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Eisenhower and Adenauer: alliance maintenance under pressure,

1953–1960

Article  in  Cold War History · April 2011

DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2011.569161

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Ronald Granieri
US Army War College
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286 Book reviews
The domestic politics of Vietnam and intraparty divisions, furthermore, served to
strengthen the conservative wing of the party by discrediting liberal Republicanism
among the party’s leadership. Vietnam’s Second Front challenges historical accounts of
the Vietnam War that focus exclusively on national security considerations and
demonstrates the continuous role of domestic politics in defining the context in which
policy was formulated. While further research into how the Johnson and Nixon
administrations understood public opinion remains necessary, Johns’ work
contributes greatly to a historical understanding of the similarities between the two
administrations, of how partisan politics shaped policy, and of the changing policies
and political trajectory of the Republican Party during the period of the Vietnam War.

Sandra Scanlon
University College Dublin
sandra.scanlon@ucd.ie
q 2011, Sandra Scanlon

Eisenhower and Adenauer: alliance maintenance under pressure, 1953 –1960, by Steven
J. Brady, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2010, xii þ 275 pp.

Scholarship on Cold War Europe has been enriched over the past two decades by a
shift in focus from the superpowers to their European clients, to trace not simply
conflict between the blocs but also tensions within the blocs in an effort to try to
understand the ways that those European clients, especially in the West, were able to
influence, shape, and even change the course of alliance policy.
One topic that has received particular attention in this new scholarship is the
relationship between the US government of President Dwight Eisenhower and
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the one side and the Federal Republic of
Germany led by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on the other. Between 1953 and 1960,
the two governments often appeared to be in perfect harmony. Adenauer and Dulles,
both prone to using Christian moral rhetoric to spice their anticommunism, were
especially linked in the public mind, both positively and negatively, as exponents of a
hard line. Idealised memories of that relationship after Dulles’ death in 1959 and
subsequent alliance problems in the 1960s tended to reinforce that idea, creating the
impression that this was a golden age of German –American Cold War cooperation.
Recent scholarship, however, has revealed that this surface agreement papered over
serious disagreements over such fundamental issues as the role of arms control in
East –West relations, the proper strategy for negotiations and détente, and even the
centrality of German reunification in Allied policy. Indeed, by early 1960, in the midst
of the Berlin Crisis, Adenauer and his American allies had a near-public falling out,
with Adenauer accusing the Americans of being too willing to make a deal with the
Soviets and turning for support to the increasingly anti-American French president
 Cold War History 287

Charles de Gaulle. That estrangement became more apparent during the subsequent
Kennedy administration, but the divisions were apparent even during this so-called
golden age, raising important questions about the nature of German– American and
European –American cooperation.
Steven Brady’s work fits within this current literature, offering a traditional political
analysis of the most important controversies and focusing on the men at the top, using
broadly familiar American diplomatic documents and some German archival
materials. The book is clearly written and flows smoothly, with flashes of wit and style,
though it has its weaknesses. For example, the book could more correctly be called
‘Dulles and Adenauer’, since the focus is more on the relationship between Adenauer
and the secretary of state than with the president. Indeed, once Dulles dies in early
1959, the book rushes to its conclusion, ignoring such controversial issues from the
late Eisenhower administration as the Geneva Conference or the failed Paris Summit.
It is also unfortunate that, despite his claim to be filling a gap in our understanding of
the alliance in the 1950s, Brady only intermittently engages with the existing literature,
so it is not always clear where he intends his work to fit within the historiography.
Knowledgeable readers seeking a solid analysis of alliance diplomacy during the 1950s,
however, will find this a useful addition to their reading lists.

Ronald J. Granieri
Syracuse University
rongranieri@me.com
q 2011, Ronald J. Granieri

The United States and the making of modern Greece: history and power, 1950 –1974, by
James Edward Miller, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 2009, xvi þ 301 pp.

In The United States and the Making of Modern Greece, James Edward Miller takes a
fresh look at a familiar story, the post-war relationship between the Unites States and
Greece. The period in question is a crucial one, rich in significant events: the book’s
eight thematic chapters expand from the rise of the conservative government to power
in the aftermath of the civil war, the Cyprus affair, and the rise of the Colonels and
closes with the Cyprus tragedy and the return to democracy with Constantinos
Karamanlis at the helm of the Greek government. The United States and the Making of
Modern Greece is based largely on the author’s long-standing research in different
American archives supplemented by British, Greek, and French sources in an effort to
reduce ‘something of a bias toward the American viewpoint’ (p. xi).
The author’s interesting novelty is to point to the writing and political exploitation
of history by Andreas Papandreou (prime minister, 1981 – 89 and 1993 –96).
The ‘“Andreas Version” of historical narrative became a bridge to Papandreou’s
ultimate ambition of leading Greece’ (p. 211), riding on a wave of anti-Americanism
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