compared with 1960, this
indicator is 127,000 less. As for the amount of dead, in the same period, it was
characterized by the tendency of growth and reached maximum in 2005—174,000
people. As a result of reduction in the amount of children born and an increase in
the amount of dead, the natural increase of the population considerably reduced
and in 2000, made up 125,000 instead of 367,000 in 1960, i.e., 242,000 less. In
2005, in the Caucasus, the natural increase of the population was 30,000 people
more than in 2000.
The rates of childbirth and of natural movement in general, due to their
simple calculation, are widely used for the demographic processes analysis,
though they are characterized with some demerits along with the merits. The
value of natural movement rates depends not only on intensity of the demographic
processes but, first of all, on sex-age structure of the population. The more aged
the population in the country is, the more the share of non-childbearing contingent
is in the entire population and the less the general rate is. In the countries with
high childbirth, the situation is just the opposite. Thus, the childbirth rate value
may be changed intensively and the real change of the childbirth intensity may be
concealed. In such cases, for deep analysis of childbirth, more precise and better
rates of childbirth are used. Aging of the age structure of the population also has
great influence on the crude death rate. Despite all of the information mentioned
above, general rates are popular and form certain impression on the dynamics of
natural movement of the population in the Caucasus (see table 22).
The childbirth level in the Caucasus within nearly the last half a century kept
continuously reducing, though it still remained high. In 1960, there were 34.4
children born per 1,000 persons, in 1980—22.0 children, but the latter indicator
was vividly high as compared with the indicator of the Soviet Union (18.3
promile). In the beginning of the 90s of the last century, the level of childbirth,
due to the reasons mentioned above, started reducing, and, in 2000, in the
Caucasus, it made up 13.5 promile, though in this case it was also high as
compared with the western countries of the post-soviet space. In recent years, the
level of childbirth again increased and in 2005, it was 14.6 promile. Two opposite
tendencies were outlined in regard to the childbirth from 1960 to 2000; from 1960
to 1980, in the South Caucasus, the level of childbirth was higher than in the
North Caucasus; in the following period the situation was just the opposite.
Namely, in 1960, in the Caucasus, the highest levels of childbirth were in
Azerbaijan (42.6 promile) and Armenia (40.1 promile). Just these two republics
Table 22. Dynamics of General Rates of Childbirth,
Mortality and Natural Increase in the Caucasus
Years Per 1,000 Years Per 1,000

Childbirth Mortality Natural childbirth mortality Natural
increase increase
Adygeya The North
Caucasus
1960 21.7 7.4 14.3 1960 32.7 6.7 26.0
1980 16.2 11.8 4.4 1980 21.8 7.7 14.1
2000 9.1 15.0 -5.9 2000 15.4 8.6 6.8
2005 10.3 15.2 -4.9 2005 15.4 7.9 7.5
Karachaev- Georgia
Circassia
1960 29.6 5.7 23.9 1960 24.7 6.5 18.2
1980 19.0 7.5 11.5 1980 17.7 8.6 9.
2000 10.6 11.3 -0.7 2000 11.0 10.7 0.3
2005 12.0 11.9 0.1 2005 10.7 9.9 0.8
Kabardian- Azerbaijan
Balkaria
1960 30.8 5.9 24.9 1960 42.6 6.7 35.9
1980 20.6 8.0 12.6 1980 25.2 7.0 18.2
2000 10.4 10.0 0.4 2000 14.8 5.9 8.9
2005 10.0 10.1 -0.1 2005 17.2 6.3 10.9
North Ossetia Armenia
1960 21.8 6.2 15.6 1960 40.1 6.8 33.3
1980 16.9 9.7 7.2 1980 22.7 5.5 17.2
2000 10.3 12.3 -2.0 2000 10.6 7.5 3.1
Years Per 1,000 Years Per 1,000

Childbirth Mortality Natural childbirth mortality Natural increase
increase
2005 11.2 12.3 -1.1 2005 11.7 8.5 3.2
Ingushetia* South Caucasus
1960 32.3 6.0 26.3 1960 35.0 6.7 28.3
1980 20.9 6.6 14.3 1980 22.1 7.3 14.8
2000 21.5 5.4 16.1 2000 12.7 7.5 5.2
2005 14.0 3.8 10.2 2005 14.2 7.6 6.6
Chechnya** The Caucasus
1960 32.3 6.0 26.3 1960 34.4 6.7 27.7
1980 20.9 6.6 14.3
2000 25.1 6.5 18.6 1980 22.0 7.4 14.6
2005 24.9 5.1 19.8
Dagestan 2000 13.5 7.8 5.7
1960 40.0 7.2 32.8
1980 26.6 6.7 19.9 2005 14.6 7.7 6.9
2000*** 15.5 6.5 9.0
2005 15.9 5.9 9.6
* 1960 and 1980—including the data on the Chechen republic.
** 1960 and 1980—including the data on the Ingushetia republic.
*** Data of 2003 (due to the armed conflict on Chechnya, the data on natural movement of the population from 1995 to 2002 do not
exist).
determined high levels of childbirth in the South Caucasus (35.0 promile),

because in Georgia in 1960, there were born only 24.7 children per 1,000 persons,
and this indicator was the lowest in all of the Caucasus, except Adygeya. In recent
years, the crude birth rate increased in the majority of the Caucasus regions and
the highest level of childbirth, despite bloodshedding conflict, was fixed in
Chechnya—24.9 promile (2005).
The mortality rate from 1960 to 2005, in all of the Caucasus, increased a
little, though in separate republics considerable changes took place from this
viewpoint. In the North Caucasus in Adygeya, Karachaev-Circussia, Kabardian-
Balkaria, and North Ossetia, the level of mortality increased twice nearly
everywhere. If we take into account that the childbirth is traditionally high among
the North Caucasian people, and the mortality is low, such even should not have
taken place, but here, a decisive role is played by a high share of Russians in the
population of these republics, among which the crude birthrate kept long reducing
continuously and, at the expense of the population age structure aging, the
mortality was increasing. Essential differences among the republics of the North
Caucasus according to childbirth, mortality, and other demographic indicators are
caused by high share of Russians (1989 and 2002) in the entire population of
Adygeya (68.0 and 64.4%), Karachaev-Circussia (42.4 and 33.7%), Kabardian-
Balkaria (31.9 and 25.1%), and North Ossetia (29.9 and 23.2%), though in North
Ossetia, worsening of demographic indicators is caused by Christian religion to
which a great part of the population in these republics is devoted.
In Russia, demographic development of Russians—indigenous population—
faces jeopardy. In the opinion of professional demographers, the process of the
population stabilization in the world will take place without the Russian ethnic
group. If it continues this way, the population of Russia will reduce much at the
expense of the Russian population, and all this may even cause disappearance of
the Russian nation from the geographic map.1 Famous Russian demographer, V.
Borisov, mentions: ―Even if the childbirth does not reduce in the future any
longer, which is doubtful to suppose seriously, in conditions of the demographic
education existing in the country at present and non-existence of any public
movement for saving the Russian nation from extinction, depopulation will
continue for indefinitely long time, even until full disappearance of the Russian
nation from the political map. But the country may perish earlier as well, when the
1
Horev B., Demographic results of 2001. The Population and crises 8th edition, Moscow, 2002, p
46.
population will reduce so much that it will weaken and some bigger neighbor will
join it to itself.‖2
In this aspect, demographic situation in the regions is of great importance. In
2004, in Russia, the crude birthrate was 10.4 promile, the crude death rate in the
16.0 promile, and crude natural increase rate equaled 5.6 promile. If we compare
these indicators with the indicators of the republics of the Caucasus (see table 20)
and other national autonomies within the Russian Federation, we‘ll see great
difference. From this viewpoint, an especially catastrophic situation is in the lands
populated with Russians, namely, Pskov region is a record-holder from the
viewpoint of mortality—in 2004 there died 24.2 persons per each 1,000, then
come the regions also populated with Russians—Tver (23.2%), Novgorod
(22.4%), Tula (21.7%), Ivanovo (21.6%), and Kostroma, Smolensk, Leningrad,
Vladimir, Ryasan, and Yaroslavl (20 to 21%). The mortality rate is high in big
cities of Russia, as well. Due to low level of childbirth and the high level of
mortality, natural reduction of the population is great. If in 2004, in the Russian
Federation, there died 5.6 persons more than were born per each 1,000 persons, in
the regions mentioned above this indicator fluctuated within 10.6 to 15.1 promile.
Therefore, the situation is hopeless, as extinction threatens not only the entire
regions, but big cities of the country, as well. We should take into consideration
the situation that strong aging of the population age structure of Russia
accompanies depopulation and is related to it. The same may be said about,
especially, in the fertility age, during strong violation in the ratio of sexes. Still, in
1959, in Novgorod, Pskov, Ivanovo, Vladimir and other central regions of Russia,
the share of men in the entire population did not exceed 42% to 43%. This
indicator did not change much in 2002, either, and the share of men in these
regions fluctuated within 44% to 45%, which is considerably low as compared
with the analogous indicators of the Caucasus. As a result of this, in some regions
of Russia, men exceeded and, on the other hand, the number of regions increased,
where the women prevailed. In both cases, disproportion of sexes negatively
influenced the demographic indicators—formation of new families was impeded,
the number of divorces increased, etc.
Proceeding from the mentioned above we may conclude that in some
republics of the North Caucasus, the reason of low childbirth, high mortality, and
natural reduction of the population is a high share of Russians in the population of
these republics, especially in Adygeya. This was clearly witnessed also by the
data of Russia‘s population census of 2002. In the republics of the North
Caucasus, among the indigenous population each, out 1,000 women of age 15 and
2
Borisov V. Demography. Moscow, 1999, p 191.
more, have far more children than the Russian women living in these republics
(see table 23). Namely, in Adygeya, each of 1,000 women has 1,649 children, the
Adygeya women proper have 1,808 children, and Russian, 1,560. In Ingushetia,
the corresponding indicators equal 2,354; 2,381; and 2,077 children. It should also
be mentioned that in Adygeya and the republics where Russians live in great
numbers, the level of childbirth among the women of indigenous population is
comparatively low as compared with the women of indigenous population in the
republics where the share of Russians in the entire population is low. For
example, in Adygeya, each of ten Adygeya women of age 15 and more has 1,808
children, when in Ingushetia, a corresponding indicator of Ingush women equals
2,381 children. This situation is conditioned by the fact that due to low childbirth
among Russians, Adygeya has long to live in low childbirth conditions, and re-
evaluation of the role and significance of families with many children is noticed
here more vividly than in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan. In these republics,
due to the national traditions, habits, and customs and, what is most important,
Muslim religion widely spread among the entire population, the tradition of
families with many children has been firmly fixed in the mentality of the women,
and this tradition remains one of the main values of the human consciousness.
The results of sociological research conducted in Georgia in 2003, are most
interesting, according to which, unlike people of the North Caucasus, quite a
different attitude is felt towards the families with many children. In modern
Georgian society, the families with many children gradually lose priority.
According to the data of sociological research, the respondents attached only the
41st place among 50 universal values to the families with many children. To the
question: ―What should be a priority: having four or many children, or having less
children and their perfect education?‖ Of the respondents, 82.5% answered,
―having less children and their perfect education,‖ only 17.5% answered, ―having
four or more children.‖ It should be mentioned that women, as compared with
men, attach more importance to children‘s education: 87.7% of them consider it a
priority to have less children and their perfect education, when only 72.8% of men
share this position. According to the groups of respondents, all the representatives
of rich and employers (100%) prefer having less children and their perfect
education. 3
Thus, in those republics of the North Caucasus where Russians live in great
numbers, starting from the Communist governance until today, international
marriages are comparatively high. Striving of the local population for the families
3
O. Shurghaia. Demographic values: results of changes and tendencies. The jrnl. Demography, N 3,
2004, pp 40, 45-46.
with many children gradually weakened. At the same time, despite reduction, the
level of childbirth among the women of indigenous nationality still remains high.
A clear impression on high childbirth level among people of the North Caucasus
is given by actual number of children, especially according to the age groups. The
actual amount of children is that amount of children that people have by the
definite moment. We have already mentioned that according to the population
census of 2002, in Russia, for example, each 1,000 Adygeya woman of age 15 and
more had 1,808 children, and an Ingush woman—2,381. This witnesses that the
level of childbirth in Ingushetia is higher than in Adygeya, but it should be taken
into consideration that many of women, when questioned, were in the fertile age
(15 to 49) and that many of the women still want to have children, i.e., the
expected number of children will be far more than the actual number of children.
The actual childbirth rate of the real cohort (the aggregate of simultaneously
born people or of the coevals), which finished the fertility age, i.e., finished
childbirth, forms a clear impression on the childbirth level (see table 23). Namely,
in 2002, the amount of children born by each of 1,000 women of 55 to 59 years of
age was 2,562, and of the age of 70 and more was 3,124. An analogous indicator
for Ingush women was 4,911 and 5,123, respectively. Approximately, the similar
data characterize the actual childbirth rate of the North Caucasus indigenous
women for the age groups mentioned above. The difference is only that in the
republics, where Russians live in great amount, this indicator is comparatively
low than in the republics where the amount of Russians in the entire population is
represented in a low share. Finally, we may conclude that as compared with the
previous period, the childbirth level of the Caucasus people reduced more or less,
but on the whole, it provided extended reproduction of the population.
Total fertility level is one of the best indicators for characterizing childbirth.
It shows how many children are born on average by one woman within her entire
life (15 to 49 years of age) and represents quite a precise indicator determining the
childbirth level. The main merit of the total fertility level is that it does not depend
on the peculiarities of the population age structure and of the women reproduction
contingent. At the same time, this rate gives an opportunity to determine the level
of the population reproduction guarantee.
The population equal reproduction in conditions of the lowest mortality is
reached in case when the total fertility rate equals 2.1.i.e., when an average of one
woman gives birth to 2.1 children, independent of marital status (married and
unmarried). Mortality in the Caucasus is not the lowest and critical meaning of
Table 23. Distribution of Women of 15 and More Age According to

Nationality, Age and the Number of Born Children in the North Caucasian
Republics Based on the Data of Population Census of 2002
Average number of born children (per 1,000 women)

Total Among them
Age 55 to 59 Age 70 and more
ADYGEYA—total 1,649 2094 2343
Among them:
Adygei 1,808 2,562 3,124
Russian 1,560 1,931 2,126
KARACHAEV-
CIRCASSIA
Total 1,793 2,374 2,864
Among them:
Karachayev 1,902 2,969 3,920
Circassian 1,867 2,741 3,507
Russian 1,629 1,961 2,175
KABARDIAN-
BALKARIA
Total 1,712 2,396 2,796
Among them:
Kabardinian 1,807 2,741 3,440
Balkar 1,689 2,755 3,888
Russian 1,501 1,896 2,057
NORTH OSSETIA
Total
Among them: 1,673 2,231 2,525
Osset
1,683 2,333 2,760
Russian 1,556 1,873 2,034
INGUSHETIA
Total 2,354 4,795 4,955
Among them:
Ingush 2,381 4,911 5,123
Russian 2,077 2,405 2,565
DAGESTAN
Total 2,069 3,610 3,860
Among them:
Avar 2,103 3,912 3,833
Dargin 2,184 4,032 4,089
Kumyk 1,983 3,448 4,026
Lesghin 2,108 3,842 4,647
Russian 1,589 1,988 2,148
total fertility level equals 2.2. It is clear that if we divide the actual meaning of the
total fertility rate by its critical meaning, we‘ll understand by what percentage the
population reproduction (generation renewal) is guaranteed.
In recent years, the total fertility level in the Caucasus, especially in the South
Caucasus, considerably reduced. From 1958 to 1959 one woman within her entire
life gave birth to 2.6 children in Georgia; 5.1 in Azerbaijan, and 4.5 in Armenia.
In 1974, this indicator was respectively 2.6; 4.0; and 2.8 children. In 1990, the
total fertility rate in the South Caucasian countries (except Georgia) and in all the
republics of the North Caucasus guaranteed extended reproduction of the
population, especially in Dagestan (3.2 children) and Chechen-Ingushetia (3.0).
From 1990, the total fertility rate reduced by half first in Georgia, then
everywhere, except Chechnya and Azerbaijan. As a result of this the population
reproduction, i.e., generation renewal was guaranteed by 50.0% in Kabardin-
Balkaria; by 59.1% in Adygeya; by 68.2% in North Ossetia; by 59.1% in Georgia;
63.6%, in Armenia, etc. (see table 24).
This means that in conformity of the population age structure with the modern
levels of childbirth and mortality, each following generation will be twice less in
number as compared with the previous generation. It should be mentioned that
these indicators are not elaborated according to the national sign, but in the
indigenous population of the North Caucasus, the total fertility rate is undoubtedly
comparatively high. We have mentioned above that different indicators of the
childbirth level in the republics of the North Caucasus are lower as compared with
the indicators of the childbirth level among the indigenous nationalities living in
these republics. This is caused by a high share of Russians in the entire population
of these republics; the indicators of the democratic development of which are not
enviable. All this is vividly seen in the example of Chechnya. In Chechnya from
1990 to 2005, the total fertility level has not changed; the Russian population
from 1989 to 2002 reduced by 252,000 and was 3.7% in the entire population of
Chechnya. Taking into consideration the above mentioned, the situation is the
worst among Georgians, from the viewpoint of the generation renewal guarantees,
as there live in Georgia in abundance the representatives of those nations, among
which the level of childbirth is high and, therefore, too low total fertility level in
Georgia is far lower among Georgians.
Table 24. Total Fertility Rate in 1990 and 2005 and the Level of the
Population Reproduction (generation renewal) Guarantee in 2005
1990 2005 Generation renewal Guarantee

level In 2005 %
Adygeya - 1.3 59.1
Karachaev-Circassia - 1.5 68.2
Kabardian-Balkaria 2.5 1.1 50.0
North Ossetia 2.3 1.5 68.2
Ingushetia 3.0 1.6 72.7
Chechnya 3.0 2.9 131.8
Dagestan 3.2 1.7 77.3
Georgia 2.2 1.3 59.1
Azerbaijan 2.8 2.3 104.5
Armenia 2.6* 1.4 63.6
* Data of 1989.
An analogous picture is given by a far more precise indicator of the

population: net reproduction rate. The thing is that the total fertility rate shows an
average number of boys and girls born per one woman in the fertility age. But it is
more important to know how many girls are born by average one woman, as just
girls provide mother-generation replacement. But here, we should take into
consideration the situation that not each born girl reaches the age of mother. A
part of girls die before reaching the age of one year, another part cannot reach the
fertility age, i.e., we should take into account the cases of deaths among girls. We
should calculate not only how many girls are born by one woman in the fertility
age, but also how many girls can reach that age of mothers, when they themselves
were born. This rate characterizes women generation-replacement level with their
maidenhood. Both the total fertility rate and the population net reproduction rate
are indicators of the conventional generation (intensity of demographic processes,
which within conventional totality of people during life at each age corresponds to
that existing in the present calendar period). Net reproduction rate is usually
calculated per one woman. It is accepted that if the net reproduction rate is more
than one, i.e., if a woman has average of more than one girl, here is the case of
population extended reproduction, if the rate equals one, this means even
reproduction, but if it is less than one, the population-reduced reproduction takes
place When within years, the net reproduction rate is less than one, then the
amount of population reduces.
The net reproduction rate in the Caucasus has not been calculated with regard
to the North Caucasian republics. In all three republics of the South Caucasus, the
net reproduction rate provided the extended reproduction of the population nearly
until 1990 (see table 25). From 1969 to 1970 it was: in Georgia,1,,233; in
Azerbaijan, 2,085; and in Armenia, 1,488. Thus, to replace 1,000 mothers in these
years, there were 1,233 girls in Georgia; 2,085,in Azerbaijan; and 1,488 in
Armenia. In the following period, this indicator kept continuously reducing, and,
in recent years, it left the critical limit. In 2005, each of 1,000 mothers had 634
girls in Georgia; 833 in Azerbaijan and 681 in Armenia.
Table 25. Net Reproduction Rate of Population from 1969 to 2005
1969 to 1980 1980 to 1981 1989 2005

Georgia 1.233 1.048 0.993 0.634
Azerbaijan 2.085 1.454 1.267 0.833
Armenia 1.488 1.077 1.231 0.681
Among the factors influencing childbirth in the Caucasus, we should separate

the level of education, according to which the difference between the levels of
childbirth is still very high. For example, in Ingushetia in 2002, one woman had
average of 2.4 children, a woman with higher education had an average of 1.9;
with general secondary education, the average was 2.1; with elementary
education, the average was 4.0; and without general elementary education, the
average was 5.2. An analogous situation was in the South Caucasus. Namely, in
2001, in Armenia, one woman had an average of 2.1 children. According to the
level of education, this indicator considerably differed: a woman with higher
education had 1.7; with general secondary education, 2.0; with elementary
education, 3.5; without elementary education, 4.2. Analogous indicators
characterize the relation between childbirth and education levels in the indigenous
population of the Caucasus.
Marital status has also an essential influence on the childbirth level. The level
of childbirth is far higher among the married women than the unmarried. In the
Caucasus, as well as in the entire world, the amount of out-of-wedlock children
keeps growing. Outside of marriage, women have mostly only one child. Single
mothers face problems to marry; outside of marriage, they seldom give birth to
more than one child and often have only one child. This condition considerably
reduces the levels of childbirth. For example, according to the data of the
population census of 2002, in Dagestan, each 1,000 women had average of 2,069
children; each married 1,000 women had an average of 2,740. Analogous
indicators in Ingushetia equaled 2,354 and 3,806 respectively; in Kabardin-
Balkaria they equaled 1,712 and 2,242. In Georgia, in the same year, the amount
of children born per each married 1,000 women equaled 2,257, never-married
1,000 women, equaled 1,394; and 1,000 divorced women equaled 1,440.
In this paragraph, we‘ll also discuss the processes of migration in the
Caucasus, which were very intensive both in the XIX and the XX centuries. In
previous paragraphs, we have analyzed such type of internal migration, mostly,
forced migration (1920 to 1950) and the movement of population inside the
country, as village-city. It may be said that there were no cases of external or
international migration in the Soviet Union, as in the closed space. From the
1990s, when the republics of the Soviet Union gained independence and when,
due to opening of the borders, it became possible to move freely, the international
migration acquired a most intensive character, especially in the South Caucasus.
One essential peculiarity is outlined while studying the dynamics of the
international migration problems. Migratory streams in the countries of the South
Caucasus were mostly directed to Russia both before the dissolution of the Soviet
Union (1991) and after it. So, before 1991, the migration from the South Caucasus
to Russia was the movement of population within the country, i.e., internal
migration, and after that international migration, as the borders of the already
independent states were crossed.
The migration processes became too intensive in the countries of the South
Caucasus in the 1990s, which was caused by many reasons. A migrant, in general,
makes a radical choice and is sure his goals will be realized. In most cases, the
factors causing migration are intertwined. First of all, they are economic, political,
social, ethnic, religious, and ecological. The migration processes in the countries
of the South Caucasus were caused by the first three of those reasons, especially
after the restrictions on migration were abolished. A main stream of migrants
from the countries of the South Caucasus moved to Russia. At the same time, the
level of immigration from the former Soviet Union was far higher among
Armenians than Georgians and Azerbaijani. In 1990, the Soviet Union was left by
about 450,000 people, and their major part involved three ethnic groups: Jews
(200,000), Germans (145,000), and Armenians (50 to 60,000).4 Such a tendency
was noticed in the following years, as well.
The migratory streams from the countries of the South Caucasus to Russia
were comparatively weak within the last two hundred years, especially until the
second half of the XX century. The opposite process was more intensive. In the
XIX century, Russia set a wide program with the aim of colonization of the South
Caucasus, which it did partly fulfill. Only in the 30s of the XX century, hundreds
of thousands of Russians migrated from Russia to the South Caucasus for
4
International migration. Tbilisi, 2001, p 15.
permanent residence, as if for participating in the grand construction works. From

1926 to 1939, in the South Caucasus, the amount of Russians increased from
336,000 to 882,000, i.e., by 546,000 (2.6 times). Increase of the Russian
population was not the result of natural migration, but, mostly of their moving
from Russia to the South Caucasus. Within 13 years, nearly 500,000 Russians
came to the South Caucasus for permanent residence. Just due to this, from 1926
to 1939, the share of titular nations considerably reduced in the entire population,
namely, of Georgians in Georgia, from 66.8% to 61.4%; of Azerbaijani in
Azerbaijan, from 62.1% to 58.4%; and of Armenians in Armenia, from 84.5% to
82.8%. It should be mentioned that Russians in the Communist period, in fact,
demographically mastered nearly all the national autonomies. For example, in the
Autonomous Republic of Karelia, the amount of Russians in 1926, was 154,000,
and in 1989, it was 581,000. Correspondingly, their share in the entire population
of the autonomous republic increased from 57.0% to 73.5%. In the Khanty-Mansi
autonomous area from 1959 to 1989, the amount of Russians increased from
90,000 to 848,000. In 1989, the share of Khants and Mansis in the entire
population made up 1.4% and of Russians, it was 66.2%, etc.
In the last quarter of the XX century, the migration processes became more
intensive between Russia and the South Caucasian countries, especially from
1991 to 2000. This phenomenon was caused by many factors, firstly, a great part
of Russians living in the South Caucasus returned to live to Russia due to armed
conflicts, worsening of economic conditions, and, simply, because of their human
wish to return to their historical homeland. From 1981 to 2004, there were 2,110
thousand men who came to Russia from the South Caucasus to live, and, in the
same period, 774,000 left the Russian Federation for the South Caucasus and the
migration negative matrix made up 1,336 thousand men (see table 26). According
to separate countries, this indicator was in Georgia was 491,000; in Azerbaijan, it
was 553,000; in Armenia, it was 292,000. In the 1990s, the emigration processes
of the South Caucasian countries with Russia became far more intensive as
compared with the 1980s. In Georgia, the negative matrix was 359,000 (in 1980s,
it was 109,000); in Azerbaijan, 299,000 (in the 1980s, it was 243,000); and in
Armenia, 200,000 (in the 1980s it was 75,000). From the beginning of the 2000s,
emigration from the South Caucasus to Russia considerably reduced, and it
increased to the United States of America and West European countries. If in the
1980s, the average annual negative matrix was 43,000 men, in the 1900s, this
indicator made up 86,000, and from 2001 to 2004, it was 13,000. In total from
1981 to 2004, the negative matrix of migration in the South Caucasus was average
annual 56,000 (see table 26).
Table 26. Migration between the Russian Federation

and the Countries of the South Caucasus from 1981 to 2004 (in thousands)
1981- Among them

2004 1981- 1991 -2000 2001- 2004
1990
Migrated to Russian 749 313 409 27
Federation from
Georgia
From 929 522 389 18
Azerbaijan
From Armenia 432 181 230 21
From The South 2,110 1,016 1,028 66
Caucasus –
Total
Average 88 102 103 17
Per year
Migrated from 258 203 51 4
Russian
Federation to
Georgia
In Azerbaijan 376 279 90 7
In Armenia 140 106 30 4
In The South 774 589 170 15
Caucasus
- total
Average 32 59 17 4
Per year
Migration balance -491 -109 -359 -23
Georgia
Azerbaijan -553 -243 -299 -11
Armenia -292 -75 -200 -17
In The South -1,336 -427 -858 -51
Caucasus
- total
Average -56 -43 -86 -13
Per year
Source: Demographic yearbook of Russia. Moscow, 1999, pp 330-333. Main results of the
all-Russia population census of 2006. Goskomstat of Russia, 2003, p 129.
In the migration streams from the countries of the South Caucasus, except
Armenia, directed to Russia, the representatives of ethnic minorities living in
these countries exceeded the indigenous nationalities. For example, in the peak of
the migratory streams—in 1994—67,000 people left Georgia for Russia to live,
among them: 20,000 Russians, 14,000 Azerbaijani, 12,000 Armenians, and
16,000 representatives of other nationalities. In the same year 50,000 men left
Azerbaijan for Russia: 20,000 Russians, 14,000 Azerbaijani, 9,000 Armenians,
and 7,000 representatives of other nationalities. There were 47,000 people who
left Armenia for Russia: 38,000 Armenians, 5,000 Russians, and 4,000 other
nationalities. As we see, as compared with other nationalities, it is only in
Armenia that a great amount of indigenous population—Armenians—migrated to
Russia. In the migratory streams from the countries of the South Caucasus, the
share of Georgians is low, which cannot be said about Azerbaijanians and,
especially, Armenians. In the 1990s, from the post-soviet space the amount of
Georgian emigrants to Russia was far less as compared with Azerbaijanian and
Armenian emigrants. In the most intensive period of the migration processes—
1992 to 1998—the former Soviet republics were left by 59,000 Georgians,
116,000 Azerbaijanians, and 276,000 Armenians for Russia to live.5 Mostly due
to this reason, according to the data of the population census of 2002, in Russia
the amount of Armenians and Azerbaijanians considerably increased from 1989 to
2002. In 1989, there lived in Russia 131,000 Georgians, and in 2002 there were
198,000, i.e., in the period of two population censuses in Russia, the amount of
Georgians permanently living in Russia increased only by 67,000. In the same
2002, there lived in Russia 1,130 thousand Armenians and 621,000 Azerbaijani,
when their amount in 1989 in Russia was 532,000 and 356,000 respectively.
Thus, in the period mentioned above (from 1989 to 2002) the amount of
Armenians that came to Russia for permanent residence increased by 598,000 and
of Azerbaijani, by 265,000. In Russia, there already lived permanently seven
peoples, the amount of the population of which separately taken exceeds one
million: Russians (115,869 thousand); Tatars (5,558 thousand); Ukrainians (2,943
thousand); Bashkirs (1,674 thousand); Chuvashs (1,637 thousand); Chechens
(1,361 thousand), and Armenians (1,130 thousand).6
A main part of emigrants from the countries of the South Caucasus settled
mostly in three regions of Russia: Moscow and Moscow region, the North
Caucasus, and in the regions along the river Volga. This is caused by the fact that
movement of family members, relatives, and acquaintances historically took place
in these regions of Russia. This condition formed networks of migrants, which
was followed by further migration processes. Through these networks, potential
5
Demographic yearbook of Russia. Statistical handbook. Moscow, 1999, pp 354-357.
6
The all-Russia population census of 2002: Main results. Goskomstat of Russia, 2003, pp 13-15.
migrants get more reliable information on living conditions and reaching possible
success there.
It is of no less importance that in the beginning, the migrants hope for
assistance and support from the relatives. It should also be pointed out that in
conditions of existence of compatriots in the areas of settlement, emigrants feel
less leaving their native places.
The population, capable of work, participates in the migratory processes, and
migration of labor resources really takes place. A majority of migrants is
represented by youth, healthy and educated, high professional people, able to
boldly stand the problems of life. Therefore, migration of a considerable part of
labor resources happens, which leaves certain trace on the economic and spiritual
life of the country. First of all, the genetic fund of the country is degrading,
economic advance of the country is being impeded, and, what is most important,
the abilities to use potential energy of the nation are becoming lower, and the
process of the population aging is being accelerated. It may take some tens of
years to further fill the emptiness in the intellectual life of the nation caused by
migration. Emigration has negative influence on the demographic processes:
leaving of the country by a great part of the population of work age results in
reduction of childbirth and increase of mortality. Some positive role of migration
should be taken into consideration, as well, in economic and cultural life of the
country. In recent years, in conditions of economic recession, unemployment, and
overall distress, migrants financially assist their families and relatives and thus
morally support them.
Some part of migrants is expected to return to their countries, but in different
periods, taking into account economic potentials and appearance of prospects in
the Caucasus: those engaged in profitable business will return after a long period
of time, and those involved in hard physical work return as soon as economy
revives and the living conditions become better
Chapter 6
POPULATION OF THE SOUTH CAUCASIAN

COUNTRIES IN THE XX CENTURY AND THE
BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY
VI.I. POPULATION OF GEORGIA

Georgia is located in the central and west part of the South Caucasus. It is an
independent, single, and united state, which is confirmed by the referendum held
on 31 March, 1991, in the entire territory of Georgia, including the Autonomous
Republic of Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian autonomous region and by
the act on restoring state independence of Georgia adopted in April, 1991.
The territory of the state of Georgia is determined by the condition of 21
December 1921. The territorial integrity of Georgia and inviolability of its state
border is proved by the constitution and the laws of Georgia and is recognized by
the commonwealth of world states and international bodies.
Georgia is bordered by the Russian Federation northwards (the border
between Georgia and the Russian Federation passes mostly along the main ridge
of Kavkasioni), Azerbaijan, eastwards; Armenia, southwards; and Turkey, south
westwards. On the west, it is encircled by the Black Sea. The total length of the
borders is 1,968.8 km, land borders in this amount make up 1,660.4 km. The
territory of Georgia is 69.5 thousand square meters. By the size of the territory
and the amount of the population, Georgia occupies a second place in the South
and all of the Caucasus after Azerbaijan, though historically, until the 50s of the
XX century, Georgia was on the first place in the Caucasus by these indicators.
In the beginning of the XX century, East Georgia was Tbilisi gubernia and
West Georgia was Kutaisi gubernia; both gubernias were within the Russian
Empire as administrative-territorial units.
The Tbilisi gubernia, Tbilisi being its center, was formed in 1846. It involved
Tbilisi, Akhalkalaki, Akhaltsikhe, Borchalo, Gori, Dusheti, Suighnaghi, Telavi,
Tianeti mazras (provinces), and Zakatala okrug (area). In the Soviet power period,
the division of the territory into mazras was abolished; the region became the
main administrative unit in the rural areas. The regions were formed in the cities
where the population was more than 100,000. In the soviet power period, Zakatala
okrug was quite ungrounded and transferred to Azerbaijan. It should be mentioned
that in 1917, when Tbilisi gubernia was abolished, South Ossetia was not an
administrative unit. It was because Ossets migrated mostly in the XIX century
from their home country, North Ossetia—Ossetia, as it was called then without
any prefix ―North‖—and lived preferentially in the highlands of historical
province of Georgia—Shida (Inner) Kartli (Gori mazra).
Kutaisi gubernia, with the center in Kutaisi, was formed in 1846. First, it
involved Akhaltsikhe (in 1867, Akhaltsikhe mazra was subject to Tbilisi
gubernia), Kutaisi, Ozurgeti, Racha and Shorapani, later Zugdidi, Senaki and
Lechkhumi mazras and Sokhumi, Batuni and Artvini okrugs. Kutaisi gubernia
was abolished in 1917. At present, when Abkhaz and Ossetian separatist scholars
try to re-write history and announce that Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia
had never been within Georgia, it‘s fully false and distorted. In the XIX century,
according to the population censuses conducted by Russia in Georgia (among
them, general census of the population conducted in the Russian Empire in 1897),
scientific works of famous Russian scholars and the cartographic maps used in
these works, there is no mention of ―South Ossetia‖ existing in Georgia, namely,
in Shida Kartli in the form of any administrative-territorial unit, or of Abkhazia
never belonging historically to Georgia. For example, in the census of 1886 and
1897, Ossets living in the highlands of Shida Kartli (Gori mazra) were introduced
in the total amount of Tbilisi gubernia population, and the population of Sokhumi
okrug in that of Kutaisi gubernia. In the maps of Tbilisi and Kutaisi gubernias,
compiled by Russian cartographer, E. Kondratenko, according to the condition of
1886, it is clearly seen that Tskhinvali, the capital of the former South Ossetian
autonomous region, and the villages around it are fully settled by the Georgian
population and Ossets live only in Dusheti and mostly extreme highland of Gori
mazra (Shida Kartli),1 and Sokhumi okrug (the territory of present-day Abkhazia)
1
Collection of statistical data on Transcaucasus region. Part I, Tiflis, 1902, a map of Tbilisi
gubernia inserted between pages 268 and 269.
Population of the South Caucasian Countries in the XX Century… 203
was completely within Kutaisi gubernia.2 According to the encyclopedic

knowledge, the representations of the geographic reality (settlements, etc.),
national composition of the population, etc. have exactly the same disposition
towards the cartographic net in the map as it is in reality. This is a unique
peculiarity of the cartographic model of the reality, which attaches to it scientific
and practical importance. In our case, the maps of Tbilisi and Kutaisi gubernias
show vividly that Abkhazia is an integral part of Georgia and that there existed no
administrative-territorial unit in Georgia in the form of ―South Ossetia,‖ and
Ossets lived in the mostly in the extreme north part of Shida Kartli, on the
southern slopes of the Kavkasioni Ridge.
In the first quarter of the XX century, an important change of the
demographic situation was directly connected with quite changeable political and
economic situation in the country, which impeded natural demographic
development of the country. First, the I World War, then February-March
revolution of 1917, and October counter-revolutionary coup d‘etat of the
Bolsheviks in Russia was followed by exceptional aggravation and economic
destruction in the political situation in Russia, outlying countries occupied by
Russia, and, among them, in Georgia.
On 26 May1918, the national council of Georgia adopted ―the Act of
Independence of Georgia,‖ the first article of which said: ―From now on, the
people of Georgia are carriers of sovereign rights and Georgia is plenipotentiary
independent state.‖ By the Act of Independence, the political system of Georgia is
recognized as a democratic republic.3
Soviet Russia could not stand losing its position in the South Caucasus,
namely, in Georgia as well, and tried hard to restore its positions there. Still in
January 1918, it tried to occupy Georgia and entire the South Caucasus but failed
to get desirable results. The newly formed Georgian military corps and the units
of people‘s guards defeated the Russian army at the station Shamkori and in other
places. Russia also supported the separatism of Abkhazia and of Ossetia living in
Shida Kartli, trying to tear off the territory of Abkhazia and the territory of Shida
Kartli populated with Ossets from Georgia and to join these territories to Russia.
Despite this, in March 1919, the people‘s council of Abkhazia adopted an act on
autonomy of Abkhazia within Georgia. It should be mentioned that the
Constituent Assembly of Georgia proved the Constitution of Georgia on 21
February, 1921, according to which the old integral parts of Georgia, namely
2
Ibid. A map of Kutaisi gubernia inserted between pages 276 and 277.
3
Collection of legal acts of Democratic Republic of Georgia 1918-1921. Tbilisi, 1990, pp 3-4.
Abkhazia (Sokhumi region), Adjara (Batumi region) and Saingilo (Zakatala

region) were granted autonomous governing in local affairs.
Unfortunately, the Constitution of 1921 of Georgia has not operated
practically, because on 25 February, 1921, the soviet power was established in
Georgia. It was ―sovetization‖ by force and, in fact, an annexation as well. But,
before that, immediately after restoration of independence, violation of the
territories started. Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists were supported by Russia,
which tried through them to appropriate the territories of Georgia. Intelligence
network of Iran and Turkey tried to unleash the separatist movement in Saingilo
(historical province of Georgia in Hereti). In April of 1918, the Turkish army
started military activities against Georgia, and its armed units occupied
southwestern territory of the country, and in December 1918, Armenia attacked
Georgia demanding in the ultimatum for to concede old Georgian territories in
South Georgia, Kartli, involving capital of Georgia Tbilisi up to Gori and Adjara.
Regular units of the Georgian army and people‘s guards defeated the Armenian
army and, if not England, Armenia could have faced great military catastrophe.
After its victory in the civil war (1918 to 1920), Soviet Russia started to take
care of occupying independent states of the South Caucasus. In April, 1920, the
11th Red Army of Russia occupied Azerbaijan, establishing the soviet power
there. Then, in November, Russia annexed Armenia, establishing the soviet power
there as well. It became evident that due to geopolitical position of Georgia,
Russia would never abandon the idea of occupying Georgia. Still in May, 1920,
the 11th Red Army units crossed the border of Azerbaijan and moved forwards to
Tbilisi, but at that time, the Russia-Georgia talks were ongoing in Moscow, and
on 7 May 1920, a peace treaty was concluded between them. Russia recognized
independence of Georgia, but it was evident it was a temporary event.
According to the scenario prepared in Moscow on 12 February, 1921, the
11th Red Army entered Georgia for the reason of supporting rebels in the Russian
villages of Borchalo mazra. This ―revolt‖ was interpreted by the Russian
propaganda as ―the revolt of Georgian workers.‖ In any case, to disguise apparent
aggression against the independent country, on the initiative of the Bolsheviks, an
appeal for support was sent to Moscow on behalf of the Georgian workers. This
promoted the 11th army of Russia, which was attacking Georgia both from
Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, the 8th army of Russia invaded
Abkhazia from Sochi region, and two brigades of the Russian army moved to
Kutaisi from the North Caucasus. Russia attacked Tbilisi from the Dariali gorge
as well. Despite furious retaliatory resistance, it became clear that in such a
situation and due to great military strength, superiority of the Russian army the
Georgian army and the people‘s guards could not have managed to defend Tbilisi,
and they retreated. On February 25, 1921, the units of the 11th army of Russia
entered Tbilisi, and the soviet power was declared in Georgia. By nearly the
analogous scenario, using the separatist sentiments formed by it in ―South
Ossetia‖ and Abkhazia, in August, 2008, Russia occupied a great part of Georgia.
However, due to the efforts of the western countries, Russia later retreated, but
without the support of the international community, it could have occupied entire
territory of Georgia as well.
As a result, there were formed three national-state units—the soviet
autonomous republic of Abkhazia (4 March, 1921), autonomous soviet socialist
republic of Adjara (16 July 1921), and autonomous region of South Ossetia (20
April 1922). After the Russian Federation, by the territory and population, a small
republic of Georgia was the most national-state unit among the allied republics.
Within the entire period of preparations for exporting the soviet order by
Russia in Georgia, and as a result of fulfilling this on the basis of military
occupation, considerable changes took place in demographic events and
processes. In the period of the I World War and existence of independent Georgia,
followed by fall of economy and utter worsening in the level of living, the
demographic situation became extremely aggravated. From 1914 to 1917 only, the
population of Georgia reduced from 2,601 thousand to 2,338 thousand, i.e., by
263 thousand.4 By 1921, the population of Georgia increased a bit and made up
2,411 thousand.5 In that period, the childbirth reduced and mortality increased.
The number of dead in the war was large; the cases of dangerous infectious
diseases became frequent; and the number of those who died from them increased.
Decrease in the amount of population was noticed in all the regions of the
country, especially in Samtskhe-Javakheti, as it was the region close to the place
of armed clashes. The non-Georgian population, which came to settle in Georgia
in pre-war period (Armenians, etc.) and was not established firmly in the new
place of living, left Georgia first. If, in the pre-war period, outer migration
processes in Georgia had distinctly expressed positive balance, from 1914 to
1917, the amount of those who left the country much exceeded the amount of
comers.6
Essential changes took place in the demographic processes after 1921. A
majority of the non-Georgian population, which left Georgia from 1914 to 1920,
came back. In the 1920s, and, especially, in the 1930s. As a result of reviving the
economic life, the amount of migrants in the country considerably increased. The
4
Economy of the Georgian SSR. Jubilee statistical yearbook. Tbilisi, 1977, p 9.
5
Ibid., p 10.
6
V. Jaoshvili. The population of Georgia. Tbilisi, 1996. p 100.
ethnic composition of the population changed to some extent. But before we

discuss this issue, it is necessary to say that after establishment of the soviet
power, the territory of Georgia reduced by 20,000 square meters (population
about 300,000). Despite the fact that according to article IV of the peace treaty
signed between Russia and Georgia on 7 May1920, Russia recognized the Batumi
region, also Zakatala and Sokhumi regions.7 Russia and the Georgian Bolsheviks
gave Georgia‘s lands as presents. Namely, Russia, to ease the tense relations with
Ottomans, conceded to the Ottomans a great part of south-west Georgia—
Shavsheti-Urusheti-Artaani with Potskhovi. This happened on the basis of Kars
agreement (13 October 1921). In fact, the Kars agreement spread on Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia major provisions of the agreement concluded between
Russia and Ottoman Empire in Moscow on 16 March, 1921. Consequently, the
Kars agreement was ratification of the above-mentioned Moscow agreement.
Armenia the got neutral zone of Alaverdi and Azerbaijan—Zakatala region. Thus,
Georgian lands were divided and presented by Bolsheviks in the very first years
the soviet power was established in return for their being in power.
In the period of the soviet power, the first population census in Georgia, as
well as in the entire Soviet Union, was held in 1926. Then, followed censuses of
1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989 and, of course, these censuses involved
Georgia as well, as the Soviet Union member republic. The last census was held
in Georgia in 2002, and it was the first national census conducted in independent
Georgia. As such, censuses give the most exact data on the size and composition
of the population, the present work analyses the condition of the population in the
period of censuses. Due to ethno-political conflicts existing in the country, the
population census of 2002 was conducted on the territory controlled by the central
power. That was why it did not involve the entire country, namely Abkhazia and
the Tskhinvali region (a great part of the territory of the former South Ossetia,
which is controlled by the separatist authorities).
At some time, the politically and economically strongest Georgia belonged to
the list of the world biggest states by the size of its territory and population. But
within centuries, the vital energy of the country was being exhausted gradually in
the fights against numerous enemies, which was finally followed by the
abolishment of its statehood and, therefore, decline of the sentiment of protecting
its national peculiarity. From the viewpoint of reproduction of the population of
Georgia, the size of Georgia‘s population was of great importance before the
annexation of Georgia by Russia (1801), namely, in 1800. It was assessed by
7
Georgia-Russia agreement, 7 May 1920. See in the book: L.Toidze. Intervention, occupation,
forced sovietization, actual annexation as well. Tbilisi, 1991, p 221.
relevant calculations that by that year, the size of the population of Georgia within
the present borders was 675,000.
In the XIX century, there were formed in Georgia conditions favorable for
reproduction of the population. Loss of independence as a result of annexation of
Georgia‘s territory by the Russian Empire was the greatest misfortune for the
country. The Georgian nation faced the jeopardy of losing its own appearance.
The nation lost the opportunity of revealing its vital energy. Despite all this,
peaceful life laid the basis for stable reproduction of the population. Renowned
public figure of the XIX century, Ilia Chavchavadze, mentioned about it: ―Tired
and restless for a long time, the country found calm; it also found peace after long
periods of destructions; it became quiet after wars and struggles; the arms and
saber-rattling stopped, which was directed at us and our families by the enemies;
the fire disappeared, which was burning to ashes the abode of our ancestors, our
dwellings; the raids finished and were in the past and remained only as terrible
and horrifying memory.‖8
According to the data of the population census conducted in the Russian
Empire in 1897, there lived in Georgia 2,109 thousand people, 1,336 among them
being Georgians (63.3%). The size of the population in Georgia was 1.7% of the
population of the Russian Empire. The amount of the population in Tbilisi and
Kutaisi gubernias was approximately equal, though in West Georgia there lived
401 thousand more Georgians than in East Georgia. It should be mentioned that in
Tbilisi gubernia, the amount of Georgians made up 44.5% and in Kutaisi gubernia
the amount was 82.1%. Professor V. Jaoshvili calculated the size of the
population of Georgia in 1897, in the present-day borders and received the
following results: the entire population equaled 1,919 thousand people, and of
Georgians there were 1,331 thousand. Thus, in 1897, as compared with 1800, the
population of Georgia in the present borders is 1,244 thousand, i.e., increased 2.8
times, and the amount of Georgians increased 2.6 times.
Analogous growth of population took place (2.8 times) in the XX century, as
well. There were 2.7 million people living in Georgia in 1926, but after 60
years—in 1989—there were 5.4 million. The population of Georgia would have
increased more if Georgia had not sacrificed a great number of its population in
the war of 1941 to 45. About 300 thousand Georgians died at the front. Such
losses and reductions in childbirth during the war years negatively influenced the
increase of population.
The population of Georgia considerably reduced recently, especially in the
last decade, and in 2005, it made up 4,516 thousand on the territory controlled and
8
I. Chavchavadze. Collection of complete works in ten volumes, vol. IV, Tb., 1955, pp 216-217.
uncontrolled (Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region) by the Georgian authorities.

Within its entire history, Georgia has not experienced such considerable reduction
in the population in such a short period. This reduction was caused by zero natural
increase and intensive external migration processes.
According to the evidences preserved in the Georgian written sources, in
early and Middle Ages, the population censuses were held in Georgia in the VI
and XI centuries, but their data are lost. In the middle ages, it was a rule to hold
the population censuses, but only fragments have reached us. Despite this, the
evidence of different kinds that reached us from the written sources enable us to
determine the approximate amount of the population based on relevant
calculations. The Georgian chronicler preserved for us the data of the population
census of 1254. Though these data are not perfect, based on relevant calculations,
we have determined the amount of the population of Georgia (see table 27).
Table 27. Dynamics of the Size of the Population of

Georgia From the X to XX Centuries (in thousands)
years Population total Among them:

Georgians
Absolute %
X to XI centuries 1,370 - -
1254* 8,000 - -
Beginning of the XVIII 2,500 - -
century
1770 761 - -
1800 675 - -
1897* 2,109 1,336 63.3
1926* 2,667 1,788 67.1
1959* 4,044 2,601 64.3
1979* 4,993 3,433 68.8
1989* 5,400 3,787 70. 1
2002* 4,601 3,724 81.0
2005 4,516 - -
Note: Size of the population of Georgia in 2002 and 2005 is cited according to the territory
both controlled and uncontrolled by the Georgian authorities. The data of 1770 are
calculated by Prof. V. Jaoshvili.
* Data of the population census.
It is seen from the table that the population of Georgia in the Middle Ages
considerably reduced, which was caused by the raids of Mongols and Tamerlane,
and after widely spread trade with people. The Georgian slaves have been sold at
the slave-markets for nearly three centuries.
The results of Georgia‘s population census of 2002, due to well-known
reasons, are most unfavorable. The entire population of Georgia reduced exactly
by 800 thousand, as compared with the census of 1989. According to the data
published by the UN Population Fund, by the rate of the population increase (in
our case, decrease) Georgia has the worst indicators among the world countries
after Ukraine. By the calculations of Georgian and foreign demographers, if it
continues thus, by 2050, the population of Georgia will reduce nearly by half. It
may happen even earlier, unless the Georgian authorities conduct efficient
measures. This is witnessed by the data of the Georgian population census of
2002.
The population census of 2002, as we have mentioned above, was held on the
territory controlled by the Georgian authorities and, therefore, did not embrace the
entire country, namely, Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region. This means that the
census results without Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region fail to give a clear picture
of the changes that took place in the size of entire population of the country in the
period between two last censuses (1989 and 2002).
With this aim in view, on the basis of expert evaluations, through different
information and calculations, we have determined the size and national structure
of population in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region. In 2002, there lived in Abkhazia
and Tskhinvali region 180 thousand and 50 thousand, respectively.
According to the data of the population census of 2002, the Georgian
population on the territory controlled by the Georgian authorities comprised 4,371
thousand, and the population of entire Georgia, both on the controlled and
uncontrolled territory was 4,601 thousand, instead of 5,401 thousand in 1989 (see
table 28). This reduction was mostly caused by migration of nearly one million
people abroad.
To calculate the amount of migrants to the foreign countries, let‘s add to the
size of population natural increase of the population (difference between
childbirth and mortality) and extract the size of population in 2002. By the official
data, from 1989 to 2001, on the territory controlled by the Georgian authorities,
the natural increase made up 248 thousand. If we add to this amount the natural
increase of the population in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region, which according to
relevant calculations was 10 thousand, then the natural increase of the population
of Georgia within 13 years was about 258 thousand. Thus, in the period between
the censuses, from 1989 to 2002, Georgia was left by 1,058 thousand (5,401
thousand + 258 thousand—4,601 thousand) for permanent residence abroad. We
should still make one note: 80 thousand were the Soviet armed forces contingent
and their family members. Finally, migrants from Georgia made up 978 thousand
in total.
Table 28. Size and Natural Structure of the

Population of Georgia from 1926 to 2002
Years 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002

POPULATION–
total Absolute 2,677 3,540 4,044 4,686 4,993 5401 4371
thousand 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
%
National structure of the population
GEORGIANS
Absolute thousand 1,788 2,174 2,601 3,131 3,433 3,787 3661
% 66.8 61.4 64.3 66.8 68.8 70.1 83.8
ABKHAZS
Absolute thousand 57 58 63 79 85 96 3
% 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 0.1
OSSETS
% 4.2 4.2 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.0 0.9
ARMENIANS
% 11.5 11.7 11.0 9.7 9.2 8.1 5.7
AZERBAIJANIANS
% 5.2 5.3 3.8 4.6 5.1 5.7 6.5
RUSSIANS
% 3.6 8.7 10.1 8.5 7.4 6.3 1.5
GREEKS
% 2.0 2.4 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.3
JEWS
% 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.1
UKRAINIANS
% 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.2
THE REST
% 3.0 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.7 0.9
Note: The data of 2002 reflects the size and national structure of the population on the
controlled territory.
On the basis of analogous calculations, we can determine the size of

Georgians and national minority representatives in Georgia in 2002, and the
number of migrants that left for the foreign countries. For example, in 2002, there
lived 3,724 thousand Georgians in Georgia, i.e., the amount of Georgians reduced
by 63 thousand as compared with 1989. Thus, the amount of Georgians in 2002,
as compared with the previous census, despite political and socio-economic
cataclysms accompanying the transitional period, has not changed much—it
reduced only by 63 thousand. This was caused by the circumstances that the
absolute indicator of natural increase of Georgians, especially in the beginning of
the 1990s, was comparatively high, and it exceeded the amount of Georgian
migrants that left for foreign countries.
In Georgia, the amount of Abkhaz population reduced by half. Their amount
in 2002, was 46 thousand, and 47 thousand from this lived in Abkhazia, the rest,
in more or less amount, lived nearly in all the regions of Georgia. There were
2,586 Abkhazs who lived in 1989, in different regions of Georgia, except
Abkhazia; in 2002, this indicator increased up to 3,518. Thus, thousands of
Abkhazs were forced to run away from the separatist regime of Abkhazia and to
find shelter in different parts of Georgia. Within last 13 years, 52 thousand
Abkhazs left abroad, mostly to Russia.
The amount of Ossets also reduced nearly by half. Their amount in 2002, was
85 thousand; 46 thousand from this lived in Tskhinvali region. In all of Georgia,
the amount of Ossets from 1989 to 2009 reduced by 79 thousand. Natural increase
made up only 500. Thus, 80 thousand Ossets migrated to foreign countries for
living, mostly, to Russia.
The amount of Russians reduced by 241 thousand, and, at present, their
number in Georgia is 100 thousand (67 thousand of them on the controlled
territory), instead of 341 thousand Russians in 1989. This reduction was caused
by numerous factors. As we have mentioned above, 80 thousand Soviet Army
contingents left Georgia, a majority of them being Russians. It became possible in
the 1990s, in the former Soviet Union, to talk loudly about the accumulated,
unsettled problems; the national sentiments became elevated, and wishes arose to
return to the historical home country, which was fulfilled by many. Hard socio-
economic factors, a search for better living conditions, and armed conflicts,
surely, played quite an important role. But reduction in the amount of Russians
was, to some extent, caused by one factor, namely, within last 13 years natural
decrease of the Russian population living in Georgia made up 18 thousand. So,
reduction in the amount of Russians by 241 thousand was caused, on the one part,
by natural decrease of its population (18 thousand), on the other, mostly by the
departure of Russians for Russia to live (163 thousand) and, on the third,
departure from Georgia of about 60 thousand Russians, who served in the Soviet
Army in Georgia. Just due to these factors, the amount of Russians reduced by
millions in the former soviet republics. For example, in the period of the last two
population censuses, the amount of Russians in Ukraine reduced by 3 million; in
Kyrgyzstan, by 313 thousand; in Azerbaijan, by 250 thousand; in Latvia, by 202
thousand, etc.
The amount of Armenians in Georgia was 281 thousand, and, as compared
with 1989, this number reduced by 156 thousand. This reduction was especially
considerable in Tbilisi—by 68 thousand. In total, 164 thousand Armenians left
Georgia for foreign countries.
The amount of Azerbaijanians in Georgia was 285 thousand, and their
number, as compared with 1989, did not reduce much, only by 23 thousand. This,
to some extent, was caused by a majority of Azerbaijanians—75%—living in the
rural regions, when in 1989 the rural population in total was 44.6%. It‘s true that
the amount of Azerbaijanians reduced by only 23 thousand, but the number of
those who migrated to foreign countries was 63 thousand due to their high natural
increase.
According to the data of the population census of 2002, considerable
reduction was noticed in Georgia among Greeks (81 thousand), Ukrainians (42
thousand), Jews (212 thousand) and the representatives of other national
minorities. Nineteen thousand Greeks, 11 thousand Ukrainians, and 4 thousand
Jews lived in Georgia in 2002.
In conclusion, the general census of the population in Georgia showed
negative changes that took place in the size and structure of the population that
were considerably caused by the most complicated demographic situation.
Hard economic conditions and unstable situations in the country reduced the
childbirth and increased mortality to a critical limit. If an average of 94 thousand
children were born annually in the 1980s in Georgia, at present the amount of
newborns reduced by 47 thousand; i.e., became twice less. Families with few
children were spread among the Georgian population. The amount of mothers that
have three or more children keeps reducing. It should be mentioned that in 1960,
the share of second and more born children made up 36.5% in the total amount of
born. At present, this indicator is 11.5%. Now, fewer children are born than it is
required for replacement of the parents‘ generation. External migration processes
became most intensive. Mostly due to hard economic conditions, about a million
people left the country recently for other countries to earn their living. As a result
of all this, the share of young age groups keeps reducing in the entire population,
and the share of people older than 60 is increasing. That means the population is
demographically aging. These processes are especially outlined in recent years

and are most apparent among the Georgian population.
The Georgian nation faced jeopardy of physical extinction. Generation
renewal in the same amount becomes far more difficult, which is much more
dangerous than obvious slowing down of the process of spiritual continuity.
Primacy of physical continuity is evident, because perceptible weakening of
spiritual life of the nation may be overcome. The nations with rich spiritual
heritage do manage to revive their cultural heritage and to return and develop their
spirituality, even in the case of decline of their cultural life and even its
suspension. This is caused not only by the rich spiritual past of the nation, but also
by the fact that the nation genofund is imminent carrier of this rich spirituality. In
the middle ages, spiritual life nearly stopped in Georgia, ruined and destroyed by
Mongols, Tamerlane, and other numerous enemies. But in the following centuries,
it did become possible to revive, because rich support of the spiritual values
existed.
By the official data, the biggest amount of children was born in Georgia in
1961—104 thousand. An average of 93 thousand children were annually born
from 1960 to 1990. A sharp reduction in childbirth started from 1992. Forty-six
thousand children were born in Georgia in 2005, and the childbirth reduced twice
as compared with the previous years. As a result of this, natural increase of the
population also reduced considerably in recent years. Even in the period of war,
namely from 1941 to 1945, natural increase was 135 thousand, when this
indicator from 2001 to 2005 was only 5.8 thousand.
It should be mentioned that in the South Caucasus, where indigenous
nations—Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanians—live, the demographic
development in Georgia essentially differs from the indicators of demographic
development of Armenians and Azerbaijanians. At the same time, it should be
taken into consideration that the South Caucasus is one single region, where
natural and climatic terms and the mode of life in general are close to one another.
Still, despite this, the indicators of childbirth, mortality, and natural increase in
Georgia were and are far worse than in neighboring countries. For example, in
1926, the natural increase per 1,000 persons in Armenia was 36.4, in Georgia it
was 23.2.9 In 2005, this indicator was 0.8 in Georgia, when in Armenia and
Azerbaijan it was 3.5 and 10.9, respectively. The indicators mentioned above
differ much more according to the indigenous nations of these countries, and thus
the childbirth rate has essential impact on the national structure of the population.
The level of childbirth and natural increase is very low among Georgians than
9
Drobizhev V. In the beginning of the Soviet demography. Moscow, 1987, p 147.
among the representatives of other nations living in the country. For example, in
1959, the crude birth rate among Georgians was 21.8 promile; among Armenians
it was 28.8; among Azerbaijanians, it was 43.9; among Abkhazs it was 22.3; and
among Ossets it was 25.5. In the following years, the childbirth reduced, but the
difference between them remained.10 There were 16.1 children born per each
1,000 Georgians in 1989 in Georgia, and 28.6 per each 1,000 Azerbaijanians. The
natural increase per each 1,000 Georgians was 7.6; the corresponding indicator
among Azerbaijanians was 22.8. This indicator was so high among Armenians
and, especially, among Kurds.
Systematic reduction of childbirth in Georgia is more vividly shown by such
precise indicators as total fertility rate and population reproduction regime net
rate. Namely, total fertility rate was 2.6 children from 1969 to 1970; in 1989 it
was 2.1; and in 2005 it was 1.3 children, which is not sufficient to renew the
parents‘ generations in number. The net rate keeps also reducing systematically;
in 1989, it was 1,003, i.e., one woman of fertility age gave birth to about one girl;
1,003 girls were necessary to replace each 1,000 mothers. In recent years, the net
rate considerably reduced, and in 2004, it was 0.662. This means that only 662
girls come to replace each 1,000 mothers.
Thus, modern parameters of childbirth are nearly twice smaller than it is
necessary to replace the generations. When a woman gives birth to 1.3 children
during her lifetime (in some years this indicator is far less), it may be said that
compensation of one parent is being made, in fact. All this is more essential, as
even in case the living terms are improved, the childbirth will reduce far more.
Unless radical measures are adopted, this process will become more expressive
after seven to eight years and will reach its peak in the beginning of the 2020s.
The reason of this is essential worsening of the sex-age structure.
In case active demographic policy is conducted, which will be designated for
a long-term period, this process may be delayed only, and after some time is
passed, the desirable result may be achieved. It‘s enough to say that 456 thousand
girls were born in Georgia from 1981 to 1990, i.e., in 10 years, and only 238
thousand girls were born from 1995 to 2004 (again in 10 years), i.e., 218 thousand
less.
Consequently, mostly as a result of considerable worsening of economic
terms, along with decrease of childbirth in the passed period, the amount of born
women sharply reduced and due to this, the country would be unable to avoid
further reduction of childbirth, even in case of essential improvement of economic
10
Tukhashvili M. Socio-demographic problems of the population of the third age in Georgian SSR.
In the book: Population of the third age. Moscow, 1986, pp 225-226.
conditions. It‘s true, however, that in case the level of living conditions improves,
average of one woman will give birth to more children during her lifetime, but,
despite the processes of external migration, it won‘t be able to considerably
compensate the childbirth reduction caused by decrease in the amount of women
born in the previous period.
Families with few children are widely spread among the Georgian population.
The number of mothers that have three and more children keeps reducing. If in
1960, the share of born third and more children was 36.5% of the total born
amount, in 2007, this indicator was 10.8%. The share of first-born children is
especially high in the total amount of born. For example, in the same year, 29,883
children were the first-born for their mothers (60.6%). The analogous indicator in
1960, was 34.7%. Thus, a low level of childbirth in Georgia is connected with
widespread one-child families, correspondingly, with the highest share of the first-
born in the total amount of born. With this indicator, Georgia has already outrun
economically advanced countries. In the United States of America, the first-borns
make up 40% of the total number, in Sweden; they make up 45%; and in Russia,
they make up about 60%.11
The level of mortality was traditionally low in Georgia, as compared with
both neighboring and major European countries. This indicator has considerably
increased recently. If 6.5 men died per 1,000 in 1960, this indicator in 1990
equaled 9.3 and in 2004 it was in the 11.3 promile. The share of males is higher
among the dead as compared with females. For example, in the 15 to 59 age
group, the males constitute 70.0% in the total amount of dead. Quite a great
number of males fail to reach the pension age. The males that reached this age
remain on pension for average 13.7 years, while females remain for 20.2 years.
The level of child mortality is also high. For example, 49,572 children were
born in 2004, but after a year, their amount was far less because of high mortality
rates among children up to one year. Namely, 1,178 children died in the age up to
one year in 2004, i.e., 23.9 children per 1,000 born. In 2003, this indicator equaled
24.8 promile, the highest in the post-soviet space.12 These figures have a far more
terrifying impression if we consider the children mortality in the long period.
From 1980 to 2004, i.e., in a 25-year period, 43,940 children died at the age of
one year, nearly the same amount as the number of children born in 2004.
Unfortunately, this is not all. The number of stillborn children is also very high.
There were 722 children stillborn in the same year, that is, the indicator of
11
Population and society. Information bulletin of the centre of human demography and ecology of
the Institute of Economic Prognosis RAN. N 1000, 2006.
12
Statistical yearbook of Georgia, 2006. Tbilisi, 2007, pp 319-320.
stillbirth was 15.3 children per 1,000 born. From 1980 to 2004, the stillborn
amount was 16,500. Consequently, the amount of died and stillborn children in
that period made up 60,440. In conditions of additional efforts for improvement of
medical services, better care of children, and spreading of relevant knowledge, if
the level if indicators of developed countries was achieved, then in 2004, it would
have been possible to save the lives of more than 1,370 children. In total, from
1980 to 2004, the lives of about 48 thousand children could have been saved; that
is more than the amount of children born in the country in 2005.
The amount of marriages keeps decreasing in Georgia recently, which
impedes considerably reproduction of the country population. If 52 thousand
couples married in Georgia in 1979, this indicator was 38.3 thousand in 1989 and
only 12.5 thousand in 2002. In the beginning of the 1990s, the level of divorces
was high and the number of widowed is also too high, namely, 57 thousand men
and 322 thousand women (17.3%) of the age of 15 and older are widowed. The
level of childbirth decreases by 8% as a result of divorces and widowhood.
Sociological methods are more widely used in recent studies of the
demographic processes. Each family, each person, has its own ideas and attitude
with regard to childbirth, marriage, divorce, migration, and other demographic
processes. This idea and attitude are mostly worked out through national and
family traditions, religious belief, concrete conditions of life, level of education,
and that social environment in which people have to live and work. So,
demographic behavior of people depends on numerous factors and, therefore,
study of demographic problems in relation with these factors is of great
importance. The main thing here is that people‘s attitudes coincide with their real
demographic behavior and, thus, there is formed the means for clarifying and
prognosticating general tendency of in the development of childbirth, marriage,
divorce, and migration processes.
With the aim of studying the childbirth problems, we have conducted
sociological questioning in 1989 and 2007 in Tbilisi. Married women of up to 40
years of age were the respondents. About 1,500 questionnaires contained
questions concerning desirable, factual, and expected amount of children in the
family. In conditions of low level of conscious childbirth, and especially
childbirth, to know these indicators was of greatest importance. First of all,
attention should be attached to the condition that the number of desirable children,
as a rule, was always more than that of expected and factual children. The reason
of this mostly is that while naming the amount of desirable children, women are
limited with the number of children they consider best to have in the family
proceeding from their private aspirations. But demographic behavior is not
formed only with attitudes. The number of expected and factual children, first of
all, depends on concrete conditions of life. And, as it is so, we should determine

the reasons that impede women to have as many children as they want. Just in this
case, we can make the amount of expected and factual children close to desirable
number and, thus, increase the childbirth.
As a result of research conducted in 2007, we received considerably different
data as compared with 1989 (see table 29).
Table 29. The Amount of Desirable, Factual and Expected Children in the
Family According to the Research of 1989 and 2007
Desirable Factual Expected number Factual and

number of number of of children expected number
children children of children
Research 3.7 1.9 0.8 2.7
of 1989
Research 2.5 1.4 0.6 2.0
of 2001
If in 1989, the amount of desirable children in the family was considered to

be 3.7, in 2007 this indicator was far less, at 2.5. Mothers in these years
respectively had 1.9 and 1.4 children, but had wished to have 0.8 and 0.6 children
more. In case of realizing this wish, factual and expected amount of children was
2.7 in 1989, and 2.0 in 2007. So within the last years, the average number of both
desirable and factual and expected children considerably reduced in Tbilisi. The
data of research conducted in Tbilisi point out that equal reproduction of the
population is impossible in Tbilisi according to the expected and more to the
factual number of children, i.e., renewal of generations in one and the same
amount, and the data on the amount of desirable children witness that in certain
conditions, childbirth can be increased, i.e., there exist some reserves of growth.
If we take into account the circumstance that in the traditional understanding
the number of many-children families is reducing, that in some cases three and
four children are desirable in a family, a whole complex of measures should be
conducted in this direction. Namely, we should conduct realization of this
sentiment, i.e., we should make average final factual amount of children in each
family close to that of desirable children. This is most important because the
sociological research showed the reasons and complexities due to which families
do not want to have children. In case these problems are settled, 61% of
interviewed women in Tbilisi want to have children again. Further, 80% of them
consider it necessary to improve the economic conditions.
It should be generally mentioned that the childbirth level in Georgia

historically was not high. Crude birth rate, which shows the amount of born per
1,000, was twice less in Georgia in the XIX century than in Ukraine and Russia.
In old Georgian written sources and Georgian folklore, we come across evidences
on the ideal amount of children in a family, and this amount is three or four. One
folk verse, widely spread in Georgia, evaluates the importance of having each
child thus: ―One child—no child, two children—as if children, three children—
real children, four children—these are children.‖ Some demographic evidences
preserved in the Georgian literary monuments are indeed of great value. For
example, in the work Life of Giorgi Mtatsmindel, by Giorgi Mtsire, working in the
XI century, one information is cited, the likes of which cannot be found in the
world literature history of that period. In this medieval Georgian work, the talk is
about the amount of children, i.e., whether it is necessary to have many (seven or
eight) children in a family. Giorgi Mtsire comes to the conclusion that it is most
difficult for normal living to bring up many children, mentioning that an owner of
seven or eight children ―however rich he may be, will face great problems; if he is
poor, his life will be hard and full of troubles and sufferings.‖13 In the author‘s
conclusion, having many children is a heavy burden not only for the poor, but for
the very rich, as well. Giorgi Mtsire turns special attention to upbringing of
children and to the need for giving proper education to them. He considers
relevant education to be a necessary term for a human being to reach perfection.
To use modern terminology, this means that the attention in this work is stressed
not only on the amount of children, but also on the quality of children‘s
upbringing.
According to the data of population census of 2002, families with small
children are widely spread among the Georgian population. The indicator of born
children per 1,000 women is high in the regions (in some cases even by 800
children) populated by national minorities, and the number of expected children is
exceptionally low among Georgian women, which points to an unfavorable
perspective for the development of Georgian population. Such data were received
as a result of the population census, which are most dangerous from the
demographic development viewpoint for such a small-numbered country as
Georgia is. There are 1,864 thousand women of 55 and older age in Georgia. Of
these women, 1,059 thousand of them (56.8%) are married; 405 thousand (21.7%)
have never been married; 323 thousand (17.3%) are widowed; and 76 thousand
(4.1%) are divorced. These data are most unfavorable. The level of unmarried in
Georgia is comparatively higher than in other countries. The indicator of
13
Georgian prose. Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1981, p. 480.
widowhood in the country is also high—17.3% of women are widows. Analogous

indicator in Armenia in 2001, was 13.6%, and in Kyrgyzstan in 1999, it was
11.9%. Such a situation is acute social and psychic problem for a man and entirely
for the society. But one should take into consideration the too-high level of
mortality in this category of the population, especially among males. It is also
determined that mortality is twice higher among the never-married males than
among married in Georgia. This difference in the mortality levels among married
and unmarried females is comparatively insignificant. Thus, mode of family life
has an important influence on the mortality level. To illustrate this statement, we
may cite the results of one of the researches conducted in the United States of
America. According to this research, the family condition has significant
influence on the mortality levels among the males. Namely, according to some
diseases, mortality of divorced men 10 times exceeds analogous indicator of the
married. For example, heart disease caused death of 176 married men per 1,000
and of 382 from 1,000 thousand divorced. The analogous indicators equal 35 and
128 among those that died from the car accidents; 17 and 73, in cases of suicides,
etc.14
According to the data of census, there are 619 thousand unemployed in the
country, 220 of them were ready to start work, if they managed to find work. Only
37.3% of unemployed had worked earlier. This condition has the most negative
impact on demographic processes and events. It should be taken into
consideration that the level of unemployment in 2003, in Georgia was the highest
in Georgia as compared with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States and is characterized by the tendency of growth.15
A great part of unemployed—251 thousand (40.6%)—are up to 60 years old,
a majority of whom, 230 thousand (88.4%), are young people who have never
worked. A majority of those young people, employed before, have not worked for
10 to 12 years and are seeking a job. Such young people become indifferent and
alienated from the society; national and spiritual values lose sense for them; they
abstain from marriage, as they are in waiting for better future. They often fail to
find the way out from the situation, become involved in criminal cases, and, what
is more important, the knowledge they possess is being devalued. This generation
is morally degraded and lost. We do not live in the XIX century, when the
university knowledge was sufficient for a man during his entire life. At present,
knowledge requires renewal every five to ten years. At the present stage of the
society development, knowledge has turned into a main factor of production. No
14
Cited from: Results of science and technique. Medical geography, vol. 16, M., 1989, p 96.
15
Statistical yearbook of Georgia, 2006. Tbilisi, 2007, p 322.
one argues today that the capital invested into knowledge production has become
most efficient.
According to one of the most interesting research on problems of
unemployment, which was conducted in Austria, unemployment causes far more
destroying personal apathy and disintegration than political disorders and
organized revolution. The tendency of reduction and disappearance of social and
friendly relations is fixed in the unemployed heads of the families and the level of
all the informal relations (e.g. visits to friends) lowered. The degree of political
activity was lowered due to unemployment, poverty, etc.16
According to the population census of 2002, there are 732 thousand
pensioners in the country; 202 thousand are single persons; only 175 thousand
(124.4%) are employed by profession corresponding to their education; and 1,172
thousand people of 16 years old and older are dependants on others, among them
more than half a million—556 thousand—are 16 to 29 years old. This situation
has the most negative influence on the dignity of a man, his psyche, and
demographic behavior of those being in fertile age and dependant on others.
After the cited data, it becomes clear that a great part of the population,
especially of young people, is either unemployed or does not work according to
the obtained knowledge. For earning their living, they are forced, if they find
work, to be employed in the sphere uninteresting for them, thus failing to realize
themselves; that is to say, they cannot ―spend themselves fully‖ for the well being
of their nation; they cannot create anything valuable, and their national energy is
wasted. Even more, lack of potential for their realization brings devastating
results. In fact, enormous expenses spent by their families and the state on their
education are lost. In a man‘s life, it is most important that the work should give
him an opportunity of self-expression and full manifestation of his potentials; he
should be attracted with the artistic nature of the work, and professional work
should not turn into the source for earning his living only. Otherwise, nothing
valuable can be created in the country.
All mentioned above has a negative impact on the demographic processes and
will negatively influence them in the future, as well. It is necessary to conduct
active demographic policy. There has long been a demand in the society for such
policy, which, unfortunately, has had no answer from the state for years. In the
future, it will be most difficult and less efficient, and even impossible to overcome
tense demographic problems, whatever big resources the state may spend. The
tomorrow of Georgia depends on the amount of children born today and the
quality of their upbringing.
16
Cited from: L. Mezvrishvili. Economic sociology. Tbilisi, 2003, pp 241-243.
Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia considerably differs with the size of the

population, the territory it occupies, and the national structure from the
autonomous formations in Georgia. The jurisdiction of the central authorities does
not spread in it due to the ethno-political conflict unleashed in Abkhazia by
Russia.
In the XX century, the population of Abkhazia was quickly growing (see
table 28). The rate of growth in different periods considerably exceeded average
indicator in Georgia. From 1926 to 1979 the population of Georgia increased 1.9
times, among them, in Abkhazia, 2.4 times. In the same period, the population of
Abkhazia was 7.5% and 10.0% of the entire population of Georgia. Such growth
was mostly caused by immigration of residents from other regions of the Soviet
Union to Abkhazia, because the indicator of natural increase of the population of
Abkhazia was analogous to the indicator of entire Georgia. Immigration processes
in Abkhazia were of the most intensive character from 1926 to 1939, when the
population of Abkhazia increased by 1.6 times. Tens of thousands of Armenians,
Russians, and Greeks entered Abkhazia in that period for permanent residence,
and their amount increased by 2.8 times, but of Georgians it was 1.4 times. As a
result of this, the share of Abkhazs and Georgians reduced much in the entire
population, namely, of Abkhazs from 27.8% to 18.0%, and of Georgians from
33.5% to 29.5% (see table 30).
Unfortunately, the Abkhaz separatists give a different interpretation to the
official statistical data on the population of Abkhazia. They point that the policy
of settlement of Abkhazia that was being conducted by the Georgian authorities
led to the situation that, according to the data of the population census of 1989,
Abkhazs became a minority in their own home country (17.8%), and Georgians
were 45.7% of the population of Abkhazia. This statement lacks real basis. In
1989, even if the Georgian population had not lived in Abkhazia, the share of
Abkhazs in the entire population still would have been only 32.7%. This is
because population immigration processes from other countries and natural
increase indicators are far higher among the other nations living in Abkhazia.
Even if not so, Georgians have no less right than others to settle in Abkhazia—the
oldest and integral part of Georgia. In different periods, absolute increase of
Armenians and Russians was far more than of Georgians, which points to their
intensive immigration into Abkhazia. For example, from 1926 to 1939, the 67-
thousand Georgian population in Abkhazia became 92 thousand and increased by
25 thousand. In the same period, 25 thousand Armenians increased by 25
thousand, and 12 thousand Russians, by 48 thousand.
Table 30. Size and National Structure of the
Population of Abkhazia from 1886 to 2002
1886 1926 1939 1959 1979 1989 2002

Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Population 68.7 100.0 210.0 100.0 311.9 100.0 404.7 100.0 486.1 100.0 525.1 100.0 180.0 100.0
total
Abkhaz 28.3 41.2 55.9 27.8 56.2 18.0 61.2 15.1 83.1 17.1 93.2 17.8 42.0 23.3
Georgian 34.8 50.7 67.4 33.5 92.0 29.5 158.2 39.1 213.3 43.9 239.9 45.7 60.0 33.3
Armenian 1.1 1.6 25.7 12.8 49.7 15.9 64.4 15.9 73.3 15.1 76.5 14.6 32.0 17.8
Russian 1.2 1.7 12.6 6.3 60.2 19.3 86.7 21.4 79.7 16.4 74.9 14.3 32.0 17.8
Greel 2.1 3.1 14.0 7.0 34.6 11.1 9.1 2.2 13.6 2.8 14.7 2.8 - -
Rest 1.2 1.7 25.4 12.6 19.2 6.2 25.1 6.3 23.1 4.7 25.9 4.8 14.0 7.8
Note: Greeks in 2002 are among the other population.
Population of the South Caucasian Countries in the XX Century 223
It should be mentioned that from 1959, the growth of Abkhaz and Georgian
population is characterized by the equal rates; mostly natural increase takes place.
For example, from 1959 to 1989, Abkhaz population increased by 52.3%; the
Georgian population, by 51.6%. In 2002, as compared with 1989, the population
of Abkhazia considerably reduced (by 345 thousand) due to ethno-political
conflicts and made up 180 thousand instead of 525 thousand.
Mostly Georgians and Abkhazs lived in the XIX century in Abkhazia, but
Abkhaz separatists present their numerical correlation in a distorted form. In
1886, by the decision of the Russian state council, the family lists of the
population of Transcaucasus (the South Caucasus) were compiled. The Abkhaz
separatist authors deliberately distort the data of this year, pointing out that,
according to the family lists, the amount of Abkhazs in 1886 in Abkhazia was 59
thousand (85.7%) and of Georgians, it was four thousand (6.0%). To clarify the
issue, we‘ll cite the amount of Abkhazs and Georgians in Abkhazia in different
years so as the Abkhaz authors represent it (in thousand). 1
years 1886 1897 1926

Georgian 4.2 25.9 67.5
Abkhaz 59.0 58.7 55.9
Irrelevance of the data cited above in regard to different periods is evident. It

is impossible to understand why the amount of Abkhazs is reduced in 1897 and
1926, as compared with 1886, or why the amount of Georgians is so suddenly
increased. It has been known that after 1886, there was no migration of Abkhazs
to Turkey. Just, on the contrary, the repatriation of Abkhazs continued from
Turkey in small amounts. Neither in the first quarter of the XX century did
Abkhazs go anywhere. In the period of the I World War, the Russian authorities
did not take Abkhazs to the army. Many Georgians, living in Abkhazia, who did
not want to pay military duty, and, to avoid serving in the army, took citizenship
of Abkhazia and became Abkhazs in the end of the XIX and the beginning of the
XX centuries. The tsarist authorities of Russia introduced certain privileges in the
end of the XIX century for the conscript contingent from Abkhazs and the Muslim
population of Terek and Kuban regions. Article 43 of the charter on military duty
said that for the Abkhaz Christians, living in Sokhumi okrug (area) of Kutaisi
gubernia, ―conscription to the army was temporarily suspended and replaced by
1
White book of Abkhazia. Moscow, 1993, p 30.
special money payment into the state treasury.‖2 The same article said that this
duty was called payment in kind. Serving in the army was then quite long. The
total term of serving in the infantry was 18 years, from which five years were in
the army and 13 years were in the reserve (Article 17). Young people were called
for serving in the army from the age of 21 (Article 11).3 Such privileges positively
influenced reproduction of Abkhazs, because it was just the very age when youth
married, and there were no losses in the war in that period.
In such conditions, the amount of Abkhazs from 1886 to 1926, within entire
40 years, should not have reduced but should instead have increased. But the thing
is that according to the family lists of 1886, there are no 59 thousand Abkhazs
seen anywhere. During this population census, 28,320 Abkhazs lived in Abkhazia,
mostly in Gudauta and Kodori regions. But the Abkhaz authors deliberately
distorted the data, and the 30.6-thousand Georgian population in Samurzaqano,
who are separately mentioned in the family lists and who lived on the territory
between the rivers Ghalidzga and Enguri (Samurzaqano involved mostly the
territory of present Gali region) were added to Abkhazs, and, by this
manipulation, a desirable amount was reached.4 But by the same census of 1886,
not a single Abkhaz is registered in Samurzaqano area. 5
Samurzaqano, historically, was always the territory populated with
Georgians. It is interesting from this viewpoint that 40,858 Georgians and only
1,161 Abkhazs lived in Samurzaqano according to agricultural census of 1917.6
So, if we take into consideration Georgian population of Samurzaqano (30.6
thousand), then in 1886 there lived 34.8 thousand Georgians and 28.3 thousand
Abkhazs in Abkhazia.
In 1897, the amount of Abkhazs is also shown increased. The amount of
Abkhazs could not have increased fro 28.3 thousands to 58.7 thousand within 10
to 12 years (1886 to 1897), i.e., by 30 thousand. In reality a mistake was made in
2
Code of laws of the Russian Empire, vol. IV, Charter on military conscription, 1897, St Petersburg,
p 17.
3
Ibid, pp 8-9.
4
Samurzaqano, a historical part of Georgia, entered Russian protection in 1805. In 1813-1840, it was
subject to principal of Samegrelo – historical province of Georgia. Then, it was redeemed by the
Russian authorities and Samurzaqano sabokaulo was founded. In 1857, when Sanegrelo
principality was abolished, Samurzaqano was subject to the ruler of Samegrelo. Only from
1864, it was within Sokhumi military okrug, and from 1883, Sokhumi okrug (mostly the
territory of present autonomous republic of Abkhazia). Joining of Samurzaqano to Sokhumi
okrug, as we see, was quite artificial.
5
Code of statistical data on the population of Transcaucasian area, obtained from the family lists of
1886, Tiflis, 1893.
6
Mazra (area) results of agricultural and land census of 1917. Tbilisi, 1922, pp 14-15.
the Russian Empire population census of 1897—unlike 1886 ―Samurzaqanians‖

were attributed to Abkhaz population. As a result of corresponding correction
39.6 thousand Abkhazs7 and 44.8 thousand Gergians lived in Abkhazia in 1897.
That this correction is right is once more witnessed by the official data, namely,
annual reports of the Russian officials, For example, according to the register on
national, religious and position, compiled by the Russian officials in 1902, 46.4
thousand Abkhazs and 51.3 thousand Georgians lived in Abkhazia. 8 The registers
of other years also involve analogous data.
The data of the census of 1926 require certain corrections as well. According
to this census 67,494 Georgians and 55,918 Abkhazs lived in Abkhazia. And
8,920 Abkhazs, i.e., each sixth of them considered Georgian their native language.
During next censuses far fewer Abkhazs named Georgian as their native language.
Georgian was native only for 730 Abkhazs in 1979. Majority of those Abkhazs,
who named Georgia as their native language, were Georgians by nationality. It
seems, the then Abkhaz authorities deliberately promoted the process of
Georgians recognizing themselves as Abkhazs. But, later, when the amount of
Abkhazs was fixed in the population census exaggerated, being important for
them, famous Abkhaz revolutionary N. Lakoba mentioned: ―Several thousands of
Georgians recognized themselves as Abkhazs, though their language is not
Abkhazian, but Georgian.‖9 We should take into consideration the situation
mentioned above, - many Georgians recognized themselves Abkhazs then to
avoid serving in the army, a part of them, however, became Abkhazs afterwards.
So, if we imply that at least half of these Georgians were deliberately added to the
Abkhaz nationality, then 71,954 Georgians and 51,458 Abkhazs lived in
Abkhazia.
If we take into account the corrections made above with regard to the amount
of Georgian and Abkhaz population, then their amount living in Abkhazia looks
as follows:
years 1886 1897 1926

Georgian 34,806 44,882 71,954
Abkhaz 28,320 39,600 51,458
Georgians made up the majority of the population in Abkhazian cities. For

example, according to the data of the same family lists, three Abkhazs: one
7
K. Antadze. Georgian population in the XIX century. Tbilisi, 1973, p 88.
8
Georgian central state historical archives. Fund 229, census 1, case 920, sheet 25.
9
Lakoba N.A. Articles and speeches. Sukhumi, p 213
woman and two men lived in Sokhumi, the main city of Abkhazia, in 1886.
Georgians were in a majority of the city population. The same in Ochamchire;
only Georgians lived there in 1886. Georgians predominated among Gudauta
population, as well.
Except Georgians and Abkhazians, there lived in Abkhazia in numerous
numbers, Russians and Armenians, who came to live there first from abroad (e.g.
Armenians) and then from different republics of the Soviet Union. In different
periods, their amount (especially of Russians) considerably exceeded the amount
of Abkhazs. In 1959, there lived 25.5 thousand more Russians than Abkhazs in
Abkhazia, and in 1970, there were 15.6 thousand more.
In the XX century, the urban population of Abkhazia kept regularly
increasing at the expense of those who arrived from rural areas and other
republics. If, in 1926, the share of urban population was 15.0%, in 1989, this
indicator was 47.1%. The same year, 119.2 thousand people lived in Sokhumi, the
capital of Abkhazia. Georgians comprised the majority of the urban population at
41.5%; Russians were 21.6%; Abkhazs were 12.5%; Armenians were 10.3%;
Greeks were 6.2%; and Ukrainians were 3.3%. Gagra was the biggest city after
Sokhumi by the amount of the population (24.1 thousand); then Tkvarcheli (21.7
thousand); Ochamchire (20.1 thousand); Gali (15.8 thousand); Gudauta (14.9
thousand) and Gulripshi (10.7 thousand).
Adjara autonomous republic is within Georgia. It was founded on July 16,
1921. Adjara is located in the southwest part of Georgia, on the Black Sea coast. It
borders Turkey southwards. Its area is 2.9-thousand-square kilometers.
Adjara autonomous republic was founded in quite a different situation. Its
foundation was caused not by national sign, but by the religious and foreign-
political factors. In the 70s of the XVI century, Adjara, historical province of
Georgia, was occupied by Ottomans. The Adjara feudals adopted the Muslim
religion in the second half of the XVII century, while peasants still followed the
Christian religion. The Christian religion was partially preserved in Adjara until
the end of the XVIII century. After the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877 to 1878, the
three–hundred-year domination of Ottomans ended, and, by the Berlin treatise
(1878), Adjara was transferred to Russia. The same year, Adjara joined the newly
formed Batumi oblast (region) in the form of Adjara okrug (area). In 1883,
Batumi oblast joined Kutaisi gubernia, though in 1903, it again separated from it.
A congress of Georgian Muslims was held in Batumi in August, 1919; the
participants of which demanded formation of Adjara autonomy within Georgia.
By the Constitution of Georgia of 1921 (Paragraph 107 of Article 11),
autonomous rule was introduced for Muslim Georgia (Batomi area) in local
affairs.10 But, as we know, in a few days after adoption of the constitution, the
constitution suspended functioning due to occupation of Georgia by Russia.
Everything was decided by the Russia-Turkey agreement concluded in March,
1921. In case Adjara adopted autonomy, Turkey would have no claims for Adjara
any longer. It follows from the agreement that in July of the same year, the
revolutionary committee of Georgia formed the autonomous soviet socialist
republic of Adjara on the special decree.
Adjara has been populated with the Kartvelian tribes since ancient times.
From the XIV to XV centuries B.C. in Colchis, since its accumulative valley
seems dried, there already exists population. As it has been studied, the population
appeared in Adjara, namely, in the Kobuleti accumulative valley, in the XV
century B.C.11 By the old Greek mythological and written sources, peoples of
Georgian kin lived on the territory of Adjara. For example, Apollonius of Rhodes
in his Areopagitics tells in details about habits, customs, everyday life, and
dwelling place of the Kartvelian tribes on the south and south-eastern coast of the
Black Sea. He names the Kartvelian tribes living on the Black Sea coast, Khalibs,
Tibarens, Mosiniks, Makrons, Pilirs, Bekirs, Sapirs, Bidzers, and Colchians
proper. The later Kartvelian historical and literary sources consider Adjara
populated only with the Karvelian tribes.
In the 80s of the XIX century, after Adjara joined its home country, Georgia,
its population was about 60 thousand. According to the family lists compiled in
1886, Batumi area was populated by 61,376.12 Georgians comprised the majority
of the population, namely, 45,998, i.e., 75.0% of the entire population of Batumi
area. In that period, the entire population of Batumi city was only 14.8 thousand.
After 1886, the population of Adjara, especially of Batumi, kept growing fast.
For example, if Batumi population was three thousand in 1878, twenty years after,
in 1897, there lived 28.5 thousand in it. The urban population was increasing
mostly at the expense of external migration. According to the data of the
population census of 1922, Batumi was already a big city—60.8 thousand people
lived in it. According to this census, along with Georgians, Batumi was also
settled with the representatives of different nationalities, the majority of which
were born outside of Georgia‘s borders, in other countries (49.9%). From 14.5
thousand Armenians living in Batumi, 10.3 thousand were born beyond Georgian
10
Collection of legal acts of Democratic Republic of Georgia, 1918-1921. Tbilisi, 1990, p 476.
11
D. Bakhutashvili. Kobuleti :country, I, Batumi, 1995, p 14.
12
Code of statistical data on population of Transcaucasus area, from the family lists of 1886. Tiflis,,
1893.
borders; from 10.7 thousand Russians, the number was 7.7 thousand; and from 7.6
thousand Greeks, the number was 5.4 thousand, etc. 13
Growth of Adjara population was stable within entire XX century. The rate of
this growth was higher than average in Georgia. From 1926 to 2002, the
population of Adjara increased 2.8 times—from 132 thousand to 376 thousand. It
should be mentioned that if, as a result of recent political and economic
fluctuations, the amount of population visibly reduced in all the regions, in Adjara
this reduction was minor. Namely, Adjara population in 2002 reduced by only 16
thousand as compared with 1989 (see table 31).
Georgians make up the major population of Adjara, the share of which in the
entire population was 93.4% according to the data of the population census of
2002. The share of Georgians kept growing within the entire XX century, mostly
caused by their high natural increase. Natural increase of Georgians in Adjara was
far higher and, even at present, remains high as compared with Georgians living
in other regions of the country. This situation is mostly caused by quite a great
number of Georgians living in Adjara who observe Muslim religion.
The regions of highland Adjara—Keda, Shuakhevi, and Khulo—are nearly
homogenous by the national structure of the population. The share of Georgians in
these regions is everywhere, 99.8%. The situation was nearly analogous during
the previous censuses. The national structure of entire Adjara, it may be said, is
determined by Batumi population. According to the data of the census of 1989,
the population of Batumi was 136.9 thousand, and, from this amount, Georgians
make up 65.9%. Living in Batumi that year were 90.3 thousand Georgians; 21.1
thousand Russians; 13.4 thousand Armenians; 4.0 thousand Ukrainians; 2.7
thousand Greeks; and 5.4 thousand representatives of other nationalities. For well-
known reasons, the Batumi population reduced to 121.8 thousand in 2002, and
Georgians were 85.6% of its population. In total, the amount of the national
minorities reduced from 67.6 thousand to 24.9 thousand in Adjara from 1989 to
2002. From this amount, 17.5 thousand representatives of other nationalities, i.e.,
70.3%, lived in Batumi.
The problem of ―demographic capacity‖ is very acute in Asjara. Systemic
natural events, highland relief, a great part of the territory that is useless for
settlement, a high natural increase of the population, and excess population in
Adjara, unlike many other parts of Georgia, makes actual migration of local
13
Results of the urban population census of Georgia of 30 November 1922. Part I, demography,
Section 2, p 15.
Table 31. Size and Structure of Adjara Population from 1926 to 2002
1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002

Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Population 132.0 100.0 200.1 100.0 245.3 100.0 309.8 100.0 354.2 100.0 392.4 100.0 376.0 100.0
total
Georgian 90.0 68.2 127.5 63.7 178.7 72.8 236.9 76.5 283.9 80.1 324.8 82.8 351.1 93.4
Russian 10.2 7.7 30.6 15.3 32.8 13.4 35.8 11.5 34.5 9.8 30.0 7.7 9.1 2.4
Armenian 10.5 8.0 14.1 7.0 15.8 6.5 15.6 5.0 16.1 4.5 15.8 4.0 8.8 2.3
Greek 5.6 4.2 8.0 4.0 5.7 2.3 6.9 2.2 7.1 2.0 7.4 1.9 2.2 0.6
Ukrainian 1.5 1.1 6.9 3.4 5.8 2.4 7.2 2.3 5.4 1.5 5.9 1.5 1.0 0.3
Rest 14.2 10.8 13.1 6.6 6.5 2.6 7.4 2.5 7.2 2.1 8.5 2.1 3.8 1.0
population to other parts of the country to live. Especially heavy damage was
incurred to highland Adjara by landslides and avalanches in 1988, which was
followed by a great number of human victims. The human victims, caused by
landslides, took place afterwards as well. A hundred hectares of earth became
useless for settlement and cultivation. From 1988, mostly organized migrations
are conducted in different historical parts of Georgia. Settlement in great amounts
is conducted in the sea coastline of Adjara, Javakheti, Kakheti, and Guria.
The former South Ossetian autonomous region, a great part of the territory of
which is now called Tskhinvali region, is located on the southern slope of the
Central Caucasus, in the northern part of Shida Kartli—the historical province of
Georgia. On the north, it borders the Russian Federation, namely, Republic of
North Ossetia-Alania. Its area is 3.8 thousand square kilometers and is 5.4% of the
territory of Georgia. Tskhinvali is the centre of the former region. It involves four
administrative regions.
―South Ossetia‖ was the most small-numbered autonomous formation in
Georgia. We have already mentioned above about artificial and illegal formation
of the region and settlement of Ossets there from North Ossetia. It should be
added that during formation of the region, Ossets lived in such a small territory
that it was impossible to form autonomy. So, the territory of the autonomy was
enlarged at the expense of 40 Georgian villages. The Georgian city of Tskhinvali
was transferred to the autonomous region, as well. No Ossets have ever lived in
Tskhinvali earlier. Tskhinvali, in that period, was the only city, and, naturally, it
became the centre of the autonomous region.
It may be said that the population of ―South Ossetia‖ has not increased within
the entire XX century (see table 32).
The entire amount of the population natural increase mostly moved to
different parts of Georgia to live. From 1989 to 2002, due to ethno-political
conflicts, the population of ―South Ossetia‖ reduced by half—from 98.5 thousand
to 50 thousand.
National structure of ―South Ossetia‖ had not changed much until the 1990s
of the XX century. From 1926 to 1989, the amount of Ossets increased from 60.3
thousand to 66.2 thousand, i.e., by 6 thousand, and the amount of Georgians
increased from 23.5 thousand to 28.5 thousand—by 5 thousand. Russians,
Armenians, Jews, and representatives of other nationalities also lived in the region
along with Ossets and Georgians, and their amount in the entire population
fluctuated from within 4% to 6% in different periods. Like Adjara, the national
structure of ―South Ossetia‖ region was mostly determined by the national
structure of its capital—Tskhinvali. The amount of the representatives of other
nations was 4.8 thousand, and 3.8 thousand from them lived in Tskhinvali.

Population of “South Ossetia” From 1926 to 2002
Ossets had never lived in Tskhinvali, the capital of the former South Ossetia
autonomous region until the XX century. It has always been a Georgian city. Even
more, the Georgian population was being robbed in the XIX century, and that was
why, in 1824, Russian general Khoneb reported to general Ermilov: ―To stop
attacks on Georgians and their robbing by Ossets, the citizens of Kartli should be
given an opportunity to defend themselves from robbers. Therefore, we should not
persecute Georgians by rule of law for murdering robbers. We should try to make
both landowners and citizens of Kartli apprehend that they are not responsible for
murdering evildoers and robbers. We should only oblige Georgians to inform the
local authorities about each of such cases, namely, that an Osset is killed during
an attack or a robbery.‖1 That was why Ossets were not allowed to enter
Tskhinvali without a special permit. The report, sent to general Tormosev by
general Akhverdov, says: Ossets, which require ―to enter the Georgian villages,
especially, Georghian village Tskhinvali, for trade, should be given a special
permit-ticket of Prince Machabeli and other princes.‖2
Ossets settled in Tskhinvali, mostly, in the beginning of the 1920s, after
Tskhinvali became capital of the region. In 1886, according to the family lists,
Ossets did not live in Tskhinvali (see table 33).
1
Acts of Caucasian archeographic commission, vol. VI, Tiflis, 1874, p 690.
2
Ibid. p. 460.
Table 33. Dynamics of Tskhinvali Population Size in 1886 to 1989
1886 1922 1926 1959 1970 1979 1989

Georgian 1,135 1,436 1,920 4,652 5,475 5,584 6,905
Jew 1,953 1,651 1,772 1,649 1,475 652 396
Armenian 744 765 827 860 768 712 734
Osset - 613 1,152 12,432 20,846 25,319 31,537
Russian - 64 114 1,583 1,180 17,037 1,836
Rest - 14 33 465 567 787 925
Population 3,832 4,543 5,818 21,641 30,311 34,791 42,333
total
Thus, the national structure of Tskhinvali population changes only in the

beginning of the 1920s, especially after 1922, when South Ossetia autonomous
region was formed and Tskhinvali was granted to Ossets as the capital. According
to the census of Georgian urban population of 1922, the majority of Tskhinvali
Ossetian population are comers and one-third of them has not lived in Tskhinvali
even for a year.3 Only after that, Ossets come to Tskhinali in great numbers for
permanent residence. This is already determined by the need of staffing ruling
authorities with national officials and turning Tskhinvali into a cultural centre.
After 1922, numerical correlation between Georgians and Ossets changes rapidly
in favor of Ossets—Ossets come from highland villages in great amounts to live
in Tskhinvali. In 1989, there already live in Tskhinvali 31,537 Ossets and 6,605
Georgians.
VI.II. POPULATION OF AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijan is located in the south-eastern part of the South Caucasus. It
borders the Russian Federation (Republic of Dagestan) to the north, Georgia to
the northwest, Armenia and Turkey to the southeast, Iran to the south, and the
Caspian Sea to the east. Its area, together with the islands, comprises 86.6-
thousand-square kilometers.
The territory of present-day Azerbaijan was divided into 15 khanate (Kub,
Shak and Karabakh khanates being the biggest among them) and small feudal
domains until the second half of the XVIII century, before it joined the Russian
3
Results of All-Georgia census of urban population of 30 November 1922, part I, section 2, Tpilisi,
1923, p 36.
Empire.4 Kub, Shak, Gyanja, Shirvan, Baku, Karabakh, and Talish khanates,
existing in the first half of the XIX century, were transformed into one Shumakh
gubernia within the Russian Empire (from 1859, Baku gubernia). The concept
―Azerbaijan‖ itself, with regard to the territories that entered the Republic of
Azerbaijan in the 1920s, appeared only in the beginning of the XX century, and
was established in use after the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was
proclaimed on 28 May1918. It was the first attempt of forming independent state
of Azerbaijan. Formation of a new state was supported by Great Britain, which
had its own economic interests in Azerbaijan. England recognized the government
of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. The then-Parliament of the democratic
republic involved two Armenian factions, one of them representing ruling party of
Armenia—―Dashnaktstiun.‖
Within entire period of its existence, the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan
was at war with neighboring Armenia for Nakhichevan, Karabakh, and other
territories.5 The Communist Party of Azerbaijan did everything to return
Azerbaijan within the state of Russia. In April, 1920, the Antanta leaders once
more discussed the issue of military assistance to the South Caucasian republic,
but they came to the conclusion that they had no forces sufficient for such
assistance. However, the Communists prepared everything for establishing the
soviet power in Azerbaijan by the end of April. The Communists planned to
arrange armed action in Baku by 27 April and the XI Red Army should have
crossed the borders of Azerbaijan. Indeed, on 27 April, in the morning, the armed
units occupied important objects in Baku. The military minister ordered the
officers to obey the new power. The Caspian navy played an important role in the
April events in Baku. They sent an ultimatum to the acting authorities to delegate
power to the revolutionary committee of Azerbaijan. For this, on 27 April, in the
morning, the navy warships stopped at roadstead and turned their arms at the
buildings of the governmental institutions. The leading units of the XI Red Army
crossed the border of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In the afternoon, the delegation
of Communists submitted the ultimatum for delegating the powers to the
revolutionary committee of Azerbaijan within 12 hours. The Parliament of
Azerbaijan opened its emergency session at 20:45. According to the results of
voting, the Parliament adopted a resolution on transferring the powers to the
revolutionary committee. On 27 and 28 April, at night, the Parliament was
dissolved. Thus, Soviet Russia occupied Azerbaijan. On 28 April 1920, the Soviet
Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan was formed. It involved the Autonomous
4
Gadjiev K. Geopolitics of Caucasus. 2003, pp 25, 98.
5
Ibid., p 98..
Republic of Nakhichevan (founded on 9 February 1924, the area was 5.5–

thousand-square kilometers) and the Autonomous Republic of Karabakh (founded
on 7 July 1923, the area was 4.4-square kilometers).
On 31 August 1991, Supreme Council of Azerbaijan adopted a declaration on
restoring independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which existed from 1918 to
1920. It should be mentioned that still in 1918, when the Democratic Republic of
Azerbaijan was formed, legitimacy and lawfulness of the state of Azerbaijan was
doubted, as not everyone seriously recognized the fact of a new state formation.
A. Denikin, leader of the Whites movement, called Azerbaijan an artificially
formed state. He mentioned that everything in the Republic of Azerbaijan was
artificial, starting with the name taken from the name of one of the provinces of
Persia and ending with the government. As K. Gadjiev said, ―Such position was
quite popular in our days as well . . . But one cannot hide from the fact that at
present, the Republic of Azerbaijan exists as an independent state, recognized by
the world community as a sovereign and equal-rights subject of international
relations and, consequently, of international law.‖6
The people of Azerbaijan were formed from merging of old ethnic groups
(Albanians, peoples of Caspian, Midian) with the comers. In the Middle Ages,
Azeri people adopted the Turkish language from one of these peoples, namely,
Seljuks, and, on its basis, developed the contemporary literary language of
Azerbaijan people. The coming of Seljuks to settle on the territory of present-day
Azerbaijan changed the ethnic structure of the population; ―Turkization‖ of the
local population took place, which laid the basis for starting the formation of
Turkish-speaking nation of Azerbaijan.7
The evidences of the size of the population of Azerbaijan are quite scarce
until the XIX century, and, it may be said, in fact, do not exist either. Ancient
evidence is not available at all. We can discuss the size of the population of some
khanates only by the number of the warriors they brought out at war. But such
calculation tells nothing about total amount of the population and lacks reality.
For example, a demographic monument Description of neighboring countries of
Georgia has reached us in two editions. The first is more complete and was
compiled in 1769. Description of each part is compiled according to some plan.
First, it gives evidence on the border, then nationality of each part and, after that,
on how many warriors each part can bring out at war. The monument, which does
not involve description of all the khanates, mentioned about Ganja beglarbeg
(head prince), who could bring out three thousand warriors and about Shak khan,
6
Ibid., p 102.
7
Kovalev S., Kovalskaya N. Geography of the USSR population. Moscow, 1980, p 145.
who also could bring out the same amount of warriors. The evidence preserved in
description of Shak khanate informs that ―there were many Christians among the
population, Armenians—openly, and Georgians—secretly.‖8 It is clear that by
such separate evidences that have reached us, it is impossible to determine the
then-data on the size and national structure of the population on the territory of
present Azerbaijan and even some khanates.
We can discuss about the size and national structure of the population of
Azerbaijan in the XIX century, and, especially, its second half, though it is known
that by 1828, after the khanates existing on the territory of Azerbaijan and other
feudal units joined the Russian Empire, the amount of Azerbaijanians was about
600 thousand.
In 1886, on the resolution of the Russian state council, the family lists of the
population of Transcaucasus were compiled. Baku and Elisavetpol gubernias were
formed on the territory of the then-Azerbaijan. The Baku gubernia population was
713 thousand, and that of Elisavetpol was 729 thousand. Azerbaijanian Tatars (as
they were then called) dominated in both of them, Azerbaijanians were 53.0% in
Baku gubernia, and 56.0% in Elisavetpol gubernia, and Armenians made up 7.8%
and 35.4%, respectively. Tatrs also lived in Baku gubernia in abundance,118
thousand (16.6%) and Talishs, 51 thousand ( %).
In compliance with the data of the population census held in the Russian
Empire in 1897, the population of Azerbaijan was 1,806.7 thousand. Its
population kept increasing rapidly and in 1913, it became 2339.2 thousand, i.e., it
increased by 532.5 thousand within 15 years. According to the last population
census of 1999, the population of Azerbaijan was 7953.4 thousand and, within
one century (1897 to 1999, in 102 years), had increased 4.4 times. It should also
be mentioned that if, in the period between the last censuses (1989 to 2002), the
population of entire Georgia reduced by 800 thousand, and in Armenia (from
1989 to 2001) it reduced by 92 thousand, the population of Azerbaijan (1898 to
1999) increased by 952 thousand. Despite the most difficult political and socio-
economic conditions of this period, the average annual growth was 95 thousand.
By 2006, its population increased by 483 thousand more and reached 8436
thousand. Table 34 gives a clear picture of the population growth according to the
years of censuses.
8
L. Melkised-beg. Description of neighboring countries of Georgia. Tbilisi, 1935, pp 10-11.

Population of Azerbaijan from 1926 to 1999
Years 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 1999

POPULATION–total
% 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
National Structure of the population
AZERBAIJANIANS
% 62,1 58,4 67,5 73,8 78,1 82,7 90,0
LEZGS
% 1,6 3,5 2,7 2,7 2,6 2,4 2,2
RUSSIANS
% 9,5 16,5 13,5 10,0 7,9 5,6 1,8
ARMENIANS
% 12,2 12,1 12,0 9,5 7,9 5,6 1,5
TALISHS
Absolute thousand 77 87 _ _ _ 21 77
% 3,3 2,7 0,3 1,0
AVARS
Absolute thousand 19 16 _ 31 36 44 51
% 0,8 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6
TSAKHURS
Absolute thousand 16 _ _ 6 9 13 16
% 0,7 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2
TATARS
% 0,4 0,8 0,8 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,4
GEORGIANS
% 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2
JEWS
% 0,9 1,3 1,0 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,1
THE REST
% 8,1 3,9 2,2 1,6 1,5 1,6 1,4
Note: Tsakhurs in 1939 and 1959, and Khundzs in 1959, are united in other nationalities.
Vazha Lordkipanidze and Anzor Totadze 237
From 1926 to 1939, the amount of the republic population increased by 890
thousand, and the average annual growth made up 68 thousand. After that, from
1939 to 1959, the average annual reduction in the amount of the population took
place, which was caused by the human losses in the war of 1941 to 1945. By the
beginning of 1940, the population of Azerbaijan was 3,274 thousand, and by the
beginning of 1945, it reduced by 568 thousand. The amount of the pre-war
population was the highest by the beginning of 1955. The highest average annual
increase rate in the amount of the population was noticed from 1959 to 1970
(3.5%). Total increase of the population in this period was 1,419 thousand and
was mostly caused by natural increase, as the case was in previous years.
The high rate of growth in the population of Azerbaijan is firstly connected
with high level of childbirth and reduction of mortality. In Azerbaijan, the natural
increase of the population in different periods was twice higher than average rate
in the former Soviet Union. Such a difference was caused mostly by traditions and
the custom of preserving families with many children, also by Armenians and
Dagestan peoples who live in great amounts in Azerbaijan, as the level of
childbirth was also historically high among them.
High childbirth among the population of Azerbaijan considerably depends on
the age structure. High childbirth and low mortality among them determines a
high share of youth in the age structure, which promotes preservation of childbirth
at high level.
It is interesting to note that physical defect was fixed only in the population
census of 1926, a high level of which is marked in Azerbaijan, as compared with
Georgians and Armenians. Per each 1,000 Azerbaijanian males living in the South
Caucasus 2.0 were blind, and per 1,000 females, 3.6; deaf and dumb, 1.2 and 0.8,
respectively. Among Georgians, 0.9 per each 1,000 males and 0.8 per each 1,000
females were blind; deaf and dumb, 0.5 and 0.4, respectively. Analogous
indicators among Armenians were 1.6; 2.0; 0.4 and 0.4.1 This was considerably
caused by the efforts of Azerbaijanians to maintain endogamy of relatives in
marriages. Preference was given to marriages among cousins.2 It is known that
kinship marriages have negative influence on the descendants.
It should also be considered that from ―1886 to 1913 from the amount of the
population of Azerbaijan, 262.6 thousand, i.e., 44.2%, came on migration, among
them in cities, 262.6 thousand, and in the villages, 91.6 thousand. Such high
migration in pre-revolution Azerbaijan was caused, first of all, by the resettlement
policy being conducted by Tsarist Russia in regard to plundering exploitation of
1
Population census of 1926, vol. XLVIII, Tbilisi, 1932, p 107.
2
R. Topchishvili. Ethnography of Caucasian peoples. Tbilisi, 2007, p 317.
oil fields. Satisfaction of high demand on labor force was mostly provided from
the central gubernias of Russia, the North Caucasus, and Dagestan, and at the
expense of peasants‘ migration from Transcaucasus.‖3
It should be generally mentioned that rapid development of oil extraction and
export in last quarter of the XIX century strengthened the attraction of Baku. It
became the largest centre of oil extraction. In 1901, oil extraction made up 11
million tons instead of 26 thousand tons in 1872. Fifty percent of the world oil
extraction was on Baku. The population of Baku considerably increased—from 15
thousand to 112 thousand from 1864 to 1879. The immigration processes in
Azerbaijan became intensive, and the amount of comers considerably exceeded
the amount of migrants. In the beginning of the XX century, Azerbaijanians
occupied a second place after Russians among the urban population of Azerbaijan.
In the following years, Azerbaijanians move from rural places to the cities to live
in more and more great amounts. They mostly moved to Baku. In 1923, according
to the data of the population census, 50.4% of the urban population lived in Baku.
Azerbaijanians made up 29.8% of Baku population, and Russians, nearly the same
amount (29.4%). Armenians were 21.4% of Baku population.4 A second place in
Baku population after Azerbaijanians (43.3%) in 1886, was occupied by
Armenians (28.3%), and the third, by Russians (24.7%). In that period, parallel to
the development of the oil industry, many Armenian merchants and entrepreneurs
kept arriving to Baku to accumulate capital. This is witnessed by the fact that in
1886, from 24.5 thousand Armenians living in Baku, 17.5 thousand were men
(71.4%) and 7 thousand were women (28.6%). The share of the urban population
of Azerbaijan was 51.6% of the entire population in 2006.
We have discussed above the issues of urban and rural population of
Azerbaijan, natural movement, sex-age structure, etc. and here, naturally, we
won‘t analyze them any further. We should add only that urbanization has
important influence on the demographic processes. After urbanization, the rural
population reduces and the urban population increases. But the rate of childbirth
among the urban population is far lower, and the rate of divorces is higher, as
compared with the rural population. This negatively influences the childbirth. For
example, the childbirth general rate in the urban population of Azerbaijan in 2005
was 15.1 promile, and in the rural population it was 19.4 promile. The difference
is more apparent in previous years. In 1991, this indicator was 23.5 and 30.2
promile, and in 1963, it was 33.4 and 48.0 promile, respectively. The more exact
3
Muradov Sh. Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. In the book: Population of the soviet
republics, coll. of essays, Moscow, 1977, p 156.
4
Statistical reference-book on Azerbaijan for 1926. Baku, 1927, p 20.
indicator of childbirth level, the total fertility rate, in the urban population of
Azerbaijan was 2.1 and in the rural population, it was 2.5 in 2005. In 1980, it was
2.5 and 4.5, respectively. Analogous tendency is characteristic to the level of
divorces. In 2005, the level of divorces in the urban population of Azerbaijan was
1.6 promile, and in the rural population it was 0.5 promile.5 The indicators of
natural movement of the population are far better in the migrants from the villages
to the urban places than among the local population. The research conducted in
Istanbul clearly witnesses this. The total fertility rate in Istanbul made up 2.2
children, while among the migrant women living in Istanbul, it was 2.4, and
among the local non-migrant women, it was 1.8 children.6 The population could
have reduced without migration. The difference in the level of childbirth between
the migrants (comers from the villages) and native citizens, nearly completely
disappears in the next generation.
As a result of intensive immigration processes, considerable changes were
experienced by the national structure of the population of Azerbaijan, mostly from
1926 to 1939. In this period, Armenians and especially Russians come in great
amounts into the country for permanent residence (see table 34). At the same
time, as a result of the high natural increase, the amount of Azerbaijanians keeps
growing rapidly. In recent years, the amount of Russians sharply reduced in
Azerbaijan, and it made up 142 thousand in 1999, instead of 392 thousand in
1989. In the same period, the amount of Armenians reduced from 391 thousand to
120 thousand. This amount of Armenians—120 thousand—is the amount that
lived in Nagorny Karabakh in 1989. As we know, due to the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict, no population census has been held in Karabakh, and so 120 thousand
Armenians living in Karabakh in 1989 were introduced into the entire population
of the country in 1999. Thus, nearly no Armenians live in Azerbaijan any longer,
except Nagorny Karabakh. At present, the people of neighboring Dagestan,
Lezghins (178 thousand, 2.2%), occupy a second place in Azerbaijan after
Azerbaijanians according to the amount; they live compactly in the northern part
of Azerbaijan. The people of Dagestan—Khundzs—live in a comparatively great
amount in Azerbaijan (51 thousand); other nationalities are represented in small
amounts.
While characterizing the national structure of the population in Azerbaijan, it
is necessary distribute separately Talishs, which make up 1.0% of the population
of Azerbaijan and make up the oldest ethnic group living in the extreme southeast
part of the country. It is difficult to determine their amount, as in the soviet period,
5
The population of Azerbaijan. Baku, 2006, pp 27, 34, 48.
6
Then population of Turkey, 1929-1994. Ankkara, 1995, p 48.
Talishs, as an independent ethnic group, were not registered at all in censuses of

1959, 1970, and 1979. They were attached to Azerbaijanians. Talishs are very
close to Azerbaijanians, with their material and spiritual culture. They nearly
merged with Azerbaijanians. But still, despite this, 21 thousand of them attached
themselves to Talishs in 1989, and 76.8 thousand, in 1999, which points to
increase of national self-determination of Talishs. So, 21.2 thousand Talishs lived
in Azerbaijan by the data of population census of 1989, and after ten years, it was
76.8 thousand. Surely, 3.6 times the increase of Talishs is impossible in ten years,
because no immigration was among them. It is clear that their majority was
enlisted as Azerbaijanians. This is clearly witnessed by the fact that 77.3 thousand
Talishs were registered in Azerbaijan in 1926, and 87.5 thousand were registered
in 1939. Earlier, 50.5 thousand Talishs lived in Baku gubernia in 1886, and their
majority, 47.3 thousand, are fixed in Lenkoran mazra of Baku gubernia, which is
45.0% of the mazra population. There were 35.3 thousand Talishs living in the
Russian Empire in 1897, and from this amount, all (35.0 thousand) were
registered in Baku gubernia.
In ancient times, Talishs‘ settlement area was within first Median and then
Persian states. From the XI to XII centuries, before the invasion of Turkish tribes,
Talishs fully controlled their ethnic territory. Later, in the end of the XVI century,
Talishs‘ khanate was formed, which gained independence after the state of Nadir-
Shah was dissolved in the mid-XVIII century. The khanate involved the entire
southeast territory of present Azerbaijan, and its capital was Lenkoran, which, due
to a favorable geographical location, became considerably advanced in this
period. At the turn of the XVIII and XIX centuries, orientation to Russia became
strong in the Talish khanate, which ended in khanate being accepted under
Russia‘s protection in 1802, and by the Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchai (1828)
agreements, it joined the Russian Empire.
There are recently noticed separatist sentiments among Talishs. For example,
in summer of 1993, separatist demonstrations of Talishs took place in south of the
republic, which were suppressed.7
Azerbaijanians, which were called Azerbaijanian Tatars and also Turks in the
literary sources and documents until the 1920s, form a main body of the
population of Azerbaijan. Their share in the entire population of the country is
90.0% and increased by 7.3% items as compared with 1989. As we have
mentioned above, this was caused by a high natural increase of Azerbaijanians
and immigration of great amounts of Russians, Armenians, and Jews from the
country. According to the population censuses, the amount of Azerbaijanians kept
7
Gadjiev K. Op. cit., p 102.
increasing permanently, though their share in the entire population reduced by

3.7% items in 1939, as compared with 1926, which was mostly caused by the
population migration from Russia.
Except the Caucasus, Azerbaijanians live in Iran as well, namely, in the
northwest part of Iran. As a result of the Russia-Iran war of 1826 to 1828, the
feudal units existing on the territory of the present state of Azerbaijan-
Nakhichevan khanate, Ordubad region, and other territories of Azerbaijan, passed
into the ownership of Russia. South Azerbaijan (before the 1920s, only Iran‘s
Azerbaijan was called Azerbaijan) remained in the domain of Iran. It is rather
difficult to determine the amount of Azerbaijanians living in Iran, as the
authorities of Iran first denied existence of national minorities in the country,
because Muslims living on the entire territory of the country were called Persians,
among them Azerbaijanians, as well. The evidences on the national minorities
living in Iran first are met in the materials of the population census held in 1956.
According to this census, 4,500 Azerbaijanians lived in Iran, and they made up
23.8% of the entire population. The next censuses were conducted in 1966 and
1976. According to them, the amount of Azerbaijanians was 3,800 and 5,800
thousand, respectively, and their share in the entire population of Iran was 14.7%
and 16.5%.8 As we see, within 20 years, there was noticed nearly no growth of
Azerbaijanians in Iran, when in that period, the amount of the population of Iran
nearly doubled, increasing from 18,950 to 35,500 thousand. At the same time, the
amount of Azerbaijanians reduced by 700 thousand in 1966, as compared with
1956. There was no immigration of Azerbaijanians from Iran in the same period.
This means the evidences on national minorities are superficial and represented in
reduced amounts. We should also take into account that the levels of childbirth
and natural increase in Iran in this period were very high, namely, in 1976, the
amount of born per 1,000 was 42.5 children, the amount of dead was 4.6 persons
and natural increase was 37.9 persons.9 The factors influencing the childbirth
were nearly the same in all of Iran. According to the research conducted in the
city of Sharaz in Iran, which aimed at determining the average amount of children
depending on the status of fathers‘ education, in case of illiterate husbands, the
families had 5.2 children; in the families where husbands had university
education, there were 2.2 children; with high school education, there were 3.1
children; and with secondary school education, there were4.7 children. Sixty-four
8
E. Babalashvili. Urgent problems of demography of Iran. Tbilisis, 1987, p 33.
9
Ibid, p 64.
percent of the population of Iran of 15 and older age were illiterate.10 At the same
time, the traditions of families with many children were not only among the poor
population, but quite often in the well-to-do families. All said above points to the
fact that the amount of Azerbaijanians should have doubled in Iran from 1956 to
1976.
At present, the population of Iran is 71 millions, i.e., its amount doubled as
compared with 1976. In the same period, the amount of Azerbaijanians should
have doubled. That‘s why we consider real the consideration of famous
politologist K. Gadjiev that Azerbaijanians make up nearly one-third of the entire
population of Iran, and they are here two to three times more in the amount than
in Azerbaijan itself.11 Thus, at present, up to 22 million Azerbaijanians live in
Iran, and in the world, their amount is about 30 millions.
The Russia-Iran war ended from 1826 to 1828, with the peace treaty
concluded in Turkmenchai. According to Article 12 of the treaty, the subjects of
both countries were given three-year terms to freely sell their real estate and to
move from the territories occupied by Russia to Iran and also from Iran
(Christians) to the domains of Russia. They were also able to settle in the
desirable provinces on the permit of the power (Article 14). In that period,
Armenians came to the Russian general Paskevich, who was in Tabriz (Iran), with
the request to allow them to settle in the Caucasian provinces. General Paskevich
positively settled their request, because in his words to settle obedient, religiously
devoted to our (Russia—authors) people, could have beneficial for the state of
Russia. Resettlement of Armenians from Iran to Russia could have a certain
response in the diplomatic circles of West Europe—Tsarist Russia considered
itself to be patron of Christians in the East. With the aim of Armenians‘
resettlement from Iran, Catholics of All Armenians Nerse, devoted to Russian
autocracy, sent his emissaries to Iran‘s Azerbaijan occupied by the Russian army
to assist in the resettlement of Armenians, and general Paskevich granted Nerse‘s
emissaries all the powers. The amount of Armenians wishing to resettle from Iran
kept growing rapidly, which was promoted by the fact that, according to the treaty
concluded in Turkmenchai, the Russian army had to soon leave Iran‘s Azerbaijan.
As S. Glinka mentioned in the process of war, the relations between Armenians
and local Iranians extremely aggravated, and Armenians, who were assisting the
Russian army, could not remain in the territory after the Russian army left it.12
10
The Population of Iran. A Selection of Readings. Edited by Jamshid A. Momeni. Shiraz, 1977, pp
35, 155.
11
Gadjiev K. Op. cit., pp 340-341.
12
Cited from: P. Gugushvili. Economic development of Georgia and Transcaucasus in the XIX-XX
centuries. vol. I. Tbilisis, 1945, p 521.
The process of Armenians‘ resettlement from Iran‘s Azerbaijan started in

1828. They should be sheltered in Yerevan and Nakhichevan regions and
Karbakh. The families deliberately demanded to settle them in Karabakh khanate
in Karabak because it was closer to them.
Resettlement of Armenians from Iran‘s Azerbaijan finished in five months. In
total, 8,249 families were settled—mostly Armenians. By 1 August 1828, the
correlation between aboriginals and those resettled in Nakhichevan region was as
follows (by households): local Armenians made up 404 households, and local
Muslims mad up 2,024 households; resettled Armenians made up 1,228
households. Thus, resettled Armenians were 50.6% of the aboriginal population,
and indigenous and newcomer Armenians were 45%, while, by the beginning of
1828, Muslims (Azerbaijanians) were 85% of entire population. After some two
years, Armenians in great amounts, were settled here from Ottoman provinces.13
Contradictions arose from the very beginning between resettled Armenians
and local Muslims, mostly in the issue of the system of land tenure for
Armenians. Muslims kept expressing dissatisfaction openly due to oppressions
from Armenians, which is witnessed by the data mentioned above. The numerical
balance was violated between Armenians and Azerbaijanians, especially in
Nagorny Karabakh, being one of the reasons causing bloodshedding conflict in
the end of the XX century.
It should be mentioned that mostly Armenians and Azerbaijanians lived in
both autonomous formations of Azerbaijan, in Nakhichevan and Nagorny
Karabakh. They were 97% to 98% of the entire population (see table 35).
Azerbaijanians exceeded much in Nakhichevan. From 1926 to 1989, the amount
of Azerbaijanians increased from 88 thousand to 282 thousand, i.e., 3.2 times. In
the same period, 11 thousand Armenians living in Nakhichevan kept reducing,
and, in 1989, as a result of intensive migration, nearly not a single Armenian was
left practically in the autonomous republic. The same year four thousand Russians
and three thousand Kurds were registered in Nakhichevan. In total, the population
of Nakhichevan in the period mentioned above increased by 2.8 times. However,
the population was increasing at an extremely low rate in Nagorny Karabakh.
From 1926 to 1989, its population increased only by 1.5 times, from 125 thousand
to 189 thousand. In 1926, 111 thousand Armenians and 13 thousand
Azerbaijanians lived in Nagorny Karabakh, and their share in the entire
population was 88.8% and 10.4%, respectively. Armenians, which differ with a
high natural increase rate, from 1926 to 1989, increased only by 1.3 times, which
13
Ibid., pp 534, 537, 539.
Table 35. Size and National Structure in Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic

and Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Region from 1926 to 1989
years 1926 1959 1970 1979 1989

Nakhichevan autonomous region
Population-total
Absolute
thousand
% 105 141 202 240 294
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
AZERBAIJANIANS
Absolute thousand 88 128 190 230 282
% 83.8 90.8 94.0 95.8 95.9
ARMENIANS
Absoluite thousand 11 9 6 3 -
% 10.5 6.4 3.0 1.2 -
RUSSIANS
% 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.4
REST
% 3.8 0.7 1.0 1.2 2.7
Nagorny Karabakh autonomous region
Population—total
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
ARMENIANS
% 88.8 84.6 80.6 76.0 76.8
AZERBAIJANIANS
% 10.4 13.8 18.0 22.8 21.7
RUSSIANS
Absolute thousand 0.6 2 1 1 2
% 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.6 1.0
REST
Absolute thousand 0.4 - 1 4 1
% 0.3 - 0.7 0.6 0.5
Source: National structure of the USSR population, censuses of the population, 1989.
Moscow, 1991, pp 118. 120.
means that they were intensively leaving the autonomous region for other regions
of the country to live. In the same period, Azerbaijanians in Nagorny Karabakh
increased from 13 thousand to 41 thousand, i.e., 3.2 times and their share in the
entire population grew from 10.4% to 21.7%. In the 1980s, in Nagorny Karabakh,
each fourth to fifth citizen was an Azerbaijanian.
VI.III. POPULATION OF ARMENIA

Armenia is located in the south of the South Caucasus. To the north it borders
Georgia; to the east, Azerbaijan; to the south, Iran; and to the west, Turkey. Its
area comprises 29.8-thousand-square kilometers.
The independent state of Armenia has existed on the territory of present-day
Armenia only for some time (1918 to 1920) after the revolution of 1917 in Russia.
On 29 November 1920, the revolutionary committee of Armenia declared the
Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia with the support of Russia. Finally, Armenia
gained its independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire (1991). The
geographic location of Armenia, within the entire history of its existence, has
always caused vital interest of neighboring great states (Rome, Byzantium,
Ottoman Empire, Persia, and, in the end, Russia) and Arabs living not so far from
it. That was why Armenia was mostly occupied by other states. Before the
revolution, Armenia was divided into two parts, eastern and western. The eastern
part was the property of Persia, and the western was owned by the Ottoman
Empire. As a result of the Turlkmanchai peace treaty of 1828, North Azerbaijan
and East Armenia joined Russia. After these territories joined Russia, mass
migration of Armenians started from Turkey and Iran. Gradually, this process
became large-scale, and migration took place not only into East Armenia, but also
into all of the South Caucasus—Georgia and Azerbaijan.14 The process became
especially intensive after the Russia-Turkey war of 1878.
We have already mentioned above that after the Russia-Iran war of 1828 to
1829 ended in the victory of Russia, and the Turkmanchai peace treaty was not
yet concluded, the Armenian deputies came to the Russian general Paskevich in
Tabriz and appealed to him with the request to give a permit for Armenians living
in Iran‘s Azerbaijan to move to the South Caucasus. Their migration to the South
Caucasus was also in the interests of Russia and for this ―ad hoc committee for
assisting migrants‖ was founded. Famous Georgian poet, head of the service of
14
Hodjabekian V. Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia. In the book: Population of the union
republics. Coll. of articles. Moscow, 1977, p 263
the newly formed Armenia okrug (area), general Alexandre Chavchavadze, and
settlement of Armenians in the former Karabkah khanate was charged to head of
Karabakh military-regional service, colonel, prince Abkhaz. For six years, the
migrants were exempted from paying any taxes, and each family received
financial assistance in the amount of 15 to 25 rubles.
As a result of the Russia-Ottoman war, numerous amounts of Armenians
migrated from Turkey to Azerbaijan and, especially, Georgia, namely, Georgia‘s
historical province, Samtskhe-Javakheti.
One of the motives of migration was that Armenians assisted Russians in the
war, delivering confidential information and materials on the weak sides of the
fortresses and combat the ability of the Turkish army. When the war began,
Armenians hoped that after the peace treaty was concluded, the territories they
settled in Turkey, which were occupied by Russia during the war, would be
transferred to Russia. But it did not happen so. After the Adrianopol peace treaty,
a major part of the territories occupied by Russia still remained in the ownership
of Ottoman Empire, and, thus, Armenians might become the object of strict
revenge from Muslims. General Paskevich mentioned about it, saying they should
not allow Ottomans to revenge Armenians for their assistance to Russia.
The first groups of Armenians moved from Turkey to the South Caucasus in
autumn of 1829. Before spring 1830, they were followed by a great amount of
migrants. Thousands of Armenians came to Georgia. On the way, they were
attacked by Muslims, which robbed them of the property they were carrying with
them. So they reached Georgia in greatest distress, having nothing with them.
They were very much afraid of revenge and hoped for better arrangements of their
lives so much that they used to say then: ―Even if Christ Himself preaches us to
return to Turkey, we won‘t listen to him.‖15
There were 14,044 families, i.e., about 84 thousand, who migrated from
Turkey to the South Caucasus from 1829 to 1831, and most of them, five
thousand families, settled in Georgia, namely, in Akhaltsikhe city and its
surrounding regions.16 There were 12,100 who lived in Akhaltsikhe itself in
1832—2,475 local and 9,625 migrants from Ottoman state (9,608 Armenians and
17 Greeks). Migrants prevailed the local population 3.9 times.
A great part of Armenians migrated from Iran and Ottoman state from 1828
to 1830, settled in Yerevan (later Armenia) okrug (area), later Yerevan gubernia,
which was the greatest part of the territory of present-day Armenia. There were
15
Potto V. Caucasian War, IV, ed. p 484.
16
P. Gugushvili. Ethnic development of Georgia and Transcaucasus in the XIX-XX centuries, vol. 1,
Tbilisi, 1949, p 595.
82,377 Armenians who lived in 1832, in Armenia okrug (area)—among them:

57,226 were migrants, 35,560 from Iran and 21,666 from Ottoman state. The total
population of this region was 164,450. Armenians already were 50.1% of the
entire population of Armenia okrug (area), when four years prior, they did not
exceed 15% to 18% of the entire population.17 The amount of indigenous
Armenians in Armenia okrug (area) in 1832, was 25,151, and of Muslims, it was
82,073. Thus, Armenians were only 23.4% in the entire indigenous population
(without migrated Armenians). It should be mentioned that from 1828 to 1830, a
considerable part of Muslims preferred migration to Iran-Turkey to becoming
subjects of Russia (the same as Muslim Georgians in Samtskhe-Javakheti
historical province of Georgia). Before 1828, Muslims in Yerevan okrug (area)
made up a great majority. So, cardinal changes took place in the national and
religious structures of the area population. In the city of Yerevan proper, 11,463
people lived in 1832; there were 7,331 Muslims and 4,132 Armenians (36.0%). If
we do not take into consideration the migrant Armenians, then Armenians made
up 24.4% of the city population and Muslims made up 75.6%.
Later, the population of Armenia okrug (area), which became Yerevan
gubernia from 1850, kept increasing at the expense of both natural increase and
migration. In 1865, the gubernia population was already 437,719. There were
45,728 living in the gubernia cities, and 391,991 in mazras. Thus, the urban
population made up 10.4% of the gubernia population. By that period, the national
structure of Yerevan gubernia changed. Namely, 240 thousand Armenians (54%),
170 thousand Tatrs (Azerbaijanian Tatars, as Azerbaijanians were then called,
39%), 19 thousand Kurds and other nomads (4%), 8.2 thousand Russians
(2%),.400 Gypsies, and 45 Georgians lived in the gubernia.18
According to the lists compiled in 1886, there already lived in Yerevan
gubernia 670 thousand. Armenians made up 56.0% of the entire population of
gubernia, Azerbaijanians made up 37.4%. The rest population of the gubernia was
6.6%. There were 936,586 Armenians living in the South Caucasus (Tbilisi,
Kutaisi, Yerevan, Elizavetpol, Baku gubernias, and Kars area) in 1886.
According to the data of population census of 1897, there lived 1,173
thousand Armenians in the Russian Empire, among them the urban population—
23%. The majority of Armenians lived in the Caucasus—1,118 thousand and
made up 12% of the population of the Caucasus. In the North Caucasus, their
amount was comparatively less—31 thousand (0.9% of the population). The
remaining part of the Armenians, 1087 thousand, i.e., 19.5%, lived in the South
17
Ibid., p 600.
18
Collection of statistical evidences on Caucasus, vol. I, Tiflis, 1869, pp 5,7.
Caucasus; 20% of Armenians belonged to the urban population. Their center was
Yerevan gubernia, where 441 thousand Armenians lived (18.7% of the
population), in Elizavetpol gubernia their amount reached 293 thousand (33.3% of
the population), Tbilisi gubernia, 196 thousand (18.7% of the population); Baku
gubernia, 52 thousand (6.3% of the population). Forty-nine thousand Armenians
lived in the European part of Russia, mostly in the cities. There were registered
753 Armenians in St Petersburg, and 1,604 in Moscow in 1897.19
The cited data witness that Armenians that moved from Iran‘s Azerbaijan and
Ottoman state from 1828 to 1830, and the following years settled in gubernias and
okrugs (areas) of the Caucasus, also mostly in those cities of Russia‘s European
part, where they had earlier had their Armenian settlements. In the beginning, they
did not attach any importance to their settlement in Yerevan gubernia, because in
Yerevan and Elizavetpol gubernias, a majority of the population everywhere was
made up by Tatars (Azerbaijanians). Even more, while migrating from Iran‘s
Azerbaijan, they preferred to settle in Nagorny Karabakh, only because Nagorny
Karabakh was near to Iran‘s Azerbaijan.
Tatars (Azerbaijanians) made up a major part of the population in Yerevan
khanate, founded in 1604, by Abas I. Yerevan khans were Georgians. In the
second half of the XVIII century, Yerevan khanate was a vassal to strengthened
Kartl-Kakheti. Yerevan and its province were, in turn, in the hands of Turks,
Persians, and Georgians. According to the evidence of one of the witnesses, seven
Armenian churches and eight Muslim mosques were in Yerevan by 1878.20
Immigration of the Armenian population in East Armenia and the South
Caucasus became especially wide scale after the Russia-Ottoman war of 1877 to
1878. It‘s interesting that, within the present-day borders, the Armenian
population was 161.7 thousand in 1831 (in that period, migration of Armenians
due to the Russia-Iran 1826 to 1828 and the Russia-Ottoman 1828 to 1829 wars
was, in fact, finished). According to the data of all of Russia‘s population census,
conducted in 1897, the amount of the population of Armenia reached 798
thousand, and in 1913 it was more than one million. Thus, from 1831 to 1913 the
population of Armenia increased six times, when the population within the
borders of the Russian Empire increased 2.7 times.21 The amount of Armenians
considerably increased both in the South and the North Caucasus as a result of
mass immigration.
19
General code on the Empire of the result of elaborating the data of the first population census
conducted on 28 January 1897, vol. II, St Petersburg, 1905, p XV.
20
Gachinski I. Medical-topographic notes on the city of Yerevan. Jrnl. Meditsinski Sbornik, N 28,
Tiflis, 1878, pp 1, 3.
21
Khodjabekian V. Op. cit., pp 264-265.
In the period of the World War I, Armenia became the area of military
activities, to which were added epidemic and starvation. It became the source of
migration streams. The streams of migrants from Armenia moved to the North
Caucasus, Krasnodar, Stavropol, the Crimea, Don, and Rostov steppes via
Georgia. In the end of 1920, the population of Armenia was 720 thousand and
reduced by 280 thousand as compared with 1913.

Population of Armenia 1926 to 2001
During the first soviet population census—in December, 1926—the

population of Armenia was 881 (see table 36), and the amount of Armenians in
the Soviet Union was 1567.5 thousand. From this amount, 743.6 thousand, i.e.,
47.5% lived on the territory of their republic. This tendency was preserved within
the entire XX century. Not a single titled nation, living in the Soviet Union, lived
in such a small amount on its own territory. Only 66.7% of Armenians, living in
the Soviet Union in 1989, lived in Armenia, when among Georgians this indicator
was 95.1% and among Azerbaijanians it was 85.7%. In 1926, Armenians lived in
Georgia in great amounts (307 thousand), Azerbaijan (282 thousand) and the
North Caucasus (161 thousand).
The amount of the population of Armenia in the XX century, namely, from
1926 to 2001, increased from 881 thousand to 3,213 thousand, i.e., 3.60 times,
and of Armenians proper in their own republic—from 744 thousand to 3,145
thousand, i.e., 4.2 times. Such an increase in the amount of Armenians, along with
the high indicator of natural increase, also caused the condition that more than 200
thousand Armenians, living abroad in the soviet period, found shelter in Armenia.
In the period after the war of 1941 to 1945, many Armenians came from abroad to
live in Armenia.22 From 1962 to 1973, Armenia received 26,100 Armenians more
from abroad.23
Armenia is distinguished with monolithic character of the national structure.
According to the data of last census (2001), it became a mono-ethnic republic—
Armenians made up 97.9% of the entire republic. If, in 1989, the amount of other
nationalities, except Armenians, was 221 thousand, in 2001, the number of other
nationalities was 68 thousand, i.e., their amount reduced 3.3 times within a 12-
year period. It is true that due to well-known events, the situation was the same in
other republics, but in far less scales. Reduction of Azerbaijanians in Armenia
started at a high speed from 1979, and, at present, no Azerbaijanians live there
any longer. At the same time, the amount of Russians also reduced—from 70
thousand to 15 thousand, as well as the amount of Ukrainians, Assyrians, Greeks,
and Georgians that lived there in small amount.
Within the entire XX century, not to take into account the last years, a high
level of natural increase of the population was characteristic to the Republic of
Armenia, which was caused by a high level of childbirth and regular reduction of
mortality, and rapid growth of the urban population, as well.
In the 1990s, external migration processes became most intensive in Armenia,
especially to Russia. A great part of Armenians, living in the former union
republics, started moving to Russia to live. As a result, if in 1989, there lived in
Russia 532 thousand Armenians, in 2002, their amount was 1,130 thousand.24
22
Kovalev S,., Kovalskaya N. Geography of the USSR population. Moscow, 1980, p 145.
23
Imranli K. Formation of the Armenian state in Caucasus. Moscow, 2006, p 180.
24
General results of All Russia population census of 2006. Moscow, 2003, p 13.
Thus, more than one-third of Armenians living in the Republic of Armenia, i.e.,
36.0%, lived only in Russia.
Historically, migration of Armenians from Armenia to different countries
quite often was the result of aggression from the big states. The most large-scale
eviction of Armenians from their ethnic territories took place in 1915, during the
Armenian-Turkish conflict. By the different sources, this conflict sacrificed the
life of 1.5 to 2 million Armenians; about one million of them moved to different
countries. There were 300 thousand Armenians who found shelter in the Russian
Empire, mostly in the South Caucasus.
Re-settlement of Armenians from their own territories has a thousand-year
history. Like Jews, they lived in various world countries; therefore, it is too
difficult to determine their exact amount. It‘s not a serious mistake if we point that
at present, the amount of Armenians in the world at present is 7.5 to 8 million.
Chapter 7
POPULATION OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN

THE XX CENTURY AND THE BEGINNING OF
THE XXI CENTURY
VII.I. POPULATION OF ADYGEYA

There existed no national autonomies in Russia before the revolution of 1917.
In the first years after the revolution, many soviet republics were formed, which
soon were transformed into autonomous republics and regions or were abolished.
The Black Sea Soviet Republic was declared in Tuapse in March 1918, and in
April of the same year, the Kuban Soviet Republic—in Ekaterinograd (the present
Krasnodar). Both republics were within the Russian Federation. After that, in May
1918, both republics were united into one republic, which also involved the
territory populated by Adygeians. In 1920, the Adygeya regions separated as an
independent administrative unit, and on 27 July 1922, the Adygeya Autonomous
Region was formed on the territory populated with Adygeians in Krasnodar
region, which was called Adygeya-Circassian Autonomous Region from 24
August of the same year until 13 August 1928. In July 1991, Adygeya received
the status of a republic and was within the economic region of the North Caucasus
in the Russian Federation as the case is with the rest republics of the North
Caucasus.
The north part of the Republic of Adygeya occupies the plain of Kuban
region; the south part is located on the north-western territory of the Great
Caucasus. Its area is 7.6-thousand-square kilometers and is 0.04% of the Russian
Federation territory.
Adygeians, together with kindred Kabardinians and Circassians, are

descendants of Adygeis, the oldest natives of the Caucasus. In the XII to XIV
centuries, a part of Adyigeis moved to settle to the river Tergi (Terek) basin,
which is now the territory of Kabardinia. Another part of Adygeis remained in
Kuban and the Black Sea region, which are the direct ancestors of present-day
Adygeians. This group involved many tribes in the XIII to XIV centuries, namely,
Bzhedukhs, Abadzakhs, Shapsughs, Beslens, and other small-numbered tribes. At
present, no tribal division exists any longer. In 1830, the total amount of Adygeis
was 1,082 thousand, and the Shapsugh tribe was the most numerous—300
thousand.1 The self-name of western Adygeians is Adygeis, as well as of
Circassians and Kabardinians. Thus, Adygeians, Circassians, and Kabardinians
are people of the kin.
By the beginning of the XIX century, as in the previous centuries, indigenous
ethnic units of the North Caucasus were not a single body, neither separate,
centralized states. These units failed to reach political, socio-economic, and
cultural unification, which impeded them from embarking on the road to state
unification. That was why, while discussing the issues of Adygeya-Circassian,
Karachaev-Circassian, Kabardian-Balkar, North Ossetian, Chechen-Ingush and
Dagestan population in the XIX century, such a division is conventional.
According to the then-administrative division, ethnic units of the North Caucasus
mostly lived in Kuban, Tergi (Terek), and Dagestan regions. The last was within
the South Caucasus (Transcaucasus, as the South Caucasus was then called by
Russians) in the XIX century.
By the first half of the XIX century, the amount of Adygeis-Circassians in
northwest of the Caucasus, i.e., Adygeya-Circassia, in the opinion of majority of
scholars, fluctuated within 450 to 500 thousand. Along with them, there also
lived, in comparatively small numbers, Armenians, Jews, Nogaians, Greeks, and
Gypsies.2
The Russian Empire conducted big colonization in all of the North Caucasus
in the XIX century, both in the period of the Caucasus unification and the
Caucasian war. Many Cossack villages (stanitsas) were founded, and the Russian
officials received large land plots. Colonization was of an especially large scale in
Kuban region. In that period, the North Caucasian peoples migrated to Turkey in
great numbers, especially, Adygeians. Not a single representative of some of their
tribes has remained on the native land. Some hundred thousand migrated to
1
Georgian Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. I, p 93.
2
Essays on the history of North Caucasian peoples. Tbilisi, 1978, pp 5-6.
Population of the North Caucasus in the XX Century… 255
Turkey from the North Caucasus from 1859 to 1865, and a majority of them were
Adygeis-Circassians.
In the XIX century, the Caucasian statistics committee published time and
again information on the amount of highlanders and other Muslim peoples living
in the Caucasus. Due to most mixed characters of the ethnic groups and intensive
migration processes living there, exact specification of the ethnic structure of the
North Caucasus is too difficult. Quite often the data, released by the officials of
the statistical services, do not display a real picture and are contradictory. Even
then, they felt such irrelevance while determining the size of the North Caucasian
peoples. It is interesting from this viewpoint the note made by the editor in regard
to the statistical evidences published on the size of the Kuban region highlanders
and other Muslims: because migration to Turkey results in quick reduction of
Circassians and other Muslims living in the Kuban region, we publish data on the
amount of these peoples with special pleasure; the data were delivered to us by a
member of the Kuban region statistics committee, esaul (Cossack captain) K.
Felitsin. The information was collected in December 1883, and exceeds other
evidences with novelty and exactness.3 According to these evidences, 56,423
Adigeians lived in Maikop, Batalpashinsk, and Ekateringrad masras of Kuban
region in 1883. An average size of their family was 6.3 people. There were 20,471
people living in all these three mazras, and Adigeis were 62.4% of the entire
population.4
Migration of North Caucasian Muslim peoples to Turkey continued from
1870 to the 1880s as well, though in a smaller scale. There were 13,586 who
moved to Turkey from the Kuban region from 1871 to 1884, among them 11,417
Adygeians. They were 84.0% of the entire migrants to Turkey.5
A considerable amount of the North Caucasian Muslim peoples lived in the
Tergi (Terek) region, namely, 285,569 in 1867. Among them were Kabardinians
(Adygeis)—44 thousand, i.e., 15.4% of the entire population. There were 79.5
thousand who lived in the Kuban region in 1865, and among them about 45
thousand were Circassians (Adygeis).6
A total amount of Adygeis, according to the population census of 1897, has
considerably increased. It is mentioned in the census materials that ―among the
Circassian tribes (Shapasughs, Natukhaits, etc.), which call themselves Adygeis,
the first place by the size and culture is occupied by Kabardinians—98,561 …
3
Collection of data on Caucasus, vol. IX, 1885, p 51.
4
Ibid, pp 70-81.
5
Ibid, pp 98-99.
6
Collection of statistical information on Caucasus, vol. I, Tiflis, 1859, pp 27-31.
Their amount in the Tergi (Terek) region is 84,093, and they make up two-thirds
of the Nalchik mazra population. In the Kuban region, their amount is 14340 …
The other Circassian tribes do not exceed 46,286 in total. Contrary to
Kabardinians, a main part of these tribes is settled within the Kuban region
borders.‖7
Consequently, the total amount of Adygeis in 1897 reached 145 thousand.
The Adygeis-Circassian population occupied a vast territory. They often used to
move from one place to another, and the settlement borders of the Adygeis tribes
were being changed. In the XVIII and the first half of the XIX centuries, as a
result of intensive consolidation of the Adygeis tribes, some ethnic groups
completely disappeared.
The size of the Adygeis population kept permanently increasing (see table 37)
in the XX century, especially from 1926 to 1939, which was caused by not only a
natural increase of the population, but by the territorial changes of the region.
Still, in the period of forming the autonomous regions, they were forced to place
an administrative centre of several of them out of the region territory, namely, the
center of Adygeya-Circassian region—in Krasnodar, of North Ossetia and
Ingushetia—in Vladikavkaz, of Chechnya—in Grozno, separate regional centers
of Karachai and Kabardinia, correspondingly, in Kislovodsk and Pyatigorsk.
A new stage of administrative-territorial arrangement starts from 1928, when
Grozno joined the Chechnya autonomous region and Sunzhen okrug (area)
territory was separated from it. In 1931, a great part of Batalpashinsk region was
divided between Karachaev and Circassian autonomies. Rivalry for the city of
Vladikavkaz (from 1931—Orjonikidze) ended between North Ossetia and
Ingushetia from 1933 to 1934, by transferring it to North Ossetian autonomous
region and unification of Ingushetia with Chechnya, etc. In 1936, Giagin region, a
part of Masikop region, also the city of Maikop itself (which became an
administrative center of the region) were joined to Adygeya autonomous region.8
From 1926 to 1939, the population of Adygeya (was called Adygeya-
Circassia autonomous region in 1926) increased from 114 thousand to 242
thousand, and from 1926 to 2002, it increased to 447 thousand, i.e., 3.9 times. In
the same period, the amount of Agygeis increased from 51 thousand to 108
thousand, i.e., 2.1 times.
7
General code on the empire results of elaborating the data of the first general population census,
vol. II, St Petersburg, 1905, p XXVIII.
8
Tsitsiev A. Atlas of ethno-political history of Caucasus (1774-2004). Moscow, 2006, p 73

Population of Adygeya from 1926 to 2002
Rapid increase of the Adygeya population was also caused by the

immigration of Russians in the region from 1926 to 1939, and, as we have already
mentioned, joining of those territories to Adygeya, where Russians lived in great
amounts. That was the reason for the 5.7-time growth in the amount of Russians
in that period. From 1970 to 2002, the population of Adygeya and Adygeians
increased at a slow rate—correspondingly, by 15.8% and 31.7%. The amount of
Russians and Adygeians together made up 88.6% of the entire population. The
third place was occupied by Armenians, at 3.4%. Their amount increased from 10
thousand to 15 thousand from 1989 to 2002.
The indicators of demographic development of the Republic of Adygeya are
low, which is caused by the greatest share of Russians (71.7% of the entire
population in 1970, and 64.4% in 2002). The childbirth rate in Russians is far
lower than among the North Caucasian peoples.
Noisy debates are recently ongoing in the Republic of Adygeya on its joining
to Krasnodar region, which surrounds the Adygeya territory. The supporters of
abolishing the special status of Agygeya mention that it is an artificial formation,

which is favorable for the elite only. In the opinion of their opponents,
abolishment of Adygeya would destroy a unique shelter for Circassians. Adygeis,
Kabardinians, and Circassians, which are united under a common name of
―Circassians,‖ constitute one of the largest ethnic groups of the North Caucasus.
Naturally, to raise this issue was, first of all, caused by a demographic factor.
Adygeis now make up 24.2% of the population of their republic, and Russians
make up 64.4%. In 1926, this indicator was 44.7% and 26.3%, respectively. At
the same time, there is no mass return stream of Russians from the republic. The
amount of Russians in the entire population reduced only by 2.0% according to
the official statistics from 1989 to 2002. It is the lowest indicator as compared
with other republics of the North Caucasus. The Adygeian language is on the
verge of extinction, which is most important. Only from 5% to 10% of Adygeis
can speak their native language fluently, according to the data of the questioning.
The statement, made by the President of Adygeya, says: ―Adygeya has been
formed as the autonomy of Adygeya people for preserving their language, culture,
and traditions and for forming the potentials for realizing national requirements
through the state institutions … Adygeya would never be a colony (of
Krasnodar).‖ In the opinion of Krasnodar governor, ―this issue is too complicated.
The people of the region should decide whether to unite or not.‖9
VII.II. POPULATION OF KARACHAEV-CIRCASSIA

Karachaev-Circassia was formed on 12 January 1922, as Karachaev-
Circassian autonomous region. On 26 April 1926, it was divided into two parts:
Karachaev autonomous region and Circassian national okrug (area). The latter
was called an autonomous region from April 1928. Karachaev autonomous region
was abolished in 1943. A united Karachaev-Circassian region was formed in
1957, within Stavropol, and it got the status of a region in July 1991.
The republic is located on the northern slope of Great Caucasus, in the north-
western part of the Caucasus. Its territory comprises 14.1-thousand-square
kilometers, and is 0.1% of the territory of the Russian Federation. The ancestors
of Karachaevs and Circassians have lived on the territory of Karachaev-Circassia
since time immemorial. Karachaevs belong to the Turkish-speaking ethnic group
as well as their kindred Balkarians. In fact, they are one people. But they have no
common national self-consciousness, which is caused by their territorial
9
War and peace in Caucasus. The institute on highlighting war and peace. London, pp 23-24.
disconnection. Karachaevs and Balkarians live around the Ialbuzi Mountain and
the Ialbuzi Mountain divides them from each other. The Karachaev-Balkarian
language belongs to the Qipchak group of the Turkish languages.
It is mentioned in the specialist literature that in the place of Karachaevs
settlement there lived, firstly, Alans of the Iranian kin. Like the other Caucasian
peoples, they often changed their places of settlement—they settled in the gorge
of the river Kuban, then in the Baksan gorge. Among the considerations expressed
by the scholars, we should share the one, according to which Karachaevs (and
Balkars), ethnic unity has not been established before Mongols and formation and
establishment of Karachaevs ethnic group is connected with appearance and
campaigns of Mongols. These campaigns resulted in the establishment of the
Turkish-speaking tribes in the central part of the North Caucasus and the
formation of a new Karachaev ethnic group caused by merging with the local
peoples.10 The local Caucasian peoples and the Iranian- and Turkish-speaking
tribes, which came there, participated in the ethnogenesis of Karachaevs in
general. Though Karachaevs and Balkars are the same people, in fact, the Soviet
power united them into different territorial-administrative units and, consequently,
with different peoples—Karachaevs with Circassians and Balkars with
Kabardinians.
So, formation of Karachaev-Circassian autonomous region has not been done
by the national mark. The unification, mostly, was on the basis of socio-economic
mark. In 1926, division of the autonomy was conducted by the national sign:
Karachaev autonomous area, Circassian national area, and Russian Batalpashin
region. When the formation of national autonomies is mostly based on the
economic arguments, then formation of such autonomies becomes senseless.
Despite this, in 1957, Karachaevs and Circassians were united again, and the
autonomous area was formed again with the initial name.
The population of Karachaev-Circassia by the beginning of the XIX century,
according to incomplete evidences, equaled about half a million.11 In that period,
epidemic of the plague spread in Karachaev and a great part of the population
died. In the end of the XVIII and the beginning of the XIX centuries, the Russian
population established on the Karachaev-Circassia territory, and they formed quite
big villages there.
The population living on the territory of Karachaev-Circassia considerably
reduced from 1858 to 1864, as a result of migration to Turkey. As we have
mentioned above, this touched Adygeis-Circassians most of all, but Karachaevs
10
R. Topchishvili. Ethnography of the peoples of Caucasus. Tbilisi, 2007, p 125.
11
R. Topchishvili. Op. cit., pp 12-13.
moved to Turkey in great amounts and also Nogaians living in abundance in

Karachaev-Circassia in that period.
According to the population census of 1897, the amount of Karachaevs was
27,223, and they lived in the upper gorge of the river Kuban and Batalpashin area
of the Kuban region.
In the XX century, the change in the size of and national structure of the
population in Karachaev-Circassia is characterized by certain features (see table
38).
These peculiarities are connected with the territorial changes and migration
processes, especially from 1926 to 1939. In this period, the amount of Russians
increased 60 times, which is connected just with these changes. The region was
mostly settled with Karachaevs and Circassians, also Abazs and Nogaians. Abazs
are kindred people to Abkhazs. Their ancestors settled on the north-eastern
coastline of the Black Sea. In the I millennium, there was a process of merging of
the Abkhaz tribes and Abazs, but, finally, their merging failed. Abazs have lived
on the present-day territory since the XIV century, though they often changed the
places of their settlements and have not had a determined area of settlement. After
the end of the Caucasian war, a great part of Abazs moved to Turkey—about 30
thousand. The majority of them merged with Abkhazs and Adygeis. At present,
they live, except Karachaev-Circassia, in small numbers in Adygeya and
Kabardian-Balkaria.
Nogaians are Turkish-speaking people of the North Caucasus, and they were
formed as an ethnic group before they came there. They are descendants of
different Turkish and Mongol tribes of the Gold Horde and mostly of Turkish-
speaking Qipchaks. The name of Nogaians comes from the name of Gold Horde
ruler Nogai (the XIII century). As it seems, Nogaians appeared in the North
Caucasus in the XV century, and they mostly led nomadic lives in all of the North
Caucasus. Since the end of the XVIII century, before the end of the Caucasian
war, Nogaians moved to Turkey several times. The total amount of migrants is
determined as 180 thousand. At present, Nogaians live in the greatest amount in
Dagestan (38 thousand).
From 1926 to 2002, the population of Karachaev-Circassia increased from
102 thousand to 439 thousand, i.e., 4.3 times, and the amount of Karachaevs and
Circassians—from 68 thousand to 219 thousand, i.e., 3.2 times. It should be
mentioned that Karachaevs exceeded Circassians three and more times. Russians
lived in great amounts in the republic. From 1939 to 1989, they were far more in
number than Karachaevs and Circassians together, and in separate years, they
Population of Karachaev-Circussia from 1926 to 2002
Years 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002
Karachai Circassia Karachai Circassia

POPULATION–total
Absolute thousand 65 37 150 93 278 345 367 415 439
% 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
KARACHAYEVS
Absolute thousand 53 _ 70 1 68 97 109 130 169
% 81,8 46,8 1,0 24,4 28,1 29,7 31,3 38,5
CIRCASSIANS
Absolute thousand _ 15 _ 16 24 31 34 40 50
% 40,6 17,2 8,7 9,0 9,3 9,6 11,4
RUSSIANS
% 1,5 2,7 43,0 58,0 51,0 47,0 45,2 43,4 13,7
ABAZGS
% 4,6 29,7 2,6 10,8 6,5 6,6 6,6 6,6 7,3
NOGAIANS
Absolute thousand _ 6 1 6 9 11 12 13 15
% 16,2 0,5 6,5 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,1 3,4
THE REST
% 12,3 10,8 7,1 6,5 6,2 6,1 6,0 7,0 5,7
even made up half of the population. In 2002, the amount of Russians, as

compared with 1989, reduced by 28 thousand and made up 148 thousand (33.7%
of the population). Despite this reduction, Russians still lived in great amounts in
Karachaev-Circassia—each third of the inhabitants of the republic is a Russian.
Abazs and Nogaians kept increasing in comparatively lower rates, and their
amount in 2002, was 32 thousand and 15 thousand, respectively.
VII.III. POPULATION OF KABARDIAN-BALKARIA

The Kabardian autonomous region was formed in 1921; and in 1922, the
Kabardian-Balkar autonomous region. In 1936, it was transformed into the
autonomous republic. It was called Kabardian autonomous republic as a result of
resettlement of Balkars to the Middle Asia in 1944. In 1957, the national
autonomy of Balkars was restored, and the Kabardian autonomous republic was
again transformed into the Kabardian-Balkar autonomous republic. In January
1991, it received the status of republic.
The republic is located in the central part of the Caucasus northern slope and
Kabardian lowland. Its territory involves 12-thousand-square kilometers and is
0.1% of the Russian Federation territory. The highest peak of the Caucasus—
Ialbuzi (5,642 m)—is in Kabardian-Balkaria.
A part of Agygeis received the name of Kabardinians from the XIII to XIV
centuries and settled on the territory of the present-day Kabardian-Balkaria. The
historical sources generally mention the territories from the east Black Sea area to
Chechen-Ingushetia as Circassia, which is divided by then into two parts
conventionally—West Circassia and Kabardinia. As for Balkars, as we have
mentioned above, the Balkar people were formed as a result of merging of the
North Caucasian and Alan tribes with Qipchaks. Kabardinians joined Russia in
1557, while with Balkars, the same process finished in 1827.
Within the XX century, namely from 1926 to 2002, the population of
Kabardian-Balkaria increased rapidly—then 4.4 times, Kabardians proper—4.1
times, and Balkars—3.2 times (see table 39). Thus, the comparative indicators of
the population dynamics, rates of growth, are quite high. Correspondingly, the
rates of increase are also high. The rate of the republic entire population increase
in this period was 342.0%, with Kabardinians at 310.0% and Balkarians at
220.0%. The rate of increase was especially high among the Russian population.
In the same period, an absolute increase of Russians was 212 thousand (from 15
thousand, it grew up to 227 thousand), and the rate of increase was 1,413.0%. At
the same time, the amount of Ukrainians reduced twice (from 127 thousand to 8
thousand), and of Ossets increased 2.5 times (from 4 thousand to 10 thousand).
Table 39. Size and National Structure of

Kabardian-Balkaria from 1926 to 2002
In separate periods of the XX century, the rates of population growth differed.

It should be mentioned that the amount of Balkars reduced by 7 thousand from
1939 to 1959. This was caused by the results of the war with Germans (1941 to
1945) and deportations of Balkars to the Middle Asian republics. In 2002,
Kabardinians formed 55.3% of the entire population of the republic, and Balkars
formed 11.6%; when in 1926, the analogous indicator was 60.0% and 16.1%. The
situation was caused by the growth of the Russian population, which now makes
up 25.1% of the entire population of the republic, despite reduction of the years of
1989 to 2002.
Great amounts of Turks (8,770), Armenians (5,342), Koreans (4,722),
Chechens (4,241), Tatars (2,851), Germans (2,525), Gypsies (2,357), Georgians
(1,731) and the representatives of other nationalities also lived in comparatively
great number in Kabardian-Balkaria in 2002, in addition to the nationalities
mentioned above.
VII.IV. POPULATION OF NORTH

OSSETIA-ALANIA REPUBLIC
The Republic of North Ossetia-Alania is located on the north slope of the
Caucasus. Its territory involves eight-thousand-square kilometers and is 0.05% of
the Russian Federation territory.
In 1921, the autonomous soviet socialist republic of mountain peoples was
formed on the territory of the former Tergi (Terek) region and part of Kuban
(Karachai), in the Russian Federation. It lasted three years. Its capital was
Vladikavkaz. In 1921, Ossetioan okrug (area) was formed within it without any
prefix ―North.‖1 We have mentioned above how artificially and illegally South
Ossetian autonomous region was formed in Georgia in 1922. So we won‘t
continue discussing this issue any further. We would only point that before the
formation of North Ossetian autonomy, the territory of Ossetia was mentioned in
the Russian and foreign encyclopedias not as North Ossetia, but under the name of
Ossetia, and Ossets were said to live also in Georgia. Kabardian, Karachaev,
Chechen, and Balkarian regions were gradually separated from the autonomous
republic of mountain peoples from 1921, and they were transformed into the
autonomous region of the Russian Federation. On 7 July 1924, the autonomous
republic of mountain peoples was abolished, and the autonomous region of
Ingushetia was founded on its territory, and instead Ossetia—the autonomous
region of North Ossetia, as there already existed in Georgia, though illegally, the
region under the name of South Ossetia. This witnessed existence of two
Ossetias—one in the North Caucasus (North Ossetia) and the other in Georgia
(South Ossetia). Vladfikavkaz separated as an independent unit and was subject to
the central executive committee of the Russian Federation.
In 1936, the North Ossetian autonomous region was transformed into an
autonomous republic. In December 1990, the autonomous republic of Ossetia
received the status of a republic within the Russian Federation.
At the level of encyclopedic knowledge, formation of the Ossetian people
started from the VIII to VII centuries B.C., when Scythian-Sarmatian-Alan tribes
appeared in the Caucasus and which mixed with the aboriginal population of the
Caucasus, making their linguistic assimilation.
According to the 1897 Russian Empire population census data, 171,716
Ossets lived in the Russian Empire, from this amount, 96,621 lived in Tergi
(Terek) region (mostly the territory of the present-day North Ossetia), and 71,508
lived in Georgia.2 According to these data, it seems, at the first glance, as if Ossets
have lived from time immemorial in Georgia, as well as in North Ossetia. But if
we look through the data in dynamics, the picture is quite different.
According to the Brockhaus and Effron encyclopedia 46,802 Ossets lived in
the North Caucasus (the present-day territory of North Ossetia) in 1860, and
19,324 lived in Georgia.3 So, in that period, 2.5 times more Ossets lived in the
present-day territory of North Ossetia than in Georgia. According to the same
encyclopedia, by the 1833-year data, 347,750 Ossets lived in the Russian Empire,
and, if we take into consideration the proportion mentioned above, then the mount
of Ossets in Georgia in 1833, was 14 thousand. According to another source data,
14 thousand Ossets lived in Georgia in that period.4 With the aim of clarifying the
issue, it is important to mention that the plague epidemic raged on the territory of
the present-day North Ossetia from the 80s of the XVIII century to the 20s of the
XIX century, as a result of which, the amount Ossets reduced much, namely, from
200 thousand to 20 thousand by the year of 1831.5 Thus, it may be said for sure
that in the 80s of the XIII century, 20 times more Ossets lived on the territory of
the present-day North Ossetia than in Georgia. According to numerous Georgian
written sources, and the works of renowned Russian, foreign, or Ossetian scholars
themselves, Ossets started migration from North Osssetia to Georgia, namely, to
its historical part, Kartli highlands from the XVII century, due to the most
1
Soviet encyclopedic dictionary. 1983, p 1180.
2
General code on the empire of the results of elaborating the data of the first all-union population
census… vol. II, pp 42-43.
3
Encyclopedic dictionary, vol. XXII, St Petersburg, 1897, p 263.
4
The newsp. Tifliskie Novosti, N 72, 1830.
difficult economic terms and oppression from Kabardinians. This is also

witnessed by archaeological data, linguistic material, Ossetian folklore,
monuments of Shida Kartli highland architecture, epigraphic, and toponyms.
The migration of a small part of the population from one country to
neighboring or other countries often took place in the previous centuries and often
takes place even now, but neither migrants demand autonomy, nor the authorities
of other countries have an idea to form autonomy for the immigrants. The Soviet
Russia decided to annex independent Georgia and fulfilled its decision in 1921.
To conceal its real intention, Russia has arranged several times a revolt against the
authorities of Georgia, based on the separatist Ossetian forces living in Georgia
(it, itself actually formed separatist forces) to justify entrance of their armed
forces for assisting the rebels. Just in return for this, the Soviet Russia formed an
autonomous region for Ossets living in Georgia. Formation of an autonomous unit
meant putting a delayed-action bomb in Georgia, which Russia used quite well
once more after a century against independent Georgia, and thus caused great
tragedy to both Georgian and Ossetian peoples.
The reduction of Ossets in the North Caucasus in the XIX century was to
some extent caused by migration of Ossets to Turkey. Compared with other
mountain peoples of the Caucasus, Ossets settled in Turkey in small numbers.
This was caused by Ossets mostly being Christians, living comparatively quite far
from Turkey, and not participating in the Caucasian war. Despite this, during the
greatest wave of migration, from 1859 to 1865, three thousand Ossets migrated
from the North Caucasus to Turkey.6
The population of North Ossetia considerably increased in the XX century,
from 1926 to 2002, from 152 thousand to 710 thousand, i.e., 4.7 times (see table
40). The amount of Ossets proper increased from 128 thousand to 445 thousand,
i.e., 3.5 times. The higher level of the entire population increase rate (350.0%)
compared to the Ossets‘ increase rate (250.0%) was caused by rapid growth of the
amount of Russians. In the mentioned period, Russians increased from 10
thousand to 165 thousand, i.e., 16.5 times (the increase rate was 1,550.0%). In
separate periods, the highest growth rate of both the entire population amount and
according to the nationalities was in 1926 to 1939. This situation was caused by
the condition that Vladikavkaz was not in North Ossetia during the population
census of 1926, and it, as we have mentioned, was a separate unit and became the
capital of North Ossetia later. According to the population census of 1926, the
population of Vladikavkaz was 78 thousand, from this amount Russians were 40
5
Essays on the history of the North Caucasian peoples, section II, p 15.
6
thousand, Ossets were 11 thousand, Armenians were 6.5 thousand, Georgians

were 5 thousand, Ingushs were 1.5 thousand, and the rest population were 14
thousand.7 Thus, the growth of Russians in the mentioned period, resulted from on
the one part, migration of Russians to North Ossetia, and on the other, joining of
the territories settled with Russians to North Ossetia.

Population of North Ossetia-Alania from 1926 to 2002
Years 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002
POPULATION–total
% 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
OSSETS
% 84,2 50,5 47,8 48,7 50,5 53,0 62,7
RUSSIANS
% 6,6 37,1 39,6 36,6 33,9 29,9 23,2
INGUSHS
Absolute thousand _ 6 6 18 24 33 21
% 1,8 1,4 3,3 4,0 5,2 3,0
ARMENIANS
Absolute thousand _ 9 12 13 13 14 17
% 2,7 2,7 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,4
KUMUKHS
Absolute thousand _ _ 4 7 7 10 13
% 0,9 1,2 1,3 1,5 1,8
GEORGIANS
% 0,6 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,5
THE REST
% 8,6 6,1 5,8 6,1 6,2 6,3 5,4
The population of North Ossetia-Alania republic increased in the period of

last population census (1989 to 2002)—from 633 thousand to 710 thousand. The
amount of Ossets increased more noticeably—from 335 thousand to 445
7
Peoples and native language of the USSR population, IV, Moscow, 1928, p 72.
thousand, which was caused by the conflict that took place in ―South Ossetia;‖
certain amount of Ossets migrated from Georgia to North Ossetia. In the same
period, the amount of Ingushs reduced (from 33 thousand to 21 thousand) due to
the conflict between Ossets and Ingushs; little increase was noticed in the amount
of Armenians (from 14 thousand to 17 thousand) and of Kumukhs (from 10
thousand to 13 thousand); the amount of Georgians reduced by one thousand,
making up 11 thousand.
Ukrainians (5 thousand), Chechens (3.4 thousand), Kabardinians (3
thousand), Turks (2.8 thousand), Azerbaijanians (2.4 thousand), Greeks (2.3
thousand), Tatars (2.1 thousand), Koreans (1.8 thousand), Gypsies (1.5 thousand),
and a small amount of representatives of more than 100 different nationalities also
lived in the republic of North Ossetia-Alania.
VII.V. POPULATION OF CHECHNYA AND INGUSHETIA

Chechen-Ingushetia joined the Autonomous Republic of Mountain Peoples on
20 January 1921. On 30 November 1922, there was formed the Autonomous
Region of Chechnya, and, on 7 July 1924, the Automous Region of Ingushetia
within the Russian Federation was formed, which on 15 January 1934, united into
the Autonomous Region of Chechnya-Ingushetia. On 5 December 1936, the
autonomous region was transformed into the autonomous republic. In 1944, the
Autonomous Republic of Chechnya-Ingushetia was abolished because of
deportations of Chechens and Ingushs to the Middle Asia and Kazakhstan by the
soviet state. In 1957, they were brought back to their native places, and the
national autonomy was restored. It should be mentioned that when the Ingushs
returned to the Prigorodni region, where they lived before deportation in a great
amount, it had already been fully settled by Ossets—the authorities gave this
place to Ossets to settle there. There was also conducted repression of Ingush
toponyms—the Ingush toponyms were replaced with the Ossetian, namely, the
Pshedahski, Nazranovski, and Achalukski regions were named Alanski, Kosta
Khetagurovski and Nartovski, respectively. In general, in analogous cases, the
North Caucasian peoples were given their land plots and property back when they
returned from exile. The soviet power left the Prigorodni region to the Republic of
North Ossetia, which became the reason for conflict between Ingushs and Ossets.
Ossets appropriated the land plots and houses of Ingushs.
In 1992, the autonomous republic of Chechnya-Ingushetia separated from
each other, and both received the status of an autonomous republic within the
Russian Federation. At present, they are subjects of Russia. Until 1992, the
territory of Chechnya-Ingushetia was 19.3-square-kilometers and occupied 0.1%

of the territory of the Russian Federation. Both republics are located on north
slopes of the Kavkasioni (the Caucasus).
Chechens and Ingushs are old, local indigenous peoples of the Caucasus.
From the XV to XVI centuries, they started to come to the lowlands, on the valley
of the river Tergi (Terek) and its tributaries, though Chechens lived in the North
Caucasian lowland earlier, as well, and their settlement in the highlands is caused
mostly by Mongols‘ raids. The area of Chechens and Mongols settlement was
often changed, sometimes as a result of persecution of neighboring peoples.
According to the evidences preserved in the Georgian written sources, King
Saurmag of Kartli took a great amount of Chechens to his country and settled
them on the vast territory of the North Caucasus. It is known that Georgians called
Chechens and Ingushs ―Kists,‖ some time earlier, Durdzukns, and the country,
Durdzuketi (country of Durdzuks). According to the XI century Georgian
chronicler Leonti Mroveli, in the III century B.C., King Saurmag of Kartli brought
an important amount of Durdzuks, because the number of people in this country
increased much and they had ―no places to live.‖ He gave them ―the place to live
in the highland region, from Didoeti to Egrisi, which is Svaneti.‖8Thus, Saurmag
settled Durdzuks in entire the North Caucasus.
The North Caucasian peoples often changed the area of their settlements, and
Chechens and Ingushs were not an exception. Sometimes, surely, it was made by
compulsion. After Chechens and Ingushs came from the highlands to live in the
lowland regions, their living conditions were improved—they had far better
conditions for development of farming and improving their living conditions, and
consequently, for reproduction of the population. The amount of Chechens and
Ingushs was about 218 thousand by the beginning of the XIX century.9
Chechnya-Ingushetia was under Russia‘s protection from the 80s of the XVIII
century. Despite this, Russia conducted colonial policy towards them. In the XIX
century, the Russian army, more than once, suppressed in blood liberation
movement of Chechens and Ingushs, annihilated their auls (villages). In 1834,
theocratic power was formed on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan—
Shamil‘s emirate. The lives of numerous people were sacrificed in the struggle of
the Russian army against him. By 1841, the majority of Chechnya lowland auls
were burned down. Chechens and Dagestanians were defeated in this long
struggle in 1859. After that, about 20 thousand Chechens and Ingushs migrated to
8
Kartlis Tskhovreba, vol. I, p 27.
9
the Empire of Turkey, along with other peoples of the North Caucasus.10 As a
result of this, within one century, the amount of Chechens and Ingushs increased a
little; in 1897, Chechens were 226.4 thousand and Ingushs were 47.4 thousand.
Table 41. Size and National Structure of

Chechnya and Ingushetia from 1926 to 2002
Chechens and Ingushs, especially, differ among the peoples of the North
Caucasus by natural increase. This caused a high rate of the population growth in
their republics in the XX century (see table 41). It should be mentioned that from
1926 to 2002, the population of Chechnya increased from 310 thousand to 1,104
thousand, i.e., 3.6 times, and of Ingushetia—from 75 thousand to 467 thousand,
10
R. Topchishvili. Ethnography of the Caucasian peoples, p 72.
i.e., 6.2 times. In the same period, Chechens increased by 741 thousand and
became 1,032 thousand, and Ingushs increased by 291 thousand and their amount
in 2002, was 361 thousand. The rate of Ingushs increase was 415.7 thousand.
As we have mentioned above, during the population census of 1926, the city
of Grozni was a separate unit and then became the capital of Chechnya-
Ingushetia. In 1818, it was built under the name of Russian fortress Groznaya,
when the Sunji defense line was constructed and from 1869, it was a city. Ninety-
seven thousand lived in Grozni in 1926, and a great majority of the population—
68 thousand (70.1%)—were Russians. The amount of Chechens was two
thousand (2.1%) in Grozni the same year, and no Ingushs lived in the city at all.11
If we discuss the amount of Chechens and Ingushs in dynamics, we‘ll see that
from 1939 to 1959, their amount considerably reduced, especially, of Ingushs—
their amount reduced nearly by half. This was caused by the war of 1941 to 1945,
and deportation of Chechens and Ingushs to the Middle Asia and Kazakhstan,
which took away many lives. The population census of 1959 showed that not all
Chechens and Ingushs had returned to their dwelling places from exile yet.
In Chechnya, and especially Ingushetia, only Russians lived in great amount,
along with the indigenous population. In 1959, Russians made up nearly half of
the entire population of Chechnya-Ingushetia (49.0%). From 1970, their amount
considerably reduced, especially after the ethno-political conflict in Chechnya. In
2002, only five thousand Russians lived in Ingushetia, and 41 thousand lived in
Chechnya, and as compared with 1970, when their amount reduced by 321
thousand. It should be mentioned that Russians, neither by absolute nor by
comparative indicators, have lived in any republics of the North Caucasus, though
everywhere their amount vividly reduces. Thus, Russia keeps gradually losing an
important demographic factor for preserving its influence, for which it took great
care when was forming national autonomies.
VII.VI. POPULATION OF DAGESTAN

The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Dagestan was formed on 20
January 1921. It was transformed into a republic in 1991, as the subject of the
Russian Federation. The Republic of Dagestan is located in the eastern part of the
North Caucasus. By the size of its territory and population, it is the largest among
the North Caucasus republics. The area of its territory involves 50.3-thousand-
square kilometers and 0.3% of the Russian Federation territory, and 45.0% of the
11
Peoples and native language of the USSR population, IV, p 72.
North Caucasian republics. According to the amount of its population, it is 1.8%

of the Russian Federation population, and 38.8% of the North Caucasian
population. It is interesting to mention that in 2002, the territory of the North
Caucasus (we point once more that under the North Caucasus, we mean national
republics of the North Caucasian peoples—Adygeis, Karachaians, Circassians,
Kabardinians, Balkars, Ossets, Chechens, Ingushs and Dagestan peoples) was
0.65% of the Russian territory and by the population, it was 4.6%.
About 30 peoples and ethnic groups live at present in Dagestan. The most
numerous among them are Avarss (758 thousand), Dargins (426 thousand),
Kumyks (366 thousand), Lezghins (337 thousand), Lacktsis (140 thousand),
Tabassarans (110 thousand), Nogaians (38 thousand), Rutulians (24 thousand),
Aguls (23 thousand), and Tsakhurs (8 thousand). There also live in Dagestan,
Russians (121 thousand), Azerbaijanians (112 thousand), Chechens (88 thousand),
and representatives of other nationalities (25 thousand). Dagestan peoples are the
oldest population of their republics. Their amount was far earlier, but later
Dagestan small-numbered peoples, were mostly ascribed to Khundzs and Dargins;
Dagestan peoples were enlarged. We have talked quite much about these issues
above.
In the beginning of the XIX century, the Russia-Iran war of 1804 to 1813
finished by Gulistan peace treaty. Iran recognized Dagestan‘s entrance within
Russia, and thus Dagestan‘s joining to Russia was legally formed. Before that, at
the end of the XVIII century, 10 comparatively large political units and about 60
so-called free societies were on the territory of Dagestan. Implementation of the
tsarist colonial policy, which began in Dagestan after its joining to Russia, caused
powerful liberty movement of mountain peoples headed by Shamil, which was
suppressed in 1859. Dagestan‘s demographic loss was great in this struggle. The
Dagestan region was formed in 1860, within Transcaucasus (the South Caucasus).
A comparatively small amount of the population left Dagestan for Turkey in the
XIX century.
The indicators of the population‘s natural increase in Dagestan were
favourable within entire XX century, for the population reproduction (see table
42). From 1926 to 2002, the population of Dagestan increased from 788 thousand
to 2,576 thousand, i.e., 3.3 times, the Dagestan peoples proper increased from 546
thousand to 2,230 thousand, i.e., 4.1 times. Among Dagestan peoples, this growth
was the biggest among Khundzs, from 139 thousand to 758 thousand (5.5 times).
This was caused not only by the natural increase of Khundzs, but also by the
condition that during the population censuses, small-numbered peoples of
Dagestan were ascribed to Khundzs.
Russians lived in the greatest amount (121 thousand, 4.7% of the population)
in the republic after Dagestan peoples. It should be mentioned that they have
never been more than 20% in the entire population of Dagestan, which is the
lowest indicator in the North Caucasian republics. The amount of Azerbaijanians
and Chechens increased considerably in Dagestan. The rate of their increase from
1926 to 2002 was 3,900,000% and 300%, respectively.

Population of Dagestan from 1926 to 2002
Years 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002

POPULATION –
total 788 930 1063 1428 1628 1802 2576
Absolute thousand 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
%
DAGESTAN
PEOPLES 546 688 736 1061 1267 1444 2230
%
1. AVARS
% 17.6 24.8 22.5 24.5 25.7 27.5 29.4
2. DARGINS
Absolute Thousand 109 15o 148 208 247 280 426
% 13.8 16.2 13.9 14.6 15.2 15.6 16.5
3. KUMYKS
% 11.2 10.8 11.4 11.8 12.4 12.9 14.2
4. LEZGHINS
% 11.5 10.4 10.3 11.4 11.6 11.3 13.1
5. LACKTSIS
% 5.1 5.5 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.4
6.
TABASSARANS 32 33 34 53 72 78 110
%
7. NOGAIANS
% 3.3 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5
Years 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002

8. RUTULIANS
Absolute thousand 10 7 12 14 15 24
% 1.3 - 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0
9.AGULS
Absolute thousand 8 - 6 9 11 14 23
% 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
10. TSAKHURS
Absolute thousand 4 - 4 4 5 5 8
% 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
RUSSIANS
% 12.5 14.3 20.1 14.7 11.6 0.2 4.7
AZERBAJANIANS
% 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.3
CHECHENS
% 2.8 2.8 1.2 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4
THE REST
% 12.5 5.6 5.8 4.4 3.6 3.2 1.0
Note: The amount of Dagestan peoples, namely, Rutulians, Aguls, and Tsakhurs in 1939,
was 30 thousand, i.e., 2.2% of entire Dagestan population.
INDEX
anthropological, 100
A anthropology, 99
apartheid, 77
Abkhazia, vii, 8, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 41, 50,
apathy, 85, 220
74, 79, 81, 84, 85, 88, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100,
application, 67, 69
101, 102, 103, 104, 118, 120, 125, 201,
Arabs, 2, 18, 19, 24, 25, 86, 148, 245
202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 211,
argument, 65
221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226
armed conflict, 71, 72, 74, 84, 105, 119, 120,
adults, 166, 167
171, 173, 183, 186, 196, 211
Adygei, viii, 100, 101, 191
armed forces, 59, 65, 87, 88, 94, 97, 98, 106,
Africa, 3, 9, 55, 87, 107, 117
209, 266
afternoon, 233
Army, 56, 58, 60, 62, 69, 76, 93, 204, 211,
aggression, 72, 204, 251
233
aging, 43, 166, 167, 168, 171, 173, 187, 188,
artistic, 220
199, 213
Asia, vii, 1, 18, 21, 23, 31, 53, 65, 66, 67, 68,
agricultural, 5, 12, 53, 66, 75, 90, 101, 159,
72, 74, 76, 77, 78, 82, 83, 84, 112, 146,
224
262, 268, 271
agriculture, 5, 9, 27, 148, 159
Asian, 20, 33, 38, 51, 109, 119, 173, 264
aid, 39, 61
Asian countries, 109
Albania, 17, 18, 19, 86, 117
assimilation, 30, 32, 144, 150, 265
Albanians, 18, 19, 20, 24, 234
attacks, 25, 50, 62, 64, 85, 88, 105, 107, 231
alcohol, 176
attitudes, 77, 216
allies, 56
Austria, 220
alternative, 83
authority, 83
anatomy, vii
autonomy, 71, 78, 88, 93, 94, 203, 226, 230,
animals, 112, 176
258, 259, 262, 264, 266, 268
annihilation, 12, 25, 26, 55, 72, 117, 150, 155
aviation, 87, 106
anomalous, 175
Azerbaijanians, 1, 20, 29, 84, 87, 113, 134,
138, 142, 198, 212, 213, 235, 237, 238,
276 Index
239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 247, 248, Caspian, 1, 2, 18, 82, 83, 88, 162, 232, 233,
250, 268, 272, 273 234
Caspian Sea, 1, 2, 18, 82, 83, 162, 232
catastrophes, 74
B catholic, 74
Catholics, 242
babies, 44, 84
cats, 176
BAL, 128, 161, 163, 170, 172, 191
cattle, 5, 9, 21, 27, 176
Balkars, vii, 28, 31, 57, 62, 70, 134, 135, 138,
Caucasian population, 42, 49, 50, 125, 129,
139, 155, 259, 262, 263, 272
130, 131, 137, 142, 147, 149, 153, 155,
banking, 159
173, 272
banks, 24, 40, 65, 157
Caucasians, 144
beating, 77, 178
cease-fire, 97
behavior, 85, 110, 165, 216, 220
censorship, 64
Belarus, 51, 53, 69, 113, 115, 116, 118, 151,
Census, 113, 135, 191
159
Central Asia, 53, 65, 72, 74, 76, 77, 82, 84
Belgium, 150
central executive, 265
betrayal, 55, 56
ceramics, 5
bilingualism, 150, 151
certificate, 43
bipolar, 80
channels, 77
birth, vii, 42, 43, 47, 114, 116, 117, 131, 165,
Chechens, vii, 28, 35, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62,
175, 176, 177, 187, 190, 192, 194, 214,
70, 71, 107, 131, 134, 135, 138, 141, 142,
215, 218
146, 155, 198, 264, 268, 269, 270, 271,
birth rate, vii, 187, 214, 218
272, 273
births, 177, 181
child mortality, 167, 215
Black Sea, 2, 6, 7, 28, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41,
childbearing, 12, 47, 177, 184
65, 82, 83, 102, 201, 226, 227, 253, 254,
childhood, 155
260, 262
China, 23, 178
blame, 56, 58
Christianity, 18, 19, 29, 74, 86
blood, 11, 12, 29, 68, 76, 269
Christians, 35, 43, 46, 73, 126, 223, 235, 242,
bloodshed, 81, 88
266
bomb, 93, 266
citizens, 38, 52, 53, 67, 70, 76, 95, 96, 98,
borderline, 52, 54, 63, 65
107, 120, 231, 239
boys, 35, 173, 175, 177, 179, 193
citizenship, 67, 79, 95, 96, 111, 223
breeding, 5, 9, 21, 27
civil rights, 54
broad spectrum, viii
civil war, 204
buildings, 233
classification, 143, 166
Co, 124
C colonization, vii, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42, 101, 119, 195, 254
campaigns, 259 colonizers, 37
capitalism, 136 commander-in-chief, 29
capitalist, 3, 136 commerce, 148
car accidents, 219 Commonwealth of Independent States, 219
carrier, 213 communication, 74, 76, 77
Index 277
communism, 151
Communist Party, 67, 80, 116, 136, 233
D
communities, 7, 90, 148
Dagestan, viii, 2, 12, 18, 27, 31, 32, 46, 54,
community, 14, 30, 85, 86, 120, 205, 234
57, 60, 104, 105, 107, 109, 123, 130, 131,
compensation, 214
134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143,
complexity, 110
144, 145, 149, 153, 156, 160, 162, 167,
compliance, 65, 94, 119, 235
174, 186, 189, 192, 193, 194, 232, 237,
complications, 47
238, 239, 254, 260, 269, 271, 272, 273, 274
composition, viii, 1, 68, 102, 117, 120, 147,
danger, 64, 173
165, 203, 206
death, 13, 14, 15, 22, 44, 52, 55, 61, 62, 66,
compulsion, 52, 269
85, 92, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 125, 131,
concentration, 53, 158
133, 173, 184, 188, 219
conception, 65, 136
death rate, 52, 61, 62, 66, 85, 92, 111, 112,
concrete, 4, 79, 110, 216, 217
114, 115, 117, 125, 133, 184, 188
conflict, vii, 71, 72, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88,
deaths, 181, 193
89, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 104, 106, 142,
decay, 151
164, 187, 221, 239, 243, 251, 268, 271
decisions, 52, 70, 86, 94
confrontation, 82, 105
defense, 33, 88, 271
consciousness, 77, 78, 80, 155, 189
deficit, 53, 177
consolidation, 17, 93, 256
deformation, 12, 177
Constitution, 106, 153, 156, 203, 204, 226
degrading, 199
construction, 40, 41, 83, 159, 196
delivery, 42
construction sites, 159
demobilization, 67
consumption, 177
demographic change, 79, 165
continuity, 213
demographic data, 110, 142
control, 26, 61, 69, 84, 107, 161, 163, 179
demographic factors, 116, 164
copper, 5, 17, 27
demography, 175, 213, 215, 228, 241
correlation, 45, 117, 133, 137, 162, 164, 166,
density, 9
173, 175, 176, 177, 223, 232, 243
deportations, 49, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, 61, 66,
Cossak-Russians, vii
67, 68, 69, 70, 84, 119
Council of Europe, 79, 84, 96, 97
deported, 11, 15, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60,
couples, 179, 216
61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75,
crime, 63, 87, 179
76, 77, 79, 80, 119
crimes, 96, 165
deposits, 83, 84
criminal activity, 176
desert, 26, 28
criminals, 70, 77, 147
destruction, 22, 25, 26, 55, 123, 147, 203
cultivation, 17, 21, 230
devaluation, 144
cultural heritage, 213
developed countries, 112, 117, 158, 216
culture, 4, 5, 7, 10, 17, 26, 27, 31, 54, 75, 78,
developing countries, 112, 114
98, 120, 122, 136, 138, 149, 156, 158, 240,
deviation, 57
255, 258
differentiation, 158, 168
dignity, 14, 220
disabled, 61, 67
discrimination, 119
disorder, 76
278 Index
displaced persons, 96, 119 ethnic diversity, 26, 105, 138

displacement, 56 ethnic groups, 1, 2, 5, 28, 102, 105, 119, 131,
disposition, viii, 88, 110, 157, 203 138, 195, 234, 255, 256, 258, 272
dissatisfaction, 39, 243 ethnicity, 141
distress, 85, 199, 246 ethno-genesis process, vii
distribution, 22, 145, 157 ethno-political conflicts, vii, 49, 51, 85, 130,
diversity, 26, 105, 138 142, 206, 223, 230
division, 22, 29, 30, 32, 38, 60, 101, 105, 137, EU, 50, 82, 84, 104
144, 202, 254, 259 Eurasia, 3
divorce, 47, 216 Europe, 1, 26, 64, 65, 83, 96, 97, 117, 124,
dogs, 34, 66, 176 148, 158, 242
dominance, 96, 109 Europeans, 21
draft, 69, 70 evolution, 3, 176
execution, 65
exercise, 15, 26, 181
E exile, vii, 54, 69, 268, 271
exploitation, 237
earth, 27, 66, 80, 89, 113, 230
extinction, 187, 188, 213, 258
East Caucasus, 2, 35
extraction, 162, 238
ecological, 119, 195
extremism, 83
ecology, 215
economic assistance, 81
economic change, 3, 166 F
economic development, 11, 98
economic growth, 158 faith, 114
economic losses, 84 family, 14, 23, 31, 35, 42, 66, 70, 100, 102,
economic problem, 111, 114 103, 110, 114, 138, 144, 145, 151, 159,
educational institutions, 76 175, 177, 179, 198, 210, 216, 217, 218,
Egypt, 157 219, 223, 224, 225, 227, 231, 235, 246, 255
elaboration, 29, 83, 137, 145 family income, 110
embryo, 177, 178, 179 family life, 219
embryos, 175 family members, 159, 198, 210
emigration, 26, 33, 63, 75, 119, 121, 149, 166, family support, 175
196 Far East, 41, 52
employees, 106, 159 farmers, 62
employers, 189 farming, 9, 269
employment, 110 farms, 60, 66, 76
energy, 16, 50, 64, 82, 83, 199, 206, 207, 220 fear, 12, 90, 119
England, 92, 159, 177, 204, 233 females, 176, 215, 219, 237
enslavement, 55 fertility, 43, 47, 114, 116, 117, 164, 188, 190,
entrepreneurs, 238 192, 193, 214, 239
environment, 3, 20, 77, 79, 122, 146 fertility rate, 114, 116, 117, 190, 192, 193,
environmental conditions, 119 214, 239
epidemic, 249, 259, 265 financing, 107
estates, 36, 78, 148 Finns, 52, 53
Estonia, 51, 105, 113, 116, 118, 159 fire, 17, 18, 95, 107, 207
Index 279
first language, 155 grains, 175

fishing, 9 Great Britain, 38, 233
flow, 16, 100 Greece, 24, 67, 179
fluctuations, 228 grouping, 143
folklore, 42, 99, 101, 179, 218, 266 growth rate, 266
food, 66, 93 guns, 13, 106
forced migrants, 119 Gypsies, 247, 254, 264, 268
forced migration, 52, 56, 119, 195
foreign affairs, 36
foreign nation, 55 H
foreign policy, 50, 86
hands, 74, 87, 248
forests, 5
happiness, 175
France, 36, 44, 68, 92, 150, 177
hardships, 164
freedom, 35, 57, 59, 80, 92, 107, 114
health, 52, 85, 110
freedoms, 114
healthcare, 114, 165
freight, 60, 98
heart, 16, 219
heart disease, 219
G hegemony, 17, 25
height, 2, 6
gambling, 82 helicopters, 87
gas, 82, 83 heroism, 56
gender, 147 high school, 241
general education, 152 higher education, 55, 70, 194
generation, 12, 42, 45, 68, 78, 112, 114, 133, highlands, 10, 15, 20, 21, 22, 27, 89, 92, 202,
168, 172, 192, 193, 212, 219 265, 269
Geneva, 76 high-level, 5, 86, 88
genocide, 72 homeless, 50, 66
geography, 9, 219 homogenous, 228
Georgians, 1, 7, 11, 12, 13, 16, 21, 29, 30, 43, hospitals, 166
45, 63, 64, 66, 68, 71, 73, 74, 78, 79, 90, hostilities, 56
93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, households, 243
111, 113, 130, 138, 142, 146, 148, 154, housing, 85, 110
156, 171, 179, 181, 192, 195, 196, 198, human, 3, 49, 50, 51, 87, 95, 105, 107, 112,
207, 208, 211, 213, 221, 223, 224, 225, 189, 196, 215, 218, 230, 237
226, 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 235, 237, human resources, 49
247, 248, 250, 264, 267, 268, 269 humane, 16
Germany, 38, 55, 57, 64, 172, 173, 177 humanitarian, 87
girls, 35, 44, 173, 175, 177, 178, 193, 194, hunting, 9, 26, 101
214 hydro, 82
goals, 33, 39, 52, 57, 195 hydrocarbons, 82
God, 67 hygiene, 45, 175
gold, 34, 84 hygienic, 45
governance, 14, 29, 30, 32, 189 hypothesis, 3, 9, 138
government, 15, 32, 33, 36, 37, 40, 41, 54, 55,
60, 66, 86, 92, 101, 233, 234
280 Index
instruction, 40
I instruments, 165
insults, 96
id, 13, 31, 49, 71, 77, 98, 106, 107, 151
integration, 18, 93, 95
identification, 66
integrity, 81, 97, 104, 201
identity, 133
intelligence, 63
ideology, 80
intentions, 40, 81, 101, 130
IDP, 72, 96
interference, 64
IDPs, 69, 71, 72, 74, 84, 85
internally displaced person, 96
immigrants, 120, 121, 133, 266
international law, 85, 96, 97, 104, 234
immigration, 161, 195, 221, 238, 239, 240,
international migration, 119, 120, 121, 195
241, 248, 257
international relations, 150, 234
implementation, 49, 65, 82, 89
internationalism, 57
income, 110
interval, 177, 182
independence, 2, 17, 20, 25, 26, 29, 37, 49,
intervention, 96
50, 59, 80, 81, 85, 87, 88, 92, 94, 95, 97,
investors, 83
103, 105, 107, 109, 124, 182, 195, 201,
Iran, 5, 8, 11, 13, 16, 18, 20, 22, 25, 38, 49,
204, 207, 234, 240, 245
68, 83, 148, 204, 232, 241, 242, 243, 245,
India, 26
246, 248, 272
Indians, 179
iron, 21, 27
indigenous, 24, 28, 29, 41, 42, 101, 102, 111,
irrigation, 40
122, 130, 151, 153, 156, 171, 187, 188,
Islam, 11, 18, 19, 73, 74, 86, 87
190, 192, 194, 197, 213, 243, 247, 254,
Islamic, 87
269, 271
island, 1
Indigenous, 113
Israel, 147, 148, 149
indigenous peoples, 269
Italy, 92
individuality, 63
industrial, 130, 159
industry, 238 J
inequality, 27
infectious diseases, 45, 205 Japan, 41
infertile, 115 Japanese, 53
infertility, 42, 47, 115 Jerusalem, 147, 148
information age, 24 Jews, 146, 147, 148, 149, 195, 212, 230, 240,
infrastructure, 52, 112, 157 251, 254
Ingush, vii, 55, 60, 71, 72, 106, 131, 189, 190, jobs, 53
191, 254, 268 judge, 22
Ingushetia, viii, 2, 27, 31, 32, 57, 59, 60, 71, jurisdiction, 86, 221
72, 104, 109, 123, 126, 130, 134, 139, 140, justice, 55, 86
141, 153, 154, 167, 168, 171, 174, 182,
186, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 256, 262,
264, 268, 269, 270, 271 K
inhuman, 53
injustice, vii, 56, 58, 75 Kabardino-Balkaria, viii
insight, 109 Karachais, vii
institutions, 76, 233, 258 Karachay-Cherkessia, viii
Index 281
Kazakhstan, vii, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, losses, 12, 28, 37, 64, 88, 98, 120, 123, 124,
67, 71, 75, 76, 83, 112, 113, 114, 118, 159, 171, 172, 173, 176, 207, 224, 237
268, 271
kidnapping, 98
kindergarten, 156 M
King, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 24, 89, 147,
Main Kavkasioni Ridgei, 1,2, 90, 201
269
malaria, 41
Korean, 53
males, 176, 215, 219, 237
Kurds, 2, 54, 63, 77, 146, 214, 243, 247
management, 29, 157, 165
Kyrgyzstan, 58, 61, 62, 67, 75, 76, 77, 113,
manipulation, 224
115, 116, 118, 212, 219
marital status, 190
market, 12, 82
L markets, 8, 209
marriage, 43, 181, 194, 216, 219
labor, 27, 33, 51, 175, 179, 199, 238 marriages, 42, 43, 47, 112, 176, 189, 216, 237
labor force, 33, 51, 238 married women, 177, 194
land, 8, 16, 21, 37, 39, 40, 41, 45, 62, 72, 73, martial law, 55
76, 77, 88, 90, 91, 92, 101, 112, 201, 224, Marx, 31
243, 254, 268 mass media, 77
land tenure, 243 matrix, 196
large-scale, 245, 251 meanings, 155
Latvia, 51, 111, 113, 116, 118, 159, 212 measures, 33, 54, 55, 56, 58, 62, 66, 69, 92,
law, 39, 55, 63, 72, 73, 78, 85, 96, 97, 104, 106, 112, 114, 117, 150, 209, 214, 217
231, 234 meat, 177
law enforcement, 63 media, 77
laws, 73, 85, 109, 201, 224 mediation, 97
Lebanon, 25 medical expertise, 44
legislation, 104 medical services, 45, 165, 216
liberalization, 69 Mediterranean, 5
liberation, 269 membership, 79
life expectancy, 52, 167 memory, 101, 119, 207
lifetime, 166, 214, 215 Meskheti, vii, 56, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70,
lingual, 79 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79
linguistic, 20, 99, 265, 266 metallurgy, 5
linguistically, 100 mice, 176
liquidate, 54, 66 Middle Ages, 2, 26, 99, 148, 158, 175, 208,
liquidation, 54, 58, 70, 87 234
Lithuania, 51, 113, 116, 118, 159 Middle East, 11, 51
living conditions, 42, 52, 90, 122, 183, 199, migrant, 195, 239, 247
211, 215, 269 migrants, 37, 90, 119, 122, 195, 198, 199,
living environment, 121 205, 209, 211, 238, 239, 245, 246, 247,
local authorities, 60, 77, 231 249, 255, 260, 266
long distance, 148 military, 2, 11, 15, 24, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 38,
long period, 20, 49, 57, 122, 182, 199, 207, 39, 49, 65, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 90, 96, 98,
215
282 Index
103, 104, 105, 106, 123, 203, 204, 205, nation, 12, 13, 16, 19, 26, 43, 111, 112, 114,
223, 224, 233, 246, 249 117, 119, 138, 147, 149, 150, 151, 187,
military occupation, 205 199, 207, 213, 220, 234, 250
minorities, 45, 77, 81, 119, 121, 122, 154, national culture, 155
197, 212, 218, 228, 241 national interests, 80
minority, 211, 221 national policy, 32
mixing, 68 nationalism, 77
mobility, 110 nationality, 56, 57, 67, 74, 120, 131, 133, 136,
models, 50, 81 145, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 190,
modernity, 24 225, 234
Moldova, 51, 113, 116, 118 native population, 102, 111, 142, 150
money, 66, 224 NATO, 83, 96
Mongols, 10, 11, 25, 28, 64, 89, 208, 213, natural gas, 82
259, 269 natural resources, 15, 114
morbidity, 85 Near East, 2, 26, 64, 89
morning, 60, 61, 66, 233 Netherlands, 159
mortality, 12, 36, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 166, 167, network, 204
168, 171, 173, 175, 176, 181, 185, 186, newspapers, 63, 64, 77, 91
187, 188, 190, 192, 199, 205, 209, 212, next generation, 239
213, 215, 219, 237, 250 nickel, 84
mortality rate, 44, 45, 47, 187, 188, 215 non-native, 111, 142
mother tongue, 155 non-uniform, 79
mothers, 34, 115, 133, 177, 178, 193, 194, normal, 120, 218
212, 214, 215 norms, 96, 97, 104
motives, 51, 59, 60, 136, 246 North Caucasus, v, vii, 1, 2, 13, 17, 26, 27, 28,
mountains, 1, 18, 38, 89, 100, 143, 148, 176 31, 32, 37, 50, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60,
mouth, 7, 32, 36 70, 77, 89, 92, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105,
movement, viii, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 70, 71, 75, 109, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 133,
77, 88, 92, 107, 112, 117, 120, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144,
149, 166, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155,
195, 198, 204, 234, 238, 269, 272 156, 158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 168, 173,
murder, 44, 53 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192,
music, 34 198, 204, 238, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253,
Muslim, vii, 11, 29, 33, 46, 51, 54, 62, 63, 65, 254, 255, 258, 259, 260, 265, 266, 269,
66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 270, 271
78, 79, 110, 114, 126, 189, 223, 226, 228, North Ossetia, 2, 55, 57, 60, 71, 72, 89, 90,
247, 248, 255 91, 95, 104, 126, 130, 139, 140, 141, 143,
Muslim state, 65 153, 154, 161, 168, 171, 172, 174, 185,
Muslims, 30, 33, 34, 47, 73, 75, 226, 241, 187, 191, 192, 193, 202, 230, 256, 264,
243, 246, 247, 255 265, 266, 267, 268
Mutual support, 148 North Ossetia-Alanya, viii, 2, 105, 109, 128,
163, 170, 230, 234, 267, 268
novelty, 255
N
naming, 41, 151, 216

Index 283
planning, 166
O pleasure, 33, 255
Pleistocene, 4
obligation, 14, 92
ploughing, 5
obligations, 13, 31, 106
plurality, 126
occupied territories, 29
Poland, 25, 31
oil, 82, 83, 162, 238
police, 44
old age, 176
poor, 8, 45, 65, 66, 85, 218, 242
oppression, 25, 266
population density, 4, 9
optimism, 116
population growth, 114, 126, 235, 263, 270
organic, 50, 98, 103
population size, 9, 123, 126, 136
organism, 22, 63
Post Soviet area, viii
orientation, 26, 57, 79, 240
potential energy, 199
originality, 150
poverty, 158, 220
orthodox, 30, 43, 74
power, 16, 18, 20, 22, 29, 30, 38, 49, 55, 58,
OSCE, 84, 104
60, 73, 86, 87, 93, 97, 104, 105, 106, 151,
Ottoman Empire, 12, 25, 38, 74, 206, 245,
152, 175, 179, 202, 204, 205, 206, 233,
246
242, 259, 268, 269
ownership, 106, 241, 246
powers, 105, 233, 242
prediction, 165
P preference, 175
pregnancy, 47, 177, 178, 179
pain, 57 pregnant women, 67, 85, 177
panic attack, 85 president, 106
paramilitary, 76 presidential elections, 105, 106
parasite, 47 pressure, 21, 71, 102
parents, 35, 44, 151, 212, 214 prevention, 69
Parliament, 233 preventive, 57
partnership, 82 prices, 71, 165
passports, 77, 94, 96 prisoners, 67
patients, 41 private, 41, 216
peace treaty, 74, 106, 204, 206, 242, 245, 246, producers, 148
272 production, 4, 21, 27, 157, 219
peacekeeping, 81, 88 prognosis, 136
peacekeeping forces, 88 program, 38, 195
pension, 76, 215 promoter, 85
pensioners, 220 propaganda, 24, 34, 152, 204
permit, 16, 38, 39, 54, 59, 67, 70, 75, 101, property, 34, 35, 54, 96, 175, 245, 246, 268
107, 178, 231, 242, 245 prostitution, 179
Persia, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 24, 25, 40, 234, 245 protection, 13, 38, 66, 85, 224, 240, 269
personality, 111 provocation, 63, 95
physiological, 119 pseudo, 8, 14
pigs, 176 psyche, 12, 220
pipelines, 82 public affairs, 62
plague, 259, 265 public opinion, 44, 63, 65
284 Index
punishment, 39, 55, 56, 69, 70 reserves, 40, 217

pupils, 152 Reservations, vii, 68, 75
resettlement, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 237,
242, 243, 262
Q resistance, 25, 29, 107, 204
resolution, 87, 96, 97, 233, 235
questioning, 85, 216, 258
resources, 15, 49, 50, 82, 83, 114, 121, 199,
questionnaires, 216
220
returns, 63
R revolt, 37, 60, 204, 266
revolutionaries, 53
race, 55, 65 rice, 34
range, viii, 165 rivers, 5, 90, 100, 157, 224
rape, 120 robbery, 231
rats, 176 Rome, 24, 25, 49, 245
raw material, 4, 50 rule of law, 231
reading, 13, 153, 155 rural, viii, 10, 43, 44, 112, 151, 158, 160, 161,
real estate, 242 168, 202, 212, 226, 238
reality, 13, 15, 23, 25, 45, 63, 111, 136, 157, rural areas, 168, 202, 226
166, 167, 203, 224, 234 rural population, viii, 43, 112, 158, 168, 212,
rebel, 62 238
recession, 199
recognition, 92, 97, 106
S
reconcile, 92
redistribution, 2, 82
salt, 56
reforms, 164
school, 41, 76, 78, 98, 102, 150, 151, 152,
refugees, 34, 39, 50, 84, 85, 88, 119, 147
153, 154, 156, 167, 241
regular, 85, 94, 97, 98, 106, 250
search, 50, 51, 72, 211
regulation, 111, 176, 177
searching, 49, 50
regulations, 29, 37
secondary education, 194
rehabilitation, 71, 72, 74, 75
secondary school education, 241
relationship, 81
secret, 14, 22
relatives, 63, 67, 198, 199, 237
secular, 1
religion, 11, 19, 29, 33, 46, 51, 63, 78, 110,
security, 38, 49, 52, 61, 72, 83, 88, 106
114, 126, 187, 189, 226, 228
Security Council, 97, 106
religious belief, 110, 111, 216
security services, 61
religious beliefs, 110
selecting, 35
religious groups, 19
self-consciousness, 63, 74, 144, 258
repatriation, 72, 77, 79, 119, 223
self-expression, 220
repression, 52, 136, 268
self-interest, 14
reproduction, 5, 10, 12, 13, 16, 27, 43, 47,
separation, 38, 72, 96, 100, 155
109, 110, 112, 115, 137, 165, 166, 168,
services, 31, 57, 61, 63, 76, 123, 165, 255
172, 176, 177, 179, 182, 190, 192, 193,
servitude, 69, 70
206, 207, 214, 216, 217, 224, 269, 272
settlements, vii, 4, 6, 9, 10, 17, 23, 25, 26, 33,
reputation, 65
38, 39, 40, 41, 52, 53, 54, 61, 66, 68, 69,
Index 285
70, 72, 75, 76, 78, 87, 89, 91, 100, 157, stages, 50, 152
159, 161, 162, 203, 248, 260, 269 standards, 112
settlers, 39, 41 starvation, 249
sex, 12, 67, 80, 85, 124, 164, 165, 166, 173, state office, 98
175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 184, 214, 238 statehood, 1, 8, 12, 15, 19, 25, 26, 99, 104,
sharing, 120, 156 154, 182, 206
sheep, 176 statistics, 24, 61, 91, 118, 144, 177, 181, 255,
shelter, 89, 107, 211, 250, 251, 258 258
shores, 176 streams, 120, 195, 197, 249
short period, 183, 208 strength, 7, 8, 25, 204
Siberia, 15, 37, 55, 146 stretching, 1
sign, 35, 112, 152, 159, 192, 226, 259 structural changes, 167, 168
signs, 51, 77, 87, 102, 107, 155 subjective, 72
similarity, 171 suburban, 71, 72, 105
slaves, 35, 89, 209 summer, 57, 60, 65, 159, 240
smelting, 21 superiority, 204
smokers, 165 supervision, 69, 70
smoking, 176 suppliers, 82
smuggling, 63 supply, 82, 165
social development, 158 surplus, 173
social environment, 216 surprise, 11, 78
social interests, 80 suspects, 66
social life, 165 Sweden, 178, 215
socialist, 57, 60, 65, 153, 205, 227, 264 Switzerland, 77, 124, 150
sociological, 85, 150, 151, 189, 216, 217 symbolic, 82
sociology, 158, 220 Syria, 5, 25
soil, 17
South Africa, 87, 107
South America, 55 T
South Ossetia, vii, 50, 74, 79, 81, 84, 85, 88,
tactics, 39
89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 104, 118,
Tajikistan, 113, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120
125, 173, 201, 202, 205, 206, 230, 231,
tanks, 87, 106
232, 264, 268
taxes, 30, 73, 76, 77, 246
Southern Caucasus, viii
teachers, 151
sovereignty, 95, 97, 105, 106
teaching, 102, 152, 153
species, 93
teaching process, 153
spectrum, viii, 144
teenagers, 171
speech, 138, 155, 157
temporal, 20
speed, 51, 102, 131, 250
tension, 50, 105, 106, 111, 150, 156
spheres, 2, 10, 65, 76, 81, 82, 175
territorial, viii, 19, 71, 72, 75, 81, 91, 97, 104,
spiritual, 149, 199, 213, 219, 240
105, 107, 110, 144, 201, 202, 256, 258,
spirituality, 213
259, 260
stability, 175
terrorist, 107
stabilization, 114, 187
terrorist acts, 107
staffing, 232
thinking, 90, 95, 157
286 Index
threatened, 11, 36, 64

topographic, 248
V
totalitarian, 24, 64, 80, 111
values, 20, 77, 111, 121, 122, 189, 213, 219
trade, 12, 26, 28, 77, 93, 159, 165, 209, 231
vessels, 27
tradition, 175, 189
victims, 34, 55, 87, 120, 124, 166, 178, 230
transfer, 19, 38, 86, 149
village, 4, 23, 43, 56, 66, 72, 157, 195, 231
transformation, 62, 111
violence, 77, 120, 178
transportation, 61, 66, 82, 83
visible, 72, 110, 114, 154, 159, 166
treaties, 38
volcanic activity, 1
tribal, 21, 254
voting, 233
tribes, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 28, 35,
37, 38, 93, 98, 99, 100, 101, 136, 150, 227,
240, 254, 255, 256, 259, 260, 262, 265 W
Turkmenistan, 83, 113, 117, 118, 159
turnover, 83 wages, 151
typhus, 66 war years, 56, 124, 207
water, 53, 66
wealth, 84, 113
U
West Caucasus, 2
western countries, 84, 96, 114, 184, 205
Ukraine, 25, 38, 43, 51, 53, 56, 69, 84, 111,
wild animals, 27
113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 138, 151, 209,
wisdom, 42
212, 218
witnesses, 4, 10, 24, 62, 101, 190, 239, 248
uncertainty, 75
workers, 59, 60, 61, 62, 67, 159, 204
unemployment, 51, 119, 199, 219, 220
World War, 51, 54, 55, 123, 124, 172, 177,
unification, 19, 21, 65, 91, 125, 143, 158, 254,
203, 205, 223, 249
256, 259
World War I, 123, 249
uniform, 27, 68, 79
World War II, 51, 124
unions, 19, 20, 22, 28, 158
writing, 98, 153, 155, 157
United Nations (UN), 84, 85, 97, 104, 117,
118, 178, 209
United States, 56, 68, 82, 178, 196, 215, 219 Y
university education, 241
unmarried women, 177 Yeltsin, Boris, 106
urban population, 104, 158, 159, 160, 161, young women, 177
164, 171, 226, 227, 228, 232, 238, 247, 250
urban settlement, 161
urbanization, 110, 126, 157, 158, 238 Z
USSR, 52, 53, 58, 59, 60, 68, 69, 70, 103,
113, 116, 118, 128, 131, 143, 151, 153, Zoroastrianism, 19
156, 159, 163, 234, 244, 250, 267, 271
Uzbekistan, 53, 54, 67, 75, 76, 77, 111, 113,
115, 116, 117, 118, 138

(Caucasus Region Political, Economic and Security Issues) Va'Za Lortkipanize - The Population of The Caucasus-Nova Science Publishers (2010)

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(Caucasus Region Political, Economic and Security Issues) Va'Za Lortkipanize - The Population of The Caucasus-Nova Science Publishers (2010)

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CAUCASUS REGION POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES

The Population of the Caucasus

Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

NOTICE TO THE READER

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York

POPULATION OF THE CAUCASUS FROM

Caucasian territory is occupied by mountains and plateaus. Six summits of the

I.I. ANCIENT POPULATION OF THE CAUCASUS,

Marie-A.-de Lumley, Majsuradze, Aleksander Mouskhelishvili. Earliest Pleistocene Hominid

The amount of the population of Georgia in different periods of B.C. can be

From the XVI to XVII centuries, considerable reduction of the population of

dwelling of a man in an Azikh cave, is of special importance. More than 300

Atropatena is the oldest name of Azerbaijan known in science, which has

by their own ways of ethno-genetic and ethno-cultural development in both parts.

Phrygians.‖40 In any case, if we judge by the language, Armenians are Indo-

century. A considerable part of the population of Armenia was sacrificed to

I.II. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF THE

I. III. COLONIZATION OF THE CAUCASUS BY RUSSIA

The process of highlanders‘ resettlement to Turkey was named as

Russia intensively settled Russians on the lands designated for colonization in

I.III.II. Colonization of the Caucasus

declared as Russian-populated territory. The banks received orders to sell land

coastlines, which considerably assisted in forming settlements there. Great

Despite all mentioned above, colonization of the Caucasus was conducted.

I.IV. Natural Movement of the Population of the

Table 1. Population Natural Increase in Tbilisi Gubernia from 1875 to 1879

Nationality Absolute Nationality per 1000

Table 2. Population Natural Movement in the South Caucasus

Gubernias and cities Childbirth Mortality Natural increase

made: low childbirth among Muslims was caused by marriages of women at a

DEPORTATIONS OF THE CAUCASIAN PEOPLES

II.I. DEPORTATIONS OF THE CAUCASIAN PEOPLES

wide scale, forced migration impeded natural demographic development of the

and Usuriisk regions in great amounts.2 In 1922, as a result of the Russia‘s

population of these territories positively met Germans. Anti-soviet armed groups

1. All Karachayevs, living on the territory of the autonomous region, have

Uchkulan region of Karachaev autonomous region, also a part of Mikoian

united into one—Chechen-Ingush region, which in 1936, was changed into

population living in the historical province of Georgia should be either Turks or

The birthrate considerably increased in recent years among the deported as

Meskheti Principality, which was completed in 1578. They abolished the

In the beginning of the XIX century, a great majority of Samtskhe-Javakheti

The process of political intensification among the Muslim Meskhs started

II.II. ETHNO-POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS

Armed conflicts in the Caucasus are often mentioned as ethnic conflicts,

II.II.II. Armenian-Azerbaijanian Conflict

II.II.III. Conflict in the Former South Ossetia

citizens of ―South Ossetia.‖ As a result, a great majority of ―South Ossetia‖

viewpoint. However, from the geopolitical viewpoint it is a mistake. The Main

II.II.IV. Conflict in Abkhazia

Abkhazia was within Georgia with the status of an autonomous republic.

Abkhazs—93,000 (17.8%); Armenians—77,000 (14.6%); and Russians—75,000

language in Abkhazia is witnessed by the Georgian inscriptions on the walls of

Numerous toponyms of Georgian origin, especially oiconyms (names of

territory of present-day Abkhazia. The same is proved by the Abkhaz surnames of

II.2.5. Conflict in Chechnya

Russian Federation. At present, 89 regions are subjects of the Russian Federation..

organization of Chechen armed formations was started. The amount of regular

Perfect highlighting of modern demographic conditions in the Caucasus, its

Table 3. Size of the Population and Natural Growth in the Indigenous

Size of population Natural growth

(resources) for the future generation, because in case of consuming natural