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12-FTA - ETA - Combined - Updated 201802
12-FTA - ETA - Combined - Updated 201802
Consider the following block diagram. Let I/P and O/P be the
input And output terminals. There are two sub-systems A and B
that are connected in series.
X1 X3
INPUT OUTPUT
X2 X4
For this the fault tree analysis diagram shown in next slide
OR
intermediate event
F (A) F (B)
AND AND
Basic event
F( X 1) F( X 2) F( X 3) F( X 4)
• If its too broad, overly large FTA will result. E.g. Fire in process.
• If its too narrow, the exercise will be costly. E.g. Leak in the valve.
Moto fails
to start
OR NO EMF applied to the motor
when EMF
applied
Wire from
battery to
OR No EMF from the battery
motor fails
open
Battery faild
to produce OR NO EMF to Battery
EMF
Wire from
switch to
OR NO EMF across switch
Battery fails
open
transformer Operation
theatre
generator
INPUT
X1 X2
OUTPUT
X3
F (S)
AND
OR
A Generator
B C
fails
Main fails Transformer fails
P ( X 1) = 0.01
P ( X 2) = 1 – 0.996 = 0.004
P ( X 3) = 1 – 0.99 = 0.001
F(S) = 0.0001396
FOR RELIABILITY
R(S) = 1- F(S) R(S) = 0.99986
= 1- 0.0001396
Cooling
Water In
Reactor
TIC
Temperature
Controller
TIA
Alarm Thermocouple
at
T > TA
High Temperature Alarm
Figure depicts Reactor with high temperature alarm and temperature controller
• process upset
[Example]
INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
Succes
s
Failure
REPRESENTATION OF THE
8/11/2017 FIRST
FTA/ ETA Analysis SAFETY FUNCTION 42
Step 3: Construct the Event Tree
b. Evaluate the safety functions
Oxidation reactor Operator Automatic
SAFETY high temperature reestablishes shutdown system
FUNCTION alarm alerts cooling water flow stops reaction at
operator to oxidation temperature T2
at temperature T1 reactor
INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
Succes
s
If the safety function does not affect the course of the
accident, the accident path proceeds with no branch pt
Failure to the next safety function.
8/11/2017 FTA/ ETA Analysis 43
REPRESENTATION OF THE SECOND SAFETY FUNCTION
Step 3: b. Evaluate safety functions.
Oxidation reactor Operator Automatic
SAFETY high temperature reestablishes shutdown system
FUNCTION alarm alerts cooling water flow stops reaction at
operator to oxidation temperature T2
at temperature T1 reactor
INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
Succes
s
Completed !
Failure
8/11/2017
COMPLETED EVENT TREE
FTA/ ETA Analysis 44
Step 4: Describe the Accident Sequence
Oxidation reactor Operator Automatic
SAFETY high temperature reestablishes shutdown system
FUNCTION alarm alerts operator cooling water flow stops reaction at
at temperature T1
to oxidation reactor temperature T2
B C D
A Safe condition,
return to normal
operation
AC Safe condition,
process shutdown
INITIATING EVENT:
ACD Unsafe condition,
Loss of cooling water runaway reaction,
to oxidation reactor operator aware of
A problem
AB
Unstable condition,
process shutdown
ABD Unsafe condition,
runaway reaction,
Succes operator unaware
s of problem
Failure
8/11/2017
ACCIDENT SEQUENCES
FTA/ ETA Analysis 45
High Temp Operator Operator Operator
Safety Function:Alarm Alerts Notices Re-starts Shuts Down
Operator High Temp Cooling Reactor Result
Identifier: B C D E
Failures/Demand: 0.01 0.25 0.25 0.1
A Continue Operation
0.7425
AD Shut Down
0.99
0.2227
0.247 ADE Runaway
A 5 0.02475
AB Continue Operation
1 0.00562
5
ABD
Initiating Event: Shut Down
0.007 0.00168
Loss of Cooling 5 8
0.00187 ABDE Runaway
1 Occurrence/yr. 0.0001875
5
0.01 ABC Continue Operation
0.00187
5
ABCD
0.002 Shut Down
0.000562
5 5
0.000625 ABCDE Runaway
Shutdown = 0.2227 + 0.001688 + 0.005625 = 0.2250 occurrences/yr. 0.0000625
Runaway = 0.02475 + 0.0001875 + 0.0000625 = 0.02500 occurrences/yr.
Figure 11-9 Event tree for a loss of coolant
8/11/2017 accident
FTA/ ETA for the reactor of Figure 11-8.
Analysis 46
Safety Function
0.01 Failures/Demand