E-Notes Legal Ethics Unit-2

Chanderprabhu Jain College of Higher Studies
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School of Law
An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Quality Institute
(Recognized by Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Affiliated to GGS Indraprastha University, Delhi)
Class : B.A.LL.B IX Sem
Paper Code : LLB 501
Subject : Legal Ethics and Court Craft
Faculty : Mr. Yashashvi Singh
Unit 2
The Limitation Act, 1963 and The Registration Act, 1908
The Limitation ACT,1963
Legal disability.—(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an
application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed
period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or
make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as
would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third
column of the Schedule. (2) Where such person is, at the time from which the
prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where,
before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may
institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both
disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so
specified. (3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his
legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same
period after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so
specified. (4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3) is, at the
date of the death of the person whom he represents, affected by any such disability,
the rules contained sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply. (5) Where a person under
disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him under
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this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application
within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available to
that person had he not died. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
„minor‟ includes a child in the womb.
Disability of one of several persons.—Where one of several persons jointly
entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is
under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of
such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be
given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable
of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the
disability has ceased. Explanation I.—This section applies to a discharge from
every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any immovable property.
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, the Manager of a Hindu
undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of
giving a discharge without the concurrence of the other members of the family
only if he is in management of the joint family property.
Special exceptions.—Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to
enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three
years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected
thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application.
Continuous running of time.—Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent
disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it: Provided
that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to
his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall
be suspended while the administration continues.
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-Important Cases on sec 5 to 9 of limitation act.
Raj Bahadur Singh & Another v. D.J. & Others(Civil Misc.Writ Petition
No.12718 of 2002) :
According to the learned Judge the application 4-Ga had been rejected on two
grounds firstly being barred by limitation and secondly being without any
valid ground. Thus, the appeal filed by the respondents was fully
maintainable. He further submitted that the learned District Judge vide order
dated11.2.2002 had admitted the appeal while over ruling the preliminary
objections and the writ petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable.
In the present case the question is as to whether an appeal lies against an

order passed by the trial Court wherein it had by a common order rejected
both the applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act and Order9 Rule
13 C.P.C. on the ground that the application is barred by Limitation and no
ground for condonation of delay has been made out, or a revision lies. If it is
held that no appeal lies then the order admitting the appeal is wholly without
jurisdiction and in such a circumstance a writ petition is maintainable.
Sec 14 ,15 of limitation act
Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. —
In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the
plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether
in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is
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prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause
of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which
the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding,
whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party
for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good
faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is
unable to entertain it.
Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in
relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of
that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must
fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like
nature. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending,
the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended
shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting
a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a
like nature with defect of jurisdiction.
Sec 15 of Limitation Act, 1963.
(1) In computing the period of limitation any suit or application for the execution
of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or
order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it
was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
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(2) In computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been
given, or for which the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any
other authority is required, in accordance with the requirements of any law for the
time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time
required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. As per
explanation, in excluding the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of
the Government or any other authority, the date on which the application was made
for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the
Government or other authority shall both be counted.
(3) In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for execution
of a decree by any receiver or interim receiver appointed in proceedings for the
adjudication of a person as an insolvent or by any liquidator or provisional
liquidator appointed in proceedings for the winding up of a company, the period
beginning with the date of institution of such proceeding and ending with the
expiry of three months from the date of appointment of such receiver or liquidator,
as the case may be, shall be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for a suit for possession by a purchaser at
a sale in execution of a decree, the time during which a proceeding to set aside the
sale has been prosecuted shall be excluded.
(5) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the
defendant has been absent from India and from the territories outside India under
the administration of the Central Government, shall be excluded.
Section 15 of the Limitation Act applies to a special or local law unless expressly
excluded as per Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. In Trustees of the Port
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of Madras v. Mettur Chemical & Industries Ltd., Salem, (AIR 1967 Mad. 109), it
has been held that in a suit against the Port Trust the period of notice can be
excluded in computing limitation prescribed in Section 110 of the Port Trust Act.
The object of Section 15(1) is to safeguard the interest of the person who is
precluded by an injunction or order of Court from exercising a right of suit or
execution of a decree passed in his favour against his being injured or damnified
on that account.
As Section 15 refers to a suit or an application for execution, Section 15(1) does

not apply to appeals or applications other than the application for execution.
Section 15(1) is attracted for excluding the period of stay for any suit institution of
which has been stayed by an injunction or order issued by Court. In order to invoke
Section 15(1), there must be a decree which is operative.
A party seeking to take advantage of Section 15(1) must show that he was earlier
restrained by an order from making the prayer which he is now making. But if he
could have done earlier what he is trying to do now, Section 15(1) will not be
attracted to his case.
In Ganpat Singh v. Kailash Shankar, (AIR 1987 SC 1443), the Supreme Court has
held that an application under Order XXI, Rule 95 of the CPC cannot be construed
as an application for execution.
The principle of Section 15(1) has been applied when the suit is stayed under
Order XXXII, Rule 10 of CPC, in Govind Naik v. Basavanneva, (AIR 1941 Bom.
203).
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Section 15(1) comes into play only where the institution of a suit or execution of
decree has been stayed by an injunction or order. In such a case the whole period
during which the injunction or order is in force must be excluded in computing the
period of limitation for such suit or application. It is immaterial whether the stay is
direct or indirect. Consequence of the order of the Court, but the period of
injunction is a period of time which has to be fully cut out, removed out of
reckoning and excluded in the computation of limitation for execution.
The expression “stayed by injunction or order” in Section 15(1) has reference to

order of the Court and not to disability to sue or apply for execution. Section 15(1)
applies only to injunction or order judicially made by the Courts but do not extend
to administrative instructions issued to Courts to keep execution cases pending
until further orders. In order to attract Section 15(1), it is only the order of stay
passed by the Court is necessary and not that the order is proper or valid. In
Jurawan v. Mahabir, (40 All. 198), it has been held that an order merely giving
time to the judgment- debtor for payment is not an order staying execution or an
injunction, and Section 15 does not apply.
In B. Singh v. S. Singh, (AIR 1983 P&H 174), it has been held that Section 15(1)
of the Limitation Act applies also to cases of a partial stay, but only so as to allow
exclusion of the period of the stay in the computation of time for a further
execution against the person or the property as against whom or which execution
was previously stayed and not so as to allow exclusion of that period for the
purposes of a future execution against persons or properties not affected by the stay
order.
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Section 15(1) is not confined to cases of direct stay or injunction, but can be
executed to orders which indirectly but very affirmatively and effectually cause a
stay.
The period of exclusion under Section 15Ш starts from the date on which the
injunction or order staying the suit or execution is passed and continues till the date
of its withdrawal. For that purpose both the starting and closing days as well as the
period intervening them should be excluded.
As per Section 15(2), the period of notice given in accordance with the
requirement of any enactment for the time being in force shall be excluded.
In IPS Trading Co. v. Union of India, (AIR 1973 Cal. 74), it has been held that
where a plaintiff is required to give notice to the Government under Section 80 of
the CPC, he is entitled to exclude the period of notice in computing the period of
limitation prescribed for the suit as per Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act.
Section 15(2) expressly provides for the exclusion of the period required for
obtaining the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other
authority in computing limitation.
In Premlata v. Lakshman, (AIR 1970 SC 1525), it is held that under sub-section (2)
of the Section 15, the notice must be a notice of suit and the enactment requiring
the notice to be given must prescribe the period of notice before the expiry on
which the claimant cannot institute a suit.
In TPK Nair v. Union of India, (AIR 199 Ker. 80), it has been held that even if
notice under Section 80 of the CPC was not strictly needed to be served upon the
Government but when such a notice was served and the suit was instituted two
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months of the last date of limitation, then it is within time in view of Section 15(2)
of the Limitation Act.
Section 15(2) will not be attracted where the plaintiff has no cause of action
against the Union of India.
Where the notice under Section 80 of the CPC was issued before the accrual of
cause of action the period of notice will not be excluded under Section 15(2).
Under Section 15(3) of the Limitation Act, a receiver including an interim receiver
or a liquidator including a provisional liquidator appointed in a proceeding for
adjudication of a person as an insolvent or in proceeding for the winding up of a
company as the case may be is entitled for the exclusion of the period between the
date of application and the date of appointment and also additional period of three
months thereafter in computing the period of limitation for filing suit or execution
as such receiver or liquidator. Section 15(3) has specifically provided for giving
him a period of three months after his appointment to file a suit or a petition for
executions as he requires time to acquaint himself with the affairs of the estate or
of the company, as the case may be.
To obtain the benefit of Section 15(4), the following conditions have to be

fulfilled:
(i) The suit should be one for possession by the purchaser at a sale in execution of
the decree; and
(ii) It should be a suit and not an application.
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If the above conditions are fulfilled then the time during which a proceeding for
setting aside the sale had been prosecuted shall be excluded. As Section 15(4) only
attracts a suit and not an application, the application under Order XXI, Rules 95
and 96 of the CPC will not attract Section 15(4) of the Limitation Act.
Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act has reference only to the absence of the
defendant from the realm, not to that of the plaintiff. A plaintiff out of the realm
may prosecute a suit by his attorney, but when the defendant is out of the realm it
is very hard to call upon the plaintiff to institute a suit.
The plaintiff’s voluntary absence in a foreign country cannot bar the operation of
limitation. Section 15(5) is equally inapplicable even if the plaintiff’s absence may
be involuntary through transportation.
In sub-section (5) of Section 15, the defendant is one who was at one time present
in India and later has been absent from India. A person who has never been in
India cannot be considered as having been ‘absent from India’. The onus is upon
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has been absent from India or from the
territories under the administration of Government of India.
In P.J. Johnson v. Astrofied Armadorn, [AIR 1989 Ker. 53 (FB)], the Court has
held that in a suit for recovery of money for goods and services supplied to the ship
of a foreign Corporation the foreign corporation was never present in India and
necessarily, therefore, was never absent from India and Section 15(5) cannot,
therefore, be attracted while computing the period of limitation for a suit filed in
India against such corporation to recover the price of goods and services.
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In Jivanraj v. Babaji, [29 Bom. 68 (70)], it has been held that the period of
defendant’s absence would be deducted from computation, no matter whether such
absence took place before or after the accrual of the cause of action.
In Muthukanni v. Andappa, [AIR’ 1955 Mad, 96 (FB)], it has been held that in a
suit against partners, where one of the partners is absent from India, it has been
held that the fact of his absence entitles the plaintiff b. to deduct the time not
against all the defendants, but against the absentee defendant only; and the fact that
the plaintiff has allowed the suit to be barred against the other partners who are
present in India during the absence of the absentee is not a ground for holding that
the claim against the absentee is also barred by limitation.
Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act applies even where to the knowledge of the
plaintiffs, the defendants (partners in a firm) are during the period of their absence
carrying on business in India through an agent, who is empowered to institute and
defend suits.
Sec 18, 19 of Limitation Act, 1963.
Sec 18
Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that:
(1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in
respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such
property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such
property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or
liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the
acknowledgment was so signed.
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(2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence
may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, oral evidence of its contents shall not be received.
Explanation:
For the purpose of this Section, —
(a) An acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact

nature of the property or right or avers that the time for payment, delivery,
performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay,
deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set off, or is
addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right;
(b) The word ‘signed’ means signed either personally or by an agent duly
authorized in the behalf; and
(c) An application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be
an application in respect of any property or right;
Acknowledgement is a statement in writing that a debt is due and unpaid. Under

the Indian Law, acknowledgment means a definite admission of liability; it is not
necessary that there should be a promise to pay, and the simple admission of a debt
is sufficient. In India, an acknowledgment in which there is no express promise
implying a new contract to pay, must be made before the debt is barred by time,
and in this respect an acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act
differs from a promise to pay a barred debt under Section 25(3) of the Contract
Act. An Acknowledgement does’ not create a new right of action but merely
extends the period of limitation.
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The acknowledgment, if any has to be prior to the expiration of the prescribed

period for filing the suit, in other words, if the limitation has already expired, it
would not revive under Section 18. It is only during subsistence of a period of
limitation, if any such document is executed, the limitation would be received fresh
from the said date of acknowledgement.
An acknowledgment is not limited in respect of a debt only it may be in respect of

‘any property or right’ which is the subject-matter of the suit.
In Preet Mohinder Singh v. Mohinder Parkash [AIR 1989 SC 1775] it has been
held by the Supreme Court that a recital in a sale deed executed by the mortgagee
in respect of the transfer to the purchaser the right of recovering the principal
amount and interest according to the mortgage deed as an acknowledgement that
mortgage money remains unpaid and also that the mortgagor had subsisting right
of redemption which he could exercise against the mortgagee.
Mere statement expressing jural relationship between parties does not constitute
acknowledgement. The endorsement itself must contain the acknowledgement
either express or implied but surrounding circumstances can be taken into
consideration in construing the words used in writing.
Promise to pay is not acknowledgement. An acknowledgement need not contain a

promise to pay either in express terms or even in an implied way; what is necessary
is that there should be an admission of the subsisting liability. Even if such
admission is accompanied by a refusal to pay, its character as an acknowledgement
will not be altered.
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The acknowledgement of liability must be in writing. Oral evidence is to be

excluded. The acknowledgement has to be signed by the party against whom the
property or right is claimed. It has to be within the period of limitation. So, just
sending a letter to the higher authorities to settle the dues does not amount to
acknowledgement.
The acknowledgement within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act

must be unqualified. It must be an acknowledgement of an existing liability. An
admission of liability coupled with a declaration as to the arrangement proposed
for its satisfaction is an acknowledgement of liability, or with a prayer to grant
time for payment, in such a case limitation will be saved only to the date of the
letter of acknowledgement and not upto the time mentioned in the letter.
A mere reference to arbitration does not amount to an acknowledgement. An

agreement to refer the matter in dispute to arbitration and the award thereon would
amount to an acknowledgement of the debt.
Section 18 of the Limitation Act deals with the requirement for an authority of
acknowledgement which can be summarised as under:
(i) An admission of the acknowledgement;
(ii) Such acknowledgement must be in respect of a liability in respect of property

or right;
(iii) It must be made before the expiry of the period of limitation; and
(iv) It should be in writing and signed by the party against whom such property or
right is claimed or an agent duly authorised in this behalf.
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Section 18 of the Limitation Act is applicable to local or special laws, unless

expressly excluded as per Section 29 of the Limitation Act. Section 18 is not
applicable for execution of decree.
An acknowledgement does not create any new right. It only extends the period of
limitation. The person claiming benefit of an acknowledgement must be bona fide.
The onus lies on the creditor to prove that the acknowledgement was made within
time.
The correct interpretation of the words ‘prescribed period’ in Section 18 is that the
acknowledgement or payment should have been made before the claim had
become time-barred, and that is prescribed period. The Section 18 requires that the
payment must be made within the prescribed period. It does not require that the
writing should be made before the expiry of the prescribed period where the
plaintiff in a suit for redemption relies on acknowledgement he must show that it
was made before the expiry of the period of limitation.
In Sampuran Singh v. Niranjan Kaur [AIR 1999 SC 1047], the Supreme Court has
held that the acknowledgement of liability has to be made prior to the expiry of the
period of limitation and if the limitation has already expired, it would not revive a
suit under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
It is pointed out that it is only during the subsistence of the period of limitation, if
any document is executed acknowledgement the dues, the limitation would be
received afresh from the said date of acknowledgement. Thus the
acknowledgement of liability which must be in writing by the party against whom
the property or right is claimed has to be within the period of limitation.
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In P. Sreedevi v. P. Appu [AIR 1991 K.er.76], it has been held that an admission of
past liability, that is, a debt already barred by limitation is not material and it is the
admission of subsisting liability that is an acknowledgement of liability giving rise
to fresh start of limitation. Therefore, there must appear that the statement is made
with relation to admit an existing jural relationship of debtor and creditor.
An acknowledgement has the effect of making a new period run from the date of
acknowledgement. It does not create a new contract. It must, therefore distinct
from a novation of contract within the meaning of Section 62 of Contract Act.
Therefore, an acknowledgement of a barred debt cannot give a fresh period of
limitation in favour of the credit. However, a time barred debt cannot be revived by
an acknowledgement but it can be revived only by a new contract that is by
promise to pay under Section 25(3) of the Limitation Act.
Even if the acknowledgement be a conditional one, the condition must be fulfilled

that such acknowledgement should save limitation.
It is not necessary that the acknowledgement of liability must be made to the

person who is entitled to the right in respect of which the liability arises, or to any
one through whom he claims. An acknowledgement, to whomsoever made, is a
valid acknowledgement if it points with reasonable certainty to the liability under
dispute. Thus an admission of liability in respect of a decree amounts to an
acknowledgment although the admission is not made to the decree-holder.
An admission of liability contained in a deed of gift executed by the debtor or in a

will of a deceased is a valid acknowledgement. A statement contained in a Kabala
that a certain mortgage on some of the properties comprised in the Kabala is still
subsisting is an acknowledgment.
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If the insolvent writes down a debt in his schedule as owing the debt to a named
person and signs the schedule, it would operate as an acknowledgement under
Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
An acknowledgement without signature is no acknowledgement. Signature need

not necessarily be by writing one’s name. Making his mark by an illiterate debtor
is sufficient. Under Section 3(52) of the General Clauses Act, “Sign should, with
reference to a person who is unable to write his name, includes his mark”. Initials
are equivalent to signature.
As per explanation (b) of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, it is not necessary that
the acknowledgement must be in the handwriting of the maker. But it must be
signed by the person making it or by his agent otherwise it will not be valid.
In the case of acknowledgement made by an agent, it is necessary for the plaintiff

to prove that the agent was duly authorised by the defendant to make an
acknowledgement of a liability on his behalf. In the case of acknowledgement
made by an agent, it is further necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the agent
was duly authorised by the defendant to make an acknowledgement of a liability
on his behalf. An acknowledgement by an agent being sufficient to affect has
principal – acknowledgement by one party will, it is apprehended, be regarded as
an acknowledgement by the firm.
To attract the explanation (b) of Section 18(1), a special power of attorney

acknowledging debt is not necessary, general authroisation is sufficient.
Unstamped acknowledgement is not acknowledgement. If any acknowledgement is

unstamped, it, no doubt, comes within the mischief.
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In Tanjore Ramchandra v. Vellyanandan, [14 Mad. 258 (PC)] it has been held that
the acknowledgement does not entitle the creditor to claim interest at a higher rate
than that which was prevailing upto the date of acknowledgement.
In Velayudu v. Narasimha, [32 MLJ 263] -it has been held that an
acknowledgement of a mortgage -debt is good not only as against the person
acknowledging, but also as against those deriving title under him even prior to the
date of acknowledgement and subsequent to the debt acknowledged.
Sec 19-
Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the

expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or
by his agent duly authorized in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be
computed from the time when the payment was made.
Provided that save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of
January, 1928, an acknowledgement of the payment appears in handwriting of, or
in a writing signed by, the person making the payment.
For the purposes of Section 19, according to the explanation,
(a) Where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the
rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment;
(b) ‘Debt’ does not include money payable under a decree or order of a Court.
Section 19 does not prevent the operation of Section 18 and the two sections are
not mutually exclusive. Section 18 only operates against the person who makes the
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acknowledgement, but Section 19 makes the part- payment good in favour of any
suit on that liability. Under Section 19 all that is necessary is that an
acknowledgement of payment should appear in the handwriting of or be signed by
the person making it. But this is not enough under Section 18. Under Section 18
there must be an admission of existing liability, while under Section 19 it is enough
if the writing merely records the fact of payment.
An acknowledgement under Section 18 must be by the person against whom

property or right is claimed or by some person through whom he derives his title or
liability to payment. For the purpose of Section 19 it will only be by the person
liable to pay debt.
Mere endorsement of payment without anything more will not operate as an

acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act and it will be too broad a
proposition to lay down that every endorsement of subsisting liability for debt
would amount to acknowledgement. In Ramchandra v. Giridharilal, [ILR (1964)
15 Raj. 282] it has been held that endorsement of the debtor on the back of the
hand note in the handwriting of the debtor that certain amounts were paid by the
debtor on a certain date attracts only Section 19 but that does not amount to
acknowledgement of liability within the meaning of Section 18.
If the endorsement is not by the debtor but by the creditor that would not amount to
payment to attract Section 19. In Today Stationers and Gift Centres v. Allahabad
Bank, [2004(1) ICC 166 (P&H)] it has been held that mere entry by the bank in its
books of account of the interest due to the debtor would not stop the time running
because such unilateral entry by the bank in his books of account was not based on
mutual transactions and are unilateral action by the bank.
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Section 19 of the Limitation Act applies only to a suit for a debt both secured and
secured or legacy or to the case of a mortgage with possession. It does not apply to
a suit for redemption of a mortgage. The proviso to this section does not apply
where the mortgaged land is in possession of the mortgagee.
Section 19 of the Limitation Act does not make a distinction between a payment of
interest and a payment of principal.
The word ‘prescribed’ in Section 19 means the period prescribed in the first
schedule and the Limitation Act and not the period within which the plaintiff may
bring his suit.
A payment by cheque satisfies the requirement of Section 19 of the Limitation Act

in as much as the acknowledgement of payment appears in the handwriting of or in
a writing signed by the person making the payment in the form of a cheque.
Regarding post-dated cheque, the payment for purposes of Section 19 can only the
date which the cheque bears and cannot be on the date of the cheque is handed
over, for the cheque, being post¬dated, can never be paid till the date on the
cheque arrived.
A payment saves limitation under Section 19 if it is made by a person liable to pay

it. The expression ‘person liable to pay is of wide connotation. It is not restricted to
personal liability only. It will cover the property liability also.
The fact of part-payment of the principal of a debt, interest on principal must

appear in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by the person making the
payment and not in that of any other person, even though the latter may have been
expressly authorized to endorse the fact of payment. Where the payment is made
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by a person who does not know how to write the endorsement it may be made in
the handwriting of a third party and the payer may subscribe his mark to the
endorsement.
In order to attract Section 19, payment has to be made within the period of
limitation and not that the acknowledgement of such payment has to be made
within the period of limitation. It will suffice if it is signed before the suit is
commenced.
Under Section 19 it is the payment which extends the limitation and such payment
has to be proved in a particular way, namely, a written or signed
acknowledgement. That is the only mode of proof of such payment.
Payment of part of the mortgage-debt made by one of the mortgagors will give a
fresh start of limitation to the mortgagee not only against the mortgagor making the
payment but also against all the mortgagors..
The agent who can give the creditor the benefit of Section 19 has to act within the
terms of his authority. The guardian of a minor appointed under the guardians and
wards Act is an agent authorized to make a part- payment of the principal of a debt
due by the ward, if it is shown that the guardian’s act is for the protection and
benefit of the wards property.
It is not necessary that the agent should be authorized in writing to make a

payment, nor that he should be expressly authorized; it is sufficient that the
authority is implied. Payment by the principal debtor does not give a fresh starting
point against the surety. If a suit is barred by limitation as against the principal
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debtor, but if the surety has made certain payments and endorsements on the bond
on which the suit is based, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree against the surety.
Explanation (a) to Section 19 is meant to extend the time for a suit by the
mortgagee to recover a debt secured by the Usufructuary mortgage, and does not
apply to a suit for redemption by the mortgagor. If the mortgagee is in possession
of the mortgaged land and receive the produce of the land in lien of interest, such
receipt of produce must be deemed to be payment of interest in Dadia Bhailal
Motichand v. Vanad Maganlal Hirabhai, [AIR 1966 Guj. 59] it has been held that
where rent note is executed by the mortgagor simultaneously with the mortgage,
the transaction is a mortgage with possession, and limitation runs from the date
when the part-payment was made by the mortgagor to the mortgagee. ‘Land’ in
Explanation (a) to Section 19 includes house.
Explanation (b) to Section 19 of Limitation Act lays down that ‘debt’ does not
include money payable under a decree or order of the Court. Sec 25 of Limitation
Act, 1963.
25. Acquisition of easements by prescription.—(1) Where the access and use of

light or air to and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith as an
easement, and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, and where
any way or watercourse or the use of any water or any other easement (whether
affirmative or negative) has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person
claiming title thereto as an easement and as of right without interruption and for
twenty years, the right to such access and use of light or air, way, watercourse, use
of water, or other easement shall be absolute and indefeasible. (2) Each of the said
periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within two years next
before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is
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contested. (3) Where the property over which a right is claimed under sub-section
(1) belongs to the Government that sub-section shall be read as if for the words
“twenty years” the words “thirty years” were substituted. 10 Explanation.—
Nothing is an interruption within the meaning of this section, unless where there is
an actual discontinuance of the possession or enjoyment by reason of an
obstruction by the act of some person other than the claimant, and unless such
obstruction is submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the claimant has
notice thereof and of the person making or authorizing the same to be made.
Sec 27 of limitation act.
According to the Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, at the determination of

the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any
property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.
The principle underlying the Section 27 of the Limitation Act is that the person
having the right to possession suffers his right to the property barred by law of
limitation.
Section 27 only applies to persons who are out of possession and seeks to recover
possession, but not to the case of a person who is still in possession of the property.
Where no period of limitation is provided, then Section 27 does not apply. Section
27 applies only to suits and not to applications.
Section 27 is an exception to the general principle that the law of limitation only
bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right itself. So f
ar as a suit for possession is concerned, Section 27 states that at the determination

of the period thereby limited to any person instituting a suit for possession being
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out of possession, his right to such property shall be extinguished. Section 27 is not
actually related to the law of limitation but to a law of prescription which has to be
distinguished from the law of limitation.
Section 27 is not merely procedural but substantial. The Section 27 only

extinguishes the title of the rightful owner.
If the rightful owner, therefore, does not institute any suit for recovery of
possession within a period prescribed for such suit, then the right of the said
rightful owner is extinguished and the person in wrongful possession shall acquire
title over it.
The principle of Section 27 also applies in areas where the Limitation Act does not
apply. In Kartar Singh v. Khankha, (AIR 1935 Lah. 787), it has been held that even
though the Section 27 does not apply in terms to Special or Local Acts, but the
principle underlying Section 27 applies to local laws. In Balwantah v. Ganpat,
1975 MVLJ 9), it has been held that failure to sue for possession within the time
prescribed by the time prescribed in Bombay Tenancy Act has also the effect of
extinguishing the right of that person to entitle to sue under the Act.
Where a person goes out of India voluntarily or under compulsion, it is his duty, to
make some arrangement to look after his property left in India. When he does not
do that and a person enters the land openly and continues to possess in assertion of
his right and completes the requisite number of years, he acquires title by adverse
possession under Section 27 of the Limitation Act.
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Section 27 of the Limitation Act is limited to suits for possession of the property.
So it does not apply to a suit by a mortgagee for recovery of the money due to him
by sale of the mortgage property. The mortgagor’s remedy may be barred if he
omits to sue within the statutory period, but his right is not extinguished.
In Unify & Co. v. D. Sugar Mills, (AIR 1970 Cal. 80), it has been held that Section
27 applies to both movable and immovable property for the possession of which
the right has to be exercised within the period of limitation prescribed for such
recovery failing which the right to such property shall be extinguished by virtue of
Section 27 of the Limitation Act.
In Shankaram v. Veeramani, (AIR 1957 Ker. 117), it has been held that a suit for
redemption of a usufructuary mortgage and the suit for recovery of property under
Article 65 of the Limitation Act would attract Section 27 of the Limitation Act.
The effect of Section 27 is that right to property shall be extinguished after expiry
of the period limited for instituting a suit for possession of the property. Where the
plaintiff fails to bring the suit for possession based on his title within 12 years of
dispossession of the immovable property by the defendant his suit would fail as
there would be complete extinguishment of his title. However, any suit brought
before expiry of 12 years of dispossession would arrest the period of adverse
possession and a decree passed in his favour would relate back to the date of
institution of the suit, irrespective of the time taken for prosecuting the suit and the
execution.
Once the person’s title to the property has been extinguished by adverse possession
his re-entry to the property will not revive the lost title.
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In Fakirappa v. Ningappa, (AIR 1949 Bom. 266), it has been held that under
Section 27 of the Limitation Act right itself is extinguished. Twelve years adverse
possession of land by a wrong-doer not only bars the remedy of the original owner
to recover possession but also extinguishes his title and confers a good title upon
the wrong-doer.
A person who claims adverse possession has to prove that he has remained in
uninterrupted possession of the property to the knowledge of the true owner and
has denied the title of the true owner and asserted his own rights of ownership in
the property to the exclusion of the true owner. Otherwise mere possession for any
number of years cannot constitute adverse possession. Adverse possession implies
that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right.
‘Possession’ means effective physical control or occupation. There are three

requisites of possession:
(i) There must be actual or potential physical control;
(ii) In Zile Singh v. Munshi, (AIR 1990 P&H 50), it has been
held that when after the order of eviction was passed the
tenant was continuing in possession for more than 12 years
and the landlord did not file any execution for possession
within the above period the right to recover possession has
been lost by lapse of time. However, it is a case in which
right may be subsisting but remedy lost. In Ajit Chopra v.
Sadhuram, (AIR 2000 SC 212), the Supreme Court has
made it clear that even if the execution of the decree for
execution is barred by limitation that does not debar the
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landlord filing a suit for recovery of possession based on

title.
The Registration Act, 1908
Sec 17 of the act.
The Registration Act, 1908 serves the purpose of proper recording and registration
of documents/instruments, which give them more authenticity. Registration means
recording of the contents of a document with a Registering Officer and
preservation of copies of original document. Documents are registered for the
purpose of conservation of evidence, assurance of title, publicity of documents and
prevention of fraud.
Object of Registration Act
The object of Registration and inter-alia Registration Act is elaborately discussed

by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. versus
State of Haryana and Another AIR 2012 SC 206, as under:
“The Registration Act, 1908, was enacted with the intention of providing
orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to transactions relating to
immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of
transfer.”
Registration of Document
The documents registrable under the Act fall under three categories.
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In the first category, documents relating to transactions which according to the

substantive law, can be affected only by registered documents. In order for a
transaction to be valid must be effected by a registered instrument only. What it
provides is that when there is a written instrument evidencing a transaction, it
must, in certain cases, be registered. Under section 17 of the Registration Act, the
compulsorily registrable documents are given.
In the second category, certain transactions can be effected without writing, i.e.
partitions, releases, settlements etc. But, if the transaction is evidenced by a writing
and relates to immovable property, the Registration Act steps in and clauses (b)
and (c) of Section 17(1) of said Act require registration of such documents, subject
to the exception specified in sub-section 2 of that section. If an authority to adopt is
conferred in writing, other than a Will, it is also required to be registered vide
section 17(3).
In the third category, it is open to the parties, if they so choose, to get certain
documents registered at their option and this is permitted by section 18. ‘Will’
need not be registered but it is open to the parties to get it registered under the third
category.
Under the Registration Act, the following documents are compulsorily registrable.
1. Instruments of gift of immovable property.

2. Other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare,
assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or
interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and
upwards, to or in immovable property.
3. Non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any
consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or
extinction of any such right, title or interest.
4. Leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one
year, or reserving a yearly rent.
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5. Non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a

Court or any award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to
create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any
right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred
rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property.
Limitation for registration of a document
Limitation for registration of a document under Section 23 of the Act, subject to

certain exceptions, any document other than a Will has to be presented for
registration within four months from the date of its execution. The term ‘execution’
means signing of the agreement.
Section 17 deals with documents of which registration is compulsory.
Sec 18 of the Registration act.
The real purpose of the Registration Act, 1908 (the Act) is to provide a method of
public registration of documents so as to give information to people regarding legal
rights and obligations arising or affecting a particular property, and to perpetuate
documents which may afterwards be of legal importance, and to secure every
person dealing with any property against fraud. The scheme of the Act is to
consolidate the law relating to registration.
Registration lends inviolability and importance to certain types of documents. At

the time of registration, it is very essential to see that the officer is duly competent
to register a document and that the document is not presented to unqualified or a
wrong registration circle, as otherwise such registration would be of no use or
validity. If the language in the document is not understood by the registering
officer, he shall refuse to register the document. Also, no non-testamentary deed
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relating to immovable property would be accepted for registration, unless it

contains a description of such property sufficient to identify the same.
If an instrument is compulsorily registrable, it should be presented for registration

before an officer who is competent to register such document which can be read
under Section 17 of the Act. However, in case of an instrument which is not
compulsorily registrable, it is complete without registration.
At this juncture, it is very essential to refer Section 18 of the Act, 1908 which deals
with “Documents of which registration is optional”.
Section 18 of the Registration Act, 1908- Documents of which registration is

optional
Any of the following documents may be registered under this Act, namely:
(a) instruments (other than instruments of gift and wills) which purport or operate
to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any
right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of a value less then one
hundred rupees, to or in immovable property;
(b) instruments acknowledging the receipt or payment of any consideration on

account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any
such right, title or interest;
(c) leases of immovable property for any term not exceeding one year, and leases
exempted under Section 17;
(cc) instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a Court or any

award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to create, declare,
assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or
interest, whether vested or contingent, of a value less than one hundred rupees, to
or in immovable property;]
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(d) instruments (other than wills) which purport or operate to create, declare,
assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest to or in movable property;
(e) wills; and
(f) all other documents not required by Section 17 to be registered.
** Sec 23 to 31 of The Registration Act 1908.
Introduction
The provisions relating to the registration of documents are now scattered about in
seven enactments. This will make the law more easily ascertainable. It will further
clear the Statute-book of three entire Acts and will enable two more Acts to be
entirely removed from it on the coming into force of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, and of the Indian Limitation Bill, now before Council. The opportunity has
been taken to incorporate alterations of a formal character intended merely to
improve and simplify the language of the existing Act. The numbering of the
sections of the Act of 1877 has been preserved. It has been found that the mere
process of consolidation might result in the law being changed in some respects.
To avoid this some few amendments appear to be necessary.
Purpose of the Act
The purpose of the Registration Act, amongst other things, is to provide a method
of public registration of documents so as to give information to people regarding
legal rights and obligations arising or affecting a particular property, and to
perpetuate documents which may afterwards be of legal importance, and also to
prevent fraud. Registration lends inviolability and importance to certain classes of
documents.
Registration procedure in the Act
The scheme of the Act is to consolidate the law relating to registration and to
provide for the establishment of its registration. It lays down what documents
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require compulsory registration. S. 23 of the Act provides the time for presenting
the documents for registration.
It provides limitation for getting a document registered. S.25 provides for
condonation of delay in presenting documents for registration. S. 34 specifically
provides for that enquiry, that can be held before the registration by the Registering
Officer: Central WarehousingIt is well settled that an instrument which creates a
right or interest in the rents, profits, benefits and income from an immovable
properly, is a document which is compulsorily registrable. Thus, a document
creating an assignment of a debt will not require registration, but a document
assigning rents will require registration. If the power of attorney in question is to
be treated as creating an equitable assignment of rents, it will require registration
and if not registered, will be void and unenforceable. The power of attorney does
not create or recognize any right in or relating to any immovable property or
benefit arising there from in favor of the bank. It merely authorizes the bank to act
as the company's agent to perform the acts stated therein.
The question whether a machinery which is embedded in the earth is movable
property or an immovable property, depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case; primarily, the Court will have to take into consideration the intention of
the parties when it decided to embed the machinery whether such embedment was
intended to be temporary or permanent (case under Stamp Act, 1899)
Conclusion
The registrations act illustrates about the procedure of registering, what
documentations should be registered and how it should be done. The registration of
Will documents, powers and duties of the registrations department. It also explains
about the penalties and punishment for not following the procedure and not
completing things on time. This Acts brings a good administration system among
government offices and the court system that everything should be managed with
in time and in a proper procedure in order to avoid future confusions.
** Sec 47- 50
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47. Time from which registered document operates.—A registered document shall
operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no
registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its
registration. 48. Registered documents relating to property when to take effect
against oral agreements.— All non-testamentary documents duly registered under
this Act, and relating to any property, whether movable or immovable, shall take
effect against any order agreement or declaration relating to such property, unless
where the agreement or declaration has been accompanied or followed by delivery
of possession 1 [and the same constitutes a valid transfer under any law for the
time being in force: Provided that a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds as defined
in section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), shall take effect
against any mortgage-deed subsequently executed and registered which relates to
the same property]. 49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be
registered.—No document required by section 17 1 [or by any provision of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882)], to be registered shall— (a) affect any
immovable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be
received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such
power, unless it has been registered: 1 [Provided that an unregistered document
affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in
a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.
Sd/-
Mr. Yashashvi Singh
Page 33 of 33

E-Notes Legal Ethics Unit-2

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Chanderprabhu Jain College of Higher Studies

Class : B.A.LL.B IX Sem

Paper Code : LLB 501

Subject : Legal Ethics and Court Craft

Faculty : Mr. Yashashvi Singh

-Important Cases on sec 5 to 9 of limitation act.

In the present case the question is as to whether an appeal lies against an

Sec 14 ,15 of limitation act

Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. —

As Section 15 refers to a suit or an application for execution, Section 15(1) does

The expression “stayed by injunction or order” in Section 15(1) has reference to

To obtain the benefit of Section 15(4), the following conditions have to be

(ii) It should be a suit and not an application.

Sec 18, 19 of Limitation Act, 1963.

Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that:

For the purpose of this Section, —

(a) An acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact

Acknowledgement is a statement in writing that a debt is due and unpaid. Under

The acknowledgment, if any has to be prior to the expiration of the prescribed

An acknowledgment is not limited in respect of a debt only it may be in respect of

Promise to pay is not acknowledgement. An acknowledgement need not contain a

The acknowledgement of liability must be in writing. Oral evidence is to be

The acknowledgement within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act

A mere reference to arbitration does not amount to an acknowledgement. An

(i) An admission of the acknowledgement;

(ii) Such acknowledgement must be in respect of a liability in respect of property

Section 18 of the Limitation Act is applicable to local or special laws, unless

Even if the acknowledgement be a conditional one, the condition must be fulfilled

It is not necessary that the acknowledgement of liability must be made to the

An admission of liability contained in a deed of gift executed by the debtor or in a

An acknowledgement without signature is no acknowledgement. Signature need

In the case of acknowledgement made by an agent, it is necessary for the plaintiff

To attract the explanation (b) of Section 18(1), a special power of attorney

Unstamped acknowledgement is not acknowledgement. If any acknowledgement is

Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the

For the purposes of Section 19, according to the explanation,

An acknowledgement under Section 18 must be by the person against whom

Mere endorsement of payment without anything more will not operate as an

A payment by cheque satisfies the requirement of Section 19 of the Limitation Act

A payment saves limitation under Section 19 if it is made by a person liable to pay

The fact of part-payment of the principal of a debt, interest on principal must

It is not necessary that the agent should be authorized in writing to make a

25. Acquisition of easements by prescription.—(1) Where the access and use of

Sec 27 of limitation act.

According to the Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, at the determination of

ar as a suit for possession is concerned, Section 27 states that at the determination

Section 27 is not merely procedural but substantial. The Section 27 only

‘Possession’ means effective physical control or occupation. There are three

(i) There must be actual or potential physical control;

landlord filing a suit for recovery of possession based on

The Registration Act, 1908

Sec 17 of the act.

Object of Registration Act

The object of Registration and inter-alia Registration Act is elaborately discussed

In the first category, documents relating to transactions which according to the

1. Instruments of gift of immovable property.

5. Non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a

Limitation for registration of a document

Limitation for registration of a document under Section 23 of the Act, subject to

Section 17 deals with documents of which registration is compulsory.

Sec 18 of the Registration act.

Registration lends inviolability and importance to certain types of documents. At

relating to immovable property would be accepted for registration, unless it

If an instrument is compulsorily registrable, it should be presented for registration