Being and Time 37
Ig. II
II
THE TWOFOLD TASK IN WORKING OUT THE
QUESTION OF BEING. METHOD AND DESIGN O
OUR INVESTIGATION
115. The OntologicalAnafuticof Daseinas Laying Bare the Horipn for
of theMeaningof Beingin General
Interpretation
'formulating' the question of Being, we
I N designating the tasks of
shown not only that we must establish which entity is to serye as
primary object of interrogation, but also that the right way of accessto
entity is one which we must explicitly make our own and hold secure.
have already discussedwhich entity takes over the principal role wi
the question of Being. But how are we, as it were, to set our sights
this entity, Dasein, both as something accessibleto us and as
to be understood and interpreted ?
In demonstrating that Dasein in ontico-ontologically prior, we
have misled the reader into supposingthat this entity must also be w
is given as ontico-ontologically primary not only in the sensethat it
itself be grasped 'immediately', but also in that the kind of Being whi
it possesses is presentedjust as 'immediately'. Ontically, of course,Dast
is not only close to us-even that which is closest:we are it, each of
we ourselves.In spite ofthis, or rather forjust this reason,it is ontologi
that which is farthest. To be sure, its ownmost Being is such that it
an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each
as if its Being has been interpreted in some manner. But we are certai
not saying that when Dasein'sown Being is thus interpreted
cally in the way which lies closest,this interpretation can be taken
as an appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what
emerge when one's ownmost state of Being is consideredr as an
logical theme. The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is rather
that, in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in
of that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a
which is essentially constant-in terms of the 'world'. In Dasein i
and therefore in its own understanding of Being, the way the world
1 'Besinnung'. The earliest editions have 'Bestimmung' instead.
ontologically upon the way I6
,,nderstoodis, as we shall show, reflected back
,'. which Dasein itself gets interpreted.
"'Thrr, becauseDasein is ontico-ontologically prior, its own specificstate
'categorial
(if we understand this in the sense of Dasein's
ef Being
is ontically'closest' to itself
Itrurt,rri'; remains concealedfrom it. Dasein
und ontologically farlhest; but pre-ontologicallyit is surely not a stranger.
"'H"r,
we have merely indicated provisionally that an Interpretation of
peculiar difficulties grounded in the kind of
this entity is confronted with
taken as our theme and to the very
Being which belongs to the object
are not grounded in any short-
irt -io", of so taking it. These difficulties
are endowed, or in the
lod.rgr of the cognitive powers with which we
iu"y a suitable way of conceiving-a lack which seemingly would not
"f
be hard to remedY.
Not only, however, does an understanding of Being belong to Dasein,
kind of
but this understanding develops or decays along with whatever
at the time; accordingly there are many ways in
BeingDasein may possess
which it has been interpreted, and these are all at Dasein's disposal'
Dasein'sways of behaviour, its capacities,powers, possibilities,and vicis-
situdes,have been studied with varying extent in philosophicalpsychology,
'political science', in poetry, biography, and
in anthropology, ethics, and
the writingof history, each in a different fashion. But the question remains
whether these interpretations of Dasein have been carried through with
a primordial existentiality comparable to whatever existentiell prim-
o.diulity they may have possessed.Neither of these excludes the
other but they do not necessarily go together. Existentiell interpre-
tation can demand an existential analytic, if indeed we conceive of
philosophical cognition as something possible and necessary. only when
the basic structures of Dasein have been adequately worked out with
explicit orientation towards the problem of Being itself, will what we
have hitherto gained in interpreting Dasein get its existential justification.
Thus an analytic of Dasein must remain our first requirement in the
question of Being. But in that case the problem of obtaining and securing
the kind of accesswhich will lead to Dasein, becomeseven more a burning
one.To put it negatively, we have no right to resort to dogmatic construc-
tions and to apply just any idea of Being and actuality to this entity, no
'cate-
matter how 'self-evident' that idea may be; nor may any of the
gories' y,'hich such an idea prescribes be forced upon Dasein without
proper ontological consideration. We must rather choose such a way of
nccessand such a kind ofinterpretation that this entity can show itselfin
itself and from itself
fan ihm selbst von ihm selbst her]. And this
r[eans that it is to be shown as it is proximall2 andfor the mostpart-
 Being and Time
3B
in its averageeuerytdalness.rIn this everydaynessthere are certain st
t7 which we shali exhibit-not just any accidental structures, but
ones rvhich, in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may
persist as determinative for the character of its Being. Thus by havr
.egard for the basic state of Dasein's everydayness,we shall bring out I
Being of this entit)' in a preparatory fashion'
When taken in this way, the analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented
towards the guiding task of rvorking out the question of Being. Its hmi
are thus determined. It cannot attempt to provide a complete ontology,
instance,proaisional.It rnerely brings out the Being of this entity, witho
Interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by whi
the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being may
laid bare. Once we have arrived at that horizon, this preparatory analy
of Dasein will have to be repeated on a higher and authentically on
losical basis.
We shall point to temporalit2sas the meaning of the Being of that
which rve call "Dasein". If this is to be demonstrated,thosestructures
Dasein which we shall provisionally exhibit must be Interpreted
again as modesof temporality. In thus interpreting Dasein as temporali
hon,ever,rve shall not give the answer to our leading question as to
meaning of Being in general. But the ground will have been prepared
obtaining such an answer.
2 The arnbiguity of the pronominai references in this sentence and the one belbre
reflects a similar'ambiguiiy in the German. (The English-spe3lilg reader should
'anthropologyi which Heidtgger has in mi
."-ind.d that the kind" of philosophical
it u rtrdv of man in the widest sensi, and is not to be c-onfusedwith the empirical sci
'physical' and 'cultural' anthropology.)
of
3 ' < e i t l i c h k e i t ' .\ V h i l e i t i s t e m p t i n g t o t r a n s l a t e t h e a d j e c t i v e - ' z e i t l i c h ' a n d t h e
'Zeitlichkeit' by their most obvious English cognates, 't!mgly' and 'timeliness', this
'temporal' and 'temporality' come much. closer to
be entirely misleading; for
Heideeeer' has in miid, not olly when he is diicussing these words in their p
..nr.rli. he does on the following page) but even when he is-usingggT in hlt.q*l
i" i. 6< helow. (See (SeE6sp?cially
isoiciallv H. ea6
3e6 below,
""."" as ir Section 65 below.
serse,
On tire other hand] he occasionaliy usei thd noun
,temporal'in a sense which-he will.expl-ain late.r (H. rg). we shall translate these
'Temporality' and'Temporal', with initial capitals.
INr. I INr. II Being and Time 39
We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as
its ontically constitutive state. Dasein zi in such a way as to be some-
thing which understands something like Being.r Keeping this inter-
6onnectionfirmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly
understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with
lime as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light-and genuinely
conceived-as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any
way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be
explicated primordialfu as tlu horizonfor tfu undnstandingof Being, and in terms
d tanporalityas the Being of Dasein, which undnstandsBeing. This task as a
whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be dis-
tinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. This
ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation IB
precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which has persistedfrom
Aristotle to Bergson and even later. Here we must make clear that this
conceptionof time and, in general, the ordinary way of understanding it,
have sprung from temporality, and we must show how this has come
about.We shall thereby restore to the ordinary conception the autonomy
which is its rightful due, as against Bergson'sthesisthat the time one has
in mind in this conception is space.
'Time' has long functioned as an ontological----orrather an ontical-
criterion for naively discriminating various realms of entities. A distinc-
tion has been made between 'temporal' entities (natural processesand
historicalhappenings) and 'non-temporal' entities (spatial and numerical
reiationships).We are accustomed to contrasting the 'timeless' meaning
of propositionswith the 'temporal' course of propositional assertions.It is
alsoheld that there is a 'cleavage' between 'temporal' entities and the
'supra-temporal'
eternal, and efforts are made to bridge this over. Here
'temporal' 'in time'-a designation
always means simply being [seiend]
which, admittedly, is still pretty obscure. The Fact remains that time, in
thesenseof 'being
fsein] in time', functions as a criterion for distinguishing
realmsof Being. Hitherto no one has asked or troubled to investigatehow
ume has come to have this distinctive ontoloeical function. or with what
right anything like time functions as such a criterion; nor has anyone
'-r---^r
---:.r .L^-^---:-:^-l .^:--
askedwhether the authentic ontological relevance which is possible for
tt,.getsexpressed
when "time" is used in so naively ontological a manner.
rtrne' has acquired this 'self-evident' ontological function 'of its own
so to sieak; indeed it has done so within the horizon of the way
Ltto.d',
'r ls ordinarilv
below. where'Zeitlichkeit'is define
de understood.And it has maintained itself in this function
'Temporalitdt' to this
and the aljecl day.
I 'Dasein irl in der Weise. seiend so etwas wie Sein zu vcrstehen.'
 +o Being and Time INr.
Being and Tinu
In contrast to all this, our treatment of the question of the meaning INT' II 4r
The Task of DestroIing the Historl of Ontologt
Being must enable us to show that the centralproblematicof all ontologlt J16.
rootedin the phenomenon of time, if rightu seenand rightl2 explained,and fl,ll research-and not least that which operateswithin the range of the
must show how this is the case. ssflffal question of Being-is an ontical possibility of Dasein. Dasein's
If Being is to be conceived in terms of time, and if, indeed, its leing finds its meaning in temporality. But temporality is also the con-
modes and derivatives are to become intelligible in their dition which makes historicality possible as a temporal kind of Being
modifications and derivations by taking time into consideration, t which Dasein itself possesses, regardless of whether or how Dasein is an
Being itself (and not merely entities, let us say, as entities 'in time') entity'in time'. Historicality, as a determinate character, is prior to what
'
thus made visible in its 'temporal' character. But in that case, iscalled "history" (world-historical historizing).1
'being 'non-temporal "Historicality" stands for the state of Being that is constitutive for 20
can no longer mean simply in time'. Even the
'historizing' as such; 'historizing' is
the 'supra-temporal' are 'temporal' with regard to their Being, and Dasein's only on the basis of such
'world-history' possible
just privatively by contrast with something 'temporal' as an entity 'i anything like or can anything belong historically
r9 time', but in a positiuesense,though it is one which we must first expl to world-history. In its factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and
' 'what' it already was. It esits past, whether explicitly or not. And this
In both pre-philosophical and philosophical usage the expression it is
poral' has been pre-empted by the signification we have cited; in is so not only in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along'behind'it,
following investigations,however, we shall employ it for another signi and that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-
tion. Thus the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics ha at-handand which sometimeshas after-effectsupon it: Dasein'is'its past
their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we in the n'ay of ils own Being, which, to put it roughly, 'historizes'out of its
call its "Temporal" determinateness.lThus the fundamental ontologi future on each occasion.2Whatever the way of being it may have at the
task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Tcmporalitlt time, and thus with whatever understanding of Being it may possess,
Being. ln the exposition of the problematic of Temporality the questi Daseinhas grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting
of the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered. itself:in terms of this it understandsitself proximally and, within a certain
BecauseBeing cannot be grasped except by taking time into consid range,constantly. By this understanding, the possibilitiesof its Being are
tion, the answer to the question of Being cannot lie in any proposition disclosedand regulated. Its own past-and this always means the past of
is blind and isolated. The answer is not properly conceived if what its 'generation'-is n61 something which follows along after Dasein, but
assertspropositionally is just passedalong, especially if it gets circula somethingwhich already goes ahead of it.
as a free-floating result, so that we merely get informed about This elemental historicality of Dasein may remain hidden from Dasein
'standpoint' itself.But there is a way by which it can be discoveredand given proper
which may perhaps differ from the way this has hit
been treated. Whether the answer is a 'new'one remains quite super attention.Dasein can discovertradition, preserveit, and study it explicitly.
and is of no importance. Its positive character must lie in its being anra The discovery of tradition and the disclosureof what it 'transmits' and
now this is transmitted, can be taken hold of as a task in its own right. In
enough for us to learn to conceive the possibilities which the 'Ancien
this way Dasein brings itself into the kind of Being which coniists in
have made ready for us. In its ownmost meaning this answer tells us
ntstoriologicalinquiry and research.But historiology---or more precisely
concrete ontological research must begin with an investigative inqui
nrstoricitys-is possibleas a kind of Being which the inquiring Dasein may
which keeps within the horizon we have laid bare; and this is all that
tells us. '_'weltgeschichtliches
.L^ wcrtgescnlchtlrches Geschehen'.
Ueschehen', While verb 'geschehen'
the verb
Whrle the
'geschehen'
ordinarily means
ordrnarrly means to
If, then, the answer to the question of Being is to provide the clues 'a;:iriiiii
,Mlt.t'.,
lllfLl-:ld e'
will oftente,so.
and will often be so translated,
'history'.
translated, Heidegger
Heidegger stilsses
stilsses its
its etymologicai.kinship
etymologicai kinship to
to
'historize'
,_.L, ,
-"." vorr r r r J L v r y . Tor u bring
urllts out this Lconnection,
uuucLlruur {we
c rhave
r4vg coined
u uurcg the
L u g verb
vcr u ulstultzc
our research,it cannot be adequate until it brings us the insight that yig!, be paraphrased ar tlo'happen in a histo;ical way'; we shall usually translate
,

il]ll -"l'rsl
specific kind of Being of ontology hitherto, and the vicissitudes of ffi:l^"-h.;'
,6'-cschehen'
u-,.r thi;
this
rnls ;ti;;;"t."a
way in
rn contexts
contexB *r,..d-f,i't".y;;
where
wnere
'historizing'is
lristory
nrstory is
rs b;i&
beine
berng dil;;J.e.
discusied.
drscussed. w;il;h;;in"l"ua.'
We
we trust
trust that
that the reader
rei
' . H rinr r rmind
i l l n o rthat n a l ssuch
u c n n l s l o r r z r n g l s cchiracterisiic
ill'^*t.p
th- nar ofall historical entities, and si not
inquiries, its findings, and its failures, have been necessitatedin the t':':
sort of of
ot thins
thing
thing that
that is done
done orimarilv by
primarily
primarily bv historians
by hi (as 'philosophizing',
(as 'ohilosoohizins'. foi insra
for instance,
;:i,,
i".'::.,, 'world-historical'see
character of Dasein. " done
iYic oLPhilosophers). (On H. 38r ff.)
.. .Yas uasein
Dasein "ist" seine Vergangenheit Versaneenheit in der Weise sel'rasSeins, pesast.
das. roh gesagt,
Seins. das,
t 'seine ttmlorala Bestimmtheit'. See our note g, p. "ie*.io.
jl$.aus_seinerZukunft her "geschieht".'
38, H. r 7 above.
 Being and Tirnz Int
42
possess,only because historicality is a determining characteristic
Dasein in the very basis of its Being. If this historicality remains
from Dasein, and as long as it so remains, Dasein is also denied
possibility of historiological inquiry or the discovery of history. If
toriology is wanting, this is not evidence agairut Dasein's historicality;
the contrary, as a deficient model of this state of Being, it is evidence
it. Only becauseit is 'historical' can an era be unhistoriological.
On the other hand, if Dasein has seized upon its latent possibility
only of making its own existence transparent to itself but also of inqui
into the meaning of existentiality itself (that is to say, of previ
inquiring into the meaning of Being in general), and if by such inq
its eyeshave been opened to its own essentialhistoricality, then one
fail to see that the inquiry into Being (the ontico-ontological necessi
which we have already indicated) is itself characterized by histori
The ownmost meaning of Being which belongs to the inquiry into
2I as an historical inquiry, gives us the assignment [Anweisung] of i
into the history of that inquiry itself, that is, of becoming historiologi
In working out the question of Being, we must heed this assignmen
that by positively making the past our own, we may bring ourselves i
full possessionof the ownmost possibilities of such inquiry. The q
of the meaning of Being must be carried through by explicating
beforehand in its temporality and historicality; the question thus
itself to the point where it understands itself as historiological.
Our preparatory Interpretation of the fundamental structures
Dasein with regard to the average kind of Being which is closest
(a kind of Being in which it is therefore proximally historical as
will make manifest, however, not only that Dasein is inclined to fall
upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in
that world by its reflected light, but also that Dasein simultaneously
prey to the tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken
This tradition keeps it from providing its own guidance, w
1 'defizienter Modus'. Heidegger likes to think of certain characteristics as occu
in various.ways or 'modes', among which may be included certain wa;rs of 'not occur
-occurnng
o_r'occurring only to an tnadequate
o_r inadequite extent' or, rn in general, occurrng'dehclenu)
occurring;deficiently'. It
ifzero and the negative.integers were to be thought ofas representing'deficient
being a positive integer'.
2 '. . . das Dasein hit nicht nur die Geneigtheit, an seine Welt, in der es ist, zu vet
and reluzent aus ihr her sich auszulegen, Dasein'verfillt in eini damit auch seiner
oder mrnder
minder ausdriickhch ergriffenen Tradition.' The verb 'verfallen' is one
ausdriicklich ergrifl'enen
Heid-egger will use many times. Though we shall usually translate it simply as 't
has the connotation of dzttrioratine, collabsinp,or fallinp doran.Neither our 'flli back
rror our flt'_p:a
ralrs prey to ts qurte righl:
rtgnt: bu^i'fallupo"' and .F[ql
but'lall upon, a"f, .lall on .'r.*hjch
to,, whrch are mgl
more.
::1.?n
would be misleading 19'jlquite
for tan . . .-"u verfallen'; ind though ,falls to ihe lot of11e
' and .de
upg.n-'would do well for 'vefillt'
well here.
with the dative in o"ther contexts, they will not
lrr' II Being and Time 43
or in choosing. This holds true-and by no means least-for that
lnquiring
xnderstanding which is rooted in Dasein's ownmost Being, and for the
of developing it-namely, for ontological understanding.
'possibility
When tradition thus becomesmaster, it doesso in such away that what
,transmits' is made so inaccessible,proximally and for the most part,
it
that it rather becomesconcealed.Tradition takes what has come down to
us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those
primordial'sources'from which the categoriesand conceptshanded down
io us have been in part quite genuinely drawn.l Indeed it makes us forget
that they have had such an origin, and makes us supposethat the neces-
sity of going back to these sourcesis something which we need not even
understand.Dasein has had its historicality so thoroughly uprooted by
tradition that it confinesits interest to the multiformity of possible types,
directions,and standpoints of philosophical activity in the most exotic
and alien ofcultures; and by this very interest it seeksto veil the fact that
it has no ground of its own to stand on. Consequently, despite all its
historiological interests and all its zeal for an Interpretation which is
'objective'
philologically ["sachliche';], Dasein no longer understands the
most elementary conditions which would alone enable it to go back to
the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own.
We have shown at the outset (Section r) not only that the question of
the meaning of Being is one that has not been attended to and one that
hasbeen inadequately formulated, but that it has become quite forgotten
in spite of all our interest in 'metaphysics'.Greek ontology and its history
-which, in their numerous filiations and distortions, determine the con-
ceptual character of philosophy even today-prove that when Dasein
understandseither itself or Being in general, it does so in terms of the
'world',
and that the ontology which has thus arisen has deteriorated
[vertallt] to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident
-merely material for reworking, as it was for Hegel. In the Middle Ages
this uprooted Greek ontology became a fixed body of doctrine. Its syste-
matics, however, is by no means a mere joining together of traditional
ptecesinto a single edifice. Though its basic conceptions of Being have
Deentaken over dogmatically from the Greeks, a great deal of unpre-
tentious work has been carried on further within these limits. With the
peculiar character which the Scholasticsgave it, Greek ontology has, in
its essentials,travelled the path that leads through the Disputationzsmeta-
Ph)sicaeof Suarez to the 'metaphysics' and transcendental philosophy of
rrndern times,
determining even the foundations and the aims of Hegel's
,- *t^In ,hi. passage]Heidegger juxtaposes a number of words beginning with the prefix
'tibergibt'
1i,"fr-'; ('transmis'); 'iiberantwortet' ('delivers over'); 'das Uberkommcnc'
\ wnat has coire
down to us');''r.iberlieferten' ('harided down to us').
 +4 Being and Time Inr.
'logic'. In the course of this history certain distinctive domains of
have come into view and have served as the primary guides for su
problematics: the ego cogitoof Descartes,the subject, the "I", r
spirit, person. But these all remain uninterrogated as to their Being
its structure, in accordance with the thoroughgoing way in which
question of Being has been neglected.It is rather the case that the ca
gorial content of the traditional ontology has been carried over to t
entities with corresponding formalizations and purely negative
tions, or else dialectic has been called in for the purpose of Interpreti
the substantiality of the subject ontologically.
If the question of Being is to have its own history made tra
then this hardened tradition must be loosenedup, and the
which it has brought aboutr must be dissolved.We understand this
as one in which by taking tlu questionof Bcing as our clue,we are to
the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those
ordial experiencesin which we achievedour first ways of determining
nature of Being-the ways which have guided us ever since.
In thus demonstrating the origin of our basic ontological concepts
an investigation in which their 'birth certificate' is displayed, we
nothing to do with a vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints.
this destruction is just as far from having the negatiuesenseof shaking
the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positi
possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within
limits; these in turn are given factically in the way the question is
mulated at the time, and in the way the possiblefield for investigation
thus bounded off. On its negative side, this destruction does not r
itself towards the past; its criticism is aimed at'today'and at the
23 way of treating the history of ontology, whether it is headed
doxography, towards intellectual history, or towards a history of
But to bury the past in nullity fNichtigkeit] is not the purpose of
destruction; its aim is positiae; its negative function remains u
and indirect.
The destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound up
the way the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only wi
such aformulation. In the frameworkof our treatise.whichaimsat
out that question in principle, we can carry out this destruction only
regard to stagesof that history which are in principle decisive.
In line with the positive tendencies of this destruction, we must
the first instance raise the question whether and to what extent
t '. .. d9t durch sie gczeitigten Verdeckungen.' The verb 'zeitigen' will appear
-.
qucntly in later chapters. See H. 3o4 and our note ad loc.
INT. JI Being and Time 45
Interpretation of Being and the phenomenon of time have been brought
together thematically in the course of the history of ontology, and whether
fre problematic of Temporality required for this has ever been worked
eut in principle or ever could have been. The first and only person who
has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of
femporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of
g6ephenomena themselves is Kant. Only when we have established the
problematic of Temporality, can we succeed in casting light on the
obs",rrity of his doctrine of the schematism. But this will also show us
uhy this area is one which had to remain closed off to him in its real
dimensionsand its central ontological function. Kant himself was aware
'This schematism of our
that he was venturing into an area of obscurity:
understanding as regards appearances and their mere form is an art
hidden in the depths of the human soul, the true devices of which are
hardly ever to be divined from Nature and laid uncovered before our
eyes.'iHere Kant shrinks back, as it were, in the face of something which
must be brought to light as a theme and a principle if the expression
"Being" is to have any demonstrable meaning. In the end, those very
phenomena which will be exhibited under the heading of 'Temporality'
in our analysis, are precisely those zosl couertjudgments of the 'common
reason'for which Kant says it is the 'businessof philosophers' to provide
an analytic.
In pursuing this task of destruction with the problematic ofTemporality
asour clue, we shall try to Interpret the chapter on the schematism and
the Kantian doctrine of time, taking that chapter as our point of depar- 24
ture. At the same time we shall show why Kant could never achieve an
insight into the problematic of Temporality. There were two things that
stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem
of Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology
with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a
preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject. Instead
of this, Kant took over Descartes' position quite dogmatically, notwith-
standing all the essential respects in which he had gone beyond him.
rurthermore, in spite of the fact that he was bringing the phenomenon
ot time back into the subject again, his analysis of it remained oriented
towards the traditional wav in which time had been ordinarilv under-
st^ood;in the long run this iept him from working out the pherro-erron
ol a 'transcendental determination of time' in its own structure and func-
lion. B..ur-,r. of this double effect of tradition the decisive connzction
Detween
ilme and the 'I think' was shrouded in utter darkness: it did not
evenbecome
a problem.
 46 Being and Tinui
In taking over Descartes,ontological rt Being and Timt +7
position Kant made an l'tt' :.the question of Being. In other words, in our processof destruc-
omission: he failed to provide u.,
ol.rrotoif-of Dur.irr. This omi,
a decisive onein thespirit
tn'' Sj"".t;it.;;;;;ilil:ll
eel"i n"a ourselvesfaced with the task of Interpreting the basis of the
With the ,cogitosum,b.r"u.t., fr"a don-i orrtotogy in the light of the problematic of Temporality. When
.f"j*J- that he- was putting
sophy onaa new
sophv on new and
and firm
f,rm footing.
r^^+i-- n"t
n--- r . i {l-'"i' aon", it will be manifest that the'world' ancient way of interpreting the
*rrutrr.il-;#."fi.r$ or 'Nature' in the widest
began in this ,radical' way, was 4 - ^f .ntities is oriented towards the
the kind of belongs Wl'"! 'time'
rescopitanr.
cogitaru,or-more
or-m^rF precisely_th.'
n--^i^^r-- !L lti"*--hich *a that it is indeed in terms of that its understanding of
*r;;;- ; ;";;;; ; r;.:nl t-tiLl
i, obtained. The outward evidence for this (though of course it is
ontotogicalfou'ndationsof the,cogito
shall
ffiIt3j:,:ll::td
completeou*oiorrr, at the second unt, o"r*"ra evidence) is the treatment of the meaning of Being as
;il';r;;;;.;:1ffi1 T)ri,
'1,^h"i"
or oiola, which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal terms,
r,i".,y .r o", rnterpretation 'pre-
*:,::.1._:::T:":;r,r,.
not Entities are grasped in their Being as
only prove that Descarteshad io ""'roir". #;,d
iII.r"n""' ["Anwesenheit"].1
to a definite mode
gether;it will alsorh"y *lI he ""g1.";:i;;;:#;
came,.,irpp.r. that the absolute,B ; this means that they are understoodwith regard
certain' ["Gewisssein',l,of1lg,rgiti "lnce, 'Presenl'Z
piJJ rri* from raising the ^itime-the
.rir must take
tion of the meaningofih. n.irrg"*fri"f, The problematic of Greek ontology, like that of any other,
yet Descarte, tfri-."titv oossesses
";,;;i; ;'ffi ;TT'ffi:l'
Dasein itself. In both ordinary and philosophical usage,
:tlT:'j'.'i,,,,o its cluesfrom
status ro1-
u""" Dasein,man's Being, is 'defined' as the (Qov A6yov (yov-as that living
the rescogitans
siaemms dis-
:::o":':::l^t:*1:1"_'::,":tologrcal
animw ['the thing which cog-ni".r, *h.th.,
it be a mind or spirit,J:
it
thingwhose Being is essentiallydetermined by the potentiality for
Atyew is the clue for arriving at those structures of Being which
jlt;..,1t,r asafundommtum ircontwsum, andappriedthemedie courre.s
::Tf:l
ontology to it in carrving through ,rr. r""aurrr.ntar Ire belongto the entities we encounter in addressingourselvesto anything
considerations of
in.-,,,,7gi;.",Jlo*,r, asan ens;and or speakingabout it [im Ansprechen und Besprechen]. (Cf. Section 7 n.)
*!i:!:f::I:9.1*o
medievat ontology the meaning orn.ug Ib;:;;; in Thisis why the ancient ontology as developed by Plato turns into
'dialec-
#;fi;::"t; tic'. As the ontological clue gets Progressively worked out-namely, in
i,:!,^..iod, asercinrnitum,.u,,r,l
'?""Til'Tr:o!ri
i?:
nc::i:::::ot::,"^:' :',^
r ea t u m. But crearedness the 'hermeneutic' of the ldyos-it becomesincreasingly possible to grasp
[Geschrg.."rr.i
something's having breen,produced f theproblem of Being in a more radical fashion. The
'dialectic', which has
irem in
item i- +L^ ^._.-^---l [Hergestelltheit], was an beena genuine philosophical embarrassment, becomes superfluous. That
25 the structure of the ancien,;;;;;ffi.l;"
?r:
Descart
X5n"*"'x':1r*{: "'*r;.1,:#:'i,1llilT.:il1
espropos ed 6. pr,itorophizing
hz
I The noun oriolc is derived from one of the stems used in conjugating the irregular
illrt"."sr1j",TlTl verb elyar. ('to be'): in theAristotelian tradition it is usually translated as'substance',
'being'.
generations though translator"'of Pl.to are more likely to write 'essence', 'existence', or
from makingany themati";r;;;;i Heidigger suggests that oioia is to be thought of as synonymous with. the derivative
,""rrir"'li,ilt_ noun ?oooro7i ('beine-at'. 'presence'). Ai he points out, napovola has a close
"11lri take;; ;;;i." or Beingasa cruez
vr uL'rs ar a clue 'Anwesenheit', which is similarly derived
I"l;-::.:;i,-11
would at the same time
me c.,mc
come r^ --ti-^:,."-
to grips
etymoloeical
from the"stem "o-opotri.n..
with the Ge*..t
'wesan') and a prefix of the place
critically with the traditi of a verb meaning'to be' (Cf. O'H.G'
ancient ontology. or time at which ('an-'), We strill in general translate 'Anwesenheit' as 'presence', and
the participle 'anweseni' as some form of the expression 'have presence'.
Eve?one who is acquainted
., with the middle ages seesthat z'die
"Gcgctwarl"'. While this noun may, like nopovota or
'Anwesenheit', mean the
J .
*.al.val. scholastic"*-
r"a .*ploy, it, tl hesenceof soineone d, some place or on somi occasion, it more often means the present, as
But with this'discoverv'
nothing ir distinguished from the p.stind the future. In its etymological root-structure, however, it
"i:,t::fl,^-"p:rr ""r,i."J irJ;:;"i,H', Tffiil':: \eari a waitinp-towards. Wht:le Heidegger seems to tirink of al I these meanings as somehow

::,y3j,:,r:"ill1.*,*,ir,."#l;;';**X n
ilill'il.:T#T, t1xed,we shall-generally translate thii-noun as'the Present', reserving'in the present'for
influenced thewayin whichposterif;;;,;#;Til:i.i:? the correspondiig adje6tive'gegenw?irtig'.
as'rational animal', on.the
--3The phrase (Qov )tdyov iXor_is^tradition-ally translated
I':j :T^":::i,."1r "nT":,J: or.rnl,^
*);tuns.
rhef,u.*t..,toi lFumpti6r, that iivos refers td the faculty of reason.Heidegger, however, points out that
cannot beestimated until bothth. _.;"i;;;;; itjyos l-J.ii"J
i;v* the same root as ihe
from ih;;;;-;;i;
L derived l;; ihe ,,erb Afierv (it6
verb ,\/ye,r (1o talk',
talk',
'to hold discourse');

ancient ontorogy have been exhibited il ffir:fi: :i h.

r We follow the
, Iater edi
have an anacoluthic ,0"r,dl.t
li
he ie;;ne,'iliJ't';..t,i; *ith ,".a,
irfc.tiG* thic i- rrrrn *iiii . .i' fto-og"i""', 'io
'to be'aware
('tn ronize' 'rh;;j;;i;; of'.'to know'),
he aware of','to know'). and calls
i" i.ti, ofan orientation d,.er attention
to thefacttr,"t *" ,'i,l,i",i;J;iff;T; s,ot *,,*6, ('diilectical')'
(See also H. 165 below.) He thus interprets,\riyos as-'Rede', which we shall.usually
translate as 'disc,"ourse'oi 'talk'. dependine on the context. See Section 7 n below (H.
reading ,det Scinssinndcs,,sum,,,.
The earlier edi 'Rede' will be defined and distinguished both from
9-2ff.) and Sections qa and qs, where
'Sprache' 'Gerede' ('idle talk') (H. r6o tr').
('languag;'j attd ir-om
 48 Bcing and Time Being and Timc
'no JNT,II +9
is wfut Aristotle longer has any understanding' of it, for he has
phenomenonwhich has come down to us. Every subsequentaccount of
on a more radical footing and raised it to a new level [aufhob].
1;4e,including Bergson's,has been essentiallydetermined by it. When we
itself---or rather voeiv, that simple awareness of something
aealysethe Aristotelian conception, it will likewise become clear, as we
26 hand in its sheerpresence-at-hand,lwhich Parmenideshad already qo back, that the Kantian account of time operates within the structures
to guide him in his own interpretation of Being-has the T
i"hi.h A.irtotle has set forth; this means that Kant's basic ontological
structure of a pure 'making-present' of something.2Those entities w
orientation remains that of the Greeks, in spite of all the distinctions which
show themselvesin this and for it, and which are understood as en
arisein a new inquirY.
in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to The question of Being does not achieve its true concretenessuntil we
Present; that is, they are conceived as presence(oioia).s
have carried through the process of destroying the ontological tradition.
Yet the Greeks have managed to interpret Being in this way wi In this way we can fully prove that the question of the meaning of Being
any explicit knowledge of the clues which function here, without is one that we cannot avoid, and we can demonstrate what it means to
acquaintance with the fundamental ontological function of time or 'restating'
talk about this question.
any understanding of it, and without any insight into the reason why In any investigation in this field, where 'the thing itself is deeply
fiunction is possible. On the contrary, they take time itself as one er veiled'lii one must take pains not to overestimate the results. For in
among other entities, and try to grasp it in the structure of its such an inquiry one is constantly compelled to face the possibility
though that way of understanding Being which they have taken as of disclosing an even more primordial and more universal horizon
horizon is one which is itself naively and inexplicitly oriented from which we may draw the answer to the question, "What is
time. 'Being'?" We can discuss such possibilities seriously and with
positive 2 7
Within the framework in which we are about to work out the pri results only if the question of Being has been reawakened and we have
of the question of Being, we cannot present a detailed Temporal I arrived at a field where we can come to terms with it in a way thar can
pretation of the foundations of ancient ontology, particularly not be controlled.
loftiest and purest scientific stage, which is reached in Aristotle. I
we shall give an interpretation of Aristotle's essayon time,ii which \ 7. The PlunomenologicalMetlzod of Inuestigation
be chosen as providing a way of discriminatingthe basis and the li In provisionally characterizing the object which serves as the theme of
ofthe ancient scienceofBeing. our investigation (the Being of entities,or the meaning of Being in general),
Aristotle's essay on time is the first detailed rnterpretation of it seemsthat we have also delineated the method to be employed. The task
l'. , von etwas Vorhandenem in seiner puren Vorhandenheit , . .' The adi of ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities
literally-before the hand'i but^this signification t io"g .i"tE
l,t_._l\1"-d^"::leans
way,to others. In ordinary'German usageit may, for instince, b. ",
stand out in full relief. And the method of ontology remains questionable
th";
goo{s wnrcn_aGealerhas'on hand', or to the 'extant'worksof an"p;li.J6
author; and in in the highest degree as long as we merely consult those ontologies which
philosophical yriltlc jt could, be used, like the word 'Dasein' itselr, as r.
Latin'cxistzntia'. Heidegger,.however,_distinguishes quite sharply bit*.J" "
J"."v- havecome down to us historically, or other essaysof that character. Since the
oL".i",
vornanoennerr-, yllng_th_g.latter to desig'natea kind of Being which belonss to tl term "ontology" is used in this investigation in a sensewhich is formally
othzrthan lJasern. we shall translate-'vorhanden' as 'present-ai-hand', and ,Vorhar
heit'as'presence-at-hand'. The reader must be careiul not to co"lusl tne""'.*pio
broad, any attempt to clarify the method of ontology by tracing its history
with our 'presence' ('Anwesenheit') and .the present' fiai. Cie*;"ri').-;;..';'. rs automatically ruled out.
rew _otherverbs and adjectives which we may find it convenienito transiate bv ,p
,.'. ...^des reinen."Gegenwartigens" ,gegenw:irtigen'', ^wt 'v When, moreover, we use the term "ontology", we are not talking about
,. i,': :, ;d"l ::mel."c.ege.nwartigens".vonvon etwas'. verb ,gegenw:irtieen".
etwas'. The verb
cr_enved trom. the adJectlve'gegenwiirtig', is not a normal Germinlerb, bu-t was ur
some definite philosophical discipline standing in interconnection with
Husserl and is used extensivCly by Heidigger. While we shall translate i; il;";i;; the others. Here one does not have to measure up to the tasks of some
of 'make present',.it does not necessarilf mean ruq4rr .making
rrl4f,tng pty.icaffy-fie"i,"t,,-;;
pnystcalty pfesent,, but
means something like 'bringing vividly to mind'. discipline that has been presented beforehand; on the contrary, only in
''Das seiende, das sich--in ihm ftr es zeigt
und das ars das eigentriche se terms of the objective necessitiesof definite questions and the kind of
verstanden wird, erhzilt demnach seine Auslegung in Rticksichr ?"LC.s*-
d'h. es ist als Anwesenheit (orioda) begriffen.' r"fr9.iypt,."au."-.i.c.g."--*1;r treatment which the 'things themselves' require, can one develop such a
attention to the structure of this word ii a way which tinnot u" r.proJ"3J i" discipline.
Seenore
Dcc note 2',p.
2rp.4?,
47, H.-e5 aDove.
!..25
above.The pronounsiihm,
I..he pronouns .rhm,
and ,o' presumably
arrd ,es' pro"^ltiv b;th-;irefer
both
to Aay€Lv,though their relbrence is ambiguous, as our version suggests. With the question of the meaning of Being, our investigation comes up
 h,rr. II JNr. II Being and Timc 5r
Being and Time
5o
rvord itself, which presumably arose in the Wolffian school, is here of
against the fundamental question of philosophy. This is one that must be
'stand'
1le
tieated phenomenological$t.Thus our treatise does not subscribe to a no significance.
'direction'; for phenomenologyis nothing A. The Corueptof Phenomenon
point' or represent any special 'phenomenon'
of either sort, nor can it become so as long as it understandsitself' The The Greek expression$ow6y,evov,to which the term
expression'phenomenology' signifies primarily a methodological
concep- goesback, is derived from the verb $atveo1oe,which signifies "to show
t;oi. fnis expressiondoes not chatactetize the what of the objects of itself". Thus $ou6pr€yolmeans that which showsitself, the manifest [das,
philosophicaf research as subject-matter, but rather the hou of that was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare). $atveo0or itself is a
i"r.ur"h. The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out niddle-uoicedform which comes frorn $aivat-to bring to the light of
and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on which a day,to put in the light. @o/vcocomes from the stem {a-, like {6s, the
scienceis to be conducted, all the more primordially is it rooted in the way light, that which is bright-in other words, that wherein something can
we come to terms with the things themselves,r and the farther is it becomemanifest, visible in itself. Thuswe must keepin mind that the expres-
'phenomenoz'signifies that uhich shows itself
removed from what we call "technical devices", though there are many sion in itself, the manifest.
'phenomena'
such deviceseven in the theoretical disciplines' Accordingly the $au6p.evo or are the totality of what lies
,phenomenology' expressesa maxim which can be for- in the light of day or can be brought to the light-what the Greekssome-
Thus the term
28 mulated as'To the things themselves!'It is opposedto all free-floating times identified simply with z<iduzo (entities). Now an entity can show
constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any itself from itself [von ihm selbst her] in many ways, depending in each
conceptionswhich only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed caseon the kind of accesswe have to it. Indeed it is even possiblefor an
as 'problems', often entity to show itself as something which in itself it is zot. When it shows
to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves
itself in this way, it 'looks like something or other' ["sieht" . . . "so aus
for generatio6 uiu time. Yet this maxim, one may rejoin, is abundantly
wie. . ."]. This kind of showing-itselfis what we call "seeming"lScheinenl,
self--evident,and it expresses,moreover, the underlying principle of any
Thus in Greek too the expression $aw6y.evov("phenomenon") signifies
scientific knowledge whatsoever.Why should anything so self-evidentbe
that which looks like something, that which is 'semblant', 'semblance'
taken up explicitly in giving a title to a branch of research? In point
'self-evidence'which we should like [das "Scheinbare", der "Schein"]. Qatvdp.evov dya|dv means some-
fact, the issue here is a kind of
thing good which looks like, but 'in actuality' is not, what it gives itself
bring closer to us, so far as it is important to do so in casting light upr
out to be. If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of
the procedure of our treatise. We shall expound only the prelimrna
phenomenon, everything depends on our seeing how what is designated
conception fVorbegriff] of phenomenology'
in the first signification of $ow6p.evov ('phenomenon' as that which shows
Thi--s.*piession has two components: "phenomenon" and "logos"
itself) and what is designatedin the second ('phenomenon' as semblance)
Both of these go back to terms from the Greek: $ov6p.evovand idTos
are structurally interconnected. Only when the meaning of something is
Taken superficially,the term "phenomenology" is formed like "theology"
,.biology;, ,,sociology"-names which may be translated as "science suchthat it makes a pretension ofshowingitself--that is, of being a phenome-
;'science life", "science would maKe
make prphel non---canit show itself al something which it is notl only then caz it
God", "science of lif-e"r "scrence ol society". This
of socrety--' lnrs woulo 'merely
of pfunomena. we shall set forth the preliminary , look lil<e so-and-so'. Y,lhen"$orv6pevousigrrifies 'semblance', the
menology the science
mind in primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already
ception;f phenomenology by characterizing what one has in
'phenomenon' and 'logos', and by establishi tncludedas that upon which the secondsignification is founded. We shall
term's two components, auot the term 'phenomenon' to this positive and primordial signification
the meaning of the name in which these are put togetlur.The history oI $awdpevov,and distinguish t'phenomenon" from
"semblance", which
ts the privative modification
I The appeal to the 'sachen selbst', which Heideg.ger presents as.virtually a slogan of ';phenomenon" as thus defined. But what
ff"rr.rf:. iif,.nomenology, is not easy to translate without giving misleading-impressir botl these terms
iin^i guir..t has in mJird is the'things'that words may be found to signify_when tJ expresshas proxi*ally nothing at all to do with what is
calledan 'appearance',
ari correctly intuited b-v the-right kind of 4y:l'yuyne' (ql' hit.
-[iitiuti,hrngrr,vol.
.i;;fi;J;;t or still lessa 'mere appearance',1
z, part'I, secondedition,F4]9. ,9lS'P: 6') We.havefollowed
"adtpting'the things themselves'. of Plwnor
(9f. his .Tlu..Foundation .*. was man "Erscheinung" oder gar "blosse Erscheinung" nennt.' Though the
'Erscheinung'
fu.f.. i" 'otrn
"j.-' 'a[p.--
pp. ioz-g.) The word'Sache'will, of course, be transla qrce' and the ver6'erscheiien' behave so much life the English
C"-U.iJg., M'^tt.ir943, and 'appear: that the ensuing discussion presents relatively rew diffiiulties i; this
other uays also.
 52 Being and Time Being and Time 53
This is what one is talking about when one speaksof the ,sv^. V"'^rr"of the fact that'appearing'is never a showing-itselfin the sense
a disease' ["Krankheitserscheinungen"]. Here one has t.lY.""^r""n", appearing is possible only b1 reasonof a showing-itself
i" ;i;d,
occurrencesin the body which show themselvesand whict.-l'r*., of "P"l'.'it^o
of"Pt'.i)ii"n. Sut
But this showing-itself, which helps
showine-itself, which possible the
helps to make possible
'*y",'indicate' 6 *'::;. ii not the appearing itself. Appearing is an annouruing-itselffdas
:i:::':1?:',
thing which does lT'-:i"::g,',1:f J*i"ai,i.,in'
1 ,pYT,lla shows itself. If one then saysthat with
zot show itself. The emergence through something that
[Auftretenl
occurrences, their showing-themselvesr goes together with $c"".);a, iosearance' we allude to something wherein something aPpears
tie
eirl,,, the
present-at-hand of disturbances which do not show tt.*r.lui. U"i"g itself an apPearance, one has not thereby defined
appearance, as the appearance .of something,, does not mean *:':";;
of phinomenon : one has rather presupposed it, This presupposition, 3o
,i
itself; it means rather the announcing-itself by somethi;;-o ::;;;"r, remuins concealedl for when one says this sort of thing about
'^ ' [von]-- 'appear' gets used in two ways' "That
does not show itself, but which announcesitse'." something ?i^,]iurun"r', the expression
r^^- show
does ^L^- - itself.
,r--,r Appearing
a llt1cn 'appears' means that wherein something announces
is a not-showing-itself.But th. ,rrotl-iu -l[i*;"something "
'without
here is by no means to be confused with the privative ,,not,' ,L"ff und therefore does not show itself; and in the words [Rede]
whi ',
used in defining the structure of semblance.rwhat appears do.,
-l itr.ff an "appearance" "appearance" signifies the showing-itself'
itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, i, also something., essentially to the 'wherein' in which some-
i* ifrt, showing-itself belongs
can never s e e m .2 All indications, presentations, symptoms, and "li"n announcesitself.According to this, phenomena are neaeraPpeam'oces'
Jy thing
have this basic formal structure of appearing, even itto"gh th.f is dependent on phenomena.
,to,f,n o" the other hand every appearance 'appearance'
among themselves. iioni a.nn.r "phenomenon" with the aid of a conception of
'critique'
respect for the translator,_the,passage-shows
*t i.tt ir still unclear, then everything is stood on its head, and a
some signs.ofhasty construction, and
comrnents
Tay pe helpful. We arelold several timJs that,appearance,and,,phl
of phenomenology on this basis is surely a remarkable undertaking.
to
," be sharply
slTpty 'appearance' itself can have a double signifi-
j:.""'l^,"i:
l?f
distinguished;
drstrngu,shed; yet we are also
also reminded
remind!'d that
th;lii.,.;.is;;
there is i sen, so ugui.r the expression
whtch,"T: :,9
they cornctde, and e_venthis senseseems to be twofold,_tho"gt it is not
Heidegger is.fully aware of this. The whole discussion rs based aL cation: first, appearing,in the senseof announcing-itself, as not-showing-
'showing' upon two further di:
Il"-T:,j1.,^1'.'Ii"iJ:i
' bringing folh' ('hervor ('zeigen') u"a ,"""o,ir,"ing;-tiilJiilrif itself;and next, that which does the announcing [das Meldende selbst]-
l_..y.:n
bringen,), ir,.' airil".,i.;;-. ;;; j'" )'?r,"i iiilT'
itself' ('dasSichzeigende') ,does
""a.
oi wli,ich the un"ou".ing,(,d"i M.il;;i;;i; that which in its showing-itself indicates something which does not show
'gers brought
'gets 'lu;"-"rlril
brought.forthr
.forthj (,dai HerrorgebraJ,.;i, ,l, ."J
('da; Hervorgebracht that which ,annomca i
."Ji"'liyj--ih.i;i"h itsef, And finally one can use "appearing" as a term for the genuine
('das sichmeldende') or which does the bringing-fo.tfi. H.ia.gf.;1. trr#]ff.
duce the followingsenses of 'Erscheinung' ,Zfi..r""".', t i senseof ,,phenomenon" as showing-itself. If one designates these three
r..
T-,.P.^":I",lt"^_.y::l2l1,:""h
",
as a slmptoiiwhich^announces a diseasex by sho different things as 'appearance', bewilderment is unavoidable'
or, throirghwhichx ;"";";"; itseli*itr,."irr,.*id 'appear-
.r D_. J:::.]l:.11
S S n o \ v l n Ig - t t s e l t ;
ffi d But this bewilderment is essentially increased by the fact that
2. x's announcing-itselfin or throughT; ance'can take on still another signification. That which does the announc-
ga. the,'mere appearance'2 which x may bringJorth when
real nature can neaerbe made manifest;
r is of such a kind ing-that which, in its showing-itself, indicates something non-manifest-
is,the balas_foilhof a .mereappearance,in may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and
_jl:_,1^._'i:T_.-1!t.uril.:,,which
tterdegger makes abundantly
which emanates [ausstrahlt] from it in such a way indeed that the non-
nelqegger makes abunclantly clear
clear that sens6 ce'iis the
that sense ttre nrnhFr
p.op." ...rid.f,;pp;;;;;",
cahca ^f.^^--^-- ,
that sensesqa and qb are the proper,an.a, ofl-a."-uppa..u.ra.,.
On H...ro and gr
to-ir.,.
iii-.".aii"I"".Tiii".pr.Iii.,l,i.fi,,i'i*
:?"T.."9::.,1,-1,j.i,".^L!_:_"^1,:ln."i. manifest Sets thought of as something that is essentially ncaermanifest.
i;',x1::,:,:i1*'":J,'if
::ilx',ii;;**o.;;d;;;-*,i';;;;;;"i;.,i;;;d" When tha-t which loes the announcing is taken this way, "appearance"
is tantamount to a "bringing forth" or "something brought forth", but
r '. . als welches es die Struktur des scheins bestimmt.' (The order editions
the 'es'.) somethingwhich doesnoimake up the real Being of what brings it forth:
-.z.'was sich in der'weise,nicht zeigt, wie
das Erscheinende, kann auch nieschein here we iurr. ut appearance in the sense of 'mere appearance" That
is ambiguous, ,au,
but presrimably E.."ii.i"""d.; a;l;;i";;;";;
llf o"".."9t..t,
t:.:q: *
p,.5r,.noto.u1l.Thereadershouldnoticethat our standardlziJtan which doesth. u..ro.rt"i.rg and is brought forth does,of course,show itselll
:91
tion of 'scheinen'as'seem'iJone which here becomes,.tt., -irt.aairre-,;; th, and in such a way that, as an emanation of what it announces, it keeps
:i'j:"Y$*Hllnn*3:lt":".j11",^.
and'erscheinen'.
f{eideseer'se11t9,*".*:*S;;
i."ai.*ffii.r,i"'i!,-il.'.i'.iil#i
u" i'Ji.ti"E-ir,"t *i;;il;'tililTil,i"Lry
this very thing constantly veiled in itself. On the other hand, this not-
'does
theT.which'shows itseifj or showing which"rr.il, is noi a semblance. Kant usesthe term "appearance"
the announci-ng', not by the r which .annou'
through.,2, even though c"r-u''
:::,f^::,..:
so sharply. "rilJ-JBJ,
not differentiate these verbs qr in this-twofold way. According to him "appearances" are, in the first
 Being and Timc Being and Time 55
understood and as accompanying it in every case, can' even
'P=)i
i, thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to
So"lir".tf, and what thus showsitself in itself (the 'forms of the intuition')
s"",'i"
fio'-'" .t- .(^hennmcnet'
th" "phenomena" nf of phenomenology.
nhennrn".r.r'iao.r- For
For manifestly
manifestlv snace and
space and

Yj. ^"t, be able to show themselves in this way-they must be able to

In so far as a phenomenon is constitutive
for ,appearance, in Y).n*, phenomena-if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental
':T:::::::jy:':'-T:::ql::T.:li"c*rii"r,.r'"*,iu.r[ tl
in the facts when he says that space is the a piori
*'ff
sucha phenomenoncan privative'iy take ,fr. ir..i"",
ffi;;
lrrri"n -qii:d:d
of an ordering. r
appearancetoo can becomemeresemblance. frrside-which"
-If.
rn a certainkini ho*"u.t, the phenomenological conception of phenomenon is
someone can look as if his cheekswere flushed with
red;;-;. r^ be understood at all, regardless of how much closer we may come
3r which shows itself can be taken as an announcement
of the Beino-, the nature of that which shows itself, this presupposes
at-hand of a fever, which in turn indicat., i determining
,;;;rr;;;;'"-; that we must have an insight into the meaning of the formal
organism. inevitably
legitimate employment in an
" Phenomenon",the showing-itself-in-itserf, signifies a conception of phenomenon and its
distinctive r ordirrary signification.-But before setting uP our preliminary con-
which something can be encountered.r ,,Appeafance,,,
on the othel ception of phenomenology, we must also define the signification of
means a reference-relationship which i
, i., an entity itsel42 ani li7os so as to make clear in what sense phenomenology can be a 'science
is such that what doesthereiferring(or the
announcing) can fulfil its r of'phenomenaat all.
function onlv if it showsitserf in ltserf and ir th;z
b#;-;"f,
a. Tlu Corceptof tlu Logos 32
:i&.:T::^i.:d;;rnblance.arefounrreduponthepr,."o-..,or,,-t-i_
different ways. The bewildering ,ph.rro_.rru;
multiplicity of L. In Plato and Aristotle the concept of the l<iyos has many competing
by th-ewords "phenomenon", ,,simblanca,,,;iuppaarance,,,..mere
significations, with no basic signification positively taking the lead. In
ance", cannot be disentangled unless
the concept of the phenom fact, however, this is only a semblance, which will maintain itself as long
understood li.om the beginning as that
which shows itsetf in itself. asour Interpretation is unable to grasp the basic signification properly in
If in taking the conceot of ,,phenomenon,,
-..phenomena,,, this way, we t.ulr.i its primary content. If we say that the basic signification of ).i7os is
which entities we consider as
and leave it open- "discourse"rs then this word-for-word translation will not be validated
what shor+'s itself is an entity o, ,ath.r ro*.
which an until we have determined what is meant by "discourse" itself. The real
t.t*:,,1.:.*..ll"i merely "hur."teristic
arrivedat theiformat signification of "discourse", which is obvious enough, gets constantly
l?:".::i1_t1
tion of "phenomenon". rf by ,,thattwhich'Jows ct
itself,, we unders coveredup by the later history of the word A6yos,and especially by the
those entities which are accessiblethrough
the empirical ,,intuition numerousand arbitrary Interpretations which subsequent philosophy has
let us say,Kant'ssense, then ,h.;;;.i.l;;dffi;',,o;:;H; provided.A6yos gets'translated' (and this means that it is always getting
b3 legitimatelyemployea.rn tli. usage.,phenomenon,, interpreted)as "reason",'Judgment"r "concept"r "definition"r "ground",
:']t signification
the :9::1 of the ordinary of phenomenon. But or "relationship".t But how can'discourse'be so susceptibleof modifica-
"orr".ptlo.,
tr,..pr,.,,o*.".i"gi""r
::l*:r"::::l^,:i": ".,: conception.
rf we tion that }dTos can signify all the things we have listed, and in good
within the horizonof the Kantia" pr.b;;;:;;;;i# scholarly usage? Even if ldTos is understood in the senseof "assertion",
of what is conceived p.henomenologically
;iJ
as a,,ph-enomenon,, but of "assertion" as Judgment', this seemingly legitimate translation may
reservationsas to other differences;
fo'. *.'*uy;.ri;;;';;;;;r; still miss the fundamental signification, especially if 'Judgment" is con-
already shows itself in the appea;".
.r;;l;r to the ,.phenomenon ceivedin a sensetaken over from some contemporary 'theory ofjudgment'.
_
I'.. . eineausgezeichnett zl<iyosdoes not mean "judgment", and it certainly does not mean this
'begegn-n,, noun,'Begegnis'is
the
"'; verb in nore2.o. zo.H..f+t1.i,-."'- - *derived
*nr.n trujf.Hl.l"ltL":::tyi'3e
.''"::.i...T:iilXalTi'." drscussed
im Seienilen ,.ttL-t . .-],'it".,."U I Cf. Citiqw of Pure ReasotP,'Transcendental Aesthetic', Section I , p' 34'
.
tifi:"H,:lti"Ttt:?,,:.ff
whrch we shall rran.ror- ^"1:1.":lF:b.:"g
,nflii,*jn::*nlgiru;,"*,m,S*fr 2 On liyos,'Rede', etc., seenote 3,P. 47, H. z5 above.
3'. . . Vernunft, IJrteil, BegriS Definition, Grund, Verhaltnis"
 56 Being ane
Dcrng and Time
I ??ne II Being and Time 57
Irtt. INT. 'Being
primarily-if one understandsby ,,judgment,, they must be discoaered.lSimilarly, false' (,1'ei6eo0a,")
a way of ,binding, son rhat is,
thing with something or th; ,;ril; to deceiving in the senseof couering up : putting some-
of a stand,
- (whether ^rorn,. laerdeckenf
acceptance or .else, \'r^rv!r
by rejection). in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen)and thereby
it;ng
as "discourse,'_,means rather it off as something which it is nol.
^!:l^": the same as 64iodz: to oassing
'
manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse.r Aristotle gut because 'truth' has this meaning, and because the )<i7os is a
explicated this function of discourse tr<iyosis just zol the kind of
more precisery as drro$atveo( defiiite mode of letting something be seen, the 'locus'
The )<iyos lets something be seen that can be considered as the primary of truth. It as has
16ot ro/,or!,namely, what thl thing
does so either;fr2 the one who is doing become quite customary nowadays, one defines "truth" as something that
:,"rlry*:::r"T1l,
(the medium) the ta
or for personswho are ,.r*"f *i f, ;;;;;#.;: ,rcally' pertains to judgment,2 and if one then invokes the support of
may be. Discourse.letssomethirrg ;: ;:':
b. ,.Jr, dn6 . ..: that ir,l;i;" Aristotle with this thesis, not only is this unjustified, but, above all, the
seesomethingfrom the very thi;g-;;i;
,i."0i"""^1":rtt;:":l Greekconception of truth has been misunderstood.Ato1qois, the sheer
*1.": it i", g.,,;i,,., what is said 'true' in the Greek sense,a;rd indeed
[eoasgere sensoryperception of something, is
1,,"::'::..!:"*:!:.:"
istl is drawn ifromwhatthetalk i, ubo";;;;;;;;;;"##;",-::n pore primordially than the )<i7os which we have been discussing.Just
in what it says[in ihrem Gesagten],
rnut., rn"rrifestwhat it is talk as seeing aims at colours, any oio|qor"s aims at its i6lo (those entities
about, and thusmakes
thisaclersi-br.
t. tr,.^lr'i*';i,.i] ilir'ii which are genuinely accessible only throughit and for it); and to that
as dnigavots.
This modeof makinsman extent this perception is always true. This means that seeing always
iff:::tj,n.^_-1ft
in the senseof lettins somethingbe seen discovers colours, and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure voeiv is
b, ;;;;',r'.11, lt.Il;,
Requesting (eiyfi),for instance,
'//' 'vr 'rJLa'LL' the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities
::,:,* T1., it'9j*.".se'.
manifest, but in a different
alsorrl
4r)u ma
wav. as such may possess,and it perceives them just by looking at them.s
j-.1_111.l.oiscoursing (letting
somethingbe seen)has This voe?vis what is 'true' in the purest and most primordial senselthat
ch aracter of speakin
",Y*:"l'lt g.[Spr.t..,r11_i;il.ffi is to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such away that it can never
33 )ir.": fo $avri, and, indeed, ,;.".ir"""rijjlol],
'6,o_ootor_.un
S-r)1 prrd. coverup. Thisyoe?ycan never cover up; it can never be false; it can at
which something is sighted ;., t' utterance
.".f,'"i..* worst remain a non-perceiuing, d,yvoeiv,not sufficing for straightforward
Ano only because the function and appropriate access.
of the )d)ros as dtrd\avots lies
blRoin,i"s;;;;;, canthe )<i),os
have When something no longer takes the form ofjust letting something be 34
i::,,m:f:iT"t_1s;en seen,but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so
that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-
occurrences where the.,problem,arises ;";il:;;;";r, structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up.r The
"'f Trt;; 'truth
somethingo,','J"i'.",side. ofjudgments', however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up,
li:lg"]::i:lii::'yi:h
purely apophanticat significatio" Here the auzhas
;; a secondary phenomenon of truth, with more than oru kind of fomdation,E
;;;, Ietting something be
in.its togetherness Both realism and idealism have-with equal thoroughness-missed the
fBeisammenlwith *;.rht;letting it be seen as s
thing. meaning of the Greek conception of truth, in terms of which only the
Furthermore, because the A6yos r The 'tr"th'
is a letting_something_be_seen, Greek words for (i d)tilero, zti dl/ds) are compounded of the
'!;'"*:"2:::::,:3::: it ivative prefix ti_
P-rivative--orefixa- ('notl;
(.not') a"J
and ttri
the"ver6al stem -,\c0-
_,\"0_ i,to
('to escape
escapd notice',
.to
'to
be
ofanyconception *.: :*.r*"*
:,"t*hi.i;;"#ffi;ffi:"ffTffi:::l a.o."o, onoursteering
r concealed'). The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is un-concealed, that
oftruth wllch gets discovered or uncovered ('entdeckt').
'Wenn

IH $:};,|T-1.^fl:i',,r,. p.i'"^i;"6* theconcept

I man . . . Wahrheit als das iestimmt, was "eigentlich" dem Urteil zukommt. . .'
ordArj
:i "' ;;,;:j:;-#;:"T:',",,i'
:'. . . das schlicht hinsehende Vernehmen der eiifachsten Seinsbestimmungen dcs
16'
T:r"i;n:,'il:'Jl,::' ^!f,J
o{ whichone is talking must
oetenden
"
,-.
als solchen.'
1'W^ nicht mehr die Vollzugsform des reinen Sehenlassenshat, sondetn je im Auf-
weisen auf ein anderes rekurriert-und
hiddenness;
onemust
hi.t,r^--^-^ . ^_ _ ,:s
r.tIr,.*ue;;;;.-f#il;i,'Jil:Tiffi:j be taken out of tl so je etwas dk etwas sehen liisst, das iibemimmt mit
di.ser Sytrtiresirsi*-li* ai. Vfogtichteit"aes Verdeckens.'
o '. . . 'secondary' or 'founded'
-, ein tmchrfach
t&tat tw,a IJundizttzsnhanomen
urauwwJ rtr4ltottlcll von
vurr Wahrheit.' A
notion of iFundierung'
l :.: :;*::il,T,fii'*l?.#J:i"'t3j:,y9.'.die ist,
Rede,,
Phenomenonis
Pqenomenon
Phenomenon
one which
is oie
orie wliich is based
one which
wliich based upon something else.
something
upon somethi The notion
else. The
'Fundierung' is
fr'om Husserl. S"eeour note l, p. 86, on H. 59 bel6w.
Heidegger has taken over from
Heideeger
i
 5B Being and Timc
possibility of something like a ,doctrine Bcing and Tirnc 59
of ideas, can
V'.
philosophical knowledge. -* of their respective sciencesaccording to the subject-matter which 'Phe-
And becausethe function of
the )<i7oslies in merelv &Je""n eprise at the time [in ihrer jeweiligen Sachhaltigkeit].
"--t^*'
6tl"nology'
6cf obiect of its researches,
neither designates the object researches.nor charac-
L:,::.:;;l,3,,,li,"iiti,'i.'il,'Jniiir,X";,nf;::i:,,}l,H:
A6yoscansignifythereason.[Vernunft].'ind;':;::',T:r..1ll flll.tn" subject-matter thus comprised.Theword merelyinforms us of
used not only with the siglificaril;;;j W::hnn" with which what is to be treated in this science gets exhibited
35
yew but also
Aey'p,evov(that-,t;^L
Aeyduevo, /thrt whichi, ^--L:r .. r
:^ .;ibit;;;; - with '!^in1rrl.To have a science'of'phenomena means to grasp its objects
nothing else than the thoxelp,evr;;;;:'i
il;;"il;ri:.tT *. "-,,n
ts^Present-at-hand, o ,ol that everything about them which is up for discussionmust be
ties
lies at
at the
the bouom fzum
bottomfzum p;;; r
cn,,,Jo1nr--..--^--
;,.;, :.rJffi :i:*,ff l^\t d by exhibiting it directly and demonsrating it directly.l The
"?ro:l.i""; lrrsion'descriptive phenomenology',which is at bottom tautological,
lm':::: )dZ o):::,,::l:!ii':"
because s as Aey6F,evou^can+il;Gound, theratio.Andnn
also .ig"ili, ;;".;; ill th. same meaning. Ffere "description" does not signtfy such a pro-
L;:;,r:::
oneself,u."o*.r;;:tH. in itr relatio., to frup utwe find, let us say, in botanical morphology; the term has rather
its'relatednerr,,;t;;"";;i;::il;::r::Y:r:;:;;:::;i;:;
l"t*Xgesses
,h, ,.nr. of a
prohibition-the avoidance of characterizing anything
such demonstration. The character of this description itself,
,r};Lt*:n
the
j_lT"
primary function of:f,,.topr,."ii'J-al,
urs
e,maysuftceto J without
tn. U7rr. ge specific meaning of the ),&yos, can be established first of all in
'thinghood' 'described'-that
tcrmsof the ["Sachheit"] of what is to be
C. Tlu preliminary Conception phznomcnologt isto say, of what is to be given scientific definiteness as we encounter it
of
*hat w. harre ohenomenally.The signification of "phenomenon", as conceived both
tion of 'phenomenon, ,logos,,
Y5:^f-::1.:s€,concre.tely
and
ret forth in our Ir
;. ;;;;;;"k formallyand in the ordinary maruler, is such that any exhibiting ol an
;;.T il"".:..:li;
*.it
-formu-tated'i"
ui tr,.".1..rr.'in. entityas it shows itself in itse[ may be called "phenomenology" with
ology"
|;S:::,ll"*:
may be expression,,Dhen formaljustification.
c.;;-;; ;r;'Jfit?:1;,_3i;
Now what must be taken into account if the formal conception of
)ygaw
rd ;:,,,:::::T?!:
6p.eva-tolet:.' ".twhi"r,
":. Th*' ;;;;;.".rogv', means dzod, phenomenonis to be deformalized into the phenomenological one, and
that rr,..,"itir.iiu.
r:::il"_T:ffi"il:*: howis this latter to be distinguished from the ordinary conception? What
l?*"# iil ;;;... meaning orthatb, isit that phenomenology is to 'let us see'? What is it that must be called
of research *;,j::f calls*i::,.rr.
which itself.,pheno;;;i;;: " ;;,T:TT: :::i a 'phenomenon' in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence
""iqli,:i:.*:.,1.,:::16:**l;il:/ve:.rothethingsthe
Thus theterm..phenoT.r*sy,l is ruussarifuthe theme whenever we exhibit solnething cxplicitQ? Mani-
r, q"". a"rr."il;ilT?:.H:i
such ,,theologr,,
expressions as .ira irrl-frl. frro.. t.r*, H;;i.
festly,it is something that proximally and for the most part does aol show
itselfat all: it is something that lies hiiden, in contrast to that which
is.here pointing
uner.bA€v€.v'which has i*o""lr" our
..^lFSlO"tt"1 that the word ^o7os
i,,J;:,:-*_1:ig
,\tir rs e-tymologically akin
to
proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same titne it
jfiii?.'*:til,T,'llo-svet'(4'"sz't)in;irtw,,,a
X',k''f:##-i:!iiir,!;'# 'q A(vew can be thought
u somethingthat belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so

:'fiij;;"f',H;'J
arso mean rd Aeydlteov i*{:t:ylftt
*hi"h;;k;;;lo7os esentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground.
ff "ttiy*:t''^s,,bin:I:!I!e;*,:*-#?idiiJ$,f;
jilti#:,ffi**:q,*Xr+*i*$:*,l,*,giffi
;,ffi
llgglBerose"r,eii;l;iil'lq
r exhibitedor told-it is extribited
*"r lfz:t i;;;;ri.;;*", (
Yet that which remains hiddn in an egregious sense,or which relapses
andgets cooncdup again, or which shows itself only 'in disguise',is not just
thisentity or that,but rather the Beingof entities, as our previous observa-
tions have shown. This Being can be covered up so extensively that it
relationo. ihutio#rip-ffi,H + Aevdpoa
correspond
tothree
sei..*^;:l:1,+l*^."C
.yi.r,rilKri5l"fr,!,T,?l1,ij3f.*1"::::::l its meaning.
;fi6i'-13'l'.#::';fff,,ii'::,iiii:?;b:ltijTil'5i1,:"lY::i:::?,|:::,9TTtri llcomes forgotten and no quistion arises about it or about
g#"*,tr**T*{5.r#::*rill!':i!iiJ:s*,:.:"s.,iffi
Jffi:l"i'"#
rhus that which demands that it become a phenomenon, and which
dernandsthis in a distinctive senseand in terms of its ownmost content as

;a*atg**;j#*l*uti$*ut'flffi a thing, is what phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically
as its object.
r . . . itr direltcr Aufwcfuungund direkterAruwcinug . . .'
 6o Being and Time
Beingand Time Ut
Phenomenology is our way of accessto what is IJ
to be the ',
Ilr' . -, r :-- -,^ ,
^.."i, r possibility that it may degenerateif communicated in the form
ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative t'l'.i
precisio
phenominotog2,isonnkeio::;;t,i;;";';ffi urr"taion. It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed
J#jilr,iji'.,1'i1;J: thesis.
"phenomenon" what one has in mind as that whiclishows il"i"rl"g its indigenous character, and becoming a free-floating
irr.iii, the concrete work of phenomenology itself there lurks the pos-
Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and il,"n i" 'within our grasp' may become
derivatives.l And luiiru ti.rutr.t,hathas been primordially
showing-itselfis not just any showing_itself,nor is
it some such thi. of this
36 appearing. Least of all can the Being of entities ever lirl.i,.a so that we can ,ro long.. grasp it. And the difficulty
'behind be anything suci lies in making it self-critical in a positive sense'
i.l,a ..r.utch
it' standssomething else ,which does not appear,. n'Th.of
'Behind'
the phenomena of phenomenologythere i, essentially *.uy in u,hich Being and its structuresare encounteredin the mode
objects
else; on the other hand, what is to become a"phenomenon ^f ohenomenon is one which must first of all be urestedfrom the
can be Thus the very point of departure lAusgang] for our
And just becausethe phenomena are proximally
and for the most ig pt."o*."ology.
notgiven, there is need for phenomenology. Covered_up_ness requires that it be secured by the proper method, just as much as
,nuiyri,
is the cou
concept to'phenomenon'. Jo.r'orr. access l,(ugang] to the phenomenon, or our passagelDurchgang)
There are various ways in which phenomena can ttrorgr, whatever is prevalently covering it up. The idea of grasping and 37
be covered up. In 'original' and 'intuitive'
first place, a phenomenon can be iovered up explicating phenomena in a way which is
in the sensethat it is is directly opposed to the naiaeti of a
quite undiscouered. It is neither known nor unknown.2 Moreove f,,originziren" und "intuitiven"]
phenomenon can be buriedouer iaphazard.,'immediate',and unreflective'beholding" ["Schauen"]'
luerschtlttetl.This means that it has at s
time been discoveredbut has deteriorated ilow that we have delimited our preliminary concePtion of pheno-
fverfiel] to the point oi5 'plunomenal'and pltenomenological' can also be fixed in
covered up again. This covering_up can become menology,the terms
complete; or rather
25 4 lgls-1vhat has been discovered earrier may still be their signification. That which is given and explicable in the way the
visible, 'phenomenal'; this is what we have
u t.T?Ju":.: Yet so much semblance, so phenomenonis encounteredis called
:-"]yrt much ,Being,.3 This
as a 'disguising'
is both the most frequent and the .riost darrger, in mind when we talk about "phenomenal structures". Everything which
i"S-yp beiongsto the specresof exhibiting and explicating and which goes to
for here the possibilities of deceiving ,rrd
misleading are esp-eci make up the way of conceiving demanded by this research, is called
stubborn. Within a ,system,, p..hup{ thore
structrr..s- ;.; 'phenomenological'.
their concepts-which are still availabre "f
but ve'ed i" irr.ir-i"ai
-f..ri'' Because phenomena, as understood phenomenologically, are never
character, may claim their rights. For rvhen
,n.y f,.". anything but what goes to make up Being, while Being is in every case
together constructively in a system, they present
'"]?.', themselves as som the Being of some entity, we must first bring forward the entities them-
requiring no further justification, and thus
can serve as the selvesif it is our aim that Beirrg should be laid bare; and we must do this
ofdeparture for a processofdeduction.
in the right way. These entities must likewise show themselves with the
The covering-up itsel{ whether in the sense
of hiddenness,br kind of accesswhich genuinely belongs to them. And in this way the
over, or disguise, has in turn two possibilities.
There u.. ordinary conception of phenomenon becomes phenomenologically rele-
which are accidentar; there are arso ,ome "orr..i
which are ,r."arru.y, g vant. If our analysis is to be authentic, its aim is such that the prior task
in-what the thing discovered consistsin
[der Bestandart des Entd of assuring ourselves 'phenomenologically' of that entity which is to serve
Whenever a phenomenological concept i.
d.u*., from primordial as our example, has already been prescribed as our point ofdeparture.
t
, lDg.
phiinomenologische phd.nomen
Begriff von With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the scienceof the
d"" t i."-d;;^;;il.,i 5i,iil'i.i"" Modifikationen mr sichzeigende
das
Being of entities---ontology. In explaining the tasks of ontology we found
2 'uber seinen d:|i,":[.gas
Bestand sibt es weder ""d
5."*T:;; Unkenntnis/ Th-e earlier edi it necessarvthat there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its
presents
i::.:"1*:*::ll-"*,1g,"-,,1^._ll:.. o"i, r,uu.'iri"i1"","i,,. rhe word,Bestand, ar
difficurties
inHeidesger; r,.'.-it p..-ii;i#;:i illT,Iill,J,,T,lill,nliil theme thai entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in
have deliberately
steeredbeti"een: 'wrr.tii..
t'r,.i. ,, ui'y",r.r, thing, is neither'known
unknown', and 'what it comprisesir .o.".tiiing" grder to confront the cardinal problem-the question of the meaning of
nor ignorance.' or**nr"n we have neither knowre,
Being in general. Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of
3 'Wieviel Schein jedoch,
Phenomenologicaldescription as a method lies in intnpretation.The )tdyos
 Irr. II Being and Titu 63
Being and Time
'movement'
doesnot lie in its actualit2as a philosophical ["Richtung"].
Tligher than actuality stands possibilitl. We can understand phenomeno-
logy only by seizing upon it as a possibility."
'inelegance' of expression in the
With regard to the awkwardness and
designatesthis bt analysesto come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report
the primordial signification of this word, where it
But to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of in which we tell about mtities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. 39
oi lrrt"rpr"ting.
structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit the hor: For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the
and the basic ,grarr,lmar'.If we may allude to some earlier researcherson the analysis
ontological study of those entities which do not have
fo. .ry further
of Dasein, this hermeneutic also becomesa'hermeneutic' in o1B.ing, incomparable on their own level, we may compare the onto-
"hu.rct", ofany ol logical sections of Plato's Parmenidesor the fourth chapter of the seventh
senseof working out the conditions on which the possibility with a narrative section from Thucydides;
depends. And finally, to the extent that Dase book of Aristotle's Metaphltszcs
loeical investigation
the possibility of existence, has ontological priority we can then seethe altogether unprecedentedcharacter ofthose formula-
an" entity with
tions which were imposed upon the Greeks by their philosophers.And
otl"t entity, "hermeneutic", as an interpretation of Dasein\ B
3B "rr"ryih" third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiali where our powers are essentially weaker, and where moreover the area
hu,
primarlt' of Being to be disclosed is ontologically far more difficult than that which
existence; and this is the sensewhich is philosophically
works out Dasein's historicality ontologicall was presented to the Greeks, the harshnessof our expression will be
far as this hermeneutic
possibility of historiology, it contains enhanced,and so will the minutenessof detail with which our concepts
the ontical condition for the
in a derivative sense: are formed,
roots of what can be called'hermeneutic'only
methodology of those humane sciences which are historiologica
character. f1B. Designof tlu Treatise
of r The question of the meaning of Being is the most universal and the
Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no classor genus
'universality'- is to be s.ought emptiestof questions,but at the same time it is possibleto individualize
yet it fertains to every entity. fts
iro. n"i"g and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and r it very precisely for any particular Dasein. If we are to arrive at the basic
e!:{is.tlu t conceptof 'Being' and to outline the ontological conceptions which it
possible charac-terwhich an entity may Possess. ! .t' :." :.t :
Being is distincti requiresand the variations which it necessarilyundergoes, we need a clue
iu* ona simph.LAnd the transcendenceof Dasein's
which is concrete. We shall proceed towards the concept of Being by way
iirt it implies the possibility and the necessityof the most radicalindit
knowlt of an Interpretation of a certain special entity, Dasein, in which we
tion. Every disclosure of Being as the trarucmdmsis transcendental
plunomenological of Being)is aeritas
truth (tlu disclosednzss transcendent shall arrive at the horizon for the understanding of Being and for the
possibility of interpreting it; the universality of the concept of Being is
Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical
oih..t. These terms characterize philosophy.itself, not belied by the relatively 'special' character of our investigation.
ciplines *ottg
But this very entity, Dasein, is in itself 'historical', so that its own-
regard to its object and its way of treating that object' PhiJ
most ontological elucidation necessarily becomes an'historiological'
un-iversal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure
Interpretatioi.
hermeneuiic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existerce,has made
Accordingly our treatment of the question of Being branches out into
the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it two distinct tasks, and our treatise will thus have two parts:
and to which it rcturns.
The following investigation would have have been possibleif the Pail One: the Interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the
had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose Logisclu exptcation
of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of
sadwtgmphenomenology first emerged. Our comments on the prelirr ueing.
of phenomenology have shown that what is essential
"orr""ptiott ,.Patt Two.' basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the
r\tory
r .Sein und Seinsstruktur liegen iiber jedes Seiende and jede m<igliche seiende of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as our clue.
mtheit ein€s Seienden hinaus. .Samist das transundcw schlechthh.'
 64 Being and Timc
Part One has threediuisioru
r. the preparatory fundamental analysisof Dasein;
z. Dasein and temporality; PART ONE
g. time and Being.l
Part Two likewise has threediuisions:t THE INTERPRETATION OF DASEIN IN TERMS
40
r. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary oF TEMPORALITY, AND THE EXPLICATION
a problematic of Temporality; OF TIME AS THE TRANSCENDENTAL
2. the ontological foundation of Descartes, ,cogitosum,, and, HORIZON FOR THE Q,UESTION OF BEING
l11
medieval ontology has been taken over into ihe problematic
'rcscogitaru';

3. Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discr

the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology. DIVISION O}'IE
r Part Two and the third division
of part One have never appeared, PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS
OF DASEIN

Ix the question about the meaning of Being, what is primarily interrog-

atedis thoseentities which have the character of Dasein. The preparatory
existentialanalytic of Dasein must, in accordancewith its peculiar charac-
ter, be expounded in outline, and distinguished from other kinds of
investigationwhich seem to run parallel (Chapter l.) Adhering to the
procedure which we have fixed upon for starting our investigation, we
must lay bare a fundamental structure in Dasein: Being-in-the-world
(Chapter z). In the interpretation of Dasein, this structure is something
'a priori';
it is not pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a
whole.It affords us, however, various ways of looking at the items which
areconstitutive for it. The whole of this structure always comes first; but
if we keep this constantly in view, these items, as phenomena, will be
made to stand out. And thus we shall have as objects for analysis: the
world in its worldhood (Chapter 3), Being-in-the-world as Being-with and
Being-one's-Self(Chapter 4), and Being-in as such (Chapter S). By
analysisof this fundamental structure, the Being of Dasein can be indic-
atedprovisionally. Its existential meaning is care(Chapter 6).