The first issue is to consider

whether the oral statement is a

term of a contract. The Parol
Evidence
Rule states that the point is that
such statements and actions
reveal the terms of the contract
which the
parties intended or hope to make.
They are superseded by, and
merged in, the contract itself.
This
means the court will just look at
the contents of the written
document, as shown in the case
of Codelfa
Construction Pty Ltd v State
Real Authority of NSW (1982).
Section 91 and Section 92
of the
Evidence Act also states that once
the terms of the contract have
been reduced by or by consent of
the
party to form a document, no
evidence shall be given in proof
of the terms of the contract except
the
document itself. Hence, no oral
evidence shall be admitted as
between the parties for the
purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from its terms.
However, there are exceptions to
these 2
statutes. This includes situations
where there may be suspicion of
fraud, where the contract made
was
partly written and partly oral,
condition precedents must be met
before contract can be performed,
where parties may have entered
into a subsequent oral agreement
by which they have varied, or any
usage or custom which may not
appear in the contract, and also
when any fact may be proved
which
shows in what manner the
language of a document is related
to existing factors. These
exceptions are
stated as Proviso (a)-(f) to
Section 92 of Contracts Act.
Another area that needs to be
discussed is the
Contractual Intention Test. This
test consists of factors which are
time lapse, relative importance of
the statement, statement not
included when contract reduced
to writing, and special knowledge
or skill
of the parties. In this case, Joyce
had made a contract with Phillip
based on her plans to buy land for
the purpose of building 4
townhouses. Joyce had
reminded Phillip of her plans and
asked again
whether she would have any
problems gaining a permit to
build 4 townhouses to which
Phillip had
answered her “You won’t have
any problems” right before the
signing of the contract. Hence,
because
this oral statement happened right
before the signing of the contract
and it is important as it is the
main purpose for the contract,
and it was not included in the
contract when it was reduced to
writing
and also because Joyce had to
rely on the special knowledge of
Philip as a real estate agent, the
oral
statement is a term of the
contract.
The next issue which needs to be
discussed is what category the
breach of term belong to. There
are 3
types of terms known as
Condition, Warranty and
Innominate terms. A condition
basically represents
the purpose of the contract; it is a
term that goes to the root of the
contract, as seen in the case of
Poussard v Spiers and Pond
(1876). A warranty is not as
important as condition, where it
does not go
to the root of the contract and the
relative importance of the term is
not as much as condition as seen
in the case of Bettini v
Gye (1876). Innominate terms
are terms that the courts
was unable to
categorise as either condition or
warranty as seen in the case of
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd
v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd
(1962). This terms are
decided based on the
seriousness of the
consequence from the breach. In
this case, the term can be
considered as a condition because
Joyce
has bought the land for the
purpose to build 4 townhouses
but in fact the land could only
obtain the
permit to build 2 townhouses.
Evidently, Philip had breached a
condition.
The third issue is the
remedies that Joyce is able to
claim. From the discussion
above, it was
concluded that the breach is a
breach of condition which allows
the injured party to terminate the
contract and claim for damages.
As stated in Section 74 of
Contracts Act, the main purpose
of
damages is to place the injured
party in the position they would
have been in, if the contract had
been
performed, and this was decided
in the case Addis v Gramophone
Co Ltd (1909). The breach must
have causes loss and also the
victim to mitigate the loss. This
was decided from case Reg Glass
Pty
Ltd v Rivers Locking System Pty
Ltd (1968) and Payzu Limited v
Saunders (1919) respectively.
The
breach of the condition entitles
the innocent party to rescind
contract, rescind contract and sue
for
damages or accept breach and sue
for damages. Here, Joyce will
have to accept the breach and sue
for
damages as once the land has
been bought by her, it is highly
unlikely for her to terminate the
contract. However, she may claim
for damages amounting to
RM300,000 which is the
difference of
the price of the land for the
purpose of building 4 townhouses
and the price of the land she
bought.
The first issue is to consider
whether the oral statement is a
term of a contract. The Parol
Evidence
Rule states that the point is that
such statements and actions
reveal the terms of the contract
which the
parties intended or hope to make.
They are superseded by, and
merged in, the contract itself.
This
means the court will just look at
the contents of the written
document, as shown in the case
of Codelfa
Construction Pty Ltd v State
Real Authority of NSW (1982).
Section 91 and Section 92
of the
Evidence Act also states that once
the terms of the contract have
been reduced by or by consent of
the
party to form a document, no
evidence shall be given in proof
of the terms of the contract except
the
document itself. Hence, no oral
evidence shall be admitted as
between the parties for the
purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from its terms.
However, there are exceptions to
these 2
statutes. This includes situations
where there may be suspicion of
fraud, where the contract made
was
partly written and partly oral,
condition precedents must be met
before contract can be performed,
where parties may have entered
into a subsequent oral agreement
by which they have varied, or any
usage or custom which may not
appear in the contract, and also
when any fact may be proved
which
shows in what manner the
language of a document is related
to existing factors. These
exceptions are
stated as Proviso (a)-(f) to
Section 92 of Contracts Act.
Another area that needs to be
discussed is the
Contractual Intention Test. This
test consists of factors which are
time lapse, relative importance of
the statement, statement not
included when contract reduced
to writing, and special knowledge
or skill
of the parties. In this case, Joyce
had made a contract with Phillip
based on her plans to buy land for
the purpose of building 4
townhouses. Joyce had
reminded Phillip of her plans and
asked again
whether she would have any
problems gaining a permit to
build 4 townhouses to which
Phillip had
answered her “You won’t have
any problems” right before the
signing of the contract. Hence,
because
this oral statement happened right
before the signing of the contract
and it is important as it is the
main purpose for the contract,
and it was not included in the
contract when it was reduced to
writing
and also because Joyce had to
rely on the special knowledge of
Philip as a real estate agent, the
oral
statement is a term of the
contract.
The next issue which needs to be
discussed is what category the
breach of term belong to. There
are 3
types of terms known as
Condition, Warranty and
Innominate terms. A condition
basically represents
the purpose of the contract; it is a
term that goes to the root of the
contract, as seen in the case of
Poussard v Spiers and Pond
(1876). A warranty is not as
important as condition, where it
does not go
to the root of the contract and the
relative importance of the term is
not as much as condition as seen
in the case of Bettini v
Gye (1876). Innominate terms
are terms that the courts
was unable to
categorise as either condition or
warranty as seen in the case of
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd
v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd
(1962). This terms are
decided based on the
seriousness of the
consequence from the breach. In
this case, the term can be
considered as a condition because
Joyce
has bought the land for the
purpose to build 4 townhouses
but in fact the land could only
obtain the
permit to build 2 townhouses.
Evidently, Philip had breached a
condition.
The third issue is the
remedies that Joyce is able to
claim. From the discussion
above, it was
concluded that the breach is a
breach of condition which allows
the injured party to terminate the
contract and claim for damages.
As stated in Section 74 of
Contracts Act, the main purpose
of
damages is to place the injured
party in the position they would
have been in, if the contract had
been
performed, and this was decided
in the case Addis v Gramophone
Co Ltd (1909). The breach must
have causes loss and also the
victim to mitigate the loss. This
was decided from case Reg Glass
Pty
Ltd v Rivers Locking System Pty
Ltd (1968) and Payzu Limited v
Saunders (1919) respectively.
The
breach of the condition entitles
the innocent party to rescind
contract, rescind contract and sue
for
damages or accept breach and sue
for damages. Here, Joyce will
have to accept the breach and sue
for
damages as once the land has
been bought by her, it is highly
unlikely for her to terminate the
contract. However, she may claim
for damages amounting to
RM300,000 which is the
difference of
the price of the land for the
purpose of building 4 townhouses
and the price of the land she
bought
The first issue is to consider
whether the oral statement is a
term of a contract. The Parol
Evidence
Rule states that the point is that
such statements and actions
reveal the terms of the contract
which the
parties intended or hope to make.
They are superseded by, and
merged in, the contract itself.
This
means the court will just look at
the contents of the written
document, as shown in the case
of Codelfa
Construction Pty Ltd v State
Real Authority of NSW (1982).
Section 91 and Section 92
of the
Evidence Act also states that once
the terms of the contract have
been reduced by or by consent of
the
party to form a document, no
evidence shall be given in proof
of the terms of the contract except
the
document itself. Hence, no oral
evidence shall be admitted as
between the parties for the
purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from its terms.
However, there are exceptions to
these 2
statutes. This includes situations
where there may be suspicion of
fraud, where the contract made
was
partly written and partly oral,
condition precedents must be met
before contract can be performed,
where parties may have entered
into a subsequent oral agreement
by which they have varied, or any
usage or custom which may not
appear in the contract, and also
when any fact may be proved
which
shows in what manner the
language of a document is related
to existing factors. These
exceptions are
stated as Proviso (a)-(f) to
Section 92 of Contracts Act.
Another area that needs to be
discussed is the
Contractual Intention Test. This
test consists of factors which are
time lapse, relative importance of
the statement, statement not
included when contract reduced
to writing, and special knowledge
or skill
of the parties. In this case, Joyce
had made a contract with Phillip
based on her plans to buy land for
the purpose of building 4
townhouses. Joyce had
reminded Phillip of her plans and
asked again
whether she would have any
problems gaining a permit to
build 4 townhouses to which
Phillip had
answered her “You won’t have
any problems” right before the
signing of the contract. Hence,
because
this oral statement happened right
before the signing of the contract
and it is important as it is the
main purpose for the contract,
and it was not included in the
contract when it was reduced to
writing
and also because Joyce had to
rely on the special knowledge of
Philip as a real estate agent, the
oral
statement is a term of the
contract.
The next issue which needs to be
discussed is what category the
breach of term belong to. There
are 3
types of terms known as
Condition, Warranty and
Innominate terms. A condition
basically represents
the purpose of the contract; it is a
term that goes to the root of the
contract, as seen in the case of
Poussard v Spiers and Pond
(1876). A warranty is not as
important as condition, where it
does not go
to the root of the contract and the
relative importance of the term is
not as much as condition as seen
in the case of Bettini v
Gye (1876). Innominate terms
are terms that the courts
was unable to
categorise as either condition or
warranty as seen in the case of
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd
v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd
(1962). This terms are
decided based on the
seriousness of the
consequence from the breach. In
this case, the term can be
considered as a condition because
Joyce
has bought the land for the
purpose to build 4 townhouses
but in fact the land could only
obtain the
permit to build 2 townhouses.
Evidently, Philip had breached a
condition.
The third issue is the
remedies that Joyce is able to
claim. From the discussion
above, it was
concluded that the breach is a
breach of condition which allows
the injured party to terminate the
contract and claim for damages.
As stated in Section 74 of
Contracts Act, the main purpose
of
damages is to place the injured
party in the position they would
have been in, if the contract had
been
performed, and this was decided
in the case Addis v Gramophone
Co Ltd (1909). The breach must
have causes loss and also the
victim to mitigate the loss. This
was decided from case Reg Glass
Pty
Ltd v Rivers Locking System Pty
Ltd (1968) and Payzu Limited v
Saunders (1919) respectively.
The
breach of the condition entitles
the innocent party to rescind
contract, rescind contract and sue
for
damages or accept breach and sue
for damages. Here, Joyce will
have to accept the breach and sue
for
damages as once the land has
been bought by her, it is highly
unlikely for her to terminate the
contract. However, she may claim
for damages amounting to
RM300,000 which is the
difference of
the price of the land for the
purpose of building 4 townhouses
and the price of the land she
bought.
The first issue is to consider
whether the oral statement is a
term of a contract. The Parol
Evidence
Rule states that the point is that
such statements and actions
reveal the terms of the contract
which the
parties intended or hope to make.
They are superseded by, and
merged in, the contract itself.
This
means the court will just look at
the contents of the written
document, as shown in the case
of Codelfa
Construction Pty Ltd v State
Real Authority of NSW (1982).
Section 91 and Section 92
of the
Evidence Act also states that once
the terms of the contract have
been reduced by or by consent of
the
party to form a document, no
evidence shall be given in proof
of the terms of the contract except
the
document itself. Hence, no oral
evidence shall be admitted as
between the parties for the
purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from its terms.
However, there are exceptions to
these 2
statutes. This includes situations
where there may be suspicion of
fraud, where the contract made
was
partly written and partly oral,
condition precedents must be met
before contract can be performed,
where parties may have entered
into a subsequent oral agreement
by which they have varied, or any
usage or custom which may not
appear in the contract, and also
when any fact may be proved
which
shows in what manner the
language of a document is related
to existing factors. These
exceptions are
stated as Proviso (a)-(f) to
Section 92 of Contracts Act.
Another area that needs to be
discussed is the
Contractual Intention Test. This
test consists of factors which are
time lapse, relative importance of
the statement, statement not
included when contract reduced
to writing, and special knowledge
or skill
of the parties. In this case, Joyce
had made a contract with Phillip
based on her plans to buy land for
the purpose of building 4
townhouses. Joyce had
reminded Phillip of her plans and
asked again
whether she would have any
problems gaining a permit to
build 4 townhouses to which
Phillip had
answered her “You won’t have
any problems” right before the
signing of the contract. Hence,
because
this oral statement happened right
before the signing of the contract
and it is important as it is the
main purpose for the contract,
and it was not included in the
contract when it was reduced to
writing
and also because Joyce had to
rely on the special knowledge of
Philip as a real estate agent, the
oral
statement is a term of the
contract.
The next issue which needs to be
discussed is what category the
breach of term belong to. There
are 3
types of terms known as
Condition, Warranty and
Innominate terms. A condition
basically represents
the purpose of the contract; it is a
term that goes to the root of the
contract, as seen in the case of
Poussard v Spiers and Pond
(1876). A warranty is not as
important as condition, where it
does not go
to the root of the contract and the
relative importance of the term is
not as much as condition as seen
in the case of Bettini v
Gye (1876). Innominate terms
are terms that the courts
was unable to
categorise as either condition or
warranty as seen in the case of
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd
v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd
(1962). This terms are
decided based on the
seriousness of the
consequence from the breach. In
this case, the term can be
considered as a condition because
Joyce
has bought the land for the
purpose to build 4 townhouses
but in fact the land could only
obtain the
permit to build 2 townhouses.
Evidently, Philip had breached a
condition.
The third issue is the
remedies that Joyce is able to
claim. From the discussion
above, it was
concluded that the breach is a
breach of condition which allows
the injured party to terminate the
contract and claim for damages.
As stated in Section 74 of
Contracts Act, the main purpose
of
damages is to place the injured
party in the position they would
have been in, if the contract had
been
performed, and this was decided
in the case Addis v Gramophone
Co Ltd (1909). The breach must
have causes loss and also the
victim to mitigate the loss. This
was decided from case Reg Glass
Pty
Ltd v Rivers Locking System Pty
Ltd (1968) and Payzu Limited v
Saunders (1919) respectively.
The
breach of the condition entitles
the innocent party to rescind
contract, rescind contract and sue
for
damages or accept breach and sue
for damages. Here, Joyce will
have to accept the breach and sue
for
damages as once the land has
been bought by her, it is highly
unlikely for her to terminate the
contract. However, she may claim
for damages amounting to
RM300,000 which is the
difference of
the price of the land for the
purpose of building 4 townhouses
and the price of the land she
bought.
The first issue is to consider
whether the oral statement is a
term of a contract. The Parol
Evidence
Rule states that the point is that
such statements and actions
reveal the terms of the contract
which the
parties intended or hope to make.
They are superseded by, and
merged in, the contract itself.
This
means the court will just look at
the contents of the written
document, as shown in the case
of Codelfa
Construction Pty Ltd v State
Real Authority of NSW (1982).
Section 91 and Section 92
of the
Evidence Act also states that once
the terms of the contract have
been reduced by or by consent of
the
party to form a document, no
evidence shall be given in proof
of the terms of the contract except
the
document itself. Hence, no oral
evidence shall be admitted as
between the parties for the
purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from its terms.
However, there are exceptions to
these 2
statutes. This includes situations
where there may be suspicion of
fraud, where the contract made
was
partly written and partly oral,
condition precedents must be met
before contract can be performed,
where parties may have entered
into a subsequent oral agreement
by which they have varied, or any
usage or custom which may not
appear in the contract, and also
when any fact may be proved
which
shows in what manner the
language of a document is related
to existing factors. These
exceptions are
stated as Proviso (a)-(f) to
Section 92 of Contracts Act.
Another area that needs to be
discussed is the
Contractual Intention Test. This
test consists of factors which are
time lapse, relative importance of
the statement, statement not
included when contract reduced
to writing, and special knowledge
or skill
of the parties. In this case, Joyce
had made a contract with Phillip
based on her plans to buy land for
the purpose of building 4
townhouses. Joyce had
reminded Phillip of her plans and
asked again
whether she would have any
problems gaining a permit to
build 4 townhouses to which
Phillip had
answered her “You won’t have
any problems” right before the
signing of the contract. Hence,
because
this oral statement happened right
before the signing of the contract
and it is important as it is the
main purpose for the contract,
and it was not included in the
contract when it was reduced to
writing
and also because Joyce had to
rely on the special knowledge of
Philip as a real estate agent, the
oral
statement is a term of the
contract.
The next issue which needs to be
discussed is what category the
breach of term belong to. There
are 3
types of terms known as
Condition, Warranty and
Innominate terms. A condition
basically represents
the purpose of the contract; it is a
term that goes to the root of the
contract, as seen in the case of
Poussard v Spiers and Pond
(1876). A warranty is not as
important as condition, where it
does not go
to the root of the contract and the
relative importance of the term is
not as much as condition as seen
in the case of Bettini v
Gye (1876). Innominate terms
are terms that the courts
was unable to
categorise as either condition or
warranty as seen in the case of
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd
v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd
(1962). This terms are
decided based on the
seriousness of the
consequence from the breach. In
this case, the term can be
considered as a condition because
Joyce
has bought the land for the
purpose to build 4 townhouses
but in fact the land could only
obtain the
permit to build 2 townhouses.
Evidently, Philip had breached a
condition.
The third issue is the
remedies that Joyce is able to
claim. From the discussion
above, it was
concluded that the breach is a
breach of condition which allows
the injured party to terminate the
contract and claim for damages.
As stated in Section 74 of
Contracts Act, the main purpose
of
damages is to place the injured
party in the position they would
have been in, if the contract had
been
performed, and this was decided
in the case Addis v Gramophone
Co Ltd (1909). The breach must
have causes loss and also the
victim to mitigate the loss. This
was decided from case Reg Glass
Pty
Ltd v Rivers Locking System Pty
Ltd (1968) and Payzu Limited v
Saunders (1919) respectively.
The
breach of the condition entitles
the innocent party to rescind
contract, rescind contract and sue
for
damages or accept breach and sue
for damages. Here, Joyce will
have to accept the breach and sue
for
damages as once the land has
been bought by her, it is highly
unlikely for her to terminate the
contract. However, she may claim
for damages amounting to
RM300,000 which is the
difference of
the price of the land for the
purpose of building 4 townhouses
and the price of the land she
bought.
The first issue is to consider
whether the oral statement is a
term of a contract. The Parol
Evidence
Rule states that the point is that
such statements and actions
reveal the terms of the contract
which the
parties intended or hope to make.
They are superseded by, and
merged in, the contract itself.
This
means the court will just look at
the contents of the written
document, as shown in the case
of Codelfa
Construction Pty Ltd v State
Real Authority of NSW (1982).
Section 91 and Section 92
of the
Evidence Act also states that once
the terms of the contract have
been reduced by or by consent of
the
party to form a document, no
evidence shall be given in proof
of the terms of the contract except
the
document itself. Hence, no oral
evidence shall be admitted as
between the parties for the
purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from its terms.
However, there are exceptions to
these 2
statutes. This includes situations
where there may be suspicion of
fraud, where the contract made
was
partly written and partly oral,
condition precedents must be met
before contract can be performed,
where parties may have entered
into a subsequent oral agreement
by which they have varied, or any
usage or custom which may not
appear in the contract, and also
when any fact may be proved
which
shows in what manner the
language of a document is related
to existing factors. These
exceptions are
stated as Proviso (a)-(f) to
Section 92 of Contracts Act.
Another area that needs to be
discussed is the
Contractual Intention Test. This
test consists of factors which are
time lapse, relative importance of
the statement, statement not
included when contract reduced
to writing, and special knowledge
or skill
of the parties. In this case, Joyce
had made a contract with Phillip
based on her plans to buy land for
the purpose of building 4
townhouses. Joyce had
reminded Phillip of her plans and
asked again
whether she would have any
problems gaining a permit to
build 4 townhouses to which
Phillip had
answered her “You won’t have
any problems” right before the
signing of the contract. Hence,
because
this oral statement happened right
before the signing of the contract
and it is important as it is the
main purpose for the contract,
and it was not included in the
contract when it was reduced to
writing
and also because Joyce had to
rely on the special knowledge of
Philip as a real estate agent, the
oral
statement is a term of the
contract.
The next issue which needs to be
discussed is what category the
breach of term belong to. There
are 3
types of terms known as
Condition, Warranty and
Innominate terms. A condition
basically represents
the purpose of the contract; it is a
term that goes to the root of the
contract, as seen in the case of
Poussard v Spiers and Pond
(1876). A warranty is not as
important as condition, where it
does not go
to the root of the contract and the
relative importance of the term is
not as much as condition as seen
in the case of Bettini v
Gye (1876). Innominate terms
are terms that the courts
was unable to
categorise as either condition or
warranty as seen in the case of
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd
v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd
(1962). This terms are
decided based on the
seriousness of the
consequence from the breach. In
this case, the term can be
considered as a condition because
Joyce
has bought the land for the
purpose to build 4 townhouses
but in fact the land could only
obtain the
permit to build 2 townhouses.
Evidently, Philip had breached a
condition.
The third issue is the
remedies that Joyce is able to
claim. From the discussion
above, it was
concluded that the breach is a
breach of condition which allows
the injured party to terminate the
contract and claim for damages.
As stated in Section 74 of
Contracts Act, the main purpose
of
damages is to place the injured
party in the position they would
have been in, if the contract had
been
performed, and this was decided
in the case Addis v Gramophone
Co Ltd (1909). The breach must
have causes loss and also the
victim to mitigate the loss. This
was decided from case Reg Glass
Pty
Ltd v Rivers Locking System Pty
Ltd (1968) and Payzu Limited v
Saunders (1919) respectively.
The
breach of the condition entitles
the innocent party to rescind
contract, rescind contract and sue
for
damages or accept breach and sue
for damages. Here, Joyce will
have to accept the breach and sue
for
damages as once the land has
been bought by her, it is highly
unlikely for her to terminate the
contract. However, she may claim
for damages amounting to
RM300,000 which is the
difference of
the price of the land for the
purpose of building 4 townhouses
and the price of the land she
bought.
The first issue is to consider
whether the oral statement is a
term of a contract. The Parol
Evidence
Rule states that the point is that
such statements and actions
reveal the terms of the contract
which the
parties intended or hope to make.
They are superseded by, and
merged in, the contract itself.
This
means the court will just look at
the contents of the written
document, as shown in the case
of Codelfa
Construction Pty Ltd v State
Real Authority of NSW (1982).
Section 91 and Section 92
of the
Evidence Act also states that once
the terms of the contract have
been reduced by or by consent of
the
party to form a document, no
evidence shall be given in proof
of the terms of the contract except
the
document itself. Hence, no oral
evidence shall be admitted as
between the parties for the
purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from its terms.
However, there are exceptions to
these 2
statutes. This includes situations
where there may be suspicion of
fraud, where the contract made
was
partly written and partly oral,
condition precedents must be met
before contract can be performed,
where parties may have entered
into a subsequent oral agreement
by which they have varied, or any
usage or custom which may not
appear in the contract, and also
when any fact may be proved
which
shows in what manner the
language of a document is related
to existing factors. These
exceptions are
stated as Proviso (a)-(f) to
Section 92 of Contracts Act.
Another area that needs to be
discussed is the
Contractual Intention Test. This
test consists of factors which are
time lapse, relative importance of
the statement, statement not
included when contract reduced
to writing, and special knowledge
or skill
of the parties. In this case, Joyce
had made a contract with Phillip
based on her plans to buy land for
the purpose of building 4
townhouses. Joyce had
reminded Phillip of her plans and
asked again
whether she would have any
problems gaining a permit to
build 4 townhouses to which
Phillip had
answered her “You won’t have
any problems” right before the
signing of the contract. Hence,
because
this oral statement happened right
before the signing of the contract
and it is important as it is the
main purpose for the contract,
and it was not included in the
contract when it was reduced to
writing
and also because Joyce had to
rely on the special knowledge of
Philip as a real estate agent, the
oral
statement is a term of the
contract.
The next issue which needs to be
discussed is what category the
breach of term belong to. There
are 3
types of terms known as
Condition, Warranty and
Innominate terms. A condition
basically represents
the purpose of the contract; it is a
term that goes to the root of the
contract, as seen in the case of
Poussard v Spiers and Pond
(1876). A warranty is not as
important as condition, where it
does not go
to the root of the contract and the
relative importance of the term is
not as much as condition as seen
in the case of Bettini v
Gye (1876). Innominate terms
are terms that the courts
was unable to
categorise as either condition or
warranty as seen in the case of
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd
v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd
(1962). This terms are
decided based on the
seriousness of the
consequence from the breach. In
this case, the term can be
considered as a condition because
Joyce
has bought the land for the
purpose to build 4 townhouses
but in fact the land could only
obtain the
permit to build 2 townhouses.
Evidently, Philip had breached a
condition.
The third issue is the
remedies that Joyce is able to
claim. From the discussion
above, it was
concluded that the breach is a
breach of condition which allows
the injured party to terminate the
contract and claim for damages.
As stated in Section 74 of
Contracts Act, the main purpose
of
damages is to place the injured
party in the position they would
have been in, if the contract had
been
performed, and this was decided
in the case Addis v Gramophone
Co Ltd (1909). The breach must
have causes loss and also the
victim to mitigate the loss. This
was decided from case Reg Glass
Pty
Ltd v Rivers Locking System Pty
Ltd (1968) and Payzu Limited v
Saunders (1919) respectively.
The
breach of the condition entitles
the innocent party to rescind
contract, rescind contract and sue
for
damages or accept breach and sue
for damages. Here, Joyce will
have to accept the breach and sue
for
damages as once the land has
been bought by her, it is highly
unlikely for her to terminate the
contract. However, she may claim
for damages amounting to
RM300,000 which is the
difference of
the price of the land for the
purpose of building 4 townhouses
and the price of the land she
bought.
The first issue is to consider
whether the oral statement is a
term of a contract. The Parol
Evidence
Rule states that the point is that
such statements and actions
reveal the terms of the contract
which the
parties intended or hope to make.
They are superseded by, and
merged in, the contract itself.
This
means the court will just look at
the contents of the written
document, as shown in the case
of Codelfa
Construction Pty Ltd v State
Real Authority of NSW (1982).
Section 91 and Section 92
of the
Evidence Act also states that once
the terms of the contract have
been reduced by or by consent of
the
party to form a document, no
evidence shall be given in proof
of the terms of the contract except
the
document itself. Hence, no oral
evidence shall be admitted as
between the parties for the
purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or
subtracting from its terms.
However, there are exceptions to
these 2
statutes. This includes situations
where there may be suspicion of
fraud, where the contract made
was
partly written and partly oral,
condition precedents must be met
before contract can be performed,
where parties may have entered
into a subsequent oral agreement
by which they have varied, or any
usage or custom which may not
appear in the contract, and also
when any fact may be proved
which
shows in what manner the
language of a document is related
to existing factors. These
exceptions are
stated as Proviso (a)-(f) to
Section 92 of Contracts Act.
Another area that needs to be
discussed is the
Contractual Intention Test. This
test consists of factors which are
time lapse, relative importance of
the statement, statement not
included when contract reduced
to writing, and special knowledge
or skill
of the parties. In this case, Joyce
had made a contract with Phillip
based on her plans to buy land for
the purpose of building 4
townhouses. Joyce had
reminded Phillip of her plans and
asked again
whether she would have any
problems gaining a permit to
build 4 townhouses to which
Phillip had
answered her “You won’t have
any problems” right before the
signing of the contract. Hence,
because
this oral statement happened right
before the signing of the contract
and it is important as it is the
main purpose for the contract,
and it was not included in the
contract when it was reduced to
writing
and also because Joyce had to
rely on the special knowledge of
Philip as a real estate agent, the
oral
statement is a term of the
contract.
The next issue which needs to be
discussed is what category the
breach of term belong to. There
are 3
types of terms known as
Condition, Warranty and
Innominate terms. A condition
basically represents
the purpose of the contract; it is a
term that goes to the root of the
contract, as seen in the case of
Poussard v Spiers and Pond
(1876). A warranty is not as
important as condition, where it
does not go
to the root of the contract and the
relative importance of the term is
not as much as condition as seen
in the case of Bettini v
Gye (1876). Innominate terms
are terms that the courts
was unable to
categorise as either condition or
warranty as seen in the case of
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd
v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd
(1962). This terms are
decided based on the
seriousness of the
consequence from the breach. In
this case, the term can be
considered as a condition because
Joyce
has bought the land for the
purpose to build 4 townhouses
but in fact the land could only
obtain the
permit to build 2 townhouses.
Evidently, Philip had breached a
condition.
The third issue is the
remedies that Joyce is able to
claim. From the discussion
above, it was
concluded that the breach is a
breach of condition which allows
the injured party to terminate the
contract and claim for damages.
As stated in Section 74 of
Contracts Act, the main purpose
of
damages is to place the injured
party in the position they would
have been in, if the contract had
been
performed, and this was decided
in the case Addis v Gramophone
Co Ltd (1909). The breach must
have causes loss and also the
victim to mitigate the loss. This
was decided from case Reg Glass
Pty
Ltd v Rivers Locking System Pty
Ltd (1968) and Payzu Limited v
Saunders (1919) respectively.
The
breach of the condition entitles
the innocent party to rescind
contract, rescind contract and sue
for
damages or accept breach and sue
for damages. Here, Joyce will
have to accept the breach and sue
for
damages as once the land has
been bought by her, it is highly
unlikely for her to terminate the
contract. However, she may claim
for damages amounting to
RM300,000 which is the
difference of
the price of the land for the
purpose of building 4 townhouses
and the price of the land she
bought.
The first issue is to consider whether the oral statement is a term of a contract. The Parol
Evidence Rule states that the point is that such statements and actions reveal the terms of the
contract which the parties intended or hope to make. They are superseded by, and merged in,
the contract itself. This means the court will just look at the contents of the written document,
as shown in the case of Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Real Authority of NSW
(1982). Section 91 and Section 92 of the Evidence Act also states that once the terms
of the contract have been reduced by or by consent of the party to form a document, no
evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of the contract except the document itself.
Hence, no oral evidence shall be admitted as between the parties for the purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from its terms. However, there are exceptions to
these 2 statutes. This includes situations where there may be suspicion of fraud, where the
contract made was partly written and partly oral, condition precedents must be met before
contract can be performed, where parties may have entered into a subsequent oral agreement
by which they have varied, or any usage or custom which may not appear in the contract, and
also when any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document
is related to existing factors. These exceptions are stated as Proviso (a)-(f) to Section 92 of
Contracts Act. Another area that needs to be discussed is the Contractual Intention Test. This
test consists of factors which are time lapse, relative importance of the statement, statement
not included when contract reduced to writing, and special knowledge or skill of the parties.
In this case, Joyce had made a contract with Phillip based on her plans to buy land for the
purpose of building 4 townhouses. Joyce had reminded Phillip of her plans and asked again
whether she would have any problems gaining a permit to build 4 townhouses to which
Phillip had answered her “You won’t have any problems” right before the signing of the
contract. Hence, because this oral statement happened right before the signing of the contract
and it is important as it is the main purpose for the contract, and it was not included in the
contract when it was reduced to writing and also because Joyce had to rely on the special
knowledge of Philip as a real estate agent, the oral statement is a term of the contract.

The next issue which needs to be discussed is what category the breach of term belong to.
There are 3 types of terms known as Condition, Warranty and Innominate terms. A condition
basically represents the purpose of the contract; it is a term that goes to the root of the
contract, as seen in the case of Poussard v Spiers and Pond (1876). A warranty is not as
important as condition, where it does not go to the root of the contract and the relative
importance of the term is not as much as condition as seen in the case of Bettini v Gye
(1876). Innominate terms are terms that the courts was unable to categorise as
either condition or warranty as seen in the case of Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (1962). This terms are decided based on the
seriousness of the consequence from the breach. In this case, the term can be considered as
a condition because Joyce has bought the land for the purpose to build 4 townhouses but in
fact the land could only obtain the permit to build 2 townhouses. Evidently, Philip had
breached a condition.

The third issue is the remedies that Joyce is able to claim. From the discussion
above, it was concluded that the breach is a breach of condition which allows the injured
party to terminate the contract and claim for damages. As stated in Section 74 of Contracts
Act, the main purpose of damages is to place the injured party in the position they would
have been in, if the contract had been performed, and this was decided in the case Addis v
Gramophone Co Ltd (1909). The breach must have causes loss and also the victim to
mitigate the loss. This was decided from case Reg Glass Pty Ltd v Rivers Locking System
Pty Ltd (1968) and Payzu Limited v Saunders (1919) respectively. Thebreach of the
condition entitles the innocent party to rescind contract, rescind contract and sue for damages
or accept breach and sue for damages. Here, Joyce will have to accept the breach and sue for
damages as once the land has been bought by her, it is highly unlikely for her to terminate
the contract. However, she may claim for damages amounting to RM300,000 which is the
difference of the price of the land for the purpose of building 4 townhouses and the price of
the land she bought.